AMISOM`S INFLUENCE TOWARDS PEACEBUILDING IN SOMALIA

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

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CERTIFICATION

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
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DEDICATION

This thesis is respectfully dedicated to the memories of Capt. David Ochuodho and Spte Samson Munene, AMISOM soldiers who died in action in Somalia. For "conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity at the risk of life above and beyond the call of duty" while defending their embattled comrades, these soldiers were decorated posthumously.

ACKNOWLEDGEMNTS

ABSTRACT

Peace support operations have been conducted in the past under the auspice of the UN, regional security mechanisms and even unilaterally. These operations are designed to avert humanitarian complex emergencies in strife-torn nations. There have been military interventions in countries like Haiti, Bosnia, Yugoslavia and Somalia to prevent humanitarian disaster spiraling out of hand. Somalia remains embattled in one of the most vicious conflicts of the century. During collapse of Said Bare`s regime in early 1990s, warlords took over the country as the republic disintegrated into clan controlled segments. Attempts to mount peace support operations have proved fruitless. Operation Restore Hope orchestrated by the UN in 1992 which did not accomplish its mission leading to the deaths of US marines up to date durable peace still remains elusive. AMISOM troops have stayed in the war-torn Horn of Africa country for nearly a decade now, yet Somalia still remains volatile. Indeed, recent successful attacks by the Al Shabaab on AMISOM bases leave many in doubt whether AMISOM is capable of fulfilling its mandate. Guided by the underpinnings of theory of securitization, theory of armed combat and theory of interventionism, the research evaluated the effectiveness of African Union Mission operations influencing peace building in Somalia. It addressed the three specific objectives; to examine the nature of military strategies in relation to peace building in Somalia; to assess contributions of African Union Mission operations towards peace building in Somalia and to evaluate challenges AMISOM face towards peace building. Descriptive research design was used. The target population was 150 key AMISOM personnel, Somalia`s ambassador to Kenya, 800 soldiers, 10 Somalia elders, and 10 Al-shabaab defectors. Based on 10% to 20% sample size for social sciences, 80 soldiers were selected through random sampling for the study whereas 15 personnel from top leadership were selected through purposive sampling. Random sampling was used to select 10 Al-shabaab defectors for study. Purposive sampling was used to select 10 elders for interviewing. In-depth interview was used to collect data from the Somalia Ambassador to Kenya which was predetermined by the virtue of his office. Questionnaires and interviews were administered to the sampled group. Literature was reviewed from books, journals, periodicals, and AU policy and legal documents. The study employed descriptive statistical tools to analyse quantitative data obtained whereas qualitative data were analyzed through qualitative techniques. The results were presented in line with specific objectives in form of chapters. Seventy three percent of the respondents felt that the present nature of military strategies slows down its peace building in Somalia, seventy five percent of the sampled group showed that AMISOM`s contributions towards peace building is yet to be felt by the common Somalis and the study found out that eighty percent of the respondents felt that AMISOM faces certain challenges which makes hard to achieve its mandate. The study recommends that alternative sustainable sources of funding should be established; operations should major on winning the hearts and minds of the locals which is vital in fighting asymmetrical warfare; and AMISOM should enhance capacity building for the National Security Agencies (Somalia National Army, Police Force and National Intelligence Service Agency) as part of exit strategy. The overall conclusion is that AMISOM offers the best platform to stabilize Somalia for durable and sustainable peace for the Somalis.

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AIED: Airborne Improvised Explosive Devices

AFSOL: African Solutions

AMIB: African Union Mission in Burundi

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia

AMMO: Ammunition

APC: Armoured Personnel Carrier

APF: African Peace Fund

ARPCT: Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism

AU: Africa Union

AUPSC: AU Peace Security Council

CIMIC: Civil Military Cooperation

CoG: Centre of Gravity

COIN: Counter Insurgency

ECOWAS: Economic Communities of West African States

EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone

EN: Enemy

EU: European Union

FGS: Federal Government of Somalia

FHQ: Force Headquarters

HoM: Head of Mission

HUMINT: Human Intelligemce

ICISS: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGASOM: Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia

IO: Intergovernmental Organisations

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force

KDF: Kenya Defence Forces

KFOR: Kosovo Forces

MMC: Mobile Military Courts

NATO: Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization

NGO: Non-Governmental Organizations

NFD: Northern Frontier Districts

NFL: No Fly Zone

OLF: Oromo Liberation Front

ONLF: Ogaden National Liberation Front

ONUC: UN Operation in Congo

PKO: Peace keeping operations

PVU: Peoples of Vietnam Army

PSO: Peace Support Operations

QRF: Quick reaction force

R2P: Responsibility to Protect

SFOR: Stabilization Force

SNA: Somalia National Army

SNF: Somalia National Front

SNM: Somalia National Movement

SPM: Somalia Patriotic Movement

SSDF: Somalia Salvation Democratic Front

SYL: Somalia Youth League

TCC: Troop Contributing Countries

TFC: Transitional Federal Charter

TFG: Transitional Federal Government

TFI: Transitional Federal Institutions

UIC: Union of Islamic Court

UN: United Nations

UNICEF: United Nations Children`s Fund

UNITAF: United Nations Task Force

UNOCHA: United Nations for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

UNOSOM: United Nations Operations in Somali

UPDF: Ugandan People`s Defence Forces

USC: United Somalia Congress

DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALIZATION OF CONCEPTS

Al shabaab defector: This is a reintegrated soldier who , formerly, used to be an al shabaab foot soldier or operative.

Buffer Zone: A safe corridor along the border (Kenya- Somalia) which is supposed to be free of any Al shabaab`s activities.

Clan elders: These are respected individuals who are above 60 years of age and represent their respective sub-clan in any gatherings and functions (both formal and informal ones).

Conflict: A situation in which various armed groups in Somalia are fighting to impose their will over one another and take control over the Federal Government of Somalia.

Contact points: These are liaison points amongst the contingents where various AMISOM fighting troops can share any vital information and intelligence.

Defensive position/ Defended localities: These are areas occupied by the AMISOM troops from which they can launch subsequent operations. They include towns, centres and sections of major roads such as Mogadishu and Afmadhow.

Defectors: These are soldiers who have surrendered from Al shabaab and been reintegrated into Somalia National Army.

Enemy: Refers to various militant groups meting terror on the Somalis.

Engagements/ Contact: The actual exchange of fire between the troops and Al shabaab.

Failed states: These are states whose governments are too weak to offer basic public services such as social security and thus cannot discharge their constitutional rights anymore such as Somalia since the collapse of the government around 1991.

Foot soldiers: The ground soldiers who are doing the actual fighting in Somalia.

Force multipliers: These are activities that dramatically increase the effectiveness of AMISOM troops such as morale, technology and geographical features.

Host country: Refers Somalia in which peace support operation is taking place.

Industrial democracy: An arrangement allowing the organization`s members to make decisions, share responsibility and authority.

Key terrain: These are areas, structures or towns that if seized by the al shabaab they will have due advantage over the AMISOM troops.

Military intervention: The mandating of AMISOM troops to employ threat or use of force in Somalia to prevent and end widespread grave violations of the fundamental human rights of the Somalis.

Missions: These are AMISOM military assignments that are meant to neutralize the armed groups thus ending the hostilities.

Operations: These are actions and processes employed by AMISOM to achieve the task of peace building.

Peace: Harmonious existence and lack of hostility.

Peace building: This is the development of positive political relationships across clans, ethnic groups so as to be able to transform the structural conditions that generate conflict.

Peace support operations: These are military operations conducted by AMISOM troops in Somalia. It is aimed at degrading the Al shabaab`s capability.

Theatre of operations: Refers to Somalia where all peace support operations actions take place.

Structural violence: Violence occasioned by corrupt and ineffective institutions in the Somali Government during Said bare`s tenure.

Sustainable peace: This is a long lasting peace that Somalis desire.

Warlords: These are Somali individuals with both civilian and military control over a subnational region due to an armed group who owes him allegiance and loyalty rather than to the government.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the background to the study. It also examines the statement of the problem and research objectives. Justification of the study outlines the importance of this study to the society and its contribution to the academic and policy making bodies. Scope of the study has been underlined. The chapter ends with a summary.

1.1 Background to the study

In the past, alliances and security bodies have been formed for peace and stability within a given region. The Warsaw Pact was formed by the former Soviet Union and its allies to protect its members from any external threat and to ensure peace and prosperity within the region (Ligawa, 2015). Global security changed a lot by the end of the cold war. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, global war between superpowers became less likely (Okoth, 2008). However, a new security situation topped the agenda. Intrastate conflicts intensified. Ritske and Bruijne (2007) posit that smaller high and low-intensity conflicts have erupted, largely with ethnic and religious origins, and occurring overwhelmingly within, rather than between, countries. Intrastate conflict accounts for 95% of current conflicts worldwide. Africa as a continent has been steeped in violent conflicts.

These vicious conflicts are threatening peace and stability of the continent (Ritske and Bruijne, 2007).

Africa has been hit by a wave of conflicts (Okoth, 2008; Woodward, 1996). Lawlessness prevails in the region with failed states like Somalia. Warlords and organized criminal gangs find safe haven in these places. Terrorists find easy passages since the borders are porous (Chumba, 2016; Opon, 2015; Masese, 2016) . Such ungoverned places become training grounds for the armed militia who terrorize the vulnerable population leading to complex humanitarian crises. The Somalia crisis has caused a lot of insecurities in the region (Menkhaus, 2014). Civil war in Somalia has been ongoing since early 1990s.   The most affected ones are countries sharing the same borders like Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya has experienced a series of terrorists' attacks which were planned in the war-torn Somalia. To curb the spillover effects of the lawlessness in Somalia, the Kenyan government was forced to march into Somalia in order to create a buffer zone. Thus there was need for security measures to stabilize Somalia. To avert such crises, the international community and regional organizations called for adequate security frameworks and tools. David (2006) advises that the security threats, balkanization and marginalization have led to the calls for unity and collective solidarity as the *dues ex machina* for the maintenance of continental peace, security and development.

Somalia has been embroiled in protracted conflict since the ousting of President Said Barre in 1991. To this end, there have been various peace support operations

which have been mounted in Somalia. Despite these peace support operations, including the ongoing one by the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), durable peace still remains elusive.

The conflict in Somalia can be traced back to colonial times. Historically, the current Somalia conflict can be drawn back to the 19th century, when Great Britain, Italy, France and Ethiopia divided the Somali-inhabited territories of the Horn into five distinct political jurisdictions (Abdulahi and Henderson, 2007). The territories were the British Somaliland Protectorate (current Somaliland), the Italian Somaliland (Somali Republic), French Somaliland (the present day Republic of Djibouti upon achieving independence in 1977), and the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (Hersi, 2015).

Concerted efforts were made to bring the Somalis under a single national flag. In spite of all these attempts, only two Somali territories succeeded in merging up. British Somaliland became independent in June 26 1960 and Italian Somaliland that achieved independence 4 days later on July 1st 1960. Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland united forming the Republic of Somalia which became under civilian rule till 1969. On 21st Oct 1969 the army took over power in a bloodless coup. Mohamed Siad Barre assumed power in a coup after the assassination of the elected president; he went on to declare Somalia a socialist state and nationalised most of

the economy (Nyambura, 2011). It undertook radical modernization campaigns that brought several transformations in the Somali society; both at cultural level and infrastructure level: health, education and public works projects (Ken, 2014; Menkhaus, 2012; Williams 1996) . Armed domestic opposition to Siyad Barre arose in 1988 in the Northern part of the country. The Somali National Movement (SNM), the United Somali Congress (USC), and the Ogadeni Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) joined forces to fight against Siad Barre's government. In 1990 as Barre began to lose control of the country, the local political and business figures came together to sign the Mogadishu Manifesto, calling for Barre's resignation. Mohammed Siyad Barre fled Somalia in January 27, 1991 and Somalia descended into a state of anarchy. After Barre fled from the country the USC established an interim provisional government, which was headed by provisional President Ali Mahdi Mahammad. As of September 1991, Somalia is effectively under the control of as many as 12 rival clans and sub clans (Hersi, 2015; Kent, 2005)

 While the coup brought short relief, the military regime drove Somalia into long suffering and turmoil. However in 1991, British Somaliland broke from wider Somalia after the fall of Siad Barre's regime. It has undertaken democracy without official recognition or support from the international community (Nyambura, 2011). The failure to incorporate the remaining Somalia-inhabited territories into the new Somali Republic has and continues to have enduring consequences for the peace and security in the Horn of Africa region.

The immediate cause of conflict in Somalia was related to crises in governance. The democratic principles were being enacted at the top level while nepotism, corruption and clan competition were rapidly eroding the underpinnings of Somalia's nascent democratic system. The Political misrule, combined with pervasive corruption, hampered the maturity of administrative institutions and undermined development of the country's embryonic social services network, thereby engendering general disillusionment with the entire system (Scahill, 2013; Shin 2009). The exploitation of clan identity by political opportunists swiftly gave rise to an unwieldy number of clan based political parties (Mukhtar, 2003).

The root cause of the problem can be traced to the rapid marriage of the two Somali territories (North formerly British Somaliland and South formerly under Italian rule) to form the first 'united' state in 1960 (Nyambura, 2011). After the union, Southerners held all major posts in the government. The government programmes failed to tackle the serious problems of underdevelopment and socio-economic stratification in the North inherited from the colonial administration (Adedeji, 1999). The Rehanwein of the Riverine region, who enjoyed an equal number of seats with the two other major clans the Hawiye and Darod prior to unification, were comparatively marginalized, and faced discrimination both in the education and government sectors. This means the war in Somalia began long before the state collapse in 1991 (Patrick, 2011). Table 1.1 shows the major actions that took place in Somalia from 1960 to 1991 when president Siad Barre`s

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government was overthrown. The table explains the events that took place and could

have contributed to the collapse of the state.

Table 1.1 The genesis of Conflict in Somalia from 1960 to 1991

Year	Action
1960	Independence of Somalia and unification of the two regions as the Somalia republic (British Somaliland & Italian Somaliland)
1961	Referendum for the first Somalia constitutions. Osman becomes President and rules for 6 years.
1964	First general election after independence and unity
1967	2nd presidential election, Abdirashid Shermake won against Osman
1969	2nd general election and the polarization of clan parties, 21st October Shermake assassinated by one of his body guards. On 21 October a military coup led by Siad Barre establishes the Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) to govern the republic.
1972	Somali- Soviet agreement
1974	Somalia joins the League of Arab States
1976	Formation of Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP)
1977	Somali National Army defeated in hands of Ethiopians in 1977 during the Ogaden
1979	Referendum for the 2nd Somali constitution
1980	Somalia agrees to give United States access to military port and airfield at Berbera
1981	Formation of Somalia National Movement an Issaq clan based opposition group.
1988	Somali signs a peace treaty with Ethiopia. After the peace treaty the army and air force bombard Hargeisa and Burao, centers of opposition to Barre driving an estimated 300,000 Issaqs into Ethiopia as refugees
1989	United Somali Congress, a Hawiye based opposition is formed and Somali Democratic Movement and Raween opposition group
1990	114 religious leaders, business men and political leaders known as manifestos call for Barre's resignation and a national reconciliation conference to create an interim
1991	Downfall of Mohamed Siad Barre's RegimeThe Issaq dominated SNM announces its secession and declares its independence as the Somaliland Republic

Sources: Researcher`s own compilation. Adopted from Adam & Ford, 1997; and

Mukhtar, 2003

On 26th Jan 1991, Somalis everywhere received news of the flight of the then President Barre with jubilation because they thought that was the end of dictatorial leadership. However, that marked the beginning of a very violent conflict (Nyambura, 2011). When the despotic leader left Mogadishu, warlords took over the government. The hawiye clan under the United Somalia Congress party seized power, but was unable to contain the ensuing chaos and anarchy (Adedeji, 1999). Mogadishu, therefore, became a battle zone. Civilians were forced to flee as the country was engulfed into a civil war. Somalia has been viewed as a lost cause in the international fora. Stupart (2011) argues that Somalia is a veritably a cornucopia of insecurity. Therefore, anarchy in Somalia remains the order of the day.

Due to a combination of drought, civil war and an overabundance of weaponry, Somalia, on the Horn of Africa, was in chaos in 1992. The major cities were in ruins. Over 300,000 had died from war and starvation. More than one million were displaced and living as refugees. Another two million were on the brink of famine (Ihonvbere, 1994). Relief agencies were the first to relay information regarding the humanitarian disaster to the media, who then broadcast the plight of Somalis to the larger world. Ultimately, members of the US Congress were moved to call for Presidential action; Senator Nancy Kassebaum, for example, one of Congress's most respected leaders, urged President Bush to establish a force 'to ensure that food gets to those in need' *(Congressional Quarterly Almanac,* 1992). By early August, both the US House of Representatives and the Senate had passed

resolutions requiring that the President take action *(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1992)*.

Following deaths and sufferings of the vulnerable population, UN Security Council passed a resolution for the deployment of a task force to stabilize Somalia to allow a corridor for humanitarian aid. On 3 December 1992, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 794 authorizing the dispatch of an international military force to conduct relief operations in Somalia (Hesse, 2014). The UN Task Force (UNITAF) composed of nearly over 25000 United StatesForces which were part of 37000-strong UN personnel (Burke, 2002; Hesse, 2014). The mission was dubbed operation Restore Hope Mission. These forces were meant to ensure the safe delivery of food aid and humanitarian assistance through a parallel United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014).

With the intervention of the United Nations in Somalia in the early 1990s having been a colossal failure in terms of conflict prevention and resolution, precious little effort has been made other than World Food Programme shipments being transported regularly through the pirate-infested waters (Hesse, 2014). Since the UN's departure in 1995 following the failure of UNOSOM I and II, Somalia has suffered virtually constant civil war at the hands of several clan warlords vying for their own segment of power in the region.

The collapse of Siad Barre's regime at the hands of rebels in 1991 effectively signalled the beginning of the end of any semblance of stability in Somalia (Lennox, 2008). However, by the time UNOSOM II was authorised by the Secretary- General in order to ensure the distribution of food aid and disarmament measures throughout Somalia as a whole, Aideed-a warlord, was ultimately responsible for refusing to accept negotiations, preferring instead to continue hostilities against political rivals and UN forces in general.

With an independent American Ranger and Quick Reaction Force (QRF) operating within Somalia independently in order to detain Aideed himself and his staff, the Blackhawk Down disaster of 3 October 1993 ultimately precipitated an international crisis. When militia forces paraded dismembered American bodies through the streets of Mogadishu, the televised message that hit home had far-reaching consequences. What was initially an unknown UN-sanctioned attempt at feeding and stabilising a starving nation amid a civil war resulted in a tremendous outcry from Americans back home at the witnessing of such graphic violence against their countrymen (Feaver, 1998). What subsequently resulted were the withdrawal of US forces from the region and the breakdown of the UN humanitarian mission surrounding it. On 26 March 1994 the last US troops boarded helicopters and amphibious vehicles and left Somali soil. One hundred thousand US soldiers had rotated through the country over the course of 15 months. Thirty had died, with 26 having been killed in combat. One hundred and seventy five had been seriously

wounded (Lorch, 1994). Somalia was left in the hands of warlords until AMISOM troops were deployed in 2007. Union of Islamic Court was the major armed group controlling the larger part of Somalia.

When a full Ethiopian military invasion came, it pushed the Union of Islamic Courts out of power. In January 2007, then, this paved the way for the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to set foot in Mogadishu for the first time since its inception - but only under the protection of upwards of 8000 Ethiopian forces (Hesse, 2014). Subsequently, Ethiopian forces withdrew westward and the first remnants of the UN- and AU-blessed African Union force, AMISOM, stepped into the breach.

The Security Council authorized the Member States of the African Union to maintain the deployment of AMISOM, as set out in paragraph 1 of resolution 2093 (2013) until 30 November 2015, in line with the Security Council's request to the African Union for a maximum level of 22,126 troops (AUPSC, 2007; AUPSC, 2008a). Currently the military component is made up of troops drawn from Uganda, Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia who are deployed in six sectors covering south and central Somalia. Ugandan troops are deployed in Sector 1, which comprises the regions of Banadir, and Lower Shabelle. Kenyan forces are responsible for Sector 2 comprising Lower and Middle Jubba. Sector 3 comprising Bay and Bakool as well as Gedo (Sub Sector 3) comes under Ethiopian command.

Djiboutian forces are in charge of Sector 4 which covers Hiiraan and Galgaduud while Burundian forces are in charge of Sector 5 which covers the Middle Shabelle region (Hesse, 2014).

Figure 1.1: Map of Somalia showing various sectors

Source: Conflict Monitor 2018

Since the arrival of African Union forces in Somalia, their main enemy has been al-Shabaab. Originally the militia for the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), al-Shabaab

has now morphed into a force of its own whose leaders have variously called for: a 'Greater Somalia' incorporating into Somalia parts of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti where large numbers of ethnic Somalis reside (109th Congress, 2014); pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda (Lister, 2013); endorsed global jihad (Lister, 2013); and praised terrorist attacks both inside Somalia and beyond. A partial list of some of al-Shabaab's more high-profile terror attacks includes: coordinated suicide-bombings in Hargeisa, Somaliland and Bosaso, Puntland in October 2008; at least 40 were killed, the targets being local government offices, a UN compound and the Ethiopian consulate (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2008);a suicide-bombing of a university graduation ceremony in Mogadishu in December 2009; at least 19 were killed, the targets being Somali Transitional Federal Government officials in attendance of the ceremony (Pflanz, 2009) and suicide bombing of Hotel in September 2015 in Mogadishu killing scores of Jazeera Palace hotel residents(Mohamed, 2015).

The recent developments show that the AMISOM troops are getting overwhelmed by the Al shabaab. The defensive positions of some troops have been overrun by the terror group. Ugandan combat team stationed in Janaale suffered heavy casualty. At least 50 soldiers were killed and another 50 are still missing in action (Omar, 2016). In the same month, both Burundian and Ugandan forces were also overrun resulting into scores of deaths on the AMISOM`s side. The Kenya Defence Forces` (KDF) defended locality at El Ade in Gedo region was breached by the armed militia

group. There were 63 fatalities and scores of soldiers being injured. It seems the AMISOM could not do immediate evacuation resulting into more deaths (Omar, 2016).

According to Mohamed (2015) Al shabaab recaptured three towns under the watch of AMISOM`s troops. These towns include: Bugda, El Salundi and Kuntuwarey. Troops in whichever kind of warfare, are supposed to hold the ground (towns, centres and cities) captured from the enemy. They are not supposed to cede any inch of the captured ground. Soldiers only abandon the towns captured when they lack the capacity to hold it anymore. From those increased enemy activities in Somalia, it seems that the troops are not able to effectively conduct peace support operations. This present study thus focuses on why the assurance of AMISOM troops on peace and security in Somalia remains uncertain.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Violent conflicts continue to unfold fresh gridlocks for peace support operations not limited to; unpredictable cost of wars (Bellamy, 2011; Hesse, 2014); uncertainty in ending protracted intrastate conflicts in the post-cold war periods (Reno, 2011) and the ever changing face of asymmetrical warfare (David, 2006). The urgency of a solutions based approach to such impasses occasioned in peace support operations is real, especially at a time when UN, regional security mechanisms and the

international community are grappling with the actualities of human cost and material support in peace building schedules. Given that Somalia`s unending violent conflict threatens regional peace and stability (Menkaus, 2014), and that previous interventions for Somali wars failed to yield durable peace (Stupart, 2011), the question of whether or not current mounted peace support operations will live up to expected scorecard performances to deliver sustainable peace is imperative.

Somalia's war spillover effects are already being felt in the neighbouring countries. Conflict has ravaged the country since early 1991 with the collapse of the Said Barre`s regime (former president of Somalia before its collapse). Wanton destruction of property and human cost of this vicious conflict remains one of the worst conflicts of the century (Menkhaus, 2014). UN Security Council passed a resolution for deployment of AU troops for peace support operations. The first AMISOM contingent from Uganda arrived in 2007. Presently, there are four more contingents from different states; Kenya, Djibouti, Burundi and Ethiopia. Security situation remains fragile despite the presence of `Green-helmets` on the ground. There have been a series of suicide bomb attacks in Mogadishu with the most recent one at a five star hotel (Omar, 2016) leading to fatalities. Al shabaab has been able to conduct successful operations against these troops. They have been able to overrun their military camps forcing the AMISOM troops to collapse and abandon their defensive positions. This includes the recent al shabaab attack on Kenya Defence Forces`(KDF) base in El Ade which led to the deaths of around 63 soldiers

(Omar, 2016). Consequently, the terror group has been able to seize some of the tightly held towns and centres from the troops. The armed militia group is gaining momentum against the troops` combined efforts to pacify Somalia and degrade their (alshabaab) capability. Peace support operations have not been able to achieve their mandates and as a result, durable peace remains elusive in most parts of the host countries. It is in this context that the study evaluated the effectiveness of AMISOM`s influence towards peace building in Somalia.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General objective

The general objective of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of AMISOM`s influence towards peace building in Somalia.

1.3.2 Specific objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

i. Examine the nature of military strategies in relation to peace building in Somalia.

ii. Assess contributions of AMISOM towards peace building in Somalia.

iii. Evaluate challenges AMISOM face in influencing peace building in Somalia.

1.4 Research questions

The study was guided by the following primary questions:

i. How is the nature of military strategies in relation to peace building in Somalia?

ii. What are the AMISOM`s contributions towards peace building in Somalia?

iii. What are the challenges that AMISOM faces in influencing peace building in Somalia?

1.5 Justification of the study

1.5.2 Academic justification

Even though a number of studies analyse actions of peace support operations (Choedon, 2010, on UN peace building in Kosovo; Hesse, 2014 on US intervention in Somalia; and Likoti, 2007, on unilateral(Rwanda's) intervention in DRC rows), very few, if any take the perspective of peace support actions coordinated by regional blocs. Thus the current crisis in Somalia with peace support troops drawn from within the regional bloc provides a fertile ground for an inquiry on influences of mounted interventions on durable peace. Such an inquiry will further provide a practical basis to advance insights on African Solutions (AfSol) mantra advocated for by Bah (2009) and Touray (2005), who counter the idea of using "borrowed fists" to solve Africa's security challenges; and (Williams, 2012) who explains that Africa is best suited to handle its own conflicts, given that no one else understands better Africa's terrain, demographics and region at large.

Regional peace and security seems to be at a threat. With the increase of terrorists' activities, most terrorist groups find the Horn of Africa a safe haven for them (World Bank, 2011). As al shabaab strengthens its grip on Somalia government and

territory, a lot more needs to be done to find out the impacts of these military interventions in the war-torn Somalia. This scenario suggests that without a practical framework, a deep understanding of peace support operations in such failed states will continue to lack clarity. This study, therefore, seeks to contribute new knowledge on making peace support operations relatively more effective and giving in-depth understanding of conduct of peace support operations.

1.5.1 Policy justification

The predatory violence threatens to render the failed state of Somalia ungovernable. Somalia remains ranked as one of the most 'failed states' (Hesse, 2014). Various peace support operations have been mounted in the past. The UNOSOM I and II did not yield any fruit leaving the Somalis at the mercy of war lords. These interventions are yet to provide the way forward for the Somalis. The study will be quite insightful to the regional security mechanisms and various international organizations dealing with peace and security of their respective regions. AU and AMISOM will find the study handy in improving their peace support operations. Peace support operations were first initiated by the UN in 1993. Two decades later, fresh operations were launched but progress remains much in doubt. Menkhaus (2014) notes that building of state institutional capacity seems to be too slow if not, none at all. Contemporary efforts should not follow the previously failed peace enforcement.

1.6 Scope of the study

The study focused on operations of the peace support troops. The fact that the AMISOM troops are present in Somalia yet peace still remains elusive. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) sits in Mogadishu yet they are holed up within the heavily fortified military barrack of Force Headquarters (FHQ). The peace enforcement force is grappling with the fact that the rate of enemy attrition on them is quite high. Mogadishu remains volatile with sporadic exchange of fire and most of the larger parts of Somalia. The study was conducted in Mogadishu where the Head of mission, Chief administrator, the Force Commander and other key elements sit. The Special Representative to the Chairperson of AU Commission (SRCC) has his office here. The soldiers from all contingents are found here. All the troop contributing countries have their representatives based in Mogadishu. This sector lies within the area of responsibility of the Ugandan People`s Defence Forces (UPDF) which is Sector 1. The study covered the period beginning from 1990 to present. According to Reno (2011) this period marked the end of cold war and it saw emergence of intrastate conflicts. (By 1990, the then president of Somalia started losing control over the government with the whole country descending into anarchy by 1991 (Nyambura, 2011). The period has also seen various peace support operations (UNOSOM I, UNOSOM II and currently AMISOM) being mounted in order to stabilize the failed state of Somalia. The researcher took one year to conduct research.

The scope covered the actors in the Somalia conflict. FGS is one of the actors. The government controls few district in Central Somalia and Capital Mogadishu. It`s still unable to defeat the militant groups. Al Shabaab is the major hardline group fighting the government. It`s backed by Hizbul Islam which is fighting along to topple the Western-backed Government. AMISOM is a foreign actor. It is has been mandated with subduing the armed militants, stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia.

1.7 Summary

Violent conflict in Somalia threatens the security of the region. Spillover effects are being felt in the neighbouring countries. Somalia succumbed to anarchic state when the former president Said Barre could not run the government. Politics of warlord emerged as a result of vacuum created by the absence of central authority. Violence escalated necessitating deployment of an intervention force by the UN and the international community. The first intervention was not successful prompting the withdrawal of the US marine soldiers. Two decade later, an intervention force has been deployed under the auspice of AMISOM. However, peace and security remains beyond reach to many Somalis. The next chapter focuses on literature review which gives more scholarly insights thus underpinning the need for the study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter focuses on literature and past studies done on peace support operations. It examines various military interventions launched in Somalia and other failed states. It gives an in-depth analysis, synthesis and evaluation of information sources to get insight of the problem under investigation. Conceptual framework assessed the justification of intervention missions and how such tasks ought to be conducted. Finally, the gaps to the study were explored and tethered to the objectives of study. The chapter ends with a summary.

2.1 Nature of military strategies

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) has been involved in various military interventions. The military organization was involved in peace support operations in Bosnia which helped in signing of Dayton Accords in Bosnia (Williams, 2012). It has been able to use various operations such as relief effort, counter-insurgency, enforcing no-fly zones and naval blockades. Peace support operations (PSOs) have become the most important means for the international community to intervene in conflict-ridden areas. These operations draw both civilian and military capabilities. Their primary aim is creating political change in these areas by reducing the level of violence and addressing the deep roots of structural violence to end the conflict (Onditi, 2015). The NATO`s

operation through military strategies was a success. However, in Libya, NATO`s PSO brought a lot of instabilities which has left the country with a very weak central authority (Opon, 2015). Gaddafi`s oppressive regime was brought down but it left a void that was not filled up. And soon armed militant groups took control of most of the districts (Williams, 2012). After the NATO`s military action, Libya`s new government has not been able to secure Libya against the insecurities brought about by various jihadist groups.

Since the end of the cold war, most conflicts around the world have been intrastate ones that occur in weakened and failed states where political systems no longer function by exercising effective sovereignty and can no longer ensure a monopoly over the organized use of force (Reno, 2011). These are often states where local politics takes place under the patronage or backing of different militias serving a diversity of interests including economic ones (Kaldor, 2001). In such situations conflict often escalates and local violence travels across state borders to endanger regional or even global stability and security. The Somalia insecurity is currently threatening the region`s stability as it presents a good platform for training terrorists. In such contexts, change implies transforming local social and political orders.

The complexity and risk of intrastate conflicts and their potential to become interlocking conflicts (Krisberg, 1980) defined as having geo-strategic meaning—such as Somalia, Iraq, or the Balkans—very often bring about the involvement of forceful Western intervention by the professional militaries of the industrial democracies . According to

Szayna *et al* (2009) military intervention is seen as necessary to stabilize the operational arena and to lower the level of violence so that the police and civilian components of a mission can operate. A peace-related mission that is sent to an arena marked by violent conflict and that does not include a robust professional military force is doomed to failure (Szayna *et al*, 2009). More widely, the past twenty years have seen the development of new international norms that define what is legitimately accepted by state actors. Colonomos (2006) states that global discourse on human rights and humanitarian intervention (developed by intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and other actors now encompasses a set of norms, rules, and expectations defining the criteria for proper use of military force and provides the very basis for justifying and legitimizing many military interventions. The global norms derived from human rights facilitate intervention in Third World countries to minimize and resolve suffering and poverty resulting in the frequent use of mobilizing concepts as human security.

Since the beginning of the 1990s scholarly authorities and pundits have emphasized the development of advanced technology and argued about the advent of safe, clean wars (Kobi and Eyal, 2011). Indeed, the very emphasis on missile defense, space assets, precision weaponry, and information technology in the views of many authorities idealized a very certain type of warfare, (Smith, 2000), armed struggles that would be accurate and distanced and therefore almost bloodless (Friedman and Friedman, 1997). These features of ''future wars'' were closely related to the heightened casualty aversion in the industrial democracies. However, in contrast to this technology-driven view,

numerous researchers consistently contended that after the Gulf War of the 1990s contemporary conflicts actually comprise ''messy,'' local wars in which ground forces continue to be of prime importance.

AMISOM has been able to deploy artilleries and mortars in the peace support operations. Thus, if anything, there is a growing consensus among scholars that in the ''future'' battlefield many of the classic features of warfare on the ground—leadership, group cohesion, the ability to withstand stress—will continue to be essential (Riper and Robbert, 1997). Indeed, then American imbroglio in Iraq and the Al-Aqsa Intifada in Israel-Palestine attest to the continued importance of ground force (Eyal *et al*, 2010). Kaldor (2001) claims that current-day conflicts stem from changes to the Westphalian order of states. Concretely, these conflicts are dispersed in place and time in accordance with the principles of guerrilla warfare because it is often unclear where front and rear are and who are the warriors on the ''battlefield'' and who the supporters are at ''home'' (Munkler, 2005).

 Local groups in such conflict arenas become targets for the military because they provide aid and pools for recruiting enemy combatants. In such situations peaceful activities exist side by side with terror attacks and humanitarian operations take place in the shadow of armed struggle. Moreover, fighting is not restricted to relatively isolated sectors but may flare up anywhere and anytime and as a consequence conflicts ''have neither an

identifiable beginning nor a clearly definable end.'' Munkler (2005) stresses that war among the people, however, is nonlinear, is complex, is over hearts and minds, and is about creating conditions for political solutions. Wars among the people may take different forms as in Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Kosovo, and Palestine, but all of these struggles have significant commonalities such as malleable objectives, unclear boundaries among the tactical, strategic, political, and military levels, an emphasis on force protection (and not only mission accomplishment), and asymmetrical relations between nonstate and state actors.

Recent military doctrines have been modified to include such subjects as CIMIC (civil-military cooperation), humanitarian projects, and the increasing importance of civilian and political aspects of missions. Soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan now understand the importance of reconstruction and assistance, and U.S. defense budgets have been reoriented toward funding counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations, language and cultural training for civil affairs officers, and embedding diplomats within military commands (Munkler, 2005). AMISOM borrows this model in trying to win the hearts and minds of Somalis. CIMIC remains a force multiplier as it reduces hostilities and bad blood from locals who perceive interveners as an occupation force.

The construction of the AMISOM support structure has been both unwieldy and complex. AMISOM peace support operations are geared towards stabilization of Somalia. It was initiated in 2007 with the first troops coming from the Ugandan

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Government. With four more troop contributing countries: Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Burundi, it has a relative large force. Initially, Sierra Leone had troops but were pulled out due to the Ebola crisis back at home. The support architecture developed for AMISOM is both extensive and complex. Several partners contribute, the largest donors being the UN, EU and United States (UNCHA, 2008).

International support to AMISOM can be divided into the following categories: Institutional capacity-building and technical support to AU headquarters for planning and managing AMISOM. The UN provides a logistical support package similar to that supplied to the UN's own operations. The use of the UN's own resources for a regional operation has been controversial and has required a creative interpretation of UN legal codes, as well as the establishment of a special UN office at AMISOM with the authority to use UN resources; and voluntary financial and other support to the AU and troop contributors (Wiklund, 2015).

The EU has contributed extensively to the management of AMISOM, particularly with regard to troop allowances, through resources from the EU's African Peace Facility. Bilateral partners support troop-contributing countries primarily in terms of strategic air support, training, equipment and troop sustenance. The major bilateral donors are the United States, Algeria and the United Kingdom. The AMISOM troops have stayed in Somalia for nearly a decade now and soldiers are known to suffer from mission creep when they overstay in a mission. Nyambura (2011) submits that productivity of interveners decrease, with overstay of the mission as seen in Iraq and elsewhere.

2.2 Contributions of peace support operations

Some of the peace support operations have been able to bring about a stable government as seen by NATO`s intervention in Bosnia (Williams, 2012). The United Nation`s Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) was able to subdue the M23 Militia Group which was wrecking vicious conflict in North Kivu District of Democratic Republic of Congo (Omar, 2016). It carried out an offensive operation that neutralize and disarm groups which were deemed to be a threat to the state authority and civilian security. In support of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade... either unilaterally or jointly with the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities (Onditi, 2015). Hermann and Kegley (1996: 440) maintain that foreign military intervention is "arguably the most fre-quent type of military force in use and under debate today." Reno (2011) postulates that as major wars have declined in frequency over recent decades and the efficacy of costly and time-consuming economic sanctions is questioned, foreign military intervention

seems to have become a *sine qua non* of modern statecraft. Military intervention being a popular policy tool is potentially more risky and costly than non-military strategies.

Interventions in support of the government are likely to bolster the political and military capacity of the target regime. The external intervention will likely be perceived, especially among the regime's constituency and average citizens, as a strong "signal" of support from the international community for the government. This will broaden the political legitimacy and credibility of the ruling elites and enhance the regime's ties with its supporters (Gurr, 1988). The existence of strong support among its constituency and general public helps the regime effectively recruit supporters and extract political and material resources to augment its coercive power. Interventions on behalf of the regime also boost the military capacity of the state, shifting the balance of military power in favor of the government over key rival groups (Touval and Zartman 2001; Reagan 2000). Military capacity is essential for the state to monopolize coercive power and political authority to effectively maintain the political order in the society. AMISOM has been supporting the FGS so that it can be capable of running its daily affairs. The SNA is undergoing training as part of the exit strategy for the mission. They should take over the national security of the country.

Deployment of AMISOM was authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC). The deployment of the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) on 19 January 2007, for an initial period of six months, had the following mandates: provide support for

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the TFIs (Transitional Federal Institutions) in their efforts towards stabilisation of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation; facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance; and create conducive conditions for long-term stabilisation, reconstruction and development in Somalia. On 20 February 2007, the UN Security Council adopted SC Resolution 1744, which further legitimised AMISOM's deployment. The UN is supporting AMISOM through an assistance cell to the AU in Addis Ababa primarily with the provision of military planners. The UN Security Council met with the AU Peace and Security Council on 16 June 2007 and discussed the modalities for deeper collaboration. In particular, both bodies discussed the importance of stabilising Somalia (Murithi, 2012).

AMISOM was officially launched in March 2007 with 1 700 Ugandan troops. Burundi also deployed 2000 troops to bolster AMISOM. Towards the end of 2008, Nigeria pledged to deploy additional troops to buttress the Ugandan presence. Ghana and Malawi have also pledged to deploy troops to AMISOM, but this has not yet materialised, and AMISOM is yet to reach its authorised strength of nine battalions. The PSC decision indicated that 'the concept of logistic support for AMISOM shall be based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB)' (AU PSC 2007: para 9). This effectively meant that the AU Commission would 'mobilize logistical support for the (Troop Contributing Countries) TCC's, as well as, funding from AU member states and partners to ensure that TCC's are reimbursed for the costs incurred in the course of their deployment, based on AU practice' (AU PSC 2007: para. 9).

AMISOM initially attempted to stabilise parts of Mogadishu and Baidoa in which it established its operations. AMISOM also sought to create the security conditions to enable the complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia. AMISOM further attempted to support national dialogue and reconciliation. The European Union (EU) initially supported the deployment of AMISOM with 15 million Euros as well as providing planning assistance to several potential troop-contributing countries and logistical support for the AU military cell in Addis Ababa. Ethiopia invaded Somalia in 2006 with a view to buttressing the support for the fledgling Transitional Federal Institutions. This only inspired local armed militia to emerge to confront this perceived occupation, which further fuelled instability and heightened the level of instability in the country. In January 2009, Ethiopia withdrew its 3 000 troops from Somalia. In addition, in December 2008, President Abdullahi Yusuf resigned, stating that Somalia had been overrun by armed militia and that he could not legitimately exercise power or control, which are key attributes for a state that claims to have sovereignty over a particular territory. The multifarious groupings of insurgents have effectively assumed control of most of southern Somalia outside the capital Mogadishu and Baidoa, where the parliament sits.

AMISOM troops have therefore been essentially restricted to their barracks and were unable to effectuate any significant transformation in the country in the absence of political consensus among the warring factions on how to reconstitute Somalia. A communique issued by the AU Peace and Security Council at its 163rd meeting held at a ministerial level, on 22 December 2008, condemned 'all acts of violence perpetrated

against civilians and humanitarian workers, in violation of international humanitarian law, as well as attacks on AMISOM personnel and positions' (AU PSC 2008b: para. 9). In the intervening period, the AU PSC has continued to review the AMISOM rules of engagement with a view to enhancing its response mechanisms, so as to ensure the safety of its personnel, equipment, key installations as well as provide effective support to the TFG. On 22 May 2009, the AU PSC 'condemned the aggression perpetrated against the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the civilian population of Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia by armed groups, including foreign elements, bent on undermining the peace and reconciliation process as well as regional stability' (AU PSC 2009: para. 3). The AU PSC also requested the UN Security Council to impose 'a no fly zone and blockade of seaports, to prevent entry of foreign elements into Somalia' and 'to impose sanctions against all those foreign actors, both within and outside the region, especially Eritrea, providing support to the armed groups' (AU PSC 2009: para. 5). The country today remains on a precarious footing with no central sovereign authority or the local will and means to consolidate any form of authority.

Currently, the AMISOM troops have managed to push Al shabaabs out of the major towns. However, they are still in charge of the rural areas. Major towns and centres are in control of AMISOM troops. Security situation remains volatile due to frequent terrorist attacks on civilian high value targets and raids on the AMISOM bases. Fighting counterinsurgency, and stabilization and reconstruction require a lot of planning, cordinations and logistical backups. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) for its part has created an Office of Military Affairs. While not as advanced as

the Americans, the U.K. forces have also in the past few years established a unit specializing in stabilization skills (USAID, 2006). More generally, the establishment and work of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams headed by a variety of countries, which ''have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan, strengthening provincial and district-level institutions and empowering local leaders who support the central government,'' is another sign of recent developments (USAID, 2006). AMISOM is appealing for more funds to aid the FGS in the forthcoming election (Mutambo, 2016). These are some of the stabilization efforts being run by the mission to strengthen the central government. Under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), AMISOM has the obligation to prevent, contain conflicts and rebuild Somalia for it to achieve sustainable peace and development.

2.2.1 The development of the concept of military intervention

In the aftermath of the devastating Westphalia wars in Europe (1618-1648), military intervention in intrastate conflicts was seen as violating the fundamental norm of the Westphalian treaties, which state that "war is not waged against a sovereign state which has not itself militarily attacked another sovereign state" (Nathan, 2009). As notes Banta (2008), these interventions were seen as contrary to international rules. More fundamentally, the doctrine of humanitarian intervention has strong roots in the moral war theory of Just War (*bellum justum*).

In the development of the Just War theory, St. Augustine (354-430BC) argued that "the justness of action could be judged without evaluating the driving intention, so also with the state action of going to war'' (Likoti, 2007). War must be waged by a competent authority and there must be a just cause for that war, so that those who were invaded must deserve to have been attacked. Therefore Just cause for war could be found in self-defence; restoration of peace; assistance of neighbours against attack and, most notably, defence of the poor and the oppressed. Massingham (2009) says the defence of innocent people, no matter where in the world, would be a just cause. This line of argument anticipated the findings of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which identified six criteria for military intervention that conform to the UN Charter and the Security Council Articles. These were: just cause, right authority, right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects.

In applying his concept of natural law in the sphere of international law, Brownlie (1963) states that if a tyrant practices atrocities towards his subjects, which no just man can approve, the right of human social connexion is not cut off in such a case. It would not follow that others may not take up arms for them. The state's sovereignty exists only as long as it does not violate the rights of its citizens, but once it pursues practices that outrage other human beings beyond the state, other countries have a legitimate right to intervene. This intervention will therefore be just. Cilliers (2008) argues sovereignty does not legitimize violation of human rights and denial of humanitarian assistance. Therefore, intervention was only accepted by the international community when it was based on humanitarian grounds.

During the early part of the 19th century at least in four instances, European countries cited humanitarian claims to influence the Balkan policy in such a manner that would have required these countries to use force in the Greek war for independence (1821-1827); During the Lebanon/Syria conflict in 1860-1861; in the Bulgarian agitation of 1876-1878 and in response to the Armenian massacres (1894-1917). While full scale military intervention did not take place in all these cases, the evolution and policy influence of humanitarian claim was set. (Barry & Woever, 2003).

