

**CHINESE ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN FOSTERING
INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA**

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**A Thesis submitted for the conferment of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Diplomacy and International Relations of Masinde Muliro University of Science
and Technology**

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

Sign.....Date.....

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CDR/H/14-53371/2018

CERTIFICATION

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DEDICATION

To my Mum, Nyar Musa, I present this work in appreciation to your early childhood ‘denial’ of the chance to education to the level you would have wished having been married off at a tender age. Though a primary graduate and in a polygamous marriage, you single handily and outstandingly struggled with your children’s education against all the tides. It has always been a challenge to me more importantly because of the vision you always cuddled for your children’s education.

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ABSTRACT

The study area for this thesis was Kenya and specific study locations were Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu counties since they host KUTRRH, SGR, Moi International Sports Centre and Lamu Port which were the infrastructure under study. China's financial aid comes to Kenya without any conditionality that has hitherto been tied to liberal democratic principles from the west. The focus was on how this partnership manifests itself in infrastructure development since 1963. Kenya-China friendship dates back to more than 600 years but the diplomatic relationship was established in 1963 to present. Chinese mutual development principle is a principle of equality and respect between the Partners and agreements that achieve win-win outcomes. Questions are usually raised due to the fact that Chinese trade agreements are shrouded with a lot of secrecy. For instance, little is known on the maturity, interest rate and grace period of concessional loan that is extended from China EXIM Bank and the method of disbursing aid is in kind an indication that, money remains in the Chinese system and that aid-financed infrastructural projects still remains at the discretion of the Chinese government. With these revelations, this study therefore, investigated whether Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963. The study was anchored on Power, Modernization and complex interdependency theories which were triangulated to inform the conceptual framework of the study. This study adopted both historical and descriptive survey research designs. Questionnaires, interview guides and observation were the data collection instruments. The study's sample size was 15 institutions and 143 respondents. The study adopted data from primary to secondary. Both quantitative and qualitative techniques were used for data analysis and presentation. The quantitative data was statistically analyzed and qualitative was thematically analyzed. Mutual Benefit in China-Kenya bilateral relations came out as the most highly applied in Kenya among the principles of peaceful co-existence. This study further revealed that new skills and technology were being transferred to Kenyan construction workers. This study also exposed that Chinese investment in Kenya's development of infrastructure is significantly beneficial to Kenya's informal sector. Equally, this study found out that although China-Kenya bilateral agreements seemed economically viable Chinese firms' terms and conditions are shrouded with a lot of secrecy. The findings revealed that the population of Kenyan low cadre employees are more than that of their Chinese counterparts on Chinese infrastructure construction firms in Kenya. The study concluded that the most popular principle in China-Kenya economic diplomatic relations was the principle of mutual benefit, Chinese investment in Kenya's development of infrastructure is significantly beneficial to Kenya's informal sector because the lower cadre of employees who are actually the majority are acquiring skills that can make them start their own businesses and that although China-Kenya bilateral agreements seem economically viable Chinese firms' terms and conditions are shrouded with a lot of secrecy. This study's overall conclusion was that Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963. The study's recommendation was that Kenyan government should formulate a policy that the technological skills impacted on Kenyan workers by Chinese firms should be improved and be included in the Kenyan schools' curriculum.

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ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYMS

ADS	Approved Destination Status
BRI-	Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
BWGC	Blue Wave Group of Companies
CCCC-	China Communications Construction Company Limited
CCFs-	Chinese Construction Firms
COVEC	China Oversees Engineering Company
CRI-	China Radio International
CRBC-	China Road and Bridge Corporation
FDI-	Foreign Direct Investment
FOCAC-	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation PRC-Peoples Republic of China
GOC-	Government Owned Corporation
KBCTFAIEU-	Kenya Building Construction, Timber Furniture and Allied Industry Employees Union
KeNHA-	Kenya National Highways Authority
KNBS-	Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
KURA-	Kenya Urban Roads Authority
KURRA –	Kenya Rural Roads Authority
KUTRRH-	Kenyatta University Teaching, Referral and Research Hospital
LAPSET	Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor

MoFAPRC	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China
MSR-	Maritime Silk Road
SADC	South African Development Community
SGR-	Standard Gauge Railway
UNCTAD-	United Nations Conference On Trade and Development
WTO -	World Trade Organization
B C-	Before Christ

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

- Bilateral diplomacy-** Is the diplomatic relationship between two parties. In this study, it is the relationship between Kenya and China.
- Diplomacy -** Refers to a tool used to manage relations among States and between those states and other actors. In this case, between Kenya and China
- Economic Diplomacy-** This is the content of foreign relations, comprising the aspirations and aims, which Kenya and China want to achieve in their relationship.
- Geopolitics -** It is commonly associated with a particular mode of visualizing space, states and the relations between them. In this study it refers to the influence of geography in structuring the bilateral diplomatic relation between Kenya and China.
- Globalization -** Globalization is the process of increasing interconnectedness and interactions among states and societies such as those events in one part of the world. In this study is the interconnectedness between Kenya and China.
- Heads of sections-** Officers that are in the position of assistant directors and above

Who are incharge of Chinese funded infrastructural projects (SGR, KUTRRH, Lamu Port, Moi Kasarani and Thika Superhighway)

Infrastructural development –Is the improvement of the quality of transport system, health, education sanitation and other social amenities. In this study they are the social amenities that China has funded in Kenya.

Middle cadre Officers Officers that are below the position of assistant directors Who are relevant to the Chinese funded infrastructural projects (SGR, KUTRRH, Lamu Port, Moi Kasarani and Thika superhighway)

Mutual Benefit The respect within the connection between partners is crucial for the attainment of mutually beneficial outcomes through agreements. The attainment of mutual benefit necessitates the establishment of regular and continuous communication channels, the formulation of agreements that uphold or enhance regional services, programs, assets, and land-use planning, and the subsequent enhancement of the social, economic, and environmental welfare of the region. This study examines the concept of Mutual Benefit, which refers to the establishment of equity and respect in the context of infrastructure development agreements between Kenya and China. The objective is to achieve

outcomes that are mutually advantageous for both parties involved.

Senior Officers

Officers that are in the position of directors and above in the research study ministries

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter explored the historical background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, justification, scope and Chapter summary.

1.1 Background to the study

According to the American Energy Research Council (2010), infrastructure refers to a comprehensive composite network of public utilities within a specific state or region. This network comprises various elements such as telecommunication facilities (including landline and cellphone coverage), roads, railways, ports, airports, state and private buildings, energy systems, and sanitation. According to UNICEF (2012), infrastructure comprises everything from energy to transportation. As a result, he perceives public infrastructure to consist of fundamental amenities such as educational and healthcare institutions.

China's interests expanded and they began to implement their "going out policy" in the late 1990s, according to UNICEF (2012). China portrayed its relationship with impoverished nations as a continuation of the ties established in the April 2011 Non-Aligned Movement. According to UNICEF (2012), the Information Office of the State Council of China published the nation's inaugural White paper on foreign assistance, which aimed to delineate the official policies, principles, and practices of China in the field of aid. The White Paper acknowledged China's status as a developing nation and explained that its foreign aid was an element of its endeavors to meet its international obligations, specifically to assist recipient states in enhancing their self-development capabilities, improving the standard of living of their citizens, and fostering economic

and social advancement. As per the stipulations outlined in this White Paper, China's tranquil development endeavors were directed toward the universal prosperity and modernization of its populace. According to UNICEF (2012), China's provision of infrastructural development assistance to allied states is governed by eight principles pertaining to economic aid and technical assistance.

UNICEF (2012) notes that in comparison to EU principles, these are radically different. In contrast to China's emphasis on mutually beneficial partnerships, the European Union tends to provide donor-recipient relationships that are unidirectional and symmetrical. Following this, the European Union places greater emphasis on social infrastructure development, including the struggle against corruption, good governance, and human rights, while China prioritizes economic infrastructure development. Coupled with economic growth and political reforms, China emphasizes the importance of non-interference in the internal affairs of allied states. An additional analogy is that the European Union has tied foreign aid to political and social reform, whereas China has established territorial integrity and sovereignty as prerequisites for providing assistance to partner states that have endorsed the One-China policy.

Therefore, UNICEF (2012) comes to the conclusion that China's aid is not clearly separated from its support for investments and its promotion of exports. They also say that China has a policy of conditionality that is mostly about making sure that Chinese companies have special rights and that economic and resource diplomacy are promoted, as well as access to agricultural products. UNICEF (2012) maintains that Chinese aid consists primarily of infrastructural projects implemented by Chinese companies employing labor that is customized to meet the specific requirements of each recipient,

rendering it comparatively adaptable and effective. Conversely, Chinese economic and resource diplomacy primarily concerns itself with bilateral relations and the exchange of resources, including oil and gas, from its allied states in exchange for infrastructural development. Furthermore, these policies prioritize the utilization of concessional loans and zero-interest loans.

Dietz and Kyriakos (2012) say that the West and Japan controlled the Chinese empire in the 19th century. The Chinese people felt cheated, and Confucianism's ideas about a peaceful world have been incorporated into China's economic diplomacy. During the Cold War, Communist leaders supported a number of African national independence movements.

According to Morazan (2012), China's economic diplomacy is influenced by BRICS countries including Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. Furthermore, he asserts that the economic diplomacy policies of BRICS member states incorporate virtues such as non-interference in the affairs of others, non-conditionality, an emphasis on expressing solidarity among equals of the global south, and respect for sovereignty.

Morazan (2012) further states that the Chinese government considers bilateral South-South Cooperation to be the preferred approach, rank it second only to multilateral settings such as BRICS. Additionally, he contended that in contrast to the donor-recipient relationship observed with Western states, the signing of development-related agreements with African, Asian, or Latin American nations is frequently accompanied by grand ceremonial symbolism representing an eye-to-eye partnership. In contrast to Chinese aid, a substantial portion of Russian aid is typically channeled through

multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, Eurasian Economic Community, and United Nations, according to Morazan (2012). As a result, Russia places little emphasis on demonstrating solidarity with its counterparts in the global South.

Brautigam (2009) states that African countries receiving Chinese development finance is not a novel occurrence; however, the scale and methods of financing these countries are generating significant attention. Between the mid-1950s and 2006, China reportedly contributed \$6 billion to Africa; by 2015, this sum had tripled. As an illustration, Sun (2014) asserts that China made a commitment to allocate \$60 billion during the Sixth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The financial relationship between the two regions also exhibits variation in the methods of disbursement. In recent years, resource-rich countries have received preferential buyers' credits and resource-backed loans, in addition to grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. A variety of terminologies have been utilized to describe Chinese finance overseas, including Chinese aid, Chinese development assistance, and Chinese foreign capital.

Sun (2014) further notes that scholarly attention has been drawn to the augmented Chinese development financing in Africa as a result. In general, he further asserts that any allusion to African interests in Chinese development finance is frequently entangled in the more extensive discourse concerning the factors that influence China-Africa relations, which combines Chinese investments, trade, and financing on the continent. According to Sun (2014), the existing body of literature on China-Africa relations seldom provides an explanation for the reasons why particular African states are drawn to Chinese development finance. Rather, the literature appears to suggest that the growing preference for Chinese finances among African states can be attributed to five

recurring themes: solidarity, diversification of economic partners, regime stability, strategic partnership, and exemplar for development experience.

Zezeza (2008) argues that advocates of China-Africa relations perceive African interests as being motivated by historical solidarity, which has its origins in the Bandung Conference of 1955. At that conference, the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were established, which included the following: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of others, non-aggression, equality, and mutual benefits. Carr (2015) contends that these principles, particularly those pertaining to mutual benefits and non-interference, have persisted in shaping Chinese discourse regarding financial assistance since that time.

Carr (2015), on the other hand, argues that certain autocratic African regimes are drawn to Chinese development financing due to the absence of conditions that were previously associated with liberal democratic principles, including periodic elections and the observance and promotion of human rights values. Asserting this line of reasoning, China serves as a safety valve to ensure regime continuity remains unaffected in the event that Western nations and their international financial institutions refrain from providing development assistance and economic investments.

Carr (2015) and Zezeza (2008) pointed out that Chinese development finance is seen as a way to increase the number of economic partners. They also said that in a world where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the West is falling, the desire for more money from African countries and Chinese companies to invest in areas of Africa that are

usually seen as too risky has helped to increase the number of financial, trade, and investment opportunities.

Furthermore, according to Carr (2015), Chinese development finance is perceived as a mechanism by which African nations establish strategic alliances with China. Carr (2015) suggested that during the height of the debate over whether Africa merits a seat on the United Nations Security Council, South Africa and Nigeria were banking on China's vote. A comparable line of reasoning has been put forth regarding Africa's flirtation with China during WTO trade negotiations. China and African nations have formed FOCAC as a strategic alliance to promote a fair global order that safeguards their respective interests.

Simultaneously, despite China's remarkable economic expansion, certain analysts (Martyn et al., 2008; Zeleza, 2008) believe that African leaders regard China as a paradigmatic example of development experience. They further contend that, as model students, African nations are eligible to obtain development financing from China.

Although the discourse is perceptive and provides valuable insights into China's recent resurgence of interest in the continent, the aforementioned themes have a tendency to oversimplify the diversity that exists among African states and lump them all together. According to Zeleza (2008), the African continent is frequently perceived in a general sense, despite its complex historical background. China, for instance, has maintained varied historical relations with several African countries, some of which have been more conspicuous than others.

Following the ratification of independence in 1963, the Kenyan government initiated an endeavor to devise and execute economic diplomacy strategies aimed at fostering swift economic expansion and progress. The government also produced the inaugural national development plan for the period 1964-1970 and Sessional Paper No.10 of 1964 titled "African Socialism and Application to Planning in Kenya" (RoK 1964; RoK 1965), in addition to the budget statement of 1964. In its 1965 Sessional Paper No. 10, Kenya delineated its economic diplomacy policies, which centered on social justice, human dignity, political equality, and equal opportunities. Kenya initiated a bilateral relationship with China with the primary objective of advancing infrastructure development. In doing so, Kenya guided its economic diplomacy policies.

The Chinese State Council (2021) asserts that a pivotal element distinguishing Chinese economic diplomacy from conventional donor nations and organizations is its heightened emphasis on fostering development cooperation through its partnership orientation, as opposed to its traditional donor role. The tenet of non-interference in internal affairs constitutes a fundamental component of the economic diplomacy policy of China. An exemplary instance involves the Dutch government's declaration in 2006 that it would suspend approximately \$150 million USD in aid to Kenya on account of the country's failure to combat corruption. Concurrently, China entered into a significant oil exploration agreement with Kenya in return for infrastructure support for rice growers in Nairobi, road construction, and the establishment of a sports center.

Likewise, Baker (2020) posits that the Chinese mutual development principle embodies a framework of reciprocity and regard that governs the partnerships and agreements, thereby guaranteeing advantageous results for all parties involved. The rhetoric put

forth by China regarding mutual benefit (win-win situation) is often met with skepticism, primarily attributable to the opaque nature of Chinese trade agreements (Mbaye 2010). For example, grant aid is specifically allocated for social welfare initiatives, material assistance, and personnel training, in accordance with the aid for development framework. The principal purpose for which interest-free loans are extended is to finance infrastructure projects. Conversely, concessional loans prioritize the financial viability of the projects.

Verifying the compliance of concessional loans provided by China EXIM Bank, the sole provider of such loans on behalf of the Chinese Government, with the Official Development Assistance (ODA) definition of promoting economic development and welfare remains a challenging task. This is due to the limited knowledge regarding the maturity, interest rate, and grace period, which are factors that impact the disclosed grant element of the loan. These loans are commonly regarded as instruments of economic diplomacy, especially in the case of resource-rich but cash-strapped African nations, particularly those with critical infrastructure requirements that can pledge their resources as security (Martyn, 2010). An illustrative instance occurred when Kenya pledged its Mombasa Port as collateral in exchange for the SGR's construction.

Kinds of assistance are consistently preferred over currency as the preferred method of disbursing aid in Kenya. This essentially signifies that the Chinese monetary system continues to exist. Furthermore, it guarantees that while aid-funded infrastructure projects are formulated in collaboration with the Kenyan government, the final decision-making authority rests with the Chinese government (Martyn, 2010).

RoK (2006) notes that the inadequate infrastructure in Kenya has led to the depletion of biodiversity as a result of negligent raw material extraction, which has contributed to elevated levels of nitrous oxide. Infrastructure deterioration, according to RoK (2006), has significantly contributed to the country's low living standards and negatively impacted its enterprises. For example, the railway stem had deteriorated to an unprecedented degree due to a lack of modern equipment. Similarly, the Mombasa Port's inefficiency was a significant obstacle to Kenya achieving its competitive advantage in industrial performance, resulting in revenue loss to its rivals.

According to the World Bank (2018), developing nations allocate nearly two hundred billion US dollars annually to improve infrastructure, which is equivalent to four percent of their gross national product (GNP) or one-fifth of their economies. Consequently, this has stimulated the expansion of infrastructure in a critical sector such as transportation.

(Martyn, 2010) notes that China has significantly contributed to the development of infrastructure in Kenya via its economic diplomacy. The SGR, which has incurred a total expenditure of \$3.8 billion, is among the most costly and prominent signature projects in Kenya, with China contributing 90% of the cost and Kenya contributing only 10%. An additional noteworthy infrastructure undertaking financed by China is the China Communication Construction Company's \$480 billion US dollar enhancement of the Lamu Port. Additionally, Moi Kasarani Stadium, which is the largest in Kenya, and Kenya University Teaching and Referral Hospital (KUTRH), which is the largest hospital financially supported by China, are noteworthy.

Therefore, insofar as infrastructure development is recognized to stimulate economic growth in Kenya, the aforementioned arguments would undoubtedly undermine the discourse of mutual benefit (win-win situation) between China and Kenya, given China's clandestine nature regarding its loaning/grant assistance and payment in kind. This study sought to comprehend the rationale behind the preference of successive Kenyan administrations for Chinese development finance, with the intention of promoting infrastructure development in Kenya. What motivates one to do so? Therefore, since 1963, the researcher has intended to determine whether Chinese economic diplomacy has contributed to the development of infrastructure in Kenya.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Kenya's infrastructure development has experienced a significant setback as a result of inadequate financial support from western traditional development partners, which can be attributed to the stringent conditions of the Structural Adjustment Programme imposed by western financial institutions such as the IMF (Baker 2020). Since 1963, as this predicament progressed, China has emerged as a significant economic diplomacy partner, providing Kenya with a mutually beneficial outcome.

Nevertheless, several scholars, including Patroba (2010), Martyn (2010), and Mbaye (2010), have documented that China's discourse regarding infrastructural development agreements is heavily shrouded in secrecy, contrary to the principle of mutual benefit (win-win situation). For example, in situations where China EXIM Bank, the exclusive provider of concessional loans to the Chinese Government, extends a concessional loan, the maturity, interest rate, and grace period that impact the disclosed grant element of the loan are poorly understood. Furthermore, it was disclosed by these scholars that

China's preferred method of disbursing infrastructural aid in Kenya is always in the form of goods rather than cash, which means that funds remain in the Chinese system and the Chinese government retains final authority over the infrastructure projects, even if they are developed in consultation with the Kenyan government.

It against this back drop, that this study therefore, investigated whether Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963.

1.3 Research Objectives

The general objective of the study investigated whether Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963.

The specific objectives were to: -

- i. Examine the influence of Chinese principle of mutual development in infrastructure development in Kenya.
- ii. Assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values, skills and technology in infrastructural development in Kenya.
- iii. Establish how the opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy affect infrastructural development in Kenya.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. How does Chinese mutual development principle influence infrastructure development in Kenya?
- ii. How does Chinese principle of transfer of values, skills and technology impact socially and economically to the infrastructural development in Kenya?

- iii. How do the opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy affect infrastructural development in Kenya?

1.5 Justification of the Study

The historical relationship between Kenya and China may be traced back over six centuries, specifically to the arrival of Zheng He, a renowned navigator, in Kenya (Kamau, 2007). The diplomatic partnership was created from 1963 till the present. China became the fourth nation to acknowledge Kenya's independence in 1963 through the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries (Xinhua News, December 11, 2013). Wang Yutien assumed the position of China's ambassador to Kenya on February 5, 1964. According to the Kenya National Archives, File AE/14/70, 1965, the Chinese group that visited Kenya in the beginning of 1965 made a firm commitment to establish a textile factory and a sugar refinery. None of these recommendations were implemented, as they were hindered by internal political divisions within the Kenyan government.

In August 1980, President Moi embarked on an official visit to China, during which China and Kenya entered into two agreements. The primary focus of the economic cooperation agreement was the establishment of the Moi International Sports Center (Chege, 2008). In August 2005, President Kibaki embarked on an official visit to China, during which a five-part agreement was struck between the two nations. The superhighway was identified as a crucial component of the infrastructure within the deal (Kioko, 2012). On May 10th, 2014, the Prime Minister of China, Li Keqiang, made an official visit to the country of Kenya. President Uhuru Kenyatta and the Prime Minister of China entered into a total of 17 agreements, aimed at generating significant financial resources to enhance the economic growth of Kenya. Among these

agreements, the most costly infrastructure project identified was the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). (Ongiri, 2014).

With this continuous economic agreement between Kenya-China, the researcher felt the need to investigate whether this economic diplomacy do foster infrastructural development since 1963.

Specifically, this study chose Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu counties because these are the counties that host the infrastructure under study. There are a number of infrastructural projects funded by China in Kenya. However, a number of scholars like Patroba (2010) and Mbaye (2010) amongst other scholars have majorly investigated whether Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering road infrastructural development in Kenya and no other forms of infrastructure funded by China. Therefore, the researcher purposively selected the following: - The Standard Gauge Railway being the most expensive infrastructure since 1963, Moi sports center being the largest stadium in Kenya funded by China, Kenya University Teaching and Referral Hospital (KUTRH) being the largest hospital funded by China and Lamu Sea Port being the only sea port funded by China

Kenya was in need of adequate financial resources to enhance the efficacy of its infrastructure network; however, neither the traditional western development partners nor the funds were forthcoming. The strict conditionality imposed by western financial institutions such as the IMF under the Structural Adjustment Programme deprived developing nations of global capital, including Kenya (Baker 2020). As this predicament progressed, China emerged as a significant donor participant, resulting in

a win-win circumstance on the African continent. According to Wasike (2001), infrastructure plays a critical and pivotal role in development. Kenya, similar to other African states, had no choice but to wait in line.

