

**THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN NATIONAL COHESION AND INTEGRATION IN  
KENYA WITH SPECIFIC FOCUS ON NAIROBI AND MOMBASA  
COUNTIES**

**MICHAEL G. MWANGI**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the  
Conferment of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies  
of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology**

**SEPTEMBER, 2020**

**DECLARATION**

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

Signature .....

**Michael Gatogo Mwangi.**

**Date**

**Reg. No: CPC/H/203/12**

**CERTIFICATION**

The undersigned supervisors certify that they have read and hereby recommend for acceptance of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology a thesis entitled **“The Role of Islam in National Cohesion and Integration in Kenya with Specific Focus on Nairobi and Mombasa Counties”**.

Signature.....

**Dr. Janet Nasambu Kassilly.**

**Date**

Department of Social Sciences Education,  
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology.

Signature .....

**Dr. Ombachi Kipkorir, N.**

**Date**

Department of Emergency Management Studies,  
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology.

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## **DEDICATION**

This work is dedicated to all Muslim leaders and faithfuls who are sincerely working hard towards a cohesive and integrated society in Kenya.

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study was to examine the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya. Cohesion and integration agenda is one of the building blocks of Kenya's Vision 2030 and has become an area of major interest at different levels of the Kenyan society. However, the country continues to experience divisions along social lines. Academic work relating to the role of religion in national cohesion and integration remains relatively low in the Kenyan context. So far, no specific studies have been done relating to the role of Islam in addressing the agenda and this study sought to fill the research gap arising thereof. Specifically, the study sought to: Assess the methods used by Islam in promoting national cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya; explore the challenges encountered by Islam in national cohesion and integration efforts; investigate the prospects of Islam in contributing to a cohesive and integrated society and examine the policy framework in place for cohesion and integration activities by Islam in the country. The research will enrich the field of religion in peace and conflict resolution by adding information on the opportunities and resourcefulness of Islam in national cohesion and integration. The study adopted an exploratory research design to help in the discovery of ideas and insights which assisted in a deeper understanding of the phenomenon hence forming the foundation for further inquiries on the subject. The study design was implemented through administering questionnaires to Muslim faithful and Muslim leaders sampled from mosques in Nairobi and Mombasa and national Muslim organizations. The study population in Mombasa was 175,452 adult Muslims while that of Nairobi was 160,941 adult Muslims. For the questionnaires, a samples size calculated from Fisher's sampling formulae yielded 372 respondents in Mombasa and 150 respondents in Nairobi. The two counties have different ratios of adherents of Islam against the total county population. To enrich the study further, data collection also involved conducting in-depth interviews with officials from Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims, Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenta and Sub-County Commissioners in Nairobi and Mombasa. A sample of National Council of Churches in Kenya officials and church leaders were also interviewed as a control measure. The two counties were selected for the study owing to their ethnic and religious diversities and having instances of violence in the past based on ethnic and religious affiliations. The research used a conceptual framework guided by two relevant theories: Functionalist Theory of Religion and National Identity Theory. The functionalist theory of religion was developed by Emile Durkheim and attempts to show how religion acts as glue that holds the society together. National Identity Theory was developed by Antony Smith and involves a sense of common political community, history, values and traditions. The research revealed some involvement of Islam in national cohesion and integration but with efforts slowed by diverse internal and external challenges. Among other things, the research recommends a need for Muslim leaders to formulate a policy framework for cohesion and integration and related tasks. On the academic front, the study recommends specific academic study on how Muslim social utilities like schools and hospitals can be avenues of promoting a cohesive and integrated society in Kenya.

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## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACRL	African Council of Religious Leaders
ANC	African National Congress
CBO's	Community Based Organizations
CICC	Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics (CICC)
CIPEV	Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence
CIPK	Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPI	Coast Peace Initiative
DFRD	District Focus for Rural Development
FBO's	Faith Based Organizations
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
FRA	European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
GoC	Government of Canada
GoK	Government of Kenya
HURIA	Human Rights Agenda
IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission
IRCK	Inter-religious Council of Kenya
IRCs	Inter-Religious Councils
JHC	Jesuit Hakima Centre
<i>JNI</i>	<i>Jama'tu Nasri Islam</i>
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KIPPRA	Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis
KMYA	Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance
KNHR	Kenya National Human Rights
KPU	Kenya Peoples Union
MCDF	Muslim-Christian Dialogue Forum
MCK	Media Council of Kenya
MSS	Muslim Student Society

MUHURI	Muslims for Human Rights
MYC	Muslim Youth Centre
NACOSTI	National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation
NAMLEF	National Muslims Leaders Forum
NAPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NCCCK	National Council of Churches in Kenya
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NCP	National Congress Party
NGO's	Non-Governmental Organizations
NPA	National Peace Accord
NPC	Northern People Congress
NRF	Nubian Right Forum
NSCIA	Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs
NSIS	National Security Intelligence Service
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement
OIS	Organization of Islamic States
PAY	Peace Awareness Among Youths
PEV	Post-Election Violence
PNU	Party of National Unity
SCC	Small Christian Communities
SCI	Supreme Council of Islam
SCIA	Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs
SDG	Sustainable Development Goals
SOC	Serbian Orthodox Church
SPLM/A	Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army
SPSS	Statistical Package for Social Sciences
SUPKEM	Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WAMY	World Assembly of Muslim Youth



WCC	World Council of Churches
WCRP	World Conference of Religions for Peace
WFDD	World Faiths Development Dialogue
WTC	World Trade Centre
YMO	Yugoslavian Muslim Organization

## DEFINITION OF TERMS

**Cohesion:** Cohesion is the state of people from diverse cultural backgrounds sticking together in a close union. It is cohering or the state of being in consonance with each other.

**Da'wah:** This is preaching Islam to others or making an invitation to Islam. It is an obligation upon every Muslim and can be verbal or in deeds.

**Hadith:** This is a set of traditions recording what Prophet Muhammed and his early followers did or said.

**Imam:** This is a name used to refer to Islamic leadership position. It is commonly used as the title of a worship leader in a mosque or Muslim community.

**Integration:** Integration is the state of being together irrespective of race, religion or ethnicity and it is a key contributor to community cohesion. Integration enables citizens to relate with each harmoniously.

**Islam:** The word Islam is derived from the Arabic root “SLM” which means among other things, peace, purity, submission and obedience. In the religious sense, the word Islam means submission to the will of *Allah* and obedience to His law.

**Jihad:** The term literally means striving for the cause of Allah. The term has a variety of interpretations. Commonly, it means spiritual struggle for moral purity. To others, it means trying to correct wrong by voice and action. The most remote and controversial

interpretation is military war against non-Muslims with the aim of converting them to Islam.

**National cohesion and integration:** In the Kenyan context, national cohesion and integration is a process and an outcome of instilling and enabling all citizens to have a sense and a feeling that they are members of the same nation engaged in a common enterprise, facing shared challenges and opportunities.

**National cohesion:** National cohesion entails the people of the same nation sticking together in a close union.

**Non-State Actor:** This is an individual or an organization that has significant social or political influence but is not allied to any nation state.

**Sheikh:** This is a name used for a respected leader in Islam. It is a honorific Arabic title for respected Muslim leader.

**State Actor:** This is a person, a group of people or an organization acting on behalf of the government.

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 Background to the Study**

National cohesion and integration is an area of interest both at the government and civic levels in Kenya. This interest was largely revived following the events of 2007/2008 Post Election Violence (PEV) which resulted into injuries, loss of lives and property. About 1.5 million people were adversely affected by the chaos (Waki et al, 2009). Evidently, the effects of the skirmishes are still being felt across the country in various ways. Furthermore, a just and cohesive society is a key ingredient of Kenya Vision 2030 (GoK, 2007).

There are several pointers to the centrality of a cohesive and integrated society. To emphasize the importance of a cohesive and integrated society, Sessional Paper No. 2 of 2012 on the national policy on cohesion and integration was developed. The aim of the policy was to ensure that Kenya becomes an equitable society which is politically, economically and socially cohesive and integrated with the citizens having a shared vision and sense of belonging while appreciating diversity (NCIC, 2014). The Jubilee government that took power in March 2013 had one pillar of its manifesto being national cohesion, whereby the coalition would work hard to end ethnic tensions and rivalry and unite all citizens (Jubilee Manifesto, 2013).

Evidently, the challenge of social divisions is both a past and a current reality. A report on the status of social cohesion in 2013 reported a national cohesion index of 56% with the highest-ranking county being Kiambu with 66% and the lowest ranking county being Wajir with 22% (KIPPRA & NCIC, 2014). Such statistics implies that, the level of cohesion and

integration in Kenya is just above average. In 2015, the chairman of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Francis Ole Kaparo was widely quoted in sections of print and electronic media lamenting at the sorry state of social cohesion in the country. He lamented that leaders were dividing the country into ethnic factions for their own selfish political benefits as they prepare to use them for selfish gains in the looming 2017 general elections. Such a view was widely held by the commission through its 2012 report which indicated that ethnic negative stereotypes are used to advance ethnic hatred by politicians (NCIC, 2013). This lament emanating from the chairman and the commission years after 2007/2008 PEV was a clear indication that the challenge is far from being overcome and hence need to be addressed from all possible fronts. Inter-group tensions are still being experienced along cultural, racial, social-economic and ethnic divisions.

Besides the most commonly known inter-ethnic conflicts which have occurred mostly around the electioneering periods, some regions have been hit by other nature of conflicts; some of which have assumed inter-clan, inter-ethnic and inter-religious dimensions (Mghanga, 2010). In the year 2011 and 2012, scores of people were brutally killed in Tana River when the Pokomo and Orma communities fought (Kirchner, 2013). Tensions between the two warring communities persisted long after the 2011 and 2012 conflicts. There has been a series of inter-communal rivalries in the North-Eastern region pitting different clans of the Somali community against each other (Human Rights Watch, 2013). This is evidence enough that different regions of the country have been variously affected by different forms of conflicts in the past and presently.

Religious animosities though not very pronounced in the country have been witnessed at different times in different localities in the country. Kahumbi (1995) asserts that Christian-Muslim relations in Kenya are characterized by misunderstanding, misrepresentation, prejudice, and what some Muslims observers refer to as discrimination by the Christian majority. There could be several illustrations to prove this point. In June 2003, five churches were reportedly burnt by some Muslims in Bura, Tana River County following a brief arrest and interrogation of an Islamic preacher who had previously converted from Christianity to Islam (Akama, 2012). The media also reported religious related tensions in Mombasa in 2012 following the killing of Aboud Rogo, a controversial Muslim cleric and extremist. After the murder of the cleric, several churches were burnt and vandalized in the city even as religious leaders from either side called for calm (Mwangi, 2014). Religious tensions of different magnitudes have been witnessed in the Coast and Northeastern regions more recently and remain a great concern to the stakeholders ([www.cohesion.or.ke](http://www.cohesion.or.ke) ). Further the state's intensified war on terrorism has evidently led to religious innuendos which if not dealt with may lead to further ethnic and religious tensions in Kenya.

There has been a negative change on religious tolerance in Kenya. Moller (2006) notes how Islam and Christianity have co-existed together for many years in the country but laments how this enviable status is changing for the worse, a thing which would obviously hinder a cohesive and integrated society. He thus notes,

On the one hand, religion is becoming politicized, *inter alia* as a medium for expression of grievances by the Muslim minority over its perceived marginalization in Kenyan society. On the other hand, more “purist” forms of Islam such as *Salafism* are, according to some accounts, making some progress in Kenyan society and thus contributing to a spread of radicalism and

fanaticism. Not only might this exacerbate risks of domestic strife, but it might also transform Kenya (as well as other states in East Africa) into hotbeds and breeding grounds for international Islamic terrorism, that is what some have called “*jihadism*” (Moller p.3).

It then follows that, these developments though from a small minority are likely to be embraced by more adherents of the religion as a way of expressing their grievances. The successive governments in the post independent Kenya have for a long time been perceived to be skewed in favor of Christian dominated regions and deliberately ignoring development of Muslim dominated regions of the Coast and North Eastern (Mazrui, 2000). Such a view is shared by Mghanga (2010). As a result, when the same government fight radicalization, it appears to some Muslim adherents that Islam is being fought, further eroding cohesiveness among citizens. Indeed, terror entrepreneurs ride on this wave bringing about unnecessary religious tensions in the country.

Nairobi and Mombasa happen to be the most populated and culturally diverse counties in Kenya. People from different ethnicities and religions have settled in large numbers in the capital city of Nairobi and the coastal city of Mombasa (GoK Atlas, 2003). Owing to these diversities, the two cities are potentially explosive in case of any provocation based on political competition, ethnicity or religion. Mombasa was badly hit by ethnic clashes prior and after the 1997 multi-party elections (Akiwumi *et al* 1999). Ethnic conflicts were reported at large scale in the two cities during the 2007/2008 Post-election violence (Waki *et al* 2009). With these cultural and historical complexities for the two cities, a study on cohesion and integration leaning on the areas is requisite.

## 1.2 Statement of the Problem

Kenya as a nation has for a long time been plagued by divisions based on class, ethnicity and religious consciousness (Okombo, 2009). These divisions have occasionally led to enmity and conflict between the social strata. The cracks in the fabric of national hood became more obvious and pronounced during election campaigns which culminated into the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence (Waki *et al.* 2009). Following the unfortunate events which led to death of many citizens and loss of property, the nation had to prioritize cohesion and integration in the national agenda. It is the realization of this problem which led the parliament in Kenya to enact an Act of Parliament on National Cohesion and Integration (Act No. 12 of 2008). Through the Act, The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) were formed ([www.cohesion.or.ke](http://www.cohesion.or.ke)). It was hoped that, with the formation of the framework, one of its kind since independence, the nation would take quick strides towards peace and cohesiveness.

Symptoms of a deeply divided society continued to be manifested during and after the 2013 and 2017 general elections. Whereas no major conflict erupted between communities during and after the two elections, the ethnic divisions were clearly notable across the nation. The voting patterns were highly leaning towards ethnic lines based on the ethnicities of the main presidential candidates and their running mates.

Since the revival of national cohesion and integration agenda, many actors have played active and visible roles on the national platform. A considerable section of the media was evidently at the fore-front of promoting cohesion and integration especially before and after the March 2013 general elections which was highly schismatic. Indeed, NCIC partnered



very closely with media players in promoting cohesion agenda prior to the 2013 general elections (NCIC, 2013). The same cooperation between NCIC and the media was evident in the run-up to 2017 elections. The church through its dense networks and organizations across the country has also been visible in the work (Githigaro, 2010). There are several reports from the protestant umbrella body, the NCKK documenting the work being undertaken to promote social cohesion. The Catholic Church's Peace and Justice Commission (CJPC) is also doing substantial work in national cohesion and integration. The commission has several programs and projects geared toward promoting harmonious co-existence across the country (<http://cjpckkenya.org>). Such reports and programs are pointers of some activities on social cohesion being spearhead by the commission.

Apparently, Islam as a religion has not been much visible in this process or at least to match the proportions with which the agenda demands at the national level. Neither are its efforts or lack of the same properly documented. Yet the religion exerts a lot of influence in some regions of the country such as the Coast and North-Eastern (Mwakimako, 2004). Islam as a religion has been over-shadowed by the mainline members of the civil society in these matters. This makes her role and efforts less visible even when the religion has been proactive in cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya. It could also be possible that the religion has only played a marginal role in the task of national cohesion and integration in the glare of ethnic and religious cracks in the country.

Most of the studies and documentations tend to clump the efforts of Faith Based Organizations (FBO's) together and hence failure to appreciate their uniqueness and historical backgrounds. This is partly evident in the recent report of NCIC and the National

Policy on Peace Building and Conflict Management (NCIC, 2013; GoK, 2009). In other cases, even at the international levels, studies on religion and peace building tend to concentrate on the role of the church as it is evident in the works of Love and Sampson (Love, 2011; Sampson, 2007). There is a major literature gap on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya. The works of various scholars in the field such as Kilonzo (2009); Ndeda (2009) and Chacha (2010) offers a broad proof to this omission and shortcoming.

Consequently, this study specifically explored the contextual place of Islam in promoting a cohesive and integrated Kenya. The research explored the extent to which the Muslim community has been involved in promoting social coexistence in its various forms such as ethnic and religious tolerance at the local and national levels. The approaches used by Islam religion in promoting national cohesion and integration in these areas were explored as well.

### **1.3 Research Objectives**

The general objective of the study was to examine the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya. The specific objectives were:

- i. Examine the policy framework for cohesion and integration for Islam in Kenya.
- ii. Assess the methods and approaches used by Islam in promoting national cohesion and integration in Kenya.
- iii. Evaluate the prospects and challenges of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya.

## **1.4 Research Questions**

The following research questions guided the study:

- i. What policy framework on cohesion and integration is in place for Islam religion in Kenya?
- ii. Which methods and approaches has Islam religion employed in promoting national cohesion and integration in Kenya?
- iii. What are the challenges and prospects for Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya?

## **1.5 Significance of the Study**

Cohesion and integration is an important factor that contributes to harmony and peaceful co-existence in societies. Without peace and unity in a nation, no meaningful social and economic development would be achieved. Kenya as a nation has appreciated this fact and hence the formation of cohesion and integration commission as the framework of pursuing the agenda (NCIC, 2014). This study will add value to the ongoing conversation and efforts in national cohesion and integration and further broaden the perspectives within which the agenda is understood and undertaken.

The involvement of religion in important national and international matters has increased across the world over the years and more so in the post-cold war times (Hayward, 2012). Since many of today's conflicts overrun the grasp of traditional diplomacy, religious actors all over the globe are getting involved in peacemaking (Johnson, 2005). The findings in this work

have the potential of contributing to policy formulation on cohesion and integration in Islam and other likeminded entities.

The study was specifically aimed at investigating the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya. In the light of diverse conflicts which have rocked the country in the past, not much academic work has been done in establishing the involvement of Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda. The agenda mostly gained increased attention in the past few years and was mostly provoked by the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence (PEV) which left 1300 people dead, 1.5 million displaced and property worth millions of shillings destroyed. Research work on national cohesion and integration is still at the foundational levels. Academic studies targeting religious institutions and more, so the role of Islam are very few or nonexistent. The research enriched the field of religion in peacebuilding and conflict management by adding to the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda.

The National Policy on Conflict Management fails to recognize the important role that religion can play in national cohesion and integration. While the policy mentions the media as one of the non-state actors in peace building, the role of religious groups is not mentioned anywhere (GoK, 2009). This study will specifically investigate how Islam as a religion could be factored in as a resource while formulating policies on matters to do with conflict management, peacebuilding, national cohesion and integration. Some areas occupied by large populations of Muslims such as Mombasa, Nairobi and North-Eastern provinces have faced political, religious, ethnic and clan-based unrest in the past (Schlee & Abdullahi, 2012; Mwakimako, 2007). Despite the religion being the second largest in Kenya and

having majority following in some regions, research on the role of Islam in the subject at present remains scarce. The findings of the study would help to stir more conversation and scholarship on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration given the strategic position the religion occupies in the country.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

This study was undertaken to examine the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya since the agenda regained prominence from the year 2008. Although a study of major religious groups and other civil players in cohesion and integration would have been necessary, this was pragmatically impossible in a single study. Secondly, Islam is practiced in many parts of the country which have been faced with different forms of conflicts. However, only Mombasa and Nairobi Counties were selected for the study since they have considerable Muslim populations; have experienced conflicts on various occasions and are demographically cosmopolitan. The findings and recommendations are assumed to be applicable generally to other areas in Kenya. Furthermore, views from officials of the national Muslim bodies like Supreme Council of Kenya Muslims (SUPKEM) and Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya (CIPK) captures the general status in the whole country. The study also encapsulates views from other national organizations including the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK) and National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). Data for the study was collected between the period of January 2017 and February 2018.

## **1.7 Chapter Summary**

The study is on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya with specific focus on Nairobi and Mombasa Counties. The foundation chapter stated the general background to the study, the statement to the problem, research objectives and questions guiding the study, significance and the scope of the study. The chapter, being the first broad section of the work introduced the study in the background, showing how national cohesion and integration has become an area of major interest in the Kenyan society. The interest has been occasioned mostly by the existing social divisions which sometimes lead to ethnic, political and religious conflicts. Owing to the mentioned social divisions, the nation has seen the need of deliberately working towards a cohesive and integrated society. The role of different players in the task is known and documented. However, the role of religion and more specifically Islam religion is not well known or documented. Yet Islam religion has a following of about 11% of the Kenyan population. The study, which is primarily based in Nairobi and Mombasa, is hoped to add more knowledge to the on-going conversation on the role of religion in enhancing peaceful co-existence between societies in Kenya and elsewhere.

The next chapter reviews literature relating to Islam in national cohesion and integration. The literature review was both undertaken from geographical perspectives as well as the framework of the defined research objectives. Knowledge gaps identified from the review on the subject are highlighted in the section.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

This chapter reviewed literature related generally to religion in social reconstruction and then more specifically to issues related to peacebuilding, national cohesion and integration. The section broadly reviewed literature relating to religion in peacebuilding and cohesion from international and regional perspectives, exploring and interrogating how Islam religion has been involved in each context. This brought into the fore some knowledge gaps arising from existing studies in the regions reviewed. The chapter then explored some fundamental issues in the subject which led into literature relating to the study objectives of the topic. Some background review was done on erosion of cohesion and integration in Kenya, an overview of Islam religion and development of the cohesion and integration agenda in the country. The other part of the literature review was undertaken guided by the thematic areas arising out of the objectives formulated in the previous chapter on Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda in the Kenyan context.

#### **2.2 Religion and Social Reconstruction**

In the newly adopted UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG), peace is a critical component for the success of the 2030 Agenda. The United Nations document asserts that sustainable development is not achievable in the absence of peace in the society. Religious values and practices across the globe are often deeply entwined in the fabric of daily lives.

Religious actors could potentially be key players in fostering peace and harmony under SGD Goal 16 (DANMISSION, 2016).

In Africa, there exist three dominant religions namely: Traditional African Religion, Islam and Christianity (Nthamburi, 1999). Other religions with fewer followers in the continent are Hinduism, Judaism, Sikhism and Jainism. One certain fact is that religion in its diversity remarkably contributes to the development of a coherent community in the continent (Nthamburi, 1999). It was initially anticipated that, the influence of religion would diminish with increased scientific and technological evolution in the world. This has not happened as religion continues to deploy massive influence upon societies in Africa and beyond. Religion in many contexts, both in Africa and elsewhere around the globe continues to reinforce social order by controlling and facilitating change (Kamaara, 2004). One advantage of religious actors in peacebuilding and a wide array of social transformation activities is that religious personalities and institutions have previous opportunities of living with ordinary people while providing services especially in contexts of non-existing or broken government structures. In that case, there is an advantage of familiarity and trust from communities.

Kamaara continues to argue that religion on the surface seems to be immaterial and trivial to human life. This is especially when it is viewed in the light of increased scientific and technological advancements of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. But as already alluded, this is just an appearance, the reality is that religion in its many facets remains an indispensable institution within the society (Kamaara, 2004). Religious players contribute immensely to the social and economic dimensions of societies in Africa and other parts of the world.



Love states that “throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century, both the so-called idealists and realists’ approaches to international politics believed that religion ought to be kept out of politics” (Love, 2011 p.174). For them and many others, both at the academic and practitioners’ levels, religion belonged in the private, personal sphere and not in the arena of public or world affairs. Sociologists had on their hand predicated the demise of religion with the onset and the rapid growth of modernization. Accordingly, religion which was in a large extent based on primitive views would be phased out as technological developments took the center stage (Love, 2011). Over time, international relation scholars and world political analysts have been proved wrong on their claims. The truth of the matter is that religion in its many facets have had a great influence, both positive and negative on world politics. Sampson states that “a growing number of religious actors of many sorts- individual religious leaders, denominational structures, *ad hoc* commissions and delegations, and multi-religious bodies- have been involved in a range of peacebuilding efforts during the past several decades” (Sampson, 2007: 273). This is true in Africa where some religious actors have been involved in conflict resolutions in countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Sudan and Kenya.

More recent performance by religious actors’ points towards a greater potential inherent in a more systematic and coordinated mobilization of the spiritual and sociological resources of religion for conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Sampson further highlights the levels of religious involvement including but not limited to top level peace negotiations, grassroots initiatives in conciliation, mediation, trauma healing, reconciliation, reconstruction and advocacy for nonviolent socio-political change (Sampson, 2011). Such involvement in

various phases of conflict resolution proves the resourcefulness of diverse religious actors in promoting peaceful communities in various contexts around the globe.

According to the functional theory of religion, society is made up of complex institutions that constitute the social system. One of the major functions of religion is to maintain social order. Religion performs this function either by controlling unnecessary change or by facilitating desirable change (Kamaara, 2004). At the same time, religion has been a headspring of division and driver of conflict in various parts of Africa. People have conducted war in the name of God with the consequence of societies getting disintegrated because of pseudo-religious fundamentalism. Occasionally, the politicization of religion in conflicts is often facilitated by contradictions found in sacred texts and other doctrinal sources of religion as they relate to war and peace (Appleby, 2000). This view is supported by Kamaara (2004) in stating, “At its worst, religion can be a source of social conflict. Northern Ireland with its perpetual conflicts between protestants and Roman Catholics and Nigeria with conflicts between Muslims and Christians provide examples of dysfunctions of religion” (p. 126). Africa has suffered several cases of religious conflicts, more so between adherents of Christianity and Islam. The religious conflicts have been a major source of civil strife in countries such as Sudan, Nigeria, Central Africa Republic and elsewhere including Kenya.

Such scenarios cast darkness on the consistency of religious actors in peacebuilding and reconciliation among societies. But the success stories strongly show that if well tapped, religion remains a key player in holding societies together given that other highly esteemed structures such as state governments, intergovernmental organizations and reputable Non-Governmental have also fallen short of the task. It is therefore evident that religion can work

both positively or negatively for peacebuilding including related tasks such as national cohesion and integration depending on the dynamics at a given time in a context.

### **2.2.1 Religion and Social Reconstruction in Africa**

Religion as severally stated in this work comprises an inextricable part of the African fabric. This is both a historical and a present fact. Religion happened to be one of the key drivers of social transformation in Africa during the colonial period and has been the case in the post-colonial period. Previously, policy makers had hoped that the influence of religion on public matters in Africa and elsewhere around the globe would diminish with the increased levels of modernization. Such a view assumed that modernization thrives properly in the environment of secularization (Mugambi, 1999). Mugambi further states, “after five decades of secularists ‘modernization’, it is becoming appreciated that institutionalized religion has to be involved in modernization and democratization” (p. 75). Hence you find that in most parts of Africa, Islam or the church, which are the major religions, have key role to play on the social, political and economic spheres of many countries. Consequently, political and socio-economic aspects of various nation-states are closely invigorated with religious assertions and expressions (Agbiji and Swart, 2015). This makes religion not just an acquiescent and reserved element in the society, but a key driver of the life of most communities in the world.

Mugambi (1999) suggests that, religion should spearhead the social reconstruction of Africa in the same way that it facilitated the colonization and marginalization of the continent. To many observers, Christianity is a religion that facilitated the colonization of the continent

and assisted in sustaining the neo-colonial legacy. This association is founded on the fact that Catholicism and Protestantism were the dominant religions of most European colonial powers at the time of the scramble and partition of the continent (Cleall, 2012). In the present times, religion is therefore expected to provide social reconstruction through intentional rejuvenation of the continent.

Regrettably, despite the strong assertion of religion, the continent continues to be hit by social ills including poor governance, corruption, poverty and social conflicts. According to a recent report of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NAPAD), nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa rank among the seventeen most corrupt countries in the world (Agbiji and Swart, 2015). This is unfortunate for a region that boast a rich religious heritage. The failure is captured more bluntly by Agbiji and Swart (2015) in stating, "The enormity of corruption in African society in the midst of intense religiosity inevitably raises serious questions about the kind of Christian, Islamic and Traditional religious morality that exists in this predominantly religious continent" (p. 6). The question that then arises is the contribution of African religiosity to the social transformation of the continent-and more specifically the direction such a transformation usually takes-whether positive or negative. In our study context, the issues would be the contribution of religion in building cohesive and integrated nation states. Apparently, many parts of Africa have been hit by ethnic conflicts which in most cases are politically instigated.

It is evident that religion has so far played a marginal role in the socio-transformation in some sections of the continent. The sorry state has been blamed on the apparent religious complacency across various faiths. At the same time, the resourcefulness of African religiosity to social transformation in the continent should not be viewed as completely lost.

The challenge is on how the resource of religion could be regained and engaged for an ongoing and progressive socio-economic transformation of the African society. The next part explores the phenomenon on a national level in the Kenyan context.

### **2.2.2 Religion and Social Reconstruction in Kenya**

Policy makers and other stakeholders in public affairs had assumed that the influence of religion in social reconstruction has been waning over the decades. While this may be the case in some contexts, it is not always the situation everywhere. It is true that, owing to increased secularization of the society, the influence of religion may have diminished. But as Mugambi (1999) notes, the influence of religion on the society has not disappeared in entirety. This could be said to be the enduring case in Kenya. According to Chacha (2010),

Religion has played a strong correlate of Kenya's political orientation for more than five decades...Religion is so much part of people's lives and is strongly tied into their cultural identities and their efforts to survive amidst life's contingencies and the political insecurities of the Kenyan state (P. 105,106).

The above statement by Chacha describes the role of religion in the psyche of the Kenyan society. This transcends most of the history of the people of Kenya and it lingers true in all eras of the existence of the nation. It was so during the pre-colonial period, grew more in the colonial times and is even stronger in the post-colonial era. In Kenya, there is no doubt to the fact that religion is invoked and accorded a prominent place in the constitution. The opening words of the constitution attests to this fact. The national anthem obviously points to the intended role of religion in Kenya (Nyaundi, 1999).

Religion played a central role during the colonial period, post-colonial era, during the Cold War and in the post-cold war period in the region (Mugambi, 1999). Of paramount importance is that religious institutions, and more so the church was at the center of providing education and healthcare among other social necessities in the country since the colonial era. As things stand for now, the state has taken over most of the social amenities which were initiated by religious institutions. Education and health service were some of the key social services which were offered by religious institution both in the colonial and post-colonial Africa (Mugambi, 1999). Indeed, many top schools in Kenya and numerous health facilities were started as initiatives of religious institutions and more so the various church denominations in Kenya. However, even as things stand today, the role of institutionalized religion has not vanished completely. The central role of religion may have been suppressed but cannot be abolished in its entirety.

Religious institutions in Kenya and other parts of the continent have maintained an active role in responding to the various social, political and economic issues arising from time to time. One such role is peacebuilding, more so in a continent that has been hit by both intra and interstate conflicts. It cannot be lost on close observation that, even in instances of high secularization of societies, religion is occasionally evoked for convenience to boast the ego of certain political regimes.

The vibrant role of religion in socio-political matters seems to have been the case in Kenya over the years. President Moi during his 24 years' presidency almost never missed a Sunday service. He contributed financial help to support social projects affiliated to the church. However, there was a brand of religious leaders who were very critical to President Moi regime and went to the extent joining forces with political and civic leaders who agitated for

a wider democratic space in the 1990s. Mr. Kibaki in his 10 years' term also recognized the role of religion in smooth governance and occasionally sought the advice of religious leaders on important national matters (Chacha, 2010). Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto had religious leaders play a key role in their first and second inauguration ceremonies. They even went to the extent of having pastors pray specifically for them at the start of their terms. Indeed, it has now become a pattern for religious leaders to offer prayers during important national events. These prayers are offered by Pastors, Sheikhs and even leaders from ethnically based indigenous religions.

Religious organizations may it be those affiliated to the Church or Islam have been urged over the years to mobilize people for the implementation of the government agenda and policies. To a good extent, the response by religious organizations has been positive and constructive. A good example to the positive and constructive response is the existence of church sponsored learning institutions, health facilities, creation of employment opportunities and other social welfare initiatives. Islam has not been left behind as there are numerous social amenities sponsored by the religion in the country (Nyaundi, 1999). But even with this magnitude of cooperation between the state and religious bodies, political leaders still find reasons to fault religious leaders and to advise them to keep off political and national governance issues. This mostly occurs when religious leaders speak on matters of public concern and more so against the excesses of the rulers (Nyaundi, 1999). Religious bodies, as part of the civil society should continue to challenge the government of the day to ensure that citizens are served well. This is in consonance with their mandate to ensure that justice is served to the people by those mandated with the responsibility.

### **2.3 Inter-Religious Dialogue and Religious Diplomacy**

Inter-religious dialogue also referred to as interfaith dialogue involves people from different religious faiths coming to a common understanding and respect which allows them to co-exist and cooperate with each other despite their different religious orientations (Forde, 7). The term is used to refer to cooperative and positive interactions between people of different religious traditions. This interaction may either be at the individual or group levels. In Inter-religious dialogues, one can remain true to his or her faith while respecting the rights of others to practice their own faith with dignity and without interruption (Forde, 7). Inter-religious dialogue hence becomes a key ingredient and resource for cohesive and integrated societies not only in Kenya but also in other contexts with multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies around the globe.

Inter-religious dialogue is process that has become necessary both in Africa and other regions like Western Europe, North America and Middle East. Although Europe and North America are traditionally Christian contexts (Faruqi and Sopher, 1974), there has been gradual growth of Muslim populations and indeed people of other religious faiths. In that case, Christianity remains the majority religion but living alongside significant minorities from other religious orientations. In the Middle East and indeed other parts of Asia such as the Far East, the Christian population has been experiencing growth amidst the dominance of Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism (Faruqi and Sopher, 1974). In that case, inter-religious dialogue becomes a major necessity to promote harmonious co-existence between communities from diverse religious backgrounds.



The need of an ongoing interreligious dialogue was underlined by the address by Pope Benedict XVI to ambassadors from Muslim Countries in 2006 when he said in part, “Inter-religious and inter-cultural dialogue between Christians and Muslims cannot be reduced to an optional extra. It is, in fact, a vital necessity, on which in large measure our future depends” (Pope Benedict XVI n.d). The importance of Christian-Muslim dialogue is further highlighted through the letter signed by about 140 Muslim Scholars and leaders from across the Muslim world and it partly stated,

Muslims and Christians together make up over half the world’s population. Without peace and justice between these two religious’ communities, there can be no meaningful peace in the world. The future of the world depends on peace between Muslims and Christians (Forde, p.8).

The above words uttered and affirmed by leaders of the two major world religions is a prove of the value leaders from both sides attach to inter-religious dialogues. It is further a call upon leaders from the two religions to address the frequent polarization occasioned by wars, injustices and persecutions perpetrated by groups or individuals. The leaders are aware of the many occasions’ members of the two religious convictions have come into a crossfire which have led to devastation on communities. In accommodating dialogue among religious communities, the leaders positively affirm the resourcefulness of the same in ensuring cohesive and integrated communities in otherwise volatile places.

Religious diplomacy and interreligious dialogues can take different shapes depending on the context and the matters under contestation. Faith based diplomacy has been utilized as a resource for peace for many years now. At the formal level, this may be seen to have gained prominence in the 1980s and 1990s (Scheffler, 2003). Religious diplomacy and

Interreligious dialogues have partially been inspired through the success stories of religious figures who played key roles in effecting smooth regime transition in volatile countries like Poland, East Germany and Philippines.

Further the success stories in reconciliation by faith-based groups such as the community of *Sant Egidio* in Mozambique and the role of religious dignitaries such as Desmond Tutu in establishing the Truth Commission in South Africa adds weight to the claims (Scheffler, 2003). Scheffler further opines that faith-based peace activism has been morally encouraged by the Nobel Peace Prize Committee which has awarded the Nobel Prize to religious leaders from across the religious spectrum.

From a casual observation, inter-religious dialogue may be viewed as a preserve of scholars from the West and more so those from the United States. When viewed from such a perspective, it would look inapplicable in places like the Middle East and other non-western parts of the world with competing religious interests. But as Scheffler asserts, many of the related (religious) peace promoting activities are taking place in the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean” (p,4). He attributes the presence of religious diplomacy in the region to the historical reality of the Middle East being the origin of the three Abrahamic and monotheistic world religions. The region has also been characterized by a heritage of conflicts and contested memorial landscapes (Scheffler, 2003). A key hall mark of religious diplomacy birthed through a process of interreligious dialogue is the Alexandria Declaration signed in 2002 by a dozens of senior Christian, Muslim and Jewish leaders from the Holy Land. The leaders pledged themselves to work together for a just and lasting peace (<https://www.usip.org>).

Kenya is a nation of diverse cultures and religions. There are forty-two commonly recognized ethnic groups and two major religions; Christianity and Islam. Though this diversity is a demonstration of God's wisdom, it has occasionally been manipulated to become a source of conflict in the society. The holding of different cultures and profession of different faiths has on many occasions challenged the harmonious co-existence of different religious and ethnic groups. Conflict on religious matters is mostly caused by ignorance on the other religion by the opposing religious camp (Mutahi, 2007).

As noted earlier in this work, religious tensions have not been absent in Kenya. It is both a historical and a present reality (Kahumbi, 1995). While the scenario may not be as severe as it is in other countries such as Nigeria and Central Africa Republic, the problem is a reality in Kenya, leading to a negative contribution in enhancing a cohesive and integrated state.