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, in his 2000 report to the Millennium Assembly, challenged the international community to try to forge consensus, once and for all, around the basic questions of principle and the process involved: when should intervention occur, under whose authority, and how. It was in this spirit that the Canadian government established The Independent International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (DFID, 2005). Both reports establish a conceptual framework upon which humanitarian intervention may take place and defines boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate interventions. Both reports therefore, form the basis of how interventions should be perceived as both legitimate and illegitimate by the international community.

The report among other issues argues that, the so-called "right of humanitarian intervention" has been one of the most controversial foreign policy issues of the last decade-both when intervention has happened, as in Kosovo, and when it has failed to happen, as in Rwanda (Cutts, 1998). The report`s central theme is the idea of "The

Responsibility to Protect." Sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe - from mass murder and rape, from starvation - but when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states. The supplementary volume of the Commission's report is itself an important contribution to the ongoing debate on how the international community should respond to massive. It is clear that the notion of state sovereignty coexisted with intervention since its inception. The UN Charter also embraced this tradition in 1945. Military intervention during the 19th and 20th centuries was regarded as the last option when all peaceful measures were not successful. Cutts (1998) argues that one of the major challenges facing modern society since the end of the Second World War has been the pervasive problem of both intra and inter-state conflicts. He argues further that all of the 30 major armed conflicts fought in the world in 1995 were intrastate wars.

Since the Second World War, the interventionist environment has refused to fade away. The record of unauthorised military intervention in intrastate conflicts appears to be far from over. More countries have become involved in intrastate conflicts than ever before. From 1945 to 1989, the world witnessed around 269 interventions (Burke, 2002). All were conducted without UNSC resolution. They were unilateral and hence illegitimate in terms of international law. AMISOM should therefore be able to work in line with the concept of military intervention if it's to realize any gains.

2.2.2 Responsibility to Protect

The principle of Responsibility to protect (R2P) recognises that states have a responsibility to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (hereafter 'genocide and mass atrocities'); that international society has a duty to assist states to fulfill their R2P; and that should a state 'manifestly fail' to protect its populations from these crimes, international society would take 'timely and decisive' action through the various provisions set out in the UN Charter (Bellamy, 2011; Ken, 2014). Since R2P has been reaffirmed in UN Security Council (hereafter also 'Security Council') resolutions - including 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009) - in reports of the UN Secretary- General (Ban, 2009), and in the establishment of a joint office of the special advisers to the Secretary-General on genocide prevention and R2P (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 2011).

Approximately 16,000 civilians were killed and over two million were displaced by the conflict in Somalia between 2006 and 2010 (Bellamy, 2012). Not a lot has been done towards the role of R2P with regards to the Somalia crisis as noted by some scholars. Bellamy (2012) opines that a 'hard' case for R2P that has not been discussed much by the critics either: Somalia. The R2P has not been seen by the Somalis positively us such. The local saw the intervention by the AMISOM forces as an abuse of their sovereignty. As espoused by Mamdani (2009: 300). R2P is a 'slogan that masks the big power agenda to recolonise Africa'. It was argued that in other countries the UN and NATO had stepped beyond the parameters of mandates to protect civilians in Cote d'Ivoire and Libya to

effect regime change in those two countries, demonstrating that doctrines such as R2P would always be put to nefarious use by the powerful (O'Shea, 2012).

Under the principle of Responsibility to Protect (R2P), AMISOM should be able to carry out its mandate. The primary responsibility was on each state to protect its own population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. There is also a responsibility on the international community to use diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter to help to protect populations (Massingham, 2009).

The responsibility includes three elements: the responsibility to prevent, the responsibility to react and the responsibility to rebuild. Under these elements the intervening force should be able to carry out post conflict reconstruction (Scahill, 2013). The peace building process has to be as diligently as possible to bring the country to its feet again. Military intervention for humanitarian purposes is a crucial part (although last resort measure) of the responsibility to react. The R2P is premised on the understanding that international order is best maintained by non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states. However, it also challenges this principle in so far as it recognizes that to respect sovereignty all the time is to risk being complicit in humanitarian tragedies sometimes (Burke, 2002).That is, the R2P adopts a view of sovereignty which emphasizes as its defining characteristic the capacity to provide protection, rather than territorial control. Scahill (2013) reinforces that the principle strengthens human security rather than regime protection. Thus the despotic leaders who are meting acts of terrorism

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on their citizens can be stopped by invoking this principle. Kent (2005) describes the R2P as adding a fourth characteristic, namely 'respect for human rights', to the three Peace of Westphalia characteristics of a sovereign state – territory, authority and population.

2.2.3 Justification of past PSO in Somalia through 'Just war' theory

The events leading to the military intervention was precipitated by a chain of occurrences within the Republic of Somalia. After the disastrous Ogaden War with neighboring Ethiopia in 1977-1978, the Siyad Barre government—which in its early years built strong, albeit repressive, political institutions in the security sector, the ruling party, and parts of the civil service—focused solely on regime survival An increasingly narrow set of clan interests drove political calculations, corruption grew rampant, and the ruling clique systematically de-institutionalized the state, rendering the large civil service little more than a bloated bureaucracy with little to do but collect very modest monthly paychecks and engage in "project hopping" with aid agencies to make ends meet (Menkhaus 1997).

Decision-making on virtually all matters of state was monopolized by a small circle around Barre, while ministerial positions were frequently rotated to prevent potential rivals from establishing a power base or demonstrating competence. And critically, the large and once professional security sector devolved into a predatory force advancing the interests of empowered clans and their leaders (Samatar 1986; Samatar and Samatar 1987). Because Somalia's strategic importance in the Cold War, foreign aid flows were

very substantial, so much so that by 1987 international development assistance composed 57 percent of the country's GNP (Henze 1991, 125). One analyst concluded as early as 1979 that Somalia had become "a ward of the international community" (Feaver, 1998).

The Somali state in that form was, in retrospect, a castle built on sand, destined to collapse once foreign aid dried up, as it did in the late 1980s with the end of the Cold War (Menkhaus 1997). Until then, donor states ignored the systematic corruption of the state, the hollowed-out civil service, the state-sponsored land grabs, and the predatory behavior of its security forces. This was done because of a combination of strategic interests in maintaining good relations with the regime and what former U.S. diplomat to Somalia David Rawson termed the "baseless optimism" of donors who were repeatedly taken in by the "studied ambivalence of Siyad's zig-zag tactics" of promising reform and then failing to deliver (Rawson 1993).

In this context, external efforts to build the state's institutional capacity failed, and foreign aid funds of all types were diverted and funneled out of the country by enterprising political elites, especially close relatives and clansmen of the president. Even external efforts to professionalize the military—a form of institution-building that has enjoyed considerable success elsewhere in Africa in the past two decades—foundered. Emblematic of this failure was the U.S. officer training program that brought commanders such as General Ali Hersi "Morgan" for advanced training at Fort Leavenworth, only to subsequently watch him oversee the brutal government attacks on Somali populations in the north in 1988 (earning him the nickname "The Butcher of

Hargeisa") and then grow into the role of one of Somalia's most feared warlords in 1991(Shin, 2009).

Post-collapse Somalia attracted over two decades of episodic, but often intense, external efforts at state-building. The most dramatic instance, and the one most loaded with lessons learned for today's attempts to revive a central government, came with the 1993-1995 UNOSOM intervention, two years after the country fell into a state of collapse, civil war, and famine. The ambitious UNOSOM peace enforcement mission included a United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution to promote both reconciliation and state revival with the "broad participation by all sectors of Somali society" (UN 1993). UNOSOM sailed into uncharted waters, as reviving a completely collapsed state was at the time an unprecedented task (Clarke and Herbst 1997). It was a difficult assignment made worse by the UN's weak political capacity, and made almost impossible by the overly ambitious timeline of only two years to achieve reconciliation, the drafting of a new constitution, selection of district and regional councils and a provisional national assembly, holding of a referendum on the constitution, a census, voter registration, and elections. Menkhaus (2014) justified the peace support operations which were launched by the UNOSOM to avert acute humanitarian crisis in the war torn Somalia. It came at time when most of the Somalis were facing starvation. The warlords were more concerned with advancing their own interests rather than that of the Somalis. The humanitarian aid could not reach the intended destination. And the streets of Mogadishu became the battlefields.

With historical roots going as far back as the classical Greek and Roman philosophers, as well as prominent Christian thinkers such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, "just-war" theory has an extremely rich theoretical background, furthermore, contemporary thought has not neglected this theory on the whole. Michael Walzer, perhaps the foremost modern contributor to "just-war" theory, has provided much revision to the broader notions. The nature of wafare and the tactics have changed a lot but the justification of war still remains relevant in the international fora.

"Just-war" theory possesses three core categories for the moral evaluation of a war: *Jus ad bellum,* the justice of going to war in the first instance; *Jus in Bello,* the justice in the combat and conduct of the war, and lastly *Jus post bellum,* the justice of post-conflict proceedings. Each of these categories possesses a clear list of criteria for what makes the cause, conduct and post-conflict management of a war just. A "just-war" theory application of *jus ad helium* can be framed in the more contemporary notion of "responsibility to protect" (R2P), particularly when one considers how much the two doctrines overlap in purpose (Kane, 1997). At the 5858th meeting of the UN Security Council, the notion of the responsibility for the international community to intervene was discussed, and the advisor to the Secretary-General urged for the intervention in both political and security tracks, in the hopes of fulfilling the obligations set forth behind the spirit of R2P (UNSEC, 2008). Somalia has historically failed to protect its own people from self-destruction since the early1990s; thus the burden or responsibility of intervention lies squarely on the shoulders of the international community since it is in accordance with a morally-acceptable justification for military force.

2.2.3.1 Just cause

Burke (2002) justified military intervention in the modern framework of R2P through analysis of what the just-cause threshold shall be before the UN or in extraordinary cases a coalition of sovereign states intervenes. In the tradition of Grotius' philosophy, just causes for war can effectively be reduced to three overarching grounds: when acting in self-defence, when defending others from attack and when protecting citizens from oppressive, violent regimes. In the twenty-first century, this can include the just cause of situations of "state collapse and the resultant exposure of the population to mass starvation or civil war, as in Somalia." The TFG may be defined as the legitimate authority, at least politically, but the underlying truth remains that Somalia is without legitimate state control. Because of Somalia's anarchic nature the citizens are not being threatened and oppressed by a single violent regime, but by several smaller clans and armed militias. This, if anything has proven to be more detrimental than a single, despotic government or leader. Indeed, if anything, the cause for R2P in Somalia is only strengthened by its anarchy. Considering the undeniably chaotic state of Somalia, the TFG is unable to protect its own citizens from harm, whether through overt violence from al Shabaab, Hizbul Islam or any number of warring clans, or from famine-induced human security problems. Considering this inability by the Somali Government to protect its population from harm, R2P and "just cause" are fully satisfied for an intervening power.

It is difficult to exaggerate the suffering which Somalis have endured for decades in order to absolve international actors from action. However, when one examines the perpetual

violence of Somalia's clans, together with the sheer number of lives lost to the fighting, combined with endemic drought and insufficient food aid which is threatened by the scourge of piracy anyway, the case for legitimate intervention becomes clear. Likewise when one considers that a million Somalis are internally displaced, the human security threats become self-evident (Burke, 2002). Lastly, it is crucial to consider anticipatory action as justified in order to avoid greater human disaster: Military action can be legitimate as an anticipatory measure in response to clear evidence of likely large-scale killing or ethnic cleansing. Without this possibility, the international community would be placed in the morally untenable position of being required to wait until genocide begins before being able to take action to stop it (Burke, 2002).

The one primary difficulty in analysing Somalia's case, however, is that the stateless country suffers more from a prolonged and chronic manner of human suffering rather than outright genocide or ethnic cleansing. But when the continuation of mass starvation and hopelessness borne from complete state collapse and failure is considered, it is completely within the just cause criteria threshold to consider intervention.

The justification for intervention is self-evident. But we have not seen a major operation like that of *Operation Restore Hope* since. "Just cause" is thus not the reason why there is no serious attempt at stabilising Somalia. This has bearing in modern international relations, where states (or even coalitions of states) are reluctant to involve their military forces on the grounds of lacking justification. Before R2P, refusing to acknowledge the

need for intervention in a humanitarian crisis was enough to satisfy inaction. But when a state has imploded, and is no longer capable of protecting its citizens, "just cause" principles align completely with R2P guidelines, where state sovereignty is determined less by sanctified geographic borders and more by a government's ability to protect its citizens. In the 21st century strategic landscape of Somalia the real question of why there has been no concerted effort at stabilising the country is not whether it would be "just" so much as whether it is feasible (Bellamy, 2011).

2.2.3.2 Right intention

Khadiagala (2008) says that the right intention, contrary to the just-case intention, for going to war is an aspect which cannot normally be substantiated with any legally useful evidence, and as such is excluded from international law as a requirement. Stated simply, any intervening state or institution must have only the intentions of the stated objective at heart, rather than ulterior motives such as economic or territorial acquisition. In the Horn of Africa, a good example of this would be that of Ethiopia's continuing strategic interests in the region.

Given the Ethiopian invasion in 2006 to oust the then ICU, it stands to reason that this nation could not take a leading role in any humanitarian intervention under the aegis of R2P (Khadiagala, 2008). In order for some semblance of right intention to be assured in a deployment to Somalia, a non-neighbouring leading state would have to take central role,

be it through UN approval or otherwise - another aspect of *jus ad bellum* which will be discussed in further detail in the next criterion. The current criterion is ultimately outdated in modern international law and the behaviour of states since it would be impossible to prove the real Ethiopian intent in a hypothetical intervention, even though its strategic aims with regards to Somalia are clear. According to the International Crisis Group (2008) given that any major intervention in Somalia would probably involve major states such as the United States, who is actively mounting counter-terror operations in the Horn of Africa already, or NATO members likewise pursuing divergent objectives, it is crucial to ensure that, although one cannot truly identify the "intention" alignment of states involved, they can at least be in accordance with the reasoning or "just cause" behind the mission itself.

2.2.3.3 Proper authority

Burke (2002) rightly assert that the criterion of "proper authority" is the most important albeit controversial criterion in determining *jus ad bellum* for R2P intervention. Since the United Nations, or rather the Security Council, should be heavily involved in any manner of intervention in Somalia, along with the AU, both in the military and post-conflict humanitarian decision-making and operations, it follows that these organisations would be the highest authority in matters as important as enforcing something like the intervention in Somalia. However, of key importance is the problem of the Security Council's potential failure to act when the need is both clear and justified, as has been the case before in other instances of crisis such as the Rwandan genocide or, more recently,

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within the Ivory Coast. Gwertzmnan (2007) avers that when intervention is both feasible

and justified, yet is nonetheless denied by Security Council members, the credibility of

the United Nations is ultimately undermined by inaction. In 1999, when the Security

Council failed to intervene in Kosovo, for example, NATO embarked on its own

independent intervention, headed by the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR forces). The

intervention was arguably a success in the sense that it did begin to bring about a

cessation of hostilities between the warring parties, and ironically lay a good foundation

for the UN's subsequent involvement through Resolution 1244, which has subsequently

seen Kosovo not only recovering from the conflict, but ultimately declaring independence

(Pan, 2003).

The recent imposition of a no-fly zone (NFZ) in Libya, in accordance with the United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, has proven that intervention, even if

only from the air (and sea), greatly legitimises the UN's ability to determine just when

intervention is or is not justified. With UNSC approval, and an explicit mandate to

protect civilians from loyalist (and technically rebel) forces, intervention can be used

responsibly. There will naturally be objectors, neutral parties, or opponents to

intervention, as evidenced by the five abstentions in the UNSC for Resolution 1973; but

with a UN-recognised majority vote, it is possible to achieve a high degree of consensus

on when and when not to intervene (UNSC, 2011). Such intervention will be neither

perfect nor equally-dispensed, but at least it will be lawful in terms of international law

when the mandate *is* implemented.

Blokker (2000) affirms that should the case for intervention be clear, yet the political will in the Security Council be absent, multilateral organisations or coalitions of the willing can and should play a pivotal role in preventing conflict. If alternative organisations or states are not petitioned in the event of Security Council failure, this then runs the risk of enabling powerful states essentially to ignore the UN's seal of approval whichever state is in collapse or erupting in conflict. The responsibility to protect should not be a subjective principle at the behest of Security Council resolutions, which can potentially become heavily influenced by non-essential political interests or agenda. Instead, it should be the first port of call in the outbreak of emergency and, similar to the Kosovo precedent, be able to assist when member states eventually decide to act. The UN aid missions to Somalia in the early 1990s have set an example in the sense that intervention into the failed state was both acceptable and had been encouraged before. It is not unfair to argue that Somalia in the 21st century has not improved measurably since UNOSOM failed, and thus the authority with which intervention was decided upon then still exists.

2.2.3.4 Last resort

Mounting a military intervention should not be the first option when deciding on how to resolve a conflict. Intervention according to *jus ad bellum* is only permissible when all other plausible, peaceful measures have been taken. Unfortunately, in the case of Somalia, many of the avenues of peaceful coercion open in interstate conflict, such as diplomacy, negotiations, and sanctions, simply do not exist or cannot be feasibly employed. This is in no small measure due to the fact that Somalia is essentially a collapsed state (International Crisis Group, 2008). While the TFG does enjoy

international recognition as the legitimate government of Somalia, the reality is that precious little of Somalia is effectively governed by anyone, let alone the TFG.

Sahnoun (2009) notes that one of the larger problems of UNOSOM was the attempt to implement negotiations with warlords, militants and politicians, and simultaneously to gain a ceasefire agreement and subsequent disarmament across the board. Ironically, that these smaller mediations took place in Mogadishu at all was a direct result of the UN failing to find any other solution. The beginning of UNOSOM I was thus a "last resort" after exhausting normative means of conflict resolution without military intervention. Considering lack of meaningful progress since the 1990s, the criterion of "last resort" can and does still apply today when justifying military intervention.

2.2.3.5 Probability of success

Somalia has been ignored as a worthwhile endeavour in terms of R2P or any meaningful intervention precisely because it has been perceived as a "problem child" without a military solution - an entity which is largely forsaken in its multiplicity of problems which cannot be solved in any long-term manner by the international community. With the failure of Operation Gothic Serpent (the objective of which was to capture Aideed himself), as well as the general ineffectiveness of UNOSOM II to ensure peace and stability while distributing aid, military intervention has not been seriously considered since, with the possible exception of The EU Naval deployment in the Gulf of Aden (Combined Task Force 151) whose presence in limited counter-piracy operations off the

Somali coast has produced some stability at sea (Hull & Svensson, 2008). The probability of success - of meeting objectives laid out in the context of overall humanitarian intervention envisioned in *just post bellum,* such as peace enforcement, conflict resolution, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Rehabilitation (DDR), and humanitarian aid - is minimal at best. With the death of 25 Pakistani UNITAF (Unified Task Force) peacekeepers in Mogadishu in 1993, and the subsequent 3 October "Battle of Mogadishu" in which 18 American soldiers and approximately 1 000 Somalis were killed, it is presumed that even when the United States brought its military force (including highly-trained special forces) to bear on the conflict, the Somali militia were unbeatable (Hull and Svensson, 2008). However, there are several mitigating factors in 1993 which can provide a valid counter-argument to this assumption. Moreover, the "probability for success" is the single most important obstacles to be overcome in the Somali context, as it is generally considered utterly unfeasible to intervene in significant force given the historical precedent.

Proponents of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) may suggest that the African Union's (AU's) current effort in PSOs is the one major intervention which has achieved some measure of success. But AMISOM is facing fierce resistance from Al-Shabaab insurgents, suffering considerable casualties, and ultimately casting the probability of success of AMISOM's mission into serious doubt. As of the start of 2011, AMISOM have suffered over 300 fatalities during operations in Somalia, largely due to insurgent attacks (Omar, 2016). It has been several years since AMISOM was launched, and there are as yet no broad stability throughout Somalia and, therefore, no secure

channels for aid distribution. At force strength now of just over 15000, the peace enforcers should not be blamed for this failure because they simply lack the capability to do anything more permanent. Indeed, there is very little concrete indication that the AMISOM mission has a reasonable probability of success in its current form. Hull & Svensson (2008) reaffirms that without increased troop numbers, pacifying Al-Shabaab and their insurgents, and enabling meaningful aid to reach those in need (and not the black market), are not attainable.

The probability of success during UNITAF's presence in Somalia was severely hampered by the sheer lack of boots on the ground. With an initial deployment of just one battalion of Pakistani blue helmets in October 1992, and the remainder of UNOSOM's state interveners holding back on their promises of sending troops, the initial presence of peacekeepers was woefully inadequate (Bolton, 1994). Ironically (Sahnoun, 2009) who had witnessed the UNOSOM operation from the ground, had advocated for even 500 more troops to make an impact: "There is no doubt that had these 500 troops been fully deployed as late as a month after the agreement, that is, at, the beginning of September, it would have made an appreciable difference" (Sahnoun, 2009). However, given the turmoil in Somalia, combined with the immense looting of food aid comprising officially of 10-15% of delivered goods, it is difficult to perceive just *why* such a small complement of additional troops would have made any tangible difference at all. Even at the end of 1993, with the general failure of restoring peace to Somali, there was simply insufficient numbers of troops to manage the tasks laid out by the UN.

Moreover, the actual strategic purpose of intervention in Somalia mutated significantly over the period in which UN forces were actively involved in the country. While the Secretary-General had accepted the option (endorsed by the Security Council in Resolution 794) of a major, US-led "enforcement operation" also under American command, the initial objectives were almost immediately altered by Boutros-Ghali (Bolton, 1994). What had been stressed by President Bush as a limited, near-term operation designed to keep the channels of food-aid open and secure, almost immediately was warped in concept by the Secretary-General. American forces entered Somalia on December 9. Later that day, however, the Secretary-General told a delegation from Washington sent to brief the secretariat that he wanted the coalition not only to disarm all of the Somali factions, but also to defuse all mines in the country (most mines were in the secessionist north), set up a civil administration and begin training civilian police (Bolton, 1994).

This inability to establish a clear strategic path forward in the usage of military forces is crucial when evaluating the probability of success in a region. In Somalia, the objectives of the military forces were never unanimously coherent outside of the Resolution's papers, and this fed directly into the initial misunderstanding. While state leaders are effectively responsible for this lack of cooperation, the same phenomena can easily be repeated by institutions in which state leaders operate.

When President Clinton took over from Bush, the mission in Somalia warped further,

ultimately providing one major obstacle to any tangible success in Operation Restore Hope. With Clinton came the beginnings of "assertive multilateralism" and the notion of not just keeping open the channels for food aid, but to encourage the broader ambit of nation-building and development as a whole (Bolton, 1994). This was not the original intention for UNOSOM forces, nor was it effectively able to respond to the mounting violence on the streets of Mogadishu and surrounds. Effectively, Clinton's almost *ad hoc* dabbling with foreign policy shifts manifested itself in a strategic quagmire in Somalia. The administration immediately reached for new options, deciding to double the total American military presence in Somalia and offshore, while announcing the intention to withdraw entirely by March 31, 1994. "Nation building" had thus become a desperate search for a face-saving American withdrawal, exactly one year after Americans would have departed under President Bush's original plan (Bolton, 1994).

If the reasonable probability of success for a contemporary intervention is to be seriously considered, it is important to take heed of the above mistake committed by the change of presidents and foreign policy in the United States. As the leading state actor is cooperating with a UN task force, any large-scale intervention would require an initial strategic evaluation of which objectives are attainable with the forces available, as well as a clear and coherent timetable. Certainly some aspects of the operation are subject to change according to the process of the conflict resolution. Ending conflict is by no means hard and fast, but it can certainly be assessed more coherently if a state's foreign policy shift does not translate directly into an ongoing mission.

Scahill (2013) opines that perhaps one of the most important (and arguably overlooked) factors in determining probability of success is the actual make-up of the military forces being deployed. According to the Powell Doctrine and the use of American forces abroad, military forces should, if it cannot be avoided (that is, war as a "last resort"), be deployed massively and decisively, and with a clear set of objectives in addition to a feasible exit-strategy. Without these, military interventions run a relatively high risk of becoming incoherent, messy strategic quagmires from which states scramble to forget and never repeat while undermining the power of the leading state in question. The coalition learned this lesson again the hard way in Iraq, and AMISOM is fast comprehending the enormity of the task it has chosen to undertake, using a model (Burundi's intervention) that is not adequate in force for Somalia.

The UN mission, including the US forces, consisted of what on paper could be argued to have been a formidable force but effectively lacked any of the tools, numbers and Rules of Engagement required for the task of securing what is one of the least secure states in the world. The "tip of the spear", that is the US forces in Operation Gothic Serpent, comprised various infantry companies, including elite Army Rangers and DELTA Force operators (that is, Special Forces.) However, their operations were conducted in thinly armoured vehicles, trucks and helicopters. The distinct lack of powerful weaponry, while making the UN mission appear less hawklike in international media circles, crippled the operational capabilities of the forces on the ground. Without fixed-wing aircraft and armoured vehicles, tanks and any form of indirect fire support such as mortars or artillery, the forces on the ground were woefully under-equipped to fight the thousands of

warring militia on the ground in the tightly packed streets of Mogadishu (Tal, 2009).

A recent example of the capability to pacify parts of Somalia lies ironically in one of the region's most controversial organisations (or currently former organisation.) The Supreme Council of Islamic Courts, better known now as Islamic Courts Union (ICU), effectively managed to eradicate piracy altogether during its six-month reign of power by attacking the pirate "haven" ports and aggressively rooting out pirates on land and at sea (Lennox, 2008). This was achieved, not because the ICU saw piracy as a reprehensible breach of international law or Islam, but rather because the pirate warlords were political enemies. Once the TFG, backed by Ethiopian troops, wrested power from the ICU in late 2006, however, piracy surged once more as the TFG's control over the country lapsed south, leaving Puntland once again to the pirates (Lennox, 2008). Essentially then, Somalia can indeed be pacified if sufficiently aggressive action is taken.

Certainly, such an upscale in weapons and destructive capability flies in the face of Clinton's spirit of American foreign policy, as well as the objectives (however muddled) of the UNOSOM mission and its execution. But herein lies the crux of the matter: if one truly wishes to apply R2P in Somalia, a state that is extremely volatile, violent and unruly, a long-term security net needs to be established in order to ensure the stability of post-conflict aid and development which can then proceed in relative peace and quiet.

This massive scale of operations is not unprecedented in terms of peace operations. The KFOR task force commanded by NATO comprised a holistic military deployment of

multinational forces, as well as extensive air and land support thereof. If commanders and state leaders are realistic upfront about the strategic requirements of committing forces to an intervention, then there is every possibility that success can be achieved. But the permeating attitude remains that Somalia is a strategic problem whose solutions are not yet evident. This is almost a psychological phenomenon in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan military world, in the sense that what was, and still is, perceived as an impossible military task really is not. The UNOSOM failures of 1993, in which both American and Pakistani peacekeepers were killed, while tragic, is by no means an indication of the impossibility of a successful military intervention today, though it is often trumped as a major excuse for non-intervention in the twenty-first century. Indeed, US policymakers have been reluctant since the 1993 disaster to get involved in land battles in the Horn of Africa. Even though this initial flashpoint was by no means decisive, the US forces actually achieved their objective of capturing several of Aideed's aides on 3 October, and the tools required for the job, such as armoured personnel carriers, fixed-wing air support and artillery, was never seriously considered (Boot, 2009)

A holistic strategy for a success would require several measures: a "massive deployment" in accordance with the Powell Doctrine, clear and coherent objectives from the outset, a strong naval presence in the Gulf of Aden to curb piracy, aggressive Rules of Engagement, and military depth. Such an intervention force would not just consist of infantry, but all the necessary aspects of waging a large- scale military operation against a hostile enemy force. This is in accordance with the Powell Doctrine and would be effective in creating a stable Somalia for post-conflict development and aid operations. It

may seem excessive to have more than lightly armed infantry operating under the auspices of humanitarian intervention, but one must bear in mind that Somalia is an exceptional case. Understanding the true threats in Somalia will help in gauging the proportionality required in this regard.

2.2.3.6 Proportionality

Lennox (2008) expresses that the ultimate utility of the war is the expectation that going to war will yield a net-positive result for both sides involved, with one major factor being the number of casualties. Intervention in Somalia must be done not only to address the injustices being committed on the ground - that is, mass starvation and state collapse in Somalia - but it must also be a considered evaluation of whether or not Somalia will be better off after hostilities cease.

Given that the entire purpose of military intervention in Somalia would be to create a security net in which UN organs can provide humanitarian aid and, if the scope and budget allows, promote the large-scale political and economic development of Somalia, it is not unreasonable to assert that the perceived net benefit would more than outweigh the decades of misery that have plagued Somalia. Moreover, if the probability of success exists, as previously argued, it is crucial to think of a post-conflict Somalia as a distinct possibility, with a stabilised foundation for facilitating mediation between uniting factious clans and militants on a meaningful, securitised basis.

The above failures in the intervention in Somalia in the 1990s raise serious objections to the effectiveness of international peacekeeping. Given the scope and length of UNOSOM I & II, as well as the US leadership taken in attempting to provide aid to a nation starving itself, it is easy to get the impression that a second military intervention, for whatever purpose or objective, would be foolhardy at best. But when one applies a sober analysis of the conflict itself, as well as the nature in which the initial operation was conducted, this is not quite the case. With the proportionate amount of military assets in terms of boots on the ground, and the firepower necessary to quell the chronic violence that plagues Somalia, it is entirely possible to securitise Somalia relatively quickly if carried out with a modicum of strategic responsibility.

Finally, while the *jus ad bellum* for intervention in Somalia is arguably justified, this is not the end-point in order to "save" Somalia. If the failed state can be pacified and peacekeeping operations commenced thereafter, there is a very real utility in military forces making a meaningful contribution in terms of maintaining stability for post-conflict development and humanitarian aid to commence. If military intervention is truly as vital as argued, the humanitarian post-conflict aspect must also be able to make a justified and meaningful a contribution to Somalia, if not the most important aspect. Restoring peace to a volatile region is one thing, but if Somalia is to be adequately and effectively stabilised in any sustainable fashion, the humanitarian track has to be just as coherent, which would fall into the realm of *jus post bellum,* the justice after war, thereby ensuring post-conflict humanitarian efforts are in accordance with just war theory (and

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international law). Under the principle of R2P through the lens of just war theory the intervention missions by the UNOSOM groups were justifiable. The peace support operations did not get enough support from the UN and the international community. The political will was much needed for its success.

2.3 Challenges of peace support operations

Since 1948, the United Nations (UN) has been involved in seventy-one peace support operations fifty-three of which occurred after 1990. Currently, there are sixteen UN Peacekeeping (UN PKO) with twelve in Africa and the Middle East (Williams, 2012) Just over 100,000, uniformed troops (85,808), police (13,200), and military observers (1,738) are deployed to these sixteen missions at an estimated cost of US$7.87 billion in the fiscal year commencing on July 1, 2016 (Omar, 2016). The geographical concentration of UN PKOs changes over time, depending on the location of the world's trouble spots. During the post–cold war era, there have been large- and small-scale non-UN PKOs led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECO-WAS), and individual countries. Noteworthy, non-UN PKOs include the Stabiliza-tion Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, the Multinational Force—Iraq, US-led Operation Northern Watch in Iraq, an ECOWAS mission in Liberia, and an AU mission in Sudan. Peacekeeping burden sharing possesses myriad fascinating aspects. For instance, burden sharing may involve financial contributions, troop supplies, or both to UN or non-UN PKOs. For UN

missions, financial contributions are mostly assessed against UN members since 1974 whereas troop contributions are voluntary and supported, in large part, by the financial assessments. Troop-contributing countries are compensated on a monthly basis for each soldier, police, or military observer. In some cases, this troop payment more than compensates for troops' cost and, in other instances of well-trained troops, the payment falls far short of this cost (Osman, 2007).

These differing institutional arrangements are shown to have influences on the mix of private (or country-specific) and public benefits derived from UN PKOs, thereby affecting burden sharing. By contrast, most non-UN missions rely on voluntary financial and troop contributions, except for some ECOWAS and AU PKOs for which the United States and the European Union (EU) partly reimburse participation cost like AMISOM (Kelley 2013). Differing institutional arrangements between UN and non-UN missions may also affect the realized mix of country-specific and public benefits. Next consider peacekeeping missions' effectiveness. Such effectiveness may be judged by a single primary criterion of maintaining or achieving the peace for a set period of time (Bellamy, 2012) or by curbing the carnage (Williams, 2012). More recently, some articles argue that multiple criteria are required to evaluate today's multifaceted peacebuilding operations that seek to rebuild postconflict countries and their institutions (Opon, 2015).

Monitoring and observer missions are at the consent of belligerents and consist of peacekeepers that observe and report any cease-fire violations. Traditional peacekeeping is also at the consent of adversaries and includes actions by lightly armed troops and

police to end hostilities and to maintain peace in a conflict area. It generally consists of actions to interpose UN peacekeepers between adversaries to bring about a cease-fire. At times, traditional peacekeeping may include disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel forces. Some studies group these first two categories together (Masese, 2012). Peacebuilding is more complex, for which peacekeeping forces provide humanitarian aid and/or rebuild institutions (e.g., police force). Often, peacebuilding requires a long-term commitment to nation building, wherein actions try to establish free elections, rule of law, and judicial and legislative branches.

Following the toppling of the Saddam Hussein and Taliban regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan, respectively, non-UN PKOs possess nation-building goals. Finally, peace enforcement operations involve the use of military force to end hostilities between warring sides, such as UN and non-UN missions in Haiti, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia and Iraq. Such missions are the most logistically complex, costly, and risky and require that peacekeepers are sufficiently armed to separate and pacify the opposing sides. After the conflict, peace enforcement typically includes a significant nation-building component. This postconflict need for nation and institution building to manage state society relations is stressed by Hersi (2015).

Until 1974, UN peacekeeping expenses were covered by the UN regular budget and voluntary contributions. Such contributions pose a real problem because some derived peacekeeping benefits (e.g., reduced conflict, unimpeded resource supplies, and increased stability) from PKOs are purely public with nonrival and nonexclud-able benefits for the

global community, thereby encouraging free riding among UN member states (Menkhaus, 2014). In the early 1960s, the expensive UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) PKO brought on a financial crisis as the UN had to divert its resources from some UN tasks to cover past peacekeeping expenses. Voluntary contributions did not cover the unanticipated increase in ONUC spending. Financial concerns put the brakes on UN PKOs with only two small missions initiated between September 1965 and September 1973.

The UN needed to develop a permanent financing solution for supporting PKOs not reliant on voluntary contributions or the UN regular budget. This solution assumed the form of the UN General Assembly Resolution 3101, passed on Decem-ber 11, 1973, which established nonvoluntary assessment accounts that assigned members fixed shares of UN annual peacekeeping expenses (Hansen, 2007). In recent years, the five permanent UN Security Council members pay about 22 percent above their regular budget assessment scale for peacekeeping. Thus, if a country is assessed 10 percent of the UN regular budget, then it is assessed 12.2 percent of the UN peace-keeping budget each year. Rich industrial countries, not permanent Security Council members, pay their regular budget assessment shares. Other UN members are parti-tioned into eight additional assessment classes and cover from 7.5 percent to 90 percent below their regular budget assessment scale, depending on their per capita income. Approximately 95 percent of all UN peacekeeping expense are covered by permanent members of the Security Council and rich industrial countries (Likoti, 2007). Member states are obliged to pay their assessment within thirty days of billing; nevertheless, countries may exercise

some discretion by delaying payments (Shimizu 2005). If a member is in arrears for its assessed peacekeeping payment for the two full preceding years, then Article 19 of the UN Charter provides that the member can lose its vote in the UN General Assembly. During the Reagan administration, the United States managed to maintain its vote by coming close, but not exceeding, this two-year in-arrears threshold.

UN members contribute troops on a voluntary basis and are currently compensated at a base rate of US$1,332 per month for each of their troops or military police (Williams, 2012). Recent top troop contributors include Ethiopia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Nepal, Senegal, Egypt, Ghana, and Burkina Faso. UN peacekeeping personnel payments are covered by the UN assessment account. Countries with inexpensive and poorly trained troops make a net gain by contributing their troops. For example, Opon (2015) estimate select countries' annual cost in US$ per troop as follows: Bangladesh, $4,553 (in 2009); Ghana, $5,555 (in 2012); India, $9,768 (in 2012); Nepal, $1,892 (in 2011); Pakistan, $3,417 (in 2012); and Senegal, $9,571 (in 2011). Given annual reimbursement rates of US$12,336 during earlier years, these countries achieve country-specific gains from sending their troop on UN PKOs. However, UN per troop reimbursement does not come near to covering the cost of rich coun-tries' well-trained troops. For select rich countries, Hesse (2014), calculate that the annual cost in US$ per troop is as follows: Canada, $137,054 (in 2011); France, $119,273 (in 2009); Italy, $156,181 (in 2011); and United States, $138,465 (in 2013).

With the increase in non-UN PKOs being largely manned by rich countries' military personnel, it is not surprising that their troop contributions to UN peacekeeping declined since 1995.Various peace support operations have been conducted in Somalia previously. Humanitarian crises and risk faced by the vulnerable populations from the predating warlords prompted the UN and the international community to intervene. In the past such missions have been United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia dubbed as IGASOM and African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Pacification of Somalia has been carried out under the umbrella of these missions.

2.3.1 UNOSOM`s inadequacies

The gory photographic of starving Somalis and the grave humanitarian crisis prompted the USA to constitute an intervention force atleast to create safe corridors which the humanitarian relief could be passed through. Building on the theme of human rights as the moral justification for intervention, the case was then made that they also provided the legal reasons for doing so. As of December 1992, virtually all states had signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the majority had also ratified two supporting conventions, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. As such, there was 'community of humankind' obligated to upholding the right to life, nationality, political participation, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, and numerous other fundamental 'birth rights' - birth rights clearly being ignored and/or violated in Somalia

(Abdulahi and Henderson, 2007). In 1992, more than 25,000 US forces landed in Somalia as part of a 37,000-strong United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) operation. These forces were meant to ensure the safe delivery of food aid and humanitarian assistance through a parallel United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2014). The size of the US commitment is surprising, given US foreign policymakers' rhetoric and actions with regard to the African continent prior to the troops' arrival.

In June 1993, though, twenty-three Pakistani peacekeepers were killed. The ambush was blamed on Mohamed Farah Aideed, and US forces were set the difficult task of arresting him. By August, eight US soldiers had been killed. Then, in October 1993, US forces lost eighteen men in a large, multi-day battle in Mogadishu. For most Americans, the images of dead US soldiers being dragged naked through the streets of the city and of Somalis looting the UN headquarters was too much to handle. Under intense pressure at home, Clinton announced the imminent end of direct US involvement in Somalia (Hesse, 2014).

The involvement of the international community in peace support operations in Somalia in the early 1990s led to a widespread realisation of the problematic nature of PSOs. Following the Somali peace agreements of 3 March 1992, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorized UNOSOM-I, a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation, and the intermediate US-led mission Restore Hope (UNTAF). Both missions aimed to provide the security essential for humanitarian relief. The successor of both missions (UNOSOM-

II) began in May 1993. UNOSOM-II was a Chapter VII Peace Enforcement operation with the additional aim of providing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. During this mission, the difficulties of PSOs became abundantly clear, and major problems were revealed at three levels: political, strategic and operational (Hesse, 2014).

The mandate of UNOSOM-II, agreed upon by resolution 814 of the Security Council, led to serious problems for the PSO in Somalia. According to the Turkish UNOSOM-II commander, the mandate was neither clear nor attainable. The tasks allocated to the mission in the mandate were multidimensional, including political, military and humanitarian goals. By the time the Turkish commander assumed responsibility, fewer than 30% of the UN personnel were in place to achieve these goals. At the same time, the mandate was in some sense too restrictive. The military was well aware of the importance of criminal activities which were taking place for the (re-)armament of Somali clans. However, the commanders of UNOSOM-II lacked the mandate to combat these criminal activities and were not allowed to fight organised crime (Hesse, 2014).

In order to provide security for humanitarian assistance, the main tasks of UNOSOM-II were to monitor the existing agreements and prevent any resumption of violence. The constraints facing the operation became clear when one faction, headed by General Farah Aidid, failed to cooperate with the peace agreements. A series of brutal and deadly attacks was launched by Aidid's clan on UN personnel. How was UNOSOM-II to deal with this 'spoiler'? Was it, for instance, allowed to use force against Aidid's faction? The truth was that there was no strategy available for responding to the threats posed to the

process by spoilers. Furthermore, there was no integrated, guiding vision of the multiple goals of the mission on which the commanders could rely. How were they supposed to integrate the three aims of preserving peace, providing security and engaging in humanitarian efforts? Hesse (2014) believes that at the strategic level there were no answers to these basic questions.

The political and strategic issues caused enormous difficulties at the operational level. The PSOs were manifestly hampered by lack of coordination; military commanders complained that they were not able to contact New York in case of emergencies; most of the participating forces bypassed the command of UNOSOM-II by giving direct orders, with regard to duties and tasks, to their national contingents. When the commander of UNOSOM-II launched an attack on the 'centre of gravity' (south Mogadishu) some countries refused to allow their troops to be deployed. Consequently, UNOSOM-II, supposedly endowed with 30,000 personnel, was not able to bring sufficient forces into the centre of gravity (Hesse, 2014).

On 26 March 1994 the last US troops boarded helicopters and amphibious vehicles and left Somali soil. 100,000 US soldiers had rotated through the country over the course of 15 months. 30 had died, with 26 having been killed in combat. 175 had been seriously wounded (Lorch, 1994). US taxpayers had invested no less than US$2.3 billion in the mission (Washington Office on Africa, 1995). And while good had been accomplished - because of the US troops' presence, for example, the largest relief organization in Somalia at the time, UNICEF, claimed it had been able to vaccinate 753,000+ children,

build 3700 wells and enrol 62,000+ in school (Lorch, 1994) - much was left undone. Indeed, so much was left undone that almost two decades later Kenyan and Ethiopian forces were deployed to Somalia, in October and November 2011, respectively.

Since the UN's departure in 1995 following the failure of UNOSOM I and II, Somalia has suffered virtually constant civil war at the hands of several clan warlords vying for their own segment of power in the region (International Crisis Group, 2008). The collapse of Siad Barre's regime at the hands of rebels in 1991 effectively signalled the beginning of the end of any semblance of stability in Somalia (Lennox, 2008). With Mohammed Aideed and Ali Mohamed Mahdi waging vicious war on the streets of Mogadishu, not excluding the scores of smaller clans who had allied themselves with one or another patron warlord, the UNOSOM I mission was deployed to enforce a Chapter VII mandate against both parties in Mogadishu and surrounds, effectively attempting to enforce a ceasefire (DPI, 2007). However, by the time UNOSOM II was authorised by the Secretary- General in order to ensure the distribution of food aid and disarmament measures throughout Somalia as a whole, Aideed was ultimately responsible for refusing to accept negotiations, preferring instead to continue hostilities against political rivals and UN forces in general (DPI, 2007). What was initially an unknown UN-sanctioned attempt at feeding and stabilising a starving nation amid a civil war resulted in a tremendous outcry from Americans back home at the witnessing of such graphic violence against their countrymen. What subsequently resulted was the withdrawal of US forces from the region and the breakdown of the UN humanitarian mission surrounding it. In the case of Somalia, not only was the premise for the military intervention justified by the

United Nations, the American public's support of the mission remained strong up until 3 October (Lennox, 2008).

The virtual abandonment of Somalia by the international community since the withdrawal of UNOSOM in 1995 has seen the state effectively dissolve, with the region splitting into three semi-autonomous zones: Somalia is ostensibly ruled by the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in the south and, technically, Mogadishu, Puntland in the central region of the horn of Africa, and the most stable, unrecognised area of Somaliland (Nyambura, 2011). On 20 February 2007, the UN Security Council adopted SC Resolution 1744, which further legitimised AMISOM's deployment. The UN is supporting AMISOM through an assistance cell to the AU in Addis Ababa primarily with the provision of military planners. The UN Security Council met with the AU Peace and Security Council on 16 June 2007 and discussed the modalities for deeper collaboration. In particular, both bodies discussed the importance of stabilising Somalia (Hesse, 2014).

One tangible product of state failure and insecurity in Somalia is Kenya's Dadaab camp, the world's largest for refugees. The camp has been in existence in Kenya since 1992 and accommodates some 336,495 registered Somali refugees (and many more unregistered ones) (United Nations High Commission for Refugees, 2014 and Mativo, 2014). In an effort to do its part to re-establish governance in Somalia, and in so doing, perhaps facilitate conditions which would allow refugees to leave Kenya for Somalia, Kenya hosted a two-year 'reconciliation process.' This process resulted in the formation of a

Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in 2004 - the fifteenth attempt since 1991 to restore central governance in Somalia. A hallmark of these negotiations was that Kenya steeped itself in a process meant to accommodate Somalis' complex realities. Reflecting the influence of clans, a '4.5 Formula' was negotiated for the TFG where representation in a proto-parliament was evenly divided amongst four main clan groups - the Darod, Hawiye, Dir and Digle-Mirifle - plus five minority constituencies. The minority constituencies included 'minor clans', non-ethnic Somali groups, members of the Somali diaspora, citizens' groups, and various Islamist organizations (Hersi, 2015).