Thus the justification of this study was outlined in three significant parts, the academic justification, policy justification and the philosophical justification.

1.5.1 Academic Justification

According to the researcher, infrastructure plays a crucial role in fostering economic expansion and alleviating destitution. It contends that Kenya must make substantial infrastructure development investments in order to sustain this growth. By examining whether Chinese economic diplomacy is promoting infrastructure development in Kenya, this study makes a scholarly contribution to the current body of literature on infrastructure development. This is a field that continues to garner the interest of academic individuals. Thus, the knowledge repository is enhanced. The correlation between Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructure development in Kenya was established by this study.

1.5.2 Policy justification

Kenya's economic policies have historically been shaped not only by domestic obstacles but also by external influences, most notably the realities of globalization and liberalization, according to the World Bank (2018). According to the World Bank (2018), Kenya is presently implementing the Vision 2030 policy, which aims to transform the country into a newly industrialized state where its citizens enjoy a high standard of living. Despite Kenya's membership in international organizations that

insure private investors against non-commercial risks, there is a lack of documentation regarding the policy measures the country would implement to protect itself from exploitative bilateral relations.

By investigating policies that ensure Kenya's protection against trade agreements in its bilateral relationship with China, the results of this study will thus add to the body of knowledge regarding Chinese economic diplomacy's role in promoting infrastructure development. This research will be considered by Kenyan policy makers and implementers of Vision 2030 as they formulate policies that will direct the nation of Kenya in determining whether Chinese economic diplomacy has facilitated infrastructure development in Kenya since 1963.

1.5.3 Philosophical Justification

The positivist philosophical stance informed this investigation, as it sought to establish whether Chinese economic diplomacy is contributing to the progress of infrastructure in Kenya in an unbiased manner. Bevir (2002) argues that the positivist approach has been a recurring motif throughout the annals of Western thought. Modern positivism was initially expounded upon by Auguste Comte during the early 19th century.

According to Bevir (2002), Comte's school of sociological positivism posits that society functions in the same manner as the physical world—in accordance with general laws. Additionally, Bevir (2002) contends that positivists believe that human comprehension is acquired by means of the application of reason. This suggests that positivism is founded upon the notion that knowledge can be acquired through empirical observations and calculations; thus, solutions can be discovered through meticulous data analysis and measurement, specifically numerical data. Therefore, this research

amassed information that progressively approached the true essence of the subject under investigation.

This study thus, used both quantitative and qualitative methods which are in line with the positivist approach which correlates the findings to the current.

1.6 Scope of the Study

The affinity between Kenya and China has a rich history spanning over 600 years, when Zheng He, a renowned navigator, made landfall in Kenya (Kamau, 2007). Nevertheless, the diplomatic alliance has been in place since 1963. The appointment of the Chinese ambassador to Kenya took place in 1964, and China made a commitment to establish a sugar refinery and textile factory in Kenya in 1965 (Kenya National Archives, File AE/14/70, 1965). Internal political discord within the Kenyan government prevented any of these proposals from materializing. President Moi entered into two agreements in August 1980, with the construction of the Moi International Sports Center being the most significant provision (Chege, 2008). In August 2005, President Kibaki embarked on an official visit to China, during which a five-part agreement was signed. Notably, the accord included the KUTRRH and the Thika Superhighway as critical infrastructure components (Kioko, 2012). On May 10, 2014, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang paid a visit to Kenya. The Chinese prime minister and President Uhuru Kenyatta signed seventeen agreements that were anticipated to release billions of shillings to stimulate the Kenyan economy, with the SGR and Lamu port being the most significant infrastructure provisions. As stated by Ongiri (2014). Given the ongoing economic

partnership between Kenya and China, the researcher was compelled to examine whether this diplomatic approach to economics has contributed to the advancement of infrastructure since 1963.

Whether or not Chinese economic diplomacy promotes infrastructure development in Kenya is the primary concern of the researcher. The present investigation utilized both primary and secondary sources of data. A thorough examination of all available documented information pertaining to the study was conducted with the purpose of presenting results that supported the development of suitable conclusions and recommendations.

Regarding primary data, questionnaires and interview guides/schemas were crucial. The interview guides comprised a sequence of inquiries that were posed by the researcher to the participants throughout the interview. It was intentionally structured to allow sufficient time for interviewees to share their personal narratives and contribute significant data. Additionally, it furnished the researcher with timely and overarching guidance. The inquiries were open-ended, as this is the most suitable question format in this situation. The present investigation employed a descriptive survey methodology. The information is gathered through the utilization of interviews and the distribution of questionnaires to a representative sample of individuals.

Since 1963, the study examined whether Chinese economic diplomacy has contributed to Kenya's infrastructure development. The year 1963 signifies both Kenya's independence and the establishment of officially recognised diplomatic relations between China and Kenya.

Individual, state, and system are the three levels of analysis utilized in international relations to explain world politics (Kamau, 2007). Since independence until the present, the Kenya-China relationship is adequately explained at the individual level of analysis. As an illustration, since 1963, the economic diplomacy of Kenya has been shaped and directed by the country's succeeding presidents. The president is the primary policy-shaper in economic diplomacy. It becomes apparent when: -

The establishment of a bilateral diplomatic relationship between Kenya and China occurred on December 14, 1963, when the embassy of the People's Republic of China in Nairobi was inaugurated. On February 5, 1964, Wang Yutien was designated as the ambassador of China to Kenya. According to Kamau (2007), the Chinese delegation in Kenya committed to constructing a sugar refinery and a textile factory in early 1965, following an extensive list of proposals from the Kenyan side (Kenya National Archives, File AE/14/70, 1965).

Additionally, Kenyatta's successor, President Daniel Arap Moi, assumed office in 1978. With slight adjustments, he adhered to the identical economic diplomacy policy framework (Mwega, 2009). Two agreements were reportedly signed during President Moi's inaugural visit to China, as reported by Chege (2008). The construction of Moi International Sports Center, which is situated outside the central business district of Nairobi, was one of the terms of the agreement. At the time, it occupied the largest sporting facility in all of Eastern and Central Africa.

Subsequently, in August 2005, President Mwai Kibaki conducted an official visit to China. Kibaki assumed office in January 2003. Eleven years had passed since the last official visit to China by a Kenyan chief of state, during which a five-part agreement was reached. The infrastructure grant provision for official development assistance was

encompassed within the agreement, which gave rise to the Thika superhighway. As stated by Gadzala (2009).

Lastly, from August 19th to August 23rd, 2013, President Kenyatta embarked on his inaugural state visit beyond Africa to China. During this visit, he entered into seventeen agreements that were anticipated to release billions of shillings to stimulate Kenya's economy, with significant investments in the railway, health, conservation, and security sectors. One of the most significant was the standard gauge railway (SGR), an undertaking estimated to require Ksh 327 billion for the Mombasa-Nairobi stretch and with China providing 85% of the funding for the project.

Precisely because Nairobi, Kiambu, and Lamu counties in Kenya are the locations of the infrastructure under investigation (SGR, KUTRH, Moi Center Kasarani, and Lamu Sea Port), the research was conducted in those areas.

Upon careful examination of the correlation between Chinese economic diplomacy and the road map for infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963, as well as the participation of the initial four presidents in the Kenya-China relationship, it becomes apparent that Chinese economic diplomacy has consistently influenced the progress of infrastructure development in Kenya ever since the country gained independence. Hence, the rationale for conducting this research was to ascertain whether Chinese economic diplomacy has contributed to the advancement of infrastructure in Kenya since 1963. The process that has been chosen since 1963 is ongoing, as demonstrated in the preceding justification.

Data was collected from the state corporation and government agencies in Kenya and was analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively from the month of May to August, 2023.

1.7 Chapter Summary

Chapter one has examined the background to the study, statement of the problem, study objectives, research questions, justification and the scope of the study. Chapter two reviewed the relevant literature on how Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter analyzed the Influence of Chinese mutual Development Principle on Development of Infrastructure in Kenya, Socio-Economic Impact of Chinese Principle of Transfer of Skills and Technology in Infrastructural Development in Kenya, the Opportunities /Challenges Emanating from Chinese Economic Diplomacy in Infrastructural Development in Kenya, conceptual framework, conceptual model and the chapter summary.

2.1 Chinese Mutual Development Principle on Development of Infrastructure in Kenya.

Baker (2020) conducted research on the Chinese principle of mutual development and provided the following definition of mutual benefit: reciprocity and regard within the partnership relationship, as well as win-win agreements. Engaging in consistent and continuous communication, reaching agreements that uphold or improve regional services, programs, assets, and land-use planning, and simultaneously enhancing the social, economic, and environmental welfare of the area are all components of achieving mutual benefit. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, Mutual Benefit refers to respect and equality in the context of infrastructure development agreements between China and Kenya that produce win-win results.

According to Baker (2020), the determinants of Chinese economic diplomacy have evolved from political ideology to economic pragmatism over time. The country now prioritizes facilitating trade and investment abroad and ensuring access to natural resources to satisfy the expanding domestic demand caused by its rapid economic

development. Baker (2020) neglected to mention that as the twenty-first century approaches, China's economic diplomacy is evolving to serve a new international order and facilitate its participation in global governance, in addition to its domestic economic interests. A new political ideology has emerged in which China's geostrategic ambitions and sense of great-power responsibility play a pivotal role. These factors are progressively influencing Chinese economic diplomacy, which is now guided by a more comprehensive agenda and distinct approaches. The purpose of this literature review is to demonstrate that the political continues to play a significant role in guiding the economic diplomacy of the two states.

Baker (2020) further argues that these motivations have undoubtedly influenced China's involvement in Africa, which exhibits a greater degree of similarity than dissimilarity with its overarching economic diplomacy strategy with regard to its areas of emphasis and interests. Infrastructure, which is the most prevalent and longstanding form of assistance that China extends on a global scale, concurrently serves as the primary sector of emphasis in China's development collaboration in Africa.

Despite being the third largest industry, mining could receive additional financial assistance from China in order to safeguard its mineral supplies. In the interim, platforms such as FOCAC have become more active in promoting welfare initiatives such as health and education, as well as ecological development and trade. This implies that China's development cooperation in Africa serves to advance its economic interests while also bolstering its reputation as a responsible global power. The discussion

culminated in an analysis of the application of the Chinese mutual development principle to the infrastructure development in Kenya.

2.1.1 Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

Dietz and Kyriakos' (2012) study on the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence found that China's economic diplomacy policy is based on the idea that good neighbors keep foreign instability from spreading and making things worse between neighbors. Zhou Enlai, who was prime minister at the time, presented India with five principles of peaceful coexistence regarding the Tibet issue during negotiations in 1954. These principles encompassed peaceful coexistence, equality, and mutual benefit, in addition to non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations and reverence for one another's sovereignty.

Dietz and Kyriakos (2012) further disclosed that following the end of the Cold War, China, cognizant of the fact that its strength and geostrategic position did not confer the ability to wield influence, pursued Deng Xiaoping's policy of concealing its capabilities, concentrating on national strength-building, and biding its time. As a result, China maintained a low profile and avoided confrontation with the United States and other Western powers. In response to China's vulnerability in the aftermath of Western sanctions imposed in 1989 in the wake of the Tiananmen Square protests, this low-key policy was implemented. Consequently, China formulated a *mulin zhengce* (good neighbors) strategy to foster a harmonious regional milieu that supported its economic progress. It also implemented pragmatic concessions to coexist with the hegemon and adjusted its economic diplomacy policy to acknowledge the United

States' preeminence in the international system, which serves as irrefutable proof of this.

Fang (2012) conducted research in an effort to analyze Chinese economic diplomacy. According to the findings of the study, this form of diplomacy is extremely particular regarding the sovereignty of states. It appears to be shaped by the semi-colonial experiences it underwent under Japanese and Western powers in the nineteenth century. Fang (2012) further established that one of the pillars of Chinese economic diplomacy is the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. It is derived from Taoism, a facet of Chinese cultural orientation whose tenet is *Wu Wei*, which translates to "non-interference" or "letting go." According to this study, in China's bilateral transactions with any recipient state, this principle corresponds to sovereignty.

2.1.2 Nature of Chinese Economic Aid Policy Formulation

Martyn et al. (2008) investigated the nature of China's economic aid policy formulation. It has been determined that the State Council serves as the preeminent administrative body of the state administration, exercising oversight over a wide array of Chinese economic aid initiatives. The determination of the proportion of the national budget allocated to foreign economic aid is made annually at the commencement of each fiscal year. The foreign economic aid budget is developed by the Ministry of Finance in collaboration with the State Council. The ministry also encompasses multilateral aid. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) serves as the primary governing body responsible for overseeing China's aid program, encompassing both

inbound and outbound assistance initiatives. The aforementioned tasks encompass engaging in diplomatic negotiations with other governments, evaluating requests put forth by the Ministry of other Affairs, undertaking comprehensive assessments of the viability of aid initiatives, selecting appropriate entities to execute these projects, and completing thorough evaluations of their progress.

Embassies assume a crucial function in ascertaining the requirements of the recipient country by means of the Economic and Commercial Counsellor's offices, which are staffed with officers from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Embassies also serve as intermediaries in host nations, facilitating the process of reporting, monitoring, and evaluating programs. Other ministries fulfill a consultation function and occasionally provide significant assistance in terms of administration and implementation of foreign economic aid that fits within their purview and specialized knowledge. The exclusive responsibility for managing concessional loan financing lies with the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank).

Martyn et al. (2010) conducted a study on China's lending system to developing countries. The researchers found that when China EXIM Bank, the sole provider of concessional loans from the Chinese government, extends such loans, it remains challenging to ascertain if they align with the Official Development Assistance (ODA) definition, which emphasizes the promotion of economic development and welfare as the primary objective. This study criticizes the work of Martyn et al. (2010) due to the limited understanding of the impact of maturity, interest rate, and grace period on the revealed grant element of the loan. This study identified that these loans are perceived

as a policy tool for economic diplomacy, particularly in the context of African countries who are cash-strapped but own abundant resources, especially those with significant infrastructure requirements. These governments can leverage their proven resource assets as collateral.

This study conducted a further categorization of Chinese infrastructural projects, distinguishing between grants and loans. The determination of interest rates and payment intervals is crucial for providing assessments regarding the profitability and sustainability of a given venture.

2.1.3 Chinese Negotiating Strategy

Graham et al. (2003) investigated the reasons why Chinese businesspeople frequently prevail in negotiations overlying their Western counterparts. With regard to the Taoist concept of Yin Yang, it is said that Chinese talks frequently exhibit a simultaneous display of sincerity and deception. This concept aligns with the philosophical principle of Yin Yang, which denotes the coexistence of two opposing yet interdependent forces. According to traditional Chinese philosophy, Yin represents the feminine aspect characterized by darkness and passivity, whereas Yang symbolizes the male aspect associated with light and activity. The Chinese approach the market as a strategic arena, perceiving it as a battleground where the primary objective is to secure market dominance while minimizing any detrimental impact on its sustainability. The objective is to get tangible benefits over the opposing party, so establishing a favorable circumstance to influence a counterpart into conducting business according to one's own preferences.

Pillsbury (2000) conducted an evaluation of China's novel loan security model. The evaluation findings indicate that China's new security concept significantly diverges from the security paradigm of the Cold War era. During the Cold War era, the prevailing notion of security was characterized by a zero-sum perspective, whereby the security of one nation was regarded as potentially compromising the security of another nation. The intervention by several nations would subsequently lead to a heightened competition for military capabilities and Comprehensive National Power (CNP). This factor, for instance, was accountable for the disintegration of the USSR. Chinese security specialists contend that the policy pursued by the USSR prioritized military capabilities to the detriment of its economic dimension.

The study unveiled that Chinese strategists perceived the conclusion of the Cold War as the termination of the Yalta system established by the triumphant countries of the Second World War. According to their perspective, the global framework that would supersede the Yalta system was envisioned as a multipolar structure, with dominance exerted by five key poles: the United States, China, Japan, the European Union, and Russia.

This study posited that the perspective put forth by Pillsbury (2000) is no longer viable, as Finkelstein et al. (2005) argue that China is now comprehended through a comprehensive lens encompassing six interconnected dimensions: the absence of major power conflicts, globalization, the United States as both a partner and competitor, non-traditional security challenges, energy insecurity, and China's ascent.

The phrase 'New Security Concept' of the White Paper-China's Defense, which was issued in 1998, was influenced by these factors.

The existing body of literature does not provide evidence to support the claim that the White Paper asserts an inability to ensure security through either an escalation in military capabilities or the formation of military alliances. The foundation of security need to be established upon the principles of mutual trust and shared interests. It is imperative for nations to actively foster trust through engaging in discourse, pursue security through cooperative efforts, uphold the principle of sovereignty, resolve conflicts through peaceful methods, and endeavor towards shared progress. Furthermore, the notion was expanded to encompass the addressing of non-traditional security challenges, including but not limited to terrorism, immigration, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, and illnesses, among other issues.

2.1.4 China in Africa-Its Effect in Relation with Other Global Actors

According to Pillsbury (2000), Western powers, particularly the United powers, are not regarding China's relations with Kenya as inconsequential. According to the US embassy cables, it was reported that Kenya had received a shipment of Chinese guns, ammunition, supplies, and textiles in January 2010. Telkom, also known as Telkom SA SOC Limited, is a telecommunications company based in The government of Kenya has granted a contract to a Chinese business for the provision of landline telephone monitoring technology, following the influence exerted by an official who had received illicit financial incentives. The United States has been closely monitoring the expanding influence of China in the African continent.

Meyer (2013) conducted an analysis of political values in Southern Asia and published a report in which she warned China's regional ambitions during a stopover in Senegal. She stated that the days of outsiders coming to Africa to take its wealth and leave nothing or very little behind should be over in the twenty-first century. However, Meyer argues that the allocation of resources for infrastructure projects has the capacity to significantly enhance African economies and revolutionize the quality of life for millions of individuals throughout the continent.

Meyer (2013) goes on to assert that after analyzing surveys of political values in Southern Asia dating back ten years, he comes to the conclusion that people in many South East Asian states are willing to give up some of their democratic values in order to achieve higher growth. This is the kind of increasingly state-directed economic system that China currently has and many of these states had during their authoritarian histories. Meyer (2013) did not accurately identify the shift in development strategy observed in Southeast Asian governments, wherein they have transitioned from a free market and democratic approach to one characterized by semi-free markets and an illiberal political system. The concept known as the "Beijing Consensus" has undeniably gained significant traction inside Southeast Asia.

Daojiong (2015) examined China's model for handling investments and discovered that the Shanghai local government was responsible for formulating a strategy to regulate the finer points of China's economic diplomacy. The Free Trade Zone (FTZ) effectively manages investments inside its jurisdiction by employing the 'negative list' paradigm, despite the presence of other significant economic policy changes. The government

releases a comprehensive inventory of business sectors that are either restricted or unconditionally accessible for investment, thereby managing investment activities inside the designated zone, while granting autonomy to other enterprises to make their own determinations. This study posited that the current practice of requiring businesses to obtain government approval prior to operation represents a deviation from the norm. Within this context, numerous alterations have been observed, with the most notable being the provision of equal treatment to foreign investors alongside their Chinese counterparts. Therefore, it is imperative to assess whether these developments result in a convergence of Chinese investment practices with the standards observed in Western economies.

The Beijing APEC summit in 2012 noted an increase in the level of operational flexibility for both domestic and foreign entities registered within the designated zone. It is imperative to acknowledge that leadership has a significant influence on both domestic and foreign expectations. During the Beijing APEC conference, President Xi expounded upon the comprehensive framework of Chinese economic diplomacy, sometimes referred to as the "new normal." The pace of expansion in Chinese economic diplomacy had a deceleration, reaching 7.7% in both 2012 and 2013. Furthermore, during the initial three quarters of 2014, this growth rate declined further to 7.4%. This study posited that the Chinese society is encouraged to maintain a composed attitude towards the general state of the country's economy. The study aims to investigate the existence of economic diplomacy policies that manage the economy.

2.1.5 Kenya-China Bilateral Diplomatic Relations since 1963

According to Kamau's (2007) overview of global geopolitical issues, there are three levels of analysis employed to understand international politics: the individual, the state, and the system. At the level of the individual, the Kenya-China relationship from independence to the present is adequately explained. At the individual level of international relations, it is argued that the economic diplomacy policy of a state is influenced by the personalities of its leaders. For example, the economic diplomacy policy of Kenya has been predominantly influenced and guided by the Presidents. The President possesses ultimate authority over the formulation, implementation, and projection of economic diplomacy policies. Therefore, the president is the primary shaper of economic diplomacy policy. Since its independence in 1963, Kenya has had six presidents: President Jomo Kenyatta (1963–1978), President Daniel Arap Moi (1978–2002), President Mwai Kibaki (2002–2012), President Uhuru Kenyatta (2013–2022), and President Ruto (current).

Kamau (2007) asserts in his analysis of global geopolitical circumstances that Kenya has had presidents with distinct personalities and abilities for more than five decades, and that each of them has responded in a unique fashion to such circumstances. Every individual encountered unique consequences as a result of the economic diplomacy they influenced, and they confronted distinct obstacles, including their own involvement in the practical execution of economic diplomacy relations.

Kenya and China maintained amicable relations during their independence years, despite China's transition to communism and Kenya's adoption of capitalism. Kenya's

independence was initially acknowledged by Germany (then West Germany), subsequently followed by Russia, Ethiopia, and ultimately China. China was the fourth nation to formally acknowledge the independence of Kenya during an exchange of diplomatic representatives in 1963. Wang Yutien was bestowed with the role of China's ambassador to Kenya on February 5, 1964. Size-wise and in terms of personnel, the Chinese embassy in Kenya is arguably the largest of its kind in Africa.