Religious communities have in various ways been involved in the mitigation of real and potential religious conflicts. Both the Christian and Muslim leaders and organizations have come together to dialogue on peaceful co-existence. Following the gruesome Westgate mall attack in September 2015, Christian and Muslim leaders in Mombasa came together to issue a joint statement which unreservedly condemned the act. The leaders from the two faiths denounced the Islamist group and made it clear that the indiscriminate attack of civilians was unacceptable in Islam or any other religion. The condemnation of the Al-Shabab attacks from both Christian and Muslim leadership eased the rising tensions between Christians and Muslims (Kahumbi, 2016).

The Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) is an organization that has been at the center of inter-religious dialogue in Kenya for several years and it is the one that facilitated the

joint statement mentioned above. The organization is a coalition of all faith communities in Kenya working together to deepen interfaith dialogue and collaboration for common action. According to the information gleaned from the IRCK website ([interreligiouscouncil.or.ke](http://interreligiouscouncil.or.ke)), “IRCK exists to promote inter-faith fellowship, inter-religious dialogue and sharing of values for a peaceful and just Kenya society”. The organization encourages and supports religious communities in Kenya to discern areas of convergence in their respective faith traditions and moral commitments to build a peaceful Kenyan society (Mutubwa, 2014). Such a broad approach to interaction of people of diverse backgrounds has great potential of building a cohesive and integrated nation. In that sense IRCK would be seen to make great contribution in the agenda. It also reveals some level of cooperation by a broad spectrum of religious entities to promote unity in the country.

Besides the national forums for inter-religious dialogues, there are grassroots efforts undertaken by local religious leaders and organizations. Leaders at the grassroots have over the years responded to issues of co-existence arising from time to time. Some of the issues addressed in these grassroots forums are the occasional negative and erroneous stereotypes expressed by members of one religion to those of a different religion (Gecaga, 2007). For example, in 2012 several leaders drawn from Christian denominations came together in Wajir to discuss public rhetoric about Islam and encouraged a more respectful, positive dialogue with Muslims in the District. The leaders had convened the forum in response to the controversial anti-Islam film “Innocence of Muslims” which had sparked violent protests in several Muslim-majority countries. Such initiatives though localized have enabled peaceful co-existence that obviously contributes to the national efforts of a cohesive and integrated society.

Another organization working on regional level in Inter-religious dialogue is the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) with its history intertwined with the work of Coast Peace Initiative (CPI). After the 1997 Likoni clashes, Coast Peace Initiative (CPI), a local civil society network was formed to coordinate relief and other support mechanism for the victims. The government efforts were not usually freely appreciated by the local communities as they were perceived to be partisan and the efforts of the civil society on their own could not contain the situation either (CICC website, 2014).

One of the lessons learnt therefore was that the people had strong faith and trust in the voices of their religious leaders. Hence CPI organized consultative meetings with top religious' leaders in the region to intervene. The religious leaders intervened through fact finding missions to the clash zones after which their reports were shared with the government and appropriate measures put in place to resolve conflict. Because of their successful intervention, Coast Peace Initiative (CPI) appreciated the efforts of religious leaders in promotion of cohesion amidst the social tensions. This led to the formation of an inter-religious council known as Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics (CICC) on September 11<sup>th</sup>, 2001 with the aim of promoting enduring peace in the Coast region (WFDD, 2016: Akiwumi *et al*, 1999).

The Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics has ever since been in the fore-front in bringing better understanding of inter-religious relations among the people living at the Kenya Coastal region. The importance of CICC existence in this region was highly felt during the 2007/2008 nationwide tensions which arose due to the disputed presidential election results. The council was able to preach peace in an organized manner resulting to less tension in the

Coast region as compared to other parts of the country (CICC website, 2014). The council can therefore be said to have made positive steps towards a cohesive and integrated societies in the coastal region.

The CICC Trust supports Inter-Religious Dialogue and engagement between members of different faiths and is committed to building bridges because they appreciate the fact that, different faith communities can learn from each other. Specifically, CICC has been working on educating the common Kenyans about inter-religious dialogue, increasing understanding and respect among people of different faiths, and fostering cooperation among local faith communities to solve common community problems (CICC Strategic Plan 2016-2021). All these are aspects if well harnessed have a great potential of building cohesive and integrated society both at the local and the national level. Nevertheless, it is not clear on how the local efforts by CICC have been magnified to impact cohesion and integration at the national level.

As part of Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics Trust mandate to capacity build its members and clerics in general, CICC has partnered with Global Ministries University (GMU) to offer a course in Inter-Religious understanding. The proposed three-year online Degree program will be offered in collaboration with a Local University to offer an Undergraduate Degree in Inter-Religious Studies. The purpose of the program is to build Interfaith understanding among the participants and to strengthen Inter-Religious and Cross-Cultural communications skills (CICC website, 2014). Such a program would greatly enhance a cohesive and integrated nation and possibly reduce the levels of suspicion and misunderstandings demonstrated by members of Christian and Islam.

## **2.4 Religion in Cohesion and Integration Globally**

Cohesion and integration is not only a challenge in Africa and other parts of the developing world. It is also an issue that disturbs the west and other developed nations. This section will look at some western contexts to represent multicultural democracies in the west and look at how the regions have negotiated towards achieving cohesive and integrated societies. Canada qualifies in such a review owing to its high Muslim populations and a history of tension relating to the threatened secession of Quebec province. The political system in Canada is organized along ten federal provinces and three regions (Doern, 2013).

Canada is described as an ethnically and religiously diverse society, encompassing a wide range of beliefs and customs (Scott, 2012; Moon, 2008). Canada was originally founded, not as a partnership of several states, like it is the case of the United States, but as a union of two peoples, one of British heritage and the other of French. The former is the majority in all the states except in Quebec; the latter, in turn, are chronically fearful of losing their identity. Ethnic, linguistic and religious tensions have made the union an occasionally stormy one. A referendum for Quebec secession was held in 1995 but ended up narrowly in favor of a united Canada (Schmid, 2001; Betz & Stefan, 1998).

The practice of religion in Canada is presently considered a private affair though many citizens still believe in God. According to the 2011 Census, 67.3% of Canadians identified themselves as Christians while the remaining 8.8% of religious population is affiliated with non-Christian religions. Islam forms a big chunk of the non-Christian religious population with a total percentage of 3.2%. Coming second in terms of religious affiliation, Islam

henceforth becomes a key consideration in Canadian affairs (GoC, 2013). Some of the social affairs would include the role Islam play in maintaining order and stability in the otherwise highly multi-ethnic society.

Evidently, compared to most other countries and especially in the West, Canada has been less affected by global surge in anti-Muslim sentiments and by resulting polarization of ethnic relations along this line (Adams, 2007). Canadian Muslims have to a good extent integrated with Canadian mainstream. Nevertheless, tension is not completely absent as a considerable percentage of non-Muslims are inclined to a forced adaptation of Muslims to western civilization. Furthermore, studies reveal that approximately 40% of Muslims in Canada believe that non-Muslim Canadians have a negative impression on Islam. The same percentage of non-Muslim Canadians has a general negative impression on Islam (Adams, 2009). These kinds of feelings on either side are likely to result to religious and ethnic tensions whenever the environment is conducive.

The structure of ethnic group relations and the bi-communal nature of Canada often present potential conflict along ethnic lines. The potential of conflict is specifically higher in the francophone Quebec with persistent desire for separation from the rest of Canada (Ghai, 2000). The agitation for cessation and the resulting ethnic conflict in Quebec began in 1982 when Canada adopted a new constitution that Quebec refused to immediately adopt out of fear it would be swallowed up in a more centralized Canada. The autonomy calls were championed through the *Front de Liberation du Quebec* which frequently adopted terror like tactics in advancing their grievances (Ghai, 2000).



The federal province of Quebec, though dominantly francophone have native minority groups who could still desire to remain in Canada. Such native groups would obviously expect the Canadian government to protect them from forceful incorporation within Quebec and perhaps some of them willing to employ violence in their effort to remain independent of a new country (Schmitt, 1997). Such a scenario obviously presents a recipe for violence if Quebec is granted autonomy.

Much of the available literature documents how Muslim immigrants have integrated into the Canadian mainstream but less on how Islam has played a role on this integration and progressive building of a cohesive society. There is not much mention of Islam or any other religion in mitigating the otherwise volatile situation in Canada and more specifically in the potentially explosive Quebec. May be such an anomaly may have been occasioned by the treatment of religion as a purely private affair. As it is the case in many other parts of the world, the religious capacity in building cohesive societies seems to have been untapped and overlooked. This seems to be the same case in Kenya whereby the potential resourcefulness of Islam in national cohesion and integration is marginal.

Another region that needs mention in this review is the situation in the Balkans. The conflicts in this region during the breakup of former Yugoslavia and afterwards were mostly ethnic but with some religious dimensions. Much progress has been achieved towards the attainment of stability in the territory of former Yugoslavia as the various wars and conflicts that afflicted the region over the last two and half decades have diminished (Sterland and Beauclerk, 2008). However deep-seated divisions, mutual mistrust and fear have been a reality of the region's populations even in the post war period. These fears are based upon

perceptions of ethnic, cultural and religious differences and the sense of injustice and wrongs suffered during the past conflicts. Continuing antagonisms between ethnic and national communities are compounded by various forms of institutional segregation, territorial isolation and nationalistic political prejudice (Sterland and Beauclerk, 2008). Throughout the region generally, different ethnic and national communities tend to be isolated geographically, occupying separate spaces in urban environments and different villages in the country. Cohesion and integration at national levels is still far from being achieved. Over the years, there has been little social contact between national communities and employment opportunities largely remain structured according to ethnic or religious background of the populations (Goodwin, 2006).

For all the major ethno-national populations of former Yugoslavia, religion forms a major part of national identity. Communities in the region are very conscious not only for their ethnic identities but also religious recognition. Consequently, religion in the Balkans has been indispensable to the growth of nationalism and accompanying hostility between neighboring national groups. In the Balkans, religious affiliation and institutions are much important political subjects. With the possible exception of the Kosovan Albanians, for whom religion is not a core factor in national identity, religion has played a stellar role in the populist nationalist-oriented state-building projects occasioned by the break-up of former Yugoslavia (Kordic, 2010; Perica, 2002).

As noted earlier, in the post-conflict period across the Balkan region, all countries have made major advances in establishing security, stability and economic development. However, peace across the region remains fragile with the regions various populations

remaining largely un-reconciled. Furthermore, “the healing process of coming into terms with the past, or revealing and accepting the truths, forgiving and being forgiven is yet to be fully realized” (Sterland and Beauclerk, 2008). It is in the post conflict national cohesion and integration activities that religious bodies would be expected to come in strongly alongside other players from the civil society. Many commentators feel that the efforts of religious bodies have been marginal.

In a report on the proceedings of an inter-religious conference in 2002, Paul Mojzes remarked that peacemaking or peace building by major religions in the post-conflict Balkans was marginal compared to the peacekeeping activities by the international security forces (Mojzes, 2002). Such a view was confirmed years later by (Sterland and Beauclerk, 2008) in stating,

There are remarkably few faith-based or faith-led peace building initiatives being carried out in the Balkans. With rare exceptions, the contribution of official church channels to peace building in the Balkans has been disappointing. Political interests rather than spiritual concerns have prevailed affecting credibility and preventing faith communities from taking full advantage of their own freedom from the constraints of the communist era (p. iii).

The analysis by Sterland and Beauclerk (2008) does not directly mention the failure or the success of Islam religion in peace building and related activities. In the absence of documentation to prove otherwise, it would be assumed that the bracket failure of religion includes the church as well as Islam.

In the mid and late 2000s, the most prominent attempts at stimulating inter-faith dialogue in former Yugoslavia was through enlisting the support and active participation of the key leaders from the major religious communities. This was aimed at establishing institutional

means of creating inter-faith cooperation and dialogue which would create wider pressure for peace in the society. Specifically, there were attempts to create formal inter-religious councils first in Herzegovina and Bosnia and then in Kosovo and Macedonia (Merdjanova and Brodeur, 2009). The attempts were done under the leadership of the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP), an American-run coalition of world religions. The experience of the IRCs in the region no doubt is mixed. At some point, the IRCs were effective with their members showing leadership in speaking with one voice against conflict and violence. This illustrated the importance of religious hierarchies for interfaith dialogue and the promotion of peace. However, far too often, religious leaders have demonstrated their unwillingness or inability for fruitful cooperation. This is to a large extent due to political constraints within their own communities to participate in substantial form of cooperation (Sterland and Beauclerk, 2008).

Such a scenario has not been absent in conflict zones Africa and in Kenya. The cooperation of religious actors in promoting harmony among communities is normally constrained with various religious groupings aligning themselves to competing political wings. This is mostly motivated by the desire of the religious groups in question to secure strategic political positions for their ethnic communities or religions. In such an atmosphere, religious groups cease to be resources for harmonious co-existence and become agents of communal tension and competition. Consequently, mutual relations between diverse communities are snapped as passions are negatively aroused.

As a way of summary on the Balkans scenario, it is fair to acknowledge the contribution of individual religious personalities and faith-based institutions in the healing of post-conflict

societies in the nations arising from the break-up of former Yugoslavia. From another perspective and in other contexts, religion in its complexity and diversity has evidently been visible in generating conflict and obstruction of post war recovery than in promoting cohesion and integration in post conflict Balkan communities. Yet, it is fair to note efforts by bold leaders who participated positively at personal level and in the interfaith dialogue frameworks alongside other actors to promote healing and reconciliation. Yet as it is the case in Kenya, religious institutions and more so Islam do not seem to play a prominent role in the ongoing efforts to build cohesive and integrated society in the nations that were formed from former Yugoslavia. Yet occasional tensions persist in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and elsewhere with obvious geopolitical interests from other western nations. The fault lines of the uneasy peace partially realized following the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995 are both religious and ethno-territorial, owing to the population mix of the former united Yugoslavia.

## **2.5 The Role of Religion in Cohesion and Integration in Africa**

Since the Second World War, most of the conflicts witnessed around the globe have been more intrastate than interstate (Durbin, 2008). The causes of these conflicts have ranged from resource grievances to ethnically based political competition especially in Africa (Woodhouse and Duffey, 2008; Durbin, 2008). Religious related conflicts have also been perpetrated under the cover of other grievances in various regions around the globe. The conflict which eventually led to the breakup of former Yugoslavia as already highlighted in the previous section had some religious elements though the major driver was not religion.

In Africa, inter-ethnic and resource-based conflicts have been more glaring and as a result they have overshadowed religious conflicts (Durbin, 2008). This does not mean that religion has not been used in Africa as a nest of breeding bloody conflict. Indeed, religion in many instances is clearly an extension of ethnic identity and a tool of bargaining for resources, search of political dominance and freedom. Hence ethnicity and religious intolerance are closely related in some parts of Africa (Smyth and Robinson, 2001; Appleby, 2000). Such interplay between religion and ethnicity has been a key factor in Nigerian conflicts over the years (Busari, 2014).

Following the Berlin partition of Africa, the area now called Nigeria and Southern Cameroon fell in the hands of the British. In 1903, the British divided the nation into North and South protectorates and the colony of Lagos. In 1906, the Lagos colony was amalgamated with the Southern protectorate to make the Southern Protectorate. Nigeria evolved as a nation when the Southern and the Northern protectorates were amalgamated in 1914 by Lord Fredrick Lugard who also became the first Governor General of Nigeria (Mbachirin, 2006). As it was in other parts of the continent, the amalgamation brought together various ethnic groups with distinctive traditions, histories, religions and cultures and from diverse racial backgrounds. In most occasions, these groups were not compatible to act as members of one nation state (Nnoli, 1995). Owing to these dynamics and the political exploitation of the same, a cohesive and integrated Nigeria has over the years remained an elusive commodity.

As attested by many authors, Nigeria is usually characterized as a deeply divided society in which major political issues are vigorously and violently contested both along the complex

ethnic lines as well as across the sharp religious divide (Smyth and Robinson, 2001). However, it is always good to note that while ethnic and religious conflicts in Nigeria are two separate tensions, they are usually connected since specific ethnic groups tend to practice a certain religion (Huber, 2013). This is a fact confirmed by the assertion of Busari in stating, “The Civil war which was the bloodiest political crisis in Nigeria resulted from the massacre of about thirty thousand people from the Igbo ethnic group...although the crisis was ethnic in origin, the separatists maintained it had a religious character too” (p.54). Since independence in 1960, the social-political tensions in Nigeria have threatened its existence as a nation with constant agitation of secession by cultural-religious groups airing their grievances to the rulers of the day (Nnoli, 1995). These tensions are still in existence today, only that a new element of violence has emerged in form of terror groups such as Boko Haram.

Religion is a major factor that triggers violence in Nigeria (Lockard, 2008). The intensity of religious identity in Nigeria is one of the highest in the World. Most Nigerians are more likely to define themselves in terms of religion than any other parameter. Religious identities in the country are generally classified into three- Christian, Muslim and Traditional Religion. Out of the three, traditional religion is the least politically active (Osaghae and Suberu, 2005). The Christian-Muslim relation in Nigeria is a complex phenomenon always characterized with conflicts. In effect, Christian and Muslim identities have been the main stay of religious differentiation and conflict (Mbachirin, 2006). According to Lewis and Bratton (2000) Nigerian Muslims are more likely to evince a religious identity than Christians. To compound this deep religious identity is the deep mistrust which exists between the members of the two religions.

Given the glaring and the high levels of religious and ethnic divisions and conflicts in Nigeria, the question which may arise is the role played by various civil society groups including religious groups in cohesion and integration. Since the focus of this work is Islam, the religion will be given more attention. Just like it is the case in Kenya, there is a considerable literature gap on the role of Islam religion in cohesion and integration in Nigeria. Much of the literature available concentrates on religion being a driver of conflict than a resource in promoting a harmonious society. In some instances, the studies on Islam are on the generalized concept of peace building and conflict management.

The early Muslim societies and organizations in Nigeria were social in nature. Their priority mainly focused on forging a strong Islamic community. Unlike today, most of them had little to do with political issues. However, most of them turned political because they felt that politics was the best forum to address their grievances (Falola, 1998). Generally, Muslim organizations or movements were formed to reject western values, spread Islam, and in some instances, oppose Christianity. Some have majorly acted as agencies to deal with specific matters of Islamic interest, create and promote Islamic identity and fight for Islamic rights (Oneiyekan, 1988).

Three prominent Muslim organizations in Nigeria deserve a space in this review. *Jama'atu Nasri Islam* (JNI), Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA) and the Muslim Student Society (MSS) are some of the oldest and key Muslim organizations. JNI was founded by the Northern Muslim Intelligentsia immediately after independence in 1961. The premier of Northern Nigeria, the Sarduna of Sokoto, Alhaji Sir Ahmadu Bello used his political position and public funds to start and fund the organization shortly after independence in



1961. According to Onaiyekan (1998), Bello made a declaration to the effect that he would not agree to anything against the Islamic religion at the inauguration of the society. According to Mbachirin (2006), Bello had no problem with the destruction of other religions for the sake of Islam. JNI was from the onset closely associated with the Northern People Congress (NPC) and was funded through government and foreign financial support.

Much of the work of JNI has been geared towards increasing the religious consciousness of Muslims especially in Northern Nigeria. The agitation of an Islamic state has always been a divisive issue in the country, yet it is one of the mainstays of the organization. The organization, alongside other prominent Muslim organizations has been standing behind the debate, introduction and implementation of *sharia* in Nigeria. Such a desire is obviously dangerous and divisive in multi-religious contexts (Mbachirin, 2006).

The Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs (SCIA) was formed in 1973 in Kaduna and right from its formation it has been linked closely with Nigerian politics (Mbachirin, 2006; Falola, 1998). After its formation, the council succeeded in bringing on board other Muslim organizations including the JNI so as to front a common voice in matters affecting the Islamic community in the vast country. Among the objectives of SCIA is to spread the Islamic faith across the nation and even beyond, to bring different Muslim groups together to work for the common good of Islam and work as a bridge between these different groups, and to speak to the government with one united voice on Islamic matters (Mbachirin, 2006).

The Muslim Student Society (MSS) is perhaps one of the most radical Muslim organizations. It was founded in 1954 among Yoruba Muslim students and quickly

transformed into a national organization with strong political involvement (Mbacharin, 2006). Onaiyekan (1988) claims that the outfit has long been affiliated with the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY) which is supported and financed by Arab oil nations. The movement is known to be very radical, rejecting anything secular and has a dislike for the Nigerian Constitution. Their thirst for an ultimate achievement of an Islamic state is very strong. They leave no room for dialogue with other religious groups and are ready to employ violence to force their grievances. The student society has been found by many judicial commissions of enquiries to be involved in religious violence in the country. In the recent past, members of MSS have become extremely militant and are constantly involved in clashes with Christian fundamentalist groups on university campuses (Onaiyekan, 1998).

From the foregoing review, most of the major Muslim organizations work more towards either promoting and extending their religion or protecting it from external attacks and any form of aggression. It is rare to find a major Islamic organization lobbying for ethnic or religious harmony. Ordinarily, most of the prominent Islamic organizations are political in nature and spend much energy and resources placing the religion in a strategic position for political advantage. The rise and the growth of the problematic political Islam in Nigeria have flourished in this enabling environment. The agitation of *sharia* law, Nigeria's membership to the Organization of Islamic States (OIS) and attempts to make Nigeria an Islamic state is strongly embedded either directly or indirectly in their objectives. Lobbying for such matters in the multi-cultural setting as Nigeria make the Islam community to generally lose much of the moral authority in promoting cohesion and integration agenda in the country. This does not mean that there are no members and leaders of the religion who honestly lobby for a harmonious nation.

Sudan offers another important case study for interrogation on the past and the current role of religion in peacebuilding in the African region. Sudan, and especially the state of South Sudan is a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. This diversity has been a cause of conflict as well as a resource for peaceful and harmonious co-existence (Ali, 2006). The larger Sudan was at war for two decades and only restored to some level of calm in 2005 following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). The agreement was signed between the Government of Sudan (Northern) and representatives from South Sudan. The parties to the pact were National Congress Party (NCP) and Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). As it was provided in the Peace Agreement, a successful referendum on the self determination of Southern Sudan was held on January 2011.

Analysts have attempted to critically look at the multiple roles played by religion in conflict. Bason and Kartas observes that the role of religion differs according to a specific context (Bason and Kartas, 2010). In the larger Sudan, both the Northerners and the Southerners have previously utilized religion as a tool of unity at one point, and in other situations as an instrument of rallying for political motives. The North for instance has frequently applied Muslim and Arab cultural requirements for political and economic gains and Sharia law to maintain political legitimacy which endears them to the oil-rich states from the gulf (Nsubuga, 2015). Indeed, this could be seen as one of the factors that led to longstanding difference with the South which always resisted the imposition of Islamic principles in public governance. In the South, Christianity was applied as an antidote against the oppression and spread of Muslim and Arab culture. The mix of how religion was applied by

the Northerners on one hand and the Southerners on the other give credence to the claim that the conceptualization of the role of religion in conflict is context specific. The Northerners used it as a way of political domination whereas the Southerners applied it to propel their grievances. In such scenario, it becomes very difficult to absorb religion in the Sudan conflict and the consequent peacebuilding arithmetic.

Writing in the context of the Post-CPA agreement, Ali noted that various faith-based actors were actively involved national peace building process in Sudan. The activities of the faith-based organizations ranged from provision of relief services to political mediation. Faith actors generally, but not solely, saw themselves as providers of complementary support (Ali, 2006), perhaps considering the political parties and the international community as the primary actors in the implementation of the peace agreement.

During the pre-CPA period, the Catholic Church played a crucial and central political role in the Sudan peace process. Their areas of operation spread in Juba as well as in Khartoum, though with more networks in the South. Catholics leaders had managed to form a good working ties with leaders within SPLM and to lesser extent in the North (Ali, 2006). A Muslim group *Ansar Al-Mahdi* had also played an interesting role in the North-Based peacebuilding landscape. The organization is closely related to the *Umma* party, the largest opposition party in the North. For such an actor, there is obviously a delicate balancing expected between political ambitions of the religious leaders on one side and peacebuilding support on the other side (Ali, 2006).

But more fascinating in the Sudan case is what Appleby identify as potential spoilers in the peacebuilding process arising from the signing of the CPA. The Episcopal Church in Juba

was reported to have secretly encouraged aggression by Christians against Muslims in the South even as leaders portrayed a superficial support to the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Ali, 2006). Yet, the agreement provided for nondiscrimination of citizens based on religion and other social identities (CPA, 2005). From the Muslim side, The *Sufi Sammaiya Order* featured prominently as a critical player albeit behind the scenes. The group from the onset had particular emphasis on the negative consequence of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement depicting it as the usual manipulative tendencies of the Western powers. The Muslim group, with close relationship with the National Congress Party (NCP) of the North frequently cried foul of alleged discrimination of Muslims in the South over Christians (Ali, 2006). Such claims would obviously raise the honesty of the group and their commitment in the implementation of the agreement given the historical and the present political dominance of Muslims in the region. The memory and the role of the Muslim Brotherhood in the exclusionist politics of the North in 1980s give credence to the motives of such groupings in the current dispensation (Jok, 2007). In that case, religious groups could be seen to have hindered not only the implementation of the CPA, but also the growth of cohesive society of the newly formed nation states.

Overall, it is evident that religious actors, mostly aligned to Islam and the Church were at the time of the signing of CPA and afterwards closely intertwined with politics and politics were in turn deeply entrenched in the thinking of main religious players. Islam has been part of Sudan's political landscape since 14<sup>th</sup> Century with Christianity playing an active political role in South Sudan during the conflict and in the ongoing spell of state restoration. Faith-Based peacebuilding in Sudan has therefore been a lingering part of the political power game and cannot be ignored in future engagements.

In the post-referendum period, the focus has now shifted to maintaining the gains made both within South Sudan and her future relation with the North (Nnorom, n.d). Even in the post war period, Nnorom notes that there is need to strengthen the peacebuilding efforts so as to sustain a peaceful relation between the North and South given the shared history (Nnorom, n.d). Cohesion and integration efforts are also necessary for successful national building in the young and diverse nation of South Sudan. Sadly, conflict has persisted in the Darfur region while other parts of South Sudan have slipped back to war since 2013. In 2013, there was a bad fallout between President Salva Kiir and his Vice President Riek Machar (Nyadera, 2018).

In promoting peaceful relations, religious leaders draw their legitimacy both from the doctrine of their faith as well as corresponding trust from their followers. Scott Appleby states that “religious actors are people who have been formed by a religious community and who are acting with the intent to uphold, extend, or defend its values and precepts” (Appleby, 2000 p. 9). The legitimacy of the religious actors in the case of Sudan before the CPA was their presence among people during the most difficult period of war and providing basic supplies to the besieged communities.

Prior to the CPA Muslims played a prominent role in the governance of the united Sudan. In Khartoum, the goal of Islamizing the whole of Sudan had support from the Muslim leaders. Muslim leaders played central roles in the government of Al Bashir as officials and advisers and their support for the Islamization agenda was never in doubt (Ali, 2006). After the independence of the South, Christian leaders have played a crucial role in the governance of the South forming a vast web of power brokers as it is the case with Muslims in the North. To a good extent, Juba has in the past revealed an exclusive attitude towards the Muslims

after the CPA and the referendum which favored the self determination of the South. Consequently, the Muslim community in Juba and other parts of Southern Sudan feels neglected and discriminated (Ali, 2006). But a report in June 2019 by the United States Institute for Peace points to a high improvement on Christian-Muslim relations in Southern Sudan. The government led by President Salva Kiir has campaigned against any discrimination of those who profess Islam as their faith.

The build up to the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Sudan saw a great involvement of religious actors in peace processes. Wilson writing for the United Institute of Peace states, “this was not the first time that religious actors and religious institutions had an impact- either positive or negative on what became the independent country of South Sudan in 2011” (Wilson, 2011). This involvement of religious actors has been witnessed to a varying degree even in the current state of ethnic turmoil. Since the return of unrest in 2013 in Southern Sudan, religious actors in the country continues to play prominent roles in search for peace and in assisting the victims of war.

There is a wide range of documented evidence on how the church had been involved during the time of conflict, during the peace negotiation and in the post conflict transformation. The Catholic church founded a radio station in Juba to educate people using vernacular languages on the importance of peace. The aim of the radio is act as antidote to the popular view of retribution and revenge. To achieve this, the Catholic Church sponsored radio station offers an opportunity to the ordinary people to voice their views towards a peace action (Nnorom, n.d). The influence of media towards developing a certain worldview cannot be overemphasized. The Catholic church in this regards scores major points towards peacebuilding in the Post-Referendum South Sudan.

The United States Institute for Peace on the status of South Sudan list prominent religious leaders who have actually been actively involved in peace activism in the wake of the ongoing conflict in Southern Sudan. The names of Christian leaders mentioned includes Archbishop Paulino Lokudu, Bishop Paride Tabani, Bishop Edward Hiboro, Bishop Daniel Deng, Bishop Enock and Tombe. The report also positively mentions the role of South Sudan Council of Churches in peacebuilding, reconciliation and advocacy. Women religious leader who have not been specifically associated to a specific religion by the report are also mentioned as important players in the peacebuilding processes. (United States Institute for Peace, 2019).

The report also has a light mention of the involvement of Islam in peacebuilding in South Sudan. Juma Ali, the Presidential advisor on Islamic affairs is commended for his participation in the Addis Ababa peace process as well as offering humanitarian assistance of victims of the ongoing conflict in the country (United States Institute for Peace, 2019). Beyond Juma Ali and the participation of Muslim groups in Inter-faith committees, nothing more is said of the role Islam play in the ongoing conflict. Neither do we have as many names of Muslim leaders mentioned as it was the case with Christians and Bishops. This cast some doubts on the commitment of Muslims in Southern Sudan on promoting a united Southern Sudan. This scenario resembles the Kenyan situation whereby, there is little written on the role of Islam in promoting a cohesive and integrated society. Islam as a religion continues to come out as passive player, with only increased involvement in occasions when they are directly and exclusively affected, or when the reputation of Islam is at stake. Otherwise the question of missing documentation on the role of Islam in peacebuilding in different contexts continue to nag in the mind of keen observers.



Apart from Nigeria and Sudan, the role of Islam in mitigating conflicts and building cohesive and integrated societies in post conflict areas is missing. The Post-Apartheid South Africa hails the work of the Anglican Arch-Bishop Desmond Tutu but little on Islam in the Truth and Reconciliation process (Hugo, 2003). In Mozambique, the mediation work of the Catholic Community of *Sant' Egidio* is well documented yet the country has about 18% Muslim population (Haynes, 2009; Martin, 2004). Indeed, the case of Mozambique presents a historically disjointed Muslim population with little prospects for national cohesion and integration. Partly the experiences of Muslims on the hands of colonialists could be blamed for the lassitude.

Muslims in Mozambique were subjected to abuses after the establishment of colonial rule at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century (Bonate, 2010) This was a common pattern in most countries with Muslims in minority. Even when the marginalization was not direct, there were obvious neglect of development in Muslim dominated regions as it was the case in Kenya. In Mozambique, the abuse and the persecution were civil and religious in form and nature. For one, education was based on Christian values and more seriously with mandatory aspects of Catholicism. In such an environment, Muslim shunned the mission schools, and this may have contributed to bad blood between Christians and Muslims then and afterwards (Bonate, 2010). However, there is evidence of Muslims in Mozambique participating in the independence struggle alongside other citizens from other religions and especially the Catholic which is in majority. It is not possible to quantify the extent this contributed to cohesion and integration between the members of the two religions in the pre-independent and post-independent period.

It is likely that the internal rivalry between Muslim Organizations in the independent Mozambique, coupled with later treatment of religious groups by the government did not allow Islam to effectively participate in promoting a cohesive and integrated nation. Islam appears to have continued to be marginalized in the Post-Independent Mozambique as Bonate proposes, “Muslims suffered immensely when the *hajj* celebrations of the *Ramadan* and other Muslim holidays, collection of the monetary donations and rehabilitation of Mosques, and the functioning of the Quranic Schools were all forbidden (Bonate, 2009 p.587).

Following sustained pressure from Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia on the strict government stand on religious expression and programs, the government eased its stand towards Islam and religion in general. During the 1980s and 1990s, two Islam organizations, Islamic Council and Islamic Congress continued to compete with each other for the Frelimo Party and in effect for government patronage. Deductively, if Islam was this divided, it is improbable that it made great contributions for national cohesion and integration, for a country that experienced political upheavals for the better parts of 80s and 90s.

## **2.6 Pathways to National Cohesion and Integration Agenda in Kenya**

Since independence, one of the basic objectives of Kenyans leaders has been to build a national political community as a basis of maintaining state power (Ochieng and Ogot, 1995). This view is reinforced by Gecau (1999: 28) in stating, “Given the cleavages and conflicts that Kenya had gone through by the time of independence in 1963, it was understandable that the leaders sought to build a unified and stable nation”. In theory, Kenyatta tried to build a national political community which he said must include Kenyans

of all social and economic backgrounds. According to Ochieng and Ogot (1995), Kenyatta refused to classify Kenyans based on past history. He suggested that all fought for independence and the divisions of the past should be buried in order to build a new Kenya.

The national identity theory envisioned by the founding fathers does not seem to have materialized in the successive years. Instead, cultural and ethnic rivalries seem to have taken their positions, complicating any meaningful sense of nationhood. Furthermore, the Muslim communities at the Coast and Northeastern region have continuously felt left out and discriminated by the Christian dominated government (Africa Briefing, January 2012; Bakari and Yahya, 1995). Such a feeling of marginalization of the minority religious groups in national affairs is not unique with Kenya. It runs across many multi-religious societies in Africa where Islam is in minority. Ndenda (2009:123) laments that, “during the colonial period, Islam was treated with contempt because it had not originated from Euro-America”. This seems to confirm allegations from various scholarly quarters that Islam has not been accorded the same privileges as the church by the state. This would further have robbed it of involvement in national consolidation. This is one of the possible reasons why Islam seems to be missing in the cohesion and integration agenda which is led by an independent but state sponsored commission.

The erosion of a sense of nationhood and the increase of ethnic consciousness in Kenya has been a process rather than an event. The climax of the erosion was manifested through the unfortunate events of the 2007 and 2008 Post Election Violence, though there had been visible features of the vice during the previous multi-party general elections (Waki *et al*, 2008). Moreover, there has been other form of quiet social discrimination during the various

regimes of post-independence Kenya at times manifested in the skewed composition of civil service jobs and allocation of national resources (Jonyo, 2003). Such historical occurrences have continued to weaken the national fabric as sections of the Kenyan society feels more and more marginalized.

A remote history of social divisions in Kenya can be traced back to the colonial period. The Europeans in Kenya as it was the case in other parts of Africa used divide and rule tactics to colonize the natives (Nyukuri, 1997). These divide and rule strategies ended up polarizing Kenyans along their ethnic origins. To a large extent, the divide and rule strategy contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of the various ethnic groups as actors of one nation state even after independence (Ibid). The early political parties in Kenya that championed the nationalist struggle against the colonial establishment were basically distinct ethnic unions. Leaders in the agitation for self-rule formed parties around their ethnic conglomeration and as a result a common political voice became an elusive commodity (Diamond, 1966).

The late President Kenyatta assumed leadership as the first president of the independent Kenya when the people's hopes of an equal independent nation were very high. It was only possible for one person to ascend to the presidency though the struggle for independence was from across the social diversity. It is in records that, Oginga Odinga who was from the Luo community accepted to step aside and have Kenyatta who was older to become president (Ndegwa, 2006). Odinga became the first Vice President in 1964. The ideological difference between Kenyatta and Odinga made them part ways just a few years after independence (Ndegwa, 2006). Odinga lost both the post of Vice President and the Vice chairmanship of the ruling KANU during the Limuru party conference. The angry Odinga

reacted by forming an opposition political party, Kenya People's Union (KPU) on March 1966 (Ochieng and Ogot, 1995). The two political heavy-weights publicly traded accusations and counter accusations which partially became the genesis of the Luo-Kikuyu animosity.

This animosity was to be fueled further when Tom Mboya from the Luo community was assassinated in 1969, and suspicion fell on Kenyatta government as the assassin was believed to have been his agent. There were riots in Kisumu against Kenyatta later the same year when he went to open a hospital built with funds from Odinga's friends in Communist Russia. The presidential security guards shot at the rioters and many people largely from the Luo ethnic group were left dead (Ochieng', 1995). Owing to Kenyatta's ethnic origin, more tension of political nature developed between the Kikuyu and the Luo communities. From then onwards, Kenyatta never visited the area, and this became a key source of ethnic strife between the two communities. This unfortunate history is easily invoked when the two communities are in opposite sides of the political divide (Gecau, 1999). This was the case in 2007 whereby Kikuyus were killed in Kisumu and Luos were killed in Naivasha. However, the conflict also involved members of other communities and it was witnessed in other towns. Over the years, deep rooted ethnic divisions have continued to manifest not only in the political governance but also in the day to day lives of ordinary Kenyans.