Kenya then hosted the TFG in Nairobi in 2006, until February of that year when the TFG's parliament finally met on Somali soil, convening in a converted grain warehouse in the western city of Baidoa, Somalia. Throughout, Kenyan policymakers expressed the hope that their efforts might facilitate an era of stability in Somalia. A major stumbling block to achieving such stability has been the radical Islamists of al-Shabaab which, according to UN reports, has recruited over half of its foreign fighters from Kenya (United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2012: 25-27). It is this last point which led Kenya to close the Somalia-Kenya border after Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia in 2006. The Kenyan government was worried its nationals could return with radical ideologies and lethal skills acquired in Somalia.

The Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006, and resulting occupation until January 2009, can largely be explained through irredentist and existential concerns. In the first half of 2006 a broad umbrella group of moderate to fundamentalist Islamists and Somali

nationalists known as the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) were racking up military victories over The Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT) - in reality little more than a coalition of US-backed clan militias. A semblance of peace and stability had followed. For the first time in 16 years Mogadishu's seaport and international airport reopened, large swathes of central and southern Somalia fell under a unified administration, commerce surged, and members of the Somali diaspora returned. But all the while, from their converted grain warehouse in Baidoa, TFG officials claimed it was they who should be governing (Hesse, 2014).

Ethiopia, along with other regional actors, sought to reconcile elements of the TFG and UIC through Khartoum-based talks intended to forge a unity government. When the talks stalled, though, the UIC tried to impose a victor's peace. UIC forces pushed westwards, towards Baidoa. In so doing, the UIC came in to increasing contact with Ethiopian forces - officially in Somalia as 'trainers' for the nascent TFG national military. As clashes escalated, some of the more radical leaders within the UIC began to call for a 'holy war against Christian Ethiopia' (Agence France-Presse, 2007) Ethiopian leaders in turn articulated their own radical claims, saying the UIC had extensive links with al-Qaeda and that there was a real danger of a Taliban-like regime appearing in the Horn of Africa. Moreover, Ethiopian policymakers were aware of a United Nations report noting that other forces were at work in Somalia intent on destabilizing the Ethiopian state. Specifically, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, in its 2006 *Report Pursuant to Resolution #1676* pointed out evidence that Eritrea, Ethiopia's nemesis in the region, was training, arming and hosting armed Ethiopian opposition forces, from the Ogaden

National Liberation Front (ONLF) to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) (United Nations Monitoring Group on Somalia, 2006). The report alluded to the probability that Eritrean proxies could use UIC-controlled territories in Somalia to launch attacks into Ethiopia.

2.3.2 IGASOM`s failed start

After 21 years (1991—2012) of difficult peacemaking and peacekeeping initiatives, Somalia is still in a state of insecurity. The persistence of violence in Somalia has caused tremendous damage and loss of life and prevented effective humanitarian intervention and relief work. In terms of regional security the continuing instability in Somalia has created a fertile ground for a range of armed militia, which are often clan-based, to wield significant power and control over sections of the country. Regional and international security has been affected with the spill-over of refugees and armed militia into neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya, as well as the hijacking of sea-faring vessels in the Indian Ocean (Nyambura, 2011).

A peacemaking initiative by the sub-regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), led to the signing of an agreement in October 2004, in Nairobi, Kenya, between the main Somali clans (Hesse, 2014). The objective was to establish Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs), including a Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which would strive to re-establish peace in the country. On 14 October 2004, the IGAD-led initiative laid the foundations for the election by members

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of the Somali Transitional Federal Parliament of President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as head of the TFG. The TFG subsequently went on to draft the Transitional Federal Charter (TFC) which was adopted in November 2004. While a number of Western governments recognised the TFG as legitimate, it was yet to receive universal acclaim within Somalia's borders. At the time, the TFG was governing from Baidoa, which is temporarily served as the administrative capital of Somalia. In February 2005, the AU authorised IGAD to send a peace mission to Somalia to provide security for the TFG while it established itself in the country. In March 2005, the IGAD defence chiefs adopted a plan to deploy 10 000 peacekeepers to Somalia in April of the same year (Hesse, 2014).

The idea was to utilize the peace keeping mission to oversee the voluntary disarmament of the militia. However, this plan was misconceived, largely because the IGAD member states lacked the necessary political will to see through the initiative. In addition, IGAD at the time did not possess an in-house capacity and framework to rapidly deploy peacekeepers to member states. Above all, IGAD's Charter did not have a provision for the deployment of a peace operation. Furthermore, there was no consensus among the various Somali factions about the appropriateness of a peacekeeping force in the country (Bellamy, 2012). However, on 6 December 2006, UN Security Council Resolution 1725 authorised 'IGAD and Member States of the AU to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia' which was dubbed IGASOM. IGASOM, however, was never deployed to Somalia for all of the reasons stated above. Somalia conflict also remains

complex starting from colonial times through cold war to post-cold war periods.

2.3.3 Dynamics of clanism in Somalia Society

There are four major tribes of Somali lineage: Dir, Darood, Isaaq, and Hawiye. These nomad tribes constitute around 70 percent of the Somali population. The two smaller agricultural tribes − Digil and Rahanweyn − make up only 20 percent, while 10 percent of the population is comprised of coastal dwellers whose economy is based on fishing and farming. Traditionally, nomadic society mastered the art of forming alliances to protect the interests of kingship and ensure water and grazing land (Onditi, 2015). Rainfall, in particular, is very critical to the life of pastoral communities. It is the main factor that forces them to compete with other tribes and to move from one inhospitable place to another. Although they expect two rainy seasons, some localities never see one drop of rain and experience severe droughts, costing nomads most of their livestock. In the 20th century, there were six harsh droughts across several regions of Somalia that lasted more than two years and produced famine (Osman, 2007).

 The relationship between different tribes always depends on how tribal elders manage conflicts and enforce previous agreements. However, an agreement might not last long. Therefore, it is the role of elders to find some sort of resolution to crises before things get out of hand and an endless cycle of revenge ensues. It must be said that these tumultuous situations and conflicts are positive in that they

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cement together clan-families against the threat presented by other tribes. This is necessary, as with political circumstances shifting continuously, it is hard to predict when another skirmish or war might take place. Yet, insecurity and suspicion within the clan remains high where negotiation and conflict resolution are not possible.

2.3.4 European colonial rule

Over the centuries, the Somali people have demonstrated, as part of their tradition, a vigorous independence and unwillingness to surrender to a single political authority. Clan leaders never quite had the authority to enforce rules on all people; rather, their role was to remind people of the importance of strong clan consciousness, stressing ancestral pride, as the clan has been the integral part to their survival and existence since ancient times (Murithi, 2012). It is important to discuss the reaction of Somali nomadic society to the European- introduced modern Somali state. Onditi (2015) notes that a clash of cultures invariably resulted from different conceptions of law as it relates to the person. The European concept sees the state as responsible for individual rights; inherently, it does not recognize the nomadic system of justice, based on collective responsibility. Over the centuries, the Somali coastal area has entertained various outside rulers, including the Omanis, the Zanzibaris, the Sharifs of Mukha in present day Yemen, and the Ottoman Turks. One thing these rulers had in common was that they did not disturb the nomadic lifestyle or interfere in their clan- family politics, because

they knew Somalis were used to being ungoverned and therefore suspicious of foreigners. However, everything changed when the Somali Peninsula and East Africa were dragged out of relative isolation into world politics. This was only the start of the imperial epoch. In 1885, rival European powers – Great Britain, France, and Italy – divided amongst themselves land populated by the Somali ethnic group in the Horn of Africa (Opon, 2015). This territory was essentially ruled by clans until Great Britain took the northern territory near the Red Sea, close to its other colonies in Aden; while the least- experienced European colonies, Italy, was granted Southern Somaliland. The French took hold of what is today known as Djibouti, a tiny nation on Red Sea. Ethiopia also grabbed a chunk of Somali land called the Ogaden (Mohamed, 2015).

Figure 2.1: Map showing Somalia and its neighbouring countries
Source: Conflict Monitor 2017

The British and Italians had different strategies and interests in Somalia. Britain was interested in Northern Somalia, mainly as source of livestock for its colony in Aden, its principal supply route to Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal (Hesse, 2014). British occupied Aden in 1839. Italians, on the other hand, wanted crops in the form of plantation agriculture: bananas, sugarcane, and citrus fruits. According to Nyambura (2011) as soon as the British colonial government started asserting its authority over Somalia at the turn of the century, resistance took shape under the leadership of Somali nationalist Sayyid Mohammed.

He used both religion and nationalism to advance his cause and successfully united Northern Somali tribes against the foreigners until his death in 1920. The use of force by British never produced a better outcome, but Sayyid Mohammed won many followers, especially among his own clan. He dared to suggest the possibility of a free and united Somalia. While British and Italian colonies were vying for control of the Somali Peninsula during the World War II, Somalis continued to mistrust and undermine the authority of their colonial rulers. As a result, the first modern Somali political group was formed in 1943. The Somali Youth League (SYL) articulated the need for national unity and, by extension, discouraged division and feuding between clan-families (Menkhaus, 2014). The political pressure also helped to improve lives: colonial rulers took steps for economic development, better education, and healthcare for growing urban communities. The SYL's main focus, of course, was to end colonial rule and liberate the nation from foreign influence and domination. This did not happen overnight; however, the

organization succeeded well in easing ill-feelings between tribes and compromising the clan system. The creation of a Somali state in 1960 could not have happened without this foundation.

2.3.5 Somalia in the geopolitics of cold war

The position that the Cold War in general was driven by purely material interests or ideological controversy was arguably a rather difficult one. The Horn of Africa as a strategic location turned it into a pawn during the Cold War (Mohamed, 2015). This geo-strategic importance directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula, and thus located close to major oil-lines indeed constitutes a prime spot to project power, control politics, and furthermore provide advanced military support in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region.

According to this proximity, Washington began to increase its presence on the Horn, which was necessary to support and stabilize pro-Western governments, control the sea route, and ensure the economic security of the West and restrain the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes. Additionally, the United States intended to keep the Read Sea and Indian Ocean open "for Israeli shipping" (Onditi, 2015). These strategic advantages were face to face with Moscow's attempt to permanently include post-colonial societies politically and militarily into its own communist camp.

Significantly, during the 1950's and based on the intensified east – west confrontation, political changes on the Horn became apparent. Americas increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world countries of socialist influence lead to explicit financial and military support of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia. To further prevent any Soviet enlargement on the Horn, President Kennedy tried to cooperate with the Somali as well. The Eastern bloc issued a similar deal offering what Somalia wanted and needed most: military hardware. In 1963 a Russian military aid agreement was established, including the training and arming of Somalia's army.

These developments brought us to a point where Ethiopia became a partner with the United States while Somalia was integrated into the Soviet-led communist bloc. This situation was further strengthened when Siad Barre systematically overthrew the democratic elected government of Somalia and established what was known as "scientific/Islamic socialism" (Bellamy, 2012). Furthermore, an official Somali government slogan proclaimed, "Tribalism divides where Socialism unites" (Hersi, 2015).

Actually, this situation perfectly fit into political transformations throughout the African continent in the decade between 1969 and 1979 with socialist-motivated governments, assisted by the Soviet Union. According to Osman (2009), states such as Angola, Capo Verde, the Republic of Congo, Mozambique—to name just a few—followed the anti-capitalist path and generated a socialist bloc with the entire

developing, non-allied world. Moreover, there was a need to emphasize that both Somalia and Ethiopia at any time were anxious to benefit from this international political situation by threatening their allies to change sides in case of inadequate support. Accordingly, the Soviet Union extended its military aid and approximately doubled Somalia's armed forces. This collaboration grew over the years toward a significant military alliance. On the political level, Somalia was the first African state to sign a Friendship—as well as Cooperation—agreement with the Soviet Union in 1974.

2.3.6 The United States and Soviet Union in Somalia

American and Soviet foreign policy concerning the Horn of Africa "came more into conflict" (Williams, 2012) in the decade of the 1970's. This is especially astonishing since the US policy in that era tried to appease the situation and head towards détente. The larger Soviet presence with highlighted political and military activities occurred at a time when the United States, first under the Nixon-doctrine and then during the Carter-administration, downgraded its efforts and started to retreat from Ethiopia. Summarizing, US foreign policy toward Somalia and especially Ethiopia reflected the international environment together with crucial events and developments like the ongoing growth of the Soviet power, a weakened dollar, and a general "question about American moral legitimacy" (Opon,2015) because of the recent Vietnam War. Overall, this policy aimed to deemphasize a direct confrontation and reformulate its global efforts towards détente. Accordingly, it became evident that US policy concerning Ethiopia and its strategic importance

began to shift, and thus Washington gradually began to distance itself from its former key country in the region under Haile Selassie, just as the Committee on Foreign Relations (Sub-committee on African Affairs) of the US Senate recognized. 1973 and 1974 turned out to be "key years" (Hesse, 2014) on the Horn of Africa for the United States because of the apparent weakness and rising lack of allies.

During these major developments, the administration in Washington clearly underestimated political changes in the region and was increasingly isolated from events in northeast Africa. While the United States had been able to at least maintain presence in the area until 1973, the following year changed the political situation drastically with Haile Selassie being overthrown by a Provisional Military Administrative Committee, lead by Colonel Haile Mariam who favoured a pro-Soviet, socialist policy. Pragmatically, Mariam still requested an estimated 25 million USD in aid from the United States while at the same time declaring a socialist republic. That effect, another irony of the Cold War, occurred when the new socialist power in April 1976 affronted its former major material-supplier as "white imperialists and reactionists" (Spilker, 2008, p. 19). Finally, the United States stopped all military aid in 1977, leaving it without any influence on the strategic important Horn. This significant loss of influence came along with a military aid agreement between Moscow and Ethiopia, resulting in total Soviet control over the Horn that made the situation even more complex.

At that very special point of time, the Soviet Union supported both rivalling states: Somalia and Ethiopia. Concerning this geo-political contest, the socialist bloc had achieved an important outcome. The Carter administration in Washington sought to prevent any further confrontation between the eastern and western blocs and aimed to remove any developing third world countries from this contest. The United States intended to prevent regional conflicts of ending up as proxy wars of the Cold War. President Carter believed in "African solutions to African problems" (Menkhaus, 2014). Nevertheless, the reality definitely deviated from the rhetoric as Washington never significantly cut off any support from repressive regimes with whom it had military, political, or diplomatic relations. This became evident by the fact that Carter and his foreign policy advisers around Brzenzinski discussed opportunities of supporting Somalia in order to re-establish influence and counter Soviet dominance on the Horn.

2.3.7 The Ogaden-Battle and its aftermath

Further political changes took place when Siad Barre felt strong enough to invade neighbouring Ethiopia in July 1977. Because America's Secretary of State ensured military assistance to Somalia, Siad Barre interpreted these intentions as "forthcoming attitudes" (Onditi, 2015). Moscow reached a point where it had to choose either Somalia or Ethiopia as future allies and decided in favour of Ethiopia,

especially due to the fact that the regime in the capital Addis Ababa seemed more committed to the Marxist-Leninists ideology than the Somalis.

Bellamy (2012) notes that US military aid toward Somalia in 1977 only got advanced under the condition of withdrawing out of the Ogaden region where the border-war with Soviet-backed Ethiopia took place. Although Ethiopia became more and more integrated into the socialist camp, the lost war constituted the beginning of the end for Siad Barre's perfunctory government. Due to this outcome it was even more remarkable that the United States improved its relationship with Somalia and even signed another military agreement in 1980, which was upgraded in 1982. This was a counterbalance in confronting the Soviet impact, based on the Reagan-doctrine to come, which gave a favourable opinion on active military aid for pro-Western states.

Thus, alliances have systematically changed: after the Soviets switched support to Ethiopia's new Marxist government, the U.S replaced the Soviet Union as Somali's new military patron in the early years of the 1980's. Generally, this once again showed that in a polarized world, a Soviet enemy was by definition a friend of the United States (Mohamed, 2015). Built and equipped by the Soviet Union, Somalia joined the Western camp and demonstrated the common stereotype that there are "no permanent friends and no permanent enemies." From then on, the US, mainly

via Saudia Arabia, provided Somalia with arms while Ethiopia was assisted by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Keeping in mind that Carter's administration generally aimed to relieve tensions with the USSR, Soviet advances on the Horn was seen as a paradigm case of assertiveness as well as a setback of Washington's deemphasized efforts. Consequently, with the motivation to harm the Soviet Union not only military but also politically, Brzezinski urged the US to send the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk into the Red Sea and then to support Somalia with more arms (Nyambura, 2011). He went even as far as arguing that Moscow's behaviour in the Horn had been a grotesque intention and thus linked to the negotiations of that time, "SALT lies buried in the sands of the Ogaden," implying a crisis for détente. In the following 1980's, Washington "sent millions in military assistance to the Somali regime" (Osman, 2007) to establish a balance to the large Soviet presence.

2.3.8 The Rise of Warlord Phenomenon in Somalia

The warlord phenomenon started soon after the collapse of the central government in Somalia in 1991. This was the era of the United Somali Congress (USC) rebel movement, characterized by much unfortunate chaos and violence. When USC leadership (predominately from the Hawiye tribe) could not reconcile its political differences, it descended into infighting which took the form of outright war, given that the USC was, in fact, a tribal militia at heart (Murithi, 2012). This struggle had two sides: one side was loyal to self-appointed president Ali Mahdi Mohammed and the other side to General Mohamed Farah Aideed. For a year the power

struggle afflicted the Somali people with loss of lives and property. The two men's quarrel became everyone's problem. Too often, this is the case in modern-day Somalia. Neither leader could claim a decisive victory or take control of government institutions. Consequently, peace and security in the nation's capital were threatened.

These leaders were entrapped in Somali tradition. They exploited that tradition while bearing the guise of modern diplomacy and tact. They effectively turned the struggle for control of the USC into a fight for clan supremacy. Aideed and Mahdi were vying for presidency of the entire nation. Although their collaboration had already toppled the Siyad Barre regime, they did not understand that compromise worked. Now they had worked together to defeat a dictatorship: each settled to become a local political leader of his respective clan-family in the hope he would thereby control government institutions for the benefit of his own sector of the Somali people. Interestingly, the two "candidates" were members of the same Hawiye tribe of Mogadishu and central Somalia. Aideed belonged to Habar-Gidir sub-clan family, while Mr. Mahdi was a member of the Abgal sub-clan. Thus, General Aideed and Mr. Mahdi subdivided Hawiye tribe into two sub clans over which they presided as warlords. This development marked a "slippery slope" which was incompatible with the modern nation- state. Hence, "Warlordism" became an accepted part of Somali political culture. With so much threat from other clans, every major clan-family had to grow its military leaders and militias in order to protect itself. After all, the government itself was infested with warlords.

So there was little protection − let alone examples of good state governance −
coming from the Somali State Capital.

2.3.9 The Atrocities of Despotic Regime

In 1969, a bloodless coup resulted in the installment of President Siad Barre. From 1969
to 1978, the Barre Regime enjoyed relative popularity and financial support from both the
Soviet Union and Western institutions (Nyambura, 2011). While projecting an image of
Somalia as a constitutional state to international actors, Barre cultivated a patrimonial
state that increasingly revolved around clan identity. Clan-based paramilitaries were
funded and armed by the government, a practice that exacerbated relations between
communities that had previously lived adjacently and intermarried with little conflict.
Rather than completely excluding particular clans, Barre coopted key actors in certain
sub-clans, causing divisions within the larger clans. During this time, the regime passed
legislation giving the state wide powers of detention and execution. A number of
paramilitaries, militias, and security agencies were founded, including the National
Security Service and the Victory Pioneers. While there were several incidents of political
violence, this caused relatively low numbers of civilian deaths; no single incident from
1945 to 1975 seems to have caused more than 100 civilian deaths.

The Barre regime became increasingly oppressive and violent in the late 1970s through
the 1980s, although mass atrocities did not begin until later. In 1977 Somalia entered the

Ethio-Somalia or Ogaden war with Ethiopia. After a number of initial victories, the Soviet Union withdrew support from Somalia in favor of Ethiopia, and Somalia lost the war in 1978. Discontent with the Siad Barre regime began to spread after the military loss against Ethiopia. Siad Barre had eighty-two high level military officers executed in Ethiopian territory for their opposition to the way the war was handled (Menkhaus, 2014). The military failure and execution of military officers prompted a 1978 coup attempt. Despite somewhat diverse clan participation amongst the coup leaders, Barre portrayed the coup as orchestrated by the Majeerteen clan. In a pattern similar to what would be used later against the Isaak clan in 1988, Barre responded by purging the government and military of Majeerteen, and committing reprisal killings against the Majeerteen civilian clan members that left roughly 2,000 dead (murirhi, 2012).

The 1980s saw the rise of opposition armed movements, the largest of which was the Somali National Movement (SNM), drawn principally from members of the Isaak clan in northwestern Somalia, which developed in response to state marginalization and abuse including the purge of Isaak from civil service posts, confiscation of businesses, arrests, detention, and violence against Isaak civilians. Throughout the 1980s, the Siad Barre regime responded to oppositional militias by employing increasingly violent and restrictive measures on various clan populations. Beginning in 1982, the state imposed curfews in certain areas that were used as a pretense for the detainment and extortion of civilians (Osman, 2007). Detainment and looting became a lucrative source of funding for state forces and paramilitaries that were referred to as the 'meat market'. The government employed Mobile Military Courts (MMCs) to combat opposition militants

and their associated civilian populations. MMCs were superficial judicial proceedings conducted by military officials, and followed almost immediately by executions. Although wholesale targeting and decimation of the Isaak population did not begin until the SNM offensive in 1988, a confidential report from General Morgan to President Barre that was leaked in February 1987 revealed a government intention to "liquidate" the "Isaak problem" through violent tactics (Williams, 2012).

In 1988, the SNM received information that they were about to be expelled from their base of operations in Ethiopia on account of a peace agreement between the Somali and Ethiopian governments. In response, on May 27, 1988, the SNM launched a sudden attack on Burao, followed by an attack on Hargeisa on May 31 (Jeremy, 2013). The SNM dispersed amongst the civilian population, with some SNM in uniform and others in partial uniform or plain clothes. These tactics likely resulted in higher civilian casualties than necessary, however, the government clearly responded to the SNM attack with a purposeful program of reprisal against Isaak civilians. Compagnon estimates that 15,000-20,000 civilians were killed directly from the bombing of Hargeisa and Burao. Bah (2009), "A Government at War with Its Own People" estimated that roughly 50,000 to 60,000 people were killed between May of 1988 and the beginning of 1990. While it is unlikely that all of these deaths are civilian, with SNM membership estimated at only 10,000 it is clear that many civilians were killed, the large majority of which were Isaak. Deaths were inflicted through indiscriminate government bombing of the towns of Hargeisa and Burao. Civilians fleeing from fighting were strafed by government planes.

Although the largest spike in killings is in May and August of 1988, the government's Somali National Army (SNA) continued to target the Isaak community over many months through round-ups and mass executions of Isaak civilians at the town level (Onditi, 2015). Other government tactics against Isaak civilians included laying land mines around towns, destroying water points, killing or looting livestock, burning of villages, and arbitrary detention. According to Chumba (2016), 5,000 unarmed civilian Issaks were purposefully murdered by the Somali Armed Forces between May 1988 and March 1989, in the absence of resistance and in contexts which presented no immediate danger to these forces. In general, civilian casualties were slightly more likely to be male than female. In particular, men were targeted for execution and detention.

Although violence from 1988 to 1990 was largely one-sided, the SNM forces were also responsible for civilian deaths, including about 400 deaths that resulted from attacks on refugee camps in the northwestern area of Somalia that housed ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia and from which the government had recruited SAF and militia members. All SNM attacks resulting in civilian deaths occurred in the period of May and August of 1988. With roughly 400,000-500,000 people displaced from the Northwestern area of Somalia by the government's violent tactics and fewer Isaak left to attack, the government violence in Northwestern Somalia slowed (Hersi, 2015).

The bombing of Hargeisa and Burao came at a high cost to the Barre regime. Not only had the fighting been expensive, but the departure of many of the Somali elite, the

withdrawal of vital U.S. support for Barre, and the sympathy the SNM increasingly attracted from neighboring countries threatened Barre's regime. With a sense that the Barre regime was weakening, a number of clan based militias arose to secure control over their respective areas of the country. The United Somali Congress (USC) representing the Hawiye clan in Central Somalia emerged in late 1989. From the start, the USC was divided by an "internal" faction fighting within Somalia, and an "external" branch based in Italy (Reno, 2011). By 1990 the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) was established by Ogaden clansmen in the South. SNM retained some control in the Northwest and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) originally created in 1978 but revived in 1989 was present in the Northeast. The Barre regime continued to launch targeted reprisals against the civilian population throughout 1990.

Siad Barre's presidential brigade, the Red Berets, was responsible for civilian executions in and around Mogadishu. In one incident, the Red Berets killed 100 civilians gathered in a stadium. In another incident in Buli Burti, the Red Berets killed fifty unarmed civilians (most were prominent locals such al elected officials, clan elders, and Islamic leaders) in retaliation for a USC attack on SAF troops. Nontheless, the government lost ground, and eventually retained control over only roughly ten to fifteen percent of the state territory. At the end of 1990, the USC launched an offensive on Mogadishu, and on 27 January 1991, Barre fled the capital (Hansen, 2007) . As Barre fled, the 'external' branch of the USC declared Ali Mahdi Mohamed president. The "internal" branch of the USC led by General Mohamed Farah Aideed contested this decision, and civil war between the two

factions enveloped Mogadishu shortly after Barre's departure, with significant civilian casualties as a result of heavy artillery being used within the confines of a densely populated urban environment. While some of the fatalities were undoubtedly accidental, Amnesty International reports the intentional shelling of neighborhoods known to be associated with opposing factions and Prunier describes a situation in which prisoners were executed and ambulances routinely fired at (Osman, 2007).

While violence raged in Mogadishu, other parts of the country were also enveloped in fighting between clan based militias, none of which is reflected in the above death tallies calculated for Mogadishu. In 1992, both the USC and SNF committed atrocities against civilian populations in the Gedo region of Somalia. Amnesty International recorded the testimony of survivors, who described tactics that included massacres of up to thirty or forty people at a time, cutting off and burning of body parts with acid, and the widespread use of rape (Hesse, 2014). The SNF under General Morgan and SPM under Colonel Omar Jess battled over the port area around Kismayo (Onditi, 2015).

Hansen (2007) categorizes the violence used during this time as "clan cleansing as a tactic to capture the state.' Civilians were intentionally and brutally targeted, and sexual violence, which consumed not previously been a prominent feature of the violence in Somalia, became pervasive. There was breakdown of law and order following the collapse of the Barre regime, the erosion of cultural scripts, and increased impunity as

causes for the escalation in tactics. Deliberate targeting of Daarood as the USC gained ground. when Mogadishu passed into its hands, the leaders of the USC, followed by USC fighters and civilian supporters, adopted a politics that defined as mortal enemy all Somalis encompassed by the genealogical construct of Daarood, which also included the president. Although the vast majority of these individuals had not been associated with, or benefited from the regime—in many cases as little or even less than those now hunting them down—they were nevertheless targeted for elimination and expulsion not only in Mogadishu but also, over a period of two years, in central, south-central, and southern Somalia.

Massive displacement and disruption of the livelihoods of agro-pastoral communities resulted in a famine beginning in 1992. Although famine deaths can be viewed as a direct result of violence which reflect only intentional deaths violently inflicted on the civilian population (Hersi, 2014). Various ranges emerge to capture the number of deaths resulting from the famine. Williams (2012) estimates 250,000-300,000 deaths while the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates 500,000 may have died. Famine in Somalia paved the way for an international military and humanitarian intervention in Somalia.

Joint U.S.-UN forces entered Somalia under the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF) banner in December of 1992. UNITAF was later transformed into UNOSOM and

UNOSOM II. While inter-clan militia fighting continued during this period, new casualties arose from fighting between international forces and Somali militias (Nyambura, 2011). Civilian casualties and high numbers of civilians wounded by bullets appear to be the result of international military equipment such as the Cobra helicopter gunship. Jeremy (2013) estimated that between December 1992 and October of 1993, at least 500 to 600 Somali civilians and combatants were killed, while 2,000 were wounded by U.S. or UNOSOM forces.

Investigations into the actions of various UNITAF/ UNOSOM forces also revealed abuses against civilians. One investigation of Belgian forces revealed 58 cases of killing or injury to unarmed civilians, although the number of actual abusive killings may have been much larger than the inquiry suggests (Opon, 2015). Abuses committed by the Italian troops include the looting of displaced persons camps and rape. Malaysians also engaged in looting while Pakistanis and Nigerians indiscriminately fired on protesting crowds. The United States adopted a practice of excessive force intended to achieve military victories with minimal loss of U.S. military lives. This policy, coupled with U.S. military technology in the urban Mogadishu environment led to breaches of the Geneva conventions and hundreds of civilian fatalities, including an attack on a hospital that led to at least two civilian casualties, and an attack on a mainly civilian political meeting of Aideed supporters, that resulted in 54 deaths (Hesse, 2014).

On September 9, 1993, a U.S. helicopter fired on an unarmed crowd killing roughly 60

civilians. Anywhere from 60 to 500 Somali deaths resulted from the October 3, 1993

"Black Hawk Down" incident. After the "Black Hawk Down" incident, the United States

declared a *de facto* truce with Gen. Aideed and the fighting diminished, and thereafter

UNOSOM troops shifted their mission to a more defensive strategy, and as a result,

civilian deaths caused by tensions between Somali and international troops dropped off.

UNOSOM forces were gradually withdrawn throughout 1994 and made a final exit in

February of 1995 (Nyambura, 2011). Before departing, some UNOSOM forces are

reported to have sold military equipment to Somali militants, potentially causing an

increase in the amount of heavy weapons on the ground (Osman, 2007).

Somalia remained with no central authority. The warlords took over the country. AU

through the umbrella of AMISOM mounted a peace support operating geared towards

stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia (Williams, 2012). Currently, there are

AMISOM consists of troops from 7 countries.

2.4 Theoretical insights

Institutional building of Somalia started early in 1991 with the intervention of UNOSOM

I and II. The concerted efforts yielded little success. It sounds disturbingly familiar to

observers of contemporary efforts to build Somali state institutions that many of the same

dynamics at play in the 1980s persist today, bedeviling both Somalis and foreigners

attempting to revive functional and accountable governmental institutions. The fact that

these pathologies have now been a dominant part of the Somali political landscape for 35

years suggests that explanations cannot be reduced to relatively recent factors such as warlordism. The protracted nature of the crisis has also contributed to the rise of a political subculture among much of the country's small political elite that is soaked in impunity, corruption, and collusion, reducing national political life to the art of unapologetic embezzlement regardless of who is nominally in power. To the extent that this behavior has become the "new normal" in Somali politics, and deeply embedded in the shared norms of rival elites, it will be challenging to reverse.

Many theories have been put forward to aid in understanding of the persistence of the Somalia conflict. It is in this context that the researcher has used these theories to give yard stick measures for the ongoing peace support operations in Somalia. How these theories could help make the PSO relatively much better. The section has further given critique of these theories. The theories are shown on table 2.1. Underpinnings of these theories, give peace support troops the heuristic measures of the successes or failures of the peace enforcement mission. The theories are further discussed as follows

Table 2.1 Summary of theories of war and peace

S/No	Theory	Explanation	Weakpoint
1	Theory of armed combat	Efficient in degrading the fighting capability of a fielded force.	Does not give specifics on winning wars.
2	Securitization theory	Stresses state security.	Can easily be exploited by politicians
3	Interventionism theory	Offers heuristic tool for the conduct of peace support operations.	Fails to give a clear path on institutional building capacities.

Source: Author, 2017

2.4.1 Theory of armed combat

War is a vital matter of state. It is the field on which life or death is determined and the road that leads to either survival or ruin, and must be examined with the greatest care (Clausewitz, 1940). The theory of combat has been advanced by Clausewitz. It tries to discover how one may gain a preponderance of physical forces and material advantages at the decisive point. Conflicts present complexities to the generals and the countries waging those wars. Theory of combat gives heuristic measures on the conduct of offensive operations, defensive operations, principles governing the use of troops and the use of terrain when deploying troops.

2.4.1.1 Offensive and defensive strategies

AMISOM troops will have to work on both offensive and defensive operations. The strategic attacker is the side seeking to add to its relative power. It usually is the side that initiates a war, although defenders sometimes launch preemptive attacks (and attackers nearly always claim to be defenders doing so). The attacker may be seeking to overthrow the balance of power system and establish hegemony, or it may simply want an upward adjustment in its relative position. This distinction will affect the kinds of strategies both sides will pursue and the intensity of the struggle.

The strategic defender is the side that wants to keep what it has. There may be ambiguity in this, as when a defensive-minded power seeks merely to maintain its relative position in a balance of power system. In many important respects, the defense is inherently the stronger form of war. This innate superiority of the strategic defense reflects human psychology and the balance of power mechanism, as well as the forces of friction and inertia. Within the entities at war, people are naturally willing to endure great sacrifices in defense of their homes and homelands, but much less willing to endure such sacrifices in military adventures abroad. Within the larger community, the attacker causes fear. Fear leads to hostility even on the part of those who are not attacked, who therefore tend to aid the defender (Fuller, 1945). Thus the balance of power mechanism tends to support the existing balance of power and to resist challenges to it. Friction and inertia are naturally

on the side of the defender: It is inherently easier to hold onto something than to take it away from someone else.

These political and psychological strengths of the defense are present in all wars, even those in which, as in some internal wars, territorial gains and losses are not a factor. The strength of the defense is reinforced at the operational level in wars fought over any expanse of territory. The attacker is normally moving away from his base of supply and the center of his political power, while the defender is falling back on his. The superiority of the defense is not an absolute. Obviously, a defender with few resources and poor leadership is not stronger than an attacker with vastly greater resources and good leadership. The point is that, all other things being equal (which they never are), the defender has the advantage. AMISOM operations should be adequately planned if they are to defeat the belligerents (Pflanz, 2009).

The superior strength of the defense is inherent only at the strategic and operational levels. At the tactical level, the picture is more mixed. In battle, both sides usually take a mixture of offensive and defensive actions. Historically the tactical defense has usually been the stronger form, but there have been times when tactical, technological, organizational, or social innovations have temporarily shifted the balance towards the tactical offense. Most "military revolutions" are rooted in such a development. All such military innovations are eventually countered, usually sooner rather than later (Fuller, 1945)

At the tactical and operational levels, the roles of attacker and defender may frequently change hands or even be shared more or less evenly. At the strategic level, however, the roles tend to be fixed throughout any given conflict. In World War II, for instance, the Western allies still held the advantages of the strategic defense even as their armies marched into Germany (Scahill, 2013). They were perceived as being restorers of the balance of power rather than as threats to it. Thus it is very important to place the war-guilt on the enemy. This is easiest if he can be made or allowed to attack first (and, of course, it helps if he really is the strategic aggressor).

One of Lincoln's greatest strategic achievements was to maneuver the Confederacy into firing the first shot. This did a lot at the political and strategic level to counterbalance the defensive strengths the South enjoyed operationally and tactically. It strengthened the North's sense of righteousness and greatly lessened the likelihood of foreign intervention on the South's behalf. In the case of the Franco-Prussian War, it was the French government, goaded by an irresponsibly nationalistic French press, who actually launched the war. Politically, this was an unwise move, nullifying the fact that it was Prussia who sought to radically reshape the European balance of power. In Vietnam, the United States was never able to effectively place the war-guilt on the Communists, even though it claimed to be defending an independent South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese state never had sufficient legitimacy, and it was hard to convince either the Vietnamese, the world audience, or even many Americans that the United States had any legitimate interests to defend in Indochina (Fuller, 1945).

In some situations, however, the roles of strategic attacker and defender can change hands. When war is endemic in a society, when the origins of the conflict are poorly remembered, and when the war-guilt has come to be equally shared, the advantages of the original defender tend to be lost. In such a case, the balance of power mechanism will tend to support the current defender and oppose whichever contender seems momentarily to have the initiative. Still, the inherent advantage belongs to the defense. Only if one participant gains an overwhelming advantage will this cease to be true. In that case, the balance of power system has been destroyed. At that point, the defender is left only with the operational advantages of the defense and those, if any, that technology and technique give to the defence at tactical level (Feaver, 1998).

2.4.1.2 Relationship between Major and Minor Successes

The proposition that major successes help bring about minor ones derives from Clausewitz's general assumption that war, like every real phenomenon, consisted of a number of interdependent elements, when one was affected so, too, were the others, even if only minimally. Statements like, "small things always depend on great ones," or conversely, "that great tactical successes lead to great strategic ones," reflect this belief (Howard and Peter, 1976). In turn, Clausewitz's experience as a soldier taught him that the material and moral superiority gained from large victories often led to smaller ones. For example, the defeat of the main Prussian army at Jena-Auerstadt in 1806 led to a number of smaller garrisons and depots falling rather quickly into French hands.

Howard and Peter (1976) note that the outcome of a major battle has a greater psychological effect on the loser than on the winner. This, in turn, gives rise to additional loss of material strength, which is echoed in loss of morale; the two become mutually interactive as each enhances and intensifies the other. So one must place special emphasis on the moral effect, which works in opposite directions on each side: while sapping the strength of the loser, it raises the vigor and energy of the winner. But the defeated side is the one most affected by it, since it becomes the direct cause of additional loss. Moreover, it is closely related to the dangers, exertions, and hardships -- in brief, to all the wear and tear inseparable from war. It merges with these conditions and is nurtured by them.

The successes of alshabaab offensives against the AMISOM troops have seen loss of morale against the soldiers. whereas, the enemy`s activities are high. The strategies for the peace support operations have to be redrawn. With this passage, Clausewitz did more than anticipate the modern offensive phases of exploitation and pursuit. He in fact recognized an overall interconnectedness of events within a particular theater of war, especially in terms of morale, such that a victorious outcome in one battle might contribute to success in others as well. The successful offensive

2.4.1.3 Conditions of Victory

Clausewitz (1940) derived his proposition that "victory consists not only in the occupation of the battlefield, but in the destruction of the enemy's physical and psychic forces" from the conditions of victory as he defined them for both the strategic and

tactical levels of war. On the strategic level, Clausewitz wrote that victory in war required: 1) the complete or partial destruction of the enemy's armed forces; 2) the occupation of his country; and 3) the breaking of his will to fight. The political object, the original motive, for which the war was fought determines the extent to which each of these objectives is to be pursued (Atulio, 1995). On the tactical level, victory involves: 1) the enemy's greater loss of material strength; 2) his loss of morale; and 3) his admission of the same by abandoning his intentions (Atulio, 1995). The loss of the enemy's moral and physical forces, as Clausewitz pointed out, need not be actual. It can, and often is merely the threat of loss which is sufficient to bring about the surrender or capitulation of enemy forces. Moreover, for Clausewitz, breaking the enemy's morale possessed far more significance than the destruction of his material strength: "In the engagement, the loss of morale has proved the major decisive factor ... [it] becomes the means of achieving the margin of profit in the destruction of the enemy's physical forces which is the real purpose of the engagement. The intensified engagement of the AMISOM troops on the armed group would have been maintained. Momentum has to be maintained if alshabaab capability has to be degraded.

The continued resistance of the French population after the battle of Sedan supports Clausewitz's emphasis on the psychological or irrational element of war. While the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs provides significant advantages to technology-based societies, the concept of a Peoples' War remains its Achilles heel, thereby underscoring the crucial role that cultural values, ideologies, and belief systems play in motivating a society for war (Atulio, 1995).

2.4.1.4 Turning movements and flank positions

Envelopments and turning movements are similar in nature. Their basic definitions have not changed since Clausewitz's day. Envelopments are maneuvers around or over the enemy's position, avoiding his strength, to strike at his flanks and rear. A turning movement is a variant of the envelopment in which the attacker avoids the defense entirely in order to seek key terrain deep in the enemy's rear and along his lines of communication, thus forcing him to abandon his position (Clausewitz, 1940) "The enveloping or turning movement," Clausewitz wrote, "may have two objectives. It may aim at disrupting, or cutting, communications, causing the army to wither and die, and thus be forced to retreat; or it may aim at cutting off the retreat itself (Atulio, 1995). Because such movements expose one's own lines of communication to attack, Clausewitz (1940) argued that flanking operations, which have always been more popular in books than in the field are rarely practicable, and dangerous only to very long and vulnerable lines of communication.

Clausewitz (1940) defined a flank position as any position that is meant to be held even though the enemy may pass it by: once he has, the only effect it can have is on his strategic flank. This definition included all fortified positions since they are, in theory at least, "impregnable," and any unfortified position which happens to be cut off, regardless of whether it faces parallel or perpendicular to the enemy's line of advance (e.g., the Prussian position on the Saale during Napoleon's advance in 1806). Such flank positions effective if they cause the attacker to hesitate, but risky, particularly in the case of

unfortified ones, if the attacker proceeded unchecked, since, as Clausewitz (1940) explained that the defender will pretty well have lost his chances of retreat.

The development of rapid-firing, long-range rifles and machine guns in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries made flanking operations more appealing to armies who wanted to close with the enemy while avoiding his deadly frontal fire. Moltke the Elder (Chief of Staff of the German General Staff, 1857-1888) seemed to have perfected the technique of tactical envelopment in Germany's wars against Austria and France in 1866 and 1870 respectively. To Count Alfred von Schlieffen (Chief of Staff of the German General Staff, 1891-1905), however, flank attacks became something of an obsession -- they were the essential element in all of military history (Atulio, 1995).

Rather than treat the act of "falling on the enemy's rear" as an accomplishment in itself, "a prize exhibit," or a formula for success, Clausewitz (1940) soberly argued that flanking operations in general were most effective only under the following conditions: while on the strategic defensive; toward the end of a campaign, when the enemy's lines of communication have been extended; especially during a retreat into the interior of the country; and in conjunction with armed insurrection. All of these conditions, save the last, were present in MacArthur's famous landing at Inchon during the Korean conflict, a classic turning movement that saved UN forces from defeat (Atulio, 1995). As the lethality of the battlefield continues to increase, envelopments (including those vertical in nature) and turning movements are likely to gain even greater significance as forms of maneuver.

2.4.1.5 The diminishing force of the attack

Clausewitz (1986) saw the diminishing force of the attack, the culminating point of the attack, and the culminating point of victory as related concepts. Anticipating the modern concept of strategic consumption, Clausewitz (1940) wrote all attackers find that their strength diminishes as they advance. The seven factors which cause the depletion of the attackers strength: occupation of the enemy's country; the need to secure lines of communication; losses incurred through combat and sickness; the distance from replacements of both material and personnel; by sieges and investment of fortresses; by a reduction of effort (moral and physical); and by the defection of allies. Yet, a weakening of the attack may be partially or completely cancelled out by a weakening of the defense. Thus, the depletion of the attacker's strength, while demonstrably true, has no meaning unless it is considered in relation to the strength of the defender.

Drawing directly from these observations concerning the diminishing force of the attack, Clausewitz (1940) concluded that most attacks do not lead directly to the end of hostilities, but instead reach a culminating point at which the superior strength of the attack[er] ... is just enough to maintain a defense and wait for peace. By way of corollary, the moral and physical superiority gained through a successful battle generally augmented the strength of the victor, adding to his superiority, but only to a certain extent, and this is the culminating point of victory. This circumstance was particularly evident in wars in which it was not possible for the victor to completely defeat his opponent. The same factors that contributed to reducing the strength of the attacker also played a role in diminishing the moral and material superiority that a military force

gained through victory: the utilization of a victory, a continued advance in an offensive campaign, will usually swallow up the superiority with which one began or which was gained by the victory. This culminating point in victory is bound to recur in every future war in which the destruction of the enemy cannot be the military aim, and this will presumably be true of most wars. The natural goal of all campaign plans, therefore, is the turning point at which attack becomes defense [-- the culminating point of the attack (Atulio, 1995).

In short, attacks that did not result in peace must end in defense. To proceed beyond the culminating point of the attack merely invited disaster, for it was erroneous to assume that so long as an attack progresses there must still be some superiority on its side. Clausewitz (1940) continued it is therefore important to calculate this point correctly when planning the campaign. An attacker may otherwise take on more than he can manage ... ; a defender must be able to recognize this error if the enemy commits it, and exploit it to the full. Both Napoleon's and Hitler's campaigns in Russia serve as ample illustrations of what can happen when an attacker exceeds his culminating point (Atulio, 1995).

2.4.2 Criticism of Theory of Combat

2.4.2.1 The absolute versus reality of definition of war

To Clausewitz, 'War is nothing but a duel on an extensive scale… an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will,' directed by political motives and

morality. (Clausewitz, 1940). War is neither a scientific game nor an international sport; it is an act of violence, characterized by destruction (Clausewitz 1940). Whereas Clausewitz submits that war is a natural part of human life, he begins to digress from reality into a state of fantasy, which considers the existence of absolute, or ideal, warfare. In its ideal form, war must be evaluated as 'pure concept,' meaning that war has timeless elements such as 'violence, political impact, and the vagaries of the play of human intelligence, will and emotions.' A state of absolute war would not consider the political and moral limits that hold significant in real, or total, war (Elshtain, 1995).