Mwega (2009) conducted an analysis of Kenya's foreign economic policy from 1963 to 1978, noting that Kenyatta's successor, the late President Daniel Arap Moi, assumed office in 1978. He implemented a foreign economic policy framework that bore only slight modifications. As of the conclusion of 1980, Kenya continued to be regarded as a Western client-state. In 1982, Kenya became a de jure one-party state when an amendment to the constitution was ratified by President Moi. Furthermore, his administration implemented a formidable array of electoral protocols that imposed additional restrictions on the press. Subsequently, Western aid agencies imposed aid conditionality, which mandated the government permit the participation of multiple political parties, institute an unbiased elections commission, reinstate secret ballots, and ease press censorship.

Barkan (2004) further elaborated on the research conducted by Mwega (2009) by asserting that the West was obligated to conform to the democratic trend or face repercussions. As the honeymoon was irretrievably over by 1993, President Moi and other Western bloc beneficiaries who had placed little to no value on internal democracy during the Cold War era had nothing left.

Elmi (2012) examined Kenya's economic and trade partners and discovered that Mobutu SeseSeko of Congo, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi, and the apartheid regimes in South Africa were all entangled in the scenario in which the West demanded that they conform to the democratic consensus or face the repercussions. President Moi began to develop amicable relations with more recent economic and trade partners, particularly those from the expanding Orient, as a result of Western demands for internal democracy and pluralism. President Moi initiated contact with the People's Republic of China, the very individual who in the 1960s had accused China of plotting revolution in Kenya.

According to Chege (2008), Kenya officially reopened its embassy in Beijing, which had been nominally shuttered in 1967, at the end of 1978. An ambassador was also appointed by China to Kenya. The economic ties between Kenya and China were subsequently restored.

Branch (2011) conducted an assessment of western diplomats, investors, and financiers in Kenya and found that the NARC government, led by President Kibaki, was greeted warmly by traditional donors who had previously blacklisted President Moi's government upon assuming power from KANU, which had ruled Kenya for four decades. Presidential Kibaki promptly embarked on state visits to Washington and London following his inauguration. Branch (2011) neglected to mention that President Kibaki, in a similar fashion, extended high-level official visits to Beijing, New Delhi, and Tokyo while turning eastward. It was not anticipated that President Kibaki would make such high-profile visits to countries that the Western bloc considered to be non-

traditional significant economic trading partners so soon. Western diplomats, investors, and financiers reacted angrily to this, but the Kibaki administration appeared unconcerned by the protests of the Western bloc.

Kioko (2012), in evaluating Kenya's traditional allies, argues that the new Kenyan government's top officials have publicly threatened to abandon the West for the East if the United Kingdom and the United States, Kenya's traditional allies, continue to lecture the government on corruption. President Kibaki declared his intention to maintain a close watch on the bilateral relationship with China and expressed a readiness to enhance and broaden the amicable collaboration between the two nations.

Kioko (2012) further stated that during the Kibaki administration, high-level political contacts between Kenya and China paved the way for a succession of agreements governing economic relations between the two countries. During an official visit to China in August 2005, President Kibaki was accompanied by eleven delegations from Kenya that were interested in trade and investment. In eleven years, this was the first official visit to China by a Kenyan chief of state. A five-part agreement was reached as a consequence of the extensive discussions that President Kibaki held during this visit with Chinese government officials and President Hu Jintao. The agreement encompassed various aspects of official development assistance at the state-owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation, including grants for infrastructure and energy, expanded air services between the two nations, technical support for assessing and classifying standards in industrial products, equipment modernization, and training.

Brown and Sriram (2012) note that President Uhuru Kenyatta made it plain that he intended to lead Kenya to greater heights in the international diplomatic arena, despite his personal predicament and that of his deputy at the International Criminal Court when they assumed office. In the form of a newly formed government. This perception emerged as a consequence of the tense diplomatic ties between Kenya and Western nations concerning the cases before the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Munene (2013) conducted an analysis of Kenya's economic diplomacy and noted that on April 9, 2013, during the inauguration of President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy William Ruto, the sole foreign flag adorning the flagstaff was that of China. Notably, the ceremony was attended by a high-ranking special envoy from Beijing, whereas the Western nations were solely represented by their ambassadors. China hosted President Kenyatta during his inaugural state visit beyond Africa, spanning from August 19th to the 23rd, 2013. Nonetheless, Munene (2013) was unable to ascertain whether China's involvement in the event enhances the level of economic diplomacy between the two nations.

As the president engaged in diplomatic and bilateral engagements with Chinese state officials and investors, State House spokesman Manoah Esipisu stated that the trip was both official and productive, as Ongiri (2014) examined Kenya's diplomatic and bilateral engagements with China. On May 10, 2014, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang subsequently paid a visit to Kenya. President Uhuru Kenyatta and the Chinese Prime Minister endorsed seventeen agreements anticipated to release billions of shillings to bolster Kenya's economy, with significant investments in the railway, health, conservation, and security sectors. One of the most significant was the standard gauge railway (SGR), an undertaking estimated to require Ksh 327 billion for the Mombasa-Nairobi stretch and with China providing 85% of the funding for the project.

Additionally, both leaders reached a consensus on the establishment of a China-Africa Development Bank in Nairobi, with Beijing contributing an estimated Ksh 170 billion. An additional significant undertaking was the China-Africa Research Centre, which was estimated to require Ksh 5.1 billion in funding. According to Ongiri (2014), there is little evidence that President Kenyatta's administration would carry out President Kibaki's "look east policy" in a more advantageous manner than did President Kibaki's.

2.1.6 Kenya-China Motivation

Ongiri (2014) examined China-Kenya bilateral ties on infrastructure development and discovered that Kenya is the largest economy in East Africa. Investors in the region are attracted to its location, well-developed business infrastructure, and abundance of multilateral corporations, which is why it has become a regional hub for numerous multinational corporations.

Additionally, according to Ongiri (2014), an additional benefit of investing in Kenya is the country's access to the Eastern and Southern African markets, which collectively have more than 385 million consumers and a consumer base of over 93 million in East Africa. Kenya is also politically stable, has a fully liberalized economy, and an administration that is favorable to investment. Kenya serves as a pivotal gateway to the eastern and central African regions, despite its deficiency in the natural resources that China requires.

In a scoping investigation on China-Africa economic relations, Onjala (2008) examined the situation in Kenya. In 2014, Ongiri indicated that China sees Kenya as a way to get

into the Eastern Africa group. Kenya is a crucial component of China's economic and commercial policy in Africa, as well as a gateway to the continent, according to the study. Due to the country's political stability, Kenya serves as an ideal regional hub for Chinese entrepreneurs seeking to expand their operations in Africa.

This study argued that the mere fact that Kenya serves as a pivotal gateway to East and Central Africa, despite lacking the natural resources required by China, is insufficient justification. Therefore, it investigated what motivation China had for investing in Kenya.

2.1.7 China's Economic Diplomacy

According to the report of the Chinese State Council (2021), the Chinese Government celebrated the 70th anniversary of the country's economic diplomacy initiatives in January 2021 by presenting a new white paper on foreign development cooperation. Economic diplomacy has historically exerted a significant influence on the foreign economic policy and economic statecraft of China. As the nation becomes more active in global development financing, President Xi's 2017 speech on China's growing diplomatic activism from the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to a community of shared future for humanity is even more significant, according to the report. China is not only expanding its presence and influence, but also influencing the norms, governance, and practices in such crucial areas as Official Development Assistance (ODA), which it has been providing for over six decades.

Hence, this study examined the empirical analysis which demonstrated that China's economic diplomacy is distinguished from that of conventional donor nations and

organizations by its greater emphasis on its role as a partner, as opposed to a donor, in advancing development cooperation. Furthermore, China's financing for this purpose comprises non-concessional loans, export credits, and official development assistance (ODA).

2.1.8 Infrastructural Projects Funded by China in Kenya

Patroba (2010) conducted an assessment of infrastructure development between Kenya and China and determined that China's engagement with Kenya has primarily focused on education, raw material resource procurement, and infrastructure development for the majority of the previous decade.

Patroba (2010) further indicated that there are around Forty-four Chinese enterprises that are working on various projects in Kenya. Kenya has benefited from numerous infrastructure development agreements between China and Kenya, including those pertaining to ports, roads, rail, and health. Significant infrastructure projects include the Moi Kasarani stadium, Kenya University Teaching and Referral Hospital (KUTRH), Thika Superhighway, Standard Gauge Railway, and Lamu seaport. However, Patroba (2010) neglected to mention the effect that the completion of each of these multimillion-dollar initiatives would have. Hence, the objective of this study is to assess whether the successful execution of these initiatives would generate employment and trade prospects on a national, regional, and global scale.

2.1.8.1 The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in Kenya

Kioko (2012) found that the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) is the biggest infrastructure project built in Kenya since 1963 after studying the Northern Corridor Initiative connectivity. The promulgation of the agreement occurred in 2008, with Kenya and Uganda as the participating parties. The concept of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) was conceived as a component of the Northern Corridor Initiative, which aims to establish a transportation network connecting the coastal city of Mombasa in Kenya with the landlocked nations situated in the Great Lakes Region.

Kioko (2012) also discovered that views on the economic feasibility of a standard gauge railway were varied among consultants, policy makers, and civil society activists even prior to Kenya's Treasury signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with China's Exim Bank in July 2013. An example can be found in a consultant report from Canada and a subsequent assessment conducted by the World Bank, which both indicated that the construction of the proposed SGR would lack economic viability.

According to the Special Report on the Procurement and Financing of the Construction of Standard Gauge Railway from Mombasa to Nairobi (Phase 1) (Nairobi: 2014), the National Assembly's Public Investments Committee revealed that in August 2009, the Ministry of Transport (MoT) in Kenya entered into a memorandum of understanding with CRBC. This agreement stipulated that CRBC would conduct a feasibility study on the SGR project at no cost. The study was subsequently submitted to the Ministry in January 2011. The research suggested a transition of the SGR propulsion system from electric to diesel. The free feasibility study carried the connotation that its conclusions

would be employed by both governments. However, it also raised the possibility that the procurement process may exhibit a bias towards CRBC, given their prior involvement in conducting the feasibility research. This arrangement was also consistent with the typical strategy of China's Exim Bank, which often mandates that a Chinese firm that has done a feasibility study is responsible for implementing a project.

Onjala (2008) revealed in his study on Understanding Kenyan Agency in the Acquisition and Utilization of Chinese Development Finance in the Transport Infrastructure, 2003-2017, that in January 2012, Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC) requested financing from China's Exim Bank to build the SGR through Kenya's embassy in China. The funding provided by Exim Bank has comprised several components. The package encompassed a concessional loan amounting to \$1.6 billion, to be repaid over a span of twenty years, featuring a grace period of seven years and an interest rate of two percent. Additionally, a commercial loan of \$1.63 billion was provided, with a repayment period of ten years and a grace period of five years.

Uwe et al. (2017) conducted a study on African Econo-politics, which revealed that the planning for the SGR commenced prior to President Uhuru Kenyatta assuming office in March 2013. However, it was observed that the project assumed significant importance within his administration's strategic vision for the future of Kenya. The commencement ceremony occurred on December 12, 2014, amidst public demonstrations concerning the potential ecological hazards associated with the SRG. It was additionally discovered that, despite these worries, Kenyatta's ruling coalition exhibited a resolute determination to finalize phase one prior to May 2017, in

anticipation of the national elections scheduled for August 2017. The commencement of phase two, spanning a distance of 120 kilometers, took place in the latter part of 2016, with its completion occurring in August 2019. The implementation of phase three, which was intended to connect Narok, located southwest of Nairobi, to Kisumu in western Kenya, did not commence. Significantly, the loan approval for phase three of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in China by the Exim Bank did not materialize as anticipated in August 2018. This development has raised uncertainties over the feasibility of extending the SGR to additional regions within East Africa. The implementation of the railway expansion into Uganda was originally dependent on the successful completion of the railway project in Kenya.

Uwe et al. (2017) investigated the emergence of the "Government-to-Government Procurement" method and Kenya's New Railway. According to Uwe et al. (2017), it was found that the procurement process of the SGR in Kenya lacked transparency, despite the existence of procurement laws. The governments of Kenya and China granted exclusive authorization to CRBC to undertake the feasibility study for the project, so excluding other firms from undertaking such an assessment. The Law Society of Kenya (LSK) contested the decision to only provide CRBC the opportunity to undertake a feasibility study, asserting that Kenyan legislation mandates a competitive bidding process for such studies. Nevertheless, the Kenyan court rendered a verdict in support of the government, affirming the legality of the entire procurement procedure. The award of the entire project tender was granted without engaging in a competitive bidding process. Consequently, subsequent sub-tenders, specifically for design supervision, were not subjected to competitive bidding procedures, but rather were directly awarded to the Chinese firm. The absence of competitive bidding in the

sub-tenders was brought to the attention of two Kenyan legislative committees, who subsequently recommended their termination. However, President Kenyatta chose to disregard these recommendations.

Olander (2021) evaluated the Kenya-China Debt Relief Talks Stall augmented, and Uwe et al. (2017) found that it was challenging to determine whether the government got value for money when building the SGR because there was no competitive bidding for the entire project. Nevertheless, Olander (2020) criticized the omission by Uwe et al. (2017) of the fact that the implementation of Kenya's Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) resulted in a significant rise in the country's debt to China, reaching nearly 750 percent between 2014 and 2019. Furthermore, despite the intended capacity of the SGR to handle 22 million tons of cargo annually, it has been observed that the railway has been underutilized since its inception.

Uwe et al. (2017) conducted an assessment on the financial viability of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and determined that it incurred a loss of Sh10 billion in its initial year. Additionally, their findings revealed that during the 2017-2018 fiscal year, the SGR experienced a loss of approximately \$5 million. This was attributed to the fact that only 5.039 million tons of cargo were transported from Mombasa to Nairobi in 2018, and between January and September 2019, a total of 3.25 million tons of cargo were transported. These figures indicate a significant underutilization of the SGR, resulting in a failure to generate the anticipated revenue.

2.1.8.2 Moi International Sports Center Kasarani

Will (2012) examined China's stadium diplomacy and found that one important aspect of this kind of diplomacy is the implementation of infrastructure projects. China-aided sports structures encompass a diverse array of facilities, such as outdoor stadiums, indoor stadiums designed for various purposes, swimming pools, outdoor track and field courses, as well as other venues intended for contests and training activities. This study is purposefully centered on Moi International Sports Center, which is the largest stadium in Kenya and was funded by the Chinese government, in reference to the research conducted by Will (2012).

According to Stanek (2012), who conducted research on architecture and planning in the so-called "Third World," a sizable portion of China's aided constructions are sports facilities, which can be thought of as a subset of sports aids along with sports equipment and facilities and technical assistance (coaches, sports experts, referees, and competition management staff). China has provided a diverse array of sports facilities as part of its aid efforts, encompassing various types such as outdoor stadiums, indoor stadiums with varying functionalities, swimming pools, outdoor track and field courses, and other venues designed for both contests and training purposes.

2.1.8.3 KUTRRH is the Kenyatta University Teaching, Referral, and Research Hospital.

Fischer and Katz (2009) looked at China's health diplomacy and said that health diplomacy includes a lot of different actions and talks about how health can be used to improve relations between countries. Health serves as a strategic instrument for enhancing diplomatic ties between China and the East African nations. This projection

can be attributed to multiple factors, including the strengthening of diplomatic relations between China and the East African states, advancements in communication technology, improvements in transport infrastructure, the deepening collaborations in research and education between China and East Africa, and the increase in trade between China and these states.

According to Fischer and Katz (2009), a significant number of health facilities in Kenya have received assistance from the Chinese Health Assistance (CHA). The Kenyatta University Teaching, Research and Referral Hospital (KUTRRH) is a significant hospital construction endeavor that has received backing from Chinese economic diplomacy.

Fischer and Katz (2009) conducted additional research on the health sector collaboration between Kenya and China and discovered that Kenyatta University Teaching, Referral & Research Hospital (KUTRRH) has 650 beds and is a National Referral Hospital. The hospital possesses the necessary resources and facilities to provide specialist medical services in the fields of Oncology, Trauma & Orthopedics, Renal, Accident & Emergency, and various other areas. However, it is noteworthy that the oncology center stands out as the hospital's primary and most prominent undertaking. The hospital was inaugurated by His Excellency President Uhuru Kenyatta on September 10, 2020, despite having commenced operations in October 2019. The hospital has established an integrated molecular imaging center, which serves as a valuable resource for the diagnosis and treatment of cancer. This facility addresses a significant factor that prompts Kenyan individuals to travel overseas in

search of medical assistance. Based on the aforementioned research papers, the present study aims to investigate the impact of the Chinese mutual development principle on the development of the Kenyatta University Teaching, Referral, and Research Hospital (KUTRRH) in Kenya.

2.1.8.4 The Thika Superhighway

According to a report by G.O.K (2006) on Kenya's road networks, the country had an estimated 45,000 kilometers of roads when it gained independence in 1963. Of these, only 2,000 kilometers were paved, with the remainder consisting of earth and gravel roads that were closed during the monsoon season. Emphasizing the transportation interests of the settler community, the network's geographic coverage was inadequate to support the independent Kenyan people's development objectives. Priority was given during the 1960s to the primary highway arteries comprising the arterial road system. Subsequently, segments that were frequently traveled underwent selective bituminization to establish the primary road network. Concurrently, auxiliary roads were built through areas that had previously been inhabited.

Wasike (2001), who examined Kenya's rapid economic development and growth since 1963, discovered that the Kenyan government initiated a process to formulate and implement policies for rapid economic development and growth upon achieving independence in 1963. The government also issued Sessional Paper No. 10 in 1965 and the inaugural national development plan encompassing the years 1964–1970, in

addition to the Budget Statement of 1964. At that juncture, the primary focus and, consequently, the underlying justification for public policy was to alleviate the urgent and immediate challenges of transition while simultaneously laying the groundwork for swift economic expansion.

Wasike (2001) did not establish a correlation between this economic expansion and Chinese economic diplomacy. This phenomenon might be attributed to China's limited involvement in road infrastructure development in Kenya. During the decade following independence, the African public sector made substantial advancements in the promotion of infrastructure development.

Wasike (2001) conducted a comprehensive examination of road policies in Kenya following the country's independence. The author analyzed the evolution of the road policy framework in Kenya over the course of three distinct decades. The period from 1973 to 1982 was one of continuous economic decline, whereas the years 1965 to 1972 were marked by rapid economic expansion. In contrast, the years 1983 to 2001 were characterized by structural adjustment and revisions.

Ngau (2011) evaluated the China-Kenya cooperative program. The evaluation unveiled that the People's Republic of China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarded 2010 as a period of amicable and cooperative relations characterized by enduring stability and mutual advantage. During this period, the two countries experienced substantial and

profound development, which culminated in the unprecedented funding of roads such as the Thika Superhighway in Kenya.

According to Ngau (2011), the primary impetus behind the development of this type of highway was the Nairobi-Thika road's notoriously heavy traffic and frequent road accidents, which demanded a new, safer, and wider thoroughfare. Automobile traffic along the stretch has increased in tandem with the expansion of urban areas. As unavoidable outcomes of the heavy traffic, excessive fuel consumption and a significant level of vehicular pollution ensued. All individuals who reside along the Nairobi-Thika route have benefited from the novel superhighway. The distance between Thika and Nairobi has decreased from two hours to approximately forty minutes in the past. Based on the provided data, this research investigated the correlation between the superhighway and the commercial community situated along its length.

2.1.8.5 Lamu Port Project

Will (2012) assessed the prominent infrastructure initiatives in Kenya and disclosed that the establishment of a new transportation corridor connecting a contemporary Port of Lamu with the regions of Garissa, Isiolo, Maralal, Lodwar, and Lokichogio, branching at Isiolo to Moyale along the Ethiopian border, and extending to the southern Sudanese border, was a top priority for the Government in Kenya's Vision 2030 initiative. The corridor shall consist of the following: (Isiolo/Lamu) International Airports, (Lamu, Isiolo, and Lokichogio) Port at Lamu, (Manda Bay) Resort cities, (Lamu, Isiolo, and Lake Turkana), and (road network), oil pipeline (crude and product).

Following a discussion of alternative infrastructure types, this study investigated the application of the mutual development principle to the construction of Moi Stadium Kasarani, SGR, Lamu Sea Port, and KUTRRH in Kenya.

2.2 Socio-Economic Impact of Chinese Principle of Transfer of Skills and Technology in Infrastructural Development in Kenya

Zezeza (2008) investigated the effects on recipient nations of the Chinese principle of technology and talent transfer. According to the findings of the study, Chinese companies have made substantial strides in establishing new business ventures in Africa over the past decade. As of 2015, the cumulative value of China's foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa had increased from under US\$1 billion in 2004 to approximately US\$40 billion. In addition to significantly augmenting their financial outlays, Chinese investments in Africa have diversified their focus beyond the mining industry to encompass the construction, manufacturing, financial services, and information and communications technology sectors. China has emerged as the preeminent economic associate of Africa, surpassing all other nations in terms of the extent and scope of its involvement throughout the continent.

Mbaye (2010) conducted an assessment of China's involvement in Africa. Nevertheless, Mbaye (2010) highlighted that Zezeza (2008) erred in failing to mention the contentious nature of China's involvement in Africa. Concerning whether the presence of Chinese enterprises in Africa contributes to the transmission of knowledge to host countries and the development of local employees' skills, the media, commentators, and policymakers frequently raise this issue. There is a contention that

Chinese enterprises make minimal contributions to local skill development and knowledge transmission in Africa due to their heavy reliance on imported foreign labor imported from China.