Ethnic and religious related tensions with political roots have been a major historical occurrence in Kenya. In the last few years, the North-Eastern part of the country has been hit with ethnic and clan-based conflicts. There has been a perennial conflict between the Garreh and the Degodia clans in Mandera County (Human Rights Watch, 2013). These divisions

between the two communities have continued to undermine the peaceful co-existence as each group competes for political and economic influence (Alio, 2012). The relationship between the Garreh and the Degodia has had political undertones linked to the ongoing devolution process in Kenya and the outcome of the March 2013 General Elections. Surprisingly, the violence in the region has also taken cross-border dimension with relatives in Ethiopia of both communities engaging in retaliatory attacks in support of their kin in Kenya (Human Rights Watch, 2013). This is a clear and a sad illustration of the ethnic hatred demonstrated by communities in the country. Nationhood is given a backseat for ethnic expediency.

According to some studies, terror related activities in the recent past have heightened the level of suspicion between Christians and Muslims in Kenya. In reporting the deteriorating relationships, Aden states, “terrorism is straining the relations between Muslims and Christians in Kenya and increasing the level of mistrust and mutual suspicions between the two groups” (Aden, 2012 p.1). The government has on numerous occasions been blamed for unfairly targeting the adherent of Islam in the war against terror.

The current pursuit of cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya was mostly provoked by the events of 2007/2008 Post Election Violence. Previously, the successive governments had attempted to promote national cohesion and integration using various means. Some of the measures undertaken by the government to promote cohesion and integration since 1963 includes: The independent day celebrations, five-year national development plans, District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD), Session paper No 10 of 1965 on African Socialism and the application to Kenya’s economic development (NCIC, 2011). These measures were

effective to some extent, but they seem to have lacked some fundamental social-political aspects. The same governments which came up with these strategies have also been accused of doing things which promoted negative practices such as negative ethnicity, nepotism, ethnization of the civil service jobs and social inequalities (Nyukuri, 1997). As a result, a cohesive and well-integrated Kenyan society has not been fully achieved.

The Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV) led by Justice Philip Waki was formed in the aftermath of the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence. The Commission was formed following the signing of the National Peace Accord brokered by the international community led by Kofi Annan during the national dialogue and reconciliation process (Sihanya and Okello, 2010). Further, Agenda number 4 of the National Peace Accord (NPA) focused on the consolidation of the national cohesion and unity. The agenda set in motion the institutionalization of national healing, reconciliation, cohesion and integration (NCIC, 2011). The role of religion, and more so Islam was conspicuously missing in form and composition in both the Waki Commission and the broader national cohesion and integration agenda.

Under the government of national unity, the ministry of Justice and Constitutional affairs was expanded to accommodate the national cohesion aspect. The department of national cohesion was operationalized in September 2009 to help realize the added mandate in the ministry. Prior to the creation of this department, a National Cohesion and Integration Act (2008) had already been enacted leading to the formation of the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). The commission was formed as one of the major strategies of promoting cohesion and integration among communities in the country (NCIC, 2011).

This commission would form the framework from which other institutions working toward the same would operate. One of these institutions is Faith Based Organizations, Islamic religion being one of them. Islam is the second largest religion in the country and its contribution to the agenda is deemed key (GoK, 2014). For ease of putting the analysis into context, the next section offers a general overview of the origin and development of Islam.

## **2.7 An Overview of Islam**

There is limited understanding of Islam among many people in Kenya (Kahumbi, 1995). This may be attributed to the fact that Islam only commands a following of around 11% nationwide. Secondly, Islam is not a mandatory subject in primary and secondary schools in the education system. This situation makes a brief overview of the religion important in this work. The word Islam is derived from the Arabic root “SLM” which means among other things, peace, purity, submission and obedience. In the religious sense the word Islam means submission to the will of *Allah* and obedience to His law (Abdalati, 1998). The nexus between the original and the religious meaning give rise to the implication that, true peace and joy can only be derived from submission to the will of *Allah* and obeying His Law (Abdalati, 1998).

Islam has been a religion and world power for more than 1300 years (Nehls and Walter, 2009). Yet the West only started focusing on Islam in recent times. As Nehls and Walter (2009) observes, the West hardly gave Islam space and attention in its history and media. Further they note that the religion has gone through times of glory and growth as well as moments of decay and recession. However, this scenario of blackout by the West to Islam



has changed dramatically in the last few decades. This has been occasioned by global migration, the resurgence of political Islam and the variously interpreted acts of violence associated with Muslims in places like Pakistan, Nigeria and Indonesia. The attacks first on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 and then on the World Trade Centre (WTC) and Pentagon in America in September 2001 warned the West that Islam is a force to reckon with (Nehls and Walter, 2009).

The history of Islam is closely intertwined with the life of Prophet Muhammad Ibn Abdullah, who was born at Mecca in the Banu Hashim clan of the Qarish tribe in approximately 570 AD (Quraishy, 1998; Rippin, 1996). By the time he died at the age of sixty-two, he had brought into existence a very vibrant movement that would carry Islam through the centuries and across nations in the world. The movement would give birth to empires which would impact the cultural, economic and political aspects of many societies around the globe (Durbin, 2008; Riddell and Cotterell, 2003).

Islam as a religion arose in Arabia with what Muslims believe to be a series of revelations to Prophet Muhammad. According to Islam, the revelations were from the one and only true God and were conveyed to Prophet Muhammad by angel Gabriel and are recorded in the Qur'an (Balyuzi, 2002). Although true Muslims believes in all scriptures and revelations of God, the only authentic and complete book of God in existence today is the Qur'an (Abdalati, 1998). The Qur'an is the primary source of Islam and is held in high regard by Muslims. Muslims strongly believe that these revelations given to the greatest and last in the chain of prophets stretching from Abraham through Jesus completes the message of God to humanity (Rippin, 1990).

Another source of Islam is *Hadith*. The source recounts Prophet Muhammad sayings and deeds as recorded by his companions in their reports. *Hadith* literature and its various branches of science is the richest source for the study of early Islamic history. It is a resource to help understand the legal, cultural and religious ideas of those early centuries (Abdalla and Ondigo, 2008). In the *Hadith*, a Muslim seeks guidance for his lifestyle which must be according to that of Prophet Mohammed during his life on earth (Madelung and Farhad, 2008). Muslims consider Prophet Muhammad's life to have been inspired and emulating it therefore is the best way to please *Allah* (Nehls and Walter, 2009).

Another key element of Islam is the *Sharia'h*, the code of law derived from the Qur'an and *Hadith*. *Sharia'h* is considered in Islam to be the religious evaluation and regulations of all affairs of life. Not only does the *Sharia'h* cover the personal, family and devotional life of an individual Muslim, but it lays down how an Islamic state should be governed (Durbin, 2008; Riddell and Cotterell, 2003). Nehls and Walter (2009) further notes that while Islamic justice has been practiced from the beginning on the premise established by Prophet Muhammad in Qur'an and *Hadith*, the establishment of *Sharia'h* was not systematic until 150-200 years following the death of Prophet Muhammad. It is during this period that the four law schools compiled their respective versions. The four schools are *Hanaffiyya*, *Malikiyya*, *Shafiyya* and *Hanbaliyya* schools of religious law. Each of the school has regulations that relate worship, prohibitions, and all contracts and obligations that arise in a Muslim social life such as inheritance, marriage, divorce, punishment, conduct of war and the administration of the state (Rippin, 1990).

Islam is divided into two main branches, Sunni and Shia'h though a lot more sects have arisen from the two branches over the centuries (Morin, 2007). Sunnis hold that Abu Bakr, Prophet Muhammad's father in law was the Prophet's rightful successor. Further, Sunnis held that the method of choosing leaders endorsed by the Qur'an was the consensus of the Muslim community, also called the *Umma* (Alio, 2014). Shia Muslims on the other side hold that Prophet Muhammad had divinely ordained his cousin and son-in-law Ali Talib in accordance with the command of God to be the next caliph, making Ali and his direct descendants Prophet Muhammad successors (Alio, 2014). Sunni Muslims make up most worlds Muslims commanding a following of between 87% and 90%. Significant populations of Shia Muslims are found in Iran, Iraq, Bahrain, and Azerbaijan with minority communities in Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Oman, Pakistan, India, Afghanistan, Kenya and other parts of East Africa and the rest of the world (Connie and Sandra, 2010).

The historical background of the Sunni-Shia'h split lies in the schism that occurred when Prophet Muhammad died in 632 AD. A succession dispute ensued leading to the battle of Siffin. As the battle intensified, Hussein Ibn Ali and his family were killed by the Umayyad Caliph. The outcry for revenge ultimately led to the split of the early Islamic community. Today there are differences in religious practices, traditions, and customs between Sunni and Shia'h Muslims (Durbin 2008; Rippin, 1990). Although all Muslim groups consider the Qur'an divine, Sunni and Shia'h hold differing opinions on the *hadith*. Over the years, Sunni and Shia'h relations have been characterized by both cooperation and conflict (Rippin, 1990). Outside the Middle East and North Africa, the distinction between the Sunni and Shia'ih is more blurred, more so in religious activities (Pew Research Centre, 2012). Sunni Islam dominated East African region for long time because those who came to preach Islam

along East Africa's coastal lines were Sunnis from Yemen, Iraq, Oman, Somalia and Southern parts in Arabian Peninsula. In Kenya, just like it is the case in other parts of Africa, the Sunnis are the majority of the Muslim populace. The Shia'h Muslim sect is an existing minority which is felt through development initiatives such as the Agha Khan Development Network and the Bilal Muslim Mission (Alio, 2014).

Islam is a total way of life in which religion and politics form a whole and this is understood to be divinely willed (McGarry, 2009). This means that Islam defines a code of conduct in all aspects of life to its adherents. For many Muslims in most places, a good government would be one guided by moral principles of their faith. In most cases this does not necessarily translate into a desire for a clerical rule and the abolishment of a secular state (Appleby and Marty, 1994). While such a view may be accurate in places like North Africa, Nigeria and Middle East, this is not the case in East Africa and specifically in Kenya. There seems to be a great dichotomy of religion and other aspects of life among many Muslims in the country. This perhaps explains why the call for the application of *Sharia'h* law in Kenya has been less enthusiastic as compared to other countries like Nigeria and Sudan.

Muslims hold Prophet Muhammad in highest esteem. He is their beloved prophet and the messenger of God who received God's final revelation to his people (Shenk, 2006). When he preached to his people, he was sure that he was speaking on behalf of the one true God and willingly risked his life to proclaim what he believed to be true. Muslims hold that Prophet Muhammad led his people out of the practice of idolatry which was much prevalent among the Arab people (Morin, 2007). Muslims authors hail Prophet Muhammad for his

diplomatic ability, and hence a role model to Muslim faithful around the world. Labdo (2010) states that,

Even before the dawn of his prophetic mission, Prophet Muhammad had displayed great diplomatic ability and capacity to resolve disputes peacefully and affect reconciliation between mutually antagonistic people. A notable example is the serious dispute which broke out between Arab chieftains when the Quraish leaders rebuilt the Holy Sanctuary of *Ka'aba*. The dispute arose as a result of disagreement on whom among the Arab tribal leaders would have the honor of putting the black stone (*Hajar al-Aswad*) in its place. The dispute was so serious that war seemed imminent. The prophet who was then a young man of 35, was able to solve this stalemate to the satisfaction of all when he placed the stone on his garment and asked each tribal leader to hold a tip of the garment and they carried it together. On reaching its designated location, he lifted the stone with his own hands and put it in place. Thus, he cleared a potentially explosive situation which could have degenerated into a bloody war with devastating consequences.

Another illustration is also given to support the diplomatic prowess of Prophet Muhammad and perhaps the model and precedence he intended to set for other Muslim leaders after him,

Another important example is the famous treaty of *Hudaibiyyah*, in the 6<sup>th</sup> year after Hijra. The Prophet had gone to Makkah with his companions intending to perform *Umrah* (a lesser Hajj). Makkan authorities thought that he had come to conquer the city and they prepared for war. Tempers flared when the Muslims realized that the pagan Quraish leaders would not allow them to enter the city and observe their rites. There were heated negotiations which resulted in a treaty that was unfair to Muslims because it imposed unfavorable conditions on them. Tensions rose high and danger was imminent but for the great restraint and statesmanship showed by the Prophet who was able to persuade the Muslims to accept the treaty. This treaty later proved to be a great victory for Islam (Labdo, 2010).

The above examples and perhaps many more of diplomatic gestures in the history are pointers to the positive contributions of Islam and Muslim leaders in working towards peaceful societies around the globe. We have witnessed an overwhelmingly large number of Muslim leaders coming out to condemn terror activities whenever they happen across the world. The <https://ing.org/global-condemnations-of-isis-isil> website documents world Muslim leaders condemning extremist ideological activities from ISIS/ISIL. The following is a sample of the headlines of condemnation listed in the website: Muslim leaders: “We shall not allow the extremists to define us”; Atlanta Muslim leaders on Orlando Shooter: He is not us; we are not him”; Muslim leaders wage theological battle, stoking ISIS anger; World’s largest Islamic organization tells ISIS to get lost; Muslim around the world condemn Paris attacks claimed by ISIS; World’s top Muslim leaders condemn attacks on Iraq Christians. The above headlines are enough evidence that a good section of the Muslim community around the globe is putting enough efforts to speak against terror activities by various extremist groups.

However, there remain questions on why some adherents and prominent Muslim leaders are caught wanting in championing the cause of peace while justifying their tendencies with the Holy Quran. These questions are beyond the normal Islamophobia across the world. According to 2006 data, Pew says that 46% of Nigerian Muslims, 29% of Jordanian Muslim, 28% of Egyptian Muslims, 15% of British Muslims, and 8% of American Muslims thought suicide bombings are often or sometimes justified. (Pew Research, May 20107). The figure was unchanged and American Muslims who held the same views were 8% by 2011 showing no signs of growth in alienation of extremism (Pew Research, 2011).

There are past and present figures who may be considered to hold fundamentalist and extreme understanding and practice of Jihad in Islam around the globe. They include Abd al-Wahhad (1703-1792), Sayyed Qutb (1907-1966), Abu'l A'la Mawdudi (1903-1979), Shukri Mustafa (1942-1978), Omar Abdul Rahman (from Egypt), Sheikh As'ad Bayoud, Dr. Abdalla Azzam and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. On his part, Sayyed Qutb was an Egyptian Muslim scholar who studied in United States, and after his return to Egypt in 1951 became a leading figure in the Muslim brothers. He was imprisoned in Egypt for Islamic activities in 1954; released in 1964; re-arrested in 1966 and condemned to death and executed the same year (Koylu, 2003; Sookhdeo, 2009). In Nigeria we have had Muslim leaders with extremist views such as Muhammadu Marwa Maitatsine who formed the foundation of the troublesome Boko Haram movement.

In the recent times in Kenya, Islamist fundamentalism has been a reality with the late Sheikh Abubakar Shariff and late Aboud Rogo Mohamed being key leaders. Both of them were killed in what was widely perceived as state orchestrated by the state to slow down the activism. Aboud Rogo in 1990s used to be a leading activist of the Islamic Party of Kenya (IPK) with a strong following in Mombasa and other regions with sizeable Muslim populations. At some point Rogo was arrested in connection with a suicide attack which was associated with Al Queda in November in 2002. Rogo was acquitted in 2005 after which he became a key figure in an emerging group of Muslim activists (Swaleh 2014; Ndzovu, 2013). Rogo consequently mobilized Muslim public opinion against Muslim politicians, religious leaders and scholars who held that Muslim interests would be addressed through the usual channels of democracy. Rogo and his accomplices alleged that Muslim interests in Kenya would not be sufficiently addressed. In that case Muslims needed to join the

defensive Jihad similar to the one taking place in countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan. Other Muslim preachers with similar outlooks which they expressed through sermon in Mosques were/are Samir Khan of Majengo in Mombasa, Hassan Mahad Omar of Eastleigh in Nairobi, and Ahmed Iman Ali of Pumwani Riyadha Mosque. The preachers have at different times of their activism drawn parallel between grievances of Muslims in Kenya and that at the global levels (Chome, 2019).

Abdalla and Ondigo (2008) list elimination of racism and promotion of religious tolerance as some of the achievements of Prophet Muhammad. According to them, Prophet Muhammad taught that all human beings descended from one parenthood and as such we are all equal in the sight of Allah. Consequently, our different languages and colors is not a reason to boast and look down in contempt and despise one another. These differences were given by God as a way of identifying each other and recognize the power of Allah in creating all these varieties (Abdalla & Ondigo, 2008). Abdalla and Ondigo further explain how Prophet Muhammad advised his followers to respect the people of other faiths and establish dialogue with them based on wisdom and appropriately tolerable arguments not ridiculing or insulting them.

Such an understanding to all Muslims would be a great foundation of peace between Muslims themselves and with people from other religious and cultural backgrounds. However, this situation is more ideal than real. Conflicts between Muslims and Christians in Kenya have been real, and this has necessitated inter-religious dialogues between the two faiths (Kamau, 2013; Nyaga, 2006). The inter-religious dialogues have at times gone a long way in reducing conflicts between the members of the two faiths. However, there are several



issues that have stood on the way towards a harmonious co-existence between the members of the two religions. At the center of these conflicts is the way some Biblical and Qur'anic texts are understood and publicly interpreted by preachers from the two religions. In addition, some Islamic *da'wah* (outreach), especially *mihadhra* has interrupted inter-religious harmony in Nairobi, Mombasa and other areas with sizeable followers of the two religions (Kamau, 2013). The forums at times provide opportunities for Muslim preachers to poke hole to doctrines and teachings of other religious groups especially Christianity. This obviously create some tensions between various religious communities in the country.

The recent terrorist attacks in Kenya by suspected members of *Al Shabaab* and the state spirited fight against terror has further complicated the harmonious co-existence of the two faiths. Muslims have felt unnecessarily targeted in the fight against terrorism by the Kenyan government. On the other hand, some Christians have developed a negative view of Islam by associating it with terrorism (Aden, 2016). At the center of this suspicion is the understanding of the word Jihad.

A consideration of the meaning of Jihad would be necessary in a study of Islam in national cohesion and integration especially in the current situation in Kenya. The word Jihad appears severally in the Quran most often with the expression of striving to serve the purposes of God on earth (Noorani, 2002). There is no agreeable definition on the meaning of Jihad among Muslims and scholars as the striving part is variously interpreted. Some of the Quranic verses which mentions or allude to Jihad are (Q 2:190-191; Q 2: 193; Q 2:216; Q 8:39; Q 8: 59-60; Q 9:29). But the term is defined as striving with one's self and one's

money in the cause of God in the following portions of the Quran (Q 49:15; Q 9:20; Q 9:88). This is the definition widely but not exclusively agreed by a wide section of Muslims.

According to Mandaville (2007), the term Jihad has multiple meanings in Islam. The Arabic root literally means “struggle”. This struggle is again broken into two categories by Islamic scholars. First the greater Jihad (*al-Jihad al-abkar*) referring to the inner or spiritual struggle. Through this struggle, Muslims fully submit themselves to God and try to overcome sinful temptations to follow the path of God. The second meaning of Jihad is the lesser Jihad (*al-Jihad al-asghar*) which is the never-ending attempt to reach the “Greater Jihad”. This is also the outward struggle to defend Islam, which can take the form of physical violence to protect the religion. Many radical Islamists such as al-Qaeda, consider Jihad as an obligation for all loyal Muslims to protect their religion. The later view according to Mandaville (2007) is widely associated with terrorism in the West and their allies across the world. Kenya is considered as one of the key allies of the west in Africa. It is thus important to explore some local understanding of the concept. The meaning of Jihad according to Abdalla and Ondigo is,

The unceasing effort that an individual must make towards self-improvement and self-purification and the duty of Muslims, both at an individual and collective level, to struggle against all forms of evil, corruption, injustice, tyranny, and oppression whether the injustice and oppression is committed against Muslims or non-Muslims, and whether by Muslims and non-Muslims (Abdalla and Ondigo, 2007 p.351).

The explanation of Jihad by Abdalla and Ondigo (2008) is supported by the work of Abdalati (1998) who also write in the Kenyan context. Abdalati states that,

War is not an objective of true Islam nor is it the normal course of Muslims. It is only the last resort and is used under the most extra-ordinary circumstances when all other measures fail. Islam is the religion of peace...peace is the nature, the meaning, the emblem and objective of Islam...Islam never tolerates aggression from its own side or from any other side, nor does it entertain aggressive wars or the initiation of aggressive wars.

Whereas the above scholars explain the meaning of Jihad as a war against evil, they nevertheless fail to explain other meanings of Jihad commonly held by other Muslim scholars such as Waddy (1976); Mutahhari (1985) and Sookdheo (2009). Their view and understanding are that Jihad can be both evangelical as well as military. The military aspect may be used for expansion or for self-defense. In the wake of the growing Islamic radicalization in Kenya, it would be necessary to know how Muslim leaders are addressing themselves to the various interpretations and use of the term Jihad locally.

## **2.8 Multi-Sectoral Partnership in Cohesion and Integration**

Cohesion and integration work is a complex task which needs cooperation and coordination between various actors (NCIC, 2013; Ojielo, 2010). Various non-state actors need to work hand in hand with the state, and more so the NCIC for better results. The non-state actors also need cooperation amongst themselves in the work.

On 14<sup>th</sup> -16<sup>th</sup> January 2014, a national conference on security and countering violent extremism was held at Nairobi Safari Club. The theme of the Conference was “*Advancing Shared Responsibility for Peaceful Society*”. Although the key stakeholder of the conference was The National Cohesion and Integration Commission, there were other stakeholders in

the event. The Islamic religion was represented by officials from the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) ([www.cohesion.or.ke](http://www.cohesion.or.ke)). During the meeting, the Cabinet Secretary of Interior Affairs and Coordination of National government pledged the government support to the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims in their efforts to enhance dialogue and intellectual debates. The dialogues and debates would be aimed at countering extremist narratives and half-truths perpetuated by pseudo-clerics who do not fully understand Islam ([www.cohesion.or.ke](http://www.cohesion.or.ke)). This is an indication that the government recognized and valued the input of the religion in the discussion at hand especially on violent extremism whereby Islamic religion is normally mentioned negatively. This research would seek to understand the later engagement between Islam and the government. No documentation is available on the progress.

The conference mentioned above was followed by the launching of the second phase of the *Pamoja initiative* on intra and Inter-Community County dialogues forums on June 2014. The program which would last for three years and mainly focus on national cohesion and integration was launched in Nairobi by the Interior and Coordination of National Government Cabinet Secretary Mr. Joseph Ole Lenku ([www.ncck.org](http://www.ncck.org)). During the occasion of the launch, the Cabinet secretary acknowledged that strong partnership and linkages were necessary to address issues of unity in the country. He urged Kenyans to remain united irrespective of ethnic and cultural diversities. During the launch of the said initiative, the interior Principal Secretary Dr. Monica Juma further underscored the need of cooperation among various stakeholders in stating, “The ministry anticipates harnessing the energies and

synergy from other stakeholders in developing a sustained national campaign aimed at fostering cohesion and integration of our society” ([www.ncck.org](http://www.ncck.org)).

A careful search revealed the presence of officials from the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCCK) and the umbrella religious forum, the Interreligious Forum Council of Kenya (IRCK). There is no mention of SUPKEM or CIPK officials attending the launch or giving a statement. The Technical committee has two representatives from NCCCK among other stakeholders but non-from the two Muslim bodies. This leaves the question whether Islam participation in the initiative was excluded or overlooked. This research would seek to understand the participation of Islam religion in these forums of networking and collaboration in national cohesion and integration activities.

Limited evidence from a single source may not be sufficient in making a conclusion on cooperation or non-cooperation of Muslims with other actors in programs to promote peacebuilding, cohesion and integration. The net may need to be cast wider to give a more informed status and hence more accurate conclusions. The World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) undertook a study in Kenya on the role of religion in peacebuilding and stability in Kenya. The process and the report of the study can offer a glimpse of the cooperation of Islam with other sectors in peacebuilding and related activities.

The report first gives the international linkages for both the Christian and Islamic organizations. The Muslim communities have received both philanthropic and development support from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iran (WFDD Report, 2016). However, since the bombing of US Embassy in 1998 and later the increased terror activities, the Government of Kenya has limited the international funding activities for Muslim organizations in various

sectors (Lynch, 2011). This has obviously had a bearing on the effectiveness of such organizations not only in peace related programs, but also development projects a whole. But their continued cooperation, though at a lowered scale is highly probable.

The report from the study have a section on the inter-religious organizations active in Kenya. One of the organizations which are mentioned is the Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK). The organization is based on institutional representation of all Kenya major religious institutions working together to deepen interfaith dialogue and collaboration among members. The IRCK is affiliated with Religions for Peace (formerly World Conference on Religious Dialogue-WCRD). The report states, “through Peace and National Cohesion Program, IRCK promotes peace, reconciliation, and cohesion through dialogue and shared values”. The organization was reported to have engaged in the local levels in about 23 Counties in Kenya. An example of local level engagement was on July 2012 after two churches were attacked by terrorist. The Secretary General of SUPKEM jointly gave a statement condemning the attacks with the Archbishop of The Anglican Church in Kenya (WFDD Report, 2016).

In the researcher’s analysis, the cooperation between various religions is mostly through the broad national frameworks. Occasionally, the national bodies such as IRCK may respond to happenings on the ground, but documentation on cooperation on a regular basis is largely lacking. The report admitted that there is a plethora of programs at the grassroots involved (or purporting to be involved) in peacebuilding activities. But there is a major shortcoming when it comes to the coordination of efforts coupled with concerns on the rising number of unqualified peace practitioners in the field (WFDD Report, 2016). Furthermore, there is

little evidence to show how Islam cooperates with other actors, other than the religious one, to promote cohesion and integration in Kenya. The report shows other religious bodies like the Catholic Church making the initiatives, and when Islam is involved, it does not seem to be making the first step.

## **2.9 Challenges Encountered by Islam in Cohesion and Integration**

As already stated, there is no comprehensive specific work done on Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya. However, a number of facts may be deduced in studying the challenges Islam face in doing other work and contextualize it in the task of national cohesion and integration. Abdalla (2012) has documented the challenges facing the aspiration of Islamic *da`wah* in Kenya in his doctorate thesis titled, *Islamic Da`wah and Missionary Enterprise in Kenyan Coast (Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu Districts)*. Islamic *da`wah* is any Islamic work intended to increase the Islamic commitment among Muslims. In this work, peace building and related works such as cohesion and integration would be considered as part of Islamic *da`wah*.

Lack of sincerity by some Muslim leaders is one of the hindrances in the spread of Islam and its ideals. Just like it is the case with many other civil society groups, dishonesty among Muslim leaders has posed a great challenge in the Islamic *da`wah*. Many Muslim leaders are not taking Islamic work as an obligation, but rather as a mean to sustain their lives (Abdalla, 2012). Resources which are collected from the gulf countries for social work ends up in the pockets of few individuals. It is not immediately clear whether Muslim leaders and NGOs have been mobilizing money and other resources for promoting national cohesion and

integration agenda or related tasks. This study will seek to establish whether this is one challenge that the religion is facing in the undertaking.

The other challenge facing the Muslim community in doing its diverse work is division among its ranks and files. To many outside observers, Islam either in Kenya or in other parts of Africa is a monolithic religion (Kean et al, 2003; Morin, 2007). The Quran exhorts Muslims to be united in serving Allah,

And hold fast, all together, by the Rope which Allah (stretches out for you) and be not divided among yourselves; and remember with gratitude Allah's favor on you; for you were enemies and He joined your hearts in love, so that by His Grace, you became brethren; and you were on the brink of the Pit of Fire, and He saved you from it. Thus, Allah makes His Signs clear to you that you may be guided (Q. 3:103).

Despite the above call to unity of purpose and deed, Islam has suffered many socio-political blows from the early days which has resulted in division and incompatible factions (Balyuzi, 2002). This fact is exemplified by Ashrof in stating,

It would be unrealistic to neglect the existence of various sects among Muslims. These sections do exist, even if their existence is against the teachings of the Quran and the Sunna of the prophet. But it would be self-deception to assume that they will cease to exist in the near future (p. 35).

Muslims are divided into four major schools of thought which are not always compatible (*Hanafi, Maaliki, Shaafi and Hanbali*). Although majority of Kenyan Muslims are followers of *Shaafi* school of thought, sectarianism remains a major challenge to its work progress. There are Islam groups with different agenda, some of which are incompatible with the mainline Islam agenda. For example, the *Khilafa* is a section of Muslims at the coast that



concentrates on politics and calling for the establishment of an Islamic state (Abdalla, 2012). Such a call is counterproductive to any efforts towards a cohesive and integrated society, regionally and nationally.

Lack of correct priorities in Muslim NGOs is another challenge facing the Islam religion in Kenya in its general social endeavors. Abdalla (2012) notes that it is very disappointing to see that many of Muslim NGOs have no correct priority. Priorities in Islam are divided into three categories. There are those which must be done, shall be done and can be done. This study will seek to understand where matters on national cohesion and integration are ranked.

The war against terror seems to be another indirect challenge to Islam working for national cohesion and integration. There has been a wide array of complains on how the war against terror has been conducted both by local and international security agencies. Since the US embassy bombing in Nairobi and Dar es Salam in 1998, war against terror has intensified in the country and in the region (Kundnani, 2014; Mazrui, 2006). Complains of harassment against Muslims has been frequent and several NGOs meant to undertake social activities have been banned in the country (Lynch, 2011; Aronson, 2013). The study would seek to reveal how this turn of events occasioned by war against terrorism has affected the participation of the Islam religion in the national cohesion and integration agenda.

Lack of accountability has also been cited as one major challenge facing Muslim organizations undertaking various social tasks in Kenya. Findings on a study on Islamic leadership in Kenya found that lack of accountability was rampant in SUPKEM (Kinyua, 2014). This is the umbrella Muslim organization in Kenya. Owing to its influence and prominence, lack of accountability in such an organization would most likely permeate to

other Muslim organizations in Kenya, including the ones entrusted with promoting national cohesion and integration.

## **2.10 Policy Framework for Cohesion and Integration in Islam**

Literature relating to the policy framework of Islamic religion in peace building, national cohesion and integration can be gathered from sources relating to national Muslim organizations like SUPKEM and CIPK. A policy framework is a set of principles and long-term goals that form the basis of making rules and guidelines and to give an overall direction to planning and development of the organization or program. A review of SUPKEM website does not reveal any policy framework in place for peace building, conflict resolution and national cohesion and integration. A brief study of the background of SUPKEM is necessary to bring the institution into the context of national cohesion and integration.

The Supreme Council of Kenya Muslim (SUPKEM) is the umbrella body of all Muslim Organizations, societies, Mosque Committees and groups in Kenya. The entity was formed in May 1973 following a general conference at Quran House on *Mfangano* Street in Nairobi (Oded, 2000: Kinyua, 2014). The organization was formed to foster the unity of Muslims and have a more united approach to various aspects of national development (Oded, 2000).

According to the information gleaned from SUPKEM website, the organization has several directorates. These are education, social services, information, development and planning, relief and disaster mitigation, legal affairs and health services. Suffice to say, the health and education seems to be more active as such programs seems to be in progress ([www.supkem.com](http://www.supkem.com)). Peace building and related activities such as national cohesion and

integration would conveniently fit in the social service directorate or in the relief and disaster mitigation. However, there is nothing said in the website about the functions of these directorates. Neither is there a policy framework in view to guide in the undertaking of peace related activities. This study will attempt to establish the role of Islam through SUPKEM and other Islam institutions in building a cohesive and integrative society and explore any policy framework in place to guide in the activities.

Another Islamic body which deserves mention is Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK). The council brings together respected Islamic Scholars, Imams and Muslim preachers from all over the country. The organization was founded in 1997 and has since grown into a strong Islamic network. The body provides a focal point in which Islamic religious leaders and scholars make vital contributions in addressing pertinent matters and issues affecting the society. The organization continues to grow and has developed into a national umbrella organization committed to encouraging respect for diversity of religion, culture and tribal backgrounds in Kenya and beyond.

Among its key objectives, CIPK focuses on the promotion of social justice, human and basic rights, good governance, equitable social economic growth and development for all Kenyans. The organizations vision is also crucial as it more closely address the focus of this study, “CIPK envisions a society that enjoys fulfilled lives, harmoniously co-exists by upholding respect for human dignity and the diversity of culture and religion”. The list of the organization’s programs and activities mention peace, security and development program ([https://IslamInAfrica.word\\_press.com](https://IslamInAfrica.word_press.com)). Consequently, the role of cohesion and integration may be seen to be implied in the vision and programs. What is not clear just as it

is in the case with SUPKEM is the specific policy framework in place for the subject of this thesis and will be established from field findings.

## **2.11 Conceptual Framework**

The study on the role of religion in national cohesion and integration in Kenya with specific reference on Nairobi and Mombasa Counties will be anchored on two relevant theories: Functionalist Theory of Religion by Emile Durkheim and National Identity Theory by Smith (1991).

### **2.11.1 Functionalist Theory of Religion**

This study is on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya. The functionalist theory of religion championed by Emile Durkheim (1858-1917) in his work on sociology and religion can help to show how religion can be a useful resource in holding the society together. Durkheim attempted to answer the question on what holds the society together. The scholar saw religion as the most basic social institution, and one that gave rise to other social forms. Durkheim assumes that humans are inherently egoistic, but norms, beliefs and values form the moral basis of the society, resulting in social integration (Allan, 2005). The sociologist argued that religion provides social cohesion and social control which glue the society together. According to Durkheim, religion provides collective consciousness, which is the fusion of all our individual consciousness and create a reality of its own (Pals, 1996).

In the view of the tenets of the theory, Islam being a moral community in Kenya would be expected to play a central role in social cohesion and integration. In this study, the researcher will use the theory to examine the extent to which the collective consciousness of Islam as a moral community has been used to promote a harmonious society in Kenya. A major part of the common moral philosophy in Islam as it is expected from other religious groups is promoting peaceful co-existence. The fact that there is a significant number of Muslims in Kenya offers the hope that there are prospects towards cohesion and integration through the efforts the faithful. Furthermore, it would be expected that the camaraderie and solidarity among people who profess Islam would be extended to build a wider cohesive and integrated society in Kenya.

The principles of peacebuilding and conflict transformation in Islam shares much commonality with the principles of Islamic culture and tradition (Sinensky, 2015). According to Abu-Nimer (2015), moral and spiritual forces of the religion can encourage people to act and change. Applying this comprehension of religion and moral guide, the adherents of Islam can use it as a mental and practical framework for cohesion and integration efforts in the country.

### **2.11.2 National Identity Theory**

National identity theory was originally developed by Antony Smith in 1991. According to Smith, national identity involves some sense of political community, common history, citizenship, common values and traditions (Smith, 1991). In this study, this theory would be helpful in understanding how the social identity of Muslims in the country promotes or hinder their broader identity as Kenyans. Given that there are national forums and Muslim

institutions which brings the Kenyan Muslim together, it would be expected that the members of the religion would advance social-political aspects of national identity.

Identity politics is evidently the general framework of today's politics across the globe and the Kenyan situation is not different as already severally stated in this work. As Eralp (1997) notes, "identity is the description of the definition of the existence of belongingness". Ethnic, sectarian, religious and national identities are prominent as the reference points of both local and international politics. In Kenya, ethnic identity is much stronger than religious identity. Nevertheless, religious identity still ranks very high among some people in the country.

Identity as a social phenomenon in Kenya has given rise to us versus the others (Gecau, 1999). This is central in identities relating to one affiliation with a religion or ethnic group- for instance Muslims versus Christians, Kikuyu versus Luo. The ethnic and religious identities no doubt goes against the understanding of a nation as proposed by Okullu. He states, "A nation is a permanent society which is knit together from different ethnic groups, and which, in Africa's case, rests on a body of beliefs and on the common social will which such body creates" (Okullu, 1984 p. 30). In theory, people with a common identity as a nation are built upon common memories of the past, common ideas of the present and common hopes for the future (Okullu, 1984). These ideals do not seem to be imbedded in the Kenyan society, as they keep on being shaken as we have witnessed in the past, and more so during electioneering period. A strong national identity has been overshadowed by religious and ethnic identities of the citizens.

As it is the case in many other African political contexts, Kenya is not built upon such foundations of a strong nationhood. Kenya is made up of people from diverse cultural and religious orientations. The ethnic and religious diversity is not the problem *per se*, but the issue is the feeling of self-sufficiency manifested through ethnic and religious conflicts. Ethnic groups at times conceive themselves as nations and the collective thinking and action as a nation is often absent. Okullu (1984 p.30) further laments, “Thus we are trying to form nations out of what are already spiritually independent (tribal) societies with no affinity for one another whatsoever, except for being in the same geographical location”. Consequently, a cohesive and integrated society has been elusive in Kenya.

National identity theory attempts to elaborate the transition from the ethnic identities into national identity. In this context, ethnic identity in a broader sense also includes religious identity. National identity is complicated and multi-dimensional in nature. Furthermore, it is not easy to comprehend how national identity can be built in different social-political situations. In most cases, it will come second to ethnic or religious identity. According to Gilroy (1993), national identity is structured through the notion of citizenship and patriotism that subordinate ethnic, racial, and cultural differences to the assimilating logic of a common culture.

National identity in Kenyan context is not only overshadowed by ethnic consciousness but also by other changes that have come into our societies since the colonial period. These include class, profession and occupation, gender, age as well as religious identities. Some of these have created forms of social consciousness and other solidarities that may cut across regional or ethnic boundaries. The formation of a single and homogeneous national identity

based on a political community and accepted rights and obligations has therefore become a very complicated pursuit (Gecau, 1999).