There are two motives that lead men to war in the absolute and total sense, instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In terms of absolute war, Clausewitz (1940) discusses three characteristics that make it unique. First, the utmost use of force is necessary. Second, the aim is to disarm the enemy. Lastly, absolute war calls for the utmost exertion of powers. However, absolute war only exists in the abstract, and every requirement changes in shape when shifting to reality. For instance, while Clausewitz argues as to the impossibility of absolute war, he lists three requirements for it to occur in the real world. War would become a completely isolated act in no way motivated by the previous history of a state or politics, limited to a single solution (or to several concurrent solutions), and would contain within itself the perfect solution. The probabilities and chance that exist in reality prohibit an entirely absolute war from happening because the political will always enter the realm of war, even in its conclusion (Clausewitz, 1940).

At the conclusion of World War I, Clausewitz's theory of real war began to gain ground. Though often confused with absolute war, and even used interchangeably, real war is war as it exists in the real world. War, in its ideal form, cannot be waged in a limited way, though in reality a war without limits would be neither possible nor preferable. Though Clausewitz set out in search for the 'absolute,' and the 'regulative idea' of war in the international and national context, he concluded that war cannot be explained outside of the political context, and thus there never can be absolute war in reality (Gat,1989).

2.4.2.2 Theories on war and peace

As the threat of war was constant in his time, there is very little mention of peace in Carl Von Clausewitz's *On War*. Though, much like Niccoló Machiavelli's theory that peace should only be viewed as 'breathing time' to prepare for the next military plans, Clausewitz is of the opinion that long periods of peace may alter the state's ability to defend itself in the future, and that instances of peace should be well spent by exercising the military. In addition, allies that have recently been involved in war should be made during peacetime to share lessons and experiences from different types of warfare. (Clausewitz, 1940) Whereas Michael Doyle, the author of *Ways of War and Peace*, criticizes Clausewitz for ruminating that war is a constant and never gives an explanation as to how to eliminate war entirely, it would seem that Clausewitz never set out to eradicate war but to theorize on how to be successful in war. To Clausewitz, there are no

special tactics for peace. War is a never-ending cycle, and as Clausewitz notoriously wrote, 'To secure peace is to prepare for war.' (Doyle, 1997).

In what Clausewitz refers to as the theoretical concept of war, he outlines three objectives for success. First, the armed forces of the opponent must be destroyed. Second, the country must be occupied. Third, the will of the enemy must be broken. In theory, peace simply cannot be achieved until all three objectives are met, however, the complete defeat of an enemy would be a 'mere imaginative flight.' War, '… the hostile feeling and action of hostile agencies, cannot be considered as an end as long as the *will* of the enemy is not subdued.' (Cimbala, 1991). In addition, the government and its allies must be forced to sign a peace treaty, for otherwise war could potentially start afresh with the assistance of the allies. Though Clausewitz admits that war could begin again directly after the peace, he argues that it only serves to prove that war does not carry in itself elements for a final settlement of peace. War, though not always constant, is continual (Clausewitz, 1940).

According to Clausewitz, war is always limited by 'friction' – uncertainty, chance, and inevitable logistical or organizational misfortunes. Also mentioned is the notion of 'rational calculus,' that states intrinsically use violence to achieve a desired end. The less controlled the use of violence is by one side, the lengthier the war. (Clausewitz, 1940) Throughout *Vom Kriege (On War)*, Carl von Clausewitz, continually refers to a

'remarkable' or 'paradoxical' trinity which drives real war, composed of 1) primordial violence, enmity, and hatred 2) chance and probability, and 3) the element of war of subordination to rational policy. The trinity serves as a magnet to balance the three forces of war – the people, the military, and the statesmen. Clausewitz argues that the passions that kindle war must be innate in the people, the courage and talent of the commander and army plays into the realm of probability and chance, but the political aims are only the business of the government alone. Though, without the three branches working in harmony, war cannot be successfully waged (Clausewitz, 1940; Bassford, 2008).

Above all, Clausewitz emphasizes that war exists in the realm of chance. The most certain idea about war lies in the uncertainty of it. Chance acts in a way that makes all of the elements of war more uncertain and can ultimately alter the course of events. (Cimbala, 1991) 'Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one has experienced war.' (Clausewitz, 1940).

2.4.2.3 Perceived Strengths and Weaknesses

The most significant weakness in Carl von Clausewitz's *Vom Kriege* is not an issue with the subject of the text itself, but that, because of the premature death of Clausewitz, much of the work has been left unedited and the book was not finished. While the intent of the author is always debatable anyway, the unfinished status of the book leaves perhaps too

much to the readers' imagination, and there are many inconsistencies that make *Vom Kriege* difficult to interpret. Among interpretations is that of Liddell Hart, one of Clausewitz's leading opponents. Hart (1994) portrayed Clausewitz as 'the apostle of total war,' criticizing him for identifying war with images of the utmost violence. Hart even went so far as to suggest that Clausewitz had inadvertently caused the bloodbath on the Western Front from 1914-1918, with the great misinterpretation of his theories by his disciples. (Hart, 1994).

Another weakness in Clausewitz's work can be seen in his case for the aforementioned three imperatives of war (the destruction of the armed forces, occupying forces, and the broken spirit of the enemy). While Clausewitz himself recognized that these standards were next to impossible to meet in reality, both the possibility and the impossibility have increased exponentially with new technology. First, though Clausewitz could not have foreseen the possibility of nuclear weapons whilst living in the 19th century, with the advent of nuclear bombs and the like, his theory of absolute war could, in fact become a reality in the 21st century. However, in the present day, an opponent cannot feasibly disarm a nuclear-armed superpower, as mutually assured destruction (MAD) ensures this (Bassford 2008).

On the other hand, while war in itself was no longer a playable option due to deterrence during the Cold War, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of more

regional and world powers, the international arena began to transform into one ruled by the political will of the nation-states. While Clausewitz was considered obsolete in the context of the bi-polar Cold War, the resurgence of world and regional powers in a multi-polar world reaffirmed the lessons of Clausewitz. Though the modern state is still classified as a nuclear age, with nuclear weapons available for some countries, the majority of states that make up the international system do not have access to them and still must rely on Clausewitz's strategy and tactics, no to mention less advanced weapons. The change back to multi-polarity shows that Clausewitz is even more relevant today than his work was for the better half of the 20th century, and there is strength in that *Vom Kriege* has, in fact, withstood the test of time.

While the issue of whether much of Carl von Clausewitz's work is obsolete with the advent of nuclear weapons is still highly debatable, and it is evident that the text of *Vom Kriege* is not relevant in the exact context in which it was written, the tactics and the relationship between war, peace and politics promoted throughout the literature has influenced warfare and politics alike since its conception. With tactics from Vom Kriege used widely as military doctrine and foreign policy around the world based on Clausewitzian theories such as the paradoxical trinity and the center of gravity, it is apparent that Clausewitz's lessons live on. Because of this continued application to the modern world, even over 150 years later, it is difficult to disagree with Clausewitz and the concepts of war, peace, and politics set forth in his work. Though there are clearly some contextual issues, given that he gained influence from the political atmosphere of

the early 19th century, in the end, Carl von Clausewitz is *the* war theorist to consult when advice is necessary on war, peace, and politics. As US President George Washington declared, 'If we desire to secure peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war,' demonstrating Clausewitz's sentiments exactly (Bassford, 2008).

2.4.3 Securitization theory

Securitization is the process of state actors transforming subjects into matters of 'security': an extreme version of politicization that enables extraordinary means to be used in the name of security (Buzan *et al*, 1998). The term was coined by Ole Weaver in 1995, but seems to have become commonplace, at least within constructivist studies of international relations. Securitization theorists assert that successfully securitized subjects receive disproportionate amounts of attention and resources compared to unsuccessfully securitized subjects causing more human damage. It examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. Securitization studies aim to understand "who securitizes (Securitizing actor), on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what conditions (Buzan *et al,*1998).

The theory has been developed by Woever. The main argument of securitization theory is that security is a (illocutionary) speech act, which solely by uttering 'security' something is being done. 'It is by labelling something a security issue that it becomes

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one' (Woever, 2004). By stating that a particular referent object is threatened in its existence, a securitizing actor claims a right to extraordinary measures to ensure the referent object's survival. The issue is then moved out of the sphere of normal politics into the realm of emergency politics, where it can be dealt with swiftly and without the normal (democratic) rules and regulations of policy-making. For security this means that it no longer has any given (pre-existing) meaning but that it can be anything a securitizing actor says it is. Security is a social and intersubjective construction. That is the meaning of security.

To prevent 'everything' from becoming a security issue, a successful securitization consists of three steps. These are: (1) identification of existential threats; (2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan *et al,* 1998). To present an issue as an existential threat is to say that: 'If we do not tackle this problem, everything else will be irrelevant (because we will not be here or will not be free to deal with it in our own way)' (Buzan *et al*, 1998). In the ongoing peace support operations in Somalia, the securitizing actor becomes AMISOM. The troops are to make sure that the existential threat is subdued. This consists of Al shabaab and other militant groups that threaten peace and stability of Somalia. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) remains the referent object. FGS is supposed to develop security mechanism by carrying out security and sector reforms under mentorship of AMISOM. The Somalia National Army and Somalia national Police Force are too weak to meet the security demands of the country. Somalis are the audience in the tenets of securitization theory. They play a great role in influencing the success of the operations. This first step towards

a successful securitization is called a securitizing move. A securitizing move is in theory an option open to any unit because only once an actor has convinced an audience (inter-unit relations) of its legitimate need to go beyond otherwise binding rules and regulations (emergency mode) can we identify a case of securitization.

 In practice, securitization is thus far from being open to all units and their respective subjective threats. Rather, it is largely based on power and capability and therewith the means to socially and politically construct a threat. In this way the study of security remains wide, but with restrictions pertaining to 'who' can securitize it is neither unmanageable nor incoherent. This being said it should be noted that Woever (1998) is extremely critical of framing issues in terms of security. For him: 'security should be seen as a negative, as a failure to deal with issues of normal politics' (Buzan et al. 1998). Because of this, he favours a strategy of desecuritization whereby securitization is reversed and issues are moved out of 'the threat — defence sequence and into the ordinary public sphere' where they can be dealt with in accordance with the rules of the (democratic) political system (Woever, 1998). Although this is clearly a normative statement on the part of Woever, it is important to notice that it has no bearing on what securitization theory can do. This is so because securitization and for that matter desecuritization are political acts and therefore outside of the securitization theorist's personal preference. This brief overview shows that securitization theory is not a political statement on the part of the analyst, but that securitization theory is instead a theoretical tool of analysis with which the analyst can trace incidences of securitization and desecuritization. Securitization theory by itself does not enable the analyst to say what

security should be/not be. Securitization theory thus seeks to answer the question — what does security do? — by this AMISOM should be able to provide security to the Somalis.

The theory of securitization examines the deployment of the AMISOM troops. Through the lens of concept of security in securitization theory, the research evaluated the operations of peace support troops. Securitization is a process-oriented conception of security, which stands in contrast to materialist approaches of classical security studies (Daniel, 2015). Classical approaches of security focus on the material dispositions of the threat including distribution of power, military capabilities, and polarity, whereas securitization examines how a certain issue is transformed by an actor into a matter of security. For the securitizing act to be successful, it must be accepted by the audience. The leadership of AMISOM should be able to win the hearts and minds of the Somalis as to why their presence in Somalia is much needed. This can be facilitated through civil-military actions that bring positive interactive sessions with the civilians (Onditi, 2015).

Peace support troops must be able to define securitization as a speech act that has to fulfill three rhetorical criteria. It is a discursive process by means of which an actor claims that a referent object is existentially threatened, demands the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with the threat, and convinces an audience that rule-breaking behavior to counter the threat is justified. In short, by labeling something as "security," an issue is dramatized as an issue of supreme priority. One can, therefore, think of securitization as the process through which nonpoliticized (issues are not talked

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about) or politicized (issues are publicly debated) issues are elevated to security issues that need to be dealt with with urgency, and that legitimate the bypassing of public debate and democratic procedures (Buzan *et al*, 1998). Troops in the horn of Africa should be able to realign themselves in a posture that enables them to degrade the capabilities of the alshabaab. Stability of the country will allow the citizens of Somalia to carry on with their daily lives. Currently, peace support troops seem to be overwhelmed by their mandate. The troops have been authorized to operate under chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Securitization can cause normative dilemma precipitating negative securitization. Negative securitization processes are identified here as those that are the product of unchallenged structural and symbolic power relations as well as social or political processes of exclusion. The normative here is *not* a subjective claim of what should or should not be securitized; rather it is a concern with *how* the securitization process takes place and how a particular writing of securitization reproduces exclusionary or harmful acts of securitization. Others in this camp have argued that dominant modes of security work to define 'the other' as inferior and threatening and instill images of fear within a population. A feminist perspective acknowledges that the state then seeks to fill its role as the patriarchal protector, "provoking feelings of allegiance, safety, and submission" (Burke, 2002). Consequently, security, as a concept and a political tool, is able to promote subjectivities of fear and it often materializes as the product of oppressive or undemocratic acts as well as processes of social and political exclusion.

2.4.4 Interventionism theory

The theory of interventionism examines the nature and justifications of interfering with another polity (that is, political organization) or with choices made by individuals. Interventionism is characterized by the use or threat of force or coercion to alter a political or cultural situation nominally outside the intervenor's moral or political jurisdiction. This theory was coined by Argyris. It commonly deals with a government's interventions in other governments' affairs--and is thus an aspect of political philosophy, but it can also be extended to interventions in others' cultures, religions, lifestyles, and economic activities (Argyris, 1970).

Intervention theory is used in policy analysis to refer to decision-making problems of intervening effectively in order to achieve desired outcomes (Argyris, 1970). UNOSOM under the umbrella of mission Restore Hope did not achieve its mandates and as a result the forces withdrew in 1995. They incurred heavy casualties with the death of 23 Pakistani soldiers and 18 US soldiers. The operation dubbed Operation Gothic Serpent that was intended to capture one of the most notorious warlords ended tragically. Intervention theory addresses the question of when it is desirable to intervene and when it is not appropriate to do so. In this regard, timing is essential to the intervention processes. One would argue that the operation failed to achieve its objectives.

AMISOM operations were officially launched in 2007. The troops claim to have liberated many towns yet the very towns are still hostile with the activities of the armed militia group. Mogadishu itself remains quite unsafe to operate in. It is against this background that the researcher discusses and examines the effectiveness of operations of the peace support troops through the lens of theory of interventionism. Effective intervention depends on having the appropriate and useful information for intelligence purposes. The ultimate responsibility resides with the recipients of the intervention to internalise the goals of the intervention, which usually include the objective of bringing about positive change. In this regard, interventionism is really a process of norm promotion, from the perspective of both the interveners and those who are targets and recipients of intervention.

2.4.5 Summary of conceptual framework

The theories discussed informed the study. Through these theories, the research interrogated the effectiveness of AMISOM`s influence on peace building. The proponents of theory of armed combat, Fuller, Feaver and Doyle, reinforce that this theory is effective in degrading the capability of an insurgent group. Through the theory, the study examined military strategies used in neutralizing and disarming the militant groups thus creating the post-conflict reconstruction environment. Ole weaver and Buzan who are the major proponents of the securitization theory argue that the theory stresses on state security as should be structured by AMISOM. The configurations of the security agencies should be able to secure the country against both external and internal aggressions. AMISOM troops are supposed to mentor the security agencies which form

part of exit strategy. Argyris who is a major proponent of interventionism theory contend that the theory should interrogate the conduct of peace support operations by AMISOM. Through it, the study evaluated challenges AMISOM is facing in pursuit of stabilization efforts and the contributions the organization has had on the Somalis. Therefore, the theories interrogated a holistic approach through which peace support operations should be conducted and the expected outcome. Conducive milieu should be created for post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.

2.5 Summary

It is evident throughout the literature review that little information is available in relation to AMISOM`s peace support operations and peace building in Somalia. This is the knowledge gap that the researcher wanted to close up. The researcher discussed past peace support operations and their challenges. The theories discussed form the theoretical foundation of the study. Having reviewed literature, the study interrogated research methodology in the next chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter provides the operational framework within which data was collected and analyzed. The study was designed to evaluate the operations by peace support troops and give out strategies that would make the PSOs relatively more successful. The chapter gives detailed discussion of the context, methodological design, target population, sampling process, data collection techniques, data analysis procedures, limitations of the study and ethical considerations. The chapter concludes on a summary.

3.1 Research Design

According to Guy (1992), a descriptive survey design determines and reports findings the way they occur naturally with respect to one or more variables. With the aim of examining peace support operations, the requirement to examine the context of conflicts within the country is predestined. This examination stems from the research problem's need to evaluate and provide solutions to peace support operation hitches. The method for this study was also envisaged to test the securitization theory and theory of interventionism. Securitization theory has been employed by scholars in peace and conflict field when conducting their studies, taking the example of Emel (2000), who did a qualitative study on the challenges affecting the UN peace keeping operations in the post-cold war era. The methodology of this research is also based on the theory of

interventionism and securitization theory which substantiate the choice of a case study to accomplish the research.

Descriptive research design was used in the study because it employs a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches. Further, the problem addressed by social and health sciences researchers are complex and the use of either qualitative or quantitative approaches by themselves would be inadequate in addressing these complexities (Okoth, 2012). In addition, there is more insight to be gained from the combination of qualitative and quantitative than using either by itself. Their combined use provides a wide understanding of research problem (Creswell, 2009).

3.2 Study area

The study was conducted in Mogadishu city. Located in the coastal Banaadir region on the Indian Ocean, the city has served as an important port for millennia (Nyambura, 2011). It is the largest and capital city of war-torn Somalia. Somalia has an area of 637,657 km^2 and is located on the East Coast of Africa and North of the Equator with Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya as its neighbours. This region is often referred to as the Horn of Africa. The languages spoken in Somalia include Italian, Arabic, English and Somali. Somali is the official language. Somali is ethnically a homogenous society with similar cultural traditions (Bureau of African Affairs US, 2009). Somalis are traditionally nomadic pastoralists with an estimated 50% being pastoralists, 25% are farmers and 25% are urban based. When Somalia gained independence, unlike most African States, it had a strong sense of national identity. Somalis possess a common language, culture and they

also share a profound attachment to Islam (Meredith, 2006). The clanship system is the most distinctive features of the Somali social organisation. The Somalis are divided into patrilineal kinship-based on clans and sub clans. Clans are further divided into a multitude of sub-clans that are defined into lineages and trace their relations back to many generations. Indeed, it is customary for them as young as five years to be taught to memorise the whole of their genealogy of their clan. The clan system is vital for protection as well as for social security for its members (Hansen, 2007; Pflanz, 2009).

There are six major clan-families whose heads claim to descend from the same ancestor. Despite homogeneity at national level, there are also deep divisions in the society based not only on pastoral/agricultural and rural/urban backgrounds but also along genealogical lines to which most Somalis belong. The Hawiye, Darod, Isaaq, and Dir are mainly pastoral nomads. The Sab, Rahanweyn, Digil and Mirifle are largely agricultural and are settled in the inter-riverine areas of Southern Somalia. Minority clans; bantus, Reer-Harmas and Yemenis suffer from discrimination and exclusion. Traditional valueds and institutions held Somali society together (Mukhtar, 2003). Such institutions functioned through kinship Xigto, marriage and traditional social codes of conduct. The authority of clan chiefs and elders in the system depended on were accepted and respected. The introduction of modern system of governance prompted an apparent shift from traditional system to a modern system of governance. When the veneer of modern institutions disintegrated, the traditional institutions were nolonger able to resume their earlier role (Menkhaus, 2014).

Mogadishu city is the study area since it is the seat of AMISOM leadership: Head of Mission, Force Commander, Chief Administrator and other key staff officers. It also has a representation of soldiers and military officers from all troop contributing countries. The key leaders of AMISOM and soldiers form population for the study because they are directly involved with the peace support operations. They participate in its activities; have first-hand information and experience. The military barracks that holds the Force Headquarters is situated next to the Mogadishu International airport. AMISOM key leaders and soldiers are co-located within the military camp.

Figure 3.1: Map of Mogadishu

Source: Conflict Monitor, 2014

3.3 Target population

The target population for the study focused on the AMISOM personnel based at the Port

of Mogadishu city and Somali clan elders. A population may be composed of all the

residents in a specific neighborhood, legislators, houses, and records. Creswell (2009)

states that a population is a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement. It is the larger group from which a sample is taken. The study, therefore, focused on 950 AMISOM personnel based at the Mogadishu Military camp, 10 clan elders, 100 Al-shabaab defectors and Somalia ambassador to Kenya. As shown on Table 3.1

Table 3.1: Target Population

Category	Total Population
Top AMISOM Leadership	150
Soldiers	800
Ambassador	10
Clan elders	10
Al-shabaab defectors	100
Total Target Population	**1070**

Source: Author 2017

3.4 Sample and sampling procedures

Sampling is the procedure a researcher uses to gather people, places or things to study. On the other hand, a sample is a finite part of a population whose properties are studied to gain information about the whole population. It is a set of respondents selected from a larger population for the purpose of survey (Tesch, 1990). Kothari (2009) emphasizes

that a sample size of between 10% and 20% of the population is considered adequate for detailed or in-depth studies. The sample for the study was obtained from 150 key personnel of AMISOM and 800 soldiers at Mogadishu. The key personnel includes: the Head of Mission (HoM), Force Commander (FC), commanders, chief administrator, administrators, staff officers and liaison officers. These soldiers are from all troop contributing countries (TCC`s) working under the umbrella of AMISOM. Each office has a balanced representation of soldiers from all the TCCs. There is no specific office for a certain TCC. Therefore, this kind of deployment keeps checks and balances so that they (soldiers) do not further their country`s national interest at the expense of the Somalis.

Tesch (1990) defines sampling as the process of selecting a number of individuals or objects from a population such that the selected group contains elements representative of the characteristics found in the entire group. Therefore, 80 soldiers were sampled randomly for the study. Purposive sampling was employed for selecting the informants for interviewing from the 150 key personnel of the AMISOM. Fifteen were selected from the population to form part of the units of analysis. Purposive sampling was used to select 10 Somali clan elders for interviewing. The Hawiye, Darod, Isaaq, Dir, Sab, Rahanweyn, Digil, Mirifle, bantus, and Reer-Harmas are the major clans which are being represented by the 10 elders. Clan elders play a pivot role in the Somali traditional societal set up. They are looked upto during times of crisis and nearly have final say on political and socioeconomic affairs of the Somalis. Random sampling was to select 10 Al-shabaab defectors for the study. The Somalia-Kenyan ambassador was also interviewed. He was purposively sampled form the 10 ambassadors. He was selected because most of the

Federal Government of Somalia`s meetings used to take place in Nairobi. When Mogadishu was too unsafe for the Government, most of its operations used to take place in Nairobi. This made him be the most suitable ambassador for the study.

Table 3.2: Summary of the Sample size

Category	Total Population	Sample Size
Top AMISOM Leadership	150	15
Soldiers	800	80
Ambassador	10	1
Clan elders	10	10
Al-shabaab defectors	100	10
Total Target Population	**1070**	**116**

Source: Author 2017

3.5 Data collection instruments

Different sets of instruments were used to collect primary data. The main instruments of data collection included: questionnaire survey, interview schedules and observation. Both primary and secondary data were employed. Triangulation method was used in the study to obtain different but complementary data on the same subject matter. It allowed in-depth understanding of peace support operations.

3.5.1 Primary data

The primary data collection was done through administering of questionnaires to target respondents and filling the interview schedules. The researcher asked 25 interviewees (15 senior staff members of the AMISOM and 10 Somali clan elders) questions pertaining to the survey and collected the desired information. Ashabaab defectors (10) and the Somalia Kenyan Ambassador were interviewed. In addition, questionnaire surveys were administered to soldiers. They were requested to fill in the questionnaires and return the forms for analysis. The questionnaire contained open ended questions.

3.5.1.1 Questionnaires

According to Kothari (2004) the use of questionnaire is a popular method of data collection because of the relative and cost effectiveness with which they are constructed and administered to large samples which are widely spread geographically. Both open ended and closed questionnaires were used to get views and facts to enhance respondents` objectivity. The questionnaire permitted the respondents to have more time to give their insights in a manner which was unbiased. Questionnaires were administered to the soldiers at Mogadishu based on the selected sample.

3.5.1.2 Interview schedules

It took a form of structured interviews involving the researcher asking a set of predetermined questions to the informants in a person to person situation, using the same

wording and order of questions as specified in the interview schedule. The structured interviews were used as an exploratory tool to validate unexpected information from the questionnaires. Top leadership of AMISOM as well as clan elders were interviewed so as to get relevant information on the mission. Ambassador and al-shabaab defectors too were interviewed.

3.5.1.3 Observation

Observation is a method of data collection which is used to complement and verify information collected through other procedures. According to Tesch (1990) observation as a tool of data collection is ideal in nonverbal behaviours. The study applied observation method to confirm and document important information on peace support operations of AMISOM. Selected observations were used to complement information obtained from interviews and questionnaires.

3.5.2 Secondary data

Secondary data were obtained from the published and unpublished books and project reports, magazines, and journals on regional security regimes and peace operations. Other relevant materials in the library (Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology) as well as Internet formed part of the secondary data. Previous research done on security architecture of continental and regional security organs were used as part of the secondary data.

3.6 Reliability and validity of instruments

In order to ensure that the research design represents a set of logical statements, validity and reliability tests were taken. Questionnaires were administered to a group of individuals with similar characteristics as the actual sample size. A pilot survey was conducted in Mogadishu before the main research. The questionnaires and interview schedules were pre-tested using an identical sample of subjects who did not feature in the main study as recommended by Tesch (1990). This enabled the researcher to establish the validity and reliability of research instruments by ensuring that the instruments were clear to the respondents and that they tested what they were meant to test.

According to Kothari (2004) validity is the degree to which an instrument measures what it is supposed to measure. A content validity test was used to measure instrument validity. This type of validity measures the degree to which data collected using a particular instrument represent a specific domain of indicators or contents of a particular concept (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003).

3.7 Data analysis

Data were analysed qualitatively and quantitatively to make deductions, interpretations, conclusions and possible recommendations. Quantitative data were elicited from the questions in the questionnaire where means, frequencies and percentages were computed. Data were presented in tables, figures and graphs. The researcher made use of descriptive

statistics to analyse quantitative data and results given in form of central tendency, frequency counts and percentages.

Qualitative data were put into categories according to specific themes and entered into a code book that was developed for thematic analysis. Thematic analysis was used to compare the opinions, experience and perceptions of different social groups concerning the AMISOM`s peace support operations. Finally, all data were stored in soft and hard copies in form of tables, bar graphs and pie charts, and verbatim quotations of respondents.

3.8 Limitations of the Study

Some officers were unwilling to divulge information for fear of victimization. The researcher assured them of confidentiality and anonymity of the data collected. Creswell (2009) defines limitations in research as potential weaknesses or problems identified by the researcher. The researcher also encountered language barrier. Most of the clan elders could neither converse effectively in English nor Kiswahili, so the researcher had to hire an interpreter. Most of the places are still unsafe, so the researcher had to request for security escort in order to access some of these places. Also, had to get a guide to help in navigating some of the places.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

All studies present a number of ethical and moral dilemmas which must be identified and addressed prior to carrying out any study in order to protect all participants from potential harm (Creswell, 2009). Since researchers are people genuinely concerned about other people's quality of life, they must be people of integrity who will not undertake research for personal gain or research that will have a negative effect on others (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003). The study only commenced once the approval to conduct the research was obtained from the relevant authorities such as the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) and starting at the University level (Directorate of Postgraduate Studies). The researcher acknowledged any literature cited in the study, to avoid cases of plagiarism.

Welfare of the informants was accorded highest priority; privacy was protected at all times. Freely given consent was obtained from all the respondents. Participants were informed, in a manner and in a language which they did understand best, of context, purpose, nature, methods and procedures of the research. Participants were fully informed of their right to refuse, and to withdraw at anytime of the research.

Full confidentiality of all information and the anonymity of participants were maintained as recommended by (Orodho, 2004). Participants were informed of any potential limitations to the confidentiality of any information supplied. Procedures were put into place to protect the confidentiality of information and anonymity of the participants in all research materials. Participants were offered access to research results, which were

presented in a manner in which they understood. All research materials were preserved in a manner which respects the agreements made with the participants.

3.10 Summary

This chapter discussed the research methodology that was used to carry out the study. The descriptive survey design combined qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis which were used. It has also discussed target population, sample size, sampling procedures, and the validity and reliability of instruments. The chapter also discussed limitations and the ethical issues arising from the study. In the next chapter four, the researcher has analyzed and discussed the data collected on nature of AMISOM.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE NATURE OF MILITARY STRATEGIES IN RELATION TO PEACE

BUILDING IN SOMALIA

The chapter elucidates the nature of AMISOM in relation to peace building in Somalia. Peace support operations are supposed to facilitate peace building in the war-torn nation. Stabilization operations have gone on for nearly a decade now yet the Horn of Africa country remains troubled. The chapter deliberates on military formations, tacticization of the operations, cultural intelligence, organizational hybridity, strategic attack, strategic military power, weaknesses and strengths, tactical dispositions, and counter offensive and defensive measures taken to degrade the militants' capabilities. It finalizes by providing a summary.

4.1 Military formations

A number of international and Somali scholars have examined the peace and conflict in Somalia (Menkhaus, 2011; Rutherford, 2008; Elmi and Barisse, 2006; and Osman, 2007). The dominant position among most international scholars is that since Somalia is a failed state, the best solution is to reconstruct Somalia into a democratic and developmental state. These called for peace support operations to bring order and law into the militia run state. PSOs are carried out by multidimensional forces. The military component exercises the use of coercive force to ensure cessation of hostilities. One Major at Mogadishu on 10th May 2017 noted that:

It is embarrassing if AMISOM troops are not able to effectively fight the militant

groups. It makes the locals lose credibility on AMISOM for protection. They mount roadblocks and collect taxes from the locals by force.

This view corresponds with Tresch (2007). PSO loses its credibility if the troops cannot fulfill their mandate effectively. The locals would be able to identify with AMISOM if they believe it offers the relevant platform for peace and stability. According to Tresch (2007), the troops deployed in operations should be able to subdue the militant groups. As envisaged in the securitization theory, the actor who is supposed to provide security services should be capable of providing the services. Troops should be well equipped for the mission. Contact dilemma espouses the need for building a strong force which does not run at the ''crack and thumb'' of an enemy fire.

Tresch (2007) persuasively argues that despite variations among them, military cultures around the world (and especially in alliances like NATO) have strong commonalities facilitating their working together. With less developed armies, such commonalities are not appropriately harnessed. This is occasioned by different doctrines and trainings. They also have different equipment. These commonalities centre on such characteristics as a focus on collective violence necessitating close coordination, strong hierarchies, clear chains of command, readiness of soldiers to put their lives and bodies at risk, and the importance of morale and cohesion. The relative straightforwardness with which different armed forces work together, however, has inevitably raised special questions about cooperation with civilians because PSOs are multidimensional entities composed of diverse organizations (e.g., state bodies, IOs, NGOs, and private companies). PSOs involve large numbers of civilians to handle political and developmental responsibilities

and police to handle security tasks. This trend has meant a greater need for coordination and cooperation in interagency, interministerial, or indeed intergovernmental projects because of the entities they involve, each of which brings different approaches, capabilities, interests, and commitments to missions. As a consequence, a number of administrative measures have been put into place to facilitate interorganizational collaboration and assistance. The mechanisms to ensure such coordination are still lacking. Indeed, according one respondent (Interview with a Colonel at Force Headquarters on 17th May, 2017),

> AMISOM has not developed mechanisms to ensure that activities are mutually coordinated with the components; military; police; and civilian. Lack of contact points makes each component work on its own. Unlike cog in the machine scenario, the activities ought to be synchronized. Each troop contributing country is working independently of each other. The force commander has little or no control at all of the contingents since they still get orders from their home country. This gap is easily exploited by al shabaab. It explains why during attack on a base, the rescue team was not sent to the soldiers under distress until the fourth day when nearly all of them had perished.

The respondent`s view corresponds with Ken (2014). The operations should be synchronized with all the components. This ensures efficiency of the outfit. The military activities have to be harmonized and the available intelligence shared amongst the troops. In Table 4.1, the respondents (52.6%) feel that military formation is weak and cannot relatively fight the armed groups affectively. Only 10.5% strongly disagree with the opinion.

Table 4.1: Military formation

Weak military formation	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	55	52.6
Agree	20	21
Neutral	9	5.2
Disagree	16	10.5
Strongly disagree	16	10.5
Total	**116**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

Some respondents (52.6%) believe that the military formation should be informed by the enemy posture. The configuration allows easy execution of tasks. The troop should have the capability of carrying out a particular task. The intelligence mechanism should be embedded within the troops. The troops fail to share intelligence amongst then due to competing national interests. Troop formation enhances professionalism thereby winning the hearts and minds of the locals.

In all of the PSOs, the assumption is that the military continues to be the central actor even beyond the stage of pacification and stabilization (Kobi & Eyal, 2011). This assumption is often reinforced by the idea that the armed forces are the only organization capable of carrying out such missions given that as an organization it is large, disciplined, and used to working under trying circumstances and wields resources. But the unintended consequence of this situation in which the military is the central actor tasked with implementing most of the goals of PSOs is the continued centrality of military ways of

thinking and operations.

In this regard, a respondent advised:

> Military planners should be monitored by the civilians. Mission gets challenged by high turnover of civilian staff. The civilian component should carry out its role as required. Quick impact alternatives deployed by the military might not work efficiently especially if one is battling an insurgent group (Interview with a Major in Mogadishu on 10th June, 2017).

Scahill (2013) reinforces the respondent`s view. The troops have to create a secure environment. The outfit suffers from high turnover of the civilians. These staffs are supposed to be retained through commensurate emoluments to enhance effectiveness of the PSO. More concretely, the very assignation of the new missions to the armed forces carries with it a certain partiality toward what may be called the tacticization of PSOs: the embedding of various tasks within the ''logic'' of the military in which any goals are translated along the command hierarchy into tactical tasks (Scahill, 2013).

The new "engagement doctrine'' should create an understanding that defeating insurgents requires winning the hearts and minds of the population through the armed forces engaging and empowering the local population. This is in tandem with interventionism theory which advocates for a balanced output peace processes. One component of the multicultural force should not overshadow the other arms as this creates counterproductive efforts and overlapping of roles. Such duplication of roles can therefore be avoided by observing interventionism theory. The process of tacticization is

further related to a structural differentiation within military organizations between the planning and implementing levels. The planning sections one can often find an internalization of the new modes of knowledge necessitated by PSOs and sometimes close coordination with civilians, the problem is operationalizing this knowledge. Put somewhat simply, but not simplistically, while the staff and planning elements are often very aware of the overall strategy of an operation, the actions of the implementing units are often accompanied by overtacticization. The reason for this process is that the translation between higher and lower levels inevitably involves simplification (e.g., basing action on simple causal assumptions) so that missions` goals can be translated into action. A former Chief- of-Staff of the Israel Defense Forces once explained this process as a move down nine levels of hierarchy between the head of the military and the strategic corporal (Michael, 2007). This situation creates huge difficulties in operationalizing the abstract insights and understanding of the strategic level down to the level of the combat units. To be sure, civilian organizations need to devise tactics as well if PSOs are to succeed.

Figure 4.1: Tacticization of military operations

Source: Field Data, 2017

In Figure 4.1, majority interviewed, 63.2%, strongly agreed to the fact that tacticization of operations negatively affects the mission. It is only 9% who disagree to the fact tacticization negatively affects the operations of the mission. When, military is the dominant organization and when a plethora of so-called civilian tasks are carried out by military forces then the translation of directives into concrete tactical decisions is heavily colored by the very logic of the armed forces. Most of the mission tasks are executed by

the military component. According to the respondents, this overshadows other component resulting into overlapping roles and wasting of scarce resources.

Moreover, as one proceeds down the chain of command, the military ethos of the combat arms become stronger and, therefore, the resistance to the civilian sides of PSOs becomes stronger. For example, when missions are seen as diverging from combat, they are often labeled negatively, as temporary tasks before returning to the ''real'' thing or as peripheral to the serious side of soldiering.

4.2 Cultural intelligence

Cultural intelligence is a concept that cannot be ignored in contemporary military operations. The move toward cultural intelligence—centred on knowledge of the culture of adversaries—is plainly not an organizational fad for many armed forces have adopted concrete measures to institute this kind of knowledge. For instance, aspects of cultural knowledge are now integrated into military education, intelligence systems, and new organizational entities, known also as ''human terrain,' (Hoogenboom, 2006) and they belong to what Hoogenboom calls ''grey intelligence,'' or the increasing mix of intelligence gathering operations involving public and private entities and formal and informal initiatives. In one example, the Pentagon has initiated a program through which social scientists are embedded with brigades in Iraq and Afghanistan to serve as cultural advisors to their commanders (Kobi and eyal, 2011).

AMISOM should   begin to carry out simulations and workshops aimed at exposing

forces to the importance of religious and cultural issues in missions abroad. This can be

done during predeployment training. In examining the importance of cultural intelligence

for PSOs, there is contention that the production of such knowledge is primarily a

response to the militarization of intelligence in such missions. The difference between

two types of cultural intelligence is that the first is environmental and necessary to

develop cognitive and behavioral abilities to adapt to the context of a mission, while the

second is operational in nature and is needed for understanding the enemy and the theatre

of conflict. The first type of cultural intelligence is the necessary qualification for the

second that plays an important role in developing strategies and allocating resources

within PSOs.

N=116

- Yes
- Neutral
- No

58%

10%

32%

Figure 4.2: Inefficient utilization of cultural intelligence

Source: Field Data, 2017

In terms of cultural intelligence, AMISOM has performed dismally as shown in Figure 4.2. Fifty-eight percent of the respondents felt that the mission is not making full use of cultural intelligence. Only a paltry 32% felt that AMISOM is exploiting the advantages of cultural intelligence. Cultural intelligence enables the soldiers to understand the context of mission by developing both cognitive and behavioral abilities. The pre-deployment training which they usually undergo before deployment does not capture that aspect. Therefore, they usually suffer from culture shock when they reach the host country. That's why the 58% of the respondents feel cultural intelligence has not been exploited

by the mission. It make understanding of Somalis much easier so that they are aware of the dos and don`ts through cultural awareness.

Exploitation of cultural intelligence plays a key role especially in information gathering. To date, most of the locals view AMISOM troops as invaders. Contact-dilemma theory advises that lack of cultural intelligence precipitates tactical failure during the engagements with the enemy. This is further underscored by the theory of securitization that the audience should support the war efforts. This is purely the AMISOM`s duty to seek acceptance from the locals. That kind of mind set could have been toned down by understanding the importance of cultural intelligence. Soldiers should reinforce what is acceptable by embracing cultural practices of the Somalis. That should be balanced not forgetting their role as peace enforcers.

4.3 Organizational hybridity

There is increased proliferation of hyphenated military roles (Michael, 2006). Militaries are trained to handle diverse goals, mixed practices, and assorted actors in PSOs. Yet to the initial formulation of the postwar soldier-police officer, Michael, (2006) added the soldier-diplomat, soldier-statesman, and soldier-scholar. His line of reasoning was that officers of such armed forces need to master such hyphenated roles to perform successfully in contemporary circumstances.

One military officer at Force Headquarters interviewed on 23rd June 2017 lauded:

Atleast AMISOM is trying to run short courses for its personnel such as media relations and negotiation skills. This equips soldiers and other personnel with skills necessary for the success of the mission.

The respondent`s view corroborates that of Michael (2006). The troops have to be taken through short courses so that they are equipped with the necessary skills to run the mission. To put this point by way of examples, being a soldier-relief worker or soldier-media expert always necessitates a beginning point that is military in nature. There seems to be an explosion of such military roles appropriate to PSOs, so that one could easily add soldier-consultant, soldier-relief worker, and soldier-alderman as well as soldier-media expert, soldier-social scientist, soldier-social worker, soldier-state builder, and (the somewhat unwieldy) soldier-infrastructure restorer (Michael, 2006). Yet in all of these cases it is another role that is integrated into the military one.

In organizational hybrids, civil-military (CIMIC) officers blend different structures and modes of action within one framework. The advantage of organizational hybrids—like those of hyphenated roles—is that they are means for militaries to adapt to complex environments: they bring together elements of disorder with elements of order and thus may meet the complex goals of many PSOs. Hence, hybrid organizations are often measures militaries use to manage relations with groups in the civilian environment and whose values, needs, and identities may contradict its own. CIMIC, which, despite its name, is actually a military creation and dominated by military considerations. Headed by military officers, such organizations are aimed at achieving mission ends by linking representatives of the armed forces to civilians—such as ''local'' populations, NGOs, or

civilian officials of the AMISOM.

The CIMIC officers are charged with all or a majority of the following tasks: planning and coordinating between elements of a PSO; running joint operations centers centered on human rights, political and civil affairs, and public information; and handing information sharing, mutual support, and joint assessment with partners (Michael, 2006). CIMIC activities within the theatre should play vital role. The quick impact projects can make a big difference to the locals.

One Brigadier Interviewed on 13th July 2017 in Mogadishu mentioned:

> There are various CIMIC activities that AMISOM can carry out. Most of the districts lack educational facilities, health facilities and even recreational facilities. Such requirements can be met by the mission. Quick impacts projects enhance the interaction between the soldiers and the locals. CIMIC officers are not doing much due to lack of funds.

However, the project should be on a need basis. Prior assessment should be conducted before initiating such activities. This view corresponds with Patrick (2011). It should take care of the needs of locals. The officers are not given funds to run these projects. Such funds should be availed. Quick impact projects have a positive influence on the society. The Table 4.2 shows the opinion of the staff on the CIMIC activities. From the summarized results, 63.2% of the respondents strongly agreed that the CIMIC activities have not been fully exploited while 8.3% strongly disagreed. Theory of interventionism promotes organizational hybridity through multitasking and prioritization of tasks. Urgent issues with huge impact to the bearing of the mission are given first priority. The

respondents (63.2%) believe that the utilization of cimic operations would promote mutual understanding between AMISOM the hosts. The troops get to interact with the citizens as they initiate respective projects. Through such activities, they are also able to gather information and intelligence easily since there is friendly atmosphere.

Table 4.2: Under utilization of CIMIC relations

Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	65	63.2
Agree	21	17.9
Neutral	6	3.2
Disagree	11	7.4
Strongly disagree	13	8.3
Total	**116**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

Michael (2007) indicates that the unique complexity of the role of CIMIC officers lies in the fact that they are analytically speaking ''between and betwixt'' the military and its environment and hence are part of actions that are not fully military or fully civilian. Officers staffing these bodies are part of hybrid organizations because they are mediators or boundary spanners linking the military to civilian entities and, more importantly, military to civilian thought. They are hybrids because they embody through their actions the logics of two or more organizations. In effect, in CIMIC organizations, members wear uniforms but also represent part of the military's responsibility for civilians. As such, the strength of such hybrids lies in flexibility that allows them to perceive the needs and

views of civilians and ''translate'' them into concrete suggestions that commanders and troops can take into consideration through their actions.

4.4 Counter offensive and defensive measures

AMISOM continues to conduct counter insurgency operations against the armed militant groups. The counter offensive operations have seen many towns and centres liberated. In August 2011 African troops together with TFG forces managed to push al-Shabab out of the Somali Capital; Mogadishu. The success is also attributed to more troop contributions from member states (Kenya and Djibouti); greater coordination between AMISOM and TFG forces; and reported training of Somali intelligence operatives by the Central Intelligence Agency.

AMISOM should intensify more offensive actions. Gains made in the past are being eroded by the successful attacks that al shabaab has conducted on the bases. One respondent (Interview with a Lt Col on 14th June, 2017 in Mogadishu) decried:

> Troops seem to be ceding more ground to al shabaab due to many reasons. The troops lack necessary equipment to conduct counter insurgency operations-night operations are nearly impossible due to lack of night vision devices. Militants normally move at night under the cover of darkness, so ambushes should be laid at night to catch them of guard. Air strikes are limited or non at all, the absence of air assets give them insurgents a lot of space for freedom of action. We hardly conduct offensive patrols. The defenses must be offensive in nature. Fighting patrols should be sent out and due to lack of intelligence and drones for aerial surveillances such operations is hardly feasible. Instead, al shabaab attacks us at will, meaning that they bring battle to our defences. We fight at their own convenience and a place of their own choosing, which is a real tactical blunder on the side of the AMISOM troops. Troops are should be well equipped and at least the mission should have some few attack helicopters so that we can degrade the

militant's capability.

Another respondent (An interview conducted with an Al-shabaab defector on 13th April 2017) said that:

> We know very well that AMISOM troops have low morale. They are poorly equipped and cannot with stand most of the ambushes that we mount against them. During the IED attacks, they normally suffer heavy casualties.

The Major`s view and Al shabaab defector correspond with Emma (2015). The troops are getting overwhelmed by the militant groups. The armed group launches their offensives under the cover of darkness. The troops do not have night vision googles. The defensive positions should be offensive in nature. There are a lot of tactical blunders due to inadequacy of equipment. The outfit needs to be well equipped if it has to achieve its objectives. During the mid 2012 AMISOM made a lot of gains (Meleagrou and Hussein, 2012).