Zezeza (2008) conducted an assessment of Chinese enterprises throughout Africa and determined that those under formal ownership implemented effective local employment practices. Additionally, the study revealed that Chinese expatriates in Africa were predominantly proficient personnel who offered training to their African counterparts. Additional qualitative research endeavors to investigate the extent to which Chinese enterprises contribute to the development of skills and technology in African nations, and uncovers some encouraging indications that China's involvement in Africa has resulted in the transfer of technology and expertise.

In contrast, Chen et al. (2016) investigated the contribution of Chinese enterprises to local skill development in Africa and found that empirical literature on the subject is extremely limited, according to Sun and Lin, who rely on qualitative data from Nigeria and Kenya, respectively. It has been noted that definitive evidence regarding the distinctions between local skill development strategies employed by Chinese enterprises and those of foreign entities and local enterprises remains elusive. This study contends that Zezeza (2008) appears to be preoccupied with generalizations to a significant degree. The statement fails to address several inquiries, including whether Chinese enterprises and local and foreign enterprises from developed and emergent nations differ in their approach to fostering local skill development and knowledge transfer in Africa. If so, what is the extent of their dissimilarity? If not, what are the

primary obstacles that organizations encounter when attempting to impart skills and knowledge to employees recruited locally?

2.2.1 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

As an international financial institution and multilateral development bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) seeks to enhance economic and social conditions in Asia collectively. It is the second most extensive multilateral development institution globally. The organization is based in Beijing (Chen et al. 2016). The potential of the AIIB's inception to enhance global economic governance and facilitate greater financing for sustainable development has been acknowledged by the United Nations.

2.2.2 Fostering long-term economic development

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank may be perceived as an organic international expansion of the infrastructure-oriented economic development framework that has propelled China's exponential economic expansion since Deng Xiaoping implemented the Chinese economic reform. This perspective is founded on the belief that sustainable economic expansion is exclusively possible via methodical and all-encompassing investments in infrastructure assets over an extended period of time. This stands in opposition to the shorter-term development models that were favored by mainstream Western Neoclassical economists and which were pursued by numerous developing nations during the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century, namely "domestic consumption" and "export-driven."

2.2.3 Foreign Participation and Local Skill Development

Maher (2013) examined China Foreign participation and the development of local skills. Scholarship and research indicate that human capital development in host countries through technology transfer and local skill enhancement is one of the most significant advantages of foreign direct investment, especially in developing nations. When local employees switch employers and bring with them enhanced production techniques obtained from foreign companies, they increase domestic firms' productivity. Foreign companies that find it more economical to foster local skill development rather than importing skilled labor from their native countries might be motivated to do so. According to interviews with construction project managers, importing foreign labor is extremely costly, and businesses carefully consider the associated costs and benefits. During interviews, a project manager from a Chinese construction company stated, "It is possible for the cost of importing workers from China to be ten times greater than the cost of hiring workers locally." The current cost of expatriate and repatriation benefits and compensation is prohibitive. Chen et al. (2016) further support Maher (2013) by asserting that it is crucial for foreign companies to remain competitive in the market to locate local workers in the construction industry who are capable of delivering projects that adhere to quality standards in a timely and effective manner. Foreign enterprises frequently depend on on-the-job training to enhance the skill set and capacity of locally-hired workers in areas with a substantial skills divide.

Gadzala (2009) conducted an assessment of expatriate and repatriation in a recipient country. The study identified two distinct categories of construction sector training in Ghana: short-term general training and long-term specific training. Generally, environmental and social consciousness, occupational safety and health, and short-term

general training are covered. Long-term specialized training frequently pertains to the particular proficiencies demanded by that particular field, including but not limited to stonemasonry, welding, plumbing, digital mapping, and surveying. Typically, employees who undergo short-term general training do so in groups for brief training sessions that last no more than a half-day per session on a monthly basis. In order to stay informed about environmental and social concerns, occupational safety, and health, this form of training is typically repeated throughout the duration of the project.

On the contrary, long-term specific training, which develops upon the worker's initial skills acquired through technical education or prior work experience, is often implemented in the form of apprenticeships, as overlooked by Gadzala (2009). Typically, employees are assigned a supervisor who provides on-the-job training. The duration of this form of specialized long-term training may range from three to five years, contingent upon the intricacy of the undertaking. Apprentices typically receive a daily stipend throughout the duration of their training and attain the professional level of proficiency upon apprenticeship successful culmination. In 2015, 13.1% of all construction sector employees in Ghana were reportedly enrolled in apprenticeship programs, according to estimates.

Local employees are equipped with newly acquired and enhanced competencies through the implementation of both short-term general training and long-term specific training. Therefore, it is feasible to observe casual laborers or manual laborers gaining specialized and intricate proficiencies that enhance their capabilities and competitiveness in the construction industry.

Maher (2001) provided an illustrative instance by describing the career progression of a local employee from manual laborer to project manager in a foreign-owned construction company. This individual's response to a survey question that "I have never attended a vocational school; all the knowledge and skills that have enabled me to attain this position came from working with exceptionally skilled foreign workers from other nations" serves as a more effective illustration of this mechanism.

However, this study posits that the acquisition of new skills does indeed enhance the skill set of local laborers. However, the inquiry remains whether these skills also contribute to advancements in project construction efficiency, waste reduction, and the quality of work delivered.

2.2.3.1 The Transfer of Skills and Technology in Kenya

Li et al. (2017) discovered in Technology transfer in China-Africa relations that technological skill transfer was a critical component in the creation of the SGR. CRBC established railway operation and management and engineering training in Kenya. Additionally, CRBC established a program of advanced training in China for approximately 18,000 Kenyans. Highly accomplished apprentices were extended invitations to pursue advanced studies in China under the auspices of the Ministry of Commerce of China.

Uwe et al. (2017) conducted an analysis of SGRs and concluded that the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR was completed 18 months prior to schedule in May 2017, eighteen months earlier than its initial construction began in December 2014. It is not unusual for

Chinese builders to meet their intended timelines. In the 1960s, they constructed the 'Tan-Zam Railway,' which linked Zambia to the sea along the Tanzanian coast. This achievement included the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR being completed two years early, which is one of the parallels drawn between the two projects.

Unfortunately, as stated by Gadzala (2009), the technical instruction provided by the Chinese regarding the operation of the Tan-Zam railway was inadequate, resulting in a decline in the railway's performance when operated locally. During the 1980s, there was a reallocation of Chinese labor and an increase in the railway's profitability. Hence, this research highlights the fact that the outcome was not mutually beneficial and prompts the inquiry as to whether the Zambians or the Chinese had benefited from the construction of the railway.

Uwe et al. (2017) conducted a comparative analysis of Chinese railway construction in Kenya and Tanzania and found that the Government of Kenya and the CRBC agreed to impart technical knowledge to the local population in order to avert a situation similar to the one in Tanzania. The railway would be operated by Chinese laborers for the initial five years, while approximately 15,000 Kenyans would be instructed in the operation and maintenance of the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR. It signified a shift in the Chinese government's stance on developmental assistance in the construction industry; rather than engaging in competition with domestic labor, it is embracing Alden's role as a development partner.

Ongiri (2014) did a study to look into how China affects relationships with African countries as a rival to the West. China now has a comparative advantage in the improvement of infrastructure on the continent; the SGR is estimated to have generated 46,000 employment opportunities in Kenya. Due to their personal experience, Chinese infrastructure institutions recognize the significance of infrastructure in the process of modernization. After conducting trials in the field of infrastructure technology, Chinese corporations have acquired the capability to supply developed and efficient infrastructure technology to African nations.

Kenya has never before witnessed some of the largest initiatives financed by the Chinese government in an effort to expand the country's economy and trade. As of late, it has been estimated that China is responsible for more than half of Kenya's total bilateral debt. Despite the fact that the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), the most significant Sino-Kenyan undertaking to date, was intended to bring prosperity and flexibility to Mombasa, Nairobi, and all the cities it connects, the nation has been left waiting for profits from SGR, and the railway has been operating at a loss for the first few years since its inception.

Chen et al. (2016) predict that Kenya will be required to commence the repayment of these loans to China at a specific juncture in the future. Repayment of debt is contingent on the profitability and viability of the substantial undertakings that it finances. This requires the Kenyan government to conduct a thorough assessment of the anticipated returns on infrastructure initiatives. Capacity should be developed domestically to administer them over time. This necessitates the participation of Chinese enterprises in

local training initiatives and, ideally, advocacy with the Kenyan government to facilitate the transfer of necessary skills and technology for project maintenance, shifting ownership from China to Kenya.

Chen et al. (2016) added that, as the prospective SGR fails to generate the expected profits, there is no clear plan regarding how this repayment will occur, within what time frame, or to which entity Kenya will receive the appropriate credits. Kenya, which had agreed to an approximate expenditure of \$4.9 billion for the establishment of the SGR, incurred losses amounting to \$98 million in its inaugural year of operation.

2.2.3.2 Training

Li et al. (2017) assert that training is a prevalent and expeditious method of attaining knowledge transmission. They conducted a comparative analysis to determine the impact of training, which is one of the most prevalent and immediate methods of knowledge transmission. Firms in every country analyzed provide training to their local employees, whether through formal programs, mentoring, or on-the-job instruction, according to Yao. Centers for training and formal programs. Outside of Antananarivo, an agro-technology demonstration center had been established by Hunan Agri, an agricultural firm and one of the largest Chinese investors in Madagascar, to instruct local farmers on the production of a novel variety of hybrid rice, according to research. Commenced in 2007 as a Chinese development cooperation initiative. The center continued to offer training and demonstration programs, as well as develop instructional materials in the Malagasy language, as of 2022. Tianli Agri, an additional Chinese company, has established fifteen training centers staffed by Chinese technicians to instruct locals in cotton cultivation and planting techniques. Additional training

activities are provided by aid programs, both Chinese and non-Chinese, the team discovered. One of the most prevalent and expeditious methods of knowledge transmission is through training.

The China-Africa Cotton Company (CAC) oversaw an agricultural technology demonstration center with the responsibility of instructing nearby producers on methods to increase crop yield. For instance, by means of enhanced field management. Although the center was initially established as part of a Chinese aid program and has since been transferred to the Malawian government, Chinese personnel will continue to operate it until 2022. They proceeded to discover that the Zambian division of CAC also furnished its employees and suppliers with training. CAC cotton purchasers, for instance, were instructed by Zambian managers for one to two days twice yearly. The purchasers, in reciprocation, furnished their farmers with training and impromptu guidance during their site visits.

Uwe et al. (2017) discovered that this training was not grounded in Chinese knowledge, as opposed to training in other countries, due to the absence of the contract farming model in China's cotton sector, despite its application to other commodities. The Zambian managers were entrusted by the Chinese executives to independently design the trainings, drawing inspiration from resources discovered online or from previous courses they had participated in. In contrast to the training provided by its American counterpart Cargill, CAC Zambia's program was considerably more restricted in its scope. In the interim, Cargill conducted in-house training for managers and extended training sessions for its buyers and producers. Consequently, CAC appeared to be enthusiastic about broadening its range of training programs.

Nevertheless, Uwe et al. (2017) neglected to mention that the 'Competitiveness for African Cotton Initiative' program of the German Development Cooperation (GIZ) also provided financial support for Cargill's training. Although CAC placed limited emphasis on training its suppliers and farmers, it demonstrated a more effective approach in imparting knowledge and skills to its employees and managers by utilizing institutions both domestic and foreign to China. For instance, CAC could finance courses and training for employees and managers to attend in-country and in China. Such expenses could be covered by the company or by Chinese aid programs.

However, according to this study, some individuals were skeptical of the worth of these opportunities. Multiple interviewees expressed the opinion that they served primarily as a showpiece and had minimal practical utility in Zambia. Training funded by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and administered by the Farmers' Field Schools could also be advantageous for cotton industry employees. Additionally, practical training was prevalent in Africa. A number of African nations provided technical and vocational education and training that was frequently antiquated or failed to address the demands of the private sector. By providing on-the-job training, these problems were resolved. In addition, it was adaptable to the technologies and machinery utilized by a particular organization and could be administered flexibly in accordance with the level of assistance required by the employees. Every case study documented the provision of some type of on-the-job training.

Gadzala (2009) notes that in Madagascar, Chinese companies taught their workers on the job for anywhere from a few days to three months. Certain companies paired inexperienced employees with more seasoned staff members who assisted them with their duties until they gained the ability to complete them independently. Additionally, Chinese companies operating in Kenya provide on-the-job training to their employees, frequently during the probationary phase. Although experienced Chinese or local laborers typically conduct the training, it is generally preferred to retain the Chinese labor force for the shortest duration feasible due to their higher cost compared to their local counterparts.

Gadzala (2009) further states that in Kenya, certain employees have been able to establish their own businesses by utilizing on-the-job training to acquire technical and managerial expertise. A company observed that a number of its former employees began operating autonomously, either as contractors for minor projects for their former employers or as distributors who attracted local clients. The study of Malawi and Zambia uncovered a comparable trend. In addition to its cotton manufacturing. A modest factory owned by CAC is situated in Zambia, employing approximately one hundred individuals in tasks such as oil extraction and cotton ginning. Since approximately 2014, the factory has been operated by locally trained personnel, with only a limited number of Chinese staff remaining for oversight functions. Chen (2018), on the other hand, criticizes Gadzala (2009) for neglecting to provide instances of employees who have successfully utilized on-the-job training to acquire technical and managerial expertise, subsequently establishing their own enterprises in Kenya.

Hence, this study argues that certain employees who have acquired technical and managerial expertise through on-the-job training have successfully utilized that knowledge to establish their own enterprises in Kenya.

2.3 The Opportunities /Challenges Emanating from Chinese Economic Diplomacy in Infrastructural Development in Kenya

According to Sun (2014), in an analysis of China's grants to developing countries, the modes of disbursement also differ in the financial relationship. Recently, preferential purchasers' credits and resource-backed loans have been introduced in addition to grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans, particularly in countries abundant in natural resources. Various designations (such as Chinese aid, Chinese development assistance, and Chinese foreign capital) have been utilized to describe Chinese financing overseas; however, for the sake of coherence, this research consistently employed the term "Chinese development finance."

2.3.1 Opportunities Emanating from Chinese Economic Diplomacy

Zezeza (2008) pointed out that those who support China-Africa relations believe that historical unity, which has its roots in the 1955 Bandung Conference, is what drives African interests. The Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were established at the conference, encompassed the following: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression among participants, non-interference in the domestic affairs of others, equality, and mutual advantages. Since then, these principles have continued to dominate Chinese rhetoric regarding financial support, with a particular emphasis on mutual benefit and non-interference. However, this study argues that additional

research is required to determine whether this principle of mutual benefit (win-win) actually exists in the Kenyan context or if it is merely a rhetorical statement employed by China.

In general, any mention of African interests in Chinese development finance is frequently entangled in the discourse surrounding the determinants of China-Africa relations, which encompass trade, investments, and Chinese financing on the continent. According to this study, the existing body of literature on the relationship between China and Africa seldom provides an explanation for the differential interest of African states in Chinese development finance. On the contrary, the growing preference of African states for Chinese finances appears to be explained by the following five recurring themes regarding the drivers of China-Africa engagement: solidarity, diversification of economic partners, regime stability, strategic partnership, and exemplar for development.

Some scholars, including Sun (2014), have argued that authoritarian African regimes are drawn to Chinese development finance because it is untethered from the liberal democratic principles that have traditionally been tied to such things as holding periodic elections and promoting human rights values. Asserting this line of reasoning, China serves as a safety valve to ensure regime continuity remains unaffected in the event that Western nations and their international financial institutions refrain from providing development assistance and economic investments.

On the contrary, Sun (2014) challenges the assertions made by Chege (2008) and his associates that Chinese development finance serves as a means to increase economic partner diversification. As a result of globalization and the decline in foreign direct investment from the West, Africa's expanding financial appetite and Chinese firms' eagerness to invest in otherwise risky African territory have significantly contributed to the diversification of trade and investment opportunities, thereby fostering economic growth. The 'China Card' provides Africa with a respite from western investors.

Oriental Development Finance, according to Sun (2014), is perceived as a means by which African nations establish a strategic alliance with China. The debate over whether Africa merits a seat on the United Nations Security Council has reached its zenith. Nigeria and South Africa placed their hopes in the vote of China. A comparable line of reasoning has been put forth regarding Africa's flirtation with China during WTO trade negotiations. Sun (2014) reached the conclusion that China and African nations have formed a strategic alliance via FOAC in order to promote a fair global order that safeguards their respective interests.

Following China's remarkable economic expansion, Zeleza (2008) discovered in a study examining the perception of African leaders regarding China as an exemplary model of development experience that African countries could obtain development financing from China by assuming the role of a model student. Although the discourse is perceptive and provides valuable insights into China's recent resurgence of interest in the continent, the aforementioned themes have a tendency to oversimplify the diversity that exists among African states and lump them all together.

This study contends that despite the continent's varied history, the African continent is frequently viewed in general terms. China, on the other hand, has had a varied historical relationship with several African nations and has been more visible in some nations than others. The study concluded, based on this observation, that it is erroneous to presume that these overarching themes are applicable to every African state.

2.3.2 China's 21st Century MSR Injects New Momentum to China-Africa Relations.

Adefolake (2017) conducted research on Africa in order to assess the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) of the twenty-first century. The research revealed that in March 2015, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China, in collaboration with the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, presented an action plan outlining five connectivity components for the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These components comprised policy coordination, infrastructure connection, trade facilitation, financial integration, and people-to-people exchange. As stated in a 2015 presentation by Ou Xiaoli, Counsel for the Western Region Department of the NDRC. The action plan was primarily executed in two domains: first, the establishment of six economic cooperation corridors and strategic maritime focal points; and second, the enhancement of collaboration in sectors such as resource exploration, finance, trade, and infrastructure connectivity.

According to Jean-Marc (2017), the SREB was associated with the following six economic corridors: Eurasia-Russia land bridge, China-Mongolia-China, China-

Central Asia-West Asia, China-Pakistan, the China-Indochina peninsula, and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar. The MSR pertained to the maritime route; in order to strengthen Asia-Europe-Africa connectivity, there are plans to construct transport routes connecting key seaports along the Belt and Road. This study inquires how Kenya, which is identified as a critical maritime pivot point and represents Africa in the initiative, will benefit, or whether certain regional states will withdraw their support after Kenya reaches an agreement, leaving Kenya to incur losses similar to the SGR case.

According to Jean-Marc (2017), the eastern coast of Africa, the Horn of Africa, and North Africa are all integral parts of the maritime route. The initiative is facilitating the opening of several routes for the transportation of products to and within Africa. The maritime pivot point Gwadar port in Pakistan, for instance, has established a new trade route for the export of products to the Middle East and Africa. Xinjiang to Gwadar is the destination for Chinese exports via routes that have been improved and expanded as part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Although China has maintained an active presence in Africa since 1960, the MSR pledges to escalate Chinese investment in the region, specifically in the development of infrastructure. The MSR is currently positioned to serve as a maritime route that connects Asia, Africa, and Europe. To achieve this, the MSR will utilize the ports of Mombasa and Lamu in Kenya, which are vital for expanding trade and connectivity with the African continent. In recent times, China has increased the frequency of its exchanges and interactions with African nations. There was an estimation that China's cumulative investment on the continent would exceed US\$240 billion by 2014, with an annual growth rate of 16 percent thereafter.

This study currently supports Jean-Marc (2017). In contrast, African states must devise strategies to ensure that the subsequent president upholds the regional agreements established by his predecessor. This is crucial in order to prevent Kenya from continuing to impede regional projects or render them futile, as was the case with the Lamu port (LAPSSET)?

Construction of infrastructure, particularly railway, highway, and regional aviation networks, was the primary focus of Chinese investment, according to Patroba (2010). Additional sectors that attracted investments were manufacturing and energy. Clearly, such investments and initiatives could contribute to the revitalization and advancement of Africa while also aiding in the realization of the BRI. The MSR contributed to the development of a maritime infrastructure network spanning across the South Pacific Ocean, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea. Long-term, it would effectively link East Africa, North Africa, Southeast Asia, Oceania, and even the Mediterranean. This study posits that if the MSR effectively constructed a network of seaports in the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and South Pacific Ocean, there is no reason why they cannot apply the same approach to the Lamu Port (LAPSSET) in Kenya.

Christopher (2015) said that an important part of the MSR would be building big industrial parks, special economic zones (SEZs), and factories in these places. In addition to these SEZs and industrial park investment dynamics, additional investments would be made in alternative energy, logistics, construction, energy, commerce, and tourism, as well as in information technology and biotechnology. Furthermore, trade

fairs, exhibition centers, and other structures that facilitate and support economic activities along the entire MSR's length would be included in the MSR. China has been diligently striving to achieve the successful completion of the MSR. As of now, it has established the \$40 billion Silk Road Fund (SRF), a financing vehicle for infrastructure that will provide capital for the development of the MSR and additional infrastructure projects.

However, Jean-Marc (2017) criticizes Christopher (2015) for failing to mention that it had established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), which had a \$50 billion budget and was not limited to financing MSR-related projects. Beijing was also providing the MSR with access to additional funding sources. Reportedly, the China Development Bank intended to make a contribution exceeding \$890 billion towards new investment initiatives.

2.3.2.1 East African Countries Can Benefit Greatly from the MSR.

Christopher (2015) noted that the establishment of the MSR connected the ports of Mombasa, Kenya, with those in the Asia-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. Professor Michael Chege, who was the Senior Adviser at Kenya's Ministry of Planning and Devolution at the time, stated, "As we investigate opportunities in the new economic hubs such as China and the Gulf, the new Maritime Silk Road will be a game-changer for Kenya." According to James Ndegwa, the former Deputy CEO of the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Kenya should simultaneously serve as a gateway to east and central Africa and a point of exit for all products bound

for Asia and Europe via the port of Mombasa. As a result, the LAPSET project would enable Kenya to become a significant beneficiary of the silk road strategy.