### **2.11.3 The *Umma* Concept**

*Umma* is an Arabic term equivalent to a nation in the English language. It should however be noted that the nation referred here is not synonymous with the political nation state whose members live within defined geographical boundaries. In Arabic, and to that extent, in Islam, *Umma* does not only define a group of people with common ancestry or in a limited geographical region. The proper understanding of *Umma* is a community of believers bound with a common purpose. The major purpose of *Umma* is to worship God. However, the purpose extends to other dimensions of life which can be useful in advancing the cause of Islam (Aisha, 2018).

The idea of *Umma* finds its foundation in the Holy Quran. It can be found in Quran 23:52, 2:213, 10:41, 3:110. In Quran 23:52, the following is stated of *Umma*, “And verily this *Umma* of yours is one *Umma* and I am your Lord and Cherisher, therefore fear me and no other”. Further, the holy Quran in 3:110 states the following regarding *Umma*, “You are the best community (*Umma*) raised up for the benefit of humanity, enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong and believing in God”.

In some translations of the first quoted portion of the Quran above (that is 23:52), the word *Umma* is replaced by religion. Religion generally infers to a collective way of life or course of conduct followed by a community (Aisha, 2018). In Islam, the factor determining affiliation is *Umma*. The collective identity of members of the community concerns those



who are members of the Muslim community of the faithful (Zasun Anna, 2017). The Muslim community (*Umma*) is considered as both a unique social, cultural as well as political phenomenon.


The term Islam is derived from the word *salam* which means peace. Islam is also understood to be a religion of unity, going by the Arabic *slim* in the name which translates to reconciliation or peace (Zasun, 2017). This peace which is a natural component of true Islam is then supposed to transcend whole societies and should not be limited to only those who profess Islam. Consequently, it would be assumed that one of the major causes of Islam is to promote peaceful co-existence with social cohesion and integration as key components. The envisioned inclusive impact of the spirit of *Umma* is further reinforced by Zasun (2017 p. 47) the following statement,

The conception of *Umma* is not always interpreted exclusively in reference to a religious community. In the Quran itself, which often mentioned the concept refers to both the entire community as well as those who were not converted to Islam. It may result from the fact that the political structure of the Muslim society as well as of its subjects became with time more diversified both ethnically and politically.

The broad understanding of *Umma* therefore have implications in Islam being both a resource and a medium of promoting cohesive and integrated societies wherever it exists. In Kenya, and as noted earlier, Islam religion commands a following of around 11% of the total population. Members of the religion at times lives in contexts with societies with deep religious and ethnic divisions. The concept of *Umma* when broadly understood by Muslims should therefore act a uniting factor of communities in Kenyan context as opposed to a polarizing and divisive agent as it has been the case in some instances.

### 2.11.4 Conceptual Model

The following conceptual model based on the two theories and the *Umma* concept helps to explain how the various variables work together to build a cohesive and integrated society with citizens who have a sense of national hood in them. Islam just like many other religious groups provides collective consciousness among its members and interacts with other institutions, both state and non-state actors for the mutual benefits and the collective welfare on the nation. Such a positive interaction of the various actors would result first to a cohesive and integrated society which would consequently lead to a peaceful, equitable, prosperous and tolerant society.



**Figure 2. 1: Conceptual Model Showing Interaction of Variables (Source: Researcher, 2019).**

In the conceptual model above, Islam is working with both state and non-state actors towards the achievement of national identity alongside national cohesion and integration.

The independent variable is Islam while state actors and non-state actors are the intervening variables as they are listed in the diagram above. Other actors, both state and non-states can work and interact with Islam towards cohesion and integration of the country. The *Umma* concept which is a sense of community already embedded in Islam could also be a resource within Islam which can be utilized towards building a cohesive and integrated society. When Muslims are united under the *Umma* community, that can be tapped to promote cohesiveness in the wider society in which the members of the religion live. National identity, cohesion and integration are the dependent variables as they depend on the working together of the independent variable with intervening variables as highlighted above. Further, a cohesive and integrated society with citizens who have a sense of nationhood will result to tolerance, peace, trust and prosperity in the society. The model shows that there are challenges that may stand on the way of Islam as it exploits the resources and opportunities within it in working towards a cohesive and integrated society. There are knowledge gaps on strategies used by Islam, the challenges encountered in the task and the policy framework in place for the work.

## **2.12 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has broadly reviewed literature which relates to religion in national cohesion and integration. Part of the literature is based on the international and regional perspectives whereby the role of Islam in Canada, The Balkans, Nigeria and Sudan are studied. The other part of the literature is related to the objectives of the study in the Kenyan context. The chapter also reviewed literature on the historical erosion of national cohesion and

integration, evolution of cohesion and integration agenda in the country and a brief overview of Islam to help inform and put the study into the proper context.

In the review, it was noted that erosion of national cohesion and integration has been a process which kicked off after independence and climaxed in the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence. National cohesion and integration agenda have been pursued in various forms and expressions in the post-independent Kenya though it was accorded more prominence following the 2007/2008 Post Election Violence. This is the period in which the agenda has been more institutionalized by the state and the involvement of non-state actors like the media and religious groups seems to be increasing. The overview of Islam as a religion has led the study to the need of understanding the concept of Jihad which is a crucial issue in understanding Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda especially in the Kenyan context. This is in view of the increased cases of radicalization and acts of terror associated with people who purports to be inspired by Islam.

At another level, the literature review has been guided by the research objectives and the research questions. The review has revealed various knowledge gaps on Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda. There is little academic work done on the approaches employed by the religion in national cohesion and integration. Further the specific challenges faced by Islam in the task are not properly documented in academic works. Academic literature on the modalities of cooperation between Islam and other actors in this specific agenda is scarce. Finally, although there are sufficient indications that Islam is broadly involved in peace building and reconciliation activities in the country, the policy framework for cohesion and integration is lacking. This scenario therefore necessitates an

enquiry into the framework under which Islam undertakes the task. The next chapter shows the road map, or the methodology followed in undertaking the field study.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

The study was on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya with a specific focus on Nairobi and Mombasa Counties. This chapter outlines and articulates details of research method used in obtaining the results of the study. The chapter contains details regarding the research design, the study area, and the sample design highlighting the sample size and sampling techniques, research tools for collecting data, reliability and validity, ethical considerations and data analysis procedures.

#### **3.2 Study Area**

The study was primarily based in Nairobi and Mombasa counties though it had ideas and evidence drawn from other parts of the country. These areas were targeted because they have a higher concentration of Muslims and they have experienced some degree of social conflicts in the past. Furthermore, Nairobi and Mombasa Counties have fairly mixed populations with people of different religious and ethnic backgrounds settled there. They are therefore areas likely to have had issues on cohesion and integration in the past and potentially provide valuable data for a deeper study of the phenomenon. Majority of Muslim organizations such as SUPKEM and CIPK have their national offices in Nairobi and Mombasa. The following are maps of the two study locations, with a general map showing all the counties in Kenya and specific maps showing the geography of the study areas:





Figure 3. 1: The Map of Kenya showing all the 47 Counties (Source: Google Maps <https://www.google.co.ke>).





**Figure 3. 2: The map of Mombasa County Showing the Six Sub-Counties (Source: Google Maps (<https://www.google.co.ke>))**





**Figure 3. 3: Map of Nairobi County Showing the 17 Sub-Counties (Source: Google Maps (<https://www.google.co.ke>)).**

### 3.3 Research Design

In research, a research design is a procedural plan that is adopted by the researcher to answer questions in a valid, objective and accurate manner (Kumar, 2005). A research design is a strategy of arranging conditions for the collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine relevance to the research purpose in an economical procedure (Kothari, 2004).

The purpose of this study was to gain familiarity and more insights with the role of Islam religion in national cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya. The research design adopted in the study was exploratory in nature since the phenomenon under study is relatively new (Creswell, 2009). The design fits in well since the major emphasis of the study was on discovery of ideas and insights of the phenomenon since there are little academic studies on Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya. The study will hence forth form a foundation, on which further studies can be undertaken to prove or enrich the findings.

### **3.4 The Study Population**

Data for this study was collected from institutions as well as from people at their personal capacities. The organization where data was collected through interviews with the officials are: Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) with nine Officials in each County; The Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) with seven officials in each County; National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCCK) with seven officials in each County; and National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) with 12 national officials. The total number of Sub-County Commissioners in Nairobi County corresponds to that of the 17 Sub-Counties while the number of Sub-County Commissioners in Mombasa County corresponds to that of Six Sub-Counties.

Adult Muslim population in Mombasa and Nairobi runs into several hundreds of thousands. The approximate number of Muslim populations in Mombasa was 175, 452. It was calculated as a proportion of 41% of the 2009 census results (GoK, 2009) and IEBC data (IEBC, 2012). The estimated percentage of Muslims in Mombasa is 41% of the total County

population. The approximate number of Muslims in Nairobi was 160,941, calculated from a proportion of 11% which is the national percentage for Muslims in Kenya. Consequently, it was a practical impossibility to study the whole population of Muslims in the two counties. The study therefore involved collecting evidence from a small sample of Muslims selected from the population. The next section demonstrate how sampling was undertaken for the participants in the questionnaires. This data collection approach produced bulk of the data needed for this study.

### **3.5 Sampling**

The research used purposive and random sampling techniques at various levels of the study. The researcher purposively selected religious organizations such as SUPKEM, CIPK and NCCK since they have resource people with the information needed in the interviews. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was also purposively chosen since it is the main custodian of cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya. The mosques where respondents for questionnaires were drawn were randomly selected from Mombasa and Nairobi from a compiled list of all mosques. As a result, majority of the Sheiks and Imams interviewed were drawn from mosques selected in the two counties. There are many mosques in the two counties and each of them had an equal chance of being selected through random sampling. Sub-County commissioners from Mombasa and Nairobi were selected randomly for interviews such that each Sub-County commissioner from the two counties had an equal chance of being selected for the interviews. Officials from SUPKEM, CIPK, NCCK and NCIC were randomly selected such that each of them had an equal chance of being selected from a compiled list. This was done by first getting the names of all officials

and then sampling to get the required numbers. The researcher booked appointments with the sampled officials to meet them in their offices or another appropriate location.

The following formulae suggested by Fisher (1981) and supported by Mugenda (2003) was applied to determine the sample size for respondents from the mosques selected in Mombasa County with an estimated 41% Muslims population which totals 175,452 adults (IEBC, 2012: Mollison, 1971).

$$N=Z^2pq/d^2$$

Where:

$N$  is the desired sample size if the target population is greater than 10,000

$Z$  is the standard normal deviation at the required confidence level (for 95% confidence level is 1.96)

$p$  is the proportion in target population which is 41% Muslim adherents in the County

$q=1-p$  (which is 0.59)

$d$  is the level of statistical significance or *alpha* (0.05)

Therefore:

$$N=Z^2pq/d^2$$

$$N= \frac{(1.96)^2 \times (0.41) \times (0.59)}{(0.05)^2}$$
$$= 0.929/0.0025$$

**= 372 Respondents from Mosques in Mombasa**

The 372 respondents from mosques in Mombasa were distributed to the sampled mosques in the county in proportion to the population size of each selected mosque. The total number of

mosques in the County is approximately 140. (Mwangi, Mwinyi, Abbas, 2017). Hence 14 mosques representing 10% of the mosques in the county were used for the study in Mombasa. Only one Mosque for Shia Muslims and one for Ahmadiyya Muslims were used for the research. The two branches of Islam have very few people compared to Sunni Muslims.

The total number of adult Muslims in Nairobi is 160,941 calculated from the national Muslim percentage of 11% (IEBC, 2012: GoK, 2009). Sample size for Muslim faithful respondents from Nairobi was determined using the same formulae by Fisher (1981) and recommended by Mugenda (2003),

Therefore:

$$N = \frac{Z^2 pq}{d^2}$$
$$N = \frac{(1.96)^2 \times (0.11) \times (0.89)}{(0.05)^2}$$
$$= 0.376 / 0.0025$$

**=150 respondents in Nairobi**

The 150 respondents from mosques in Nairobi were distributed to the sampled mosques in the county in proportion to the estimated population size of each selected mosque. The total number of Mosques in Nairobi County is approximately 40. ([www.esinislam.com](http://www.esinislam.com)). This was the estimate given by the SUPKEM office in Nairobi. Hence 6 mosques representing 15% of the mosques in the County were used for the study. Only one Mosque for *Shia* and one Mosque for *Ahmadiyya* Muslims were selected for the research. The adherents of this type of Islam are small compared to the Sunni.

Other classes of respondents such SUPKEM officials, CIPK officials, NCKK officials and Sub-County commissioners were selected using the 10%-30% sample population suggested by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) for smaller populations. The selection of respondents in different categories is summarized and represented in the sampling frame below.

**Table 3. 1: The Sampling Frame**

<b>Class of Respondent</b>	<b>Research Tools</b>	<b>Est. Total Ppn Mbs</b>	<b>Sam. Size Mbs</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Est. Total Ppn Nrb</b>	<b>Sam. Size Nrb</b>	<b>%</b>
Sheiks & Imams	Questionnaires	140	14	10 %	40	4	10%
Sub-County Commissioners	Interview Guide	6	2	33 %	17	3	17.6%
SUPKEM Officials	Interview Guide	7	2	28 %	7	2	20%
CIPK Officials	Interview Guide	9	2	22 %	9	2	22%
NCIC Officials	Interview Guide	-	-		12	2	16.6%
NCKK Officials	Interview Guide	7	2	28 %	7	2	28%
Muslim Faithful	Questionnaires	175,452	372	-	160,941	150	-
Muslim Faithful	FGD-Guides	175,452	37	-	160,941	15	-

(Source: Researcher, 2019)

### 3.6 Research Instruments

The researcher used interview guides, questionnaires as well as focus group discussion guides to collect the field data. The interview guides were used to collect data from SUPKEM officials, CIPK officials, NCKK officials, County commissioners and top officials from NCIC. Only a few respondents from these organizations were used for the study making it practical to have an oral interview with them. The interviews conducted helped in

gathering in-depth data for the study therefore enriching the data gathered through questionnaires.

The questionnaires and focus group discussions were used to gather responses from Muslim faithful attending prayers in the randomly sampled mosques with prior arrangements with Imams. As expected, data was collected from Muslim faithful in the two counties. A self-administered questionnaire under the supervision of the researcher and seven research assistants was the most practical way of gathering the data from this class of respondents. The questionnaire was designed in such a way that it would also help in collecting data from Sheikhs and Imams of the sampled mosques in Nairobi and Mombasa. The questionnaire was available in both English and Swahili. There is a substantial population in Mombasa County that prefers Swahili. A small section of respondents in Nairobi also preferred Swahili language over English.

The questionnaire instrument covered all objective of the study, that is questions on the policy framework in place for Islam in National Cohesion and Integration, methods and approaches used by Islam in national cohesion and integration and prospects and challenges for Islam in national cohesion and integration. The interview guide to the SUPKEM and CIPK officials covered the methods and approaches used by Islam in promoting cohesion and integration as well as the challenges and difficulties encountered. The interview guide instrument for NCIC officials, NCCK and the Sub-County commissioners covered the partnership aspect of the methods and approaches objective. In total, there were six interviews for ACCM in the two counties, three interviews for CIPK six interviews for

church leaders in the two counties and a total of four interviews for NCKK officials in the two counties.

The four focus groups mostly discussed issues relating to faith and Quran in matters of peace and conflict as well as practical issues in promoting cohesion and integration by the Islamic religion. The tool covered policy, challenges and opportunities as well as the methods used by Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in Kenya. The discussions further helped in clarifying some responses in the questionnaires since the respondents were selected from the Muslims faithful who had also filled the questionnaires. There was a total of four FGDs, two for each county.

### **3.7 Validity and Reliability**

Validity and reliability are the measures of the quality and trustworthiness of the data collected and used in a study. Generally, investigators normally attempt to maximize the reliability and validity of the data they collect by using properly constructed tools, appropriate data collection procedures and sampling techniques that not only target the right population, but also yield accurate data (Mugenda, 2008). These are things that the researcher carefully observed to increase validity and reliability of the study.

Reliability is the measure of the degree to which a research instrument would yield the same results or data after repeated trials. In this study, the researcher adopted the procedures suggested by Gibbs (2007) that is; checking transcripts to make sure that they do not contain obvious mistakes made during transcription; secondly making sure that there is no drift in the definition of codes or a shift in the meaning of codes during the coding process.



Validity is based on determining whether the findings are accurate from the viewpoint of the researcher, the participants and other readers of the research project (Creswell and Miller, 2000). The validity of the instruments was further enhanced by having them approved by the supervisors before using them in the field for data collection. A pilot study was also undertaken to pre-test the instruments and improve them accordingly.

This study used peer debriefing and triangulation to check the accuracy of the final research findings. In peer debriefing, the researcher identified an authority in the field of Islamic studies who read the final draft and asked questions based on the findings. The questions asked to the researcher by the expert were mostly based on the objectives of the study. Triangulation entailed use of data from other available related sources to build a coherent justification of the findings.

### **3.8 Pilot Study**

The researcher conducted a pilot study prior to the main data collection exercise so as to test the validity of the tools and improve the quality of the data for the final study. The pilot study was carried out in Kajiado Town. The area was appropriate for piloting as the population is mixed in terms of religious and ethnic affiliation. Although the area is not known for full blown conflicts, there have been reports of ethnic and religious tensions at different times. The piloting was also undertaken in one Sub-County in each of the two counties under study, that is Mombasa and Nairobi. Consequently, the Sub-counties where piloting took place were exempted for the main research. The pilot study was helpful in testing the effectiveness of the research tools designed and the preparedness of the research assistants. After the pilot study, any adjustment needed on the research tools was done and further training of the assistants was carried out, this time factoring the challenges faced by

those who participated in the pilot study. The Pilot study increased the validity of the data to be collected. Validity is the accuracy, truthfulness, and meaningfulness of inferences that are based on the data collected (Mugenda & Mugenda, 2003).

### **3.9 Data Collection**

The process of data collection started in March 2017 following the issue of authorization letter from the National Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI). The process went on until a few days to the expiry of the permit in February 2018. A total of 375 questionnaires were issued in Mombasa while 150 questionnaires were distributed in Nairobi with the help of research assistants. Each research assistant was issued with a copy of research permit from NACOSTI. At the close of the data collection exercise, the return rate was 306 in Mombasa representing 87 % and 144 in Nairobi representing 96%. The return rate was increased by making sure that the questionnaires were filled as the researcher or the research assistants waited.

All interviews and focus group discussions were conducted by the researcher himself. Although it was initially anticipated that more than one official would be interviewed in the selected organizations, this was not always practical. Some organizations insisted in having only one official be interviewed, arguing that the information given would be the same. This was the case with SUPKEM Nairobi, SUPKEM Mombasa, NCKK Mombasa and NCIC secretariat. However, the researcher was able to interview two officials from NCKK Nairobi and a total of three CIPK officials in Mombasa county and national offices. By the close of the data collection process, the researcher had further managed to interview three Assistant County Commissioners (ACC) in each of the two counties. The Assistant County Commissioners were interviewed on behalf of the Sub-County Commissioners who were

absent in many occasions or too busy with other official duties. Two Focus Group Discussions each made up of six participants were undertaken in each county. The groups were formed from the respondents of the questionnaires, especially in cases where a group filled the instruments at the same time. Each of the FGD had an average of six people.

Several challenges were encountered during the data collection process. Foremost, there was a high level of suspicion from some Muslim faithful owing to the heightened activities by the government security agencies in the efforts to fight terrorism. This has made many Muslim faithful to feel vulnerable. The resistance demonstrated by some Muslim faithful led to frustrations of the research assistants. Some assistants gave up before the end of the exercise and the researcher had to take up the task. For the interviews, the interviewees were not always available when the researcher went into their offices. In addition to using more money, this challenge resulted to the dragging of the data collection process beyond the anticipated time.

### **3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation**

In the process of collecting the field data using questionnaires, interview guides, and focus group discussion guides, large volume of data was amassed. The volume of the data amassed needed to be tabulated and analyzed to make sense for the study. After collection, the data was processed and analyzed in accordance with the research questions and objectives (Kothari, 2004). This is essential for a social science study as it would ensure that all the relevant data for making contemplated comparisons and analysis is available. Once collected, the data was computed along certain measures so that patterns of relationship that exists from the data may be observed and recorded (Kothari, 2004). The analyzed data was

consequently discussed in the light of the statement of problem to help arrive at a conclusion.

Several steps were followed in the process of analyzing the data. First the data was edited to detect errors and omissions and such errors were corrected where possible without unnecessarily altering the responses. Editing is done to ensure that the data is accurate, consistent with other facts gathered, complete and well arranged to facilitate coding and tabulation (Kothari, 2004).

The next step was coding of data using numerals or symbols to the answers given so that responses can be put into manageable categories and sub-themes. The categories were organized along the research questions and the problem under study. Using the service of an expert, the data was then entered and managed using Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 17. This version is appropriate as it offers extensive data handling capabilities and numerous statistical routines that analysis statistical data (Kibaara, 2014).

The data collected was presented in narrative, descriptive and inferential manner. Data analysis was undertaken using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Analysis of qualitative data involved reading through the transcripts to observe and develop patterns of relationships between the data collected. The synthesized qualitative responses from all instruments were organized under the major themes of the study as articulated in the research objectives and questions. For the quantitative data, percentages, graphs and pie charts were utilized to enable the researcher to meaningfully describe distribution or measurements using statistics. These statistics were helpful in analyzing the demographic

characteristics as well as variables in the study. Tables, charts and graphs were used to present the results of the quantitative data.

### **3.11 Ethical Considerations**

A study of this kind would obviously involve a lot of ethical issues which needed to be put into consideration. Social research of this nature largely involves collecting data from people about people (Punch, 2005). This study entailed a study of a religious group by a person who is not a member of that religion. Members of any social institution are generally known to be very protective to anything with a potential of casting doubt on the performance of the institution.

This research required the researcher to protect his research participants, develop trust with them, promote the integrity of the study and guard against misconduct and impropriety that might reflect on their organizations (Israel & Hay, 2006). Muslims hold their religion, Prophet Mohammed and place of worship in very high regard, and the researcher kept this in mind while handling the participants. Foremost, the researcher required informed consent from the respondents by having them sign a consent form. Those who took part in the study did so out of their choice which the author ensured was free from fraud, deceit and manipulation.

The study was handled in a manner that ensured that the respondents were not put into risk; physically, psychologically, socially or economically (Sieber, 1998). Any activity in the study with a potential of putting the respondent into risk was handled with utmost care. Once the researcher and the assistants went into the field, each respondent was assured of the appropriate confidentiality and where necessary identity was kept secret. The

respondents were also assured that the information obtained will be purely used for academic purposes.

The other part of the ethical considerations in the study involved the questions and purpose. The investigator ensured that the purpose and questions in his mind were understood the same way by the participants (Sarantakos, 2005). In this regard, the researcher and the research assistants ensured that any clarification needed by the respondents is addressed on time.

Other ethical procedures during data collection involved gaining the authority of individuals in authority, those who are gate keepers in the institutions involved so as to get access to the participants. Authority to collect data from the field was sought from National Council of Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) through Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. Other formalities were obtained from county officials in Mombasa and Nairobi and the letters are attached in the appendices.

### **3.12 Limitations of the Study**

Access to reliable and sufficient information is generally the greatest hindrance to any scientific study. The area of religion in peacebuilding, cohesion and integration is not widely researched. There is even more paucity for references in relation to Islam and the subject in the Kenyan context. This presented a great challenge in terms of getting enough and good literature for the study.

In regard to data collecting field data, it was anticipated that some respondents may be suspicious and unwilling to provide the necessary cooperation in the study especially due to the frequent association of Islam with terror related activities in the country. During data

collection, the researcher and the trained assistants made the best efforts to clarify the subject of the current research to the respondents. The researcher further worked hard to convince the respondents of the overall benefits of the study and assured them of maximum confidentiality to their identity. The researcher also exercised patience to convince the respondents to take part in the study.

The study involved collection of substantial data in Nairobi and Mombasa counties which are geographically far apart. This obviously took more time and financial resources. The data collection process occasionally stalled as the researcher looked for funds. To partially overcome the limitation of distance, the researcher engaged the services of seven research assistants in administering questionnaires after sufficient training. To scale down the level of suspicion, majority of research assistants engaged were of Islam background especially in Mombasa. Enough time of approximately one year was also allowed for data collection. However, the researcher conducted all the interviews by himself.

Swahili language is highly preferred in Mombasa County. It is a strongly embedded part of the Coastal culture. There are also high instances of illiteracy in Mombasa and much of the Muslim populations in Kenya. Consequently, English was not suitable for data collection for most participants in Mombasa and also in some cases in Nairobi County. To overcome the challenge this necessitated the translation of the self-administered questionnaire into Swahili language. The translation was done through the translation services of Mr. Julius Mugane.

### **3.13 Chapter Summary**

This chapter has articulated the methodological procedures followed in conducting the study. An exploratory research design was utilized to help the researcher and readers gain

familiarity and insights with the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration especially in Mombasa and Nairobi Counties. The areas of were selected owing to their ethnic and religious diversities and a history of violence based on social diversities. A pilot study to test the instruments was conducted in Kajiado Town which is known to be ethnically and religiously diverse and have occasionally faced some mild ethnic and religious tensions. Some data for piloting was also collected from one Sub-County in Mombasa and Nairobi.

A variety of appropriate sampling techniques such as random, convenience and purposeful sampling were applied at different levels of the study and in collecting data from various sources. The data collection tools included questionnaires, interview guides and focus group discussion guides. Appropriate measures were also observed to ensure the validity of data collected and the accuracy of the research findings. Reliability of the findings was ensured using member checking, peer debriefing and triangulation. The chapter further outlines the procedure followed in the actual data collection and the formulae applied in getting the sample sizes for various categories of data for the study. Data analysis procedures which were followed are clearly outlined to ensure that the data collected is summarized in a way that leads into accurate conclusions. The section also shows some difficulties in the data collection process and how they were overcome in the limitation part. Finally, ethical considerations which are very critical in a research involving interaction with human subjects are highlighted in the section. The key ethical considerations observed and critical in this study were confidentiality and anonymity.



## **CHAPTER FOUR**


### **POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR COHESION AND INTEGRATION FOR ISLAM IN KENYA**

#### **4.1 Demographic Information**

This is the first chapter of the data analysis section. The chapter therefore first presents the demographic information of respondents in questionnaires before providing the research findings for the objective on the existence of a policy framework for cohesion and integration in Islam. The bulk of the data for this study was obtained through questionnaires administered in Nairobi and Mombasa though part of it was obtained through interviews and focus group discussions.


##### **4.1.1 Gender of Respondents**

The target population was made up of male and female who were 18 years and above. For the questionnaire, a total of 306 people participated in Mombasa of which 67 % (204) were male and 33% (102) were female. In Nairobi, a total of 144 people participated in filling up the questionnaires of which 49% (71) were male and 51% (73) were female. The higher number of male respondents could possibly be explained by the fact that, Islam culture limits the extent to which women can interact with other people, and more so males. Furthermore, most of the data was collected in mosques where the attendance of male is much higher than that of female. The gender distribution of the respondents in the questionnaire is presented in the pie charts below:



**Figure 4.1: Gender distribution in Mombasa County**

(Source: Field Data, 2017)



**Figure 4.2: Gender distribution in Nairobi**

(Source: Field Data, 2017)

#### **4.1.2 Age Distribution of Respondents**

The respondents for the questionnaire were adults of age 18 years and above. Of the 308 respondents in Mombasa 56.5% (174) were aged 18-30 years; 19.5% (60) were aged 31-40 years; 12.3% (38) were aged 41-50 years while 11% (34) were aged 51 years and above.

In Nairobi County, there were 144 respondents for the questionnaire. Of the 144 respondents, 69.4% (100) were aged 18-30 years; 20.1% (89) were aged 31-40 years; 6.3% (47) were aged 41-50 years while 4.2% (40) were aged 51 years and above. As it was the case with Mombasa County, the tally of the respondents diminished with increase in age.


Overall, the respondents aged 18-30 years in the two counties were 60.9% (274); 31-40 years were 20.1% (89); 41-50 years were 10.4% (47) while those aged 51 years and above were 8.9% (40). It is evident that the tally of the respondents decreased with age. This could be explained by the facts that, the number of people in older age brackets are fewer compared to those in younger age brackets. Furthermore, younger people are likely to be in school or to have been in school more recently and therefore more willing and able to participate in an academic research compared to older people who may feel bothered to participate in such an exercise. The age distribution of the participants through the questionnaire for the two counties is presented in the table below:

**Table 4.1: Age distribution in Mombasa and Nairobi**

	Mombasa		Nairobi		Total	
Age category	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
18-30 yrs	174	56.5	100	69.4	274	60.9
31-40 yrs	60	19.5	29	20.1	89	19.8
41-50 yrs	38	12.3	9	6.3	47	10.4
51 yrs and	34	11.0	6	4.2	40	8.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>308</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>100.0</b>


(Source: Field Data, 2017)

The age distribution for each County is further presented in the graphs below:



**Figure 4.3: Graph showing age distribution of respondents in Mombasa County Table**

(Source: Field Data, 2017)




**Figure 4.4: Graph showing age distribution of respondents in Nairobi County (Source: Field Data, 2017)**

#### **4.1.3 Education Levels of Respondents**

The educational level of the respondents was categorized as Primary School Not Completed; Primary School Completed; Secondary School; and College and University. Only 3.3% (10) marked Primary school not completed in Mombasa County, 7.2% (22) marked primary School completed, 32% (98) marked secondary level while an overwhelming 57.5 % (176) marked College/University level of education.

In Nairobi County 6.3% (9) had not completed primary School, 14.6% (21) had completed primary School; 27.8% (40) had gone up to Secondary School while 51.4% (74) had some form of College/University education. From the tally of the education backgrounds of the respondents, most of the people had modest level of education that enhanced the quality of

the data collected. The education level of the respondents in the two counties is presented in the graph below:




**Figure 4.5: Education levels of the respondents**


(Source: Field Data, 2017)

#### 4.1.4 Position of Respondents in Islam

The respondents were categorized as follows in the questionnaire: Sheikh, Imam, Muslim Scholars and Muslim faithful. Most of the respondents identified themselves simply as Muslim faithful and totaled 78%, Muslim Scholars 14% (42), Imams 5% (16) and Sheikhs 3% (8) in Mombasa County. In Nairobi County those who identified themselves as Muslim faithful were 92% (132), Muslim Scholar 5% (7), Imam 1% (1) and Sheikh were 2% (3). Naturally, faithful would be more but the other categories being the leaders of Muslim communities would be much fewer. The pie charts below present the position of the questionnaire respondents in Islam from each of the two Counties:



**Figure 4.6: Position of respondent in Islam-Mombasa County**  
 (Source: Field Data, 2017)



**Figure 4.7: Position of respondents in Islam-Nairobi County**  
 (Source: Field Data, 2017)

The combined positions of the respondents in the two counties is also presented in the table below:

**Table 4.2: The position of the respondents in Islam in the two Counties**

	<b>Mombasa</b>		<b>Nairobi</b>		<b>Total</b>	
	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Muslim Faithful	240	78.4	132	92.3	372	82.9
Muslim Scholar	42	13.7	7	4.9	49	10.9
Sheikh	8	2.6	3	2.1	11	2.4
Imam	16	5.2	1	0.7	17	3.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Source: Field Data, 2017).

#### **4.2 Awareness of Policy Framework for Cohesion and Integration in Islam**

One of the specific objectives of this study was to explore the policy framework available in Islam for cohesion and integration in Kenya. According to *Cambridge International Dictionary*, a policy is “a set of ideas or plan of what to do in situations that have been agreed officially by a group of people, a business, a government or a political party” (1995 p. 1091). A policy framework can therefore be understood to be a written guideline for undertaking a complex program of which building a cohesive and integrated society through Islam religion is one of them. Such a framework ensures good coordination and uniformity when various stakeholders within the larger institution are undertaking the task. A policy also helps in evaluation of the implementation process. The complex challenges involved in building trust or social cohesion among people involves widely varied players and stakeholders. In Kenya, religious leaders and institutions such as Islam are supposed to play



a central role in the same given the place of religion in the country (WFDD, 2016). This cross sectoral cooperation requires each major stake holder to have a framework to enable for more fruitful engagement with other players while still maintaining their own identity. Inter-religious engagement looks to each faith tradition to present its own principles and values, while providing a space to hear and understand the traditions of other religious and civil players (WFDD, 2016). Such principles must be written down and widely accepted within the given religious community. Furthermore, a policy framework would be the springboard from which Islam would effectively mobilize action from the members of the faith community.


The questionnaire, interview guide for CIPK and SUPKEM officials and Focus Group Discussion guide (FGD) all sought to explore what policy framework is available in Islam for cohesion and integration in Kenya. The following were the findings. In Mombasa County, 85.8% (254) of the respondents in questionnaires stated that they were not aware of any policy framework available locally for cohesion, integration and peace building. Only 14.2% (42) of the respondents in Mombasa County were aware of the existence of such a framework locally. The figures were close for awareness of such a policy framework at the national level from respondents in Mombasa. About 83% (244) of the total respondents in Mombasa County were not aware of the existence of a policy framework at the national level while only 17% (50) of the total respondents claimed to be aware of the existence of such a policy framework at the national level.

In Nairobi County, only 25.7% (37) of questionnaire respondents were aware of a policy framework available locally for peace building, cohesion and integration while 74.3% (107)


were not aware of such a framework from the same County. Those who were aware of the availability of a policy framework at the national level from Nairobi County stood at 26.4% (38) while those who were not aware of the existence of the same were 73.6% (106). The figures for national awareness compared to local awareness were almost similar with only a one percent difference.

The two counties combined, 79.9% (350) of the respondents through questionnaires were not aware of an existing policy framework for cohesion and integration while only 20.1% (88) were aware of the existence of such a policy framework at the national level. Such a figure strongly points to lack of a policy framework in the region, or lack of awareness of the existence of such a document.

The following graphs summarizes data gathered through questionnaires on the awareness of a policy framework for cohesion and integration for the local and the national levels:



**Figure 4.8: Awareness for Local policy framework on Cohesion and Integration**  
 (Source: Field Data, 2017).



**Figure 4.9: Awareness for National policy framework on cohesion and integration**  
 (Source: Field Data, 2017)

Out of the combined 66 Sheikhs, Imams and Muslim Scholars who filled up the questionnaires in Mombasa County, approximately 60% said there was no policy framework while 40% said they were aware of such a policy framework. In Nairobi County there were a total of 11 people or respondents who identified themselves as Muslim Scholars, Sheikhs and Imams. Those who were aware of the existence of such a framework either locally, nationally or in both levels stood at 50% while those who were not aware of the existence of such a framework in any of the two levels also stood at 50%.

This objective sought to establish the availability of a policy framework in written form for cohesion and integration in Islam in Kenya. The items in the questionnaire tool provided an opportunity to the respondents to express their awareness for the availability of the document even at the Local levels, given the possibility that existence of such policies at the national level may not be known to many people at the grassroots. From the figures presented above, there is no known policy framework for cohesion and integration or the general peacebuilding work. This can be supported by the large number of respondents who stated so, and on the other hand by the fact that no one, not even the Muslim leaders produced the document or stated where it could be obtained. But this possible deficiency was investigated further through the use of other data collection mechanisms and tools.

Thus, the investigation on the existence of policy framework was also done through Focused Group Discussions. Two Focused Group Discussions were held in each of the two counties and code named FGD.MA; FGD.MB; FGD.NA and FGD.NB. The respondents were sampled from among those who filled up the questionnaires especially where a group existed to perform the task. In Mombasa County, focused group discussion (FGD. MA)

asserted that there was no policy framework in place for national cohesion and integration locally or nationally. According to the respondents in the group, Islam highly relies on the teachings of Prophet Muhammad in the Quran and Hadith to promote harmony and co-existence among people from diverse backgrounds. On the item for the existence of a policy framework for national cohesion and integration, focused group discussion (FGD. MB) just said there is no policy framework available but also asserted that such a policy needs to be formulated quickly. A similar response of the nonexistence of a policy framework was given by a focused group discussion in Nairobi code named (FGD.NA).

The other focused group discussion (FGD. MB) in Nairobi admitted that there was no written policy framework though they stated that “Islam community highly depends on Quran to guide them in all matters of faith and life including harmony and co-existence”. From the focused group discussions held in the two counties, it is fair to conclude that there is no policy framework available either specifically for cohesion and integration or for general peacebuilding activities and initiatives. Nevertheless, the members of the religion appreciate the teachings of Quran and Hadith in promoting a cohesive and integrated society. A section of the respondents further appreciates the need of crafting a policy document to be followed by Islam in Kenya in building a cohesive and integrated society.

The existence of a policy framework for cohesion and integration was further interrogated through interviews with CIPK and SUPKEM officials. According to one CIPK official interviewed in Mombasa (CIPK. M1), “there is no solid policy framework within CIPK or in the Muslim community in Kenya. There is no written document though the organization understands the work to a good level and how to go about it”. Another CIPK official in

Mombasa (CIPK. M2) stated that, “Currently there is no written policy in existence and we mostly use religious books to do the work”. He confessed that a policy is important though it is currently unavailable. A senior official at the CIPK national office (CIPK. N3) also admitted the nonexistence of a policy framework for cohesion and integration and related activities in stating, “There is no policy framework now. We are using government counter-terrorism document”. Such collaborative response by three officials from a national Muslim body proves lack of a policy framework for cohesion and integration. It is implausible that a policy may be available and be unknown to key officials of an organization like CIPK.