The involvement of the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), which is well equipped and includes a large Navy and Airforce, has greatly contributed to the achievements against Al-Shabaab. In addition, Ethiopia has redeployed troops into Somalia, capturing Beledwyne and has also moved into the central regions of Hiraan and Galgadud and further still into the Shabelle River Valley. The KDF has liberated Gedo, Juba, Kismayo, while AMISOM forces have pushed al-Shabaab from the capital, Mogadishu. Coordinated efforts of Kenya, AMISOM, Ethiopia and Somalia have had limited gains in

ousting insurgents from most parts of Somalia (Hesse, 2014). Theory of armed combat pushes for a well defended localities with a defensive position which is quite offensive in nature. Troops who are well rehearsed and conversant with battle drills. They must understand the groupings of weapons to achieve the desired firepower.

Plate 4.1: AMISOM troops advancing to capture Marka Port from the armed militants

Source: Conflict Monitor, 2014

The Burundian and Ugandan armies have significant experience in insurgency warfare

due to experience gained in the protracted civil wars they experienced in their countries. AMISOM ought to exploit that experience. They have demonstrated more resilience to the asymmetric warfare. This can prove to be invaluable in defeating and pushing the al-Shaabab out of Mogadishu and completely eradicating the militant`s menace. Figure 4.3 shows the respondents` rating of the counter offensive and defensive operations. Sixty-eight perecent of the respondents were very dissatisfied with both offensive and defensive operations. Five percent was very satisfied with the operations. The respondents were dissatisfied because the offensive actions are supposed to deter the Alshabaabs from accessing and running the outposts belonging to AMISOM troops. The defensive positions are supposed to be heavily fortified and aggressive in nature. These outposts are thinly defended thus presenting easy targets for the armed groups.

N=116

Figure 4.3: Conduct of offensive and defensive operations

Source: Field Data, 2017

4.5 Strategic attack

In the war against insurgency, planners keep strategic attacks key to the decisive engagements with the enemy. Application of the strategy weakens militants since it exploits their weak points. Strategic attack is offensive action specifically selected to achieve national strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the adversary's ability or will to engage in conflict, and may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily having to achieve operational objectives as a precondition. Strategic attack involves the systematic application of force against enemy systems and their centers of gravity, thereby producing the greatest effect for the least cost in blood and treasure. Vital

systems to be affected may include leadership, critical processes, popular will and perception, and fielded forces (Hosmer, 2001).

Strategic attack provides an effective capability that may drive an early end to conflict or achieve objectives more directly or efficiently than other applications of military power. Air, space, and cyberspace power has inherent, unique advantages in conducting strategic attack, with the distinct aim is producing effects well beyond the immediate tactical and operational effort expended and of directly contributing to achieving strategic, war-winning effects and objectives. Such offensives target activities or places where these armed groups least expect. In the fight against Al shabaab and other armed groups in Somalia, AMISOM needs to employ strategic attacks in degrading the capability of these militants.

According to a Clan Elder explained:

> These militants still control and govern the rural areas in Somalia. They carry out their businesses such as tax collection without any fear. They have adequate ordinances to plant IED attacks on the AMISOM troops. Al shabaab roams villages terrorizing locals. At times, they demand for food and do forceful tax collection. They threat with physical harm if one refuses to comply with their demand (A Clan Elder interviewed on 13 July, 2017 in Mogadishu) .

Hansen (2007) echoes the respondent`s view that AMISOM should find out the sourcing of funding of Al shabaab; their means of transport when smuggling the contraband goods and equipment and their training grounds. Attacking and completely blocking their source of funding will paralyse their operations. The militants have enough ordinances to

make IEDs. This gives them courage to inflict terror on the locals who defy their order. As observed by the researcher, one needs money to feed, clothe and arm the soldiers in order for them to fight effectively. The rag tag soldiers too need these basics and most importantly salaries to keep them motivated. Hansen (2007) advises that cutting the source of funding of the militant groups paralyzes their operations. Most of the ports have been taken by the AMISOM forces, however, the armed groups still collect taxes from charcoal and contraband goods on transit to different parts of Somalia.

Physical destruction of the fire power of Al shabaab remains key in the defeat of these armed groups. Foreign fighters have infiltrated the ranks of Al shabaab. An informant observed that they have perfected the employment of IED attacks on the AMISOM troops. Through expansive intelligence, AMISOM needs to find these individual who have the expertise in IED making. Their mortar attacks on major towns like Baidoa and Mogadishu indicates that they have various experts in these fields. These experts need to be single out and arrested or put under custody by the AMISOM forces. These people act as force multipliers to the militant group. Eliminating these experts will cripple the operations of Al shabaab.

Radicalization drives Somali youths into joining the terror group. A Clan Elder interviewed on 25th, 2016, August in Mogadishu noted:

> Youths disappear from homes only to join Al shabaab. Once they join the outfit, they become radicalized. Deradicalizing them becomes hard without the help of experts.

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The Clan Elder`s opinion corroborates that of Menkhaus (2014) that radicalizing the youths remains a major way of retaining the youths to fight for the group. The unemployed disillusioned youths are easily lured into the group with a promise of better. These youth are recruited as new young fighters to the militant groups. Menkhaus (2014) records that radicalization remains one of the security challenges in the war-torn country.

AMISOM should build an institution which is aimed at mentoring the youths and deradicalizing them. These will curb the number of the youths joining Al shabaab. As shown on Figure 4.4, 73% of the informants were dissatisfied with the application of the concept of strategic attack. It has not been sufficiently applied. Only 5% were satisfied with the usage of the concept. They dissatisfaction is due to the fact that strategic attack should be able to reduce the fighting capability of the Al shabaab. Instead, their fighting power has increased since they have been able to overrun defensive positions of AMISOM troops. The strategic attack should be able to lower their morale by conducting attacks on its high value targets such as its training grounds.

Figure 4.4: Application of concept of strategic attack

Source: field Data, 2017

Strategic attack requires understanding of human terrain. Developed nations have introduced training of human terrain systems in order to provide a deep understanding of the environment in which they operate. The concept of "human terrain" has been defined in military documents pertaining to human terrain system as "the human population in the operational environment ... as defined and characterized by sociocultural, anthropologic and ethnographic data and other non-geographical information (Kipp & Jacob, 2006). In the most immediate sense, human terrain system was developed as a response to

concerns about mismanagement of US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and, in particular, to the negative effects of recognized "deficiencies" in US military "cultural understanding" of these countries (Maximilian, 2011). AMISOM should be able to comprehend the environment in which they operate.

One Clan Elder said:

> *Some Somali view the troops as invaders. AMISOM has not worked hard towards winning the acceptance of the locals. This can be seen by Al shabaab planting IED in towns and at the 'doorstep' of the AMISOM bases targeting the troops (A Clan elder interviewed on 20th June, 2017).*

As noted by the clan elder, Ken (2014) points out that locals fail to inform troops about these activities due to lack of acceptance. The mission fails to appreciate the demographic perspectives as well as cultural practices of the Somalis. Locals play a decisive role within the cycles of intelligence community. They provide the troops with the necessary information about militant groups. Such pieces of information are harnessed to produce intelligence. When operations of the troops are intelligence driven, they become successful thus achieving their objectives. Maximilian (2011) reinforces the fact that fighting winning hearts and minds of the locals remains fundamental in any successful PSO. This too will help in easing acceptance of the troops amongst the host. Failure to understand this key concept has created a rift between the troops and locals

Human terrain system remains effective cultural tool that can help the leadership of the troops both at the tactical, operational and at strategic levels. It reinforces the winning of loyalty of the locals. This battle for control of and support from a contested population

can only be won if AMISOM understands the Somali people, whose cooperation, trust and support should be secured. Armed with this understanding, commanders at level can navigate the human terrain successfully. Without it, they will continue to be confused by the complexities of their culture, faith and society; oblivious to their desires, grievances and opinions; distracted by the lies and distortions of the enemies; and blind to opportunities to enhance reputation of AMISOM soldiers and their commanders. In building of an institution to rehabilitate the youths and provide them with meaningful skills for creating jobs, some human terrain teams should be established by the mission. The teams should be embedded with the contingents. It will facilitate the appreciation of the importance of human population in the operational environment. It tells them what Somalis' expect from their Federal Government and that they need to survive and prosper. It informs the troops how to avoid cultural missteps and explains the narratives that they must understand and utilize in order to communicate effectively with the population. It identifies Al shabaab behaviors and excesses that the population rejects and can be exploited, while providing Somali perspectives on how to exert pressure on and defeat these armed groups.

In winning the insurgency warfare, human terrain cannot be brushed aside. From the informants, on figure 4.5, 64% are dissatisfied with the exploitation of human terrain for the benefit of Somalis and the mission in its entirety. Understanding and application of human terrain will promote the utilization of strategic attack as a means of subduing the armed groups. The theatre of operation is not well understood by the troops well. Some of the intelligence is supposed to be acquired outside Somalia borders. Without

understanding human terrain, information and intelligence gathering become nearly impossible.

Figure 4.5: Employment of concept of human terrain system

Source: Field Data, 2017

4.6 Strategic military power

Strategic military has been used in the past to neutralize fighting capability of militants (Maximilian, 2011). AMISOM should use this due advantage to subdue Al shabaab. Massive strategic military power knocks off the armed groups off their feet. Joint Command Centre (JCC) should be created to harness unity of effort. To pull resources

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and deploy them decisively to weaken the organization of the Al shabaab, and destroy their will to fight, the mission needs well resourced command centre. The exploitation of this concept can create successes for AMISOM thus improving the lives of Somalis. Strategic air warfare, strategic naval operations, psychological operations and specialized land operations are examples that entail the use of strategic military power.

Strategic air warfare deploys the use of air for transport as well as for aerial attack. Aerial warfare, the tactics of military operations conducted by airplanes, helicopters, or other manned craft that are propelled aloft. Air warfare may be conducted against other aircraft, against targets on the ground, and against targets on the water or beneath it. Air warfare is almost entirely a creation of the 20th century, in which it became a primary branch of military operations (Maclsaac, 2015).

The mission should acquire large aircraft for utility. Moving troops from one point to another requires transport aircraft like, C 130. Such aircrafts can be used to drop soldiers during reinforcements for the threatened defended localities. They can be used to lift heavy weapons to where they are needed. The attack helicopters can be used insert special forces for special mission or for the strategic assignments. One respondent voiced out the concern:

> AMISOM lacks both utility and attack helicopters (An interview with a Warrant Officer on 24th September, 2016).

The respondent`s view is resonated by Maclsaac (2015), the utility aircraft and attack

helicopters are essential for smooth running of the operations. Soldiers can be dropped to whichever place they are required. They are able to reinforce the troops in distress without unwarranted delays. The attack helicopters can be used for aerial support. Freedom of movement and action can only be denied to the armed group by aggressive aerial patrols. The troops can move by day and night if the attack helicopters have night capabilities. Indeed, MacIsaac (2015) defined strategic air warfare as air combat and supporting operations designed to effect, through the systematic application of force to a selected series of vital targets, the progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy's war-making capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the will to wage war. Vital targets may include key manufacturing systems, sources of raw material, critical material, stockpiles, power systems, transportation systems, communication facilities, concentration of uncommitted elements of enemy armed forces, key agricultural areas, and other such target systems.

One clan elder pointed out:

> *The armed groups roam villages as if AMISOM does not exist. And we hardly see troops patrol these remote areas (A Clan Elder interviewed on 21st September, 2016).*

Ken (2014) notes that the freedom of movements of the militant groups should be suffocated as resounded by the clan elder. It helps in restricting their activities. As a result, some of their members are forced to defect. The researcher too observed that the patrols conducted by the troops are limited to less than five kilometres. The presence of helicopters would help in maintaining aerial observation on these places.

Places of concentration like training area can be monitored closely and then destroyed. Strategic air warfare would limit the movements of the militia. As observed from the informants, Figure 4.6, respondents (75%) say that the AMISOM has weak air power. AMISOM is struggling to deliver supplies to the soldiers by air and conduct of aerial attacks is nearly not there due to absence of stationed mission attack helicopters. From the respondents, strategic air warfare would tremendously decrease the fighting power of the armed groups. It will limit their freedom of movement. The armed aerial reconnaissance as well as armed attack can be conducted in span of minutes with the required level of battle damage achieved. Through utility helicopters, the soldiers can be para-dropped or inserted at the point which being threatened by Al shabaab. Therefore, air warfare becomes vital in the attrition of the militant groups.

Figure 4.6: Utilization of strategic air warfare

Source: Field Data, 2017

Psychological warfare remains unexploited. The term is used "to denote any action which is practiced mainly by psychological methods with the aim of evoking a planned psychological reaction in other people'' (Mascaal, 2015). Various techniques are used, and are aimed at influencing a target audience's value system, belief system, emotions, motives, reasoning, or behavior. It is used to induce confessions or reinforce attitudes and behaviors favorable to the originator's objectives, and are sometimes combined with black operations or false flag tactics. It is also used to destroy the morale of enemies

through tactics that aim to depress troops' psychological states. Target audiences can be governments, organizations, groups, and individuals, and are not just limited to soldiers. Civilians of foreign territories can also be targeted by technology and media so as to cause an effect in the government of their country (Chekinov & Bogdanov, 2015). This tool has been used both in the present and past to gain due advantage over the enemy. In the Iraq War, the United States used the shock and awe campaign to psychologically maim, and break the will of the Iraqi Army to fight. Germany's *Fall Grün* plan of invasion of Czechoslovakia had a large part dealing with psychological warfare aimed both at the Czechoslovak civilians and government as well as, crucially, at Czechoslovak allies. It became successful to the point that Germany gained support of UK and France through appeasement to occupy Czechoslovakia without having to fight an all-out war, sustaining only minimum losses in covert war before the Munich Agreement (Quester, 2003). AMISOM should exploit psychological warfare as a means of weakening the cohesion amongst the militant groups.

Propaganda warfare amplifies psychological warfare. Propaganda is a powerful weapon in war; it is used to dehumanize and create hatred toward a supposed enemy, either internal or external, by creating a false image in the mind. This can be done by using derogatory or racist terms, avoiding some words or by making allegations of enemy atrocities. Most propaganda wars require the home population to feel the enemy has inflicted an injustice, which may be fictitious or may be based on facts. The home population must also decide that the cause of their nation is just. In NATO doctrine, propaganda is defined as "Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals

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disseminated to influence the opinion, emotions, attitudes, or behaviour of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly''(Chekinov & Bogdanov, 2015). Within this perspective, information provided does not need to be necessarily false, but must be instead relevant to specific goals of the "actor" or "system" that performs it (Emma, 2015). AMISOM should be able to infiltrate the minds of these armed groups. Wars can be won without firing a single bullet. AMISOM is yet to invest into propaganda warfare. The battle posture adopted by the troops should appear to be quite lethal. Deception remains key to this end. This will make their troops to surrender to the Federal Government with a promise of integration into the national army.

The long Somali coastline should remain guarded and its national waters. Patrolling the high seas will deter the cartels who import contraband and cache of weapons that could be entering the country. Naval force should be constituted as part of the AMISOM. Naval gunfire support could be provided to the troops which are deemed to be threatened. The naval force will also play a great role in mentoring the coast guards. One respondent (A Colonel who was interviewed on13th August 2016 in Mogadishu) advised:

> Integration of a naval force into AMISOM plays a major role in stabilization efforts of the FGS.

The Colonel`s view responds with Wesonga (2016) that Somalia needs to secure its waters. The naval would dominate the waters with patrols thus eliminating piracy on the coastline. Emma (2015) confirms that Somalia needs a naval force to help in securing its borders. In the exit plan, the Somalis would be able to secure their national waters. They would be able to exploit the resources within the sea to develop their country. AU had

requested the UN to finance the Kenya Navy`s operations in the deep waters of Somalia,

but the UN Security Council declined to approve the funding (Kelley, 2012).

Despite the glaring need for a naval force, it is note worthy that some government

officials within the FGS do not want the deployment of marine component within the

AMISOM. Maritime component within the AMISOM will help in constitution of Somali

Naval Force. Securing Somali waters should be part of the exit strategy so that they are

able to secure air space, land and their waters against both internal and external

aggression. This is as also corroborated by Kelley (2013) who illustrated that:

> A high-ranking Somali official told the United Nations Security Council on Thursday that her government does not want the African Union military mission in Somalia (Amisom) to be given a maritime component. Kenya, the only African country deploying naval forces in Somali waters, has long sought UN approval of about $10 million (Sh870m) in funding for an AMISOM maritime force. Somalia's statement on Thursday of "strong opposition" to that request is disappointing, said Kenyan UN Ambassador Macharia Kamau. A naval force is needed, he commented, to "address the movement of Shabaab elements as well as their supplies.""Somalia itself," Ambassador Kamau added, "does not have the capacity to control these elements." The Somalia government's stand contradicts that of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon. In a report that was also brought before the Security Council on Thursday, Mr Ban said the 15-member body should "give serious consideration to the African Union request for an Amisom maritime component." The UN leader added that naval forces are "critical to consolidate control over southern and central Somalia, in particular wresting control from al-Shabaab of the remaining coastal towns." But Somalia's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Fawzia Y. H. Adam told the council that there is "not a compelling reason to take the campaign against al-Shabaab to sea." "Piracy, human trafficking and smuggling are important challenges," she added, "but are not linked to the mandate of Amisom." Ms Adam said she wished to reiterate "our strong opposition to the maritime forces to be authorised for Amisom." Ambassador Kamau said that while Kenya still hopes for UN support for its request, "we respect the right and prerogative of the Somali government to determine what kind of assistance they want to get."

The data showed that 85% of the respondents strongly agree with the fact that AMISOM needs a maritime component as corroborated by Kelley (2013). It will help in safeguarding the turbulent Somali waters. Maritime component builds up nuclei from which Somalia can grow a remarkable naval force to reckon with within the Horn of Africa. The Somalia sea zone remains unsafe, there is need for a maritime component to patrol and secure the exclusive economic zone. When the mandate of the mission expires, the FGS needs to take over all functions. This is further illustrated on Figure 4.7.

Figure 4.7: Need for maritime component

Source: Field Data, 2017

Special operations can be performed by Special Forces. These soldiers are trained to perform delicate tasks yet so crucial in the accomplishment of the mandate. The

commandos and Special Forces embedded in the troops can be used for missions like raiding the training bases of Al shabaab**.**) Special operations are "special" or unconventional and are carried out by dedicated special forces and other special operations forces units using unconventional methods and resources. Special operations may be performed independently of or in conjunction with, conventional military operations. The primary goal is to achieve a political or military objective where a conventional force requirement does not exist or might adversely affect the overall strategic outcome. Special operations are usually conducted in a low-profile manner that aims to achieve the advantages of speed, surprise, and violence of action against an unsuspecting target.

Special ops are typically carried out with limited numbers of highly trained personnel that are adaptable, self-reliant and able to operate in all environments, and able to use unconventional combat skills and equipment. Special operations are usually implemented through specific, tailored intelligence (Linda, 2012). Special forces have been used in the war against terrorism and insurgency. Linda (2012) mentions that the decade 2003–2012 saw U.S. national security strategy rely on special operations to an unprecedented degree. Identifying, hunting, and killing terrorists became a central task in the Global War on Terrorism. These have also been used in the past campaigns. Bellamy (2011) noted that the British Indian Army deployed two special forces during their border wars: the Corps of Guides formed in 1846 and the Gurkha Scouts (a force that was formed in the 1890s and was first used as a detached unit during the 1897–1898 Tirah Campaign).These forces can be used to infiltrate ranks of the armed groups. They can be used to capture the

leadership of Al shabaab. This will help in preempting the actions of the Islamic militant group thus thwarting their plans at the inception stages. Capturing their bases and weapons needs special operations.

The data collected on Table 4.3 show that 74% felt that AMISOM has not exploited the usage of strategic military power it possesses. This strategy is crucial in physical destruction of the armed groups. It can be applied to defeat their will to fight and destroy their cohesion. Only 1% disagrees. The 74% feels that strategic military power has minimally optimized. AMISOM should attrite the militant groups selectively thus subduing them into submission. Their sources of funding should be suffocated by making sure that they don't erect roadblocks from which they collect taxes from the vulnerable population. These functions can be realized through exploitation of military strategic power.

Table 4.3: Under utilization of strategic military power

Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	75	74
Agree	21	17.9
Neutral	6	3.1
Disagree	4	1
Strongly disagree	10	4
Total	**116**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

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4.7 Weaknesses and strengths

Counterinsurgency requires a deep understanding of the organization of the armed groups. Knowing the strengths and the weaknesses helps in understanding of the enemy. The commanders should carry out threat analysis and threat integration with regards to the enemy posture. This forms the basis in the fight against Al shabaab.

Threat evaluation involves knowing the enemy   strength, their dispositions, their capabilities and morale. This helps in identifying the gaps that can be exploited to defeat their fighting power.

One respondent (A Private Soldier interviewed at Force Headquarters in Mogadishu on 13th October, 2016) regretted:

> From the engagements we have had with Al shabaab, at times it seems that even the commanders are not sure of the kind of the enemy that is being fought, they type of equipment they have and even their deployment.

The respondent`s view relates with Clausewitz (1940) advises that a commander must know his well before any engagements. From the respondent, AMISOM has failed to carry out threat integration. It helps in giving out deep analysis of the enemy. Threat evaluation and analysis helps the soldiers in understanding the enemy thus they get prepared both physically and psychologically. The commanders are, therefore, able to adjust the quantum of firepower needed to defeat the armed group. Fighting insurgent groups who are motivated with high levels of morale can be essentially fatal. Their high levels of morale need to be vanquished before actual destruction.

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Threat integration gives the commanders planning guidelines after evaluating the enemy. The commander needs to adopt the best course of action to neutralize and defeat the belligerents. The firepower to deliver to threaten the enemy should be adjusted based on the capability of the enemy. AMISOM has not efficiently analysed AL shabaab. This has occasioned tactical blunders within the AMISOM bases. Some of our bases were overrun but had we analysed the enemy well, we would have contained the attack.

One must know the enemy who is being fought (Kent, 2005). Discerning the weaknesses and strengths of Al shabaab and other Islamic militants forms a crucial lead in the degradation of their capabilities. Commanders at all levels should utilize the weaknesses and strengths posed by the enemy for the success of their operations. Data collected from the field, shows (Figure 4.7) that 65% of the informants feel that AMISOM is yet to exploit the weaknesses and strengths of the Al shabaab for their due advantage. The ranks of Al shabaab should be infiltrated by the intelligent operatives so that their plans are preempted before executions. Their training grounds should be destroyed and freedom of movements denied through aggressive patrols by the AMISOM troops. Their resupply roots should be heavily patrolled so that they do not have access to fresh supplies of food staff and ammunitions. When such weaknesses are exploited, the militant groups will not be able to have the will to fight.

Figure 4.8: Exploitation of weaknesses and strengths of Al shabaab

Source: Field Data, 2017

4.8 Tactical disposition

The battle posture adopted by the troops determines the successes of the operations. The

deployment of troops with regards to movements of the enemy influences the fluidity and

the momentum of the activities intended to defeat the armed groups. The stationing of the

outpost should deny Al shabaab the freedom of movement. Leaving them with large

unmanned spaces allows them to perform any maneuvers they so wish. According to one

field commander who was interviewed on 24th August, 2016 in Mogadishu:

> We have some bases which are not tactically located making it hard to defend
> such outposts. These makes defence quite hard when the enemy launches an
> offensive. Some contingents insists on such posts because it is informed by the

troop contributing country`s strategic interests.

Location of defended outposts should be informed by tactical considerations (Emma, 2015). As observed by the respondent and Emma (2015), outpost should informed by the nature of terrain. The defended localities should be sited in places which can be defendable. They should also be fortified. The troop contributing countries (TCC) should leave deployment role to the Force Headquarters. The deployments are supposed to help stabilization processes of Somalia. There are still strategic towns which are yet to be captured. Jilib, El ade and Jamaame which form part of Jubaland Corridor. This space offers safe havens for the Islamic militant group. These towns need to be captured by the AMISOM. Table 4.4 shows that 78% of the respondents feel that these towns need to be under control of the FGS. They are crucial for the pacification process of Somalia. Most of the towns like Jilib, Janabdale and Badhadhe are still under the control of Al shabaab. This militant group enjoys a lot of freedom. They control these villages where they forcefully collect taxes from the locals.

Table 4.4: Need to capture and control strategic towns

Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	79	70.6
Agree	24	19
Neutral	9	3.8
Disagree	5	2.8
Strongly disagree	9	3.8
Total	**116**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

Tactical disposition should also take terrain analysis and weather into perspective. Defended localities are situated on grounds which offer tactical advantage to the troop. These areas should have good fields of view and should be dominated by fire. Place which are affected by floods during rainy seasons should be well drained to avoid outbreak of communicable diseases at the onset of rains. As shown on Figure 4.9, 64% of the informants feel tactical dispositions have not been fully exploited. The tactical position should give the troops due advantage over the militant groups. They should be able to control critical routes like the Julaland corridor, critical towns and critical infrastructures. This will deny the militant groups their usage forcing them to surrender.

Figure 4.9: Tactical dispositions

Source: Field Data, 2017

From the data collected, 73% of the respondents felt that the nature of military strategies slows down the peacebuilding in Somalia. These strategies like strategic attack, cultural intelligence and organizational hybridity will contribute tremendously towards defeating Al shabaab thus forcing them to surrender. With the Mandate due to expire, AMISOM has a lot more to be done in order to stabilize the country. The issues mentioned in this chapter need to be readjusted to make the nature of AMISOM relatively more efficient.

Figure 4.10: Opinion on nature of AMISOM

Source: Field Data, 2017

4.9 Summary

The chapter illustrated the findings on military formations, tacticization of operations and the importance of cultural intelligence in the war efforts. Organizational hybridity with regards to configuration of the personnel is essential for success of the mission. It further discussed findings on the counter offensive and defensive measures taken to degrade al shabaab`s capability. The chapter concludes on strategic attack, strategic military power, weaknesses and strengths, and tactical dispositions. The nature of AMISOM can precipitate failures or successes of mission if not given the necessary considerations. The nature of the mission facilitates and enhances peace building in Somalia. The next chapter assesses the contributions of AMISOM towards peace building.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONTRIBUTIONS OF AMISOM TOWARDS PEACEBUILDING

The chapter discusses the contributions of the mission towards peace building strategies in Somalia. It analyzes how these contributions have affected peace building in Somalia. It concludes with a summary of the contents of the chapter.

5.1 Support of peace initiatives

A couple of peace initiatives have been taken in the past to help in stabilization of the country. Table 5.1 shows the peace agreements developments from 1991 to 2009 and other major steps taken in the efforts to end conflict after ousting of President Siad Barre.

Table 5.1: Peace agreement developments in Somalia

Year	Action
1991	National reconciliation conference hosted by Djibouti in July
1992	No major action
1993	Addis Ababa agreement hosted in Ethiopia
1994	No major action
1995	No major action
1996	The Sodere agreement
1997	The Cairo agreement hosted in Egypt
1998	No major action
1999	No major action
2000	The Arta agreement hosted in Djibouti
2001	No major action
2002	Kenyan effort to bring together the Transitional National Government and opposition failed
	Signing of Declaration on cessation of hostilities held in eldoret, Kenya
2003	Amendment of Transitional Federal Charter held in Kenya
2004	Inauguration of Federal Transitional Parliament hosted by Kenya
2005	June 2005 Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed Elected as president of TFG
2006	Alliance of Islamic courts took control of Mogadishu in June 2006 signing of Khartoum 1 agreement to recognize TFG and ICU, this was never implemented and fighting broke out in December 2006 in which the Somalis, backed by Ethiopian troops defeated the ICU.
2007	National Reconciliation Congress held in Mogadishu with participation of 2,600 delegates representing clans, women and Diaspora. ARS (Re-liberation of Somalia) was
2008	TFG and ARS signed Djibouti agreement in August 2008 witnessed by international community including AU, IGAD, US, UK, EU, France, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. December 29th 2008 President Abdullahi Yusuf resigned
2009	Withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia

Source: Researcher`s own compilation, 2016. Adopted from, United Nations Political Office for Somali, 2009

AMISOM has continued to support dialogue and reconciliation efforts at local, regional and national levels. At local and regional levels, in areas recovered from Al-shabaab, AMISOM has mobilised clan elders, religious and political leaders including members of parliament to resolve political and other differences. As envisioned by the theory of securitization, support of the peace initiatives should be anchored on all actors and stakeholders. However, one respondent (A Clan Elder interviewed on 17th December, 2016 in Mogadishu) observed:

> The dialogue is a little bit slow due to lack of support by most of the leaders. Clan rivalry makes it hard for the clan elders to stick to the peace initiatives.

Lack of support by local leaders slows down the peace processes (Shin, 2009) as observed by a clan elder. The leaders are always over clan hegemony. This has had a derailing effect on the peace initiatives. At the national level, AMISOM has continued to support dialogue among various political actors in the country. Support for the peace initiatives is dwindling. Mutambo (2016) emphasized the same, thus:

> Kenya may withdraw its troops from Somalia if the international community does not plug funding gaps for the operation, President Uhuru Kenyatta has warned. At a meeting with envoys from the UN Security Council on Friday, the President told the diplomats that funding cuts to the African Union Mission in Somalia (Amisom) will not be filled by participating countries. As one of Amisom's major troop contributing countries, Kenya is questioning whether it was worth the huge cost. [President] Kenyatta asserted that AMISOM was not getting the support it needed in terms of resources and equipment, and argued that the UN needed to take on a much greater role, the UN Security Council Report, an online bulletin by the Council stated on Friday. Referring to the recent cuts in EU support, he said it was not Kenya's role to close the funding gap and the logical conclusion would be for Kenya to pull out its troops. The President also defended the Kenya

Defence Forces from accusations by a team of UN investigators that they were engaging in illegal activities. Kenyatta also raised the issue of accusations against Kenyan troops being involved in trafficking of charcoal and other goods in Somalia, saying that if people did not appreciate what they were doing, there was no reason for them to stay. The diplomats from the UN's most powerful body met President Kenyatta to discuss the planned repatriation of Somali refugees, regional security and Somalia stabilisation plan. Egyptian Permanent Representative to the UN and current UNSC President Abedellatif Aboulatta and other envoys were told the international community was doing little. President Kenyatta was concerned that the world was looking the other way despite Kenya, and other AMISOM members sending troops to Somalia. As part of AMISOM, Kenya has 3,664 troops in Sector 2 of the Mission, which is under the African Union, but is technically a UN mission. Kenyan troops are in lower and middle Juba. Much of the funding has been coming from the European Union. But in January, the EU cut its budget to AMISOM by 20 per cent. This means that the European body gives €20 million (Sh224 million) every month up to June. The money is used to pay stipends to soldiers at $1,028 (Sh103, 828) a month with no other allowances. For a KDF soldier, the government then deducts an administration fee of $200 (Sh20,200), meaning every serviceman gets $828 (Sh83,628). But AMISOM requires $300 million for its entire military and logistics.

The diminishing support from the stakeholders is likely to affect negatively on the AMISOM operations. The pay cut will affect the morale of soldiers. There will be no enough money to carry out the prerequisite trainings and purchase of equipment. Figure 5.1 show summarized results on peace initiatives support. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the peace support initiatives. Only 10% of the respondents were very satisfied with the peace initiatives. The 57% is dissatisfied with the progress of the peace initiatives. AMISOM should be able to do much more to achieve these peace initiatives. The respondents believe that luck of enough fund and political will is slowing down the process.

Figure 5.1: Peace support initiatives
Source: Field Data, 2017

5.2 The Somalia National Army (SNA)

SNA is the military outfit for the Federal Government. In the current years different groups have emerged including the Al-Shabab, community warlords, Hizbul Islam and Ahlusunna waljama (Nyambura, 2011). These groups are interested in power and ruling Somalia. They are fully armed and pose a threat to civilians; in addition they have recruited innocent children and youth into their groups. Necessary efforts should be put to disarm these groups and also the armed civilians to minimize levels of killings.

A Clan Elder advised:

> The Somalis should be ready to do away with outlawed groups so that it is easier to implement justice and order. As negotiations progresses, these groups should be persuaded to surrender their fire arms and join SNA for regular training. (A clan Elder interviewed on 24th July, 2016 in the outskirts of Mogadishu).

The Ambassador (Interview conducted on 23rd August 2016 at the Embassy of Somalia in Kenya) also opined that:

> The stability of Somalia lies in the hands of SNA. They should be ready   and prepared to secure that nation against the Al-shabaab menace. The mentorship programs should facilitate transformation of the reintegrate group into a regular army. They should own and embrace the programs. Insecurity remains a big challenge to most of   the Somalis.

The ambassador`s and Clan Elder`s view correspond with Menkhaus (2014).   Peace process must be owned by the locals. They should embrace and support the peace initiatives and denounce the militant groups. The returnees should be integrated into the SNA through rehabilitation and formal military training. AMISOM is supposed to provide training and mentorship for the SNA. Like any army, SNA should protect the country from external aggression and provide aid to civil authority.   These functions require a highly trained army which embraces professionalism. Skills remain crucial for a disciplined army. SNA is still very weak. AMISOM has to fund SNA`s activities such as training. Currently, they only provide non-lethal assistance due to the weapons embargo placed on Somalia.

SNA is marred with various problems that hinder effective training. Clanism bogs down the training efforts. Sub-tribes wrangle within rank and file jeopardizes training adeptness. Apart from lack of training facilities, SNA still fight amongst themselves

accusing one tribe for lording over others. They have no regard for qualifications and everything should be done from a clan point of view. The infighting amongst them is getting out of hand. AMISOM should strive to build training facilities, presently, it becomes hard to train a soldier who commutes from his home.

SNA is supposed to secure Somalia on their own without the assistance of AMISOM. This should form part of exit strategy. Various armed groups should be disarmed and demobilized. The reintegration should be ongoing by now. There are a handful of militant groups which need to be absorbed by SNA. Groups such as *Ahlsunna Waljama* need to be reintegrated into the national army. The two theories of securitization and armed combat underpin the importance of capacity building for the SNA. AMISOM cannot exit Somali leaving behind a moribund force which will be a walk over for the armed groups. As shown by the respondents, 75% believe that the SNA is not yet ready to take over the country`s security challenges and that it is still a weak force, whereas, 20% think it is capable of securing the country against al shabaab`s threat. SNA is also affected by the clan enmity. There are wrangles within the rank with biasness amongst the major clans. This hinders professionalism that is needed for a regular army. They are trained on different doctrines by different countries thus creating a lot of confusion. These different doctrines need to be harmonized so that all soldiers have a common understanding. The SNA therefore still needs mentorship from the troops so that they are handed over the duty of securing the country. It is shown on Figure 5.2.

Figure 5.2: SNA capability

Source: Field Data, 2017

5.3 The AMISOM components

AMISOM is a multidimensional force with a robust mandate (Hesse, 2014). The components perform different functions. Military, police and civilian components have been performing their respective roles towards peace building strategies in Somalia. Like coq in the machine they work under a unified command with a common purpose.

5.3.1 Military component

Military wing remains the "teeth arm'' of the mission. Militants` physical defeat is conducted by the military wing. At tactical level, they ensure fire power is adequately deployed against the belligerents to ensure that they submit eventually to FGS. One Colonel (Interview on 19th November 2016 at Mogadishu) observed:

> At both tactical and strategic level, al shabaab should be degraded. At strategic level, the centre of gravity of the militia should be chocked so that the will to fight is crushed. Their source of funding should be suffocated and the FGS should support AMISOM in doing that. At tactical level, the bases of Al shabaab should be annihilated if they do not want a dialogue.

This view is corroborated with Ken (2014). The military component should be able to subdue the militants. Their centre of gravity should be identified and chocked so that the will to fight is eliminated. The FGS should give AMISOM necessary support needed to degrade Alshabaab. The military component continues to carry out activities intended to kill the morale and fighting capability of the militia outfit.

However, with current force strength, and without critical multipliers and enablers such as a guard force and air assets, AMISOM will be constrained in its ability to expand its area of operations. The UN should request the African Union to increase the troop strength of the regional peacekeeping body of uniformed personnel as part of overall efforts to combat the increasingly asymmetrical tactics of al-Shabaab rebels in the country because the mission is still in need of assets to target al-shabaab strategic resources and provide air cover. AMISOM should not reduce the number of its troops; instead more strength should be added. The soldiers interviewed pointed out that the

military strength ought to be increased. The soldiers have been seen to suffer from contact dilemma.

5.3.1.1 Contact dilemma

Battlefield presents a lot of fog to the soldiers. The theatre is quite fluid and nothing remains predictable (Woever, 1998). Murkiness of war environment leaves soldiers with mortal fright. Peace support operations call for troops from different countries with different national interests. These soldiers fight in foreign countries far away from their motherlands. With the rugged and difficult terrain, fighting in the African deserts, Savannah grassland and jungles becomes such a risky affair for any nation (Bachman, 2012; Birikongo, 2006; David, 206 and Reno, 2011). African conflicts are violent in nature. During UNOSOM operations, US lost 18 marines in one attack only whereas Pakistan lost 25 soldiers (Nyambura, 2011).

With conflicts still simmering in Somalia, it is unimaginable that peace support operations will diminish. The long-term effects these conflagrations will have on development on the African continent are multi-fold. The missions will inevitably have manifest or positive, intended, as well as latent or negative, unintended consequences for the host populations of the different conflict-ridden countries involved. Yet, the soldiers are supposed to protect the civilians. The Somalis have suffered atrocities meted on them by the warlords and the militant groups (Nyambura, 2011). Rapacious violence has occasioned many deaths thus calling for robust operations. With the end of the cold war,

the room for robust action increased. In 2000, the UN Secretary-General presented the Brahimi Report on the future of peacekeeping, suggesting more vigorous action (Blocq, 2010). Following this report, soldiers have been given explicit authority to use force to protect civilians in peace support operations in Africa. The provisional guidelines with respect to rules of engagement in operations likewise demonstrate a quest for more forceful action to protect local civilians if the need arises (Blocq, 2010). Blocq (2010) notes that in peace support operation is laudatory, but the question may be raised whether the regulation can and will be executed. Individual soldiers should be able to take up the Responsibility to Protect. They should be prepared morally and psychologically to kill and risk their lives in peacekeeping operations, for people they do not know, and even in places that they may never have heard of before (Blocq, 2010).

Soldiers have been accused of failing to perform their duties. Instead, when they come under the enemy fire they tend to run away. They do not want to brave the enemy fire. This has occasioned "contact dilemma" Scholars have not done any empirical research to give a theoretical analysis to the phenomenon.

One respondent (An Interview with a Captain on 28th July 2016 in Mogadishu) noticed:

> During the occasions when troops established contact with the militant groups, the troops were not courageous enough. Some of them had to run away. And in some defended localities when the bases were attacked, the soldiers opted to running away rather than fighting back. Failure to hold ground firm and battling al shabaab resulted into unnecessary casualties.

Even the developed nations find it had sending their soldiers into these war-torn regions as seen in Somalia and Rwanda during 1994 Genocide (Scahill , 2013; Williams, 2012). The soldiers fail to withstand the fight against the armed groups. Instead of fighting, they go into a flight mode. It is in this regard that the study developed contact dilemma to facilitate practical analysis of the phenomenon. In the UN operations in Rwanda and Bosnia, some skeptics, implicitly and explicitly, claimed that cowardice and unassertiveness of Belgian and Dutch peacekeepers, respectively, were crucial factors in the ultimate dramas (Blocq, 2010). Although the debacles in Rwanda and Bosnia were by no means a good yardstick for drawing conclusions about the moral and psychological preparedness of soldiers to fight in peace support operations—the mandates in Rwanda and Bosnia were different from the robust contemporary mandates for peacekeeping, weapons and numbers of troops in Rwanda and Bosnia were inadequate to provide the protection that was needed (Blocq, 2010).

Preparedness to fight remains a complex phenomenon. During combat, soldiers get killed and other gest maimed permanently. In the developping countries, compensation takes too long or they do not even get paid at all. When US lost 18 soldiers in the marine raid in Mogadishu, they withdrew their soldiers from Somalia in 1995 (Hesse, 2014). In figure 5.2, 57% respondents admitted that during the initial contact, there is urge to run away from the enemy fire especially if one lacks proper fighting equipment. The troops need proper training before being deployed into the theatre. The soldiers need to prepare physically, psychologically and mentally. As seen from the respondents, without proper

preparation, the soldiers would not be ready for any combat encounters. The soldiers are supposed to fight through an ambush rather running away thus incurring heavy causalities.

N=80

■ Percentage

Figure 5.3: contact fright

Source: Field Data, 2017

Grossman (1995) submits that civil society sometimes assumes that soldiers are prepared to fight in any military operation. Both readiness to kill and preparedness to die are taken as fact. However, reality demonstrates that military personnel need to actually conquer

their aversion of killing and constantly suppress their fear of dying (Grossman, 1995).

Killing is commonly perceived as a moral wrong. Frequently, killing involves pain for the dying human being. It causes grief among family and friends, and it violates ethical principles such as "respect for autonomy" and "sanctity of life." (Norman, 1995). According to Marshall (1947), the aforementioned moral considerations are so deeply ingrained in the soldier that they become an emotional obstacle for him or her in war-type situations. Not only aversion toward killing but also fear of dying influence the behavior of soldiers. Human beings are generally not inclined to risk their lives. Like animals, human beings have a natural desire for self-preservation. This desire is boosted by an increasing awareness of the value of life. Not having to worry about some basic means such as food, shelter, and security strengthens the appreciation for life. Many people in Western states have more time to reflect on life, and even though there is a tendency to get trapped in material desires, when death becomes involved everything seems to fade. As a result, soldiers from developed countries appear to be becoming more cautious in war-type situations (Born *et al*, 1999). Career-conscious commanding officers heighten that cautiousness further. Casualties among their personnel diminish their chance of pro-motion, driving them to more risk-aversive behavior.

Fear of dying and aversion toward killing are natural reactions to the situation on the battlefield. They will always be present, and no attempt should be made to fully eliminate them in combat. Such elimination would require dehumanization of the enemy and possibly of local civilians. Also, it could result in irresponsible and careless action on behalf of the fearless soldier, jeopardizing his or her entire environment. Thus, fear of

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dying and aversion toward killing should be cherished; it is uncontrolled fear and unlimited aversion toward killing that need to be addressed (Marshall, 1947). Studies in combat motivation dealing with the question of why soldiers fight, demonstrate to an important extent, how soldiers cope with and control both their aversion of killing and their fear of dying. Reasons to fight range from grand ideological objectives, which chiefly play out at the ontological level, to basic stimuli such as self-preservation, which manifest themselves on a concrete psychological level. Fernando (2006) argues that distinctions have been made among motivation, impulses, motives, and morale, but a clear categorization of reasons to fight is challenging, to say the least. Accordingly, reasons to fight are understood as all elements in the social and moral psychological process that precede, lead to, and trigger action. Examples include love of glory, self-preservation, unit cohesion and comradeship, discipline, money, fear of social and physical retribution, hatred of the enemy, and belief in the ideological, strategic, and tactical goals of operations (Fernando, 2000). With the plethora of reasons to fight, it is hard to measure the location of particular elements within the general moral and psychological preparedness of individual soldiers. That role is dependent on personal, temporal, and operational circumstances. Most likely, individual soldiers will not even know themselves exactly why they fight. Nonetheless, across time, certain patterns have been identified.

Between the fifteenth century and the late eighteenth century, European armies— which certainly had not the degree of organization and professionalism that is seen today—were made up of a variety of soldiers, including volunteers, foreigners, and sometimes even

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conscripts (Mjoset and Holde, 2002). The volunteers were the largest in number, joining for money, adventure, religious convictions, or family traditions. Most of the foreign soldiers were mercenaries. Mjoset and Holde (2002) conceded that they were outcasts within their respective societies and would align with various units for the sake of money and escaping some unpleasant fate or future. Conscription was a rather unusual phenomenon. Conscripts were typically criminals, appointed by local magistrates for army service. The Nordic states of Europe—Sweden, Denmark, and Norway—were the only ones with a system of compulsory military service. While the system produced a relatively sizeable force, the conscripts were not greatly motivated to fight. In fact, many young men from the Nordic states fled the country or inflicted injuries on themselves to escape military service.

A decisive change in the makeup of armies materialized when the French introduced the citizen-soldier (Blocq, 2010). Posen (1993) explained that, in the competitive system of international politics that reigned in Europe in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, Napoleon struggled with the question about producing and retaining a sizeable and combat effective army. The French ruler realized that willingness to sign up and fight and a commitment to the outcome were crucial factors in achieving his objective (Posen, 1993). Thus, a campaign was launched to promote a national identity, loyalty to the French nation, and a feeling of belonging, which would serve the military objectives According to Posen (1993). Napoleon actively promoted nationalism to produce the conditions for a mass army.

The humiliating defeat of the Prussians in 1806 created awareness with the Prussians that the French mass army could be resisted only by a similar mass army. Recruitment of foreigners was eliminated and compulsory service was introduced. As a result, the size of the Prussian armed forces expanded substantially—from 60,000 to 270,000 within a year—and the connection between the army and the people intensified (Posen, 1993). Nevertheless, the national identity that was created by the French was different from the identity of the Prussians because, among others, the Prussian monarchs feared that the type of nationalism that was governing France, which was based on ideas of egalitarianism and grounded in the French Revolution, would crumble away the royal power. Therefore, the Prussian rulers emphasized loyalty to the monarchy. Nationalism in the Prussian army was, to an important extent, founded on a "passionate but diffuse bitterness and hatred of the world" after the defeat by France (Blocq, 2010).