Patroba (2010) is criticized by Christopher (2015) for failing to mention that the MSR also encompassed ports situated along the Horn of Africa, Eastern Coast of Africa, and North Africa. The connectivity of transport and other infrastructure that the Chinese constructed in East Africa in particular could be regarded as an advantage of the MSR within the African continent. For instance, China EXIM Bank has provided substantial funding for infrastructure projects executed by Chinese companies in Djibouti and Kenya, including the US\$3.8 billion standard gauge railway (SGR) connecting Mombasa and Nairobi. The construction of the 609-kilometer railway was undertaken by China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC), with China EXIM Bank contributing 90% of the funding and the Kenyan government contributing the remaining 10%. Additional stages of the SGR would establish connections between Mombasa and Uganda, Rwanda, and South Sudan, thereby augmenting the prospects for enhanced economic expansion and progress in each of those nations.

According to Jean-Marc (2017), China had an additional stake in the Lamu port development in Kenya. The construction of three berths had required an investment of approximately \$480 million from China Communications Construction Company. The newly constructed port, once finished, would function as a critical passageway along the South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor. Proud of his support for the MSR, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta participated in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) summit in Beijing in May 2017. Among other African leaders in attendance were the

Ethiopian Prime Minister, the Egyptian Minister of Trade and Industry, and the Tunisian Minister of Culture. While other African nations may be concerned about China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Kenya sees tremendous opportunities for Africa's development, as outlined in the African Union's Agenda 2063, in the BRI, particularly the MSR.

This study supports the assertion made by Jean-Marc (2017) that the new port, once LAPSSET is fully operational, will function as a critical passageway along the South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor. As an expression of his support and fervor for the MSR, Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta attended the May 2017 Belt and Road Initiative summit in Beijing. Nonetheless, this study simultaneously raises concerns regarding the construction halt and questions whether this will continue to be a mere formality.

Undoubtedly, the MSR would increase exports and employment, promote cultural and people-to-people exchange, and establish a vast economic zone interconnected from the eastern coast of Africa to the Asia-Pacific region, according to Christopher (2015). It provides the African and Chinese peoples with an opportunity to rediscover one another after more than six centuries of interaction. Rekindled trade and investment, in addition to the advancement of technology transfer and human interaction to unprecedented levels, hold tremendous promise and potential. Additionally, the MSR would facilitate the strengthening of pre-existing intergovernmental and bilateral consultation channels, thereby fostering an environment conducive to increased cooperation between China and African nations.

2.3.2.2 Kenya on The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road

The declaration of independence in 1963 has positioned Kenya as one of the most stable nations and economic hubs in Africa, according to a report by Xinhua News on December 11, 2013. Therefore, it has emerged as a critical conduit and platform through which the global community can engage in technological cooperation, investment, and trade with Africa. Since the 1990s, Kenya has experienced consistent growth in its domestic economy, which has resulted in an expanding market for commodities from around the world. Kenya has attracted more foreign direct investment (FDI) and international companies in recent years, as regional integration in eastern Africa has strengthened. These entities view Kenya as a gateway to the markets of east and central Africa.

In 2008, the Kenyan government introduced a nationwide strategy known as 'Vision Kenya 2030,' which focused on three key domains: legislation, economy, and society. The objective was to transform Kenya into a middle-income emergent market by 2030 through rigorous development promotion. In order to advance the local economy and actualize the Vision, the Kenyan government is making every effort to improve infrastructure across the country. Since the fourth voyage of his Treasure Fleet, Zheng He, the great navigator of the Ming Dynasty, has maintained a cordial relationship with Kenya, which extends back over 600 years.

Xinhua News, 11 December (2013), additionally stated that China established diplomatic relations with Kenya in 1963, becoming the fourth nation globally to acknowledge the nation's independence. Since that time, and especially since the

conclusion of the Cold War, there has been a notable escalation in the frequency of high-level political and military interactions between the two nations. China's inaugural military delegation to Kenya was led by General Liu Jingsong, Commander of the Lanzhou Military Region, in December 1996. In 1997, Major General Nick Leshan, Commander of the Kenyan Air Force, embarked on a reciprocal visit to Kenya. In August 2005, Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki paid a visit to Beijing. Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta traveled to China in 2013 to meet with Chinese President Xi and to sign \$5 billion worth of economic agreements. On his tour of Africa the following year, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang paid a visit to Nairobi. The signing of seventeen agreements to finance various infrastructure and non-financial initiatives, including the establishment of the China-Africa Development Bank, was observed by him and President Kenyatta. Presidents Xi and Uhuru Kenyatta initiated the China-Kenya Comprehensive Cooperative Partnership concurrently in 2013.

The Chinese Embassy-Kenya (2020) report criticized the December 11th, 2013 Xinhua News for failing to mention that President Xi and President Kenyatta announced their intention to elevate their relationship to that of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in May 2017. This mutual political confidence has established a strong foundation for collaboration between Kenya and China in additional domains. Both nations have signed a number of bilateral agreements on economic, trade, technological, and cultural cooperation, according to this study.

According to the World Bank (2018), Kenya serves as a significant supplier of raw materials to the Chinese industrial sector, whose completed goods account for Kenya's

largest imports. Predominantly pharmaceuticals, industrial and agricultural equipment, textiles, everyday commodities, and household electric appliances. Presently, over seventy major Chinese corporations conduct business in Kenya, with China Import and Export Group, Jiangsu International Economic and Technological Cooperation Co., and China Road Bridge Construction Corporation being the largest. According to a report by the World Bank (2019), Chinese enterprises operating in Kenya have an average of 360 local employees, which is significantly higher than the 147 local employees employed on average by other foreign invested enterprises in Kenya.

This research agrees with the World Bank (2018) in establishing that Kenya is an important supplier of raw materials to China's industry, whose completed products account for the bulk of Kenya's imports. These findings prompt the researcher to inquire about the potential repercussions of these products on the domestic Kenyan industry. What is the merchandise's quality? Among numerous additional inquiries is the effect on Kenyan industrial laborers.

2.3.2.3 Forms of Challenges Emanating from China's Economic Diplomacy in Kenya

According to Naïm (2018), the challenges arising from China's economic diplomacy in Kenya have become more pronounced as the country's involvement in international development cooperation expands. These concerns include, but are not limited to, corruption and obstacles to democratic development, inadequate transparency and accountability, the lack of conditionality beyond the One China principle and aid being primarily tied to Chinese contractors, competition and its effect on local businesses,

questionable procurement and variation of contracts, equipment and material sources, and human resources.

2.3.2.4 Transparency and Accountability

Longstanding concerns pertain to the transparency and accountability of China's foreign economic assistance. Grimm et al. (2011) identify transparency and accountability as enduring concerns in the realm of China's foreign economic aid in their research study. The study's results indicate that while China has made an effort to resolve concerns regarding transparency by publishing white papers containing data presentations, the figures provided are overall and lack specificity at the project level.

Several factors contribute to the lack of transparency in China's foreign economic aid, according to this study. These include the following: China lacks a comprehensive understanding of its foreign economic aid activities due to the participation of 20–30 different ministries and their affiliated agencies; domestic opposition exists regarding the use of tax dollars for foreign economic aid; a significant portion of the Chinese population continues to reside below the poverty line; and underdeveloped regions exist in central and western China; the disclosure of such information could potentially spark competition among recipients.

2.3.2.5 Conditionality

Rich (2004) identifies non-conditionality as one of the guiding principles of South–South cooperation. The research findings indicate that China's foreign economic assistance is frequently accompanied by stipulations including limited government

intervention, deregulation, privatization, and adherence to a free market system. On the contrary, China, with one exception, applies the principles of non-interference and respect for sovereignty to the One China principle. However, this study contends that China frequently associates its development financing with domestically procured products and services. Chinese scholars frequently highlight the pragmatic and adaptable aspects of China's aid practice, while maintaining a sceptical stance regarding the efficacy of aid outcomes provided by OECD DAC donors.

However, Rich (2004) further elaborates on some of the aforementioned obstacles by including purported non-conditionality and corruption as well as a lack of transparency. These indicate that it is customary for traditional donor nations to associate foreign economic aid with economic diplomacy policy objectives and the promotion of economic interests. China, like other donors, is likely to be more motivated by economic interests. Rich natural resource deposits, a burgeoning market, and the imperative for infrastructure in Africa furnish China with abundant prospects and compelling motivations to modify its aid policy in order to support its domestic economy and promote the investment of state-owned enterprises and private businesses in the continent.

China has been accused of financing dubious projects that exceed the recipient country's ability to repay, according to Brautigam (2020), which describes the 'debt trap' as an additional controversy surrounding China's expanding lending role in Africa. Indeed, it has been noted that commercial loans comprise an increasing proportion of the development financing in China.

According to Brautigam (2020), commercial banks invariably charge higher interest rates on non-concessional loans compared to concessional loans, as they endeavor to mitigate risks and secure greater investment returns. As to whether China intentionally incurs debt for these nations is debatable. Certain analysts have expressed disapproval of these allegations, contending that China's 'debt trap' diplomacy is frequently fabricated or exaggerated with regard to the scale of the debts and other underlying factors. Although instances of excessive debt do occur, they are predominantly associated with Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiatives, which are presently recognized as components of China's development financing. These projects have frequently been instigated by foreign governments, motivated by domestic considerations, and backed by China.

Nevertheless, Jones and Hameiri (2020) criticize Brautigam (2020) for failing to note that China remains liable for funding projects initiated by recipient governments. Such funding should be contingent on a realistic assessment of the recipient country's revenue generation capacity, the projects' potential for tangible benefits, and the feasibility of the endeavors in order to prevent the accumulation of excessive debt. Concerns exist, according to this study, regarding the actual contribution of China-funded initiatives to the recipient nations' economic development priorities.

According to the findings of Malik et al. (2021), Chinese commercial lending and foreign economic aid have commenced promptly addressing certain critical infrastructure requirements in Africa, albeit at the expense of substantial financial

obligations, if not debt, for the recipients. As a consequence, Chinese foreign economic aid has been accused of facilitating unjust advantages for Chinese corporations, while offering minimal advantages to domestic industries and employment. The escalating debt incurred as a result of these expansive infrastructure initiatives is specifically an area of increasing apprehension. As an illustration, the Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway incurred expenses amounting to approximately a quarter of Ethiopia's 2016 government budget. In contrast, the Mombasa–Nairobi standard gauge railway in Kenya has exceeded its budget by a factor of four and now consumes around 6% of Kenya's gross domestic product (GDP).

Acker et al. (2020) disclosed that China has adopted a more prudent lending policy in recent years to prevent the escalation of Africa's debt, in response to these criticisms. There are indications that it is beginning to give preference to recipient nations that possess stronger economies and minimal or no debt challenges. Between 2000 and 2019, it canceled a minimum of \$3.4 billion in debt and restructured or refinanced approximately \$15 billion in debt in Africa. China also reduced lending to several recipient nations, including Angola, Cameroon, Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Mozambique, between 2015 and 2019.

Conversely, this study contends that China's debt relief efforts in Africa have been constrained. China conducts country-by-country assessments of African nations and formulates debt-relief strategies accordingly. Additionally, it exhibits a preference for offering African countries the opportunity to reschedule loan repayments, refinance, or restructure, as opposed to extending universal debt relief. However, this practice

occurred concurrently with the pledges made by China in its 2021 white paper, which underscored the importance of bilateral consultations between China and recipient nations as the primary approach to resolving debt issues.

2.3.2.6 Competition and Impact on Local Businesses

Chen et al. (2009) conducted an assessment of CCFs in Africa regarding competition and the effect on local businesses. The findings revealed that international tendering emerged as the predominant procurement method, accounting for marginally less than 50% of contracts secured by CCFs in Africa. Nevertheless, they disclosed that sole source negotiation accounts for approximately 11% of projects financed by Chinese funds, while tendering accounts for nearly 40% of such projects among Chinese contractors. Chen et al. (2009) supplement their findings with those of Chege (2008), who noted that Chinese construction companies have been accused of undermining rivals in some fashion through government-provided financial subsidies.

All of these complaints, according to this study, stem from Broadman-identified behind-the-border reforms. These issues are most effectively resolved through adherence to international standards set forth by the WTO and the International Labour Organization (ILO). Economic relations between Kenya and China could be significantly improved by implementing such reforms, including those within Kenya. Such measures would level the playing field and establish a fair foundation for competition.

According to Moss and Rose (2006), as cited in the Centre for Global Development, the utilization of official agencies such as the Exim Bank to subsidize Chinese firms

has undeniable consequences for their competitors. Due to the fact that a significant number of Chinese enterprises are state-owned, they may not be subject to the same level of shareholder pressure regarding profitability, so long as they serve an economic foreign policy objective.

Moss and Rose (2006) were criticized by Munyi (2011) for failing to recognize the discontent regarding Chinese firms' persistently intense competition, which has caused African firms to lose domestic tenders, local import trade, and major business sub-sectors. As these few recent examples from East, West, and Southern Africa illustrate, this discontent is gradually increasing. This study posits that although the majority of governments have praised China and awarded construction contracts readily to Chinese firms, a significant number of domestically owned businesses are experiencing intense competition from Chinese rivals.

'China's march to Kenya upsets local firms' is the title of one of the presented case studies in the Kenyan construction industry (Munyi, 2011). An African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) report authored by fourteen universities in Africa cautioned that Kenya would be harmed by increased investment, foreign economic aid, and diplomatic relations with China. The researchers believed that local businesses were doomed to fail as a result of Chinese firms' discounting. An estimated fifty percent or more of private and state-funded construction activities in Nairobi had been absorbed by Chinese construction firms, which are typically preferred for projects involving roads, water systems, power generation, and hospitals.

2.3.2.7 Equipment and Material Sources

Chen et al. (2009) discovered through empirical research that CCFs in Africa purchase apparatus primarily from Chinese manufacturers. One CCF interviewee was quoted as saying that over fifty percent of their equipment is manufactured in China. There are numerous justifications for this, including the fact that they are inexpensive and provide access to accessories. Supply of equipment and materials is a major concern..

2.3.2.8 Human Resources

Another significant concern that has been extensively documented by scholars and policy makers is the inadequate utilization of local human resources, specifically expert labor and management personnel, by CCFs executing projects in Africa. Chen et al. (2009) discovered in an empirical study of CCFs in Africa that, while CCFs employ an equivalent number of local and Chinese laborers on average, they predominantly appoint Chinese nationals to managerial roles. Locals occupied less than ten percent of the menial labor force positions, according to the findings. Munyi (2011) further emphasizes that concerns have been expressed regarding potential risks to engineering expertise and proficiency, as well as the insolvency of domestic construction firms, as a result of Chinese construction firms' incursion. Furthermore, according to a report published in 2021 by the Institute for Development Studies at the University of Nairobi, there is a discernible shift in the employment landscape, characterized by a growing presence of foreign personnel within Chinese enterprises. Moss and Rose (2006) corroborated this phenomenon by noting that Chinese companies frequently engage in labor imports, thereby constraining the extent of economic spillover effects.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

Diverse explanations have been proposed for China's relations with its African allies. This research primarily examined the theories of power, modernization, and dependency in an effort to comprehend and make sense of the stated issue. The researcher conducted a comprehensive analysis of the merits and drawbacks of each theoretical framework in an effort to integrate them into a more robust conceptual framework for the study concerning the relationship between Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructure development in Kenya.

2.4.1 Power Theory

The challenge associated with 'power theory' is the absence of agreement regarding its definition and method of study. Regarding this, there are two primary schools of thought. A philosophical approach, on the one hand, seeks to ascertain the meanings of power, whereas a sociological approach is more concerned with the consequences and motivations behind the application of this concept. Thus, while one is preoccupied with its meaning, the other is concerned with its action. As a consequence, numerous academics have proposed diverse definitions for this notion (Oppenheim 1981).

Weber's (1947) conceptualization of power entails the likelihood that a particular participant in a social interaction will be able to impose his own desires in the face of opposition. Dahl (1957) suggested referring to the entities involved in a power dynamic as "actors." Actors, including organizations, groups, positions, governments, nation-states, and other human aggregates, are all encompassed within the term actor.

According to Morgenthau (1973), international politics, akin to other forms of politics, is characterized by a perpetual pursuit of power, irrespective of the overarching objectives that international politics may ultimately seek to achieve. He contends that power is the source of three fundamental human drives. The desire for survival, procreation, and dominance. Their aggregation in a world of scarce resources must result in a conflict for power. Such is the character of politics. Due to the fact that every state strives to optimize its own power, the concept and analysis of international politics can be reduced to a contest between autonomous entities vying for dominance over one another. The distinction between states lies not so much in their desired objectives, but rather in their capacities to accomplish essentially common goals.

Nevertheless, some academics offer critical analyses of the concept and purpose of power. As opposed to currency, influence is not fungible, according to Waltz (1990). He contends that it is crucial to differentiate between strong and feeble states. In proportion to a state's strength, its arsenal of capabilities also expands. While power may be marginally fungible in feeble states, it is extraordinarily fungible in strong states.

The critique of the assumption of power fungibility is most detrimental to theories of the balance of power. Assuming power is segmented and its capacities are issue-specific, it becomes speculative to ascertain the general balance of power. Consequently, proponents of balance of power theory require a lump sum conception of power, which posits that every component of power can be consolidated into a single overarching indicator. In light of this, prominent theorists who are, albeit feeble, have

resorted to rhetoric rather than arguments in support of their stance. As illustrated by Bull (1977), who examined the challenges associated with formulating a comprehensive notion of power, ultimately stated candidly that bargaining among states reveals the relative position of states in terms of overall power, and that states cannot function without the notion of overall power. However, Waltz (1987) finds it sufficiently convincing to argue that nations' economic, military, and other capabilities cannot be segmented and weighted separately. Neo-realists diverge from regime theorists and neo-institutionalists at this juncture. Prior to this, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977) had argued for issue-specific power structures, significantly drawing from Baldwin's work. Subsequently, Keohane (1984) presented a vehement critique of Waltz's fungibility assumption, contending that power concepts are only applicable in specific domains of concern where fungibility can be reasonably presumed. Waltz responded with disdain: "While power is undeniably less malleable than money, it is considerably more malleable than what Keohane contends. The differentiation between strong and weak states remains crucial. The variety of a state's capabilities increases in direct proportion to its strength. While power may be marginally malleable in feeble states, it is exceedingly fungible in strong states.

In his defense, Waltz (1987) argued that if power resources were so highly fungible as to be applicable in various domains, then there would be no need to debate their variation. Therefore, it is possible to utilize economic capabilities to generate political, social, or cultural results. When a wide range of capabilities is taken into consideration, it can be inferred that a strong state's strength does not stem from its overall power, but rather from its exceptional capabilities in specific domains.

A single international power structure, according to Strange (1989), is either predicated on the notion of a solitary dominant issue domain or on the high fungibility of power resources. Given the limited utility of both, it is time to acknowledge that the concept of a unified global power structure that is not tied to any specific issue domain is founded upon an almost meaningless notion of power.

According to Strange (1989), the balance of power has shifted from military capabilities and state dominance to the international control of credit and knowledge, among other things. Likewise, there is no justification for excluding from power analysis all those critical effects that may have been unintended. For example, the question of whether the German Bundesbank's interest rate policies were designed to disrupt the European Monetary System is of lesser importance than the fact that such an outcome could have been influenced by a limited number of actors. The transition in focus from intentions to effects undermines the significance of the neo-institutionalist framework in comprehending power, which is predicated on rationality, resources, and interests. It emphasizes systematic aspects of power rather than selective ones.

Barry (1988) As a result, the so-called benefit fallacy of power, which asserts that structural power is a systematic bias, has been criticized for deriving power from rewards.

Barry (1988) and Polsby (1980) both made explicit reference to the concept of the free-rider, an individual who undeniably benefits from a particular systemic arrangement

but is fundamentally dependent on it. Free-riders would not inherently be attributed with power. However, the benefit fallacy is confined to causal frameworks. The assertion that specific individuals benefit from a system does not imply that they are responsible for or in control of that benefit.

According to Morriss (1987), the notion of structural authority exhibits certain deficiencies.

Initially, it is advisable to incorporate the systematic benefits into a power analysis. Consequently, rather than referring to them directly under the concept of power, it is more appropriate to discuss them in the context of governance or rule.

Second, it provides the theoretical foundation for Gramsci's notion of hegemony and consensual rule. Gill and Law make an explicit reference to Lukes' (1974) critique of Dahl's distinction of three dimensions of power in their presentation of their methodology. Lukes had expressed disapproval of Dahl's excessively empiricist approach, which precludes the possibility that an actor's power was manipulated in the absence of overt negotiation or conflict. With the progression of the field of international relations, there was a gradual alteration in the inflexible understanding of power.

Nye (2005) posits that the evolving international framework has placed renewed emphasis on intangible forms of power, including institutions, culture, and ideology. The factors of technology, education, and economic development are equally, if not more, significant than geography, population, and resources in light of the expanding social mobilization. On the contrary, Baldwin (2012) contends that historical emphasis

has been placed on the significance of military force to the detriment of non-military forms of power.

Nye (2005) distinguishes between hard and soft modes of power. The most ancient type of power is command or hard authority. This concept is associated with the notion of an anarchic global order, in which nations abstain from acknowledging any supreme authority and are consequently compelled to engage in power politics. Assigning coercive actions or threats—the 'carrots' and 'sticks' of international politics—in order to achieve one's objectives classifies hard power.

Throughout history, real power has been assessed using various metrics, including economic strength, population size, territory, geography, natural resources, and military strength, according to Morgenthau (1973). However, there are scholars who argue that hard power fails to sufficiently explain numerous significant international outcomes. These outcomes are better comprehended through the lenses of democracy, specific configurations of domestic interests, liberal values, economic interdependence, or international institutions.

This investigation was thus influenced by Nye's (2005) conceptualization of soft power. Soft power is predicated on the capacity to influence the preferences of nations through intangible assets, including an appealing personality, culture, political values, economic interdependence, international institutions, and policies that are perceived as legitimate or possessing moral authority, rather than resorting to force, coercion, or violence.