A senior SUPKEM official in Nairobi (SUPKEM. A) asserted that they follow the Quran to guide them in addressing cohesion and integration related issues. He stated, “we don’t have another policy on these matters”. However, the SUPKEM official said that one was being contemplated. From the various officials interviewed from Muslim national organizations, that is, SUPKEM and CIPK, it can be fairly concluded that there is no policy framework available in Islam for national cohesion and integration. The religion is guided by the teachings of Islamic religious books and more so the Quran. However, the leaders agree that such a document is necessary to effectively undertake the work.

#### **4.3 Provisions of the Policy Framework**

The questionnaire had a follow up question for those who answered “yes” on awareness of a policy framework either at the local or at the national level for cohesion and integration. Majority of those who said that they were aware of a policy framework did not give any major provision of such a framework. In most cases, they left the follow-up question blank.

However, some gave some generalized provisions for the alleged policy framework in existence. Several respondents said that the provisions are to be found in the Quran and the Hadith.

A few respondents said that Islam means peace and to that extent this is a policy by itself. Other supposed provisions for the policy framework includes: Practices of Prophet Mohammed, preaching peace, love and harmony, national Muslim leader's forum, registration of Madrassahs programs, seminars for Muslim teachers and having educated Muslim spokesmen to speak on behalf of Muslims, intercultural and inter-religious forums, Islamic banking, hosting famous Muslim scholars in mosques, Imams preaching peace during Friday prayers, streamlining Madrassahs, streamlining sermons in Mosques etc.

One respondent from Nairobi Laini Saba had the following to say for the provision of the policy framework for peace building, national cohesion and integration, "There is a policy framework for peace building national cohesion and integration in every mosque, for instance Islam peace building forum" (NQR 58). Another respondent from Nairobi County offered the following explanation for the availability of policy framework for the task, "The current de-radicalization policy promotes anti-extremist ideologies to the Muslim youths in Kenya. This movement has so far reduced the number of youths engaging in extremist ideologies" (NQR 23). Another respondent codenamed (NQR 102) had a near similar thought of the de-radicalization policy being a policy framework for cohesion and integration and stated, "The de-radicalization policy to the young Muslim youth has been introduced resulting to the reduction of terror activities in Kenya". These responses and many more from other participants through the three instruments points to lack of

understanding of what a policy framework is or non-existence of such document in Islam religion in Kenya. However, it is evident that if a policy on the task was to be developed, it would heavily be influenced by the teachings of Islam found in the holy Quran. The policy framework work for peacebuilding, cohesion and integration in Islam would also need to be synchronized with anti-radicalization policies in place since it is already familiar. Acts of terrorism which are occasionally associated with people of Somali and Islam background has been one of the major factors contributing to tensions between communities in Mombasa and Nairobi.

This objective sought to examine the policy framework for cohesion and integration in Islam. According to business online dictionary, “a policy framework is a set of principles and long-term goals that form the basis of making rules and guidelines to give an overall direction in planning and development of the organization or a program” (<http://www.businessdictionary.com>.) A policy framework hence allows for structured and organized implementation of organization’s goals as well and ongoing evaluation on the performance. Based on the responses from various data collection tools, there is no policy framework for cohesion and integration in Islam.

Decisions in an organization or for a program are well made within an existing policy framework (Henry, 2010). A policy framework for a program also enhances uniformity, clarity of the task being performed, predictability and accountability on the part of the personnel involved (Bolman and Deal, 2003). Islam religion is practiced in different parts of the country and is diverse in its form and character. Beside the different sects within the religion, there are also numerous organizations affiliated with Islam in Kenya. The absence



of a policy framework for cohesion and integration in Islam would therefore lead to particularism and expose the task to political and personal manipulation (Bolman and Deal, 2003). As a result, effectiveness in undertaking the task would greatly diminish.

As already noted, approximately 80% of respondents from both counties were not aware of a policy document for cohesion and integration or related tasks in Islam. The 20% of respondents who claimed to be aware of a policy framework for the task could not give any substantial provision of the policy framework document they claimed to be in existence. It is possible that they did not understand what a policy framework entails, or others just wanted to portray their religion in positive light. Such assertion can be collaborated with the consultancy report by Danmission which states, “most organizations have only limited if any monitoring and evaluation capacity” (DANMISSION, 2016 p.5).

Majority of the Sheikhs, Imams and Muslim scholars were unaware of the existence of a policy framework. It is unlikely that such a large number of leaders could be unaware of the existence of such an instrument if indeed it was in place. In that case, it is safe to conclude that there is no available policy framework in Islam for cohesion and integration or related tasks. Lack of policy framework means that measuring tools are not available to quantify the results (DANMISSION, 2016). As one of the implementing organization in peacebuilding, cohesion and integration, Islam needs to develop a framework for measuring progress in tasks relating to cohesion and integration.

There are several Muslim organizations in Kenya with Supreme Council of Kenyan (SUPKEM) Muslims and Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK) being the main ones. Other Muslim organizations involved in a wide range of social tasks, and were

mentioned in the field research include MUHURI, NAMLEF, HURIA and DAAWA organization. One cannot compartmentalize an organization into a particular paradigm, whether theological, political or peacebuilding owing to multiplicity of roles. (DANMISSION, 2016). Hence, for any of them to undertake an effective role in cohesion and integration, specific policy frameworks would be necessary to enhance effectiveness. Islam could have a more general policy either through SUPKEM or CIPK. The other Muslim affiliate organizations can draw from the mother policy.

Just like it was the case with the Muslim faithful, some Muslim leaders cited Quran and Hadith to be the policy frameworks for cohesion, integration and related tasks. From a professional perspective, the Holy Book and the Hadith cannot qualify as policy documents. However, they can serve as a good basis of developing a written working policy for cohesion and integration agenda through Islam religion. Muslim faithful considers Prophet Muhammad as the foremost peacebuilding champion in the Qur'an. He advocated for diversity and tolerance of differences based on gender, skin, color, language, belief and social status as variously captured in the Qur'an. Harmony between various social groups is variously appraised in the Holy Qur'an whereas competition and dominance of one group by the other is highly condemned (Abu-Nimer, 2015). The call for co-existence and collaborative exchange oriented relationships with Islam is reinforced by the Islamic Hadith, the documentation of Prophet Muhammad teachings, deeds and saying (Sinensky, 2015). These are great principles which could be factored in a policy frame work for Islam in national cohesion and integration.

According to a study undertaken by Omari Hassan Kinyua on Islamic leadership in Kenya, wrangles in leadership in Muslim organizations in Kenya emerged as a key challenge encountered by the Muslim community in Kenya (Kinyua, 2012). Lack of clear policies in undertaking important national roles such as cohesion and integration would therefore be likely prone to leadership wrangles. Such wrangles would obviously hinder the performance of Islam community in the task. It has also been observed that there exists occasional discord between Muslim organizations as they undertake varied stands on sensitive public and national matters (Kinyua, 2012). A policy document for cohesion, integration and related matters would allow for smooth consultation across various Muslim organizations and forums undertaking the task. Such consultations would obviously boast the efficiency in the task while minimizing conflicts and arbitrariness among stakeholders in Islam.

Leaders in Muslim organizations and opinion leaders in the religion would therefore need to come together and draft a policy framework to guide the task. The use of Islam religious books and the government counter-terrorism policy is not sufficient to undertake the work. It was important to hear some leaders from CIPK and SUPKEM saying that a policy framework for the task is under consideration. Such a project needs to be fast tracked for the religion to effectively participate in promoting cohesion and integration in a country where social divisions are very real. A policy framework for the task in the religion would also enable uniformity and accountability in undertaking the task from the various institutions that make up the Muslim community in Kenya.

Peacebuilding efforts through Muslim communities are likely to be hampered by the notion from the western media that Islamic religion and culture contradicts the norms of

peacebuilding, non-violence, cohesion and democracy (Abu-Nimer, 2001). Abu-Nimer view is supported by Sinensky who opines, “Many of the highly publicized conflicts that persist today are in countries where Islam is the prevailing influential culture and faith background” (Sinensky, 2015). Such an atmosphere arising from negative publicity has the potential of derailment of a widely accepted policy making and implementation process for Islam and peacebuilding activities. A viable Islam policy document would therefore need to be drafted in a way that it addresses the aggressive image of Islam already reflected through literature and policy documents emanating from western setups (Abu-Nimer, 2001). The government of Kenya and other stakeholders would therefore need to consider supporting and promoting any structured efforts by Islam in peacebuilding, cohesion and integration agenda. Such support would offer moral support to the Muslim policy makers and increase the credence of the document among the peacebuilding community.

Lack of a peacebuilding policy framework in Islam does not appear to be a deficiency only unique to the Kenyan situation. But even Nigeria, one of the countries in Africa with high levels of religious and ethnic conflicts appears to suffer from the same deficiency. Going through the website of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs (NSCIA) easily confirms this deficiency. There is nothing indicative of a framework for peacebuilding and other related tasks. Furthermore, among the 13 functional committees listed in the web, none seems to be directly involved in national cohesion and integration. This is a great deficiency in a country with such a high level of social conflicts. The shortcoming is also reflected in the aims and objectives of the Council as stated in the constitution. The aims and objectives do not capture in the remotest way possible the task of promoting harmonious co-existence, but instead address how the welfare of Islam and Muslims will be addressed

(<https://www.nscia.com.ng>). In terms of contemplating on promoting peaceful co-existence, the national Muslim organizations in Kenya, that is SUPKEM and CIPK rates far much better than the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs but in both countries there is deficiency of policy frameworks for the task.

#### **4.4 Chapter Summary**

This chapter analysis the quantitative and qualitative data amassed from the field on the existence of a policy framework for cohesion and integration. The study sites were Mombasa and Nairobi Counties, and both Muslim faithful and leaders provided pertinent information for the objective. The analysis of the data for this objective strongly pointed to a lack of policy framework for cohesion and integration for Islam in Kenya. Most of the respondents cited Quran and Hadith as the basis on which the task is undertaken by the faith in Kenya. Other respondents wrongly implied that the de-radicalization policy is the Islamic policy of cohesion and integration.

Based on the careful analysis of the data gathered with three research instruments, there is no evidence of the existence of a policy framework for cohesion and integration in Islam. It also seems that there is no policy framework for related tasks such as peacebuilding and conflict management. Neither is there a policy framework for the task housed either in SUPKEM or CIPK. While a policy may be under current contemplation, there is no sense of urgency across the board to develop one. This is not healthy, and something need to be done

to stir the process of developing a policy framework for promoting cohesion and integration in Kenya.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **METHODS AND APPROACHES USED BY ISLAM IN PROMOTING COHESION AND INTEGRATION IN KENYA**


#### **5.1 Introduction**

The objective was multipronged in examining the effectiveness of the methods used by Islam in promoting national cohesion and integration in Kenya. Within the objective, the study also sought to investigate any partnership between Islam and other actors in promoting cohesion and integration agenda in the country. The objective was undertaken by first establishing whether the areas where the respondents came from had witnessed any religious or ethnic conflicts, and if so, how the Muslim community responded in dealing with the conflicts. The respondents were also required to state the main causes of conflicts in their localities bearing in mind that the methods likely to be used are to a large extent influenced by the causes of conflicts. The research question for the objective was answered through questionnaire items, focus group discussions and interviews with key respondents. The findings are consequently presented under the following sub-headings.

#### **5.2 Incidences of Ethnic Conflicts in Nairobi and Mombasa**

From the data collected using questionnaires, the research revealed that, 30% (90) of the respondents in Mombasa had witnessed ethnic conflicts in their localities while 70% (210)

of the respondents from the same County asserted that they had not witnessed ethnic conflicts in their localities. In Nairobi County, 54.9% (79) had witnessed ethnic conflicts in their localities while 45.1% (65) of the respondents stated that they had not encountered ethnic conflicts in their localities. Overall it seems that 38.1% (169) of the respondents from the two counties had witnessed some form of ethnic conflicts from their localities while 61.9% (275) had not witnessed such conflicts in their localities. The findings are presented in the graph below:



**Figure 5.1: Percentages of those who had witnessed/not witnessed ethnic conflicts in their localities**

**(Source: Field Data, 2017).**

The percentages affirmed that ethnic conflicts in the two counties is a reality but with more incidences in Nairobi County as compared to Mombasa County. In Nairobi County, majority of the people lives in the low-income residential neighborhood and informal settlements locally known as slums. The low-income residential areas of Nairobi are Kibera, Mathare,



Dandora, Huruma, Kariobangi Korogocho, Kangemi and Githurai just to mention a few. Informal settlements keep on springing up owing to the growing population in Nairobi which do not always match with the availability of decent housing. Most times these neighborhoods in Nairobi are characterized by high incidences of crime including murder and illegal administration of taxes by ethnically based militia groups (*Waki et al 2009*). The prevalence of ethnically based militia groups is much lower in Mombasa as compared to Nairobi. The high prevalence of ethnic militia would naturally have some contribution to ethnically based conflicts more so during elections period.

Nairobi slums offers an accurate model of the ethnization of politics in Kenya. The ethnization of politics in the city slums could be explained by the false illusion of the poor slum dwellers that one of their own would someday rescue them from the socio-economic struggles they have to contend with on a day to day basis. Aware of this fallacy with the urban poor residents, Kenyan politicians have not hesitated to exploit the emotions of the slum dwellers to help them ascend to power (Okombo and Sana, 2010). The past ethnically based conflicts around the electioneering period in Nairobi have largely been anchored on this phenomenon.

The centrality of the slums in city politics could further be explained by the larger number of people who lives there and hence the possible number of voters. Secondly, the money factor through bribing to sway voting patterns is more rampant in these poverty-stricken residential areas for the obvious reasons. Consequently, the ethnically based militia groups are highly sought by political contestants during election times. In trying to make sense of the

ethnically based violence that took place in Nairobi in 2007/2008 PEV, Waki report states in part,

It is not surprising therefore that the NSIS in its security briefing of 24<sup>th</sup> December 2007 noted that all Nairobi's eight constituencies were potential flashpoints due to the fact that the stakes in the 2007 General Elections were extremely high. Some politicians had consequently enlisted the support of multiple (ethnically based) gangs like *Mungiki* to intimidate opponents (Waki *et al*, 2009 p.194).

The Waki report therefore pointed to tribal loyalties and ethnic mix in the city politics as a factor that hugely contributes to patterns of violence in Nairobi during electioneering seasons. The affiliation of militias to ethnic groups, for example *Taliban* to Luo community and *Mungiki* to Kikuyu community is definitely a factor that contributes to ethnically based conflicts in the City during elective politics.

The animosity of the Kikuyu landlords with tenants who are mostly drawn from the Luo and the Luhya communities also contributes to ethnically based conflicts in Nairobi. Owing to suspicion of the tenants from the two communities refusing to pay rent as a result of political incitement, the Kikuyu landlords have previously given vacation notices to tenants, a move that is considered unjust and hence highly resisted by the Luo and Luhya tenants. This has been a source of ethnic tensions in most of the low-income residential areas in Nairobi.


To support tenant-landlord ethnic tensions, Kombo and Sana in quoting Waki states, "The violence (2007/2008 PEV) was also characterized by forceful displacement and evictions while areas such as Dandora and Mathare North saw deep seated rent disputes escalating to violence" (Waki as quoted by Okombo and Sana, 2010 p.12). Such an ethnically based

landlord-tenant squabbles are not known to be rampant in the Coastal City of Mombasa. The Waki report which also extensively investigated the PEV in the Coastal Region did not attest to such a widespread pattern. Neither did the Akiwumi report on 1997 tribal clashes suggest that tenant-landlord squabbles were underlying factors which motivated the inter-ethnic conflicts in Mombasa or the larger coastal region in build-up to the 1997 General Elections. Instead the 1997 Likoni clashes were more motivated by intimidation of the up-country people living there against voting for the opposition candidates. This would allegedly allow the ruling KANU to gain some grounds it had lost in the Coast since the first multi-party election held in 1992 (Akiwumi Report, 1999). Such a phenomenon brings out another perspective of politically motivated conflicts whereby the state supports conflicts based on ethnic suspicions in some regions. This has been a characteristic of Kenyan conflicts in the past.

### **5.3 Incidences of Religious Conflicts in Nairobi and Mombasa**

The data collected from Mombasa revealed that, only 29.3% (88) of the respondents had at one time or the other witnessed religious chaos and conflicts in their localities while an overwhelming majority totaling 70.7% (212) from the same County stated that they had never experienced religious conflicts in their localities. In Nairobi County, only 24.3% (35) of the respondents had encountered some religious related conflicts in their localities while a whopping 75.7% (109) were categorical that they had not experienced religious conflicts in their areas of residence. On average, it seems that only about 28% (123) of the respondents from the two counties had witnessed conflicts of religious nature in their localities while 72% (321) had not witnessed conflicts of that nature. This percentage is a clear indicator that there have been incidences of religious conflicts in the two cosmopolitan counties of Kenya

in the past. The incidence rate at which religious conflicts have been witnessed in the two counties is as presented in the following bar graph:



**Figure 5. 2: Percentages of respondents who had witnessed/not witnessed religious conflicts in their localities**

**(Source: Field Data, 2017).**

The percentages challenge the popularly held notion of religious tolerance in Kenya. The average of 27.7% of those who have ever witnessed instances of religious conflicts is worrying in a country assumed to have citizens with high levels of religious tolerance. It is even more significant that the City of Nairobi could register these high instances of religious conflicts.

According to those who had either witnessed religious or ethnic conflicts in their counties, the Muslim community responded variously as it will be shown in the next section. However, a sizeable number of the respondents did not attend to the follow-up question on

how the Muslim community responded to the conflicts witnessed in their respective areas of residence.

The data gathered through questionnaires, focus group discussions and interviews confirmed that there are incidences of ethnic and religious conflict in Mombasa and Nairobi. The literature review had pointed to incidences of these conflict in other parts of the country beside the two counties as noted by various authors (Akama 2012; Mghanga 2010; Okombo 2009; Jonyo 2003 and Nyukuri 1997). The field data revealed higher incidences of ethnic conflicts in Nairobi than in Mombasa. However, there were slightly more people who had witnessed religious conflicts in Mombasa (29%) compared to those who had witnessed the same in Nairobi County (24%). This would imply more likelihood of religious conflicts in Mombasa as compared to Nairobi. The indigenous people of Mombasa with high leaning towards Islam considers it the religion of the City.

Most of the immigrants from the upcountry have Christian backgrounds which they would love to conserve. With an enabling political or social-economic environment and grievances, religious conflict is easier to trigger, unlike in the city of Nairobi where none of the two religious backgrounds could claim earliest occupancy, though Christianity have majority following. Furthermore, religion is one of the factor known to have ignited conflict in Mombasa in the past alongside race, ethnicity and political supremacy (Waki *et al* 2009). The next section explores the various ways in which the religious community responded to religious and ethnic conflicts in Mombasa and Nairobi counties.

#### **5.4 Response to Ethnic and Religious Conflicts by Muslims**

There were various ways in which the Muslim community and their leaders responded to ethnic and religious conflicts when they occurred in their localities. According to several respondents, the religious leaders preached peace and reconciliation when religious or ethnic related conflicts occurred. To support this a respondent from Nairobi had the following to say, “The Muslims leaders convened a gathering where they emphasized togetherness and peace. At times elders from the conflicting parties were engaged to help resolve the matter at hand” (QRN 78). Reaching out to the conflicting parties seems to be something the Islam community through their leaders have applied in resolving conflicts when they occur in their areas. This is further supported by another respondent from Mombasa who stated, “the Muslim leaders reached out to the conflicting parties and preached peaceful co-existence in reference to the teachings of the holy Quran” (QRM 103).

In the event of religious related tensions and terror related activities, the Muslim leaders including Sheikhs and Imams shed light on the provisions of Quran and Hadith on peaceful co-existence for all people. In cases of religious conflicts where Muslims were a party to the conflict, the Muslim leaders took upon themselves the task of preaching peace and advising the youths. This happened mostly in their daily prayer times and on the Friday major gatherings for the Muslim communities. Such initiatives contributed positively in cooling down the tensions between communities.

One respondent said that in times of increased tensions, reconciliatory messages were preached such as, “All human beings are the same, whether an Arab or African all are the same before the eyes of God. Muslims and Christians are all equal as human beings, only

that they are different in religious beliefs and preferences” (QRN 102). Such sentiments were widely shared by other respondents though using other unique ways of expressing the point. Other ways of responding to the conflicts includes: formation of peace and reconciliation boards; organizing interfaith forums to address the contentious issues; using madrassah to preach peace and harmony; working closely with the administrative offices and responding to the felt needs of the affected people irrespective of their ethnic or religious affiliations.

The formation of permanent peace forums out of a conflict experience have happened in few occasions following a conflict situation both in Mombasa and Nairobi. An ethnic conflict which was fueled by political competition in Kibra residential area of Nairobi led to the birth of Kenya Nubian Council of Elders. A respondent from the area who witnessed the formation of the council stated,

When there were ethnic based conflicts in Kibra, the local Muslim community responded quiet positively. The Muslim community took the initiative of contacting the local leadership of the warring communities for a peace meeting under the slogan, ‘there is life for all after the elections. Peace was restored and the initiative gave birth to the Kenya Nubia Council of Elders, the first in the country (QRN 113).

This was one of the few instances that a conflict situation has given rise to the more preferred permanent mechanisms and frameworks for conflict resolutions in warring communities. More often, most responses are temporal, only aimed at addressing the immediate challenge.

## **5.5 Causes of Conflicts in Nairobi and Mombasa**

To better understand the methods applied or applicable in cohesion and integration, one of the questionnaire items required the respondents to state some major causes of conflicts in their localities. The following is a summary of some of the points raised by the respondents across the board in the two counties: land disputes; political affiliation, political interference and competition, religious differences, competition and varying opinions, negative ethnicity expressed in form of ethnic supremacy and dominance, competition for scarce basic resources such as water, mistrust and suspicion among people of different ethnicities and religious affiliations, poverty and lack of employment. Other factors cited as causes of conflicts and weakened bond between communities are disrespectful relations and interactions between people from diverse backgrounds, limited knowledge in religious beliefs and creeds, negative stereotypes, radicalization and terror activities, drugs trafficking and abuse.

A huge number of respondents in Nairobi associated the occurrence of conflicts with politics, tribalism and competition for resources. The political causes of conflicts are normally witnessed during elections periods as the “us versus them” rhetoric takes a center stage. Politicians normally invoke the ethnic cards while promising more access to resources in case one of their own is in power. In the city of Nairobi, as it is the case with other cosmopolitan electoral constituencies, politicians have a tendency of invoking the ethnic and resource allocation cards to gain political advantage over their opponents. It was interesting to realize that the respondents in Nairobi could easily associate conflicts with politics as it has been done by various authors on the subject. Both Akiwumi (1999) and



Waki (2009) have closely associated the ethnic conflicts in Nairobi to political competition engineered by political players along ethnic lines.

In Mombasa County, conflicts are occasionally caused by the feeling of marginalization of the local communities. This is argued on the basis of the natives versus the non-indigenous divide. Waki *et al* states that “Some ethnic groups have been classified as ‘insiders’ or indigenous communities, while other communities are routinely referred to as ‘outsiders’”. These are the Kamba, Kikuyu, Luo and other upcountry people resident at the Coast” (Waki *et al* 2009 p. 219). This classification was used to fuel the 1997 clashes in Likoni and Kwale (Akiwumi *et al*, 1999). There is a feeling that outsiders have an advantage in land ownership and employment opportunities over the communities who are considered to be native. In stating some of the causes of conflicts, a respondent in Mombasa echoed the feeling in stating, “lack of opportunities due to unfairness is a major cause of conflict in the coast. Opportunities are given to people from upcountry while the coastal people are left out” (QRM 27). This assertion cannot fully explain the causes of conflicts in Mombasa and other parts of the coastal region. For example, there have been incidences of conflicts in the region which involved communities considered native. Political competition provides a ripe environment to amplify the alleged marginalization of the local people. Otherwise, if marginalization was the main factor, then conflict would be the order of the day. It would therefore be fair to conclude that, conflicts in Mombasa and the larger coastal region is a complex phenomenon caused by a multiplicity of factors.

Based on the outcome of the field data, the causes of conflicts in Mombasa and Nairobi counties are social, political and economic in nature. The respondents gave ethnic and

religious suspicions as key drivers of strained co-existence between communities belonging to different religious and ethnic backgrounds. The social cause in many times take the dimension of stereotyping of people from certain ethnic and social backgrounds. Muslims have been branded terrorists by many people from other religious backgrounds and more so Christians. In such an environment, the trust between the members of the two religions in Kenya has been diminishing and eroding over time. As a result, there is a strong feeling of victimization and profiling among the Muslim community in the country. On the other hand, members of the Kikuyu community have been stereotyped as thieves and economically privileged, though there are thieves from across ethnic groups whereas some members of the Kikuyu community remain poor. Similarly, the stereotyping of Luo as proud and arrogant is not accurate. Arrogance is something that can be found with people across diverse ethnic communities. Even the positive stereotype of hard work among members of the Kikuyu community is inaccurate as lazy people are still there.

The political causes of conflict are normally witnessed in high political seasons such as during the electioneering period. During such times, the “us versus them” rhetoric becomes unusually high as politicians invokes religious and ethnic cards to gain selfish political mileage. Communities are reminded of how different they are from people of other ethnicities and religions, yet these communities have always lived together for years. Hansen (2009) describes politically motivated conflict as the commission of violent acts largely motivated by the urge to obtain or access political power. As it is the case in other parts of Africa, and indeed even beyond the continent, politicians have a tendency of using conflict as a ladder for ascending to political positions.

Political and social causes of conflict are closely related to economic factors. Indeed, political and social factors are usually but not always triggered by economic conditions of communities. In Kenya, there is a tendency of some communities being viewed as economically advantaged compared to others. Such communities easily become a target of conflict from those who feel marginalized. There is always a stiff competition for scarce resources and opportunities among poor communities. In most cases, such competition triggers the “us versus them” divide. In the past, ethnic communities in the two counties under study have tended to blame their rival communities for their economic misfortunes. In the coast region, the indigenous communities have blamed land scarcity on the settlers’ up-country ethnic groups. This have always been a potential source of conflict, with its climax occurring in the 1997 tribal clashes in Likoni and other parts of the Coastal region (Goldsmith, 2011, Waki et al 2009; Akiwumi, 1999). Such a claim goes against the spirit of the Kenyan constitution which allows citizens to settle and own property on any part of the country.

### **5.6 Strategies for promoting Inter-Ethnic and Interreligious Co-existence**

Much of the conflict witnessed in Kenya has been ethnic in nature though the underlying factors are diverse. Religious based conflicts have also been witnessed at different times and more so in the wake of increased terror related activities across the country. Two questionnaire items sought to know the strategies used by the Islam community in promoting ethnic harmony and inter-religious co-existence. The Focus Group Discussion guide as well as the Interview Protocols also had items relating to methods and strategies used by Islam in promoting national cohesion and integration in Kenya. Addressing ethnic

harmony and inter-religious would in many ways contribute to a cohesive and integrated nation.

The respondents through questionnaires and FGDs stated the following as ways through which ethnic harmony and religious co-existence are promoted in their respective counties by Islam: Teaching people more on religion so that they can separate the true teachings from heresies; holding public forums where contentious issues among ethnic groups and religions are addressed; interfaith forums and interfaith road shows to build rapport and mend bridges; co-operation in business ventures where by Muslims closely work with people from other religious convictions; organizing sporting activities which accommodate people from different religions and ethnic groups; organizing cultural festivals to promote mutual understanding and using Quran and other Islam religious sources like hadith to teach tolerance. A few respondents could be quoted on their views on the methods and strategies employed by Muslims in promoting dialogue and harmony between communities. A respondents codenamed QRN 079 sated,

Islam undertake inter-community social activities such as football tournaments, and educational forums. In these activities, youth and the old people interact and debate the issues that are affecting them as a community. They share ideas that can strengthen the bond between the different religious and ethnic groups that live within the area (QRN 079).

It has been widely acknowledged in various forums that sporting has a way of bringing Kenyans together. Indeed, sports have not only offered Kenya a great publicity in the international arena, but it has also acted as tool for national cohesion. When Kenyan sportsmen and sportswomen scoop trophies in international stage, the nation celebrate

together irrespective of ethnic or religious affiliations. This is something that has been acknowledge in variety of media outlets in the country. During such times, leaders and common citizens challenge each other to identify themselves as Kenyan first even in other times as they do during sporting activities.

Using sport is therefore a very effective approach of promoting a cohesive and integrated society in Kenya. Mazrui (1986) as quoted by Mwisukha *et al* states that sport is recognized as symbol of national unity in the country. Njiru and Nyaga further asserts that “with a total of 42 ethnic groups, as well as people of diverse religions and racial backgrounds, sports have rightly acted as a tool for integration and co-existence of people” (Njiru and Nyaga 1988). The use of sports by Islam in promoting cohesion and integration was also acknowledged by other respondents both in Nairobi and Mombasa. A respondent from Nairobi code named (QRN 043) stated, “There are sporting activities regularly organized in Eastleigh by an interfaith committee made up of Christians and Muslims” while a respondent from Mombasa code named (QRM 111) stated, “Muslims use sports as a channel of bringing people from diverse religions under one umbrella of peace hence discouraging any form of discrimination in the community”. With the evidence provided by respondents across the spectrum, it could easily be concluded that the Islam community has severally applied sporting as a strategy of promoting cohesion and integration in communities which could potentially fight. The Muslim community would therefore be commended for adopting such a strategy as it would mean building on what is already in the common psyche of the people of Kenya from many walks of life.

Other strategies cited as used by the Islam religion in promoting cohesion and integration include: Using the mass media platforms to preach peace and tolerance; education through

the Friday weekly bulletins and other written forums; encouraging inter-marriages across religions and diverse ethnic groups; providing social amenities like water and schools for use by people of all social backgrounds; enlisting the services of Muslims scholars to explain the Quran and other important concepts needed for peaceful co-existence. These are some of the responses given in the related questionnaire items by respondents from the two counties. A few of them will be elaborated further in the discussion section of this chapter.

### **5.7 Muslim Organizations Working for Cohesion and Integration**

The questionnaire item sought to investigate whether the respondents were aware of any Muslim NGO or organization working for cohesion, integration and peace building. Out of the 300 respondents who answered the question in Mombasa, 38.7% (116) said they were aware of such organizations while 61.3% (184) said that they were not aware of it. The following organizations featured severally from respondents in Mombasa: Supreme Council of Muslims in Kenya (SUPKEM); Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK); Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI); Muslim Education and Welfare Association and Haki Africa. At least, these names were mentioned by more than five respondents. Other organizations which featured in the response at least twice, but less than five times include: Changanwe Muslim Association; Madrassa Resource Centre; Likoni Community Development Program; Association of Muslim Patrons, and HURIA. Most of these organizations named performed many tasks but promoting peace and harmony was one of their key roles. It is important to note that, a substantial number of respondents who had indicated awareness of an organization working for peace, cohesion and integration did not provide a single name for such an organization. The lack of ability to recall the names would also imply less concern on the part of the respondents or perhaps little involvement on the


part of the organizations. At worst, such organizations might just be brief case NGOs as it has become the case in many parts of Africa.

In Nairobi County, out of 144 respondents 45.8% (66) were aware of a Muslim NGO working for peace and for a cohesive and integrative society. A total of 54.2% (78) respondents were not aware of such an NGO in Nairobi County. The names of NGOs severally mentioned by respondents in Nairobi are: Nasrudeen Uprising Youth Group; Amani Association; DAAWA Organization; County Muslim Forum; Supreme Council of Muslims in Kenya; Muslim Youth Group; Peace and Awareness among Youth (PAY); Alliance for Middle East Peace; Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI); Kenya Muslim Youth Alliance (KMYA); NAMLEF; Kibera Muslim Youth Groups and Umma for humanity. The percentages of the awareness of Muslim NGO working for peace building, cohesion and integration is presented in the table and the graph below,

**Table 5.1: Awareness of Muslim NGOs working for peace**

	Mombasa		Nairobi		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	116	38.7	66	45.8	182	41.0
No	184	61.3	78	54.2	262	59.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>444</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Source: Field Data, 2017)



**Figure 5.3: Awareness of Muslim NGO working for peace**

**(Source: Field Data, 2017)**

The table below highlights the commonly mentioned Muslim NGO’s working for cohesion, integration and related work and the role undertaken in Nairobi and Mombasa Counties.



**Table 5.2: Muslim organizations and their work**

	<b>NAME OF THE MUSLIM NGO</b>	<b>NATURE OF WORK UNDERTAKEN</b>
1	SUPKEM	Deals with a wide range of issues regarding Muslims; promoting peace and security; Lobbying for Muslim rights etc.
2	CIPK	They spearhead in preaching peace and promote co-existence between Muslims and other communities.
3	MUHURI	Promoting human rights
4	NAMLEF	Educating Muslims on the true meaning of Islam.
5	KEMYA	Hold public meetings to promote peaceful co-existence.
6	PAY	Creating awareness among youth on the importance of peace; building a safe environment for young people.
7	NASRUDEEN	Uniting Muslim brothers and sisters
8	MEWA	Muslim Education and welfare
9	Association of Muslim Patrons	Promoting true understanding of Islam.
10	Haki Africa	No specific role provided.
11	HURIA	No specific role provided.
12	DAAWA Organization	For educating and expanding peace in the community.
13	<i>Ummah</i> for Humanity	No specific role provided.
14	<i>Ummah</i> Foundation	No specific role provided.

**(Source: Field Data, 2017)**

The Muslim organizations listed above play many crucial roles in the social welfare of Muslim populations. Whereas not all the mentioned organization are directly involved in peaceful co-existence a few do. The others could still be seen to indirectly work for peaceful co-existence internally and externally. Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI) appears to be the most vibrant Muslim organizations in the promotion of human rights and to some extent in the peacebuilding activities among those identified in the study.

### **5.8 Cooperation of Islam with other Actors**

Islam was reported to have slightly engaged other actors in promoting cohesion and integration in the country. Occasionally, Muslims have initiated joint peace meetings with the churches in Mombasa and Nairobi after which joint press statements have been issued to the public. Muslims have also held joint seminars and workshops with other religious groups to campaign for peaceful co-existence in the two counties. For instance, a respondent from Kibra in Nairobi stated, “Islam community has engaged other actors by involving them in discussions and planning for peace rallies aimed at building cohesion and integration among the members of the Kibra community” (QRN 053). Another respondent stated that Muslims invite other actors in forums that teach cohesion and integration (QRN 057) while a respondent codenamed (QRN 035) stated that their engagement with other actors partly involves sitting with those who are Christians in solving problems of common concern. Such a view was supported by yet another respondent from Nairobi who said that Muslims engages other actors by organizing community clean-ups and campaigns against drugs, violence and Female Genital Mutilation (FGM). Bringing the members of the community to discuss and reflect on matters that commonly affect the wider society is a power tool. In

such forums, people are able to see the things that affect humanity in general and hence get united in addressing them together irrespective of their social orientation.

Other ways through which Islam has engaged other actors in promoting cohesion and integration includes: Inviting Christians for interreligious dialogues; a common approach in dealing with common challenges such as drug abuse, crime, Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) etc. In the evaluation of this researcher, the cooperation and engagement does not seem structured, but it is more situational. It is usually prompted by an occurrence of a certain event or series of events which bring concern in the wider society.


### 5.8.1 Non-State Actors Involving Islam in Cohesion and Integration

The following table and graph summarize the respondents' views on whether other actors beside the government have involved Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in their localities:

**Table 5.3: Other non-state actors involving Islam in cohesion and integration**

	Mombasa		Nairobi		Total	
	Count	%	Count	%	Count	%
Yes	48	16.3	27	18.8	75	17.1
No	88	29.9	34	23.6	122	27.9
I Don't know	158	53.7	83	57.6	241	55.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>294</b>	100.0	<b>144</b>	100.0	<b>438</b>	100.0

(Source: Field Data, 2017).



**Figure 5.4: Other non-state actors involving Islam in cohesion and integration**  
 (Source: Field Data, 2017).

From the graph above, 29.9% (88) of respondents from Mombasa County were of the view that other actors have not involved Islam in national cohesion and integration. However, 16.3% (48) affirmed that other actors had indeed involved Islam in national cohesion and integration while an overwhelming number of respondents standing at 53.7% (158) did not know whether there was any involvement or none from other non-state actors with Islam in national cohesion and integration. The “I don’t know” would to some extent imply non-involvement of Muslims by other non-state actors in cohesion and integration in Mombasa County.

In Nairobi County, only 18.8% (27) people believed that other non-state actors have involved Islam in national cohesion and integration while 23.6% (34) believed other actors had not involved Islam in cohesion and integration exercise. As it was the case of response from Mombasa, majority of respondents did not know of such involvement only that such a

response stood at 57.6% (83) compared to Mombasa where “I don’t know” stood at 53.7% (153). As it was the case in Mombasa, the “I don’t know” response would to some extent point to non-involvement of Islam by other non-state actors in cohesion and integration work.