While all European countries, as well as the United States, at one point or another introduced a national army and some form of conscription, the roles and forms of nationalism were different in each case. Sometimes conscription and nationalism were used for the socialization of the country, such as in Austria, where the elite tried to "displace social unrest" outward by turning the loyalties of young men to their villages into loyalties to their nation. In other cases, such as in the United States, nationalism basically came from below and was more a matter of citizen service (Kestnabaum, 2002) process that ran, in part, analogous to the formation of national armies was the rise of military professionalism in Western society. That professionalism transpired in the form of an officer corps that was, and still is, guided by expertise—officers with specialized

skills and knowledge—by responsibility and submission toward society and by corporateness—a sense of organic unity. Huntington (1967) explained how military professionalism came about: "The growth of population in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the development of technology, the beginning of industrialism, and the rise of urbanism—all contributed to increased functional specialization and division of labor.

The parallels between Huntington's explanation for military professionalism on one hand, and Hansen (2007) explication regarding the advance of nationalism—resulting from the need for a division of labor in industrial society—on the other hand, are striking. Not surprisingly, Huntington (1967) argued, "A professional soldier is imbued with the ideal of service to the nation.'' In practice, he must be loyal to some single institution generally accepted as embodying the authority of the nation. Professionalism and nationalism are necessarily connected. But while this bond between the professional soldier and the nation is manifest and real, it should not obscure the distance that professionalism also creates. Professionalism implies a certain detachment from political affairs. Politics forms the realm of other experts and should, therefore, not be invaded by the military. This situation sometimes creates tension. On one hand, the professional soldier is expected to be devoted to society and care about it, but on the other hand, or just because of that, it must stay aloof. In present-day politics and civil-military relations, this tension sometimes plays out in the phenomenon of "shirking" by the military (Hansen, 2007).

5.3.1.2 The persistent characteristics of contact-dilemma

Battlefield is marked by fog. Troops are deployed on ground and aligned for combat. Success is realized from aggressive, calculated and decisive use of combat power. Soldiers must be ready for combat and respond appropriately to the enemy fire. If soldiers cannot withstand the enemy`s fire and opt to run away, this act of cowardice jeopardizes the AMISOM`s operations. There are persistent characteristics of contact dilemma; friction; uncertainty and chaos; violence and danger; and Human stress.

5.3.1.2.1 Friction

When troop establishes contact with the armed groups, soldiers tend to lose initiative. Confusion arises due to enemy action. This is the force that makes the simple task look difficult and the difficult ones seemingly impossible. Friction could be mental or physical. One respondent elucidated:

> During contact with the armed groups, all over sudden everything seem to freeze in time. The smell of gun powder, gun shots and bomb explosions can make one run away if one has not been well trained or one lacks equipment (An interview with a Field commander on 25th May 2016 in Mogadishu).

The respondent`s view corroborates Ken (2005). The theatre of war is synonymous with a lot of chaos and friction. The exploding artillery shells, the gun shots and the cries of the injured renders terror in the war zone. The effects of friction can be overcome by determination, high morale, a sound organization that is understood by all men and effective system. The battlefield needs a lot of endurance both physical and mental. Unprepared soldiers will not be able to withstand such frictions. Ken (2005) advises that

soldiers can be prepared to withstand such circumstance through training and a lot of combat scenario rehearsals.

5.3.1.2.2 Uncertainty and mayhem

Combat is uncertain and chaotic. No plan survives contact. When Al shabaab attacks, they leave a tail of destruction. The battle is quite bloody owing to their barbaric tactics. IED explodes killing dozens of soldiers before reinforcing it with a barrage of small fire arms and RPGs. It is therefore conducted against a background of possibilities arrived at by balancing of risks. However, risk is reduced at by the availability of intelligence on the enemy. With lack of information about activities of al shabaab, the operations are thus conducted blindly. Most of the operations are not intelligence driven. The contingents do not share information amongst themselves. AMISOM is yet to develop a synchronized information collection and gathering mechanisms. Lack of prior information predisposes soldiers to contact-dilemma. Prior information prepares the troops physically and psychologically. Readying of troops start by rehearsing drills, and conducting anti-ambush drills. Seizure of initiatives is key to exploiting chaos and uncertainty at the theatre.

5.3.1.2.3 Violence and danger

The enduring mortal fright in the battlefield is real. Overwhelming violence can be applied or threatened to be used by application of combat power. At tactical level, troops must apply lethal force to defeat the enemy. Weapons embedded within the fighting units should be able to deliver the required fire power. It is difficult to fight an enemy who is

more equipped; one is bound to be overwhelmed by that firepower thus turning the base into a rout. Violence brings fear and danger and all men fear. Leaders have to train their soldiers to master the use of weapons and equipment. It harnesses courage from within the soldiers necessitating success.

5.3.1.2.4 Human stress

The will of the individual soldier to stand and find, triangulated across their fighting unit determines the success of mission at hand. The resolve to fight has to be manifested within the soldiers and commanders. Competent leadership and efficient drills are vital in the face of danger. Combat motivation should be expressed in the soldiers` wake to accomplish any given task. AMISOM should provide specialists to help soldiers in managing combat stress.

5.3.1.3 Implications of contact-dilemma

Contact dilemma becomes a defining moment for the PSOs. Al shabaab wants to maximize the battle field confusions to their advantage. They launch lightening attacks on the AMISOM bases with overwhelming lethality. The barbaric modes of offensive are quite intimidating and deathly to the troops. Al shabaab`s commanders exploit that to their success. They also consolidate their firepower and deliver it at decisive points. With powerful machine guns, 47AKs of the troops are a no match.

Troops can only overcome this situation with proper training and equipment. One cannot fight a superior enemy with inferior weapons. The researcher observed that Al shabaab

has superior weaponry. This complicates the battle equation. Professionalism of soldiers should be complemented by appropriate equipment. War against Al shabaab needs sound tactical movements coupled with the necessary weapons. So long as these militants own such powerful machine guns, degrading their capability is far from reality not unless the troops get modern equipment which can be used to counter their offensives.

The military component should live up to its name. They are supposed to mentor the SNA and provide appropriate leadership yet they are marred in various scandals. This leaves doubt whether military component has what it takes to degrade the enemy`s capability. Some of the troops were caught selling military supplies to the 'locals' which finally ends up in the hands of Al shabaab. The act renders the fight against the insurgent groups counterproductive. Zadock (2016) expressed some of the soldiers were caught selling illegal military supplies to the locals. AMISOM had previously received information that its soldiers were allegedly involved in illegal activity and acted decisively to investigate the matter. The investigation culminated in a joint operation to apprehend the soldiers, who were found in possession of fuel and sand bags. The soldiers were arrested alongside 10 civilians at a garage in the Benadir region. Also recovered were telephones, ammunition materials and petrol, among others. AMISOM needs to be in charge of its soldiers otherwise the whole operation will lose its meaning since it is aiding the enemy which it is supposed to fight.

Data showed that, 75% of the respondents feel that AMISOM has a weak military

component. The weakness is occasioned by lack of proper training and lack of the required equipment. Fighting asymmetrical is quite complex. It needs special equipment like mine detectors. Without such equipment, the troops become vulnerable from attacks by the militant groups. AU needs to outsource troops because they are overwhelmed by the tasks at hand. Sierra leone withdrew their troops in 2015 and since then AMISOM is yet to receive their replacements. AU needs to request for more funding to boost up the activities of the troops. This is expressed in Figure 5.4.

Figure 5.4: Military component

Source: Field Data, 2017

5.3.2 Police component

Police force instills law and order just like any other police force. AMISOM police component has the mandate to guarantee the rule of law in the city of Mogadishu and to improve the capacity building of the Somali Police Force (SPF) with the aim of transforming it into a credible body that can provide security for the population (Kimani, 2013).

AMISOM police component continues to support the reform, restructuring, reorganization and professionalization of the SPF though various programs and activities. During the reporting period, AMISOM police, including the Formed Police Units (FPUs), worked closely with the SPF at various police establishments in Mogadishu to mentor, train and advise Somali police officers on a wide range of policing issues, including human rights and management of crime. However, the police component struggle with a lot of work due to limited number of police force.

It has strength of 1, 680 and currently has 362 deployed personnel consisting of two FPUs of 140 personnel each, 76 individual police officers and a senior leadership team of 6 officers (AU, 2013). However, AMISOM still needs more staff and equipment for the FPUs to be able to provide more successful responses to public disorder and to effectively assist the Somali Police Force in increasing the number of operational police officers in the country. The SPF trained should be dispatched to these places. One respondent (A Major who was interviewed in Mogadishu on 23rd September 2016) remaked:

There is a shortage of skilled and specialized police Trainers in AMISOM. This challenge is further compounded by the fact that the few skilled and specialized police trainers like all other police officers, are deployed on a rotational basis and so, have to leave at the end of their mission cycle. This negatively affects both the internal and external training cells in AMISOM. The training of AU Peace Support Operations remains a significant challenge because of low level of experience and language problems. Particularly since its latest expansion, AMISOM is hampered by a lack of Somali speakers, who could play a crucial role in the understanding of the local population and the National Security Force.

Some sectors even lack police personnel completely. Sector 2, for example, has no police components. The respondent point out to the fact that absence of qualified police personnel dwarfs the efforts of peace building strategies as corroborated by Kimani (2013). AMISOM is yet to train trainer of trainees. The few skilled police officers should form up a training cell where they are deployed to train new police officers. Going by the mission cycle, the skilled ones are not effectively utilized. During the training, interpreters should be made available. Most of the trainings occur without a qualified interpreter. From figure 5.5, Seventy-three percent of the sample feels that AMISOM has a weak police component. There is need for more formed police units. They will be involved in training of Somali National Police. They police component remain vital in accomplishment of the AMISOM mandate. Maintenance of law and order is key for the daily operation of the government. They are supposed to secure key government installations like parliament and presidential palace. Such trainings are prerequisite to a lean professional police force.

Figure 5.5: Police component

Source: Field data, 2017

5.3.3 The civilian component

The component has political, humanitarian and public information units. The political unit monitors, interprets and reports on political and other developments throughout Somalia, as well as providing pieces of advice on political processes. It is responsible for the implementation of political decisions on Somalia taken by the Africa Union Peace and Security Council and is helping build up the capacity of the nation's public service.

The Civilian Component is committed to encouraging the launch of civil reconciliation initiatives with a view to seeking political inclusiveness and representation (Neus, 2013). While military assets are critical, multidimensional peace operations also require civilian capabilities. Here the AMISOM suffers from a shortage of experts in the rule of law and security institutions such as police, justice, and corrections officers as well as expert trainers to build local capacity in these areas. With the little funds available, they will have to work harder to ensure that the elections are free and fair. They support the electoral processes – such as voter education, voter registration and training, mentoring and support to local independent electoral commissions. As shown on figure 5.6, 75% of the respondents feel that the civilian component is weak. As such, fulfilling its mandate could be a little bit hard. The weakness as shown by the respondents is occasioned by the understaffed departments. There is also high staff turnover. Most of the employees leave the institution after gathering work experience. This leaves AMISOM with no experts. Civilians are also not trained based on the needs of the AMISOM but on donor`s choice. Therefore such trainings fail of address the needs of AMISOM. AU should reevaluate the remunerations of the civilian staffs and give them necessary trainings based on the needs of AMISOM.

N=95

■ Percentages

Figure 5.6: Civilian component

Source: Field Data, 2017

The humanitarian unit works closely with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, the UN Children's Fund, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World Food Program (WFP) and other UN agencies as well as Somali and international NGOs to establish coordination mechanisms and the sharing of information.

It also collaborates closely with the relevant Somali government agencies and ministries. However, the component is dogged by high turnover of the civilian staff, this kills the institutional memory and the lesson learnt mechanisms. To this end, AMISOM should find away of retaining the civilian staff. A staff officer, interviewed on 29th May 2017 in Mogadishu, commented:

> Similar to the Military and Police components, the Civilian component is understaffed and therefore faces difficulties in achieving its stated objectives. This makes it difficult to organise in-mission training as each unit needs specific training in addition to the generic peace support operations knowledge that is applicable to all the units in the component. The most significant purpose of training in a peace support operation is to enhance the capabilities of mission staff to efficiently perform the mandated tasks needed for the effective execution of the mission mandate. Training must therefore be based on a function need and performance assessment basis. However, due to the absence of a structure for function and performance analysis, training has been individual-needs led rather than mission led. Whilst the various types of training required by the civilian component for the performance of their functions is available on the continent and elsewhere, the skeletal nature of the component means that in some instances, sending an officer out for a two-week training would mean that there would be a vacuum for that period as there would be no one else to hold the fort. In the initial stages of the mission, the international community prioritized strengthening the Federal Government and mitigating the threat posed by the al-Shabaab. This in effect resulted in the neglect of recruitment and training of a capable civil component.

The respondent`s opinion corresponds with Neus (2013). The civilian component is undermanned. The capability of mission cannot be fully enhanced with shortage of civilian staff. Due to lack of structure for function and performance analysis, the trainings have been individual-led rather than mission-led. The training, therefore, does not meet the needs of AMISOM. The trainings are essentially supposed to be carried out on a function need and performance assessment basis. This will equip the component with a capable human resource. This will enhance and build the capacity to effectively execute

the mission mandate.

AMISOM's exit strategy is closely tied to the development of the institutional capacity of the Federal Government of Somalia. There is need to ensure that all the key state institutions, and especially those charged with providing security, are established and well functioning to ensure maintenance of rule of law, effective governance and provision of basic public services. In these, the AMISOM has and can play a crucial role. The pay of civilian employees should be commensurate with the work that they do and best on market survey.

Table 5.2 shows cross tabulation of satisfaction of the components of the multidimensional force by the respondent type. From the summarized results, all components: military; police; and civilian, have not been performing to the satisfactory of the respondents. For the military component, police component and civilian component had very dissatisfaction of 63.1%, 84.1% and 57.9% respectively. The percentages are high pointing to the fact that AMISOM still has to improve its components in order to improve the proficiency of the mission. These components have helped the FGS achieve some semblance of government. For example Ugandan troops are charged with the mandate of securing Mogadishu and as a result, the government is able to conduct its business from Mogadishu. Some of projects are being initiated through CIMIC operations. Such activities include building schools, sinking boreholes and building healthcare facilities.

Table 5.2: Cross tabulation of satisfaction of components of the multidimensional force by respondents

Rating		Military component	Police component	Civilian component
Very satisfied	Frequency	6	4	5
	%	6.3	4.2	5.3
Satisfied	Frequency	9	3	7
	%	9.5	3.2	7.4
Neutral	Frequency	0	1	3
	%	0	1.1	3.1
Dissatisfied	Frequency	20	7	25
	%	21.1	7.4	26.3
Very dissatisfied	Frequency	60	80	55
	%	63.1	84.1	57.9
Total	**Frequency**	**95**	**95**	**95**
	%	**100**	**100**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

5.4 Amalgamation of Political and Diplomatic Settlement of Armed Conflict

AMISOM political unit monitors, interprets and reports on political and other developments throughout Somalia, as well as providing advice on political processes. It is responsible for the implementation of political decisions on Somalia taken by the Africa Union Peace and Security Council and is helping build up the capacity of the nation's public service. The pursuance and consolidation of political and diplomatic settlement of armed conflict has been in the forefront of mission`s agenda. Most of the informants

interviewed felt that the AMISOM`s political office has not done much in streamlining the political processes within the country. The political office should play advisory role in bringing the political leaders of Somalia together. The Somalia leaders within different clans should be brought together. The processed should be owned by locals so that they feel that they are part and parcel of the peace processes rather than being imposed upon them by foreigners.

With the collaboration of AMISOM, the political situation in Somalia has continued to improve. The Federal Government continued its efforts to implement its Six-Pillar plan. The Six Pillar strategy is a comprehensive policy framework outlined by the President of Somalia for the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, around which the AU and the international community should align its support; Full Stability - Supremacy of the law and good governance, that incorporates rule of law and security; Economic Recovery - Livelihoods and economic infrastructure; Peace building-Social reconciliation through building bridges of trust; Service Delivery - Health, education and environment; International Relations - Building collaborative relations and polishing the national image; and The Unity and Integrity of the country - Striving together for a better future (AU, 2013). This plan remains as good as the paper work if it can be executed. The summarized results from Figure 5.7, shows that 69% of the respondents feel that there is no enough support for the political and diplomatic efforts stabilize Somalia. Only 2% of the respondents are feel there is strong support. The clan dynamics plays a key role in any political decisions. There warlords who have been profiteering from the Somalia conflict

do not want to settle for peace as that kills their business. There amassing the political

leaders and clan elders to support a course at times takes too long.

Figure 5.7: support of amalgamation of political and diplomatic settlement of armed

conflicts

Source: Field Data, 2017

5.5 Facilitation and implementation of security and stabilization plan

The military does a difficult task of securing the country from Al shabaab threats. The

military component of the African Union Mission in Somalia is the biggest of the three

components of the AU Mission in the country. The component provides protection to the country's Federal Institutions as they carry out their functions and helps secure Somalia's key infrastructure including its airports and seaports. All the troops are deployed in four sectors covering south and central Somalia. The AMISOM military component has created a relatively secure environment which has allowed the Somali peace process to take root, allowed local population the opportunity to begin establishing accountable local governance institutions that can deliver services as well as rebuild the local economy and create linkages to the national economy and government.

One respondent (A Clan Elder interviewed on 23rd May, 2017 in Mogadishu) expressed fears:

> Securing Somalia remains a big challenge to the troops. Up to date there are still bomb explosions in the streets of Mogadishu and other towns. AMISOM needs to do much more to ensure safety and security for all Somalis.

The clan elder`s statement corresponds with Mohammed (2016). The streets of Mogadishu still remain unsafe despite the presence of AMISOM troops. The troops are unable to secure the State against the menaces from the militant groups. Most of the towns in Somalia are still under the control of Al shabaab. Despite some achievements, Al-Shabaab is still a threat in some of the recovered areas, and they still occupy some remaining pockets of Southern Somalia. To address those challenges, the new Federal Government of Somalia in close collaboration with AMISOM has come up with a policy plan which is centered on reconciliation and stabilization of the country.

AMISOM has continuously offered support in various mediations undertaken, to build internal cohesion among members and in capacity building for the public sector institutions to enhance security and to participate in the government stabilization plan. In figure 5.8, 60% of respondents are dissatisfied with the facilitation of implementation of security and stabilization plan. Negotiating jointly managed security structures that will de-escalate violence, restore public security and build confidence between belligerents is integral to indigenous Somali peace processes. A starting point for security sector policy in Somalia should be to understand the ways in which Somalis themselves mediate conflict, negotiate ceasefires and manage security. A starting point for security sector policy in Somalia should be to understand the ways in which Somalis themselves mediate conflict, negotiate ceasefires and manage security. Over the past two decades, however, international actors have ignored local approaches.

Figure 5.8: facilitation of implementation of security and stabilization plan

Source: Field Data, 2017

5.6 Regionalizing operations

Most of African interventions have been conducted by foreign forces (Reno, 2011). The end of the Cold War brought a rapid growth in quantity of UN activities in Africa. Soon after unsuccessful withdrawal from Somalia and failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda led to the retrenchment and reassessment of UN operations in Africa (David, 2006). Major powers in the UNSC retreated from their initial post-Cold War enthusiasm for

engagement in African conflicts. Simultaneously, a debate about possible increased cooperation with regional organizations emerged. Through the lens of interventionism theory, the regional security mechanism should be able to effectively intervene in the conflict ridden countries. The member states ought to be non partisan and remain as neutral as possible while engaging the key actors in peace talks. Interventions by African countries in conflicts outside the UN or AU frameworks have been observed. More importantly, such interventions by individual states have occurred side by side with internationally mandated missions in two central theatres of armed conflict: Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Both are the centerpiece of a regional conflict formation with non state armed groups, but also state forces operating across borders on a regular basis.

In Somalia, the establishment of the African Union Mission (AMISOM) was meant to replace Ethiopian military involvement, but the neighbor's forces have repeatedly intervened after an official withdrawal in 2009. Furthermore, Kenya directly intervened in Somalia after October 2011 and got approval from the AU later, followed by the plan to incorporate Kenyan forces into AMISOM. Similarly, the Eastern DRC has time and again seen military interventions by neighboring Rwanda based on an agreement between the Congolese and the Rwandan Presidents after November 2008. The international community finds it convenient to argue for the regionalization of peacemaking and peacekeeping efforts in Africa and the principle of "African solutions for African problems" (Williams, 2012). Most of the informants agreed to the fact that troops drawn

from African nations stand better chances in intervening in Somalia rather than foreign forces if they are given the necessary support. This is shown in figure 5.9 Africans understand the demographic factors and the rugged terrain much better than foreigners. This was also the consequence of the death of American soldiers which not only influenced American public opinion towards UN peacekeeping but also acted as a major warning against putting Western boots on the ground in African war zones. Fifty-nine percent of the respondents believe that AMISOM has help in regionalizing of the operations since the TCCs are from within the AU member states. However, 39% believe that it has not helped in regionalizing the operations.

Typically, the majority of African troop contributions come from countries in the same region. Within the large pool of African states contributing army or police troops, a sub-set including Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Nigeria, Kenya, Chad and South Africa stand out as important players. Their importance is derived from the consistency, size and military effectiveness of their contributions. Significant incentives to contribute include increased access to international forums and stronger bilateral relationships with powerful states that ask for contributions. It can also affirm the rule of the political parties which authorise deployments. Crucial too are the interests of countries within the region in containing or suppressing the conflict itself.

While some may argue that this is all the better for promoting 'African solutions to African problems', this can have negative consequences for African citizens, including exposing them to poorly paid and resourced troops with low levels of training and little respect for civilians; further entrenching despotic regimes; or regionalising existing conflicts. Even so, troops originating from neighbouring countries remain a desirable component for 'peacekeeping' because of two main advantages over troops from further afield: they can be deployed faster and their governments have a greater political commitment to take risks. This is where robust operations and the use of regional troops come together. The ability to provide a force that is willing to act aggressively is often dependent on using troops from countries that have a direct stake in the outcome.

Regional 'peacekeepers' in Africa with robust mandates are here to stay. To ensure the best chance for assistance to reach civilians trapped in African conflict zones, humanitarian agencies need to protect their neutral identity and open lines of dialogue with all parties to the conflict. Currently, however, most humanitarian organisations are primarily geared towards dialogue with the UN and Western militaries and diplomatic players. This is not adequate: humanitarian organisations need to urgently improve dialogue not just with the AU (and its subsidiary regional economic communities) but with key African troop-contributing states.

N=95

Figure 5.9: Regionalizing of operations

Source: Field Data, 2017

From the data collected (Figure, 5.10), 75% of the respondents felt contribution of AMISOM is yet to be felt by the common Somali. Most of the rural areas are still under control of Al shabaab. Even in the towns which have been liberated by the AMISOM forces, the Islamic group still terrorizes the locals whenever the troops are not on watch. With the available infrastructures, AMISOM should be able to make its efforts be felt by the common Somalis by realizing its mandate.

Figure 5.10: Opinions on contributions of AMISOM to peace building

Source: Field Data, 2017

5.7 Summary

The chapter discussed the support of AMISOM to the peace initiatives and how it has aided SNA into a relatively modernized army. Components of AMISOM were analysed and how they contribute to peace building. It has investigated how contact dilemma affects the troops and how it can be corrected. Apart from pursuance and consolidation of political and diplomatic settlement of armed conflict, AMISOM also facilitates the implementation of security and stabilization plan of the country. It finally captures the

regionalizing of operations and how AMISOM has contributed to the AFSol mantra. The next chapter presents findings and discussions on challenges facing AMISOM towards peace building.

CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AMISOM FACE IN INFLUENCING PEACE BUILDING

The chapter details findings, analysis and interpretation on data collected on the challenges AMISOM faces towards peace building in Somalia. The analysis focuses on how support affects efficiency of the force. It also delves into how these flaws can be resolved to ensure relatively more effective future peace support operations.

6.1 The mandate

Exploiting clan dynamics and employing asymmetrical tactics, Al shabaab has the capacity to cause economic damage, create insecurity, fear and disruption of political process in Somalia and beyond. The collapse of the central government of Somalia in the 1991 resulted into civil war. Sixteen years of peacemaking efforts could not resolve conflicts in Somalia and restore peace. In May 2007, violent conflicts caused tremendous damage and loss of life and as a result of which the humanitarian relief operations were prevented. In December 2006, the UN Security Council authorised the AU to establish a protection and training mission in Somalia. Pursuant to that, the Peace and Security *Council* of the AU set up the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) in January 2007. On the basis of the report prepared by the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Situation in Somalia and the recommendations of the AU Military Staff Committee, the Peace and Security Council of the AU authorised the deployment of AMISOM. The major objectives of the AMISOM to: provide support for the transitional federal institutions (TFIs) in their effort to normalise the situation and initiate reconciliation;

facilitate the humanitarian assistance, and create conditions for long term peace, reconstruction and development in Somalia (Hull and Syensson, 2008).

The UN supports African Union mission in Somalia by providing military planners and an assistance cell to the AU in Addis Ababa. The UN Security Council met with the AU's PSC in June 2007 for a better collaboration for restoring peace in Somalia. The AU mission in Somalia deployed 1700 Ugandan troops in March 2007. Nigeria, Ghana, Malawi and Burundi also declared their willingness to contribute by deploying their troops. The AMISOM is making efforts to stabilise the regions of Mogadishu and Baidoa while trying to create conditions for complete withdrawal of Ethiopian troops from Somalia, besides initiating dialogue and reconciliation. The European Union and United Kingdom (UK) are supporting the AMISOM by providing financial assistance. UK is providing planning assistance and logistical support for the AU military cell in Addis Ababa (Hull and Syensson, 2008). The EU has shown keenness to support the AU in its long-term capacity building, military and civilian crisis management to strengthen its ability to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts. The support is quite essential if the mandates are to be executed.

The AMISOM has various mandates to undertake. These mandates need various supports so that they can be achieved. Milestones to be accomplished by the troops can`t just happen; the troops as well as the other stakeholders need to play their respective roles. AMISOM, as a multidimensional PSO, is mandated to: take all necessary measures, as appropriate, and in coordination with the Somalia National Defence and

Public Safety Institutions, to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; assist in consolidating and expanding the control of the FGS over its national territory; assist the FGS in establishing conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia, through supports as appropriate, in the areas of security, including the protection of Somali institutions and key infrastructure, governance, rule of law and delivery of basic services; provide, within its capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support for the enhancement of the capacity of the Somalia State institutions, particularly the National Defence, Public Safety and Public Service Institutions; support the FGS in establishing the required institutions and conducive conditions for the conduct of free, fair and transparent elections by 2016, in accordance with the Provisional Constitution; liaise with humanitarian actors and facilitate, as may be required and within its capabilities, humanitarian assistance in Somalia, as well as the resettlement of internally displaced persons and the return of refugees; facilitate coordinated support by relevant AU institutions and structures towards the stabilization and reconstruction of Somalia, and provide protection to AU and UN personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defence. As required by the theory of securitization, support of the mandate remains key n the successful facilitation of peace strategies in Somalia.

The mandates should be able to bring the Horn of Africa back to its former self. The delivery of basic services, effective governance, rule of law, protection of Somali institutions and the establishment of Somalia National Defence are key items that should

be quickly put into place by the AMISOM. Posture adopted by AMISOM presently can only guarantee limited success. A lot needs to be done yet the means is quite limited. These sentiment augurs with 75% of the respondents who agree with the fact that peace support operation does not receive the support that will make it realize meaningful gains.

When the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1772 in 2007 it authorized AMISOM to take "all necessary measures" to *inter alia* protect the institutions of the Transitional Institutions of the Somali government and "support dialogue and reconciliation" by providing protection and safe passage to personnel involved. In Resolution 2036 of 2012 the Security Council was more specific in authorising AMISOM "to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia." Despite the political objectives, AMISOM's role, circumscribed by the overall scope and direction of the Security Council, was originally primarily seen as a military contribution, aimed at creating an enabling security environment, and part of a wider political strategy that is still taking shape.

A Maj General interviewed on 24th July 2016 in Mogadishu enlightened:

> Support of the mandate remains a big challenge for the success of peace support operations. This is a multicultural undertaking that needs support of various kinds. The soldiers doing their work cannot achieve much as defined by the mandate if

they are not facilitated in the quest to accomplish their missions. The AU through AMISOM should provide the infrastructure required to facilitate these mandates.

The respondent`s view corresponds Maclsaac (2015). The soldiers needs to be provided with the necessary infrastructure so that that they are able to achieve their mandate. The reporting and monitoring mechanisms should be put into place so that there is smooth flow of command and control. Both financial and logistical support should be prompt. AMISOM was initially restricted to defending itself, the transitional government, and the air and seaports in Mogadishu with barely more than a couple of thousand troops. The mission gradually grew in size, with several incremental expansions of a few thousand soldiers at a time, until an increase of almost 6,000 in the troop ceiling occurred in early 2012 (Beadle, 2012) Uganda`s and more recently Kenya's, political resolve and national commitment to robustly interpret and implement the mandate has helped to overcome the political and bureaucratic inertia that usually characterize such multilateral missions. The rules of engagement (RoEs) allow the use of the use of lethal force. Troops can operate in hostile environments and are able to protect themselves. AMISOM is deployed under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which allows the use of force in implementing UN Security Council resolutions. It was under Article 51 of the same chapter, which recognises "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence" that Kenya invaded Somalia in October 2011. AMISOM is authorised to employ "all necessary measures" in the fight against al Shabaab. Rule No 1.27 of its rules of engagement also authorises "use of force up to and including deadly force in support of offensive actions".

The mandate is clear and RoEs are defined. Under the watch of theory of interventionism, interveners are supposed to intervene at the opportune time with the right means. Failures of peace support troops put the credibility of the mission in doubt. The type of RoEs of the AMISOM requires superior weaponry which is out of reach for troop contributing countries. There is increase of troops, weaponry and tactics borrowed from other parts of the world. Al shabaab and other armed groups have improved their tactics as opposed to the troops which are trained to fight a regular war fare. AMISOM has a long way to go in terms of the support of the mandate and if meaningful gains are to be made.

The mandate is overwhelming and the stabilisation of Somalia has to be realised, that is a daunting task that calls for support from even the locals themselves In the face of an enemy that strikes and completely melts into the civilian population is quite a nightmare to deal with. He strikes at will and morphs every now and then. In the bloody attacks on AMISOM troops, the armed militia group exhibits superior tactics. The force needs force multipliers and enablers. The forces to face terrorists and hardened criminals lacked air and maritime components in a country that has a coastline of more than 3000 km. Djibouti meeting strongly condemned the recent attacks perpetuated by Al Shaabab in Mogadishu, Leggo, Janaale, and El Adde and, the continued asymmetrical warfare by this terrorist group against the FGS, the Interim Regional Administrations, Somalia security institutions, AMISOM, the UN and the civilian population and urges all relevant stakeholders especially the international community to intensify efforts in support of AMISOM and Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) operations to significantly

degrade the growing threats posed by Al Shabaab (Djibouti Declaration, 2016). The theory of Armed Combat plays a role in explaining the fatalities in AMISOM bases. They could not hold the enemy`s fire power, hence, the defence turned into a rout. This calls for critical examination of the training of the troops and how equipped they are. The troops are supposed to be battle ready. However, from the attacks, it is clear that these troops were overwhelmed.

AMISOM mandate is renewed every year and is subject to political dynamics, financial and other factors out of control of the AU and the Somali government. At the moment, AMISOM faces a lot of financial crisis especially after EU announced a cut in their donor aid by 20% (Omar, 2015). AU has to start generating funds to keep the operations going. There are a lot of negotiations that take place between African decision-makers, Somali government and their non-African partners. As shown on Table 6.1, 82.1% of respondents suggested that the missions mandate should not be subject to changes frequently not unless when being strengthened. Twelve point six percent of respondents disagree, 3.2% agree and 2.1% strongly disagree. The outcome of these negotiations has complex motives and interests that have consequences on the autonomy of the mission. The TCCs should rotate their soldiers to avoid mission creep. They should not be allowed to stay for more than a year as this leads to laxity. With shorter mandates, mission planning becomes hard. The mission cycle should be allowed to go atleast for two years. This gives the troops enough time to plan for the mission tasks.

Table 6.1: Frequently changing mandate

Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	8	2.1
Agree	9	3.2
Neutral	0	0
Disagree	16	12.6
Strongly disagree	83	82.1
Total	**116**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

6. 2 Uncertain political situation in Somalia

The political power in Somalia can be characterized as local, fragmented, violent, heterogenic and based on hybrid structures of formal and informal institutions controlled by clans or militias, in which different socio-political orders interact (Hesse, 2014). This fluidity of structure, with access to resources and power being an important source of clan conflicts, has been an enduring challenge for peace negotiations and will continue doing so. Figure 6.1 shows response from the respondents. Seventy-three percent of the respondents feel that the uncertainty of political climate hampers the peace building in Somalia, hence they are very dissatisfied. Five percent were satisfied with the political climate. The lack of agreed policies or framework to tackle disputes among federal member states or between them and central government makes the new president`s work be hard (President Mohamed was elected in Feb, 2017) . The most intractable of the conflicts between federal states remains that between the Galmudug Interim

Administration (GIA) and Puntland over the city of Galkayo which straddles their common border. Clashes in November and December 2016 saw hundreds killed and thousands displaced. Tensions subsided following a ceasefire agreement in late December, but the violence highlights the ferocity of competition between clans for territorial control.

Disputes within federal states also hamper efforts to rebuild the country. On 10 January, local Galmudug state parliamentarians passed a no-confidence motion against GIA President Abdikarim Guled, which he rejected on the grounds that it fell short of the required two-thirds threshold and was passed while parliament was closed. The GIA also faces resistance from the Sufi-aligned, anti-Al-Shabaab militia, Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), which continues to control Galmudug state capital, Dhusamareeb. Al-Shabaab remains resilient and continues to launch strikes against civilian and military targets across Somalia, especially in Mogadishu's heavily guarded centre. Though weakened, it has adapted and become versatile in using both urban and rural guerrilla tactics. Effective counter-insurgency will require concerted action by both military and civilian actors.

N=116

■ Percentage

Figure 6.1: Political situation in Somalia

Source: Field Data, 2017

Looking beyond the clan issue, there are disagreements about the nature, or even desirability of the state. Much of Somali society has traditionally been nomadic and suspicious of the interference of a central authority in their affairs, a sentiment reinforced by experience with military dictatorship. The major clans favour a federal system of governance where distinct units of the country are largely autonomous but federated into

a loose nation state, thus giving them control over their own territories.

The success of AMISOM is, therefore, partially dependent on whether centralised structures of government can demonstrate legitimacy among the Somali citizenry. One way of demonstrating legitimacy is ensuring the timely and efficient delivery of the much-needed public goods and services and providing stability and peace throughout the liberated areas. The challenge with the recognition of legitimacy is already manifest in the country with accusations that the local leaders who have replaced former al-Shabaab leaders do not, often, come from the majority clans in their areas but are puppets of the central authority. To date, the central government continues to struggle to gain the needed legitimacy.

6.3 Intelligence and information gathering

Herman (1996) notes that intelligence is produced to influence government action. The ultimate purpose of intelligence is to provide information that helps decision-makers make better policy choices. Military operations are supposed to be intelligence driven. Spates of deadly offensive by the Alshabaab militants on the AMISOM bases leave many wondering if there is any intelligence on the ground. One respondent (An interviewed conducted with Sergeant on 28th May 2017 in Mogadishu) who was a survivor from one of the ill-fated base noted :

We only get general information which is disjointed and thus acting on such piece becomes hard. The soldiers are supposed to stay alert but the level of alertness increases too with the level of threat they are anticipating. Too much confusing information trickles in, the soldiers tend to take it as routine which in long term becomes too dangerous because the enemy is likely to catch them flat footed.

The respondent`s view correspondents with Emma (2015). The pieces of information are supposed to flow in on a real-time basis. Information is processed to produce intelligence. Intelligence is never supposed to be disjointed. Too much information flowing in overwhelms the soldiers. Thus, all the operations are supposed to be initiated by intelligence. Most of the exercises are done blindly like patrols, scouting and general road movements. This has resulted into several deaths from enemy action. Such deaths would have been prevented.

The AMISOM leadership should establish strong domestic intelligence to deal with threats emanating from the terror group. Threats from transnational terrorism know no boundary. Problems such as terrorism and organized crime cannot be adequately dealt with using domestically acquired intelligence only. Intelligence about these threats must also be gathered outside our own borders. Furthermore, tackling the threats Somalia now faces, such as an allegedly new type of terrorism, requires human intelligence; signals intelligence alone can no longer meet the requirement. The long civil war in Horn of Africa has made a brooding ground for even foreign fighters. Al shabaab has affliations with Al-Qaeda and links with Boko haram too. Mutambo (2016) opined that one of the

first moves by Al shabaab leader Ahmed Diriye when he took over in 2014 was to reaffirm Shabaab`s commitment to Al-Qaeda. With a revolt by internal Islamic agitators crushed, suggestions that the militant group could be collaborating with Islamic State's West Africa affiliate Boko Haram are implausible. Under Diriye the organisation has gained new vigour and expanded its regional reach, confounding hopeful predictions of its end. This is a movement whose membership and horizons are broader than Somalia, and is operationally active in at least six countries in the region. Shabaab no longer administers large territories, but has adapted to the new circumstances becoming, simultaneously weaker and more dangerous. Far from being defeated Shabaab appears reborn. It's simply not true that Shabaab is on the backfoot or desperate. They have reorganised, retrained, recruited and found renewed purpose.

 The resilient anarchy in Somalia seems to have worsened the picture. Thirteen years after the formation of the Transitional Federal Government in October 2004, Somalia is yet to have a fully operational government. This state of affairs, coupled with similar regional challenges made the Greater Horn an easy target for global crime syndicates- piracy, drugs and light weapons trafficking and most notably, international terrorism. Since late 2006, Somalia seems to be the epicentre of Islamic fundamentalism of the kind witnessed in the Middle-East in recent years. The countries in the region more often than not, are unable to tame the vice as they were plagued by internal challenges- active and/or potential conflicts amongst them. Counterterrorism requires a judicious mixture of mix of defensive and proactive measures, including the intelligence gathering. The involvement

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of use of intelligence assets to acquire information from the enemy through use of signal interception, group infiltration or imagery. The war on terrorism was not given the best approach or American foreign policy was misinformed on the Somalia affairs. For example, the Ethiopian funded invasion of Somali in 2006 resulted into more negative impacts. The Alshabaab got more sympathizers and mutated into more a radicalized wing. The ramifications of the ill advised intervention are still felt upto date.

On Somalia, Jeremy (2013) recounts how, after 9/11, the CIA recruited local militia groups to capture and kill 'Islamists'. That term defined a far wider range of ideologies than al Qaida's, which at the time had only a handful of active supporters in the country. Each week, CIA agents flew in by private jet from Nairobi to provide the roaming death squads with their target lists and dollar-filled briefcases. In 2006, an uprising in response to these CIA proxies led to the Islamic Courts Union coming to power in Mogadishu. The Bush administration interpreted the Courts as another 'Islamist' threat and decided a full-scale military invasion was needed. On this occasion, the job was outsourced to the Ethiopian army - supported with US airpower and special operations forces on the ground. The violence of the Ethiopian invasion, in turn, pushed al Shabaab, the marginal youth wing of the Courts, to the fore as the main organiser of Somali resistance. For the first time, a group with a Taliban-style agenda began to control territory in Somalia, an outcome that owed much to US policies ostensibly intended to forestall such a possibility. In Somalia, the local intelligence agency is paid for by the CIA and its operations were kept secret from the Somali Government ministers (Jeremy, 2013).

The policy of extra-judicial killings in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, especially when the victims were US citizens was implemented. These killings - usually carried out by drone strike - take place far from Iraq and Afghanistan, where the US is officially at war, and, therefore, lack any plausible legitimacy under conventional laws of warfare that allow for the killing of combatants on a battlefield. Legally, killing a 'high-value target' (HVT) was often easier than imprisoning him and the technology of bombing by remote control made possible an alternative to the complex politics of detaining suspects.

The militants' commanders operate within Somalia. Movements are done under the cover of darkness knowing very well that they are high value targets for the AMISOM troops. At the time of writing, within the sector 2, they have intensified their operations. The armed group seemed to have perfected their tactics with time and AMISOM has to work round the clock to beat them. The strategy adopted by the AMISOM in fighting the militia is counterproductive in the long run. Their key leaders are targeted then killed. Sometimes, they seek help from the US soldiers since they have sophisticated surveillance equipment. The armed militia has never suffered from leadership vacuum. If there is always one ready to take up the leadership role and it becomes cyclic. They would have adopted other means probably dialogue (Scahill, 2013).

The announcement followed revelations by the Kenyan military that it killed Al-Shabaab senior commander in charge of intelligence, Mohammed Karatey alias Mahat Karatey.

Karatey is said to have been killed in an airstrike on 24th June 2016 in Jamale and was suspected to have been a key player in the attack on a Kenya Defence Forces camp in El Adde on January 15th 2016. The Alamnyat, Al shabaab`s intelligence wing has suicide bombers, assassins, explosive experts and information gatherers. The killing of the commander is a big blow to the terror group (Omar, 2016). The wing provides logistics and operations support throughout the Horn of Africa. Karate was the second senior most commander to be killed after Abdi Dek, the operations commander of Zebeir brigade. It is glaring that every time a leader is killed, there is always someone ready to take over the remnants of leadership**.**

From Figure 6.2**,** the same opinion is shared by 54 % of the respondents who believe that the mechanism is weak. Sixteen percent is neutral, whereas, 30% believe it is fully functional. According to the respondents (who feel that the mechanism is weak), the troops are supposed to conduct operations which are intelligence driven. This will reduce the number of casualties they are currently incurring. The patrols normally run into ambush traps laid by the militant groups. Extricating from these ambushes are usually hard since they are reinforced with heavy machine guns. The intelligence cells are supposed to give out actionable information. Currently, the intelligence wing does not have necessary funds and equipment that should enable them to run their tasks efficiently. Some Alshabaab operatives are outside Somalia borders especially in Kenya, the intelligence community should be able to unearth such external webs.

N=116

- Strong 30%
- Weak 54%
- Neutral 16%

Figure 6.2: Intelligence and information gathering mechanism

Source: Field Data, 2017

The intelligence and information gathering mechanisms have not been developed. Lack of intelligence and information gathering precipitates failure in the event of contact as mentioned in the theory of contact-dilemma. The theory of intervention, further, stresses the importance of conducting an operation that is intelligence driven and that the probability of success is relatively high. The intelligence is supposed to be collaborated amongst the contingents. The gap is being exploited by the Al shabaab. Every country

works disjointedly. The information gathered is shared so that the flanking friendly forces are aware of one other`s operation. Failure to that works at the disadvantage of the whole mission. The unity of effort has to be realized by the participating troop contributing countries.

There should be an information cell at the force headquarters that collects all the information on the belligerent`s activities. Information is analysed and then disseminated to the relevant troops. Most of the offensive attack launched on the AMISOM bases nearly catches them off guard (Emma, 2015). The intelligence cycle is bogged down by the lack of modern equipment for intelligence collection. AMISOM lack modern equipment like drones that can be used for both day and night surveillances. This will ease the patrol duties of the troops since they are able to spot the enemy and engage him at a standoff range. Force protection is achieved. At the moment, the force is losing soldiers to deaths which could be easily prevented. The intelligence officers lack relevant training for intelligence. Collection plan should be comprehensive so that analysis is done before the intelligence is passed to the relevant people. Equipment under use is obsolete and more often than not they are blind with regards to intelligence. Modern equipment are handy in terms of information collection especially imagery intelligence. Source and agencies need to be maintained. Funds are always not there for sustaining these sources. Collecting real time information for commander`s decision making becomes a huge challenge. Intelligence remains crucial for any military operations. Operational blindness is occasioned by lack of intelligence in any theatre of war.

Such equipment can find, acquire and fix the enemy. For Signal intelligence, machines like jammers and interceptors are needed. Other equipment can be used to tap into the Al shabaab leadership communications. AMISOM is yet to embrace electronic warfare which is essential in the fight against terrorism. The militant have fluid tactics that remain unpredictable. In war against insurgency, the force needs to be ahead of the enemy. The target acquisition assets are fundamental to this end. When the enemy`s activity is spotted at a particular place, then priority should be located so that the air assets are deployed there. Degrading alshabaab`s capability is going to be a daunting task for the forces.