Nye (2005) elaborates that a nation's soft power is predominantly derived from three assets: its political values (when it manifests them domestically and internationally), its foreign policies (when they are perceived as legitimate and possess moral authority), and its culture (insofar as it attracts others). This is the scenario that China purports to present Kenya regarding infrastructure development in its economic diplomacy. Morgenthau (1973) notes that power motivates all of humanity in three fundamental ways. The desire for survival, procreation, and dominance. China therefore typically provides the majority of infrastructure funding in Kenya.

Consequently, the initial aim of this study was to investigate the impact of the Chinese mutual development principle on the development of infrastructure in Kenya, which was guided by this theory.

2.4.2 Modernization Theory

The modernization movement that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s serves as the foundation for modernization theory (Hussain et al., 1981; Lenin 1964). It is a theory of economics with its foundation in capitalism. Modernization encompasses the entirety of the dramatic changes and transitions that a traditional society must experience in order to attain modern status.

According to Ellis and Biggs (2001), modernization entails underdeveloped nations imitating the progress made by Europe, which was primarily the continent's former colonizer. Modernity posits that policies designed to improve the quality of life for impoverished individuals frequently involve the distribution of information and knowledge pertaining to more effective methods of production. The agriculture modernization process, for instance, encourages producers to experiment with novel

crops, production techniques, and marketing strategies. Smith (1973) concurs with this viewpoint, stating that modernization entails the substitution of antiquated agricultural practices for more contemporary ones. Modernity theorists posit that the rate at which nations progress towards modernity is contingent upon their degrees of adaptability and versatility. The development theory is erroneously portrayed by modernists as a binary progression from an initial terminal state to a state attained with the assistance of developed nations.

Nevertheless, the theory has faced criticism for neglecting to prioritize the impoverished as the central focus of efforts to alleviate poverty. Coetzee et al. (2007) assert that modernity marginalizes the commitment, creativity, and support of the target community for intervention strategies by disregarding their participation and involvement. The intervention strategy, which fails to construct adequate conceptions of the causal powers of social structures and the role of human agency in shaping social relations in general, becomes an imposed strategy. One of the most detrimental deficiencies of the modernization theory is its overly simplistic perspective on the process of social change.

Additionally, Coetzee et al. (2007) state: "To begin with, human nature is predisposed to favor the status quo over change." Resistance towards change arises due to the introduction of uncertainties. For example, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and other development strategies were formulated, packaged, and transmitted to Africa for execution. Numerous African heads of state and government have criticized NEPAD for its elitist character; consequently, the

continent's postcolonial states must devise a novel approach to ensuring the socioeconomic development of Africa.

Furthermore, an additional noteworthy drawback of the modernization theory is its reliance on deterministic logic, which posits that external factors initiate changes within the linear framework of socioeconomic progress. The deterministic rationale provides limited consideration for the reciprocal relationship between internal and external causes in the developing region. The premise promotes the notion that foreign powers should dictate the path to development for underdeveloped states. Africa, for example, was a victim of the IMF-mandated economic structural adjustment program (ESAP) in the 1980s. The ESAP initiative encountered failure due to its development lacking consideration for the recipient countries' cultural, social, political, and traditional values. In a nutshell, the ESAP initiative was an unsuccessful "Eurocentric" endeavor to alleviate poverty and underdevelopment on the continent.

Modernization is subsequently linked to development assistance provided by developed nations. The concept was derived from the post-World War II Marshall Plan. It appears that development assistance is amenable to bilateral or multilateral negotiations. Aid is subject to conditions, with the exception of humanitarian aid, irrespective of the arrangement. In general, the metropolitan states have benefited more from these connections than the recipient states.

As an illustration, China is presently one of the most significant trade partners of Africa due to its ability to negotiate development assistance under more advantageous terms

for the continent compared to Western nations. However, the narrative persists that China is more interested in harnessing the resources of Africa than both Europe and America. An examination of the trade balance between China and Africa will indicate that the former economy stands to benefit more from the exportation of its agricultural concepts, labor force, and technology to Africa. A portion of the surplus economic value derived by Chinese capital could be expended on conspicuous consumption or externalized in the form of profit remittances to China.

It is not surprising that Frank (1967) believed that a political revolution was the only viable course of action to address the exploitative relationship. Technology is one of the primary channels through which monopoly capital infiltrates and integrates the African economies into the Chinese capitalist system, as Modernity accurately observes.

Samir et al. (1987) assert that classical economists, including Smith, Marx, and Marshall, regarded technological advancements with great admiration when evaluating the economic development of developing nations. Marxists contend that the technological distinction between developed and developing nations is solely attributable to the international division of labor. As an illustration, the Western world manufactures products for both itself and Africa, whereas Africa supplies raw materials to the Western world, which relies heavily on subsistence agriculture.

According to Samir et al. (1987), Africa was impoverished during modernization as a result of Western imperialism and colonialism, and this trend continues to this day as

the East depletes the continent's resources, including energy and minerals. Africa must transcend poverty and underdevelopment; however, this objective may remain unattainable so long as the continent continues to prioritize the power and strength of modernity over the advancement of alternative development theories. Addressing the issue of poverty in Africa necessitates more than a mere transition from traditional to modern societies. Concepts of modernization caused Africa's poverty. The theory neglected to acknowledge the ingenuity and proactivity exhibited by the Africans.

Conversely, it prioritizes aid obtained from external sources while ignoring the restrictive conditions that accompany such assistance. The theory's omission of this conditionality could indicate that the metropolitan states' application of the theory to Africa was influenced by a concealed hand. Present-day discussions surrounding Africa's development are troubled by the theory's preponderance of metropolitan development as a determinant of progress.

This metropolis's preeminence was responsible for the transformation of Africa's conceptual framework and value system. The colonial conquest that ensued after the Berlin Conference (partition of Africa) from 1884 to 1885, according to Rodney (1972), established the Western bloc's complete economic and political dominance of Africa. The metropolis manipulated and continues to manipulate the "externally driven development path" that replaced Africa's indigenous development path. A paradigm transformation is required for Africa to regain its right to discuss a novel approach to development.

As a collection of development theories, modernization theory thus originated in the United States during the 1940s and early 1950s. Advocates of the Modernization theory, including Hussain et al. (1981), Lenin (1964), Ellis and Biggs (2001), Smith (1973), and Hoselitz (1960), hold the view that the industrialization process, which has had an enduring impact on numerous western states since the 18th and 19th centuries, is a revolutionary and emancipatory phenomenon that serves as an example for other societies and states to emulate. Additionally, seclusion serves as a defining feature of traditional societies.

Modernization theorists contend that traditional societies and states have minimal or negligible interactions with advanced societies and states. As a result, traditional societies and states lack successful models to imitate. This implies that developed societies and states have been unable to impart their capital, knowledge, skills, organizational structure, values, and technology to less developed nations. Advocates of this theory posit that developing states could experience progress through deviance in the form of technological advancements in infrastructure or political revolution (Hoselitz 1960). On the basis of this theory, Kenya can thus develop its infrastructure through its bilateral relations with China, a more developed nation. Kenya will emulate China in this particular circumstance. Consequently, this theory fulfilled the second aim of the research, which was to evaluate the effects of China's principle of technology and skill transmission on Kenya's infrastructure development.

2.4.3 Interdependency theory

In the context of international relations, scholars often refer to theories that emphasize interdependence among states. One prominent theory is the theory of complex interdependence, which was developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s. Complex interdependence suggests that in the contemporary international system, military force is just one of many tools that states use to achieve their goals. Economic, political, and social interactions between states are also crucial, leading to a complex web of interdependencies.

The theory of complex interdependence, developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in the 1970s, represents a significant departure from traditional realist perspectives in international relations. In their seminal work "Power and Interdependence" (1977), Keohane and Nye challenged the prevailing assumptions about state behavior, power dynamics, and the nature of international relations.

At its core, complex interdependence posits that in the modern globalized world, military force is just one among many instruments used by states to pursue their interests. The theory emerged as a response to the limitations of traditional realist theories, which often focused on military power, national interest defined narrowly in terms of security, and a zero-sum view of international relations.

One key concept within complex interdependence is the idea that multiple channels of interaction exist between states, extending beyond traditional diplomatic and military channels. Economic, social, and political ties weave a complex web of interdependencies, creating a situation where states are more connected and mutually

reliant than ever before. Unlike the realist assumption of anarchy leading to a self-help system, complex interdependence suggests that cooperation and mutual interests can arise even in the absence of a hegemonic power structure.

Economic interdependence is a central theme in the theory. Keohane and Nye argued that the increasing interconnectedness of national economies through trade, investment, and financial flows makes the use of military force less attractive and costlier. Economic ties create mutual interests, and the costs of disrupting these economic relationships often outweigh the potential benefits of military aggression. This economic interdependence, in turn, fosters cooperation and reduces the likelihood of conflict.

Moreover, complex interdependence emphasizes the role of non-state actors, such as multinational corporations, international organizations, and advocacy groups. These actors have become influential players in shaping international relations, contributing to the complexity of the global system. States are not the sole actors on the international stage, and the interactions between states and non-state actors further complicate the dynamics of international relations.

The theory also challenges the notion of a clear hierarchy of issues in international relations. Traditional realist theories often prioritize security concerns and state sovereignty. In contrast, complex interdependence argues that issues such as human rights, environmental protection, and public health are equally important and interconnected with traditional security concerns. This broadens the agenda of

international relations, encouraging a more holistic and cooperative approach to problem-solving.

The theory of complex interdependence represents a paradigm shift in the study of international relations. By focusing on the multifaceted nature of state interactions and the growing importance of non-state actors, Keohane and Nye challenged the traditional realist assumptions and provided a framework that better captures the complexities of the modern globalized world. The theory continues to influence scholarly debates and policy discussions, shaping our understanding of how states navigate the intricate web of interdependence in the contemporary international system.

Robert O. Keohane, one of the co-developers of the complex interdependence theory along with Joseph S. Nye, has been a prominent figure in shaping the landscape of international relations. Keohane's views on complex interdependence have evolved over time, and his contributions have significantly influenced the field. At the heart of Keohane's perspective on complex interdependence is the recognition that the international system is characterized by a myriad of interconnections and interdependencies among states. In his collaboration with Nye, particularly in their groundbreaking work "Power and Interdependence" (1977), Keohane argued against the traditional realist emphasis on military power as the primary determinant of state behavior. Instead, he highlighted the importance of multiple channels of interaction, such as economic, social, and political ties, in shaping the relations between states.

Economic interdependence stands out as a key element in Keohane's thinking. He contends that the deepening economic ties between states create a situation where the

costs of conflict, particularly through military means, become prohibitively high. Economic interests, expressed through trade, investment, and financial interactions, foster cooperation among states. Keohane suggests that the logic of economic interdependence encourages nations to seek non-military means to resolve disputes, as disruptions in economic relations can have severe consequences for all parties involved.

Moreover, Keohane underscores the significance of international institutions and regimes in the complex interdependence framework. He argues that these institutions play a crucial role in facilitating cooperation and managing conflicts. By providing forums for negotiation, communication, and the establishment of norms, institutions contribute to the development of a more stable and cooperative international system. Keohane's emphasis on institutions challenges the realist notion that international relations are inherently anarchic and conflict-prone.

Another noteworthy aspect of Keohane's views on complex interdependence is the inclusion of non-state actors in the analysis. Multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and other transnational actors have become influential players in the global arena. Keohane recognizes their impact on state behavior and international outcomes, acknowledging that the traditional state-centric view of international relations is insufficient in capturing the complexity of the contemporary world.

Keohane's views have evolved over time, and he has engaged with critics and refined his ideas. While he acknowledges the benefits of interdependence and cooperation, he does not ignore the existence of power disparities among states. Keohane recognizes

that not all interactions are necessarily cooperative, and power dynamics continue to shape international relations. However, he contends that even in situations of power asymmetry, cooperation and interdependence can still be prevalent, challenging the zero-sum assumptions of traditional realist theories.

In summary, Robert O. Keohane's views on complex interdependence have been instrumental in reshaping the way scholars and policymakers understand international relations. His emphasis on economic interdependence, the role of international institutions, and the inclusion of non-state actors has enriched the field by providing a more nuanced and comprehensive understanding of the complexities inherent in the contemporary globalized world. Keohane's work continues to influence debates in international relations, encouraging scholars to explore the multifaceted nature of state interactions and the evolving dynamics of global governance.

Joseph S. Nye, alongside Robert O. Keohane, co-developed the theory of complex interdependence, a framework that has significantly influenced the study of international relations. Nye's contributions to this theory provide nuanced perspectives on power, influence, and the intricate connections among states in the contemporary global system.

Nye's views on complex interdependence share many commonalities with Keohane's, emphasizing the diverse channels of interaction and interdependence that characterize modern international relations. One key element in Nye's thinking is the concept of "soft power." While Keohane focused on economic interdependence, Nye extended the analysis to include non-coercive forms of influence. Soft power, according to Nye, is

the ability to shape the preferences of others through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion. Cultural appeal, diplomatic skill, and the ability to set the international agenda are integral components of a state's soft power.

In Nye's perspective, the combination of soft power and economic interdependence leads to a more comprehensive understanding of state behavior. He argues that states can exert influence not only through military force or economic leverage but also by promoting a set of values, ideas, and cultural products that others find appealing. This emphasis on the non-material aspects of power expands the scope of complex interdependence and reflects the changing nature of global interactions in an information age.

Moreover, Nye introduced the concept of "three-dimensional chess" to illustrate the complexity of international relations in the era of complex interdependence. Traditionally, scholars and policymakers viewed international relations as a two-dimensional chessboard, where states engaged in military and economic competition. Nye added a third dimension, highlighting the significance of transnational issues such as environmental concerns, public health, and human rights. These issues, he argued, are not easily categorized as solely military or economic; they involve a mix of actors and interests, contributing to the intricate web of interdependence.

Nye's views on complex interdependence also acknowledge the persistence of traditional power politics. While advocating for the importance of soft power and non-military means of influence, he does not dismiss the relevance of military force or

economic leverage. Nye recognizes that power remains a multifaceted concept, encompassing various instruments and strategies.

In later writings, Nye has expanded his focus to address the challenges posed by the rise of new powers, particularly China. He emphasizes the importance of understanding cultural and ideational factors in shaping global politics, highlighting the role of narratives and perceptions in international relations.

Joseph S. Nye's views on complex interdependence enrich the theory by introducing the concept of soft power and emphasizing the three-dimensional nature of global interactions. His work has broadened the understanding of power dynamics in international relations, acknowledging the significance of cultural influence and non-material sources of power. Nye's contributions continue to shape scholarly debates on the evolving nature of state interactions and the complexities of power in the contemporary international system.

Joseph S. Nye is well-known for his concept of "soft power," which he introduced in the early 1990s. Soft power refers to a nation's ability to shape the preferences of others through appeal and attraction, using culture, political values, and foreign policies as tools of influence. This concept complements traditional notions of "hard power," which involve military and economic strength.

Nye's ideas on soft power have evolved over time, and his works have extended to address contemporary issues such as the rise of new powers, the role of technology, and the importance of narrative and information in global politics. To analyze Nye's power

theory, one would need to consider his more recent writings and speeches, which might offer insights into how he views the changing landscape of power in the 21st century.

Concerning complex interdependence, Nye's collaboration with Robert O. Keohane in the 1970s laid the groundwork for this theory. Complex interdependence challenges traditional realist assumptions, emphasizing the multiplicity of channels through which states interact and the importance of non-military forms of power. To analyze Nye's contributions to complex interdependence, one should delve into his early works, particularly "Power and Interdependence" (1977).

Despite its significant contributions, complex interdependence has not been without criticism. Some scholars argue that it downplays the enduring role of power and the persistence of conflict in international relations. Critics also point out that not all interactions between states are necessarily cooperative, and power disparities still exist, influencing the outcomes of negotiations and interactions.

China's economic diplomacy in Kenya, particularly through infrastructure development projects like the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), has attracted scrutiny and critique from various scholars. These critiques offer valuable insights into the complexities and potential challenges associated with China's engagement in African countries.

One notable critic is Deborah Bräutigam, whose book "The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa" (2009) provides a critical examination of China's economic activities in Africa, including infrastructure investments. Bräutigam's work questions the commonly held narratives surrounding China's engagement in Africa, emphasizing

the need for a nuanced understanding of the motivations, impacts, and implications of Chinese investments.

Luke Patey, in his book "How China Loses: The Pushback against Chinese Global Ambitions" (2019), presents a critical perspective on China's global engagements, including its economic diplomacy in Africa. Patey explores the challenges faced by African nations in ensuring that Chinese investments contribute to sustainable development and do not result in debt dependency or other adverse consequences.

Howard W. French, in "China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa" (2014), critically examines China's expanding presence in Africa. While not solely focused on infrastructure projects, French's work sheds light on the broader implications of China's economic activities on the continent, including potential social and cultural impacts.

These critics, spanning different years and works, collectively raise concerns about the potential pitfalls of China's economic diplomacy in Kenya and Africa more broadly. Common themes in their critiques include issues related to transparency, environmental sustainability, labor practices, and the broader socio-economic impacts of large-scale infrastructure projects.

Despite these critiques, it's essential to note that opinions on China's economic engagement in Africa are diverse, and scholars like Deborah Bräutigam also acknowledge the positive aspects of Chinese investments, such as infrastructure development and job creation. The nuances in these critiques contribute to a more

comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics involved in China's economic diplomacy in Kenya and its implications for both China and African nations.

In conclusion, scholars such as Deborah Bräutigam, Luke Patey, and Howard W. French have provided critical perspectives on China's economic diplomacy in Kenya, offering insights into potential challenges and implications. By examining their works and the years of publication, we can trace the evolution of these critiques and gain a deeper understanding of the ongoing debates surrounding China's role in African infrastructure development.

China's economic diplomacy, particularly in the context of infrastructure development in Kenya, has been a subject of significant academic inquiry. Scholars have examined the motivations, implications, and consequences of China's involvement in Kenya's infrastructure projects, providing a nuanced understanding of this complex relationship.

One key aspect scholars have explored is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China's ambitious global infrastructure development strategy. The BRI has been a focal point in Chinese economic diplomacy, and its impact on Kenya has drawn scholarly attention. Deborah Bräutigam, in her book "The Dragon's Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa" (2009), provides insights into China's infrastructure investments in Africa, including Kenya, highlighting both the opportunities and challenges associated with these projects.

China's economic engagement in Kenya is often seen as a manifestation of its broader strategy to secure access to resources, markets, and geopolitical influence. Howard W.

French's work, particularly "China's Second Continent: How a Million Migrants Are Building a New Empire in Africa" (2014), delves into China's expanding presence in Africa and explores how economic engagements, including infrastructure development, serve its strategic interests on the continent.

In the case of Kenya, specific infrastructure projects such as the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) have been a focal point. Focusing on the SGR, Winnie Mitullah and Giles Mohan, in their article "Chinese Migrants and the Geopolitics of Everyday Life in Zambia: Reviewing Chinese Investments in Labour, Land and Health" (2017), offer insights into the social and economic impacts of Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa, shedding light on how these projects affect local communities.

Scholars have also examined the economic and geopolitical implications of China's economic diplomacy in Kenya. Deborah Brautigam's more recent work, "Will Africa Feed China?" (2015), explores China's quest for food security in Africa, a dimension that intersects with its broader economic engagement, including infrastructure development.

Furthermore, scholars like Joshua Eisenman and Joshua Kurlantzick, in their article "China Steps Out: Beijing's Major Power Engagement with the Developing World" (2009), analyze China's global strategy, shedding light on how economic diplomacy, including infrastructure development, fits into China's vision of reshaping global power dynamics.

While much of the literature emphasizes the opportunities created by Chinese investments in infrastructure, scholars like Luke Patey, in "How China Loses: The Pushback against Chinese Global Ambitions" (2019), provide a critical perspective. Patey explores how African nations, including Kenya, navigate their relationships with China and the challenges they face in ensuring that Chinese investments contribute to sustainable development.

In conclusion, scholars have offered a rich tapestry of insights into China's economic diplomacy in Kenya, particularly in the realm of infrastructure development. From the Belt and Road Initiative to specific projects like the Standard Gauge Railway, the academic literature provides a nuanced understanding of the motivations, impacts, and challenges associated with China's economic engagements in Kenya. By examining the works of these scholars across various years, one can trace the evolving dynamics of China's economic diplomacy and its implications for Kenya and the broader African continent

2.5 Conceptual Model

This study developed an evaluative conceptual model to explain the interactions between the variables contained herein. The model interwove the three theories and developed a connecting framework which revealed the constructs and explanations that addressed the objectives of this study. The three theories to a large extent, linked to the key variables of this study. Each theory built the momentum necessary in constructing the conceptual model that systematically explained the characteristics associated with key variables contained in this study. Power theory complemented modernization theory as dependency theory complementing the two theories in explaining the

workings of economic diplomacy, how and why it is constructed, projected and used to support the interests of states.

Whereas the soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others, without the use of force, coercion or violence, but through intangible assets such as skills, technology, culture, political values, institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority (Nye 2005). It will fall short of providing the basis for doing so. Modernization theory will fill up that gap. According to modernization theorists, traditional societies/states are deemed to have little or no contact with advanced societies/states. Traditional societies/states, therefore, have no models of success to emulate. Kenya can therefore, basing on this theory, achieve infrastructural development out of its bilateral relations with china a more developed state.

Additionally, structural factors come into play in determining economic diplomacy of a state. This is influenced by global position of a particular state. Dependency theory argue that the world system divides the world into core, semi-periphery, and periphery nations. The key characteristics of the core nations are that they are economically diversified, wealthy and powerful (economically and militarily), have strong central governments, controlling extensive bureaucracies and powerful militaries, have more complex and stronger state institutions that help manage economic affairs internally and externally, are highly industrialized (produce manufactured goods rather than raw materials for export), and have significant means of influence over semi and peripheral nations.