From the percentage of those who were aware of other non-state actors involving Islam in cohesion and integration, very few of them answered the follow up question on the names of these bodies and the nature of their work. However, a few respondents from both counties mentioned the church as one of the non-state actors which involved Islam in cohesion and integration activities. Other non-governmental bodies which were remotely mentioned to have involved Islam include: Oslo Centre for peace; Haki Africa; World Vision; Nubian Right Forum (NRF); Red Cross and council of elders. Nothing substantial was mentioned on the nature of involvement. These responses would point to a scenario whereby, other non-state actors rarely involve Muslims in cohesion and integration agenda.

On partnership with other non-state actors in promoting national cohesion and integration, the respondents in FGDs indicated that there is minimal involvement of Islam by non-state actors in national cohesion and integration efforts. Indeed, the church which is the largest religion did not offer great partnership to Islam in national cohesion and integration. In Mombasa, World Vision, which is a Christian NGO was said to be working closely with both Muslims and Christians in promoting peaceful and harmonious co-existence. Other non-state actors which were mentioned by a few respondents include a section of the media (Such as Pamoja FM and IQRA FM).

Interviews were conducted with NCKK officials, denominational leaders of selected churches in Nairobi and Mombasa, national Muslim institutions, which are SUPKEM and CIPK and Sub-County officials to gauge the nature of partnership between Islam and other bodies in national cohesion and integration. The church leaders generally pointed to little cooperation between the church and Islam in both counties in promoting national cohesion and integration. For example, the Catholic Church in Mombasa and Nairobi is active in the task through PJRC and the Small Christian Communities (SCC). However, there is minimal engagement with Muslims and Muslim institutions in the task. Occasionally, there is some partnership with SUPKEM and CIPK. The same came out in interviews with key officials from the Anglican Church and the NCKK in Mombasa and Nairobi Counties. Church institutions seemed to be more comfortable working with other church institutions and denominations. Some church leaders cited lack of grass root structures in Islam as the cause of minimal co-operation with Muslims. Radicalization activities leading to terrorism and sectarianism among Muslims was cited by church leaders as a key barrier to meaningful partnership between the members of the two major religious backgrounds in Kenya. Islam religion has been closely associated with terrorism as most of the people who engage in the vice claims to be executing a religious duty.

The respondents from CIPK and SUPKEM indicated that they have cooperated with Civil Society groups; Danish Embassy and other religious groups including Christians in promoting peaceful a co-existence. There was also a light mention of direct and occasional partnership with the church or the NCKK especially at the regional and national levels. In Mombasa, there was a general agreement that Islam and the church cooperate through the CICC. Generally, Islam and the church mostly come together to respond to the occurrence

of a certain event such as terror attack or social conflicts. From the views collected through interviews and FGDs, it is abundantly evident that there is little structured and continuous engagement between the two main religious groups in Kenya.


### 5.8.2 State-Actors Involving Islam in Cohesion and Integration

Information used to determine whether the state actors involved Islam in efforts towards building a cohesive and integrated nation was sought through questionnaires, FGDs with Muslim faithful and interview with Sub-County Commissioners, Assistant Sub-County Commissioners and officials from National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC). The following table and graph summarize the questionnaire respondents' views on whether there has been any co-operation between the state actors (government agencies) and Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in their localities.

**Table 5. 4: State actors involving Islam in national cohesion and integration**

	<b>Mombasa</b>		<b>Nairobi</b>		<b>Total</b>	
	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Yes	84	28.4	60	41.7	144	32.7
No	84	28.4	22	15.3	106	24.1
I Don't know	128	43.2	62	43.1	190	43.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>440</b>	<b>100.0</b>

(Source: Field Data,2017).



**Figure 5.5: State actors involving Islam in national cohesion and integration**  
 (Source: Field Data,2017).

From the table and the graph above, the two counties had an average of 43.2% (190) of the respondents who indicated that they did not know whether there was any cooperation between Islam and government actors in cohesion and integration related works. Those who affirmed of cooperation between Islam and the state actors in national cohesion and integration stood at 32.7% (144) while 24.1% (106) asserted that there was no known cooperation between the state and Islam in national cohesion and integration activities. In Mombasa County only 28.4% (84) affirmed that there was cooperation between the state actors and Islam in cohesion and integration while in Nairobi, 41.7% (60) were aware of some form of cooperation between the government and Islam in promoting cohesion and integration.

The following were some respondents' views from Mombasa on how the state actors have cooperated with Islam in cohesion and integration and related tasks: Police work with



Muslim leaders to get information on perpetrators (QRM 039); We (Muslims) involve County Commissioners to bring both the Muslims and Christians together to spread the message of peace to their respective places (QRM 111); the chiefs in some areas have cooperated with religious leaders, including Muslim leaders to spread peace in potentially volatile areas (QRM 114). From Nairobi County, a sample of respondents had the following to say regarding cooperation of Muslims with states actors: The umbrella Muslim body, that is SUPKEM has cooperated with the government on a wide range of matters to promote social harmony (QRN 70); the Muslim community has on a number of times made presentations to the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) on a number of grievances which would bring healing if well addressed (QRN 034). Although most of the respondents did not attend to the questionnaire item, there are leads from the few who responded of a possible constructive past engagements between Islam and other others.

On partnership with government agencies, some respondents in FGDs stated that Islam was cooperating with the government to fight terror activities which in many occasions cause tension between Muslims and non-Muslims. The government of Kenya has also taken positive steps that make Muslims feel they are accommodated in the country in such ways as accommodation of Islamic Banking principles and allowing for the provision of the Kadhis Court in the country. Other mode of partnership between Islam and the state includes joint seminars on various matters for common good; key government and political leaders including the president joining Muslims in celebrating their national religious holidays. Nevertheless, the efforts by the state agencies to partner with Muslims were noted to be very minimal. For example, there was no mention of the NCIC partnering with Muslims in a major way in the promotion of national cohesion and integration. Yet Islam is the second

largest religion in the country and some Muslim dominated areas such as the Coast and Northeastern regions have been key conflict centers.

Whereas not much details on cooperation with Islam were offered, the Assistant County Commissioners interviewed in Mombasa and Nairobi pointed to some mode of cooperation with Islam in promoting a cohesive and integrated societies in their respective Sub-Counties. In describing the extent of partnership with Islam, an ACC from Mombasa code-named (ACC M2) stated that the government was working with Muslim Youth Alliance (MYA) in teaching the youths while various Muslim leaders have been appointed in various Sub-County Community Committees. However, some challenges were pointed out in cooperating with Islam in the task. The Assistant County Commissioner in one of the Sub-Counties in Mombasa stated, “Islam is rigid and so getting a middle ground is difficult; challenge of radicalization; Muslims feeling discriminated in the issuance of ID and other documents” (ACC M1). An Assistant County Commissioner in a Sub-County in Nairobi (ACC N2) stated that there is minimal participation by Muslim leaders in the activities and that is a major challenge they encounter in partnering with Islam.

Islam has attempted to promote cohesion and integration in Kenya using various strategies. The most quoted methods and strategies in promoting cohesion and integration in Kenya are: Increased messages of peace in times of conflict, enlightening Muslims and the publics on the provision of Quran and Hadith on peace, utilizing madrassa programs to promote peace, use of sporting activities, Interfaith forums and the use of mass media. Some of these are elaborated in the subsequent paragraphs in view of the field responses and the related literature.

A key method used by Islam in Kenya to promote peaceful co-existence is through issuance of statements calling for peace by the leaders. It is commonly known that the voice of a leader is a powerful resource for social transformation. Browsing through recent copies of Friday Bulletin, Muslim leaders are quoted calling for peace and dialogue among the politicians and other stakeholders in the interest of peace in the country. Provoked by the heightened political standoff following the 2017 general elections in Kenya, a Jamia Committee member, Sheikh Ibrahim Lethome called upon political leaders to unite the country through dialogue. He called upon President Uhuru Kenyatta not to chest thumb. At the same time, the Muslim leader also called upon the leader of opposition, Raila Odinga to drop the plans for the parallel swearing in ceremony. Sheikh Ibrahim Lethome further called upon Kenyans to shun divisive politics and co-exist harmoniously (Friday Bulletin, Nov. 24, 2017). Such a call by a key religious leader is prove of genuine interest of a united country on his part and to some extent the religion he leads.

Shortly before the commencement of Ramadhan in 2015, a Muslim leader also attached to Jamia Mosque called upon the Muslims to make peace and unity their priority during Ramadhan. The cleric emphasized the fact that, Islam religion is essentially about peace and Muslims should spearhead peaceful co-existence which is essential for socio-economic development in Kenya (Friday Bulletin, June 12, 2015). In the previous week, a visiting South African scholar, Sheikh Ebrahim Bham had called Muslim leaders to use mosques in nurturing unity in the country. The Secretary General of Muslim Theologians in South Africa rightly noted that, “A mosque is a unique institution which brings people together...regardless of their ethnic backgrounds”. (Friday Bulletin, June 5, 2015). This is

very factual in Kenya, since Islam has drawn members from different ethnic groups. Indeed, such was noted by some respondents who filled the questionnaire for the study.

Such calls and many more from Muslim leaders is much useful in sending reconciliatory tone to the warring political leaders and the divided communities. Muslim leaders have severally participated in talks convened by the civil society to end political standoffs in the country. For example, in the year 2016, a panel was formed to appoint new Independent Election and Boundary Commission (IEBC) as a way of solving the ensuing political standoff ahead of 2017 general elections. The Vice-Chair of the Panel was a Muslim, Sheikh Abdulghafur El Busaidy from the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims.

Another method commonly used by Islam to promote a cohesive and integrated Kenya is through teaching in Mosques. Islam mostly uses Quran and Hadith to teach the true meaning of Islam and the religions teaching about peace. The Quran and Hadith have many portions which speak about the need of people to live harmoniously. For example, there is a portion in Quran that states, “O mankind! We have created you from a male and female and made you into nations and tribes that you may know one another. Verily, the most honorable of you with Allah is the one who has piety” (Q 49:13). This and other portions of the Quran have been used to by Muslim leaders in their teachings to depict an Allah who is peace loving as opposed to promoting conflict between communities. Such teachings would agree with the general assertions of Ashrof (2017), “The unity of the people makes an invincible strong nation. This is the reason Islam lays great stress on the importance of unity. Unity teaches peace, equality and fraternity. The absence of unity brings and breeds disruption, devastation and disputes” (p 34). This is the view held by majority of Muslim leaders in

Kenya and they are indeed teaching the same in the mosque gatherings as stated in the previous paragraphs. This is a bare indication that a huge number of adherents to Islam around the world are peace loving people, a fact that would vindicate Islam from the common notion in the West of a violent religion.

Many Sheikhs and Imams have taken advantage of Muslim daily meetings and the major meetings on Fridays to enlighten members about the provisions of Quran and Hadith in peaceful co-existence between communities. This was a fact that came out strongly from the data collected through questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions. A respondent in Nairobi stated, “One method of promoting ethnic and religious co-existence is through sermons delivered by Imams in Mosques during the Friday gatherings” (QRN 116). Another respondent from Nairobi stated, “One of the best methods applied by Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in the society is using the Friday meetings whereby Muslim scholars are invited to enlighten Muslims on the teachings of Quran concerning the subject” (QRN 36). Such assertions were collaborated by reports in several Friday bulletins and points to the constant use of teaching as a medium of influencing adherents of religion toward an appreciation of just, peaceful and harmonious society.

In one of the Mosque gathering in East Leigh Nairobi, the Imam of the Abubakar Mosque urged the young people to shun un-Islamic teachings which are being spread by people harboring evil motives to cause tension between Christians and Muslims in the country. The Imam further urged the youths to counter the threat of radicalization and extremism by following the teachings and guidance of credible and renowned Muslim scholars (Friday Bulletin, June 19, 2015). Such a statement is sufficient evidence that right teachings on

Islam are being used as a tool to counter the wrong narratives about Islam being used by crooked individuals. Education has a way of bringing a behavior change, and this is a tool that Muslim leaders are utilizing effectively in the Kenyan context.

Sporting activities is yet another resource that Muslim communities in Kenya have utilized to promote cohesion and integration. This is an appropriate strategy as Kenya is famous internationally for some sporting activities especially the long races. A number of respondents demonstrated how Islam is using sports to promote a cohesive and integrated society both in Mombasa and Nairobi. Nebe quotes Kipchoge Keino, a retired Kenyan athlete in showing the role of sports in promoting social cohesion, “Through sports, many bridges can be built which promote collaboration and stimulate responsibility in communities...sports as a universal language can be a powerful tool to promote peace by bridging people across boundaries, cultures and religions” (Nebe, 2012 p. 196-197). The strategy of sports has also been applied by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) in their work. During a peace cup between Gor Mahia and AFC Leopards, the Commission’s Secretary Hassan S. Mohammed stated, “The Commission appreciates the work of our sportsmen and women in using sports to promote national cohesion and integration and peaceful co-existence amongst Kenyans” (<https://www.cohesion.or.ke>) The utilization of sports by Muslims in promoting a cohesive and integrated society is in tandem with what other institutions are doing, including The NCIC which is the main custodian of the cohesion and integration agenda in the Country.

The other strategies used by Islam in Kenya in promoting a cohesive and integrated society is use of dialogues, interfaith forum and inclusivity. Dialogue was quoted across the

spectrum of the respondents as a major tool of promoting cohesion and integration in the country. Members of the Muslim religion have attended workshops and seminars aimed at promoting sensitivity and respect for other cultures and religions. More Muslims are open to such forums that discuss common challenges facing the society in our times. St. Paul University has been organizing forums aimed at promoting Christian-Muslim dialogues on an annual basis. In the forum, scholars and members from the two religions are given opportunities to offer their views on various matters. Muslim institutions such as schools and hospitals have part of their staff being Christians as a way of promoting inclusivity.

## **5.9 Chapter Summary**

This chapter primarily explored the methods used by Islam in promoting national cohesion and integration in Kenya. However, the incidences of conflicts were identified first as well as how the Muslim communities responded when such conflicts occurred. Some of the causes of conflicts as identified in the study were: land disputes, political competition, competition for scarce basic resources, disrespectful relations between communities, negative stereotypes against others and many more.

The methods cited in promoting peaceful co-existence includes holding dialogue between communities, seminars and workshops, participating in peace caravans, public forums where people air their grievances, sporting activities, cultural festivals and teachings in Muslim gatherings. These strategies are used to promote religious co-existence as well as inter-ethnic harmony. Partnership with other actors was also explored within the broader framework of the strategies applied in advancing cohesion and integration. It was noted that

cooperation between Islam and the state actors is slightly higher than the cooperation between Islam and non-state actors.



## **CHAPTER SIX**

### **PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF ISLAM IN NATIONAL COHESION AND INTEGRATION IN KENYA**

#### **6.1 Introduction**

This section tackled the third objective of the study. The objective sought to explore the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration as well as the challenges which are likely to stand on the way towards achieving the goal. The question on prospects was answered through the questionnaires to Muslim faithful and interview guides administered to Muslim leaders in CIPK and SUPKEM. The questionnaire had four items that addressed the prospects parts of the objective under study. The first item sought to examine the past performance of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration locally, while the second item sought to examine the past performance of Islam at the national levels. The third item sought to know the prospects of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration at the local levels while the fourth item sought to discover the prospects of the same at the national level. The interview protocol item on the same with SUPKEM and CIPK officials was not specific either to the local or to the national contexts so as to allow for a broad discussion with the participants.

The second part of the third objective for the study sought to investigate and evaluate the challenges faced by Islam in undertaking the task of promoting national cohesion and integration. In the literature review, knowledge gaps were identified on the challenges faced

by Islam in national cohesion and integration work. Most of other studies offered generic challenges faced in doing Islamic *da'wah* and social related tasks. This specific study sought to specifically pin-point to barriers and challenges encountered by Islam or likely to be encountered in its efforts to promote a peaceful, cohesive and integrated society in Kenya. The objective was addressed through specific items on questionnaires, Focus Group Discussions and interview protocols.

The research instrument's items on this part of the third objective sought to know the difficulties and challenges facing Islam in promoting cohesion and integration both at the local and the national levels. The item in the questionnaire was open ended and was answered by 60% of the respondents. During the triangulated data collection process, there were various issues cited as challenges in working towards a cohesive and integrated society by Islam. However, some of them had more thickness than others owing to their frequency of mention and occurrence.


The chapter will first address the prospects for Islam in national cohesion and integration before addressing the challenges part of the objective. The integrated results for the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya are presented in two parts in the following sections. The first part looks into the past performance of Islam in national cohesion and integration while the second part examines the actual prospects.

## **6.2 Past Performance of Islam in Promoting Cohesion and Integration**

The past and the present informs the future as well. This objective partly sought to know how the respondents gauges the past performance of Islam in promoting cohesion and

integration both locally and at the national levels. This would somehow point to the potential of the religion in promoting cohesion and integration both nationally and in the local levels in future.


From the field responses in Mombasa County, 40.7 % (122) of the respondents thought that the performance at the national level was very good, 26.7% (80) thought the performance was good while 27.3% (82) and 5.3% (16) thought it was fair and poor respectively. In Nairobi County, 56.3% (81) said it was very good, 28.5% (41) said it was good, 14.6% (21) stated the performance was fair while only 0.7% (1) thought that the performance was poor. Overall, 82.9% (372) thought the performance was very good, 10.9% (49) good, 2.4% (1) fair while 3.8% (17) in the two counties combined thought the performance was poor. The results are presented in the following graph:



**Figure 6.1: Past performance of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration at the national level**

(Source: Field Data, 2017).

There was also a questionnaire item seeking to understand how the respondents gauged the performance of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration at the local levels. The local levels were defined to be at the sub-county level in the questionnaire item. In Mombasa County, 36.9% (110) indicated the performance was very good, 28.2% (84) indicated it was good, 32.2% (96) indicated it was fair while only 2.7% (8) of the respondents thought that the performance of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration would be considered poor. From respondents in Nairobi County, 52.8% (76) indicated that the performance was very good, 31.3% (45) said it was good while 15.3% (22) and 0.7% (1) indicated that it was fair and poor respectively. The combined views for the two counties was that 42.1% (186) felt that the performance was very good, 29.2% (129) good, 26.7% (118) fair while 2% (9) felt that the performance was poor. The results are represented in the following graph:



**Figure 6.2: Past Performance of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration locally (Source: Field Data, 2017).**

Going by the results from the above evaluation by Muslims on the performance of Islam on cohesion and integration at the two levels, it is evident that Islam has performed much better in promoting cohesion and integration at the national level compared to the performance at the local levels. Overall, only 2.4% of respondents in Nairobi and Mombasa combined thought that the performance was fair while a combined average of 3.8% thought that Islam had performed poorly in promoting cohesion and integration at the national levels. The score for fair and poor in the local levels was 26.7% and 2% respectively. The score for very good at the national level was 82.9% while those who indicated that the performance was very good at the local levels was 42%. This gives a difference of 40.9% between the national and the local levels on very good performance rating.

Such a scenario would probably suggest concerted efforts in national platforms by Islam towards a cohesive and integrated society and little efforts at the grassroots. This finding would be consonant with another finding in this study whereby cooperation of Islam with other actors was found to be decent at the national levels but weak in the grassroots. National Muslim bodies works hard to address cohesion and integration matters but with little trickle down of the same efforts to the grassroots. There are stronger structures at the higher levels and weak or no structures in the grassroots.

The interview protocol with CIPK and SUPKEM officials had also sought to establish and gauge the Muslim community involvement in cohesion and integration. In a scale of 5, CIPK-M1; CIPK-M2; CIPK-M3 and SUPKEM-M separately rated the involvements of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in Kenya at level 3. This would be rated at 60% which is good and is similar with the finding from the questionnaire findings for the national

involvement. A CIPK respondents (CIPK-2) indicated that their organization is working hard to make it higher, “But we are working hard to make it higher. We Have come to consider national cohesion to be a priority” (CIPK 2). The responses from the two research instruments therefore points to an institution with an average performance in national cohesion and integration.


In the assessment of this researcher, the two national Muslim umbrella bodies have a genuine interest of working towards a cohesive and integrated society despite the many drawbacks and challenges that hinders the work. They consider national cohesion to be a priority in the religion. This is convincing given that three separate officials gauged the performance of Islam at the same level of 60%.

### **6.3 Prospects of Islam in Promoting Cohesion and Integration**

The first section presents the findings on the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya at the local levels. In Mombasa, 26.9% (78) of the respondents felt that the prospects of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration are very high. Majority of the respondents who stood at 37.9% (110) however felt that the prospects are high while 29% (86) and 5.5% (16) felt that the prospects for the same are low and very low respectively.

In Nairobi County, 34% (49) of the participants felt that the prospects of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration at the local levels were very good, 47.2% (68) good, 16% (23) low and 2.8% (4) very low. Compared to Mombasa County, participants in Nairobi were more optimistic about the prospects of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration at the local/Sub-County level. The combined score for prospects for local levels from respondents

in the two counties are 29.3% for very high, 41% for high, 25.1% for low and for 4.6% very low. The findings of Islam potential at the local levels are expressed in the following graph:




**Figure 6.3: Prospects of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration at the Local/Sub County levels**

(Source: Field Data, 2017)

The findings for the prospects at the national level stood at 25.3% (76) for very high, 38% (114) for high, 29.3% (88) for low and 7.3% (22) for very low from participants in Mombasa. On the other hand, prospects at the national level stood at 29.9% (43) for very high, 44.4% (64) for high, 20.1% (29) for low and 5.6% (8) for very low from participants in Nairobi. The prospects for both counties averaged at 26.8% (117) for very high, 40.1% (178) for high, 26.4% (117) for low and for 6.8% (30) very low. This is an indication of high hope on the part of Islam religion promoting cohesion and integration in the country given

that the total for very high and high prospects is 66.9%. The findings on the prospects at the national level are presented in the bar graph below:



**Figure 6.4: Prospect of Islam in cohesion and integration at the national level**  
(Source: Field Data, 2017).

Overall, the prospects of Islam in undertaking the task of national cohesion and integration looks promising both at the local and the national levels. However, there is slightly more optimism for performance at the national level which has a combined total of 66.9% for high and very high compared to the 70.3% for high and very high in relation to the local levels. This would again be explained by the availability of stronger structures at the national level to undertake the task as compared to the grass root levels where the structures are largely absent. Whereas there are some Non-Governmental organizations working for peacebuilding activities on the grassroots, their voice is not as strong as those of the formally recognized umbrella national Muslim organizations.



The closed items had an open ended follow up questions which required the respondents to explain their answers as to why they had chosen very high, high, low and very low. There were several reasons as to why the respondents felt that the prospects were high and very high.

Foremost, peace is an ingredient imbedded within the fundamental fabric of Islam. The word Islam is derived from the Arabic word *Salaam* which means peace. Many Muslims are conscious of this and see it as a resource that increases the prospects of Islam in cohesion and integration in Kenya. This was exemplified by a respondent from Mombasa who stated,

Islam is a religion of peace and if you want to know how peaceful Islam is, go and learn from our beloved Prophet Muhammad and not the Media or what some Muslims are doing...So it is upon each and every Muslim to promote peace and cohesion to those who are peaceful to us according to Islam...So we don't need organizations to become peace promoters (QRN 056).

It is true that there are numerous portions of the sayings and the teachings of Prophet Muhammad which promote peaceful co-existence. But it is also known that there are other portions of Quran which seems to promote violent methods of fighting for Muslim rights. The later are the ones frequently exploited by some Islamic groups for selfish political ends. As implied by the above respondent, and perhaps informed by provisions of Quran which encourage aggression in seeking for Muslims rights, peaceful con-existence between Muslims and other social groups is conditional. In this sense, the basic interpretation of the meaning of Islam cannot be taken as a guarantee for peaceful relation with other segment of the societies. However, the basic tenets of Islam could be used as foundational and contextual framework of teaching and modeling peace through Islam.

Ultimately, the negative mentality of people against Islam is changing with time. This is because of sustained education through some media outlets to help non-Muslims understand the true nature of Islam. According to a questionnaire respondent QRM114, “Imams and Sheikhs are using the media outlets as channels of teaching their fellow Muslims nationally while promoting peace”. People are more willing to learn about Islam and this has been made possible through the mass media platforms in the country.

The role of education through various channels was supported by several respondents with one stating, “Many organizations have come up so as to educate people about Islam. Once more people get enlightened about Islam, the integration process will be great” (QRN70). The respondents also noted that Imams, Sheikhs and Muslim faithful are increasingly getting involved in peacebuilding and related activities. For example, a respondent codenamed (QRN 136) stated that “the Imams and Sheikhs have taken upon themselves the task of preaching peace in mosques across the country on a regular basis”. This involvement of the leaders and the faithful points to a bright future by the religion in the task as the key people leads from the front. The words of a leader have the potential of influencing the followers to a certain direction. Furthermore, the teaching of the peace-loving Muslim leaders would act as an effective antidote to the teachings of the radicalized Muslims to the young people. This is more so when the teaching comes from the rightful interpretation of portions from the Quran which promote peaceful co-existence.

Another factor for high hope in Islam is the emergence of more institutions and organizations which are involved in the task. A respondent noted that “there are a number of Islamic organizations which are being formed with an aim of raising awareness of the need

of togetherness in our communities regardless of our faiths” (QRM 139). The fact that there is increase of Muslim voices towards a peaceful co-existence indeed give hope that Islam as a religion will make a positive contribution towards the goal.

Some Muslim learning institutions have integrated peace issues in their teaching curriculums. Such a move boasts the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration owing to the fact that, children would be molded from young age. More awareness on the need of building cohesive and integrated societies have been created through dialogue forums bringing together people from diverse backgrounds. A respondent from Mombasa specifically supported the role ongoing education in playing in stating, “Education will play a major role in enlightening people on the need for a cohesive and integrated society” (QRM 166). Education informs and this has the potential of changing the behavior of people. When Muslims and other Kenyans are educated on the importance of peace, this is likely to change any negative perception and cause many to embrace behaviors that promote co-existence of people from diverse social backgrounds.

Another factor that provides hope for involvement by Muslims is increasing involvement by the government. A respondent from a mosque in Nairobi in support of the claim posited, “The Government of Kenya has come to appreciate the strategic role of Islam in peacebuilding and is involving us more than before. Muslims will therefore be more vibrant and active in promoting a cohesive and integrated nation” (QRN68). Some respondents believe that, the Kenyan government both at the national and the county levels is involving Muslims and Islam more in important national matters than it was the case years ago. One of

such areas of continuous engagement of Islam by the government is in the area of building a cohesive and integrated society.

An interviewee codenamed CIPK-M1 believed that, “with good will from internal and external players, there is a great future”. He also noted that the prospects will only remain high if Muslims are engaged by the government in national cohesion and integration matters. In the opinion of the respondent, Muslims remains under-represented in many issues of national importance including cohesion and integration agenda. An Interviewee codenamed (CIPK-M2) noted, “the organization has weathered many hindrances in the past and hence hopeful that the future will be much better”. In the opinion of this respondent, Islam is ready to remain on the path of promoting a cohesive and integrated society despite the challenges that may be encountered on the way. Such optimism is encouraging in the midst of many negative voices within and outside Islam.

There were also reasons fronted as to why some respondents felt that the prospects were low and very low in the efforts of Islam promoting a cohesive and integrated society. Foremost is the low level of trust upon Muslim faithful by non-Muslims. For one, negative stereotypes against Muslims is still high in the Kenyan society. Another factor likely to contributes to low prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration is poor leadership among Muslims. Some Muslim leaders are poorly equipped to lead the faithful in matters that contribute to the common welfare of the society. Furthermore, leaders are likely to consider cohesion and integration as of secondary importance and hence fail to prioritize them.

Some respondents were of the opinion that the general Kenyan society has no faith in Islam and is therefore difficult for Muslims to be entrusted with the task. To support this opinion, a

respondent codenamed (QRN 78) stated, “The Country has not given much chance to Islam in promoting cohesion and integration...Kenya itself does not believe in engaging Islam in promoting cohesion and integration. I believe that the Muslim leaders will work hard to create awareness among Kenyans that Islam is a resource in promoting cohesion and integration”. While this may be true in some cases, there are strategic partners like the government departments who are utilizing resources held within Islam as a religion to promote co-existence. But the fact of the dominance of Christianity would indeed blur the involvement and the performance of Islam if not well handled.

Islam lacks the framework to undertake peacebuilding, cohesion and integration related activities. A respondent from Eastleigh in Nairobi stated that, “the community faces challenges to generate policies and strategies that would enhance their contribution toward community welfare. The religion in many ways lacks institutional capacity” (QRN 115). Without a proper framework, some respondents were of the view that Islam would not undertake the task effectively. One respondent stated, “due to the lack of institutional framework, the effectiveness and hence the prospects of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration would remain low”. It was already established in a previous chapter that Islam lacks the policy framework for cohesion and integration. The researcher is therefore in agreement with the claims that the absence of a formal framework may indeed negatively affect the effectiveness of Islam in the task.

An interviewee codenamed (CIPK-M3) and an official at the Council of Imams and Preachers in Kenya was not as optimistic as the other two respondents in the same organization. His position was that Islam prospects in national cohesion and integration are

fair. He cited the limitation of monetary and human resources, low government support and increased radicalization of youths in Islam as key impediments that may negatively affect the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration efforts.

However, the respondent from SUPKEM office in Nairobi stated with no elaboration that Islam is a great resource for national cohesion and integration and hence the prospect is very bright. While looked against the results on the same from respondents of questionnaire, it is easy to see an optimism level that is well above average. The leaders and the faithful in the religion demonstrated a good level of hope for their religion working towards a cohesive and integrated society in Kenya. However, the 33% that gave a response of low and very low on the prospects of the religion in national cohesion and integration is worrying. The reasons advanced for low and very low response for the item by the respondents who are adherents of the religion is something that need examination.

From the findings through questionnaires and interview guides, there is hope in Islam religion contributing positively towards a cohesive and integrated Kenyan society. Nevertheless, there are real impediments upon the religion in undertaking the task smoothly for the all-out results. Foremost, there is still a high degree of negative attitude towards Muslims by non-Muslims in Kenya. The attitude and general stereotypes against Muslims therefore present a key hindrance to the prospects of Islam being actively involved in cohesion and integration. Many Muslims will see it as efforts in futility in trying to convince majority of Kenyans that they are genuine in their labors in working for a cohesive and integrated society.

Some church leaders have contributed in perpetuating the negative perception against Islam and Muslims. In mid-nineties, the late Cardinal Maurice Otunga was caught saying, “Muslims have joined all fields on earth including politics to propagate the tenets of their religion” (Kahumbi, 1995 p. 10). As if other religions including Christians do not do the same. Other non-Muslims in Kenya have been caught portraying Islam as the religion of the sword and insinuating that Muslims are potential terrorists (Kahumbi, 1995; Friday Bulletin June 19, 2015). Whereas it is rare to get statements of this nature from high ranking Christian leaders, pastors at lower ranks have been found doing it during crusades and other meetings. Such a scenario jeopardizes any efforts by Islam to work for a cohesive and integrated society.

The feeling of discrimination among Muslim populace in Kenya is yet another factor that dampens the prospect of Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda. Muslims and especially those of Somali origin have been undergoing through intensified screening by government officials while applying for identification documents (Kahumbi,1995). This and occasional profiling of Muslims has enraged many Muslims creating a feeling that they are unwanted in the society. Such individuals may not actively get involved in promoting a cohesive and integrated Kenya.

Discrimination of Muslims in the public spaces is not a case only unique in Kenya. Islamophobia is a widespread concept in Europe and most of the Western world. It is sparingly felt in Kenya and other non-Muslim majority countries in Africa. As it is the case with Muslims in Europe and the West in general, Muslim communities in other contexts struggle with discrimination and a host of issues surrounding community cohesion (FRA,

2008). This has a potential of preventing Muslims from actively playing a role in building cohesive and integrated societies. As the report from European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights further states, “Muslim communities do not necessarily require particular attention or special treatment. Rather Muslim communities requires mainstreaming of their needs within a broad scope of integration” (FRA, 2008). This case applies to Kenya whereby there is a need to involve Muslims in all aspects of public life including the public forums on peacebuilding, national cohesion and integration. It is the lack of inclusion that makes Muslim communities not to trust public institutions.

Despite the few factors that dampens the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration, majority of faithful and leaders are optimistic as it was demonstrated from the collected data. Indeed, there is already some work in progress through Islam in promoting a cohesive and integrated Kenyan society. Religion as a resource in promoting peaceful co-existence is based on the religious based institutions as well as religious personalities, usually the leaders (Johnson, 2005). Johnson further states the following as attributes that generally place religious institution on a strategic position in promoting peace and reconciliation,

Credibility as a trusted institution; a respected set of values; moral warrants for opposing injustice on the part of the governments; unique leverage for promoting reconciliation among conflicting parties; ability to rehumanize situations that have become dehumanized over a course of protracted conflict; a capability to mobilize community, national, and international support for peace process; an ability to follow through locally in the wake of a political settlement; and finally because religious peacemakers often operate out of a sense of calling, there is an inspired ability to preserve in the face of major, otherwise debilitating obstacles. (p. 212)



The above attributes in many ways applies to Islam religion in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes in the society. In the case of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya, the prospects are specifically anchored on several factors. Foremost, there is good will among many leaders in Islam on promoting a peaceful and harmonious society. More Sheikhs and Imams are actively being involved in peacebuilding in the country. Sometimes, they use the daily and the Friday Muslim religious gatherings to preach peace and unity in the society. This can be proved by the response given by a CIPK official code named (CIPK 1) who stated that he is aware of “the weight, urgency and importance of working towards a cohesive and integrated nation”. He further affirmed that, while the involvement of Islam in cohesion and integration stands at level 3 in the scale of 1-5, the community is working hard to make it higher. The investigator discerned a genuine interest from CIPK and other Muslim officials in working towards an integrated and cohesive Kenyan society.

The other evidence that Islam is a great resource for working towards a cohesive and integrated Kenyan society is the fact that there are organizations working towards the goal. During the data collection through the questionnaires, at least 14 Muslim NGOs were severally mentioned for being involved in cohesion, integration and related activities. Lynch (2011) in her work titled, *“Local and Global Influence on Islamic NGOs in Kenya”* highlights how Kenya is a model of Non-Governmental Muslim organizations playing a pivotal role in development and peacebuilding. With such recognition, Muslim NGOs can use the credibility to work for harmonious co-existence.

The question that formed the foundational inquiry of the chapter was how Islam could be comprehended as a resource for peacebuilding, cohesion and integration in Kenya. Such an enquiry is not new in the field as it has been raised by other scholars around the globe (Sinesky, 2015; Abu-Nimer, 2003). There is need to raise awareness so as to overcome the dominant views within the popular media, social circles and global security policies using the experiences of the people identifying themselves as Muslims (Sinesky, 2015). This study largely collected views from Muslims living in Nairobi and Mombasa Counties in Kenya. The results of the study, as it has been the case in other contexts taking objective studies on the matter, consequently, challenge the growing Islamophobic and reductionist views of Islam and people associated with the faith (Sinesky, 2015). Abu-Nimer advances the prospects of Islam in advancing nonviolent means of achieving special social goals in stating, “Islam itself is fertile soil for nonviolence because of its potential for obedience, strong discipline, sharing and social responsibility, perseverance and self-sacrifice, and the belief in the unity of the Muslim community and the oneness of mankind” (Abu-Nimer, 2003 p. 38). This study was partially anchored on the concept of *Umma* existing within the global Muslim community. This appreciation for the need of unity in the faith community is already a resource embedded within Islam and could be harnessed to propagate the ideals of social cohesion and integration in the wider society.

Finally, there is more involvement of Islam by the government in important national matters including cohesion and integration. In fact, there are several senior officials in the National Cohesion and Integration who are Muslims. The Assistant director assigned to this researcher during the interview at NCIC was a Muslim. He indicated that he cannot be

available at lunch hour for interview as he was going to the mosque for prayers. The Commission's Secretary, Mr. Sheikh Hassan Mohamed is also a Muslim.

#### **6.4 Challenges Facing Islam in National Cohesion and Integration**

Political rivalry, tribalism and clannism among Muslims were variously cited as key challenges in building a cohesive and integrated societies in Nairobi and Mombasa counties. This can be supported with one of such claims by respondents who stated, "Clannism and tribalism has denied Muslims a common voice on matters affecting them" (QRN 34). These and other challenges are discussed under the following sub-headings.

##### **6.4.1 Negative Publicity and Stereotypes**

Negative and biased reporting by the media especially on terrorism has created a negative perception of Islam religion. When the negative reporting is combined with stereotypes on Islam by non-Muslims, the environment becomes more hostile for Muslims to get engaged in promoting the agenda in their localities. A Muslim respondent from Mombasa lamented on the negative reporting concerning Muslims by stating, "Muslims are stigmatized already due to the notion portrayed about Islam to the world. Many see Islam religion from a wrong perspective and have already concluded that the religion has nothing to do with peace" (QRN 025). Such perceptions infuriate many Muslims in Kenya and cause them to portray a demeanor of withdrawal from matters of national importance.