The effective fight of the elements requires well-coordinated intelligence resources. Djibouti summit recognised the importance of the effective implementation of stabilisation efforts in liberated areas through improved local governance by the FGS with the support of the international community, establishment of social infrastructure including through Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) and by encouraging procurement of local commodities by UNSOS and AMISOM in order to promote local economies as part of efforts towards winning the hearts and minds of local communities. Requests for concerted efforts by AU Commission and the International community to identify and disable channels utilised to finance Al Shabaab and other terrorist groups and the recruitment and training of foreign fighters in Somalia (Djibouti Declaration, 2016). Efforts to achieve this through closure of money transfers systems have not born fruits. Intelligence provides the best platform for fighting this kind of war. It seems al sbabaab

has gone on an offensive charm. The armed group is seen conducting a lot of civil-military relations especially in Lower Shebelle, Middle Juba in sector 2 and Gedo regions. They are providing water pumps, erecting medicamps and vaccinating livestock. These activities further alienate the locals from the moribund Mogadishu Administration and seemingly ineffective AMISOM. These activities are aimed at softening the hearts of locals.

Tactics deployed by the enemy have changed over time. There are foreign fighters who were not previously in the battlefield but are there presently. These are hardcore with religious extremism. They have expertise in various fields in the battle space. In the months of September and august 2016 attacks by the IEDs reinforced with ambushes, metal spikes and flames, it is worth noting that the insurgent groups have changed their tactics and doctrines. AMISOM`s intelligence apparatus should have worked on how to counter their mode of attacks. The mechanism failed to point to the new mode of attack. They load vehicles with what is otherwise known as vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED). The soldiers have not been prepared for such kinds of attack. In the absence of battle hardened soldiers, in case of such model of attack, the soldiers are likely to turn the defensive position into a defeat. The urge to run away from the enemy which is an act of cowardice will be very overwhelming. Soldiers need to be prepared psychologically and that preparation is aided by the intelligence. In figure 6.3, the respondents (76%) strongly agree that the tactics of insurgency is too fluid thus training of personnel and intelligence is key to keeping the armed group off the balance. The Al

shabaab has no face and thus amorphous. They attack at will and easily blend into the civilian population. With ever changing tactics reinforced with guerrilla warfare, the soldiers need specialized training to deal with such a threat.

Figure 6.3: Highly changing insurgent tactics

Source: Field Data, 2017

In ambush site, the insurgent group has learnt how to kill the mobility of troop carrying vehicles (TCVs) and armoured personnel carriers (APCs). They plant main supply routes at strategic points with spikes. Vehicles in the convoy suffer tire burst as a result then

they use flame thrower to burn the vehicles at the ambush sites. The mode of attack is very scary and the soldier must be trained to counter such attacks. These are among their newly acquire tactics in the theatre of war.

Human intelligence (Humint) is paramount in the information gathering. Given that this is a coin operation and such operations are usually carried out amongst the locals, humint is necessary as it complements other methods of information collection. However, such sources have to be maintained by money. The intelligence officers lack funds to maintain their sources. This is crucial for winning loyalty of source. Humint can be utilised in the fight against any terror group. They should endeavor to identify and use of locals in humint. Further, efforts should be made to implant informers within the terror groups. Real time intelligence is key in fighting irregular warfare. Intelligence mechanism should be able to infiltrate the ranks of alshabaab. This will ensure constant supply of enemy intelligence. AMISOM is yet to exhaust such tactic. Intelligence is necessary if the commander is to make any decision to shape any operation. The dynamic and cyclic process is altered throughout the operation depending on the commander's intelligence requirements. The collection plan of AMISOM should be comprehensive if they are to defeat the insurgent group.

There is little or lack of liaison between agencies. The intelligence mechanisms have not developed the matrix for liaison purposes. The NGOs and other friends of AMISOM

should be collaborated with so that they share any intelligence with the AMISOM`s intelligence cell. The Force Headquarters should have well trained personnel to handle the intelligence docket. The collection plan should be laid out. The contingents lack contact points. The various intelligence officers from various contingents should have liaison or contact points when they need to share any piece of tactical information.

Clan dynamics is one big issue that the intelligence system has to bear in mind. Agencies and sources tend to be double edged at times. AMISOM has not done much to win the hearts and minds of locals. Quick impact projects need to be initiated at all sectors to enhance mutual interaction of the local populace with AMISOM. Residents view AMISOM personnel as outsiders. On the contrary, they should feel that indeed AMISOM is here to make their lives better. Recent attacks on the AMISOM bases showed that the civilians are hostile towards the interveners. The civil military cooperation should be enhanced. The SNA play a big role also as a point of contact. Many soldiers agree to the fact that restoring Somalia back into itself requires the exit strategy to be well defined so that the mission does not stay to long. The intelligence department of civil police is yet to come into action. The operation remains military led rather than police led by now. The militant groups have been seen in some parts of Somalia carrying out civil-military activities. This is geared towards winning the confidence of the locals and that they are not a violent outfit as portrayed by the AMISOM.

A Clan Elder interviewed in Mogadishu on 21st July 2016 said:

> AMISOM has done very little to make them feel that they are part of the team. The Somalis still view the troops as invaders. That foreigners` tag still hang on AMISOM troops. The locals have failed to identify with them.

The clan elder`s view is also pointed out by MacIsaac (2015). Winning the hearts and minds of the local populace has not been done efficiently. The locals still view the troops as foreigners who have come to rule over them. AMISOM should carry out intense civil-military relations so as to foster relations with the locals. Some Somalis have a feeling that some of the troops are in Somalia for their own benefit. This has hampered the effectiveness of AMISOM peace efforts. Especially Kenya and Ethiopia are viewed with a lot of suspicions by the hosts. These contingents have in the past pursued counterproductive policies that sought to retain their influence over local and national dynamics. This has been exploited by the militant`s propaganda machines. Somalis view these contingents with skepticism. The mutual interaction with the civilian population softens the heart of the Somalia towards peace efforts.

Kenya is perceived to be operating with ulterior motives. KDF is thought to be involved in the illicit trade of charcoal and sugar (Omari, 2016). The Kenya military, the Jubaland administration of Ahmed Madobe and Al-Shabaab were named as the beneficiaries of shares in a trade worth between $200 million (Sh20.4 billion) and $400 million (Sh40.8 billion). The connection between Al-Shabaab and sugar smuggling came to the fore in Kenya during the group's current mandate - this implied KDF involvement by describing

how sugar enters Kenya via Kismayo. Previously, charcoal was considered the leading source of revenue for Al-Shabaab, but that has since declined owing to the thriving and more lucrative taxation of illicit sugar. According to JFJ, loaders, traders and intelligence officials said an estimated 150,000 tonnes of illicit sugar is transported to Kenya via Kismayo each year, which translates to around 3,000 tonnes a week. This income is in addition to the export of charcoal, which, although apparently somewhat disrupted and diminished, is still going on and is still a mainstay of revenue for Al-Shabaab, Jubaland and KDF. With the charcoal business, export volumes were around 1 million bags a month, equaling to revenue of Sh2.4 billion a year. Al-Shabaab also taxes charcoal production before the bags reach the port (Omar, 2016). This portrays Kenya to be having vested interests in Somalia. Their excursion into Somalia in late 2011 is seen by the locals as away of furthering their interests.

The Ethiopian are seen also to be furthering their own interests. Wesonga (2008) remarked that the liberation groups including a sizable number of Diaspora Somalis vehemently believe the Ethiopian policy towards Somalia is far from altruistic. They argue Ethiopia has agenda in Somalia and it is one driven by ulterior motives. The Asmara based Alliance of the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) as well as some Somali academics articulate this nationalist narrative. The Somali nationalists state that current Ethiopian leaders are obsessed with Somalia and they state that the Ethiopian leaders believe a strong Somali state would be a threat to Ethiopia. Therefore, they set out to destroy and further weaken their fallen archenemy, Somalia. The pro-nationalist camp

argues Somalia and Ethiopia fought two major wars in 1964 and 1977 and they stress the idea of Ethiopia managing Somali peace processes is as odd as the idea of entrusting the security of Israel or the destiny of the Palestinians in the hands of the other side. The anti-Ethiopia forces also state that since 1977, Ethiopia has been the breeding ground and the provider of weapons and political legitimacy to every Somali warlord that wreaked havoc in Somalia. Thus, for them, Ethiopia having good relations with plethora of Somali warlords is an indicative of their "divide and rule" policy rather than a benign or positive Ethiopian role in Somalia.

The nationalist voices use the story behind the creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) to illustrate what they see as a blatant Ethiopian manipulation of the internal affairs of Somalia and the far-reaching and dangerous consequences of unchecked Ethiopian meddling. They state that Ethiopian leaders sabotaged the Transitional National Government (TNG) by creating the SRRC in 2001, which they term was an exclusive club of Somalia's most notorious warlords. According to nationalist Somalis, Ethiopia appointed itself, along with what it termed as the "frontline states", the right to manage the Eldoret and Mbaghati conferences and it overtly engineered the exclusion of Somali nationalists and Islamists from the conference. The Ethiopians also enabled the domination of the conference by pro-Ethiopian Somalis who ultimately become the Somali Members Parliament and who subsequently elected a current pro-Ethiopian President, who in turn appointed a pro-Ethiopian Prime Minister. Therefore, for the nationalist Somalis, the TFG is an Ethiopian-created puppet entity that

serves Ethiopian interests and not the interests of the Somali people. The opposition groups argue that the TFG gave the Ethiopians the legal / political cover that allowed it to achieve its century-old aspiration to conquer and dominate Somalia. For these nationalist Somalis, liberation and the dethroning of the TFG is the only answer and that explains why the largest opposition group uses of the name the Alliance of the Re-liberation of Somalia. Alliance of Re-liberation of Somalia believes that the effect of the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia is crystal-clear to everyone who follows the news: death and destruction. They argue that the international community particularly the UN Security Council, the organ responsible for keeping international peace, has decided to be mum or dance around the questions pertaining to the Ethiopian involvement in Somalia (Wesonga, 2008).

From the foregoing discussions it is evident that both the Kenyan and Ethiopian contingents are seen too be harbouring ulterior motives. One respondent (A Colonel interviewed on 23rd Octobre 2016 in Mogadishu) explicated:

> Both KDF and Ethiopian National Defence Forces (ENDF) are fighting over the control of Kismayu port. Though initially the port was under Sector 2 which was an Area of Operation (AOR) of KDF, ENDF has been authorized to send its forces to control the port. This has forced the Force Headquarters to curve out Kismayu from Sector 2 to a sector on its own and it is now called Sector 6. Each country is pursuing her national interests. Currently it has a multidimensional force.

The Colonel view corroborates that of Wesonga (2008). KDF and ENDF are fighting over the control of Kismayu Port instead of fronting the interests of Somalis first. The

two respective countries are putting their respective national interests first at the expense of Somalis. The war against winning the heart and minds of the locals is far from being worn. Without the support of citizens of the host country, the peace enforcement efforts become an exercise in futility.

Somalia continues to pose a lot of security challenges to the Great Lake region. The Eastern African Region is vulnerable to terrorism because countries in the region experience: conflicts, weak governance, collapsed state institutions; porous borders the allowing extensive and uncontrolled movement of people and illegal weapons; increased extremist religious ideology and radicalisation of vulnerable groups. These factors generally coincide with poor socio-economic conditions and create fertile ground for the existence of terrorism. Unfortunately, the Al Shabaab wing is growing quickly due to radicalization of the young Muslim communities in Eastern Africa. Boredom, idleness, and thrill-seeking impulses among youth may also be push factors for extremism, and, when combined with feelings of marginalization and frustrated expectations stemming from a lack of job opportunities in many East African countries, may make some Muslim youth more susceptible to recruitment by armed groups. Some of the terrorists are trained in the war-torn country and finally find their way to targeted country.

Kenya has suffered a number of attacks in the past. Westgate Mall attack and Garissa University College attack saw a number of young and innocent lives being lost to terrorism. Their bases remain in Somalia and after training, they are dispatched to their

targets. Currently, they are training on airborne suicide bombers which target aircrafts. They were able to carry out attack on Dhalo Airline. This is a clear indication that they have the capability of infiltrating the Somalia security apparatus.

The infiltration of the security forces and apparatus can only be defeated through intelligence. Information received be different contingents has to be collaborated in order to keep abreast with situation awareness. This intelligence can be utilized by the troop contributing countries back at home. Al shabaab is an organized militant group and every training, they conduct must have an objective. With the missing intelligence link, they are able to carry out any type of operation and later infiltrate their agents. From the data collected in the field, the population sampled has the opinion that the department of intelligence and information gathering needs to be reorganized and restructured.

6.4 Poorly equipped personnel

AMISOM consistently struggles to marshal the requisite military personnel and range of military assets needed for complex peace operations. Among the assets in highest demand in difficult theatres of the region such as Sudan and Somalia are helicopters i.e. utility and attack helis, armored personnel carriers, communications and intelligence equipment, unmanned aerial vehicles, night vision goggles, and, in the case of troops in Mogadishu, battle tanks.

One respondent (A Captain interviewed on 13th June 2017 in Mogadishu) rejoined:

AMISOM troops are inadequately equipped. Some militants have more superior

weapons that the AMISOM troops. Currently, we don't have attack helis, there are no enough armoured pers onnel carriers (APCs), powerful machine guns nor Mine Clearance Vehicles. There are no utility aircrafts. These pose a lot of challenges to troops.

The respondent`s view correspond with Williams (2012) who points out that troops lack sophisticated mortar radar system, which could have helped it reduce levels of civilian casualties. When troops lack basic equipment such as APCs, then soldier become too vulnerable to IED attacks and ambushes. Despite the level of training of the soldiers, they cannot beat the contemporary insurgency without such kind of equipment.. The modern militia groups are more equipped than even some national armies. Troops should not be taken to a theatre of war with no adequate military hardware. The defeat could be eminent causing more complications to already a complex humanitarian situation.

In the absence of the necessary capabilities, such an approach brings a high level of risk, not only of failure but also of raising people's expectations that cannot be fulfilled. Worse still, it undermines the credibility of peace support operations and weakens the organization that is responsible. As for military personnel, the troop's greatest deficits are specialists with niche skills including medicine, engineering, and intelligence gathering. To fill these gaps, the mechanism relies on external donors (the friends of AMISOM) to provide funding, training, and equipment directly to troop contributing countries—hence bypassing the normal chain.

The civilians who are part of the PSO lack the prerequisite trainings. The civilian components do human rights monitoring, support the establishment of human rights commissions and ensure that new constitutions and laws are in line with international standards. They support the electoral processes – such as voter education, voter registration and training, mentoring and support to local independent electoral commissions. They offer support for the restoration of state authority or the establishment of state services where these did not exist before, especially in the context of the rule of law (RoL). They support various aspects of security sector reform (SSR), particularly, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR).

Peace support operations also typically include a public information unit with print, radio and sometimes television capabilities, as well as specialised units dealing with child protection, gender, HIV/ AIDs, protection of civilians (POC) and sexual exploitation and abuse. Therefore, the civilians' component plays a vital role towards restoration of the falling government. The EASF should, therefore, strengthen the civilian component to bring these experts on board. These experts are very important in the post conflict reconstruction. They are charged with observing that various function of the government start running back. The *Jus post bellum* demands for the post conflict reconstruction. The militia groups should be demobilized and reintegrated into the society. The normal functions of a government should be restored and these pieces of work can only be done by the civilian experts.

In its resolution 2036 (2012), the UN Security Council authorised an aviation component of up to 12 helicopters comprising nine utility helicopters and three attack helicopters. The AMISOM deployment model requires contingents to deploy with their own equipment for which they are then compensated by the UN via a logistical support package to Amisom. Thus the helicopters were to come from the troop contributing countries. Uganda had initially pledged four choppers but this was withdrawn after three of them crashed into Mt Kenya while en route to Somalia in August 2012. None of the other four TCCs — Kenya, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Burundi — have volunteered their own planes either. It is also important to note that the KDF airstrikes using jet fighters are not AMISOM operations as the mission is not allowed fixed wing aircraft.

The alshabaab militants are still strong and they controls most of the countryside. Their morale in the recent past is quite high after successful attacks on some AMISOM bases. They retain the capacity of launching deadly and large scale attacks on the troops and even in the neighbouring countries like Kenya. In the theory of securitization, the act of securing the objects calls for the resources. The availability of these resources influences the success or failure of the securitization process. It is saddening for the troops to lose soldiers due to lack of equipment. AU had previously approved 12 helicopters to be brought to the theatre. However, up to now, none has been brought. The casualty on AMISOM troops seems to be rising. With latest attack on Kenyan contingent at the army base in El-Ade. The offensive resulted into many deaths. The Kenyan government said that it lost 63 soldiers in the attack whereas the Mogadishu government puts the figure at about 200 soldiers. According to SIPRI, 2015, 1,039 AMISOM soldiers were killed in

action between January 1, 2009, and December 31, 2013, with an additional 69 fatalities

in 2014 (per AMISOM) bringing the total to 1,108 dead from 2009 through 2014. The

number could be much higher at the time of writing. Table 6.2 shows various operational

fatalities between 2014 and 2015. This is the period in which the troop contributing

countries had availed their troops to the ground as pledged. One could say that alshabaab

is gaining control or success over the AMISOM troops.

Table 6.2 Operational fatalities

Year	Action
Ist Sept, 2015	Between 20-50 AMISOM peacekeepers are killed after the Janale base, 90 km (55 miles) south-east of the capital, is overrun by Al-Shabab militants.
26th Jun 2015	At least 50 Burundian soldiers (with potential excesses of over 70) were reported killed inan attack on their base by Al-Shabab. The attack occurred in Leego near the capital of Mongadishu
19th April 2015	Al-Shabaab insurgents attack Kenyan AMISOM troops in the southern Delbio area of Somalia. AMISOM fatalities include three dead troops.
21st Mar 2015	SNA and AMISOM troops launch a security sweep in the Bulo Burde district to clear an Al-Shabaab blockade in the area. Casualties include around five SNA troops and one AMISOM soldier
26th Dec 2014	Eight Al-Shabaab militants, dressed in Somali uniforms, launched an attack on an AMISOM base near Mogadishu International Airport, which is also home to a United Nations office and several embassies. All militants were killed while five AMISOM peacekeepers and one foreign contractor was killed.
18th Dec 2014	The Sierra Leonian contingent (850 troops) leaves AMISOM and is not replaced. During their stay in Somalia the Sierra Leone troops suffered 1 dead and 6 wounded.
26th June, 2014	Militants from Al-Shabaab launched an attack on the town of Bulo-burde, which has been besieged by militants and cut off from road access since it came under government control in March. Two Djiboutian peacekeepers, one civilian, and two militants were killed.
13th Jun 2014	A roadside bomb that was detonated near the town of Bulo Burde injured six AMISOM and Somali soldiers. At least three of the casualties were from the Djibouti contingent, and were airlifted to Mogadishu for medical attention after the attack.
26th May, 2014	Two Kenyan soldiers in a supply convoy were killed in an ambush by suspected Al Shabaab militants near the town of Lamu in an area close to the Ras Kamboni region.
24th May, 2014	Three Ugandan peacekeepers died in an attack by thirteen Al Shabaab militants on the Somali Parliament alongside four Somali soldiers and a police officer.
5th April, 2014	During joint AMISOM-Somali incursion to liberate the town of Wabxo, Al Shabaab fighters claimed to have killed Ethiopian troops from AMISOM.
18th Mar, 2014	At least three Dijiboutian soldiers were killed in a hotel attack on the town of Bulo-burde.
9th Nov, 2013	At least two Kenyan soldiers who are part of the African Union(AU) peacekeeping force in Somalia were killed in Garissa, a base for security forces in Kenya fighting insurgents in neighbouring Somalia

Source: Researcher`s own compilation, 2017. Adopted from SIPRI, 2015

Lack of equipment has been a major limitation to the success of operations by the peace support troops. Troops need modern sophisticated equipment to fight insurgency. Soft skinned vehicles become moving death traps for the personnel. AMISOM should acquire armoured personnel carriers mounted with heavy machine guns for road movement and general patrols. AMISOM continues to lose soldiers on road movements. When there is an attack by improvised explosive devices (IED), chances of troops surviving while aboard a soft skinned vehicle become quite lean. Troop carrying vehicles are soft and vulnerable to even light firearms. Most of the troops miss basic equipment.

Attack helicopters and drones are necessary for this mission. Alshabaab has revolutionized their fighting tactics. Their modes of attack have changed with time. Djibouti summit affirmed the critical importance of enhanced support to AMISOM and specifically reiterates the need for the generation and deployment of operational enablers and force multipliers, including pledged helicopters from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda and, therefore, requests the UN to expedite the finalisation of Letters of Assist in order to allow for their deployment as Mission assets, taking due consideration of the high-intensity nature of AMISOM operations. In addition, the AU Commission should report back to the Summit on the progress made in the authorisation and deployment of these Mission assets, not later than 30 days from the adoption of this Declaration. It commands all TCCs and other AU Member States for their various contributions to AMISOM operations and encourages other international partners to contribute and deploy air assets in order to facilitate AMISOM operations (Djibouti Declaration, 2016).

Since overrunning some AMISOM bases, they have enough ammunition to carry out decisive offensive on tightly held AMISOM bases and strategic towns like Mogadishu. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that they have enough ordinances to make large amounts of IEDs. One respondent (Field Commander who was interviewed on 14th September, 2016 in Mogadishu) said:

> They have a lot of ammo to make IEDs to paralyse a whole brigade. Without air assets to hit and destroy their ammunition dumping sites, they will continue to intensify their offensives and they intend to overrun other AMISOM bases. This has forced some contingents to collapse their existing defended localities to reinforce weaker ones. Some have been collapsed without even informing the Force Headquarters of such developments. Militant`s morale is quite high and they are exerting pressure and threatening other bases so that such can be also abandoned. After raiding three bases, they have got enough mortar bombs. Not unless AMISOM procures fighter aircrafts or attack helis, the fight against Alshabaab will be one hell of a task for the troops.

> The day we were attacked, AMISOM was not able to send us rescue team. We fought on their own until were were overwhelmed by the alshabaab. It was a fierce battle and the insurgent group came in droves with heavy machine guns. The efforts to repulse the enemy did not yield any fruit. The VBIED exploded inside the defensive position wrecking havoc in the area. Quick Reaction Force (QRF) came nearly on the fifth day yet there were other AMISOM bases nearby. It baffles if casualty evacuation reaches on the fifth. Most of the soldiers died of battle wounds which could have been managed had the rescue reached on the same day.

The respondent`s view corresponds with Omar (2016). Most of the AMISOM bases are lightly defended. These places are not as fortified as they are supposed to be. Without any proper fortifications of these defended localities, soldiers become too vulnerable to the VBIEDs. That explains why reinforcement takes nearly four days to reach to the distressed troops. Some of towns which had been captured from the militants have been

vacated by the troops leaving such places as safe havens for the militia. Such gains on the militants` side, have boosted their morale. Force headquarters seems not to be in charge. Command and control of the troops should come from the headquarters and not from the respective countries of TCCs. For the troops to attrite the militants they need to have attack helicopters which can intensify armed aerial reconnaissance.

AMISOM leadership must rethink their strategy of fighting these militants. Aerial surveillance is easily carried out by the armed helicopters. They double up as aerial observation posts. This will minimize fatalities and casualties on the side of AMISOM. The aircrafts which were to be provided by the AMISOM are yet to reach the theatre. Soldiers leaving out for patrols do so blindly. Drones are not beyond reach. The troops can use them for reconnaissance purposes. A fighting patrol should be well equipped to fight on its own before reinforcement by other troops. Troops are sent out without the right weapons and worse on a foot patrol thus making sitting ducks for the well armed alshabaab. Unchecked deaths of the interveners will persuade troop contributing countries from sending their soldiers to the war-raged country. In the future, finding troops for peace enforcement might become hard. Fighting trenches should be properly constructed rather than being squalidly made. Such is the tragedy which is bedeviling the troops. Maintaining a force in reserve for contingency reasons seem not to have been factored in by the mission. Any peace support operations should have foresight on reinforcement`s plan. Each sector based on size should have a quick reaction force of

atleast a battalion strong. The battalion should remain uncommitted ready for deployment on reinforcement at the shortest notice possible.

The Defence Plan should call for creation of a reserve force. Reserve force deals with the unforeseen circumstances. Presently AMISOM lacks an appropriate defence plan. That explains why the soldiers who were under distress at El-Alade could not be reinforced. Previous engagement with the armed group exposed the glaring gap within the AMISOM bases. Knee-jerk reactions cannot help anything when fighting an irregular warfare. AMISOM should be proactive in its defence planning. It will help in saving the lives of interveners and lethal equipment which is falling into the dangerous hands of alshabaab. An appropriate defence plan should be adopted and passed to all contingents. Defended localities should have appropriate fortifications. It is paradoxical to want to convince locals that AMISOM will provide security to them whereas they cannot provide security to themselves. The mission loses credibility in the eyes of Somalis. The defence should be aggressive in nature; it has to adopt aggressive mobile defence with outpost observation posts. It will deny the armed militia group freedom of action. Fighting patrols should be sent to disrupt the insurgents in the formation of their plans. Without preempting them on their intentions, the peace enforcement is already lost.

Utility aircraft are long overdue. Facilitation of movements of troops from one theatre of war to another becomes easy. Whether it is strategic or operational airlift, it saves man-hours and soldiers reach required destination while still fresh. C 130 Hercules is the best

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aircraft for transport. Resupply and replenishment of fresh food is done by road. Soldiers lose their lives and get permanent injuries from IED attacks. AMISOM should have aircrafts for transporting troops and foodstuffs. Unnecessary casualties could be avoided through procurements of such. Utility helicopters are suited for these movements. Armed air reconnaissance can be conducted by these attack helicopters. Somali is vast and large acreage is still under control of al shabaab. Intensive air patrols would take care of these places.

AMISOM lacks maritime component. And Somalia`s more than 3300km coastline remains unpatrolled. Unpatrolled coastline has seen influx of illegal fire arms. These weapons end in the hands of the militant group. They clandestinely import fire arms through the unpatrolled waters. Omari (20160 observed that more than 2,000 weapons including assault rifles, rocket launchers and machine guns were found hidden under fishing nets in a Somalia-bound boat, Australian Navy officials said Monday. The *HMAS Darwin* navy ship seized the weapons from the vessel during normal patrol of the Middle East-Eastern Africa coast waters. The recovery of the weapons could be signal a continual but clandestine attempt by Al shabaab to keep their supply of arms despite a global operation against the terror group. Australia's Vice Admiral David Johnston who is also the Chief of Joint Operations for the multi-nation patrol operation called Combined Maritime Forces, said the seizure of the cache could be significant even though there was no revelation of the origin of the weapons. The ship upon netting the weapons, classified them as 1989 AK-47 assault rifles, 100 rocket propelled grenade

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launchers, 49 PKM general purpose machine guns, 39 PKM spare barrels and 20 60mm mortar tubes. The fishing boat crew of 18 had reportedly hidden the arms under fishing nets and and were nabbed approximately 330km off the coast of Oman, heading towards Somalia.

The UN has imposed an arms embargo on Somalia in a bid to control the supply of illegal weapons to the war ravaged nation. Under the United Nations sanctions, patrolling ships can intercept vessels in the high seas suspected to be ferrying weapons to Somalia. Australia is part of a multinational team called the Combined Maritime Forces that routinely patrols about four million square kilometers of international waters lying between the Middle East and the Eastern Africa region. The force, established in 2002 to fight terrorism, piracy and secure high seas for shipping lines currently includes up to 31 countries mostly from Asia and members of international security bloc the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). The African Union Mission in Somali (Amisom), to which Kenya Defence Forces belong, have been fighting the Somali terrorists who have occasionally employed guerrilla attacks on the mission's camps in Somalia.

It has had a lot of pirates` activities. As the end of the first decade of the 21st century fast approaches, it can rightly be asserted that transnational security challenges and threats have arguably dominated, shaped, influenced and adversely affected the stability of the global political landscape, particularly on the African continent (Chalk, 2005). The

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geopolitical landscape has been altered radically and few of today's dangers have the character of overt military aggression, stemming from a clearly defined sovereign source.

The world's vast maritime realm has become particularly conducive to the rising tide of such threats. Covering more than 130 million square miles of the earth's surface, most of the world's maritime environment takes the form of vast expanses of high seas, beyond the jurisdiction of any one particular state, with the implication, that by definition this realm is considered anarchic (Chalk, 2005). Growing attention is being accorded to the concept and phenomenon of so- called ungoverned spaces and the potential link with the growth and prevalence of extremist and terrorist networks who exploit the presence of such areas in which terrorists can establish training grounds, recruitment zones and potential areas from which to stage operations. Ungoverned spaces are viewed as social, political and economic arenas where states do not exercise "effective sovereignty", or where state control is absent, weak or contested.

Since 2008, Somalia has been attracting considerable international attention due to the surge in maritime piracy emerging from its soil. One Clan Elder interviewed on 19th June 2017 in Mogadishu decried:

> Our waters are still unsafe. We still do not have naval forces to patrol it. The pirates hijack vessels at sea. This has made sea business quite expensive. Most of the idle and unemployed youths took to piracy as a source of income.

The Clan Elder`s view corresponds with Rahul (2013) opines that piracy poses new

dangers to the international shipping industry, maritime trade and commerce. Piracy soared in Somali due to a number of reasons. The Somalia infrastructure collapsed leading to poverty, extreme unemployment and rampant corruption throughout the country. According to the World Bank, 40 per cent of the Somalis were in extreme poverty, i.e. with a daily earning of less than a dollar a day and about two-thirds of the youth were unemployed (Gilpin, 2009). According to Scahill (2013) Somalia ranked first among 180 countries in the Global Corruption Index. Moreover, environmental degradation due to the two natural disasters which included consecutive droughts for four years (2002-2006) and the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 brought catastrophe to the poor Somalis. Besides, Somalia's unpatrolled waters since 1991 in the absence of any central government became a cost-free dumping ground of toxic wastes by the European countries. Initially, these wastes dumped in the region affected Somalis living on the coasts with strange rashes, nausea and malformed babies. After the 2004 tsunami, when hundreds of the dumped and leaking barrels washed up on shore, people began to suffer from radiation sickness, skin cancer, mouth and abdominal bleeding (Sekulich, 2009), which resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people. In 2005, the United Nations Environment Programme documented the damage done due to the dumping of nuclear and toxic wastes across the shores of Somalia.There s uranium radioactive waste, there's lead, there s heavy metals like cadmium and mercury, there's industrial waste, and there's hospital waste and chemical waste (Dagne, 2009).

The dumping of these wastes in the sea across Somalia became a multi-billion dollar enterprise as the dumping cost was only $2.50 per ton in Africa compared to $250 per ton

in Europe (Dagne, 2009). Moreover, the European ships which dumped the wastes along the coasts of Somalia and returned home laden with illicit catches of fish proved to be far more devastating to the Somalis. Some Somalis argue that fishermen became pirates as their life and livelihood were being destroyed while the foreign governments chose to ignore these issues. Somalia which is one of the richest fishing grounds in the world and like all other maritime countries has legal rights over an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of 200 nautical miles has no Navy to enforce its control and the poor fishermen in the region simply do not have the resources to compete with the big ships of the foreigners. Even though Somalia owned the fisheries and minerals in the area they were being utilised by other countries. Thus, the angry fishermen of Somalia, left with no other choice, began to patrol the coastal areas considering themselves to be the authorised coastguards. Commenting on the piracy emerging from Somalia, Peter Lehr remarked - It's almost like a resource swap; Somalis collect up to $100 million a yearfrom pirate ransoms off their coasts. And the Europeans and Asians poach around $300 million a year in fish from Somalia water (Lloyd, 2009)

As time went, the pirates who believed that they had every right and prerogative to attack illegal fishing vessels operating in their territorial waters began to attack the ships at random. The pirates did admit that the initial idea of protecting their coastline had been hijacked (International Crisis Group, 2008) to the current situation where any vulnerable vessel is a target and has been transformed into a huge international problem with the origin of the initial actions being forgotten. Daly is of the opinion that poverty and

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unrealised nationalistic ambition in Somalia have caused a number of soldiers to turn to crime and join the Somalia piracy. (Pflanz, 2009).

Moreover, the availability of small arms in Africa, such as pistols, light or heavy calibre machine guns along with automatic assault rifles and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPGs) provided pirates the capability to operate on a more destructive and sophisticated level (Chalk, 2005). Coupled with unemployment and poverty, this ready supply of arms makes piracy an easy alternative to earn a living through crime. The absence of a functioning Navy, Police Force and Civil Authority to enforce laws has left Somalia helpless to prevent pirate attacks taking place on the high seas in the vicinity of its long coastline of 3,025 kilometres. AMISOM has not developed maritime component for the peace support operations. KDF has naval support for their troops deployed along the coastline. However, the warships are not included in the AMISOM reimbursement package. It has, therefore, discouraged other troop contributing countries from bringing along with them their naval fleet. Somalia coastline remains unpatrolled. The naval gun support is quite essential for the bases along the coastlines as well as for the patrols.

In the equipment reimbursement package, AMISOM should struggle to ensure that country owned equipment (COE) is serviceable to the required standard percentages. If

that is not achievable, then AU owned equipment should be provided. AU should do a thorough equipment inspection and provide equipment they feel is crucial to the troops, if they cannot be secured by the TCC. As noted by one Staff office (Interviewed in Mogadishu on 26th August 2016):

> One of the TCC had a serviceability status of equipment at 40% then how does one launch an offensive against the armed militia with such unserviceable equipment.

The staff officer`s view corroborates that of Emma (2016). With such poor and unserviceable equipment, soldiers cannot effectively create a secure environment for peace processes. The also corresponds with summarized results on Figure 6.4 show that 76% of the respondents strongly agree to the fact that the mission has ill equipped personnel. It is only 4% who think that the personnel are equipped, more so, the military component. According to the respondents who believe that the troops are ill equipped for the mission, equipment are key for bring ceasefire amongst the hostile groups and also for the survival of the troops. The troops lack aircraft for transport, mortar radars for detecting inbound mortar shells and attack helicopters for conducting aggressive patrols. Modern equipment should be obtained by AMISOM so that soldiers are able to carry out their mandate. Protection of key government installations and civilians require specialized equipment. The mission is operating under article 51 of the UN charter thus sustained minimum use of firepower is unavoidable. Mortar detecting radars are yet to be secured by the mission.

N=116

■ Percentage

76

14

1

5

4

Strongly agree | Agree | Neutral | Disagree | Strongly disagree

Figure 6.4: Poorly equipped military component

Source: Field Data, 2017

6.5 Training

It should be acknowledged that the training for peacekeeping and peace enforcement differs, PSOs require training in the form of mine or booby-trap handling, patrolling,

checkpoint operations, media liaison, supervision of cease-fires, maintenance of law and order and the rebuilding of infrastructure, which is especially important in Africa. Peace enforcement, on the other hand, involves enforcement of AU sanctions, protection of minority rights, humanitarian relief efforts, separation and disarming of warring factions and the restoration of law and order. AMISOM training is mission-specific and makes provision for complex, integrated, multifaceted operations aimed at supporting and facilitating comprehensive peace agreements. In addition, the focus of peace operations is shifting gradually from peacekeeping to peace-building.

The training of the military and the police force should be geared towards allowing the government security to be police-led rather than military-led. This is essentially not taking place. The national security should be cohesive and legitimate in nature. The unity is hard to achieve due to disparaging clan subtleties. There is political in-fighting that is hindering the progress of AMISOM. Reaching political settlement becomes a pipedream.

Training of military and civilian personnel of the mission is based on the guidelines prepared by the AU Commission. Member states who contribute contingents to the sub-regional force are expected to harmonise the training of designated force with standards that are provided at continental and sub-regional levels. All the designated training centres are required to follow the standard of training procedures developed by the AU Commission in training the contingents.

The standard training guidelines include training in doctrine and in humanitarian law and international human rights law for the civilian and military personnel of the troops. In this regard it is worth pointing out that even though the aim of military intervention is not war *per se,* it is most likely to happen in a combat situation. The military forces are bound by the rules of international humanitarian law. Even though AMISOM forces are not 'State' forces in the strict sense of the word, their involvement inside a member state of the AU is governed by the rules applicable to international armed conflicts because the AMISOM forces are considered to be third parties inside a state. The forces are bound by the obligations under the 1907 Hague Regulations and the Fourth Geneva Convention. The obligations include the respect for the sovereignty of the occupied territory, the duty to restore and ensure public order, the duty to limit the occupation and the duty to allow access to international humanitarian organizations

Training of personnel is supposed to be conducted before soldiers are deployed in the mission area. Predeployment training is indispensable for soldiers and the civilian personnel coming for the mission. They are acquainted with the cultural practices of citizens of host country. Somalis are predominantly Muslims. It is worth noting that Somalis believe in clanism and so the soldiers have to be taught clan dynamics in Somalia. Cultural practices matter a lot for example men are not supposed to freely shake hands with women. It is a taboo and it is forbidden. Elders are accorded respect of high order and thus their decisions on anything are final. These perspectives have to be taught

to the interveners so that they do not suffer from culture shock and doing things that are not generally accepted by the citizenry.

Training on new equipment should be done at own country before leaving. Effectiveness of peace enforcement team is enhanced if they understand their weapons well. Interoperability of equipment is vital. Contingents within the neighbouring boundaries should ensure compatibility of equipment. Communication equipment should be able to interlink with flanking friendly forces. Training on protection of children and civilians should top the list. Some soldiers were accused of sexual exploitation which indeed is a criminal offence. Sexual exploitation and abuse are strictly forbidden by the AU`s code of conduct. Such crimes taint the good name of the mission and are counterproductive in the end. Punitive measures ought to be taken against such culprits. Protection of vulnerable population is key in any peace support operations. Even at the mission area such refresher courses should be run. Training should emphasize much on irregular warfare. In the fight against insurgency, the battlefield remains fluid with no definite targets. Soldiers should be prepared to deal with such scenarios. It presents more challenges especially if one has to perform the duties of protection of civilians.

The Somalia National Army (SNA) is not yet prepared to conduct operations on its own. AMISOM cannot talk of exit strategy if the national security mechanism is not able to maintain security of Somalia after the peace enforcers pull out. SNA is still a weak force.

A lot of mentoring should be offered. Capacity building is lacking within their ranks. Currently AMISOM is providing non-lethal support to the SNA. It should be noted that without proper training, it is impossible to instill soldier discipline within them. There is in-fighting amongst the SNA and it normally takes clan inclinations. Political will has to be provided by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).

According to Gulwaade plan, AMISOM is supposed to train 10, 900 soldiers of SNA. Djibouti summit reiterated the critical importance of a viable and strong SNA to the success of AMISOM and, therefore, calls upon all relevant stakeholders to redouble support to the forces through timely, enhanced and better coordinated training and, through the provision of appropriate infrastructure, equipment and ammunition and further calls upon the FGS, the UN and other international partners, to renew their commitments to the effective implementation of the Gulwaade Plan, including through the expansion of UN support beyond the authorised strength of 10,900 SNA personnel, in strict conformity with the relevant provisions of International Humanitarian Law and in full compliance with the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (Djibouti Declaration, 2016). Basic structures must be put into place before one starts serious training. Most of the soldiers are not paid especially the ones from sector 2. With sporadic interruptions and desertions, training them within a specified period of time is not attainable. They should be remunerated and accommodation structures put into place. The training should be aimed at capacity building. Defection of SNA to alshabaab is rampant. With proper

administration, this vice can be curbed. After acquiring skills from training they desert the camps with their arms which pose threats to AMISOM.

Biometric registration should be conducted and then positive vetting to be carried out. The exercise will help in weeding out the elements of alshabaab within the ranks of SNA. One respondent (A Field commander who was interviewed on 24th May 2017 in Mogadishu) lamented:

> Training of the SNA lacks the necessary infrastructure. One has personnel to train but there are no resources. The soldiers have not been paid even a small stipend of $200 to sustain their families while at the training camp. They have neither been registered nor vetted and that means that one could be training an Alshabab without their knowledge. No proper kitting for them. Morale boosting is prudent when undergoing training. Such challenges make training the SNA very hard. Most of them desert and leave training half-way or come for the training when they feel like. Indeed Somalia National Security Forces (SNSF) lack institutional, logistical and operational capabilities and are unable to fully integrate into AMISOM operations. Objectives of training cannot be achieved.

Maclsaac (2015) upholds the respondent`s view. Efficient training needs structures in place and staff to conduct the training. There should be an established camp where the training should take place. While at the training camp, the soldiers need to take care of their families. They should be paid some little allowance. AMISOM is yet to make such arrangements. Demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) enhance the effectiveness of SNA. SNA is a conglomerate of many militia groups including clan militia and remnants of the former SNA. To harmonise their operations, common

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doctrine for training should be adopted for reasons of unity. However, training is carried haphazardly by different donors; the training packages are not synchronized. Donor wants to train based on their doctrines thus creating a lot of confusion. This calls for one established recruit training school where they can be trained based on a common doctrine. This will enhance the efficiency of AMISOM operations and consolidate security gains across Somalia.

Police training is yet to achieve the required impact. Formed Police Units (FPU) to mentor Somalia Nation Police force. Reconstruction of a country from the brink of collapse requires a lot of commitment. Police force has a lot of work to do: maintenance of law and order, observation of rule of law and keeping the organized criminal gangs under check. The FGS is heading towards general election and already they cannot agree on the general method of voting. They finally agreed on a 'clan based system.' The 4.5 clan formula used since 2000 has coped reasonably with the social friction and stabilized the power contest between Somali communities. It is seen as the less harmful model while the other three electoral models are susceptible for manipulations and not suitable for political inclusion. The deficiencies and non- suitability of other three electoral systems emanate from the fragmentation and polarization persisting among Somali stakeholders. Unquestionably, the clan plays a central role in the Somali society in terms of identity and allegiance. While Somalis are proud of their Somali identity, clan identity, which is part of the Somali culture, provides individual inclusivity and protection. Clan identity is also the stepping stone for national reconciliation and peacebuilding. Within

the clan community, the traditional leaders exercise influential role and are promoters of peace and social coexistence. They are beholders of custom and norms, and enforcers of agreements. Despite the existence of the federal government and interim regional administrations, clan elders are first responders to any intercommunal violence and they always succeed in bringing down tensions and differences. Seventy-five percent of Somalis trust the traditional system for conflict resolution compared to federal government institutions because of the pervasive corruption. Hence, traditional leaders including religious leaders and influential elders are able to responsibly lead the electoral process.

Though the meeting at Djibouti noted the commitments made by the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) towards an inclusive electoral process within the constitutional mandated timeline of 2016, especially the efforts made in reaching a consensus agreement on a model for the 2016 elections and stresses the need for the Government to build on this important foundation, in order to fully achieve an inclusive and credible electoral outcome, representative of all Federal Member States(Djibouti Declaration, 2016). Incidences like crowd control, and cordon and search cannot be ruled out. Operations of the FGS should be police-led. This should be the part of grand exit strategy that the FGS should appreciate.

Training should cover comprehensive approach for the gains of peace support operations to be realized. Peace building and post-conflict reconstruction are ingredients of moving Somalia closer to being a self-governing state. AMISOM cannot stay in Somalia forever. There is need to undertake a review of immediate requirements for AMISOM and SNA operational effectiveness with a view to implementing remedial actions aimed at improving offensive operations against Al Shaabab and directs UNSOS to provide the identified support requirements as agreed with AMISOM and SNSF leadership.

With the dwindling funds from the major donors and friends of AMISOM, the fate of Somalia hangs on a thin balance. Soldiers arriving at the mission areas should be aware of their roles. According to most of the respondents (55%), as shown in Figure 6.5, share the same opinion that training has not been done efficiently or it does not meet the needs of the personnel. Only 11% of the respondents admit that training does meet the needs of the personnel. The training for example should prepare them for the mission life, they should be able to understand the human terrain and the theatre of operation well. These factors are crucial for the mission success. The training conducted should be based on the needs of AMISOM rather than the reference of the sponsor/donor. The experts (Civilian) should be able to receive the necessary training so that they help with building various institutions within the FGS. It also supplements mentorship programs which essential for the exit strategy.

Figure 6.5: Training needs

**Source: Field Data, 2017**

6.6 Funding

The heart of humanitarian and peace support operations lies in the ability to conduct operational logistics to sustain the assigned forces. The sub-region`s austere environment presents difficult logistical challenges. The research findings show that 87.1% of the respondents felt that the Force has a major logistical challenge as shown on table 4.9.

Limited transportation infrastructure requires that airlift be present to augment ground and sea transportation assets in response to crises and conflict situations. AMISOM has near to non-airlift capability thus will have to rely on external assistance for deployment and sustainment of the forces. According to a respondent   (An interview with a Captain on 16thh June 2017 in Mogadishu):

> The problem of logistics is not only that of outdated communication and operational equipment but also the ability of the force to maintain modern logistical infrastructure and supply system. It points to funding of the mission. AMISOM needs support from the international community as well as that of UN. Failure of enough funding will hinder peace support operation from achieving the intended strategic objectives. Under its concept of operations a lot of resources are needed for efficacy.

Omari (2016) in agreement with the respondents says that AMISOM needs funding to be able to carry out its operations effectively. Presently, the troops function with obsolete equipment with poor logistical supply system. The support from international community and UN is on the down ward trend. Without reliable source of funding, most of operations will be impossible to execute. For example, the troops should carry out more airstrikes to limit on operational expenditure. The major donor European Union (EU) announced their plan to reduce their funding. EU said the reduction of funding is due to financial constraints. AU officials were prompted to meet in order to discuss how they could reduce on the budgeting to avoid, 'waste and duplication,' of functions in Somalia. The partners included representatives from the EU, the UK, France, the US, China and the United Nations (Omari, 2016).