To this extent there is an empirical connection between the dependency and modernization theories. Dependency theory argues that the world system divides the world into core, semi-periphery, and periphery nations. The key characteristics of the core nations are that they are economically diversified, wealthy and powerful while modernization theorists believe that traditional societies/states are deemed to have little or no contact with advanced societies/states. Traditional societies/states, therefore, need models of advanced nations which are the core nations according to dependency theorists who are a success to be emulated. Kenya can therefore, basing on these two theories, achieve infrastructural development out of its bilateral relations with china through Chinese economic diplomacy which is a more developed state than Kenya.

This study, therefore, will use the three theories because of their relevance to the variables contained herein where economic diplomacy as the independent variable will affect infrastructural development as a dependent variable with Kenya's business environment. Liberalization, privatization, good governance and public goods and services act as the intervening variables. The conceptual model therefore, demonstrates the nexus between independent and dependent variable. The outcome of the interaction between independent and dependent variables are influenced by the intervening variables. For instance, good governance during the construction of the SGR by the Chinese firms, led to the acquisitions of values, skills and technology by Chinese construction firms' workers. This is illustrated in figure 2.1.




Figure 2. 1 Conceptual model showing relationship between independent variable and dependent variable plus the intervening variables.

Source: Research (2023)

Figure 2.1, summarizes how the variables affect each other. Chinese economic diplomacy which is the independent variable with its factors: Influence of Mutual principle in development of infrastructure, transfer of skills & technology and Opportunities / Challenges affects the dependent variable which is Infrastructural Development in Kenya with its factors: KUTRH, SGR, Lamu sea port and Moi Stadium Kasarani. This implies that it's through Chinese economic diplomacy that these

infrastructural projects were constructed as the intervening variable which is Kenya's business environment with its factors: liberalization, privatization, good governance Public goods and services try to influence. In this circumstance, the intervening variables need to be controlled not to interfere with the relationship between independent variable and the dependent variable if need be.

2. 6 Summary of literature review and gap identification

This study filled gaps in knowledge by investigating how Chinese economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963. From the literature reviewed, in the first objective which examined the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya:

China-Africa relations had entered a new stage of stable, sound and all-round development. Mutually beneficial cooperation and common development had become the new trend of China-Africa relations.

Chinese State Council (2014) observes that instead of viewing foreign aid as a donor-to-recipient relationship, China places more emphasis on the benefits of cooperative and collective economic development. It views economic diplomacy as mutual help among developing countries, focuses on achieving practical results, emphasizes the needs of and benefits for the recipient countries, especially the latter's capacity for independent development, and promotes bilateral relations through economic and technological cooperation. Indeed, China's 2021 white paper altogether avoids terms such as 'donor' to describe its own role, and uses the term 'development cooperation' rather than 'foreign aid' in the title.

Zhang (2017) in their view noted that during his visit to Ghana in January 1964, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai enunciated the Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance, with ‘equality and mutual benefit’ and ‘never attaching any conditions’ as the core principles.

Zhang (2017) adds that a sharp drop in the proportion of China’s economic aid to Africa, sports aid is no longer entirely upon request of the recipient countries completely gratuitous aid, but starting from the reality of China, should take the input and output, aid request, to mutual benefit, diversity, common improve adjustment, autonomy and dedication have a corresponding increase in African countries, The two sides have turned to mutually beneficial and win-win cooperation with China through China’s unilateral grant assistance.

Wei (2011) went ahead to assert that in 2015, at the Johannesburg Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), China-Africa cooperative relations were further expanded and deepened, and the upgrading of the comprehensive Strategic and cooperative partnership marked a new historical period of China-Africa cooperation. At this stage, Chinese African stadiums have expanded further, the present sports resources between China and the recipient two-way flow, China-Africa sports exchange on mutual benefit and cooperation diversity characteristics (China, in the form of gift giving, or provide low-interest loans, or to build, together with the host country or other cooperation mode).

Zezeza (2008) states that having been jump-started by Deng Xiaoping's southern fourth in 1992 foreign aid reform regained momentum the 1990s. In 1995, two vice premiers Zhu Rongji and Li Langing, travelled to Africa to sell China's new foreign approaches. Instead of treating foreign aid as purely a political task, or providing only one-way free aid, China now emphasized the economic aspect of foreign aid and used it to promote mutual benefits and trade.

Ngau (2011) observes that The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China views the year 2010 as friendly and when cooperative relationship of long-term stability and mutual benefit between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of Kenya enjoyed further and in-depth growth.

Ngau (2011) summarizes the situation by stating that Solidarity and mutual assistance between China and Africa have not only consolidated Africa's independent political status, but also enhanced Africa's sustainable development capacity, presenting a magnificent picture of China-Africa friendship. For instance, Under the framework of FOCAC, China-Rwanda cooperation is a manifestation of mutual understanding and mutual support, and sets a fine example of South-South cooperation.

Zezeza (2008) notes that proponents of China-Africa relations see African interests as driven by the imperatives of historical solidarity rooted in the Bandung Conference of 1955. At the conference mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in domestic affairs of others, equality and mutual benefits were outlined as the Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Since then, these

principles especially on non-interference and mutual benefits have continued to dominate Chinese rhetoric around financial support.

This study therefore examined the motivation behind Chinese funding infrastructural projects in Kenya and the influence of Chinese principle of mutual development in infrastructural development in Kenya.

In the second objective which assessed the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values, skills and technology in infrastructural development in Kenya:

China's engagement in Africa has also been controversial according to Haacker (2001) the media, pundits, and policymakers often question whether the presence of Chinese enterprises in Africa contributes to knowledge transfer to host countries, and skill development of local employees. Some claim that by relying on the import of a large number of foreign workers from China, Chinese enterprises contribute little to local skill development and knowledge transfer in Africa.

However, other researchers Zeleza (2008) suggest that such claims may not be supported by empirical evidence. Zeleza (2008) show that formally owned Chinese enterprises across Africa engage in strong local hiring practices, and that Chinese expatriates in Africa are likely to be skilled workers that provide training to their local counterparts. Other qualitative studies attempt to examine how Chinese enterprises contribute to technical transfer and skill development in African countries, and find some positive evidence of technology and skill transfer from China's engagement in Africa.

Monson (2011) observes that China's presence in Africa's construction sector is not a new phenomenon. For instance, Tanzania railway which linked landlocked Zambia with the Tanzanian coast involved more than 50,000 Chinese personnel, about 20% of whom offered training and skill transfer to an estimated 60,000 African workers that participated directly in railway construction.

Haacker (2001) adds that in the case of Ghana, two types of training are observed in the construction sector: short-term general training, and long-term specific training. Short-term general training is typically related to occupational safety, health, and environmental and social awareness; while long-term specific training is often related to the skill set required by a specific profession, such as stone masonry, welding, plumbing, digital mapping, and surveying. Workers are normally assigned a supervisor who trains them while working.

(2015 Labour Force Report: Ghana) show that short-term general training and long-term specific training ensure that new and improved skills are transferred to local employees. Hence, it is possible to see manual workers or unskilled laborers acquire specific and complicated skills that increase their competencies and competitiveness within the construction sector.

Li (2017) in Technology transfer in China–Africa relations found out that Technological skill transfer also was a key component in the construction of the SGR. CRBC established training, in Kenya, in railway operation and management and railway engineering. CRBC also established an advanced training program in China for

some 18,000 Kenyans. Under the management of China's Ministry of Commerce, high performing trainees were offered opportunities to travel to China for further studies.

Ngau (2011) asserts that knowledge and ideas can also spill over to local firms through imitation of foreign firms, acquisition of new machinery, and subcontracting. Backward linkages (using inputs produced in the host country) and forward linkages (producing input for use in the host country's production processes) are also vehicles for knowledge transfers. However, knowledge transfer is not given if foreign firms have limited contact or connection with the local environment (for instance, if they use only imported inputs and hire only foreign workers), their impact on host countries will likely be limited. China partly owes its recent success to the degree to which it has managed to obtain these skills and technology transfers from inward foreign investment.

Ngau (2011) further reveals that in Madagascar, research showed that Chinese firms train workers on the job for a period ranging from a few days to three months. Some firms pair new workers with more experienced colleagues, who assist them in performing their tasks until they are able to continue unaided. Chinese firms in Kenya also train their workers on the job, often during the probation period. The training is usually conducted by experienced Chinese or local workers, but there is a general preference to retain the Chinese workers for as little as possible, as they are costlier than their local counterparts.

According to Monson (2011) technology transfer is another important aspect of knowledge diffusion from foreign firms to host countries, either in the form of machinery, equipment, production processes, or organizational processes and models (Examples of this type of transfer by Chinese firms are found in all three case studies. In Zambia, CAC has contributed to technology improvements and upgrading. Chinese firms also brought new biotechnology to Madagascar, It has already been shown how CAC adapted Cargill's out grower model for its cotton production in Zambia. In Kenya, Yishan Agriculture employs Chinese agro-technicians to develop new technologies that are more suitable to the local environment, then train farmers in these technologies and supervise them in their adoption.

Monson (2011) notes that linkages between Chinese and domestic firms can also result in skills and technology transfer. Working to provide input for, or to use input provided by Chinese firms, African firms can learn new production and management skills, and increase their productivity.

Unfortunately, according to Monson (2013) technical training given by the Chinese on operating the Tan-Zam railway was not sufficient, and the railway's performance deteriorated under local operation. Chinese workers were re-stationed in the 1980s, and the railway started to become profitable. It raises the question if it was in fact not the Zambians but the Chinese who have benefitted from this railway construction. This study therefore assessed if Kenyan workers in the Chinese construction firms acquired skills from those firms, whether the acquisition of the skills is beneficial to Kenyan

Economy and assess whether Kenya still relies on the west (native donors) for funding of other development agenda in Kenya.

The third objective evaluated the opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya:

Chege (2008) notes that the development of the MSR links the Kenyan port of Mombasa with those in Europe, the Middle East and the Asia Pacific region. As remarked by Professor Michael Chege, a Senior Adviser at Kenya's Ministry of Planning and Devolution, "The new maritime silk road will be a game changer for Kenya as we explore opportunities in the new economic hubs like China and the gulf."

Chege (2008) further observes that the major focus of Chinese investment is infrastructure construction, especially on networks of railways, highways and regional aviation. Other investment areas include the energy sector and manufacturing industry. Evidently, such investments and projects can both help realize the BRI and contribute to the revitalization and development of Africa. James Ndegwa, Deputy CEO of Kenya National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, also observes that "Kenya seeks to position itself as the gateway to east and central Africa while at the same time position itself as a point of exit for all products destined to Asia and Europe through port of Mombasa;" and thus "Kenya will also be a major beneficiary of the silk road strategy through LAPSSET project."

As mentioned previously. The MSR also involves ports along the eastern coast of Africa, Horn of Africa and North Africa. Within Africa, benefits of the MSR can be

seen in the transport and other infrastructure connectivity built by the Chinese, particularly in east Africa. For example, Kenya and Djibouti have had infrastructure projects carried out by Chinese companies, heavily financed by China EXIM Bank, including the US\$3.8billion standard gauge railway (SGR) from Mombasa to Nairobi.

Jean-Marc (2017) states that the maritime route also involves ports along the eastern coast of Africa, Horn of Africa and North Africa. With the initiative, a number of routes for transferring goods to Africa and within Africa are opening up. For instance, the Gwadar port in Pakistan, a maritime pivot point, has opened a new trade route for exporting goods to the Middle East and Africa. Now, the MSR is poised to become a route linking Europe, Asia and Africa through the sea, with two ports in Kenya Mombasa and Lamu as important links to expand trade and connectivity with the African continent.

Undoubtedly, the MSR will increase the volume of exports and jobs as well as foster cultural and people-to-people exchange, creating a vast interconnected economic zone from the rapidly developing Asia Pacific region to the eastern coast of Africa. It offers an opportunity for the African and Chinese people to rediscover each other after over 600 years of engagement. There is great potential and hope for revived trade and investment, as well as the promotion of technology transfer and human interaction to new levels. Besides, the MSR will help reinforce the existing bilateral consultation mechanisms and inter-governmental links, which, in turn, will contribute to ever closer cooperation between China and African countries in different fields.

Naím (2018) asserts that starting construction of the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR in December 2014, it was finished eighteen months ahead of schedule in May 2017 as well as the ‘Tan-Zam Railway’, connecting Zambia to the sea at the Tanzanian coast, was a Chinese construction project in the 1960s that was delivered two years ahead of schedule, which one of the reasons why the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR has been compared to the Tan-Zam Railway.

Xinhua News, December 11(2013) observes that since declaration of independence in 1963, Kenya has been one of the most stable countries and economic bases in Africa, and has thus become an important window and bridge for the outside world to access trade, investment, and technological cooperation with Africa.

In recent years, People’s Daily, March 2 (2015) observes Chinese enterprises have been increasingly engaged in infrastructure building, trade, manufacturing, services and other sectors; and they are working hard to integrate into the local market. Overallly, they actively uphold their social responsibilities during business operations in Africa, and thus have earned much community trust and helped create a favorable local business environment. Nevertheless, there is still frequent violation of local workers’ rights as well as disregard of their welfare by some Chinese construction companies. As a result, local governments have issued stronger legal provisions for the protection of Kenyan workers.

People’s Daily, March 2(2015) further adds that with a GDP of US\$63.4 billion and a population of 46 million as of 2015, Kenya is a natural point of entry for the MSR into

Africa from Asia. Among the core projects are upgrading of the Mombasa Port, building of a new ultra-modern port in Lamu, and building of a new standard gauge railway line linking Mombasa port, the capital Nairobi, and the land-locked neighboring countries.

According to Naím (2018) as China increases its role in international development cooperation, its practices in economic diplomacy attract more attention and challenges.

According to Al Mariam (2017) while there are more opportunities for the deepening of the China-Africa relationship as the MSR proceeds, new challenges are emerging for both sides on their way to closer exchange and cooperation. Behind China's trillion-dollar attempt to build a modern Silk Road is a lending program of unprecedented breadth, one that will not only help build ports, roads and rail links, but could also cause many problems to local banks and national economic programs.

In Otieno (2021)'s view the challenge experienced at Chinese lending practices is that, by providing alternative sources of finance to authoritarian regimes, China is undermining efforts by traditional donor countries and organizations that require democratic reform and good governance as conditions of receiving aid.

Olander (2021) states that China has supplied diplomatic and financial support to governments in Ethiopia, Sudan and Zimbabwe that have been denounced by the international community for their violation of human rights, suppression of ethnic minorities, and refusal to transition to democratic rule and responsible governance.

Yuan *et al*, (2021) states that indeed, China also recognizes the importance of good governance, political stability and sustained economic growth for Chinese foreign aid and, more critically, for commercial loans and Chinese business interests since corruption and instability could place them at risk. Transparency and accountability are long-standing issues in China's foreign aid. According to Grimm *et al*, (2011), although China has attempted to address criticisms related to transparency by releasing white papers with data presentation, these are aggregate figures, granular project-level detail is still missing. Non-conditionality is one of the guiding principles of South-South cooperation according to Rich (2004) the framework for China's foreign aid, however, it often ties its development finance to goods and services procured from China.

Brautigam (2020) observes that another controversy related to China's growing role in Africa lending is the 'debt trap', where China has been accused of providing finance to questionable projects that are beyond the recipient country's repayment capacity. Indeed, it has been pointed out that commercial loans constitute ever larger portions of China's development finance. Brautigam (2020) adds that non-concessional loans tend to come with higher interest rates than concessional loans, as commercial banks seek to insure against risks and look for higher returns for their investments. Whether China deliberately gets these countries into debt remains debatable. With less conditionality attached Malik *et al*, (2021) say that Chinese foreign aid and commercial lending have immediately begun to meet some of Africa's urgent infrastructure needs while imposing significant financial, if not debt, burdens on recipients. This study therefore evaluated the opportunities and challenges that emanate from Chinese economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructure development in Kenya.

Having analyzed the studies on the first objective which examined the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya, the second objective which assessed the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of skills and technology in infrastructural development in Kenya and the third objective evaluated the opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya, This study generally investigated how Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963.

2.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter has discussed the background of Chinese economic diplomacy, China in Africa, its effect in relation with other global actors, Kenya - China bilateral diplomatic relations since 1963, infrastructural projects funded by China in Kenya, Socio - economic impact of Chinese Principle of transfer of values, skills and technology in infrastructural development in Kenya, the challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructural development in Kenya, Conceptual framework, conceptual framework model,. The next chapter will discuss the Research Methodology of the study.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter will explain the research design, study area, the study population, sampling procedure, sample size, data collection procedure, data collection instruments, validity and reliability, data analysis and presentation, limitation of the study, ethical consideration and chapter summary.

3.1 Research Design

This study adopted a historical and descriptive survey research design. This is a method of collecting information by interviewing and administering questionnaires to a sample of individuals. It is used when collecting information about people's attitudes, opinions, habits or any of the variety of education or social issues. Hence it provided a logical account of the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in infrastructure development in Kenya, socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of skills and technology to infrastructural development in Kenya as well as the opportunities/challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructural development in Kenya.

Table 3. 1: Selection of Research Designs

S/No.	Specific Objective	Research Design	Reasons
1.	Examine the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya.	Historical design	It is used when collecting information about people's attitudes, opinions, habits or any of the variety of education or social issues which will provide a logical account of the issues concerned.
2.	Assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values , skill and technology through infrastructural development in Kenya	Descriptive Survey design	Is where data is collected from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions. It also blends both qualitative and quantitative data to give relevant and accurate information
3.	Establish opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructural development in Kenya	Descriptive Survey design	Is where data is collected from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions. It also blends both qualitative and quantitative data to give relevant and accurate information

Source: Researcher (2023)

According to Kothari (2004), survey research design enabled the researcher to obtain insight into relationships between variables and new ideas that are related to the

problem. He adds that for a design of this nature, literate people who are competent and can contribute new ideas may be purposively selected as a source of data to ensure a representation of different types of experiences. Hence, the choice of the following institutions which helped in data collection: - The relevant state corporations, relevant Chinese construction firms and institutions representing Chinese in Kenya. Figures, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4

Therefore, this type of research design, allowed the researcher to collect people's opinions about whether China's economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya. This eventually, allowed the researcher to collect quantitative and qualitative data that was analyzed. It also gave room for wider representation of both key informants comprising of senior officers in the 3 strata and the rest of the respondents from the same 3 strata.

3.2 Study Area

The study area for this thesis is Kenya and specific study locations are Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu counties, where China Funded Infrastructural projects are found. Kenya is located in Eastern part of Africa. It neighbors are Sudan and South Sudan (North West) Ethiopia (North), Somalia (North East), Indian Ocean (East), Tanzania (South) and Uganda to the (West). It occupies 582,650sqkm and is situated on the equator at longitude 40 degrees East of the prime meridian (Keskinen 2007). Targeted institutions by the researcher are situated in Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu counties. China on the other hand is found in Asian continent. It is situated between 50 degrees North and 30 degrees North of the equator and at a longitude of 80 degrees East and 130 degrees East of the prime meridian (Keskinen 2007). This study will take place in Kenya but

specifically in Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu counties since the following China funded infrastructural projects: The Thika Super Highway, Moi International Sports Centre-Kasarani, Kenyatta University Referral Hospital, Standard Gauge Railway and Lamu Port which will be purposively selected are found or passes mainly within these counties.

3.2.1 Nairobi County

Nairobi county is the capital and largest city of Kenya. The name comes from the Maasai phrase *Enkare Nairobi*, which translates to ‘place of cool waters’, a reference to the Nairobi River which flows through the city. The city proper has a population of 4,397,073 as per the 2019 census, while the metropolitan area has a population of 9,354,580 (KNBS, 2019). The city is situated at 1°09’S 36°39’E and 1°27’S 37°06’E and occupies 696 square kilometres (270 sq mi). Nairobi is situated between the cities of Kampala and Mombasa. As Nairobi is adjacent to the eastern edge of the Rift Valley, minor earthquakes and tremors occasionally occur. The Ngong Hills, located to the west of the city, are the most prominent geographical feature of this county. Mount Kenya is situated north and Mount Kilimanjaro is towards the south- The Nairobi River and its tributaries traverse through the Nairobi County and joins the larger River Athi on the eastern edge of the county.

Climatically, this county has a subtropical highland climate. At 1,795 metres (5,889 ft) above sea level, evenings may be cool, especially in the June/July season, when the temperature can drop to 9 °C (48 °F). The sunniest and warmest part of the year is from December to March, when temperatures average in the mid-twenties Celsius during the day. The mean maximum temperature for this period is 24 °C (75 °F) east (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 7th July,2015) There are rainy seasons, but

rainfall can be moderate. The cloudiest part of the year is just after the first rainy season, when, until September, conditions are usually overcast with drizzle. As this county is situated close to the equator, the differences between the seasons are minimal. The seasons are referred to as the wet season and dry season. The timing of sunrise and sunset varies little throughout the year for the same reason (Nairobi, Kenya-Image of the Week-Earth watching 20th May 2020)

Administratively, Nairobi County has 17 constituencies. The new Mombasa-Nairobi Standard Gauge Railway connects the port city of Mombasa and Nairobi. The new railway line has virtually replaced the old metre-gauge railway. The Nairobi Terminus is located at Syokimau, some 20 km from the city centre. Passengers travelling from Mombasa are transferred the short distance into the CBD with the metre-gauge trains.

Economically, this county Hosts Several of Africa's largest companies which are headquartered in this county. Safaricom, the largest company in Kenya by assets and profitability is headquartered in the city of Nairobi, KenGen, which is the largest African stock outside South Africa, is based in the city. Kenya Airways, Africa's fourth largest airline, uses Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport as a hub. Equally, several foreign companies have factories based in and around the city. These include Goodyear, General Motors, Toyota Motors, and Coca-Cola. Nairobi has a large tourist industry, being both a tourist destination and a transport hub (Kenya tackles multi-modal upgrades to remain E.A Hub 21st May 2017)

3.2.2 Kiambu County

Kiambu is a county in the former Central Province of Kenya. Its capital is Kiambu and its largest town is Thika. Kiambu County borders Nairobi and Kajiado Counties to the South, Machakos to the East, Murang'a to the North and North East, Nyandarua to the North West, and Nakuru to the West and has a population of 2,417,735 (KNBS, 2019). The county is 40% rural and 60% urban owing to Nairobi's consistent growth northwards. The Kikuyu are the dominant ethnic group in the county.