Islam has widely been viewed as a violent and hostile religion especially by non-Muslims. Consequently, Islam starts from a point of self-clarification before preaching convincingly

about peace, cohesion and integration. The fight against terror by the national security apparatus has been undertaken in a way that leaves Muslims with little motivation to promote cohesion and integration in the country. A respondent in reacting to the harassment by the security organs exclaimed, “There is a constant harassment of Muslims by the Kenyan government. They don’t want to see us doing business, they want us to sit and end up getting involved in drug abuse and this is a way of weakening Muslims” (QR127M). Concerns on the heavy handedness of the Kenyan security organs upon Muslims was voiced by many respondents both in Nairobi and Mombasa.

The same has created a feeling of discrimination among Muslim adherents. This discrimination has overflowed into excessive vetting on Muslims while acquiring important personal documents such as identity cards and passports. Such treatment to Muslims while in their own country, even when no malice is intended makes them feel mistreated in their own country.

Negative publicity on Islam through the Kenyan media outlets was one of the highly quoted challenge by respondents across the board. Kapoor (2010) laments, “By means of the media, a sinister image is presented to the eye of the public, this notorious image is mainly due to the ignorance and misunderstanding of the media and public combined” (P.41). The name of Islam religion has been negatively and, in many occasions, wrongly mentioned by the Kenyan media especially in the wake of radicalization and terror activities in the country. The Vice Chairman of Jamia Mosque Committee, Farouk Adam, was recorded lamenting, “the media is increasingly helping in fueling a hostile climate against Muslims by its persistent association of Islam and Muslims with terrorism” (Friday Bulletin, 15<sup>th</sup> May 2015

page 2). Previously, the Media Council of Kenya (MCK) had released a report that accused the media of contributing the propagation of narrative to the effect that all Muslims are potential terrorists and Islam is in support of extremism and radicalization (Friday Bulletin, 15th May 2015 page 2). Thus, Muslims start from a point of self-defense when talking about cohesion, integration or any matter related to peaceful co-existence. There is a general negative perception towards Islam in Kenya, partly due to the negative publicity by the local and international media outlets.

Negative reporting on Islam by the media is not only a problem unique to the situation in Kenya; neither is it a recent phenomenon. Such a trend has been very common in the western world for several decades (Kundnani, 2014). Said (1997) writing on the role the media has played in tarnishing the name of Islam in the Western world laments how the media has frequently depicted a factitious relationship between Arabs, Muslims and terrorism. A respondent from Nairobi stated, “Muslims in Kenya are stigmatized since the notion portrayed about Islam by the Kenyan Media is largely negative” (QRN 25). Such a feeling was widely shared by other respondents though put in different language. Perhaps, this state of affair could be explained in part by the fact that, Kenyan media is dominated by Christians. Most of the journalists happens to be Christians and hence most likely write with their religious bias (Mwangi, 2014). Subjectivity while reporting on the activities happening among the Muslim communities in the western context has been a historical reality. The same is happening in Kenya owing to the fact that, Western journalists play a central role in informing local journalists on the events in the western world (Kadhi, 1995).

In Kenya, the relationship is much the same only that the Arab ethnicity is not common in the matrix. The Arab ethnicity could locally be seen to be replaced by people of Somali descent. The Somali-Islam stereotype is perhaps reinforced by the history of Somali irredentism in 1960s and 1970s. Beside the ethnic background, other Muslim identifiers such as the veil and the robe are easily used to brand individuals as Muslims and hence potential terrorists. It is a tag that has been hard to shed off in the country and local Muslims have always to bear the burden of suspicion in their own country. Such a situation is likely to create resentment in the minds and the will of Muslim adherents. Under such kind of environment, Muslims are unlikely to passionately promote a cohesive and an integrated society. Their morale is already jeopardized by the negative publicity their religion has received in a society where they are in minority.

#### **6.4.2 Illiteracy among Muslim Communities**

Lack of education and sufficient information among Muslims was also cited as a barrier towards performing the task of promoting a cohesive and integrated state. Low levels of religious and secular knowledge among adherents have a ripple effect on the ability of the religion to effectively undertake cohesion and integration agenda. Some Muslims, owing to high illiteracy levels have poor knowledge of their own religion. They have little grasps on the teachings of Quran and Hadith. Such people therefore become easy targets of wrong and manipulated religious teachings at the grassroots levels. In Nairobi and Mombasa, and indeed even in other parts of Kenya and Africa at large, there are ready opportunists in the market to recruit young Muslims for radicalization and extremism related activities. Lack of solid religious knowledge has made such youths to be vulnerable.

Low education levels among Muslim populations was yet another challenge cited to stand on the way for the religion to fruitfully engage in promoting a cohesive and integrated society. This was especially evident in the Coast during the data collection as sizable number of respondents could not fill the English questionnaire. The research assistants preferred more questionnaires in Swahili language, citing high levels of illiteracy among the residents. The illiteracy levels of Muslims seem to be a global challenge as depicted by Ashrof (2017) in the Muslim World League Journal,

Muslims in different parts of the World lag in education. They lack rational and scientific culture. Their centers of learning are imparting sectarian and non-productive and worthless education. The enlightened Muslim thinkers have no place in most Muslim societies, they are often branded as infidels (p. 35).

The above assertion by Ashrof could be viewed as a hyperbolic presentation of the state of education among Muslims in the world. However, it can be fairly taken to mean that the levels of education among the Muslim communities is generally low across the globe. The researcher hereby agrees with him in the suggestions made to correct the anomalies of the low levels of education among the Muslim communities. He states, “the traditional and conventional methods of imparting Islamic teaching should be converted into modern methods in which Islam should be presented as a rational, democratic, scientific, progressive and peaceful code of life” (p. 35). Such a holistic approach of education in Islam would be more helpful to expand the worldview of a Muslim in a rapidly changing world.

Knowledge in its variety is surely a great resource in enhancing the quality life as well as helping in solving the myriad technical and social challenges of life. The Muslim

community in Kenya should also embrace formal education instead of relying on religious education as it has been in some areas. This would help in broadening the perspectives and horizons of individuals and help address real issues in life such as national cohesion, integration, production, industrialization, globalization and many more.

Majority of the adherents of Islam resides or originate from the arid and semi-arid North-Eastern and Coastal regions in Kenya. The two regions are historically known to have been marginalized in development and to some extent formal education. During the colonial and post-colonial periods, education was rejected by Muslim populations since it was perceived as an instrument of propagating the Christian ideals (Kahumbi, 1995). In national examinations in Kenya, Counties in the two regions usually post very poor results (Mazrui, 1994). Indeed, the North-Eastern region has been of late been a beneficiary of lowered University entry points as an attempt to correct the historical anomaly. This is a positive move by the government, but the accumulated consequences cannot be rectified in few years.

Illiteracy have a ripple effect of making the population especially among the young people vulnerable to wrong teachings. Lack of formal education also means that many Muslims cannot effectively comprehend Islamic teachings by themselves from Quran or Hadith. Most of them cannot effectively read the Quran for themselves. Such individuals become an easy target of groups brainwashing and wrong teachings from people of ulterior motives. The number of Muslims who receives extremist teachings increases with time. Such people continue to identify themselves as Muslims even as they exhibit the acts occasioned by teaching which are not compliant with true Islam.



### **6.4.3 Limitation of Resources**

Financial limitations were also widely cited by participants of the research as a barrier on Muslims and Muslim organizations in working toward a cohesive and integrated society. One questionnaire respondent stated, “Muslim organizations lack government support to finance their activities. The lack of funds stifles important activities by Muslims in their target areas” (QRM 014). This challenge is compounded by lack of well-trained human resource personnel to effectively drive the agenda as said by a respondent, “there are few people in Islam with skills and expertise on peacebuilding, cohesion and integration” (QRM 111). This could be true since the field of peace and conflict studies is relatively new in Kenya. It might be true that not many people of Muslim background have been trained as experts in the field of peace and conflict studies.

Lack of financial and manpower resources was also cited as a challenge for Islam in working towards a cohesive and integrated society. Owing to general incidences of illiteracy among Muslims, it is possible that only few Muslims have been trained on conflict resolutions and related matters. This would mean that those who are in leadership are not able to educate the Muslim faithful. The challenge of resources is not limited to Islam religion. Limitation of monetary resources is a major barrier to both governmental and non-governmental agencies in undertaking important social tasks like conflict management. The existence of only a few Muslim organizations dealing with cohesion, integration and other related tasks can be explained by scarcity of international donors to fund the initiatives.

The fight against terror in Kenya has led to crackdown on Muslim NGOs working either locally or from abroad in humanitarian activities. Following the 1998 US embassy bombing

in Nairobi and Dare Salam, several Muslim partner NGOs in the United States, Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom were closed. More local and transnational Muslim NGOs have been affected by the crackdown in the aftermath of the September 11<sup>th</sup> World Trade Centre and Pentagon terror attacks and the persistence of local terror activities. Recently, such crackdown by the local NGO coordinating board has tended to sweep wide, affecting the activities of Muslim NGOs undertaking a wide range of humanitarian work. These transnational security discourses and domestic politics have a way in which they have negatively impacted on Islamic peacebuilding and development (Lynch, 2011).

These developments have disadvantaged Islam in Kenya in programs involving promotion of cohesive and integrated society. There was no mention of partnership of Islam with international organizations such as USAID, UKAID and United Nations from respondents through questionnaires. However, respondents from CIPK indicated some partnership with USAID and Danish Embassy in some other programs but not peacebuilding. Most humanitarian programs in the developing world highly depends on funding from developed countries. With diminishing funding, activities such as peacebuilding by Islam NGOs becomes less vibrant and effective.

#### **6.4.4 Divisions in Islam**

Sectarianism coupled by other forms of divisions in Islam was another factor quoted as hindering cohesion and integration efforts. It is not uncommon to see Muslim and Muslim leaders pulling in different directions on important issues based on their religious sects, tribes and clans. A respondent lamented, “not all Muslims believe in the same thing, they

differ a lot in many things, some are Sunnis and others are *Shia* so it becomes difficult to build peace. The diverse sects within Islam makes it difficult for Islam to effectively get involved in peacebuilding (QRN 121). Such was a feeling expressed by several respondents in Mombasa and Nairobi. In such an environment, Islam lose the moral authority of preaching about a united nation while their own religion is having challenges of unity.

Internal division among Muslims has posed a great challenge in the task. The incompatibility of various sects within Islam has made it harder to accomplish much in important national responsibilities. Furthermore, Muslim leaders in some instances are involved in unhealthy competition which hinders the religion in undertaking key social tasks like peacebuilding. Political interference and low government support were cited as factors hindering effective promotion of cohesion and integration by Muslims at the local levels. The government has been very reluctant in registering Non-Governmental Organizations formed by Muslims owing to suspicion of them being used to channel funds for planning terror attacks. This has continued to limit the avenues through which Muslims can acquire strategic funding from donors. Consequently, Islam has been left to run social programs with very limited resources, hence affecting their effectiveness in the work.

The reality and the effect of sectarianism is something that has bothered even the policy makers within the faith. Oded (2000) exemplify this as he laments, “although there are factors that strengthen Muslim solidarity, religious, political, and personal divisions among the Muslims weaken their overall position” (p. 47). Occasionally, Kenyan Muslims lacks proper coordination since they are represented by many voices, therefore hindering smooth coordination and central point of reference (Lynch, 2011). This challenge was cited by a

bishop from a major denomination in Mombasa. The Bishop exclaimed, “Sometimes we are not able to know which group to engage within Islam. Some groups within Islam are closed minded to partnership in national matters”. As much as some Muslims in Kenya would like to insist that Islam is one united religion, the reality is that there are sects and divisions within the faith community. These sects are not always compatible.

This reality of sectarianism is echoed by Oded (2000) in stating, “Although the Muslim community has many divisions, its solidarity comes to the fore whenever they suspect that the sanctity of Islam is threatened” (p. 44). Locally, several events have triggered the coming together of Muslims from different sects whereby a common complaint is fronted. The war against terror has elicited such grievances by Muslims in general out of a feeling of being unfairly targeted by the government security apparatus.

The reality of sectarianism in world religions needs to be appreciated. It is occasioned by the realities of contexts and other dynamics in human existence. The existence of various sections within the same religion should not mean that there are no matters that can be done together for the common good. Whereas the mode of worship may vary between various sects within the same religion, such should not be allowed to deter people from coming together to find solutions for challenges that face humanity at different times. Conflicts and social division is such a challenge that face the Kenyan community. The Islam religion have a responsibility of collectively joining other actors in solving the problem.

The researcher in this work also encountered the challenge of discrimination while collecting the data. A Muslim sect which is pre-dominantly composed of members of certain ethnicity could not allow him to collect data from their members within their premises in

Nairobi. He had not identified himself as Muslim or non-Muslim. He therefore assumed that his different looks contributed to the hostility with which he was received in the premises.

The problem of ethnicity within Islam was also cited as a barrier to promoting a cohesive and integrated society. The CIPK official in Mombasa stated thus, “ethnicity within Islam whereby people identify themselves as Arabs; Somalis; Mijikenda’s etc. is a major hindrance to building a cohesive society”. The same was cited by a SUPKEM official in Nairobi though he used the term tribalism to state the challenge of ethnicity within Islam. As Oded (2000) notes, the challenge of ethnic division, and more so the Arab-African divide has been witnessed since the pre-colonial period. The challenge of ethnic identity in Islam over the strive for nationhood was cited by a substantial number of Muslim faithful in Nairobi and Mombasa. Such a mentality is common in the country and even elsewhere in the continent. People have stronger attachment to their ethnic identities and pay little attention to nationhood. Indeed, nationhood is usually sacrificed on the altar of ethnicity.

#### **6.4.5 The Rise of Islamic Terrorism**

The rise of Islamic extremism and radicalization activities in Mombasa and Nairobi is yet another barrier on Islam working toward a cohesive and integrated society. This has come in the wake of increased terror activities undertaken in the cover of Islam religion. This has resulted to multi effects including suspicion from outsiders on the activities of Muslims. Even when Muslims are holding public debates (*mihadhara*) on important social issues like preaching peaceful co-existence, people of other religions such as Christians rarely stop to listen (QRM176).

Another effect arising from terror activities is stereotyping of Muslims. Some non-Muslims see Muslims as potential terrorist and sometimes speak out to that effect. QRN 82 exclaims that Muslims have been discriminated and branded terrorists in Kenya. This perception is such widespread especially in areas where populations of Muslims is low and in times of heightened terror alarm. Muslim women wearing a veil and men wearing the religious robe of worship are at times viewed with suspicion. This marginalizes the innocent Muslims adherents further and make the atmosphere for working towards cohesion and integration more difficult.

#### **6.4.6 Problems with Leadership**

Another challenge cited to stand on the way of Islam promoting cohesive and integrated society concerns leadership at the local levels. Some Muslim leaders are said to be corrupt to the extent of embezzling money meant for such work like peacebuilding. This was alluded by several respondents with one stating, “one major challenge that hinder Muslims from effectively undertaking social activities including cohesion and integration is poor leadership. Tribalism and greed have got into the hearts of many Muslim leaders in Kenya” (QRN 076).

Others are poorly equipped in leadership skills to steer the community in crucial issues like cohesion and integration. The poor leadership skills among Muslims also hinder them from making initiatives outside religious activities for the common good of the society. Some of these leaders continually use derogative language such as *kafir* to refer to non-Muslims.

Such language and other related utterances to dismiss non-Muslims further contributes to less cohesive and integrated communities.

Leadership challenge in Islam is multi-faceted in nature. On one part, some leaders in Islam are dishonest and corrupt. As already noted by Abdalla, some Muslim leaders have previously embezzled resources donated from gulf countries for Islamic *da'wah* (Abdalla 2012). In 2015, a trustee member of Riyadh Mosque in Lamu was accused of misappropriation of resources meant to benefit the Muslim Learning Centre (MLC) located in the town. The accused leader had turned the endowment fund into personal use, a matter that ended up into a court of law (Friday Bulletin, 29 May 2015).

Muslim leaders have failed to speak with one voice regarding national matters. At times, religious division between Muslim leaders has been occasioned by political competition especially while jostling for elective positions. Some leaders have failed to co-operate with their colleagues in addressing national cohesion and integration and other matters of national importance. A respondent who is a senior member of CIPK stated as follows during the interview, “We face a challenge of non-cooperation from some Muslim leaders who are stubborn. They are unwilling to cooperate with others in promoting a cohesive and integrated society” (CIPK M1). A SUPKEM official also lamented of non-cooperation by some Muslim leaders. Lack of a united voice obviously pose some major difficulties on the religion in accomplishing the task. It also potentially portrays Islam badly to the outsiders.

Some Muslim leaders including Imams have been involved in radicalization and extremism activities. They have used their places of worship and positions to bend the teaching of Islam to the youths for their selfish goals. A case in point is the late Sheikh Aboud Rogo,

Sheikh Makaburi and other Imams who recruited and radicalized young people in Mombasa. Their leadership influence was negative and gave Islam a very bad image at the time.

#### **6.4.7 Political Interferences**

A respondent code named (CIPK 2) cited political interference and mobilization which has the capacity of overshadowing well intended efforts. In most cases, politicians put their own interests ahead of the welfare of the wider society. At times politicians thrive well in places where communities are divided and therefore sabotage any efforts of bringing communities together. Some political statements uttered at the national levels by both Muslim and non-Muslim politicians have had negative effects in promoting cohesion and integration.

Political competition in Kenya is normally played along ethnic communities. Consequently, politicians seeking for elective seats during the electioneering periods usually invokes ethnic cards for their own political goals (Nyukuri,1997). In North-Eastern region, mostly dominated by the Somali community, clannism is invoked by politicians to gain advantage over their political competitors (Human Rights Watch, 2013; Alio, 2012). In some cases, religion is used as a dividing factor for political survival. Elections therefore leaves people more divided along ethnic and religious lines. Such politician may not wish to have people who strongly identify themselves as Kenyan. They would rather have them continue with strong religious and ethnic identities so that that can use them for own political advantages.

#### **6.4.8 Other Challenges**

The challenges faced by Islam at the national level in promoting cohesion and integration of communities were much like the ones given for the local levels. The respondents cited lack



of qualified manpower to run the agenda, difficulties in muscling substantial co-operation from non-Muslims, and lack of unity among Muslim leaders were given as some of the challenges. Scarcity of financial resources was also cited as a barrier to mounting a strong campaign in cohesion and integration at the national levels.

A respondent from Council of Imam and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK 1) cited non-cooperation from some Muslim leaders who he referred to as stubborn. Such leaders are unwilling to cooperate with others in doing the work. The other challenge standing on the way of building a cohesive and integrated societies is religious suspicion. Such religious suspicion affects smooth cooperation especially with other religious actors like Christians. Ethnicity and clannism within Islam is also another challenge. Major ethnic identities within the religion such as Arabs, Somalis and Mijikenda have become a major impediment for the religion to effectively contribute to the task. The challenge of competition among clans in North-eastern region is a key impediment for Islam in promoting cohesion and integration between communities in Kenya.

Another factor cited by a substantial number of respondents in questionnaires was poor support from the government. Indeed, there is a general feeling that the government, which is seen to be heavily composed of Christians does not have much trust on Muslims. Historically, the Muslim community feels marginalized in many ways. Some respondents affirmed this point by suggesting that Muslims are not involved in important national matters such as cohesion and integration agenda.

Islam religion is only concentrated in some parts of the country. Compounded by the overall lower percentage of Muslims nationally, the religion's voice on important matters is not

strong compared to that of Christian religion. Other barriers to cohesion and integration through Islam at the national level includes: Activities of illegal groups such as Al Shabab, negative reporting by the media on Islam and terrorism, scarcity of Muslim NGOs focusing of peace related issues, and lack of support from non-Muslims. Greed and pursuit of selfish goals among Muslim leaders was also variously cited as a difficulty in promoting cohesion and integration at the national level.

The issue of Muslim understanding of Jihad also came up from the study. There was a question that directly required the respondents to present their understanding on Jihad. This concept is very sensitive, yet it has some implications in promoting a cohesive and integrated society. The understanding of the Islamic concept of Jihad was varied among respondents and is presented separately in the next section.

### **6.5 Muslims Understanding of Jihad**

The respondents in Nairobi and Mombasa gave varying views on their understanding of the term Jihad. Understanding of how the concept is understood is necessary since it have a bearing on dealing with issues related to harmonious co-existence. Scholars have disagreed on the true meaning of Jihad as it was established during the literature review. Jihad is variously understood and interpreted by Muslims in Kenya as it emerged from the respondents in the field. The questionnaire item posed was, “Kindly, give your own understanding of the meaning of the term Jihad”. A sample of the views are presented in the table next page:

**Table 6.1: Respondents understanding of Jihad.**

	<b>Respondents View</b>	<b>Analysis of the View</b>
1	Doing all what you can to ensure no one interferes with your faith.	This is a generic meaning. All what you can may involve peaceful and non-peaceful means.
2	Jihad is how someone shall sacrifice himself to Allah by making sure that he does the right and avoid all the evils even though the world may appear to be attractive more than the hereafter. It is not simple.	This is the Jihad of the heart. It is striving to do what is right.
3	Fighting in the name of Allah. Fighting for the sake of Allah.	This is a common meaning, but it is generic in nature. One would ask what does fighting for Allah entails? Hence it remains open to misinterpretation.
4	Jihad is an Arabic word derived from the term “ <i>Ijtihada</i> ” meaning working towards an aim. So, Jihad is working hard in any way provided you make the word Allah the highest. Be it financially or physically or even orally.	The understanding of the author is that Jihad is doing whatever it takes to please Allah with what you have. The means of achieving that are various including financial, physical and oral.
5	Fighting for yourself and your rights. Keeping away from evil.	The first part has political aspects and may be deemed to be Jihad against the visible enemy. The second part brings out the Jihad of the heart.
6	Fighting in case there is need to defend oneself.	This justifies necessary physical defense.
7	Struggle to improve oneself.	This sounds like the Jihad of the heart. Striving to do what is right before the eyes of Allah.
8	Jihad is self-scrutiny acts that makes you control your own self and soul towards restraining your soul from sinning and from the evil desires.	This sounds like the Jihad of the heart.
9	Jihad is protecting your own territory or protecting your brother when he is attacked.	This is fighting out of necessity. It could be the Jihad against the visible enemy.
10	Making all efforts to protect the religion of Allah. It is fighting to guard the honor and the	This could take diverse means, including physical and spiritual.

	religion of Islam.	
11	It is a holy war that must be justified by a series of checklist.	This view seems to justify physical war but only when certain conditions are met.
12	Jihad in general means fighting for what would make one to deviate from the real course of Islam.	This mostly resemble the jihad of the heart.
13	Jihad is whereby Muslims fight for their religion when their rights have been infringed.	This is physical war out of necessity
14	Jihad means religious war. Fighting to protect the religion.	This is also physical war under certain conditions.
15	Jihad means fighting and it has many dimensions which depends on one's understanding. For some it is fighting for your soul while for others it can take a form of physical battle if need be.	This understanding allows both the Jihad of the heart and the physical jihad.
16	Jihad is fighting other religions for the sake of Allah.	This is an extreme form of physical Jihad. This view is remotely held by Muslims, but extremists are likely to hold such a view.
17	Fighting non-Muslims who want to end Islam.	This is protecting Islam from external aggressors.
18	Jihad means standing and fighting for the sake of Allah spiritually and emotionally but not physically.	This view strongly leans towards the Jihad of the heart. It excludes the possibility of physical war for Islam.
19	Jihad means to wage war against non-Muslims to establish the religion of Islam.	This is the view mostly held by religious extremists in Islam especially in its raw form.
20	Jihad takes many forms. Jihad <i>nafs</i> is whereby you fight against yourself to refrain from doing evil. Another form of Jihad is fighting non-Muslims if they start war against Islam.	The first type is jihad of the heart to remain pure. The second one allows for physical war to protect Islam from aggression.

**(Source: Field Data, 2017)**

From the above table, Jihad is understood differently by Muslims in Kenya. The most common understanding is striving to keep pure. This is commonly referred to as the Jihad of

the heart. Approximately 40% of those who responded to this item understand Jihad as striving against evil. There is also a fraction of about 40% who believe that Jihad can take both physical and spiritual form. While striving against evil is most common form of Jihad, this group also allows for physical self-defense in circumstance of aggression and oppression against Islam. The other fraction of approximately 20% understand Jihad as fighting non-Muslims to establish Islam religion. Those who hold jihad to be a route of fighting non-Christians are likely candidates of radicalization and extremism. They are the ones who easily get recruited in terror groups like Al Shabab where they do illegal things under the cover of Islam. They therefore pose a great challenge to cohesion and integration both in Kenya and in other countries.

The term Jihad is no doubt a word that is variously found in the Holy Qur'an. Yet the word Jihad is understood in diverse ways by Muslims as revealed in the results. Jihad is one of the most controversial aspect of Islam, especially when taken by non-Muslims or religious extremists within Islam. It has been a subject of discussion in many forums, within and outside the Islam religion. The understanding of the same may have implications upon the religion in Kenya in its efforts to promote a cohesive and integrated society. The phenomenon also has implications on the perspective of non-Muslims towards Muslims especially in times of increased terror activities.

Quraishy (1989) says that, "Jihad in Islamic terminology is an honest struggle against all that is wrong and evil according to the teachings of the Qur'an, whether thought, feeling or action" (P. 151). In elaborating the meaning of the term, Quraishy continues to state that, "Jihad is the maximum effort put into striving to establish or defend the religion of Islam".

His elaboration together with various interpretations assigned to portions of Quran that address the concept gives rise to diverse meaning of the concept. Whereas the issue of defending Islam may be well understood, striving to establishing the religion may be taken to mean that Islam can also be spread through military means. King and Fry (1980) asserts that the other groups of people who are subject to Jihad are those who do not believe in God and pays no regard to what he has prohibited. This view also held by other scholars bring undesirable meaning of Jihad which allows for conversion through military means. But majority of Muslim scholars are of the view that there should be no compulsion in religion and any conversion should be done through peaceful means. They support their case by invoking portions of Quran such as (Q 2:256; Q 16:125).

The wide range of meanings assigned to the term Jihad have led to controversies that negatively impact on peace in different parts of the world. The same challenge is experienced in Kenya, where the existence of ethnic groups and religions present some challenge in social co-existence. The various understanding and interpretation of the term Jihad needs to be discussed against the responses by the participants of the study.

The first form of Jihad is the Jihad against self. This understanding attracts little controversy. As one respondent put it, “Jihad *nafs* is whereby you fight against yourself to refrain from doing evil” (QRM 103). Such an understanding of Jihad was held by approximately 50% of the people who filled up the questionnaire in Mombasa and Nairobi. Jihad against self is the fight against extreme desires. A Muslim is supposed to desist from self-persecution and self-denial, greed and self-pride. In the understanding of this form of Jihad, a Muslim need to fight against the compulsion and the temptations of these desires

with the aim of limiting them to acceptable levels (Quraishy, 1989). Owing to the very foundation of Sufism, this understanding of Jihad is common in the sect. The essence of Sufi doctrine is to achieve moral purity and detach the minds from the worldly pleasures (Koylu 2003). Koylu further states,

Sufis from the early days to the present have given great importance to the inner jihad or the greater jihad. Their main idea concerning inner jihad is to purify the self, to control the evil forces, and to keep watch over the frontiers of the soul (Koylu p.54).

Such a view was widely supported by the respondents with one stating, “Jihad is self-scrutiny acts that makes you control your own self and soul towards restraining your soul from sinning and from the evil desires” (QRN 72). Those who hold strongly to this understanding of jihad do not necessarily exclude the possibility of a Muslim practicing any other form of jihad when necessary. But this form of jihad is to be given the priority. Koylu confirm this crucial fact and state,

Sufis have given greater importance to this inner struggle and have seen it as a prerequisite for any military struggle...External Jihad may be necessary at different times for the purification of the society from all evil forces including oppression, injustice, falsehood, cheating, backbiting, suppression of human freedom, and denial of basic human rights guaranteed in the Quran (Koylu, 55).

The above statement confirms that while military jihad is not a priority in Sufism, there is still some allowance for the same. External or military jihad is allowed in some circumstances and external physical aggression is not necessary for it to happen. Denial of

rights and social oppression may provoke military Jihad even among Muslims who lean toward Islamic mysticism.

The other form of Jihad is the Jihad against evil. This involves confronting things that shake the basis of moral order and justice in human society. Such practices include indecency, immorality, corruption, chaos, cruelty and oppression. These and many more are on increase in the world and indeed in many parts of the Muslim world (Quraishy, 1989). Those who ascribe to this form of Jihad mostly see their duty as the struggle against the evil patterns of the world.

None of those who responded to the item on the meaning of Jihad touched directly on this form of Jihad. Nevertheless, there were many allusions to fighting for people's rights and against these evils in the society. This Jihad is supported by portions in Quran such as (Q. 3:104; Q. 16:125). According to this form of Jihad, "a Muslim should devote all time and energy to bring about a religious revival in the society and reform it on Islamic principles" (Quraishy 153). Such an understanding of reforming the society on Islamic principles would be very subjective since some societies are multi-cultural. Even in situations of Muslim majority, such an approach would infringe on the rights of the minority on religious grounds. Most terror groups consider this Jihad valid in response to humiliation of Muslims and as a way of responding to specific political and social grievances (Sookhdeo, 2009). As a result, some ordinary citizens in populations have found themselves victims of Muslims exercising Jihad on what they believe to be unjust political systems.

The other form of Jihad is Jihad against the visible enemy. Such Jihad can take many forms depending on the circumstances varying from time to time and place to place. There are



circumstances that may necessitate the use of force. Many authors have documented the fact that, Jihad allows for use of physical force in self-protection (Sookhdeo, 2009; Koylu, 2003; Quraishy 1989; King and Fry 1980). Drawing from the provisions of the Quran, the authors further bring out the rules of engagement when this kind of Jihad is being fought. There was approximately 40% of respondents from Mombasa and Nairobi who understand Jihad to be a way of self-protection. One of the respondents in Nairobi stated, “Jihad means religious war. Fighting to protect the religion” (NQR 136). Another respondent drawn from Mombasa said, “Jihad means fighting in case there is need to defend oneself” (QRM 68).

The self-defense Jihad became popularized by the modernists in Islam from Saudi Arabia in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. The rise of the movement coincided with a time when the term Jihad was commonly being used by the Western Media and exaggerated to mean massacre and other atrocities attributed to Muslim fanatics. During this period, there was extreme confrontations between Muslim fanatics and the western rulers in areas such as Balkans, Greece, Armenia and Lebanon. To counter the polemic accusations, modernists started to interpret Jihad as defensive war. This interpretation was relevant to the immediate political problem since the Muslim world was almost entirely under western colonial control (Koylu, 2003). However, such interpretation has persisted even after independence by countries in the Muslim world. This implies that such a Jihad has retained the same meaning in changed contexts.

Whereas self-defense against one enemy is widely accepted in many societies, the wording of verses allowing for it in the Quran seems to have left room for exploitation by political opportunists. This may further be aggravated by lack of knowledge on Quran by many

Muslims who may not be able to read a verse accurately within the right context or interpreting it with other relevant portions to bring out the intended meaning.

The meaning of the term Jihad is understood variously as it was revealed through the review of literature and responses from the field. The most common understanding of Jihad is striving for spiritual good. It means to achieve a total control of one's own self to please Allah. This is the greater Jihad and most preferred. Islam also recognizes war as a legal and justifiable course for self-defense and restoration of justice, freedom and peace (Abdallati, 1985). The latter is the lesser Jihad which involves fighting those who may attack Muslims and their religion. In such circumstances, war is permitted and accepted but within some rules.

There is no doubt that Islam is a religion of peace and war is not an objective of the religion. Majority of Muslim scholars believe that Islam as a religion does not tolerate aggression from its side. War will only be used if Islam is under the most extra ordinary circumstances and if all other measures have failed. The Kenyan Muslims understand the concept in various ways. Coupled with shallow roots of meaning of texts in Quran, section of youths would therefore be vulnerable to manipulated and opportunistic interpretation of the term Jihad. The wrong interpretations, especially in justifying war in Islam is a sure bait to radicalization and recruitment to terrorist organizations. Such a scenario no doubt, presents a real challenge to Islam religion in working toward a cohesive and integrated society in Kenya.

## **6.6 Chapter Summary**

The chapter explored the last objective of the study. It investigated the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya as well as the challenges thereof. The study on this objective found that there is a modest level of hope in Islam religion contributing towards a cohesive and integrative Kenyan society. Many leaders and faithful from the religion in the two counties under study demonstrated great passion towards a cohesive and integrated nation. The passion is potentially able to overcome the barriers and challenges discussed in the second section of this work. Indeed, there are several organizations affiliated with Islam religion working for peacebuilding and related functions. The prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration is further boasted by the growing appreciation by the state actors on the resourcefulness of Islam in the task.

The chapter also identified and evaluated the challenges facing Islam in national cohesion and integration efforts. The information used was largely the qualitative data gathered using questionnaires, interview guides and focus group discussions. The major challenges identified were outlined and discussed in depth. The challenges include political interference, illiteracy among Muslim populations, negative stereotypes against Islam and Muslims, scarcity of monetary and human resources and internal divisions in Islam. Other challenges which were widely stated by the respondents are poor leadership, rise of Islamic extremism and radicalization. The different understanding of the term jihad and its application in Islam religion was noted to be a special problem. This is more so in the times of increased terror activities and the consequent war against the vice by the state.

## **CHAPTER SEVEN**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

The subject of the study was on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration in Kenya. Much of the focus for the study was in Mombasa and Nairobi Counties. The study was stirred by the fact that, religion and more so Islam is less visible in the efforts. Little work exists on the specific role of Islam in national cohesion and integration. This chapter, being the last one in the work brings together the study by highlighting the overall summary, conclusion and the recommendations. The conclusion for each objective guiding the study is derived from the feedback given by the participants and interaction with relevant literature at various levels of the study. The chapter also outlines both the policy and academic recommendations. The next section serves as a summary for the study.

#### **7.2 Summary**

National cohesion and integration have become an area of interest both at the government and the civic level in Kenya. The interest has been occasioned by reality that Kenya is a deeply divided society. The social divisions have at times led to conflicts which results to human suffering in its broad manifestation. The study was aimed at investigating the role of Islam religion in promoting a cohesive and integrated society. The justification of the study was premised on the fact that religion is a major institution in Kenya yet its involvement in important national matters tend to be low. Specifically, the study was driven by the fact that,

no substantive academic work has been undertaken on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration. The study investigated the existence of policy framework for the work in Islam, the strategies used by Islam in the task, the challenges encountered by Islam in promoting harmonious co-existence in the country and the potential of Islam as an agent of building a cohesive and integrated society.

The study was specifically based in Mombasa and Nairobi counties. The two areas were selected owing to their high Muslim population, their cosmopolitan nature and a history of conflict in the counties. An exploratory research design method was applied in the collection and analysis of the field data. The researcher with the help of four research assistants gathered much of the data using self-administered questionnaires. More data to enrich the study was collected by the researcher through interviews and focus group discussions. The study population was largely made up of Muslim faithful and leaders from the two counties. Other participants included government officials and church leaders. The latter were mostly enlisted to act as control for the study.

The study established good efforts from the Muslim community in working towards a cohesive and integrated society. Muslim leaders use the regular meetings to preach peace and co-existence as severally evidenced through the Friday Bulletin. The magazine is printed weekly in Nairobi and distributed to members and other interested people and institutions across the country. There were numerous barriers and challenges noted to stand on the path of the Muslim community in their efforts of working for a cohesive and integrated nation. A key challenge was the frequent negative stereo-typing by the media and the general public against Muslims.

### **7.3 Conclusion**

The general objective of the study was to examine the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya with specific focus on Nairobi and Mombasa Counties. From the findings based on the data collected from diverse respondents in the field, the general conclusion of the study is that Islam has made important strides towards promoting a cohesive and integrated Kenya despite the barriers which have stood on its way. Further the religion has untapped potential of working towards a cohesive and integrated Kenya in the future. Various stakeholders in Islam need to rise to the occasion and harness the resources within the religion for promoting a cohesive and integrated nation. Nonetheless, the following are the specific conclusions based on the three specific objectives that undergirded the study:

The first objective of the study sought to examine the Islamic policy framework for cohesion and integration in Kenya. After a thorough investigation using the various tools employed in data collection, it was found that there is no policy framework in existence in Islam for cohesion and integration in Kenya. Neither is there such framework for other related tasks like peacebuilding and conflict management. Islam largely relies on Quran and Hadith to undertake work on cohesion and integration and related activities. Lack of policy framework obviously has many shortcomings including having diverse approaches towards the task. Further, a system of working strategies, evaluation and accountability cannot be there without a policy framework. This deficiency has a way of crippling the performance of the religion in the task. Whereas there were indications of a policy framework under contemplation, the urgency of the same was greatly lacking. It is the opinion of this

researcher that relevant stakeholders need to treat a policy framework as a matter of urgency if Islam is to effectively participate in building a peaceful, cohesive and integrated Kenya.