AMISOM strategic objectives will remain a dream. The budget cut is likely to affect

operations. AMISOM should try to promote resource optimization, greater coordination and avoid duplication of efforts. AU should recommend alternative financing for the mission. These other sources of funding are meant to fill the gap. The African Peace Facility (APF) should be able to sustain the mission through the assessed contributions from the African Union members. However, most of the members fail to pay their contributions; neither do they meet their pledges. APF was established in 2003 to respond to African request to support its peace and security agenda and has been involved in other parts of Africa such as Central African Republic, South Sudan, Somalia and the Comoros. Reduction in funding is caused by the financial constraints on the EU African Peace Facility which funds AMISOM and reflects the huge demands placed upon it to support African peace and security efforts.

Supporting AMISOM operations requires astronomical amount of dollars. The Somalia mission meant to stabilise the government in Mogadishu and fight extremists has received €1.1 billion covering allowances for the 22,000 troops, pay for the police component, international and local civilian staff as well as operational costs of the mission's civilian office in Nairobi. For example, since 2007 to the end 2015, EU provided €1.1 billion (Sh123.2 billion) to AMISOM and this has depleted funding. From January 2016, the EU reduced financial contribution to AMISOM by 20 per cent. It means that the EU will give €20 million (Sh224 million) every month up to June. AMISOM requires about $300 million (Sh30 billion) a month. Its soldiers are paid a mission allowance of $1,028 (Sh103,828) a month with no other allowances. For a KDF soldier, the government deducts an administration fee of $200 (Sh20,200), meaning every

serviceman gets $828 (Sh83,628). This cut will not augur well with the soldiers taking into consideration of risk in the pacification of Somalia.

The AU mission in Somalia costs international donors $900 million in a year. This is likely to be unsustainable in the long run. On the other hand, some critics see AMISOM troop contributing countries to regard this operation as money-making enterprise and are disfranchised at the thought of exit strategy. Some countries have poorly paid soldiers who are kept busy in this mission so they would make trouble when they go back home and having no work to keep them occupied. However, this is one of the most deadly peace support operation to be undertaken in the recent past. Nearly over 1,093 soldiers have 'lost their lives (Wesonga, 2016).

Last year, EU signed a deal with AU worth €165 million for July to December 2015 to cover troop allowances, death and disability compensation for military and police personnel, international and local civilian staff salaries, operational costs of Amisom, maintenance, running costs and equipment for the Al-Jazeera Training camp in Mogadishu and Quick Impact Projects. There is need for better coordination of operations and logistics through the establishment of enhanced mechanisms and structures, as appropriate, between AMISOM, SNSF and UNSOS. Furthermore, calls for the provision of technical experts to be embedded within SNSF structures for the purposes of mentoring and capacity building.

The funding issues resulted into a draw-down. The draw down was ill advised since Alshabaab`s activities have taken a higher momentum against that of AMISOM troops. The policy was aimed at giving room for more police formed units. The mandate of AMISOM requires a robust force. Omari (2016) observed that on a Sunday afternoon in late February (2016) a car exploded outside a crowded restaurant in Baidoa, Somalia, and moments later a suicide bomber blew himself up among fleeing survivors. At least 30 people died in the attack, the latest by the Shabaab, a Somali-led Al-Qaeda group in East Africa that continues to defy repeated predictions of its demise. Two days before the Baidoa bombings 14 people were killed when two bombs exploded outside a hotel and a public park in the capital Mogadishu. One was a 200 kilogramme (440 pound) homemade bomb, only the second time Shabaab has used such a large device. The first was in July 2016 and the explosion tore the side off a six-storey hotel. Five weeks earlier, 19 were killed in a bomb and gun attack on a restaurant on Mogadishu's Lido Beach. It is not just civilians who are targeted. On January 15, Shabaab fighters overran a military outpost in El-Adde, southern Somalia, manned by up to 200 Kenyan soldiers deployed as part of the African Union peace-enforcement mission, AMISOM. Kenya has refused to say how many of its soldiers were killed in the attack.

The soldiers are committed to the peace support process some paying the ultimate price of being a soldier. Pay cut will great affect the soldiers' moral. This is one hostile country that has never known peace for the last two decades and thus a lot of commitments are required in terms of funding. With such a risky job, in fact pay should be reviewed

upwards and not vice versa. The soldiers are fighting the wrong war. They are holed up in their outposts doing patrols once in awhile leaving the belligerents with ample time for planning and executing the plans. Offensive and fighting patrols can be conducted if the troops have the required support. Rural areas are not manned by the troops, so alshabaab has too much freedom of action. With decisive offensive at AMISOM bases, the troops are forced to fight at the mercy of the armed group and on the ground of their own choosing.

The sobering costs of peace enforcements is becoming a reality to the donors more so EU, UN and the international community. At this point it would be too dangerous for the Somali community to be left under mercy of al shabaab. Instability in Somalia has had ramifications in the region and elsewhere. Security is a collective responsibility that has to be responded to by everybody. With the era of transnational terrorism, no border becomes safe. The UN should therefore take the responsibility of PSO in Somalia. Being the international body charged with maintenance of peace and security across the globe, Somalia by extension becomes a UN`s responsibility. UN should use its funds from the assessed contributions by the member states to run the AMISOM operations, in any case, AMISOM is doing the work which should be essentially done by the UN. Somali community is as important as any other citizen of the globe.

Already some TCCs have effected the pay cut on their soldiers and this is expected to have a trickling effect on the operations of the AMISOM. Wesonga (2016) advised that the Ugandan Government should renegotiate terms and benefits of Uganda People's

Defence Forces' peace keeping mission in Somalia. Effective January 2016, the soldiers' monthly allowances were reportedly reduced from Shs 3.5 million ($1,028) to UShs 2.8 million ($828). Of this, the Ministry of Defence deducts 680,000 ($200) from each officer to cater for preparatory expenses leaving a total of shs 2.1million. The European Union, which through the African Union picks the tab, has not formally said why it reduced the allowance. Out of the Shs 298 billion owed to the soldier in allowances, only UShs 98 billion has been reportedly paid as of March 2016. Government should engage with UN and other stakeholders to ensure that the allowance for the troops is paid promptly. In addition, government should reject the proposed reduction in allowances of troops as this is way below the risk exposure of the soldiers while in operations. UPDF has been in operations in Somalia under AMISOM since 2007 to pacify the Horn-of-Africa country which is under attack by Al Shabaab militants. It has the biggest contingent of 6,223 soldiers. The African Union and United Nations are also yet to pay Uganda about Shs 36 billion ($10 million) in debt as compensation for damage to military equipment used between March 2007 and January 2009. Some Ugandan figures though attribute it to the international community's "loss of interest" in the Somali mission. It could be that they are losing interest in Somalia because despite the resources and the time invested, al Shabaab is still present and is still causing chaos - even outside Somalia

The cut of AMISOM pay is likely to affect the morale of the troops. It seems that the UN and the international community are no longer interested in the war torn Somalia. From the summarized results, in Table 6.2, 89.5% of the respondents feel the pay cut will

directly affect the morale of the troops. This will eventually have a trickling down effect on the mission. The respondents argued that Somalia is a risky place to work in so the pay cut will lead to a monthly salary of $828 up from $1028. Considering that amount of risk involved, the amount should even be increased. For such risky environment, the pay needs to be relatively good.

Table 6.3: Cross tabulation of likely low morale of troops by the pay cut

Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	85	85.2
Agree	7	7.4
Neutral	0	0
Disagree	3	3.1
Strongly disagree	0	0
Total	**116**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

The failure of the international community to rally behind AMISOM would erode all the gains realized, however little. Heavy prizes have been paid by the troops for the mission so pulling out would not honour their sacrifices and such gallant acts. However, proponents of African solutions for African problems (AFSOL) argue that it is high time AU supported her activities without relying profoundly on donors. This will cripple her activities. Instead, AU should look for sustainable source of income for such operations. Moreover, regional militia integration into federal security structures do require substantial amount of funding for training and mentoring. The Al-Shabaab militant group

has been active in Somalia for a number of years and wants to establish an Islamic theocracy. War is expensive. The war on terror has moved to Africa and it is here to stay. That is why the AU, the UN and the international community must be ready to pay its costs. Al-Shabaab forces are rallying and looking to take strategic positions in Somalia cities. It would be even more costly if the AU withdrew its troops from Somalia. This would mean that Al-Shabaab had won and terror would spread unchecked. The 20% cut in EU funding forces the AU to develop a serious and long-term funding strategy, with the aim of bringing this war to a more cost-effective and swift resolution (Mutambo, 2016).

6.7 Command and control

The command and control mechanisms are inadequate forcing the troops to act in a disjointed manner. The Kenyan air and maritime assets were not incorporated in AMISOM. Despite AMISOM rehatting the KDF units with the 'Green helmets.' KDF transited from the Operation *Linda Nchi* into AMISOM operations. The Kenyan warships and jet fighters operate at the cost of taxpayer`s expenses. During the amphibious operation in which KDF captured the port of Kismayu and the subsequent fall of the town, the warships provide naval gun support. Also ferrying of troops and equipment. All the assets provided by TCCs should be under command of AMISOM. Equipment package plan should cover such equipment.

Djibouti meeting stressed the need for effective AMISOM command and control in order to achieve synergy of the Mission's efforts against Al Shaabab and therefore directs

AMISOM contingents to fully support the Force Commander in his exercise of effective and accountable command of all Military units and equipment assigned to the Mission, under the overall leadership of the Special Representative of the Chairperson of the AU Commission and AMISOM Head of Mission (Djibouti Declaration, 2016).

The command structure is likely to be influenced by external forces. This is due to the fact that the troops are not fully under the command of the AMISOM. The troop contributing country still dictates where its troops are to be deployed within AMISOM. This weakens the command structure of the force as further shown by the research findings on Figure 6.6. Seventy percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the command structure. However, 5% and 7% were very satisfied and satisfied respectively with command and control structure. The structure needs to be strengthened so that Force commander completely takes charge of the troops. Theses troops still receive command from their respective countries. From the respondents, this cripples the effectiveness of the mission. It causes fatal delays due to the bureaucratic systems of militaries. If an outpost which is thinly defended is under threat, reinforcement has to come from that particular troop contributing country. Most of the times, the much needed reinforcement takes time time to arrive and more often than not, it arrives when too heavy casualties have been incurred. The competing national interests also complicate the command structure. The TCCs should not let the struggle for hegemonic powers supersede the task at hand in Somalia for the vulnerable Somalis. The command structure should lie with the Force Commander so that he is able to deploy the troops with regards to the needs of both Somalis and AMISOM.

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
Figure 6.6: Command and control structure

Source: Field Data, 2017

The AMISOM command is overstretched thus making its control complicated. Most of the military bases are kilometres apart. Reaction time to beef up such areas takes relatively long. To reduce the long stretches, the AU, the UN and the international community should agitate for more troops. These troops will interlink the uncovered gaps. Al shabaab is maximizing on the AMISOM weakness by dominating these space with patrols. In turn they launch ambushes and IED attacks at their own conveniences.

Alternatively, these unmanned spaces can be dominated by armed air patrols. The aircrafts should be fitted with ground to air communications to prevent friendly fire and effective coordination. The area of operation for a fighting company presently ought to be covered by a battalion thus making AMISOM less operational.

Suspicion amongst the TCCs is still high. Unity of effort cannot be realized if the contingents are suspicious of one another. It jeopardizes operations. There is lack of sharing of information which could have helped in planning. One respondent (An interview conducted in Mogadishu with a Staff Officer on 13th July 2017) noted:

> It is as if the troop contributing countries are in a kind of competition. Yet their efforts should have a bearing and reflection of the good of the Somali community. Each country is apparently serving her national interests.

The respondent`s view is also echoed by Mutambo (2016). The TCCs are competing against each other on while serving their own national interests. All efforts should be directed towards stabilization of Somalia. It will enhance and hasten peace building strategies. There are no well-established contacts point where liaison could be done with flanking friendly forces. That explains why an outpost was overrun in Gedo region and there were no rescue effort for nearly five days. With a strong command and control, reinforcement should have been sent to secure the distressed soldiers at El-Adde.

Command and control are further complicated by the fact that Somali view some of the troop contributing countries as crusaders. AMISOM has to work hard towards eradicating that notion from the Somalis. Intensified civil-military coordination (CIMIC) will help

soften the hearts of locals. The department of cimic should be established. The necessary funds should be allocated for the job. The CIMIC activities are poorly coordinated throughout the mission. Quick impact projects should be initiated on the need basis. The soldiers should identify with the locals. They would be even able to provide the contingents with information on the activities of the enemy. Need assessment are supposed to be conducted before such projects are initiated. According to Omari (2016) most of troops are not conducting cimic activities. The only time they are seen at the centres is on routine patrols. At these moments, they are armed to teeth ready for war. However, they ought to create some interactive activities like sports. This enhances the confidence of the locals. Command and structure is paramount for the success of any peace support operations.

6.8 Emerging threats

Increasingly, AMISOM is being called upon to deal with emerging security challenges for example, those pertaining to maritime security including piracy, dumping of toxic wastes, over-fishing among others along the coast of Somalia. These tasks require resources. The stretch of coastline need coast guards manning. Such actualities must be addressed by the AMISOM so that capacity building can be enhanced. The slow pace in liberating areas occupied by al-Shabaab and the sporadic attacks in the liberated areas can lead to anxiety among the Somali population. Indeed, the Somali government, which is receiving support from AMISOM, could face credibility deficit whereby legitimacy of government is questioned and the resulting vacuum could easily be retaken by al-Shabaab.

These are realities the AMISOM has to contend with. The data showed that 65% of the respondents strongly agree that there are emerging threats that AMISOM has to contend with. This is illustrated on Figure 6.7. There is the effect of climate change resulting into drought. The cases fight over the grazing fields. The Somalia Sea remains unsafe. This calls for maritime component to secure the exclusive economic zones. Damping of waste on Somalia waters have resulted into pollution along the coastline. These emerging threats should also be kept under check as the country goes through post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding.

Figure 6.7: Opinion on emerging threats

Source: Field Data, 2017

6.9 Clan enmity

Somalia has five main clans and numerous sub-clans in the population structure of Somalia. The Hawiye clan is most closely associated with the Islamic extremists and represents some 25% of the population. Traditionally, it is located in the areas north of Mogadishu and stops below Punt land. Northwest Somaliland and eastern Ethiopia is the territory of the Isaaq clan, an ethnicgroup representing 22% of Somalia's people. The Darod clan is the most widely distributed tribal network and accounts for some 20% of the Somali population. It covers Puntland and a little further south, as well as the area bordering Kenya (Nyambura, 2011).

The Somali people are among the most homogenous in Africa, both ethnically and religiously. However, they are deeply divided by an ancient family or clan system which stands at the foundation of political and social life. From the respondents, as shown on Table 6.4, strongly agree (68.4%) that clan rivalry is a major hindrance to peace building, 2.1% remains neutral, whereas, 3.2% strongly disagree. The respondents (who strongly agreed) argued that fighting normally break out between sub-clans. Clan rival militias clash over disputes and vendetta. This fighting usually results into permanent disabilities and even deaths. The disputes are sparked by long-standing hostilities over land ownership and pasture. Fighting is repeated several times over long standing feud. Some of the violence involves heavy machine guns and heavy mortars. These skirmishes slow peace building. It normally takes a lot of mediation efforts to end such hostilities.

Table 6.4: Cross tabulation of negative effects of clan rivalry on peace building strategies

Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	65	68.4
Agree	20	21
Neutral	2	2.1
Disagree	5	5.3
Strongly disagree	3	3.2
Total	**95**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

6.10 Fighting strength of the troops

A key challenge especially in regards to the military component of AMISOM is the insufficient number of troops necessary to guarantee the stabilization of areas liberated from al-Shabaab and to continue with military offensive to root out all insurgency in the country. According to a respondent:

> These areas are expansive thus they need more battalions to man them (a Field Commander interviewed on 30th May 2017 in Mogadishu).

This is in line with Hesse (2014) who advised that the AMISOM should seek more troops from the member states. The vast areas need to be dominated with patrols and peace initiatives. This is impossible with little manpower that the PSO faces presently.   AU should actually appeal to the member states to contribute more troops for the success of the mission. Indeed, the increase of troop levels from 12,000 to 17,731 through Security Council Resolution 2036 (2012) had significant impact on the military operations (Hesse,

2014). However, this number is still too low to stabilize the whole of Somalia given its size and the asymmetric nature of threats posed by al-Shabaab. In a letter to the president of the UN Security Council sent in October 2013, it is noted that there was need to increase the capability of AMISOM to enable it, operating alongside the Somali forces, to liberate and secure territory in Somalia and to effectively deny al-Shabaab the opportunity to mobilize resources and/or forcefully recruit and train insurgents to prosecute its asymmetric warfare. As shown on Figure 6.8, the respondents felt that the mission needs more soldiers. Fifty-nine percent strongly agree, 23% agree and 9% disagree. Al shabaab still controls most of the districts in Somalia. These towns need to be liberated from the armed militant group. This calls for more troops and equipment. AU is supposed to bring in more troops to pacify these areas before the AMISOM mandate expires.

N=116

■ Percentage

Figure 6.8: Increament of troops` strength

Source: Field Data, 2017

6.11 Weak FGS

Somalia has a weak government which needs a lot of mentoring before it can operate independently on its own. Hesse, 2014, notes that the Somali leadership needs to support the AMISOM stabilization efforts if substantial gains are to be made. Some of the leaders are a little bit slow in implementing the proposed policies and as such are slowing down the whole process.

Figure 6.9 shows that 70% of the respondents feel that Somali still has a weak

government which requires a lot of support from the AU, the UN and the international community. Top political elites   are using the FGS to make money "without taking the risks or the hard work of actually reviving the failed state. The poor state of the FGS has allowed the al-Shabaab militia to expand its control over much of the country, despite its own weaknesses. Al Shabaab is not strong. It has numerous internal divisions. But it's the only player on the playing field. And so it's strong mainly as a function of the FGs's weakness. The conflict in Somalia has created one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters with hundreds of thousands of displaced people needing emergency.

Figure 6.9: Weak FGS

Source: Field Data, 2017

The data collected show that 80% of the respondents are of the opinion that AMISOM faces certain challenges which make it hard to effectively implement peace building. These challenges need to be resolved to allow a relatively smooth operation. This is shown on Table 6.5. AMISOM heavily relies on donor funding. This leaves most of its operation under the availability of funds.

Table 6.5: Cross tabulation of opinion on challenges facing AMISOM

Rating	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	80	76.6
Agree	15	14
Neutral	2	1.9
Disagree	5	4.7
Strongly disagree	3	2.8
Total	**105**	**100**

Source: Field Data, 2017

6.12 Summary

Support of the mandate remains big challenge to AMISOM. The mandate is overwhelming and thus requires robust resources. Stabilization of Somalia requires commitment from all stakeholders. If not checked properly, it could become one of the most expensive peace support operations which only consume both human resource and materiel. The three theories: securitization; interventionism; and armed combat call for the necessary support of the mission. AMSOM needs funds to sustain its operations,

acquire new equipment for troops and to pay the personnel both uniformed and non-uniformed ones. Federal Government of Somalia must support the AMISOM operations.

Political in-fighting for dominance of clan should be resolved. Clan dynamics fuels conflict and it is further exploited by Al shabaab. The armed group continues to blow off the civilians within hotels, beaches and even at the airport. It discredits the government which is incapable of providing security to its people. The UN and the international community should come together to help in sustaining peace support operations on Somalia. Peace and security in the face of transnational terrorism remain a collective responsibility. Command and control should not be sanctioned by the TCCs other than by FHQs. The uncoordinated operations cannot create synergy needed to contribute to the desired end-state. The next chapter discusses summary, conclusions and recommendations of the study.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The chapter gives a synopsis of summary of research findings and conclusions of the study. It outlines recommendations. It ends by providing suggestions for further research.

7.1 Summary of Findings

The study had three specific objectives namely, to: Examine the nature of military strategies in relation to peace building in Somalia; assess contributions of AMISOM towards peace building; and evaluate challenges AMISOM face in influencing peace building. The general objective of the study was to evaluate the effectiveness of African Union Mission operations influencing peace building in Somalia. The study also discussed the theoretical perspective with the theory of armed combat being the most proffered since it sets the pace for post- conflict reconstruction and peace building.

7.1.1 Nature of Military strategies in relation to peace building in Somalia

Nature of military strategies plays a vital role in relation to peace in Somalia. How the mission is configured to carry out its mission affects its adeptness. Military formations have to allow competent deployment of military resources available. All TCCs should work towards a unified command. Lack of synchronized systems hinders productivity of the troops. Troops pending mission deployment should undergo predeployment training

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based on a particular doctrine. Unity of effort is reinforced by coordination of the activities. AMISOM has not developed liaison mechanisms and contact points between itself and other actors in the theatre. They should synchronize their actions in combined efforts with other international bodies working towards stabilization of Somalia.

Tacticization of operations slows down the rate of stabilization process. Civilian should be able to supervise the military planners so that not all directives are given military. Tacticization negatively affects the operations as observed by 63.2% of respondents who strongly agreed to that fact. Such actions tend to offer temporary reprieve to matters at hand. Additionally, AMISOM has not fully embraced the use of cultural intelligence. The respondents, 58%, feel that the mission is not making use of cultural intelligence. In the effort to win the hearts and minds of locals, cultural intelligence must be exploited. Soldiers are supposed to undergo the cultural dynamics of the conflict. Cultural behaviors of the country have to be considered. When soldiers identify with the locals, they are not seen as foreigners who are on an invading mission.

The current soldier can perform several tasks ranging from diplomatic engagements to physical combat. AMISOM should exploit the organizational hybridity of the mission. The mission still struggles with CIMIC activities yet these are activities that give operations a lot of kinetic. Quick impact projects improve the lives of the local, thus giving the mission legitimacy and an edge over the armed groups. Building health

facilities, sinking boreholes and constructing schools are some of the activities that AMISOM should undertake. The respondents, 63.2%, believe that CIMIC activities have not been fully exploited. Such activities enhance the relation between the troops and the locals.

Offensive and defensive measures remain paramount to the defeat of armed militants wreaking havoc in the country. Counter offensives must be sharp and decisive in nature since they are aimed at achieving a certain objective. At tactical levels, troops have to be prepared to establish contacts with the armed groups. Coercive force must be applied for them to submit and surrender their arms. One respondents narrated that al shabaab are overrunning military bases of AMISOM. The respondents, 68%, were dissatisfied with the conduct of both offensive and defensive operations. The mission is slowly losing its credibility amongst the locals. If the soldiers cannot protect themselves against the armed groups, then they cannot be expected to protect the civilians. Their defences are not adequately fortified making them sitting ducks for the al shabaab. Defensive operations should be offensive in nature, therefore, troops should be conducting raids and sending fighting patrols to dominate the areas of responsibilities. Appropriate equipment and resources should be provided for these measures to be put into practice.

The Mission should enhance the pursuance and consolidation of political and diplomatic settlement of armed conflict. To this end, the mission lacks enough human resource to facilitate such diplomatic settlements. Dialogue should not be totally ruled out with the armed groups. The root causes of the conflict should be addressed rather than the

asymptomatic elements. As the actors are brought on board, AMISOM should remain non-partisan to the conflict.

Facilitation and stabilization plan of Somalia rests with the AMISOM. The recent developments show that the mission is getting overwhelmed by the operations. Their basses are being overrun by al shabaab and suicide bombings have made Mogadishu still unsafe. The mission needs more soldiers from the TCC to help with offering security to the country. AMISOM should maximize on strategic attack as well as strategic military power. Strategic attack facilitates physical degradation of the enemy. Strategic military power is aimed at neutralizing the enemy as well as defeating his will to fight. AMISOM is yet to fully exploit this concept in the effort to degrade the armed group`s fighting capability, indeed, 73% of the respondents were dissatisfied with its application. The militants should be given no room to conduct their activities. Their freedom of action should be curtailed. AMISOM should carry out strategic bombing to destroy their bases and ordinances.

AMISOM should capitalize on the Al shabaab`s weaknesses and strengths. Through the intelligence mechanism, the mission should find flaws within the ranks of the group and exploit it. They should, however, avoid attacking the militia from his strong points. Tactical dispositions should help in choking their movements. The defended localities should be tactically located to dominate entry points to towns and centres, and main supply routes. The respondents, 73%, feel that the nature of military strategies slows down the peace building.

7.1.2 Contributions of AMISOM towards peace building in Somalia

AMISOM has been trying hard to support the peace initiatives. The Mission plays a key role in bringing the local leaders into peace stalks so that the FGS is strengthened. Such peace talks help in coming into agreements of the way forward. It participated in facilitating the committee charged with selecting voting method for the general election. AMISOM has been applauded for facilitating FGS into having the electoral systems into place. The elections were a success. The mission still lacks civilian experts in conducting some of these tasks. SNA is part of the national security. It is supposed to take charge of manning of the country. The army is still weak and needs a lot of mentoring and training from the TCCs, partners and friends of the AMISOM. The respondents, 75%, believe that the SNA is not yet ready to take over the country`s security systems. The force is weak and it needs to be adequately mentored before the troops leave the country. Reintegration is yet to be accomplished. The FGS is yet to register the SNA soldiers in all the sectors. There are still many militia groups around which need to be absorbed by the army like the Raskamboni Brigade. Training of SNA should also form part of priority list of the mission. The soldiers need to be trained so that they can provide overall protection to the civilians and key government installations. Providing armed escort to the government leaders, and securing the country against the Al shabaab threat, form part of their functions.

The military component is weak. They seem to be overwhelmed by their duties. They need to be resourced in terms of weapons. They need relevant skills to fight insurgency. Contact dilemma has become a challenge to their operations. Soldiers tend to flee in the

face of the enemy when they are poorly equipped and lack necessary training. The data collected reinforces the observation as 75% of the respondents felt that contributions by AMISOM is yet to be fully felt by the common Somali.

7.1.3 Challenges AMISOM faces in influencing peace building

AMISOM faces a lot of challenges which need to be addressed to allow the outfit to function relatively more efficiently. The mandate lacks support from various stakeholders. The mission has enormous mandate that operates under chapter VII of the UN charter. The mandate is susceptible to political dynamics, financial and other factors out of control of the AU and the Somali government. This affects operation of the mission.

Intelligence and information gathering suffers from lack of modern equipment and funds to sustain the sources and agencies. The information and intelligence cells are not well developed to provide real time intelligence to the troops on the ground. Operations are supposed to be intelligence driven. The respondents, 54%, believe that the collection mechanism is weak. It is unable to drive the operations as required. Failure of provision of information critical to the operations leaves the troops to function and conduct their activities blindly. That explains the cause of heavy casualties on the troops. The troops do their administrative movements without prior intelligence on the deployment of Al shabaab along the main supply routes. They do not have unmanned aerial vehicles for aerial observations and patrols.

Poorly equipped troops cannot fight effectively. AMISOM has to source for funds to acquire more sophisticated equipment like mortar and radar detecting systems. The respondents, 76%, feel that the mission is ill-equipped. The basic equipment that the troops should have is missing. The absence of attack helicopters can be felt because Al shabaab are able to move in large numbers without any fear of airstrikes. Such large groups form concentrated targets for air assets. Personnel do not have enough APCs to aid in conducting patrols. Planted IEDs on routes are difficult to detect with naked eyes thus there is need for specialized equipment. Troops suffer from IED attacks which could have been averted. Life is too precious and when death can be avoided, the better.

The mission lacks sustainable source of funds. It depends on donors and friends of the AMISOM. EU cut their funding by 20% and this action is likely to affect the morale of soldiers since it translates to a cut of every soldier`s pay by a whooping USD 400. In fact, 89.5% of the respondents feel that the pay cut will lower the morale of the troops. The remuneration of the troops should be increased due to the nature of the mission. The environment is and hostile. The AU through assessed contributions, the Peace Fund could be handy in running the operations. With no sufficient funds, buying equipment and paying the civilian staff becomes a big challenge.

Command and control remain weak. The respondents, 70%, felt dissatisfied with the command structure of the troops. The troops still receive orders from their home countries. This does not give the Force Commander full authority over the control of the troops. As seen from the respondents (65%), there are incidents in which some troops

collapsed their bases and relocated without informing the Force headquarters. The contingents work with a lot of suspicion against one another. Such acts occasion lack or minimum of sharing intelligence and information. Competition amongst the TCCs overshadows the objectives of the mission. Each country is pursuing its own national ambitions. AMISOM has not established contact points where liaison can be done amongst the TCCs. The mandate is also overwhelming. This calls for the increase of the fighting strength. More soldiers should be brought to help in the manning of the liberated centres and towns. Patrols are necessary to deny the armed groups freedom of action.

Emerging threats and clan dynamics are actualities that the mission has to address urgently. The long stretch of coastline has to be guarded against illegal trade and fishing, radioactive waste dumping and piracy. The man power and the equipment have to be out sourced. Clan dynamics results into uncertain political climate in the country. The respondents, 68.4%, strongly agree that clan rivalry is a major hindrance to peace building strategies. Clan leaders have to be engaged in the peace processes. Ultimately, peace strategies must be locally owned and so they should participate in the processes to give it acceptance.

The theoretical insights discussed give heuristic tools for analysis of operations by the troops. Theory of armed combat shows how troops should be deployed in a theatre of war with regards to that of the enemy. The theory analyzes what troops should do to achieve victory or to meet the objectives of the operations. They illustrate the formations and battle posture to be adopted at both offensive and defensive operations. If that is

implemented it should give troops an edge over the enemy. Securitization theory states what should be secured against what and why the government should not attribute everything to security. It details the actors in the conflict spectrum. Interventionism theory guides the commander on the legitimacy of the targets to be destroyed during the campaigns.

7.2 Conclusions

Pursuant to the specific objective number one which was to examine the nature of military strategies in relation to peace building in Somalia, the study concludes that the mission needs certain readjustments in order to function relatively more effectively. Most of the infrastructures are weak. Cultural intelligence needs to be reintegrated within the operations of the troops. Military formations should be realigned to defeat the enemy` ever changing insurgent tactics.

The mission should be owned by the locals. Troops should be able to exert pressure on the militants so that they submit to the Federal Government of Somalia. FGS is weak and it still lacks legitimacy. Application of strategic military power should be exploited. It helps destroy the militant`s fighting power as well as the will to fight. Tactical dispositions should be observed so that the armed groups are denied any freedom of action. The Juba corridor is yet to be captured with towns such as Jilib, jamame and Walgadud. These towns remain strategic to the militant group especially for administrative and tactical movements.

Secondly, in response to specific objective number two of the study which was to assess contributions of AMISOM towards peace building, the study concludes that the mission has a lot more to be done to stabilize the country. The other peace support operations did not meet their objectives. Both UNOSOM I & II failed to give the Somalis a stable government. AMISOM should facilitate both political and diplomatic mechanisms to help the FGS in gaining acceptance by the Somalis. Security and stabilization plans should be given priority. A workable exit strategy should be laid down. Various components should be given necessary support so that they can meet their mandates.

Thirdly, in response to the specific objective number three, which evaluated the challenges AMISOM faces in influencing peace building, the study concluded that the mission needs some special support to increase efficiency of its operations. The AU should ensure sufficient funds for the operations otherwise the lives of troops lost in the pursuit of peace in Somalia means and remains nothing. It should adopt a sustainable source of funding. The international community is losing interest of conflict in Somalia 9omar, 2016). With the cut of funding by the EU, the UN should have chipped in to cover the gap. However, that is yet to happen.

7.3 Overall Conclusion

In response to the general objective of the study which was to evaluate the effectiveness of AMISOM`s influence on peace building in Somalia, the study concludes that AMISOM offers the best platform to stabilize Somalia. AMISOM has remained steadfast in fighting the armed group with a clear exit strategy. It continues to mentor the Security

Agencies like Somalia National Army, National Police Service and Somalia National Intelligence Service so that they secure the country against any kind of threat. Through AMISOM, various institutions are running. The electoral system has been put into place. Through it, general election was held in February 2017. The Federal Government of Somalia seats at the capital of Mogadishu and is carrying out its daily operations.

7.4 Recommendations

The following recommendations were based on the findings and conclusions of the study which will form the base for formulation of policies, inform scholars and guide military practitioners on their operations. Based on the specific objective one which was to examine the nature of military strategies in relation to peace building in Somalia, the study recommends that AMISOM mandate should not be changed frequently. The mandate should run for atleast two years before its renewal and based on the progress. Additional troops should be sought out. The current strength is not enough to secure the country against the militants. Forces which lack impartiality required for participation in peace support operations should be removed. If possible, forces which share common borders with Somalia should not continue to serve as part of the AMISOM mission. Those forces must be replaced by contingents from other countries, which do not have territorial ambitions, or historical enmities that will affect the mission. Otherwise, the locals will continue to view them as occupation forces.

Based on the specific objective two which was to assess the contributions of the AMISOM towards peace building, the study recommends that Somalia needs unified

international support. The UN and the international community should rally behind AMISOM. Peace strategies have to be supported for success. Somalis who are willing to negotiate to help end conflict in Somalia should be involved. Common strategies will be necessary if the international community is to fight the outlawed groups in Somalia. The international community should be committed to supporting peace initiatives from locals at any time.

Based on the specific objective three which was to evaluate the challenges that AMISOM faces in influencing peace building, the study recommends that AMISOM should look for sustainable sources of funding so that its operations are not hampered by donor dependency realities. The AU should look for a sustainable source of funding for the mission through the assessed contributions from member states. It should not rely on the UN, donors (EU) and 'friends of AMISOM' for financing these operations. Troops lack adequate modern equipment and there is high civilian turn over due to insufficient funds. AMISOM should acquire attack helicopters as well as utility aircrafts to enhance the efficiency of the mission. The civilians should be retained through relatively good emoluments for institutional build up. They have various experts who have the required expertise in peace building strategies.

7.5 Suggestions for further research

As per the specific objective one, further research needs to be done on the impact of cultural intelligence on peace support operations in Somalia. The soldiers are deployed in

Somalia with little knowledge of the host country. Little has been done on the effects of cultural intelligence on the host country.

As per the specific objective two, further research needs to be done on how human stress impacts peace building strategies amongst the troops. Some soldiers become stressed up in the host country, thus, are not able to optimally deliver.

As per specific objective three, further research needs to be done on how emerging threat trends impact on peace building strategies. There is need to study the necessary adjustments that have to be made and what new peace initiatives need to be adopted to create a secure environment for peace building strategies to be brought to bear.

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APPENDIX I: Introduction Letter

P. O. BOX 272-20116
Gilgil, Kenya.
September, 2016.

Respondent,
AMISOM
Mogadishu, Somalia.

RE: Request for voluntary participation in research

Dear Respondent,

I, the researcher, Mr. William Oluoch Ligawa is a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology pursuing Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies. I`m interested in carrying out a study on the peace support operations by the AMISOM troops. Your response will be of great value to the research findings.

I am contacting you to request for voluntary participation in my research. The questionnaire is estimated to take 15 minutes to complete. Any information you give will be treated with a lot of confidence.

Should you wish to get an electric copy of the research findings, please indicate your email address in the space provided at the end of the questionnaire. If you have any questions please contact me on 0713 316 205 or email me at ligawawilson@gmail.com.

Thank you very much for your attention, consideration as you sign your informed consent to participate in this research study.

Sincerely,

Ligawa W. Oluoch.

APPENDIX II: CONSENT FORM

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEGDE

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING:

(I) Are you a fluent English speaker   YES ☐   NO ☐

HAVE YOU:

(I) read the information contained in the introductory letter given to you explaining about the study? YES ☐ NO ☐

(II) had any opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study with the researcher? YES ☐ NO ☐

(III) received satisfactory answers to all your questions? YES ☐   NO ☐

(IV) have you spoken to the researcher concerning any of your fears concerning the study? YES ☐   NO ☐

DO YOU UNDERSTAND

……….that you are free to withdraw from the study and free to withdraw your data from any future analysis and/ or publication

☐   ☐

- At any given time   YES   NO

- Without having to give any reason for withdrawing   YES ☐   NO ☐

I hereby fully and freely consent to participate in a study entitled; *The AMISOM`s peace support operation influencing peace building strategies in Somalia.*

- I understand the nature and the purpose of these procedures involved communicated to me on a separate information sheet.

- I understand that a numerical code will replace my name so that my data can remain confidential

- I allow the researcher from Kenyatta University to record and process the dataI provide during the course ot this study unless I state otherwise. I understand this information will be used only for

the purpose (s) set out in the information sheet, and my consent is condition upon the researcher complying with his duties and obligations.

Signature Participant: _____ Date: _____

APPENDIX III: QUESTIONNAIRE

Section A – Questions addressing objective one (Structure and nature of AMISOM)

1. a. Does the force offer relatively sufficient training for its personnel?

      YES ☐   NO ☐

  b. If no, how should it be improved?

2. Is the command and control structure of AMISOM efficient?

      YES ☐   NO ☐

  a. If no, what could be the problem?

  b. How can the problem be mitigated?

3. Is their relatively well coordination of AMISOM activities?

      YES ☐   NO ☐

  a. How has AMISOM addressed the coordination issue?

4. Has there been allegations of any kind by the locals on the conduct of the interveners?

      YES ☐   NO ☐

  a. What was the scandal?

  b. How was it addressed?

5. What is your combat motivation?

6. Is the current model of AMISOM PSO effective?

  a. If not, how should it be improved?

Section B – Questions addressing Objective two (Contributions of AMISOM PSOs)

7. Do you think that you are achieving the mission objectives?

YES ☐   NO ☐

   a. If no, what has gone wrong?

   b. What is the way forward?

8. Is the AMISOM overwhelmed by the mandate?

   a. If yes, how should that be corrected?

9. What are the peace strategies that have been adopted by AMISOM?

   a. Are they efficient in addressing the current Somalia`s crisis?

   b. What are the strategies you would wish adopted by AMISOM?

10. Do you think any Somali feels safe in Somalia?

YES ☐   NO ☐

   a. If no, what should AMISOM improve to ensure security for the common Somali?

11. Can Somalia`s national security be charged with its security agencies?

   a. If no, what would be the failures?

   b. What is the way forward for the Somalia National Army (SNA), Somalia National Police (SNP), and National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA)?

Section C – Questions addressing Objective three (Challenges facing AMISOM)

12. a. Does the force get enough support from the stakeholders involved in the operations?

b. If no, what could be the reasons?

13. What are the logistical challenges that the force faces, if any?

14. Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your personal opinion for each of the following statements regarding the peace support operations.

a.

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The AMISOM`s mandate has been achieved.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Troops do understand the cultural practices of the Somalis.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The training of the Somali National Army is sustainable.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The information gathering procedure is relatively okay.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The reduction of pay allowances has affected the troops.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Pay cut likely to lower the morale of troops	①	②	③	④	⑤
Clan rivalry affects the peace building strategies negatively	①	②	③	④	⑤
The strength of troops should be increasesd	①	②	③	④	⑤
The fear of defeat is more eminent when troops are ill prepared for battle.	①	②	③	④	⑤

Statement					
Under utilization of CIMIC relations	①	②	③	④	⑤
Frequently changing mandate affects the operations negatively	①	②	③	④	⑤
The mission suffers from tacticization of operations	①	②	③	④	⑤
The military has a weak formation.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The Somalis appreciate the concerted efforts towards pacification of Somalia	①	②	③	④	⑤
So far the AMISOM leadership has won the hearts and minds of the locals.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The troops are well equipped for the mission.	①	②	③	④	⑤
More troops should be added for the mission.	①	②	③	④	⑤
There mistrusts amongst the troop contributing countries.	①	②	③	④	⑤

b.

Statement	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied
Conduct of offensive and defensive operations.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The composition of the components of the force.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Implementation of security and stabilization plan	①	②	③	④	⑤

Political climate in Somalia	①	②	③	④	⑤
Training needs.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Command and control structure	①	②	③	④	⑤

c.

Statement	Strong	Neutral	Weak
Utilization of cultural intelligence.	①	②	③
Somalia National Army capability	①	②	③
Support of political and diplomatic settlement of armed conflicts	①	②	③
Intelligence and information gathering mechanism	①	②	③

APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR AMISOM LEADERSHIP

1. a. Does the force have adequate airlift strategic capability?

   b. If not, how does the lack of the airlift capacity affect the force`s operations?

2. a. Does the force get enough funding for the operations?

   b. If no, how does the AMISOM handle such inadequacies?

3. What are the new strategies for degrading the alshabaab`s capability?

4. What are the programs put into place to help soldiers handle combat stress and fatigue?

5. a. Does the force get political support from the troop contributing countries?

   b. If no, how does that affect the operations?

6. What do you think, in your opinion, should be done to improve the peace support operations towards peace and stability in Somalia?

7. Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your personal opinion for each of the following statements regarding the peace support operations.

a.

Statement	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
The AMISOM`s mandate has been achieved.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Troops do understand the cultural practices of the Somalis.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The training of the Somali National Army is sustainable.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The information gathering procedure is relatively okay.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The reduction of pay allowances has affected the troops.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Pay cut likely to lower the morale of troops	①	②	③	④	⑤
Clan rivalry affects the peace building strategies negatively	①	②	③	④	⑤
The strength of troops should be increased	①	②	③	④	⑤
The fear of defeat is more eminent when troops are ill prepared for battle.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Under utilization of CIMIC relations	①	②	③	④	⑤

Frequently changing mandate affects the operations negatively	①	②	③	④	⑤
The mission suffers from tacticization of operations	①	②	③	④	⑤
The military has a weak formation.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The Somalis appreciate the concerted efforts towards pacification of Somalia	①	②	③	④	⑤
So far the AMISOM leadership has won the hearts and minds of the locals.	①	②	③	④	⑤
The troops are well equipped for the mission.	①	②	③	④	⑤
More troops should be added for the mission.	①	②	③	④	⑤
There mistrusts amongst the troop contributing countries.	①	②	③	④	⑤

b.

Statement	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very Dissatisfied
Conduct of offensive and defensive operations.	①	②	③	④	⑤

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The composition of the components of the force.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Implementation of security and stabilization plan	①	②	③	④	⑤
Political climate in Somalia	①	②	③	④	⑤
Training needs.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Command and control structure	①	②	③	④	⑤

c.

Statement	Strong	Neutral	Weak
Utilization of cultural intelligence.	①	②	③
Somalia National Army capability	①	②	③
Support of political and diplomatic settlement of armed conflicts	①	②	③
Intelligence and information gathering mechanism	①	②	③

APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CLAN ELDERS

1. a. Does the presence of AMISOM make the Somalis feel secure?

   b. If not, what could be the problem?

2. a. Do you as leaders feel that you have given AMISOM necessary support?

   b. If no, why?

3. What do you think AMISOM should do to eradicate the menace of Al shabaab ?

4. What is the opinion of the Somalis about the AMISOM troops?

5. a. Do you think that the international community has given the FGS enough support to degrade the militant`s fighting capability?

   b. If no, how does that affect the operations?

6. What do you think, in your opinion, should be done to improve the peace support operations towards peace and stability in Somalia?

APPENDIX VI: NACOSTI APPROVAL LETTER

**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

Telephone:+254-20-2213471,
2241349,3310571,2219420
Fax:+254-20-318245,318249
Email:dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke
when replying please quote

9th Floor, Utalii House
Uhuru Highway
P.O. Box 30623-00100
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/16/16226/12112**

Date:
6th July, 2016

Willliam Oluoch Ligawa
Masinde Muliro University of
Science and Technology
P.O. Box 190-50100
KAKAMEGA.

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *"African Union mission in Somalia (AMISOM) peace support operations influencing peace building strategies in Somalia,"* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **all Counties** for the period ending **5th July, 2017.**

You are advised to report to **the Principal Secretary, Ministry of Defence, the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, all Counties** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

BONIFACE WANYAMA
FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO

Copy to:

The Principal Secretary
Ministry of Defence.

The County Commissioners
All Counties.

The County Directors of Education
All Counties.

National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is ISO 9001: 2008 Certified

APPENDIX VII: NACOSTI PERMIT

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:
MR. WILLLIAM OLUOCH LIGAWA
of MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 0-20116
Gilgil,has been permitted to conduct
research in *All Counties*

on the topic: *AFRICAN UNION MISSION
IN SOMALIA (AMISOM) PEACE SUPPORT
OPERATIONS INFLUENCING PEACE
BUILDING STRATEGIES IN SOMALIA*

for the period ending:
5th July,2017

Permit No : NACOSTI/P/16/16226/12112
Date Of Issue : 6th July,2016
Fee Recieved :Ksh 2000

....
**Applicant's
Signature**

....
**Director General
National Commission for Science,
Technology & Innovation**

APPENDIX VIII: SOMALI EMBASSY CLEARANCE LETTER

Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia
Nairobi - Kenya

Re: ESR/991/N/16   Nairobi, 13ᵗʰ July 2016

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the Republic of Kenya has the honor to inform your good office that it has no objection for Mr. William Oluoch Ligawa, Svc No. 130241, Capt. from African Union Mission for Somalia and a Student from the Masinde Muliro University of Science & Technology (MMUST) pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict to travel to Mogadishu, Somalia to carry out Field Research titled "African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) Peace Support operations Influencing Peace Building Strategies in Somalia".

Regards

Mr. Ali Mohamed Sheikh
Counsellor