The second objective of the study aimed at assessing the methods and strategies used by Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in Kenya. It was found that Islam has used several methods and strategies to address issues of cohesion and integration. However, most of the methods used are short-term and reactive in nature. There are not many comprehensive long-term strategies to work for a cohesive and integrative Kenya in Islam. The common approaches used by Islam are dialogue and preaching in mosques, a thing that was noted to be common while there are incidence touching on the co-existence of communities. The use of Inter-Faith Forums such as Inter-Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK) and the coastal based Coast Inter-Faith Council of Clerics (CICC) were mentioned as avenues of promoting cohesion and integration. The level of cooperation between Islam and other actors was noted to be low, more so at the grass root levels. There is little structured engagement between Islam and other actors, both state and non-state actors. It can therefore be fair to conclude that, while Islam is making some attempts in promoting national cohesion and integration, the methods and strategies used are not sufficient to address a challenge of this magnitude. The religious leaders of Islam in Kenya need to be more deliberate in using Islam as a resource of promoting a cohesive and integrated society in Kenya.

The third objective aimed at evaluating the challenges encountered by Islam in cohesion and integration efforts in Kenya as well as the prospects of the religion in the task. From the findings and the consequent discussion, Islam is evidently faced by myriad of challenges

while working for a peaceful, cohesive and integrative nation. Some challenges are internal while others are external in nature. The major external challenges facing Islam in working for a cohesive and integrated Kenya are stereo-types, negative publicity and the ambiguous high handedness of the state security agencies in the war against terrorism. The name of Islam has really been tarnished and Muslims are viewed as people who do not love peace by majority of non-Muslims in Kenya. A Muslim or Muslim organization therefore starts from a position of self-defense while talking on matters to do with peaceful co-existence. This happens at all levels of the society. In addition to this, the security forces in Kenya have tended to adopt a sweeping strategy in the fight against violent extremism and terrorism. Many innocent Muslim faithful and leaders have become victims of this generalization. As a result, a large section of Muslims is apprehensive towards making sacrifices to promote a harmonious Kenyan society. From the internal perspective, there is need for the leaders in the religion to be better role models and offer strong leadership in addressing cohesion, integration and other issues that promote the common good of the Kenyan society.

The second part of the third objective aimed at investigating the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration. According to most respondents from the faith, there is a bright future for Islam fruitfully participating in building a cohesive and integrated society. Many leaders and faithful in Islam are genuinely working towards a cohesive and integrated Kenya. There are also several organizations which are actively undertaking activities aimed at making contributions towards a united Kenya. Despite the many challenges standing on the way of the religion in the task, many people are willing to pay the necessary sacrifice to stand out and promote a cohesive and integrated society. With the combined individual and



corporate efforts, Islam is evidently a major civic body that can immensely contribute to a peaceful and prosperous Kenya.

#### **7.4 Policy Recommendations**

The following are the policy recommendations arising from the study:

There is an urgent need for Islam to develop a national policy framework for promoting national cohesion and integration and related works. From the national policy, other units in Islam including Counties and Muslim organizations can draft contextualized policies from the national Islamic policy. As Islam develop a policy for the task, the stakeholders should undertake a wider consultation with other players. The sacred writings for Islam such as Qur'an and Hadith would be expected to highly contribute in the drafting of such policy framework.

Islam, just as it should be the case with other actors need to take national cohesion and integration as a continuous and ongoing process rather than an event. In most cases, Islam has taken the task seriously only in the times of social eruptions. This reactive approach needs to be substituted with a concrete long-term approach. The researcher therefore recommends the strengthening of the department and other institutions in Islam which are involved in promoting peace and harmony in the society. Such institutions should be well staffed, well capacitated and funded to enable them work on a continuous basis for a cohesive and integrated society.

Majority of internal and external challenges facing Islam in national cohesion and integration have something to do with lack of sufficient knowledge. From one perspective, Islam has become a victim of state actors and citizens who do not understand the religion. There is a need to design school curriculums in a way that help them to develop a modest understanding and appreciation of major religions in Kenya. This will help in addressing the negative stereotypes from the media and the general society that antagonize Muslims and work against the religion's morale in promoting a cohesive and integrated society. Further, the religion needs to promote education among its followers so that the issue of manpower, capacity and leadership may be addressed. Islamic religious education through the national education system and madrassas needs to be reviewed to help address the vice of radicalization which normally utilize religious knowledge deficiencies among the young Muslims. The government also needs to focus meaningful development in marginalized Islam majority areas. This would help in reducing poverty levels and empower Muslims to live dignified lives and participate effectively in national building.

Lastly the state needs to recognize Islam as a resource in building a cohesive and integrated society. Given that there is unutilized potential in the religion, the state actors need to factor Islam while generating policies that work for a united and peaceful country. The National Conflict Management Policy needs to be revised to accommodate the place of religious actors including Islam in peacebuilding. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission also needs to tap more into Islam as a resource of promoting a cohesive and integrative nation. The Commission needs to go beyond merely having Muslims as senior officials in the commission and intensify engagements with Muslim at the grassroots level.

## **7.5 Recommendations for Further Studies**

The researcher makes the following recommendations for further studies:

1. This study was on the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration with an emphasis in Mombasa and Nairobi counties. There are other counties especially in the North Eastern region with a history of conflict and have higher concentration of Muslims. Specific studies need to be undertaken in those counties to offer a more comprehensive knowledge on the extent to which Islam has been involved in building cohesive and integrated societies.
2. This research was generalized in exploring the role of Islam in national cohesion and integration. There is need for a study that specifically investigates the role of Islam's institutions such as schools, hospitals, Non Profit organizations etc in promoting a cohesive and integrated society.
3. More specific studies need to be undertaken to examine the role of other mainline civil society groups such as the media in the promotion of national cohesion and integration.
4. Opportunities are remaining open for studies in the role of public institutions such as schools, universities and hospitals in promoting a cohesive and integrated communities in their local contexts such as counties. The researcher recommends contextualized studies on the role of specific public institutions in specific areas in cohesion and integration.

5. The Christian community totals to about 80% of the Kenyan population. The church is made up of many denominations and organizations which have collective and individual role in promoting cohesive and integrated society. Studies need to be undertaken to investigate how the Christian denominations and organization can be resources in cohesion and integration.
  
6. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission is the main custodian of cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya. A study needs to be undertaken to investigate the performance of the body in the task since its inception in 2008.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR OFFICIALS IN SUPKEM AND CIPK

1. Name of the respondent and position in the organization.
2. Duration of work in the organization and in this post.
3. Briefly tell me the major activities and programs run by your organization.
4. What are the current projects being undertaken by your organization?
5. Who are your partners in the work of your organization? Please expound on the mode of cooperation and partnership.
6. Explain your familiarity with the cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya.
7. Explain your understanding of Islamic/Quranic teaching on peace, cohesion and integration.
8. Gauge the Muslim community involvement in peace building, cohesion and integration in Kenya.
9. How has the Muslim community been involved in dealing with ethnic and religious conflicts in the country?
10. How has your organization been involved in inter-religious dialogue in the country?
11. How has your organization been involved in inter-ethnic dialogue in the country?
12. To what extent is your organization involved in cohesion and integration process in the country?
13. Assess the overall performance of the Muslim community in Kenya in socio political issues.

## APPENDIX 2: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR SHEIKHS, IMAMS AND MUSLIM FAITHFUL

Assalam Aleykum. I am Michael G. Mwangi, a PhD student in Peace and Conflict studies at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. I am doing a research on: *Religion in National Cohesion and Integration with Specific Reference to Islam in Kenya*. Kindly fill up the questionnaire to assist me in doing the research. The information given will be used only for academic purposes and your name will not be revealed. **Please be honest in your response to ensure accuracy of the research report.** Thanks in advance.

Name of the Mosque .....Location of the Mosque .....

Type: (Shiite/Sunni/Other.....)

### 1. Background Information

#### A. Sex

- Male
- Female

#### B. Age

- 18-30 years
- 31-40 years
- 41-50 years
- 51 years and above

#### C. Education

- Primary level **not** Completed
- Primary Level Completed
- Secondary School Level
- College/University Level

#### D. State your Position in Islam

- A Muslim faithful

- A Muslim Scholar
- A Sheikh
- An Imam

**E. Duration of time you have stayed in this Sub-County**

- Below 1 year
- 1-5 years
- 5-10 year
- 10 years and above
- Resides outside the Sub-County

2. In your own understanding what is the Quranic/Islam teachings on peace, cohesion and integration?

3. To what extent are you familiar with the national cohesion and integration agenda in Kenya?

- Very familiar
- Familiar
- Not Familiar

Explain your answer above. ....

4. Have you had incidents of ethnic conflicts in your **Sub-County (Constituency)** in the past?

- Yes
- No

5. If yes in (4) above how did your local Muslim community respond to the conflict?

6. Have you ever had incidents of religious conflicts in your **Sub-County (Constituency)** in the past?

- Yes



No

7. If yes in (6) above, how did your local Muslim community respond to the conflict?

8. List the major causes of conflicts in your locality. (If there have been cases of conflicts in the past).

9. How would you gauge the Islam community performance in promoting cohesion and integration **nationally**?

- Very good
- Good
- Fair
- Poor

10. How would you gauge the Islam community performance in promoting cohesion and integration in your **Sub-County (Constituency)**?

- Very good
- Good
- Fair
- Poor

11. What strategies/methods (*if any*) does the local Islam community employ in promoting inter-ethnic harmony?

12. What strategies/methods (*if any*) does the local Islam community employ in promoting inter-religious dialogue and harmony in your **Sub-County (Constituency)**?

13. Kindly give your own understanding of the meaning of the term Jihad.

14. Are you aware of any Islam NGO/or Organization that works for peace building, cohesion and integration among communities in your locality?

- Yes
- No

15. If yes in (14) above, what are the names of the organizations and the nature of their work?

16. How does Islam community engage **other actors** in promoting cohesion and integration in your **Locality (Constituency)**?

17. Have other non-state actors (**non-governmental bodies**) involved Islam locally in cohesion and integration?

- Yes
- No
- I don't know

18. If yes in (17) above, identify the bodies and describe the nature of the involvement.

19. Has there been any known co-operation between Islam community and the state (**government**) in promoting cohesion and integration in your locality?

- Yes
- Not
- I don't Know

20. If yes in (19) above, explain the nature of co cooperation.....

21. What are the main **difficulties and challenges** facing Islam in peace building, cohesion and integration activities at the **national level**?

22. What are the main **difficulties and challenges** facing Islam in peace building, cohesion and integration activities in your locality (**Sub-County**)?

23. Are you aware of any **policy framework** (written guidelines) available locally in Islam for promoting cohesion and integration among communities?

- Yes
- No

24. If yes in (23) above, what are some of its provisions and how effective is the policy?

25. Are you aware of any national Islam **policy-framework** (written guidelines) for peace building, national cohesion and integration?

- Yes
- No

26. If yes in (25) above, what are some of its provisions and how effective is the policy?

27. How are the future prospects/hope of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in your County?

- Very High
- High
- Low
- Very low

Explain your answer.....

28. How is the future prospects/hope of Islam in promoting cohesion and integration in **Kenya/Nationally?**

- Very high
- High
- Low
- Very low

Explain your answer .....

29. Kindly give me any other comment on the involvement of Islam in cohesion and integration in Kenya.

**Kipengee BB: Maswali Kwa Sheikh, Imamu Na Waumini Wa Dini Ya Kiislamu.**

Assalam Aleykum. Jina langu ni Michael G. Mwangi, mwanafunzi wa somo la uzanifu (PhD) katika somo la **Amani na Mgogoro** katika Chuo Kikuu cha Masinde Muliro cha Sayansi na Teknologia. Nafanya utafiti kuhusu *"Dini katika uwiano na maridhiano nchini Kenya kwa kulenga kipekee dini ya Kiislamu"*. Tafadhali jaza maswali yafuatayo ili kuchangia msaada wako katika utafiti huu. Tafadhali kuwa mwaminifu kwa majibu yako ndivyo matokeo iwe sahihi. Asante kwa awali.

**Jina la Mskiti .....Mahali pa Msikiti.....**

**Sunni/Shia/Ingine.....**

**1. Ujumbe wa Kimsingi**

**A. Jinsia**

- Mke
- Mume

**B. Umri**

- Miaka 18-30
- Miaka 31-40
- Miaka 41-50
- Miaka 51 na zaidi

**C. Kiwango Cha Elimu**

- Kutohitimu shule ya Msingi
- Kuhitimu shule ya Msingi
- Kiwango cha Sekondari
- Kiwango cha shule Anuwai au Chuo Kikuu.

**D. Taja Cheo Chako katika Uislamu**

- Muumini wa kiislamu
- Msomi wa kiislamu
- Sheikh
- Imamu

**E. Muda uliokaa Kwa Kaunti hii dogo**

- Chini ya mwaka mmoja
- Miaka 1-5
- Miaka 5-10
- Miaka 10 na zaidi
- Mimi huishi kaunti dogo ingine

2. Kwa kuelewa kwako, mafundisho ya Quran /Kiislamu ni yapi kuhusu amani, uwiano na maridhiano?
3. Kwa kiwango kipi unaelewa Ajenda ya kitaifa kuhusu msikamano na maridhiano nchini Kenya?
  - Fahamu zaidi
  - Nafahamu
  - Sifahamu

Eleza jibu lako .....

4. Je, kumewahi kuwa na mgogoro wa kikabila katika **kaunti dogo** yako hapo awali?
  - Ndiyo
  - La
5. Iwapo ni ndiyo (4) hapo juu, jinsi gani Waislamu wa jamii yako walichangia kwa kutatua mgogoro?
6. Kumewahi kuwa na matukio ya mgogoro wa kidini katika **kaunti dogo yako** hapo awali?
  - Ndiyo
  - La
7. Iwapo ni ndiyo (6) hapo juu, Jinsi gani waislamu wa jamii yako walichangia kwa kutatua mgogoro huo?
8. Taja maswala makuu ambayo huchangia mgogoro katika eneo yako (kama kumekuwa na migogoro)?

9. Je unawezaje kupima utendakazi wa uislamu katika kuboresha uwiano na maridhiano **kitaifa**?
- Bora
  - Nzuri
  - Wastani
  - Duni
10. Je unawezaje kupima utendakazi wa uislamu katika kuboresha uwiano na maridhiano katika **kaunti dogo yako**?
- Bora
  - Nzuri
  - Wastani
  - Duni
11. Ni mikakati ipi (iwapo ipo) jamii yako ya Waislamu hutumia ili kuboresha mshikamano wa makabila tofauti katika **kaunti dogo yako**?
12. Ni mikakati ipi (iwapo ipo) jamii yako ya Waislamu hutumia ili kuboresha mshikamano wa kidini katika **kaunti dogo yako**?
13. Tafadhali toa maana yako jinsi unavyoelewa jina Jihadi.
14. Je unafahamu shirika lolote lisilo la serikali (NGO) la kiislamu ambalo huchangia kuimarisha amani, uwiano na maridhiano miongoni mwa jamii yako?
- Ndiyo
  - La
15. Iwapo jibu lako ni ndiyo (14) juu, tafadhali taja jina la shirika hizo na kazi wanayotekeleza.
16. Jinsi gani jamii ya waislamu huhusika na washikadau wengine ili kuimarisha uwiano na maridhiano katika **kaunti yako dogo**?
17. Je, unaelewa wahusika wengine **isipokuwa serikali** ambao huhusika na waiislamu katika maswala kuhusu uwiano na maridhiano?
- Ndiyo
  - La

- Sielewi

18. Iwapo ni ndiyo (17) juu, taja mashirika hayo na ujadili kiwango cha uhusika.

19. Je kumewahi kuwa na ushirikiano wowote unaojulikana kati ya jamii ya kiislamu na serikali kuboresha ushirikiano na maridhiano katika jamii yako?

- Ndiyo
- La
- Sielewi

20. Iwapo ni ndiyo (19) hapo juu, eleza namna ya ushirikiano.

21. Je ni **changamoto** zipi kuu ambazo hukabili waislamu katika shughuli za kuimarisha amani, uwiano na maridhiano **kitaifa**?

22. Je ni **changamoto** zipi kuu ambazo hukabili waislamu katika shughuli za kuimarisha amani, uwiano na maridhiano **kaunti dogo yako**?

23. Je unaelewa muundo wa sera za kiislamu huko mashinani ambayo kwake waislamu hutumia kuimarisha uwiano na maridhiano miongoni mwa jamii?

- Ndiyo
- La

24. Iwapo ni ndiyo (23) juu, eleza baadhi ya nafasi na jinsi unavyofikiria kuridhisha kwake?

25. Je unaelewa muundo wa sera za kiislamu **kitaifa** ambao hutumiwa kuimarisha amani ,uwiano na maridhiano miongoni mwa jamii?

- Ndiyo
- La

26. Iwapo ni ndiyo (25) hapo juu, eleza baadhi au nafasi na jinsi sera hiyo huridhisha?

27. Ni tumaini kiwango gani kwamba uislamu utachangia katika kuimarisha uwiano na maridhiano katika kaunti yako siku sijazo?

- Juu sana
- Juu
- Chini
- Duni

Elezea jibu lako.....

**28.** Ni tumaini kiwango gani kwamba uislamu utachangia katika kuimarisha uwiano na maridhiano **Kitaifa** siku sijazo?

- Juu sana
- Juu
- Chini
- Duni

Elezea jibu lako.....

**29.** Tafahali nitajie jambo lingine linalohusu uislamu katika uwiano na maridhiano nchini Kenya ambalo halikutajwa kwa maswali haya.



### **APPENDIX 3: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR OFFICIAL(S) AT NCIC**

1. Name and position in the National Cohesion and Integration Commission.
2. Progress of the commission's work and the achievements so far.
3. How cohesive is the Kenyan society today compared to three years ago?
4. How integrated is the Kenyan society today compared to three years ago?
5. Describe the current level of religious tolerance in the country.
6. Describe the current level of religious tolerance in the following counties: Mombasa and Nairobi.
7. Describe the current level of inter-ethnic tolerance in the country.
8. Describe the current levels of inter-ethnic tolerance in the following counties: Mombasa and Nairobi.
9. Which institutions have you been working with in promoting national cohesion and integration?
10. Describe some of the methods the commission has applied in promoting cohesion and integration in Kenya.
11. Describe the extent to which you have involved or partnered with the Church in promoting cohesion and integration.
12. What has been the result of the partnership in (11) above?
13. What challenges if any have you encountered in partnering with the church in the task?
14. Describe the extent to which you have involved or partnered with Islam religion in promoting national cohesion and integration.
15. What has been the result of the partnership in (14) above?

16. What challenges (if any) have you encountered in partnering with the Islam religion in the task?
17. What other religious groups have you worked with in promoting national cohesion and integration?
18. What has been the mode of operation in (17) above?
19. What do you think are the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration agenda?
20. What do you think is likely to hinder Islam religion in promoting national cohesion and integration in Kenya?

#### **APPENDIX 4: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SUB-COUNTY COMMISSIONERS**

1. Name of the Sub-County?
2. How long have you served in the Sub-County?
3. What is the general nature of cohesion and integration in the Sub-County?
4. What is the nature of ethnic co-existence in the Sub-County?
5. What is the nature of inter-religious co-existence in the Sub-County?
6. Which non-religious institutions have you been working with in promoting cohesion and integration in your county?
7. Describe some of the methods your office has applied in promoting cohesion and integration in the Sub- County.
8. Describe the extent to which you have involved or partnered with the Church in promoting cohesion and integration.
9. What has been the result of the partnership in (8) above?
10. What challenges if any have you encountered in partnering with the church in the task?
11. Describe the extent to which you have involved or partnered with Islam religion in promoting cohesion and integration in your sub-county.
12. What has been the result of the partnership in (11) above?
13. What challenges (if any) have you encountered in partnering with the Islam religion in the task?
14. What other religious groups have you worked with in promoting cohesion and integration?

15. What has been the mode of operation in (14) above?
16. What are the prospects of Islam in national cohesion and integration?
17. What are the likely challenges and hindrances to Islam in promoting cohesion and integration?

## **APPENDIX 5: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CHURCH LEADERS AND NCCK OFFICIAL (S)**

1. Name and position in your organization or Church.
2. How long have you served in your current position?
3. To what extent are you familiar with the national cohesion and integration agenda?
4. Please tell me how your Church/ NCCK have been involved in cohesion and integration agenda.
5. What successes have you registered in cohesion and integration work in your organization?
6. Give me the names of the **major non-religious organizations** you have partnered with in the national cohesion and integration agenda.
7. Explain the mode of cooperation and partnership with the organizations you have named above.
8. What challenges have you faced in working with the organizations you have named?
9. Have you partnered with **other religious organizations** in cohesion and integration agenda? If yes, please give the list of the religious organizations you have partnered with.
10. Explain the mode of cooperation and partnership with the religious organizations you have named in (9) above.
11. What **challenges** have you encountered in working with each religious organization you have named above?

## **APPENDIX 6: FOCUSED GROUP DISCUSSION GUIDE WITH MUSLIMS.**

1. Evaluate the current and the past role of Islam in promoting peaceful co-existence, cohesion and integration **locally** and **nationally**.
2. Examine the methods used by Islam in promoting peaceful co-existence, cohesion and integration **locally** and **nationally**.
3. What partnership has been there between Islam and the state actors in promoting peaceful co-existence, cohesion and integration **locally** and **nationally**?
4. What partnership has been there between Islam and non-state actors in promoting peaceful co-existence, cohesion and integration **locally** and **nationally**?
5. What challenges has Islam encountered or is likely to encounter in promoting peaceful co-existence, cohesion and integration at the Local and the National levels in Kenya?
6. Assess the policy Framework for Islam in national cohesion and integration at both the Local and the National Levels.

## APPENDIX 7: CONSENT LETTER FOR PARTICIPANTS

### Consent Letter

*Dear research participant,*

My name is Michael G. Mwangi, a PhD student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am currently collecting data for my thesis titled “*Religion in National Cohesion and Integration in Kenya with a Specific Reference to Islam in Nairobi and Mombasa Counties*”. If you have agreed to participate in the research, kindly sign in the space provided below. Thanks for your cooperation.

-----

**Signature of the Participant**

-----

**Date**

## **APPENDIX 8: CODES AND THEIR MEANINGS.**

ACCM: Assistant County Commissioner-Mombasa (1-3)

ACCN: Assistant County Commissioner Nairobi (1-3)

CIPK. M1: Council of Imam and Preachers of Kenya Mombasa 1

CIPK. M2: Council of Imam and Preachers of Kenya Mombasa 2

CIPK. M3: Council of Imam and Preachers of Kenya Mombasa 3

FGD: NA: Focus Group Discussion-Nairobi A

FGD-MA: Focus Group Discussion-Mombasa A

FGD-MB: Focus Group Discussion-Mombasa B

FGD-NB: Focus Group Discussion-Nairobi B

QRM: Questionnaire Respondent- Mombasa

QRN: Questionnaire Respondent -Nairobi

SUPKEM-M: Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims-Mombasa

SUPKEM-N: Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims-Nairobi

CLN-1: Church Leader-Nairobi 1

CLN-2: Church Leader-Nairobi 2

CLN-3: Church Leader-Nairobi 3

CLM-1: Church Leader-Mombasa 1

CLM-2: Church Leader-Mombasa 2

CLM-3: Church Leader-Mombasa 3

NCCCK-M1: National Church Council of Kenya- Mombasa 1

NCCCK-M2: National Church Council of Kenya- Mombasa 2

NCCCK-N1: National Church Council of Kenya- Mombasa 1

NCCCK-N2: National Church Council of Kenya- Mombasa 2



## APPENDIX 9: LIST OF MOSQUES IDENTIFIED IN MOMBASA COUNTY

### KISAUNI SUB-COUNTY

NAME OF MOSQUE	LOCATION OF MOSQUE	TYPE OF MOSQUE
Masjid Amani	Kwa Dhobi, Barsheba	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Aqswa	Kisauni Msikitini	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid As Swafaa	Kwa Saddam, Mwandoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ar Rahmah	Bakarani Stage	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ar Raashideen	Kishada, Bakarani	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Arrawdha	Harakani	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Omar ibn Khatwab	Soko Mjinga, Kisauni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Barakat	Soko Mjinga, Kisauni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Sakina	Kiembeni, Bamburi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Abdallah	Kiembeni, Bamburi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Noor	Bamburi, Maji Machafu	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Qubaa	Vescon, Bamburi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Nassor	Vescon, Bamburi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mwajuma	Fisheries, Bamburi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mujaahideen	Bamburi, Mwembelegeza	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Arafat	Posta, Mtopanga	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Anwarali	Anwarali, Mtopanga	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Farsiy	Sunlight, Mwandoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Sakina	Green Estate, Kiembeni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ikhlas	Mshomoroni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Bidala	Mshomoroni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rahma	Mshomoroni	Sunni; Congregational

Masjid Mujahideen	Mshomoroni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Zulfa	Mshomoroni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Hawabai	Bamburi, Maji Machafu	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Aabidiin	Bamburi, Mwembelegeza	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Zubeir	Kiembeni, Bamburi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Maryam	Twaa Tugawe, Mlaleo	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Fatma	Barsheba	Sunni; Congregational

#### **NYALI SUB-COUNTY**

Masjid Qubaa	Idi Kumbi, Bombolulu	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Balgun	Bombolulu	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ar Rahman	Kongowea	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mwinyi Kombo	Kambi Kikuyu	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Khairat	VOK	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Taqwa	VOK	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rawdha	Mbungoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rawdha	Kwa Karama, Kongowea	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rahma	Kongowea	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Tawbah	Kongowea	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mulla	Kongowea	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Omar ibn Abdul Aziz	Mbungoni	Sunni; Congregational
Jaffery Muslim Jamat	Near Masjid Swalihina, Lights	Shiite; Congregational
Masjid Fathi	Mkomani	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ghufayli	Opposite Nyali Cinemax	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Qadiriyah	Katisha	Sunni; Congregational

## MVITA SUB-COUNTY

Masjid Lootah	Mombasa Island, Buxton	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Siddiq	Mombasa Island, Buxton	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Yuusuf	Mombasa Island, TUM	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ali	Mombasa Island, Buxton	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Swafaa	Mombasa Island, Buxton	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Memon Villa	Mombasa Island, Memon	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Sakina	Mombasa Island, Majengo	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mussa	Mombasa Island, Kingorani	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Azhar	Mombasa Island, Guraya	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Qubaa	Majengo Sokoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Hudaa	Spaki	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Liwatoni	Ganjoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ibrahim	Ganjoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Abrar	Ganjoni	Non-Congregational
Masjid Konzi	Baroda, CBD	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mbaruk	Makadara, Old Town	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Al Mandhari	Old Town	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Jundani	Opposite Posta	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Baluchi	Posta	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Shibu	Coast Bus	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Al Furqan	Bondeni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mabrook	Posta	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid TSS	Near Nation House	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ridhwaan	Abuu Hureira, Kingorani	Sunni; Congregational

Masjid Aisha	Majengo, Kingorani	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Sargoi	Sargoi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ummu Kulthum	Serani Secondary School	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ummu Kulthum	Kizingo, Likoni Ferry Mama Ngina, Likoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rawdha	Ferry Makupa, Opp Makupa	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rahman	Secondary School Tononoka, Near	Shiite; Congregational
Masjid Saleh	Makadara Stage Near Allidina Visram	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Furqan	High School Bondeni, Near Salama	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Kilifi	Stage	Sunni; Congregational

#### **LIKONI SUB COUNTY**

Masjid Fatma	Kindunguni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ismail	Mweza	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Shafi	Mweza	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Khadija	Kindunguni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Al Azhar	Manyatta	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Darul Arqam	Kona Mpya	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Darul Ulum	Kona ya Polisi, Mshale	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Bomani	Bomani	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Tawbah	Mtongwe	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Nuur	Majengo Mapya	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Muhajirina	Majengo Mapya	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Aisha	Kibuyuni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Abubakar	Peleleza	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ibn Taymiyah	Jamvi	Sunni; Congregational

Masjid Bilal	Mrima, Likoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Darul Ulum (Ndogo)	Dimbwini	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Abdallah bin Rashid Al Ghufaily	Kona Mpya	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Sheikhul Islam	Shika Adabu, Likoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Al Maidah	Shika Adabu, Likoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Al Riyadh	Shika Adabu, Likoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Swalha	Mibaazini	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Firdaus	Shelly, Likoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Swabrina	Shelly, Likoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Tasniim	Opposite Shikadabu Secondary School	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Mujahidiin	Shika Adabu Stage	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Furqan	Shika Adabu Stage	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Tawba	Petuko	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rahma	Bwagamoyo	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Istikama	Grandi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Imani	Michikuni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Shakombo	Vijiweni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Darul Quran	Grandi	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Ahlul Bayt	Midodoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Tauheed	Midodoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Qadiriyyah	Mweza	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Darul Ghurabaa	Vijiweni	Sunni; Congregational
<b>CHANGAMWE SUB-COUNTY</b>		
Masjid Sunnah	Changamwe	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Fathi	Chaani	Sunni; Congregational

Masjid Nuur	Magongo	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rahma	Jambo	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Hidayah	Migadini	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rawdha	Kwa Hola	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Taqwa	Kwa Hola	Sunni; Congregational

#### **JOMVU SUB-COUNTY**

Masjid Rahman	Kwa Mwanzia	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Qubaa	Ganahola	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Nuur	Kwa Shee	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Islamic Teachers College	Mikindani Stage	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Maunguja	Maunguja	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Voroni	Voroni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Rahma	Jomvu Kuu	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Swirwati	Magogoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Khairati	Magogoni	Sunni; Congregational
Masjid Jamia Noor	Magogoni	Sunni; Congregational



## **APPENDIX 10: LIST OF MOSQUES IDENTIFIED IN NAIROBI**

<b>Name of the Mosque</b>	<b>Location of The Mosque</b>
Lindi Mosque	Kibera
Makina Mosque	Ngong' Road
D.C Mosque	Ngong' Road
Kambi Muru Mosque	Kibera
Ayany Mosque	Kibera/Ngong Road
Karanja Mosque	Kibra
Al mosque Islamic	Kibra
Al-huda Mosque	Lungalunga Road
Taqwa Mosque	Pipeline
Lunga Lunga Mosque	Lungalunga Road
Kingstone Mosque	Lungalunga Road
Madarasatu Umar	Ruaraka
Ulaqsa Islamic	Ruraraka
NYS Mosque	NYS Thika Road
Zamzam Madrassa	Outering Road
Islamic Relief Foundation Mosque	Kilimani
Masjid Nur	Ngomongo
Khoja Mosque	CBD
Syed Abdulla Shah	Near University of Nairobi
Daarusalam Mosque	Near Kasarani
Riverside Mosque	Ruaraka
Jamia Mosque	CBD/Moi Avenue
Adams Arcade	Ngong' Road
Laini Saba Mosque	Kibera



## APPENDIX 11: INTRODUCTION LETTER



MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 0204400916  
Fax: 056-30836  
Website: [www.mmust.ac.ke](http://www.mmust.ac.ke)

P.O Box 190  
Kakamega – 50100

NAIROBI CAMPUS

**Our Ref: CPC/H/203/12**

**Date: 20<sup>th</sup> January 2017**

National Council for Science & Technology  
P.O Box 30623-00100  
NAIROBI.

Dear Sir/Madam,

**RE: INTRODUCTION OF MICHAEL GATOGO MWANGI – CPC/H/203/12**

The above mentioned is a student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Nairobi Centre, (Adm. No. CPC/H/203/12) pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies. He has already submitted his proposal to the University titled "*The Role of Religion in National Cohesion and Integration with specific Reference to Islam in Kenya*", which has been approved by the University. He is now ready for field research.

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

Yours faithfully



Dr. Silvia V. M. M. M.  
Co-ordinator, Nairobi Campus

Sl:ek

**APPENDIX 12: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**



**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE,  
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION**

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,  
2241349, 3310571, 2219420  
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249  
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke  
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke  
when replying please quote

9<sup>th</sup> Floor, Utali House  
Uhuru Highway  
P.O. Box 30623-00100  
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No: **NACOSTI/P/17/49337/15552**

Date:  
**14<sup>th</sup> February, 2017**

Michael Gatogo Mwangi  
Masinde Muliro University of  
Science and Technology  
P.O. Box 190-50100  
**KAKAMEGA.**

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“The role of religion in national cohesion and integration with a specif reference to Islam in Kenya,”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Mombasa and Nairobi Counties** for the period ending **13<sup>th</sup> February, 2018.**

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Mombasa and Nairobi Counties** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are expected to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

  
**BONIFACE WANYAMA**  
**FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The County Commissioner  
Mombasa County.

The County Director of Education  
Mombasa County.

The County Commissioner  
Nairobi County.

The County Director of Education  
Nairobi County.

**COUNTY COMMISSIONER**  
**MOMBASA COUNTY**  
P. O. Box 80136-00100, NAI  
TEL: 311565

*National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is ISO 9001:2008 Certified*

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:**

**MR. MICHAEL GATOGO MWANGI  
OF MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF  
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 587-900  
KIambu, has been permitted to conduct  
research in Mombasa, Nairobi Counties**

**on the topic: THE ROLE OF RELIGION IN  
NATIONAL COHESION AND INTEGRATION  
WITH A SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO ISLAM IN  
KENYA**

**for the period ending:  
13th February, 2018**

  
**Applicant's  
Signature**

**Permit No : NACOSTI/P/17/49337/15552  
Date Of Issue : 14th February, 2017  
Fee Received : Ksh 2000**




  
**Director General  
National Commission for Science,  
Technology & Innovation**

### CONDITIONS

- 1. You must report to the County Commissioner and the County Education Officer of the area before embarking on your research. Failure to do that may lead to the cancellation of your permit.**
- 2. Government Officer will not be interviewed without prior appointment.**
- 3. No questionnaire will be used unless it has been approved.**
- 4. Excavation, filming and collection of biological specimens are subject to further permission from the relevant Government Ministries.**
- 5. You are required to submit at least two(2) hard copies and one (1) soft copy of your final report.**
- 6. The Government of Kenya reserves the right to modify the conditions of this permit including its cancellation without notice**



**REPUBLIC OF KENYA**



**National Commission for Science,  
Technology and Innovation  
RESEARCH CLEARANCE  
PERMIT**

**Serial No.A 12870**

**CONDITIONS: see back page**





**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

Telegrams: "PROVINCER", COAST  
Telephone: Mombasa 2311201  
Fax No.041-2013846  
Email: [msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com](mailto:msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com)  
when Replying please quote

COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE  
P.O. BOX 90424-80100  
**MOMBASA**  
Tel.0715040444

**Ref.No. MCC/ADM.25 VOL.1/22**                      **12<sup>th</sup> April, 2017**

All Deputy County Commissioners - Likoni/  
**MOMBASA COUNTY**

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

This is to authorize Michael Gatoto Mwangi Permit no.  
NACOSTI/P/17/49337/15552 of Masinde Muliro University, Kakamega to carry  
out research on "**The role of religion in national cohesion and  
integration with a specific reference to Islam in Kenya**" within Mombasa  
County for the period ending 13<sup>th</sup> February, 2018.

Any assistance given to him will be very much appreciated.

ESTHER IDZA  
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER  
**MOMBASA COUNTY**

CC:

Director of Education  
**MOMBASA**



**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT**  
**MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND COORDINATION OF NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

Telegrams: "PROVINCER", COAST  
Telephone: Mombasa 2311201  
Fax No.041-2013846  
Email: [msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com](mailto:msacountycommissioner@yahoo.com)  
when Replying please quote

COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE  
P.O. BOX 90424-80100  
**MOMBASA**  
Tel.0715040444

**Ref.No. MCC/ADM.25 VOL.1/22**

**12<sup>th</sup> April, 2017**

All Deputy County Commissioners  
**MOMBASA COUNTY**

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

This is to authorize Michael Gatoto Mwangi Permit no. NACOSTI/P/17/49337/15552 of Masinde Muliro University, Kakamega to carry out research on "**The role of religion in national cohesion and integration with a specific reference to Islam in Kenya**" within Mombasa County for the period ending 13<sup>th</sup> February, 2018.

Any assistance given to him will be very much appreciated.

ESTHER IDZA  
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER  
**MOMBASA COUNTY**

CC:

Director of Education  
**MOMBASA**

**MINISTRY OF EDUCATION**  
State Department of Basic Education

Telegrams: "SCHOOLING", Nairobi  
Tel. 0202453699  
Fax 2244831 Nairobi  
Email: [rcenairobi@gmail.com](mailto:rcenairobi@gmail.com)  
[cdenairobi@gmail.com](mailto:cdenairobi@gmail.com)  
When replying please quote



Republic of Kenya

REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF EDUCATION  
NAIROBI REGION  
NYAYO HOUSE  
P.O. BOX 74629- 00200  
NAIROBI

REF: RCE/NRB/1/14/(29)

20<sup>th</sup> February 2017

Micheal Gatogo Mwangi  
Masinde Muliro University of  
Science and Technology  
P. O. Box 190-50100  
Nairobi

**RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

We are in receipt of a letter from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation regarding research authorization in Nairobi County on "The role of religion in national cohesion and integration with a specify reference to Islam in Kenya".

This office has no objection and authority is hereby granted for a period ending 13<sup>th</sup> February, 2018 as indicated in the request letter.

Kindly inform the Sub County Director of Education of the Sub County you intend to visit.

  
**MAINA NGURU**  
FOR: REGIONAL COORDINATOR OF EDUCATION  
NAIROBI

C.C

Director General/CEO  
National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation  
Nairobi