Climatically, the county has an average annual rainfall of 1,200 millimetres (47 in) and mean temperature of 26 °C (79 °F) with temperatures as low as 7 °C (45 °F) in the upper highlands areas of Limuru. The long rains start in mid-March and run to May, and cold runs between July and August (Kiambu CIDP 2018-2022). According to the 2019 census, there is a total population of 2,417,735 in the county: 1,187,146 males, 1,230,454 females, and 135 intersex persons. There are 796,241 households with an average household size of 3.0 persons per household and a population density of 952 people/km² (KNBS 2019).

Administratively, the county is divided into 12 sub-counties, 60 county assembly wards, 97 locations and 257 sub-locations. The County is covered by 2,049 kilometers (1,273 mi) of road networks. Of this, 459 kilometers (285 mi) is covered by earth surface, 1,075.8 kilometers (668.5 mi) is marram surface, and 515 kilometers (320 mi) is covered by bitumen (Kiambu CIDP 2018-2022).

3.2.3 Lamu County

Lamu county is located in the Northern Coast of Kenya and is one of the Six Coastal Counties in Kenya. It borders Tana River County in the southwest, Garissa County to the north, Republic of Somalia to the northeast and the Indian Ocean to the South. It lies 1° 40' and 2° 30' south and longitude 40° 15' and 40° 38' east. The county has a land surface of 6,273.1 km that include the mainland and over 65 islands that form the Lamu Archipelago. The total length of the coastline is 130 km while land water mass area stands at 308 km (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 7th July 2015).

Administratively, the county has 2 constituencies namely Lamu West and Lamu East. There are 10 wards, 23 locations, and 38 sub-locations. The main economic activities in the county include crop production, livestock production, fisheries, tourism and mining, most notably quarrying. Among the challenges facing Lamu is population growth owing to migration into Lamu from other parts of the country, fuelled partly by the anticipated opportunities accruing from the Lamu Port South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor. Other challenges include landlessness and poor land management, insufficient social services such as healthcare and education, inadequate supply of piped and fresh water, under-developed infrastructure, and food insecurity. There are extensive mangrove forests in the area. The county is made of cosmopolitan population with a total population of 143,920 of which 76,103 are males 67,813 females and 4 intersex persons. There are 37,963 households with an average household size of 3.7 persons per household and a population density 23 people per square kilometer (KNBS 2019). The LAPSSET project is expected to attract a huge migrant population estimated to be over one million. This will certainly overstretch the county's social

services necessitating commensurate development planning for adequate service provision (LAPSSET Corridor Development Authority 2016).




Figure 3. 1: Study Area Nairobi County

Source: Researcher, (2023)




Figure 3. 2: Study Area Kiambu County

Source: Researcher, (2023)




Figure 3. 3: Study Area Lamu County

Source: Researcher, (2023)

3.3 Target Population

The term 'population' refers to the total number of items about which information is desired (Kothari 2004). Kombo and Tromp (2006) define population as a group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are taken for measurement. Mugenda and Mugenda (1999) refer to population as the entire group of individuals, events or objects having common observable characteristics.

The study population was a population within Kenya. The study population was drawn from respondents from the following institutions that deal with Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructure development in Kenya. The research literature review revealed that there are 13 relevant state corporations in Kenya with 2 senior officers each hence 26 senior officers, 4 Chinese Firms Contracted to develop infrastructure in Kenya with 1 senior officer each hence 4 senior officers and 50 workers in each site totaling to 117 and 3 relevant institutions representing China in Kenya with 1 senior officer each hence 3 senior officers. So target population was 13 plus 4 plus 3 is equal to 20 institutions together with 26 senior officers plus 150 workers totaling to 176 target population.

3.4 Sampling Techniques

The researcher employed purposive, stratified and simple random sampling techniques to select the institutions and respondents for the study.

3.5 Sample Size

Literature review revealed that there are 13 relevant state corporation in Kenya with 2 senior officers each and 10 of them with 20 senior officers were more involved in Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructure development in Kenya. Equally there

were 4 relevant Chinese construction firms with 1 senior officer each and 3 of them with 3 senior officers more involved as well as 3 relevant institutions representing Chinese in Kenya with 3 senior officers and only 2 of them with 2 senior officers more involved. All the 20 senior officers in the 10 relevant state corporations, the 3 senior officers in the relevant Chinese construction firms and the 2 senior officers in relevant institutions representing Chinese in Kenya were selected according to recommendations by Stutely's (2003) and Kathuria (1999) who recommends that in a descriptive survey studies with sub-groups should have at least 40 respondents to allow for statistical analysis and for those with less than 30 respondents the researcher will take all of them.

Therefore, 10 state corporations in Kenya with 20 senior officers plus 3 Chinese construction firms 3 senior plus 2 institutions representing China in Kenya with 2 senior officers totaling to 20 institutions dealing in Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructure development in Kenya and 26 senior officers Hence, the sampling frame for institutions was 10 plus 3 plus 2 is equal to 20 institutions as target population for the institutions.

Out of the 20 institutions, the following 15 institutions were purposively sampled as follows: - 10 state corporations in Kenya with 20 senior officers which are more involved; Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The National Treasury, Kenya Investment Authority, Kenya National Chambers of Commerce, Kenya Bureau of statistics, Ministry of Health, NEMA, Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Spots Culture and Heritage, 3 Relevant Chinese construction Firms in Kenya with 3 senior officers and 39 workers times 3 institutions

brings 117workers ; Synohydro, COVEC and China Wu Yi and 2 Institutions Representing China in Kenya 2senior officers ; Chinese Embassy and Confucian Institute. Hence, samples of the study were as follows: - 15institutions and 20 plus 3plus 3 is equal to 26senior officers (Key informants plus 117workers (respondents) totaling to 26key informants plus 117 respondents totaling to 143 sample size

3.6 Stratified Sampling

After obtaining a list of specific institutions engaged in Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructural development in Kenya. Stratified sampling was used to and got 3 strata as follows: N1 relevant state corporations in Kenya, N2 Chinese Firms contracted to develop infrastructure in Kenya and N3 Institutions Representing China in Kenya. These institutions were stratified into 3major strata. Figure 3.1.

Table 3. 2: Stratified Sampling Distribution of Institution

Strata	Type of institution	Target No of Institutions	No of Selected Institutions	% from ideal No. of Institutions in the strata
N1	Relevant State Corporation In Kenya	13	10	76%
N2	Chinese Firms Contracted to Develop Infrastructure in Selected Counties	4	3	80%
N3	Institutions Representing China in Kenya (Chinese Embassy, Confucian Institutes At Nairobi and Kenyatta Universities)	3	2	67%
GRAND TOTAL		20	15	75%

Source: Researcher (2023)

Fifteen (15) institutions out of the 20 representing (75%) of the institution were selected using purposive sampling. This is an acceptable practice as recommended by Kothari (2011), Albright et al (2003), Gupta (2002) and Saunders et al (2012). According to these authors, if there is (45%) of a sample in a particular category then one will be (95%) sure that the estimate for the total population within the same category will be (45%) plus or minus the margin of error. The author therefore chose on 15 institutions which is (75%) far above (45%) to increase on the confidence level.

To obtain the sample sizes for each stratum, the researcher used the method of proportional allocation as provided by Kothari (2004). Under this method the sizes of the samples from different strata are kept proportional to the sizes of the strata. Thus the formulae for getting the sample size (n) for each stratum is as follows:

$n = P/Nn$. Where P= proportion of population included in stratum

N= Total population size

n = what the researcher wants as a total sample size to be drawn from the total population of 15 institutions out of 20 institutions was got as follows: -

For the first strata (N 1) the sample size was:

$P_1 = 13/20 = 0.65 \times 15$; hence $N_1 = 10$ institutions

For the second strata (N2) the sample size was calculated as follows:

$P_2 = 4/20 = 0.2 \times 15$; hence $N_2 = 3$ institutions

For the third strata (N3) the sample size was calculated as follows:

$P_3 = 3/20 = 2.25 \times 15$; hence $N_3 = 2$ institutions.

Hence, $n = N_1(10) + N_2(3) + N_3(2) = 15$ institutions

3.7 Purposive Sampling

The researcher first used purposive sampling to select relevant institutions and informants for the study. A sub-population of Directors, deputy directors and assistant directors from relevant state corporations together with senior officers from Chinese construction firms in Kenya and institutions representing Chinese in Kenya were also purposively selected. 2 senior officers from each of the 10 relevant state corporations

totaling to 20 key informants, 2 senior officers from the 2 institutions representing China in Kenya totaling to 4 key informants and 1 senior officer from each of the 3 relevant Chinese construction firms in Kenya.

This decision was guided by recommendations by Neuman (2014) and Sandera *et al*, (2012) who recommended that purposive sampling is preferred when one is to select cases that are particularly informative. Given that there are specific institutions and individuals engaged in Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructural development in Kenya, this type of sampling ensured that more accurate information from key informants and respondents was collected.

Stutely (2003) and Kathuria (1999) on the other hand recommends that where the population in the category is less than 40 and the researcher wishes to undertake analysis at this level, the researcher should collect data from all cases in that category. This recommendation informed the choice of all the two senior officers as key informants in each category totaling to 20key informants from state corporations, 3 from institutions representing China in Kenya and 3 from relevant Chinese firms in Kenya totaling to 26key informants. To get unbiased and representative enough respondents, the researcher purposively sampled individuals as shown in Table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4

Table 3. 3: Purposive Sampling Distribution of Key Informants from relevant State Corporations in Kenya

No.	Institution	Target Population	Sample size for research
1	Ministry of Transport and infrastructural development	2 relevant Senior officers in charge of the infrastructure projects (SGR, KUTRRH, Moi sports center lamu port)	2
2	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade	2 Senior relevant officers	2
3	Kenya Bureau of Standard	2 senior officers	2
4	National Treasury	2 Senior relevant officers	2
5	Ministry of Health	2 Seniors relevant officers	2
6	Kenya National Chambers of Commerce and Industry	2 Senior relevant officers	2
7	Ministry of sports, culture and Heritage	2 Senior relevant officer	2
8	Ministry of Interior	2 senior relevant officers	2
9	NEMA	2 senior relevant officers	2
10	Kenya Investment Authority	2 senior relevant officers	2
	Total	20	20

(100% of Respondents from Target Population)

Source: Researcher (2023)

3.8 Simple Random Sampling

A-sub-population composed of workers and a Chinese senior officer of the firms from each Chinese firm was obtained through simple random sampling. Simple random sampling is best for populations that are accurate and easily available like workers and senior officers of the firms for this study's case (Tucker *et, al* 2008). A sample site visits to a Chinese firm along Kisumu-Kakamega road revealed that there are usually at least 50 workers in most site at a given time including 1 senior officer as incharge. It is on this basis that the researcher concluded that an accurate list of workers can easily be accessed for this method of sampling. Chinese firms from different geographical areas were contacted to get the views of firm workers and their senior officers in charge.

Stutely (2003) and Kathuria (1999) recommends that in descriptive survey study with sub-groups, a sample size should have at least 40 respondents to allow for statistical analysis. On this basis, Chinese firms were allocated 40 respondents each out of the 50 respondents (1 senior officer and 39 workers). These scholars further recommended that where the population in the category is less than 40 and the researcher wishes to undertake analysis at this level, the researcher should collect data from all cases in that category. Hence, 1 senior officer from each of the 3 relevant construction firms totaling to 3 key informants, and 39 times 3 firms totaling to 117 workers as respondents as shown in Table 3.3

Table 3. 4: Purposive and simple random Sampling Distribution of Respondents and Key informants from Relevant Chinese Firms

Institution Size	Target Population	Key Informants	Respondent	Sample
Synohydro firms	50 employees (1 Chinese Senior Officer & 49 workers)	1	39	40
COVEC	50 employees (1 senior officer & 49 workers)	1	39	40
China Wu Yi	50 employees (1 senior officer & 49 workers)	1	39	40
Total	150	3	117	120

(80% of Respondents from Target Population)

Source: Research (2023)

Equally, its according to Stutely (2003) and Kathuria (1999) recommendation that where the population in the category is less than 40 and the researcher wishes to undertake analysis at this level, the researcher should collect data from all cases in that category. Hence, 2 senior officers from Chinese Embassy and 1 senior officer in charge of the Confucian institutes were chosen totaling to 3 key informants in this stratum as shown in Table 3.4

Table 3. 5: Purposive Sampling Distribution of Key informants from Institutions Representing China in Kenya

Institution	Key Informants	Sample Size
Chinese Embassy	2	2
Confucian Institutes At Nairobi and Kenyatta Universities	1	1
Total	3	3

(100% of Respondents from Target Population)

Source: Research (2023)

On this basis therefore, each of the 26 Key informants comprising of 20 from Relevant State Corporation in Kenya, 3 from Chinese Firms Contracted to Develop Infrastructure in Kenya and 3 from Institutions Representing China in Kenya participated in the study. The respondents were 117 workers from Chinese Firms Contracted to Develop Infrastructure in Kenya. Therefore, the total sample size for this study was 117 respondents plus 26 key informants totaling to 143 respondents.




Figure 3.2: Flow Chart Showing Stages in Sampling of Institutions and Respondents

Source: Researcher (2023)

3.9 Data Collection Procedures

The data collection procedures involved questionnaires, interviews and observations as well as such other sources as government documents, video, tapes, newspapers, letters, and books that shed light on questions under study (Kothari, 2004). Primary data which was very instrumental in answering the objectives of the study was obtained from respondents and key informants from N1 relevant state corporations in Kenya, N2 Chinese Firms contracted to develop infrastructure in Kenya and N3 institutions

representing China in Kenya through questionnaires, interviews and observations. Primary data was collected in line with the set objectives. Meticulous effort was made to ensure that data was collected systematically to answer the research questions of the study. Secondary data formed an integral part of the study and was got through as government documents, video, tapes, newspapers, letters, and books.

3.10 Data Collection Instruments

The researcher collected data through multiple methods. Primary data was obtained through field research. This included the use of interviews, questionnaires and observations and secondary data from books, journals, newspapers, magazines and other relevant sources. The instruments contained restricted questions to obtain specific answers that include opinions, observations and insights. In order to ensure that no information was inadvertently left out, audio tapes were used extensively during interviews.

3.10.1 Primary Data

The primary data is that data which is collected afresh and for the first time thus, happens to be original in character (Kothari, 2004). Primary data is raw data that is directly collected from the respondents, first-hand information through oral interviews, questionnaires and discussions covered in the study. In this regard, primary data was obtained from respondents and key informants from N1 relevant state corporations in Kenya, N2 Chinese Firms contracted to develop infrastructure in Kenya and N3 institutions representing China in Kenya.

3.10.2 Interview

Interview is one of the main data collection tools in qualitative research. It is a good way of accessing people's perceptions, meaning, definition of situations and construction of reality (Punch, 2005). The interview method of collecting data involves presentation of oral-verbal stimuli and reply in terms of oral-verbal responses. This method can be used through personal interviews and if possible, through telephone interviews (Kothari, 2004). The researcher conducted interviews using interview guides. The guides contained structured questions. Structured questions are designed to subject every informant in a sample to the same stimuli (Kombo and Tromp, 2006). It ensured certainty and reliability of responses accruing from such interviews. Field visits were conducted in the three counties namely; Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu. Relevant senior officers (key informants) from N1 relevant state corporations in Kenya, N2 Chinese Firms contracted to develop infrastructure in Kenya and N3 institutions representing China in Kenya were interviewed through the interview guides. Data from these interviews were recorded in the interview guide.

3.10.3 Questionnaires

A questionnaire consists of a number of questions printed or typed in a definite order on a form or set of forms (Kothari, 2004). The development of the questionnaires was guided by the objectives of the study. The questionnaires consisted of close-ended and open-ended questions. Close-ended questions are easy to administer and analyze hence, the respondents are in a position to answer relatively more questions within a short period of time. Open-ended questions assisted in capturing details that were significant to the study yet they had not been considered by the researcher. The Questionnaires

were simple, clear, precise and relevant and were relied upon to collect information from a large pool of respondents.

3.10.4 Secondary Data

Documents, both historical and contemporary, are a rich source of data for social research (Punch, 2012). The range of documents which might be used by social scientists include diaries, letters, essays, personal notes, biographies and autography, institutional memoranda and reports, government pronouncements and proceedings. Secondary data was instrumental in forming the basis of the study and for providing pieces of information regarding policies, programs, strategies and national interests among others.

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3.11 Reliability

Saunders et al. (2012) argues that respondents may consistently interpret a question in a questionnaire in one way, when the researcher means something else. As a consequence, respective questions may not produce consistent findings with different samples thus lacking internal consistency. The questionnaire may therefore not be reliable. It is on this basis that the study used the internal consistency technique to ensure consistency of the research instruments with the reality on the ground. A single set of questionnaires and interview guides were used. The researcher used split half method of estimating reliability. On scoring, it was split into 2 sets of equal lengths. One set consisted of even numbered items and the other odd numbered items. Each set was treated and scored separately. The mean inter-item correlation between the 2 sets were then determined. The researcher then used the following Cronbach's Alpha coefficient of internal consistency suggested by Mitchell *et al.* (1992):

$$\text{Alpha (n)} = Nr (1 + r (N-1))$$

Where:

r is the mean inter-item correlation

f number of items in the scale

n is therefore the conservative estimate of reliability.

This technique, given that it does not require retaking the reliability test (test-retest technique), it therefore eliminates the problem of subjects correcting their previous responses with what they think is right but not true. This also reduces on the costs. It further provides a unique, qualitative estimate of the internal consistency of a scale (Saunders et al. 2012).

3.12 Validity

The researcher ensured that there was content validity. This refers to the extent to which the measurement device, in this study's case questions in the questionnaire, provides adequate coverage of the research questions (Saunders et al, 2012). This was done through giving the research instruments to experts including supervisors in the department of Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. Each of them examined the instrument and their comments on format and content were incorporated to enrich the instruments and obtain relevant data.

This was according to the advice by Saunders *et al*, (2012). Bell (2010) advises that however pressed for time a researcher may be, one should do his/her best to give questionnaires a trial run as, without a trial run, the researcher would have no way of knowing whether the questions would succeed. The questionnaires are therefore, used

in a pilot study after which necessary amendments are made. The researcher did this to find out how long the questionnaires and interview schedules would take to complete, the clarity of instructions, which questions were unclear or ambiguous, which, if any, questions, the respondents felt uneasy to answer, whether in their opinion there were any major omissions, whether the layout was clear and attractive and any other comments. Interviewer completed questionnaires would also be pilot tested as advised by Saunders *et al*, (2012). This was also done to ensure that the answers were being recorded as expected.

3.13 Data Analysis and Presentation

Saunders *et al*, (2012) view analysis as consisting of three concurrent ‘flows of activities’: data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing. The researcher drew conclusions from the start of data collection, noting patterns and regularities, positing possible structures and mechanisms. In qualitative analysis the researchers organized raw data and coded that data. The meaning was sought through thematic analysis, interpreted it and drew conclusions. The findings of this study followed formats that were compatible with analysis of qualitative data (Kothari, 2004). The data was processed and analyzed in accordance with the objectives of the study. Qualitative data was classified and categorized into a set of codes and developed coding relationships which was guided by recognizable characteristics of the data so that similar concepts, ideas and opinions were grouped together (Bhattacharjee, 2012). The next stage of analysis undertook a line-by-line examination of all data sources. This involved systematic drilling of raw data in order to build up categories of understanding. Categories were aggregated to establish relationships in order to interpret the data in a

systematic manner. Therefore, qualitative data was processed, summarized and categorized into appropriate themes.

Content analysis was also used to determine which themes occurred more frequently, in what contexts and how they related to each other (Bhattacharjee, 2012). Content analysis is a method of analyzing contents that uses quantitative measures of the frequency of appearance of particular elements in the text. Quantitative data which are numeric in nature were analyzed through descriptive analysis which comprises statistics describing, aggregating and presenting the constructs of interest. Inferential statistics arising from the findings were interpreted to reach conclusions about associations among variables. In this regard, data was converted into numeric formats and interpreted in the context of the objective this study. This included interpretation of frequencies and percentages. Charts, graphs, tables were used to project and compare scenarios and any other piece of information that could be best presented quantitatively.

To facilitate efficient and effective analysis of data in an organized manner, SPSS analytical tool was used. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) is a package of programs for manipulating, analyzing, and presenting data. This package is widely used in the social and behavioral sciences.

3.14 Limitations of the Study

Some respondents such as local investors had negative comments about Chinese firms operating in Kenya. This could have given a biased conclusion about the real impact of Chinese economic diplomacy and infrastructure in Kenya. The study however included other respondents such as senior officers from Chinese firms in Kenya and other

research agencies to minimize on this likely bias. Some of the respondents especially from the informal sector were semi-illiterate and could not comprehend the questions on the questionnaire. The researcher together with research assistants interpreted the questions for them. Face to face interviews were also used to fill in on this loop hole. Some respondents were uncooperative. The researcher replaced them with respondents who had similar characteristics. Some of the respondents were busy and requested for more time before the interviews could be done and questionnaires respondent to. The researcher therefore used a research assistant especially in Nairobi and Kiambu counties.

Another difficulty was to obtain some information that was considered too confidential from some institutions such as the National Treasury and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was mitigated by redrafting of the authorization letter by NACOSTI. The Chinese Embassy was inaccessible and this inability to physically meet some experts for in-depth interviews limited the wealth of collected information. This was mitigated by use of telephone interviews and e-mail to conduct research. Responses from the Confucius Institute in Nairobi and Kenyatta Universities were also sort to fill on this loop hole.

3.15 Ethical Considerations

The researcher observed ethical considerations during the study. Through Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, the researcher ensured that required consent from the National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NCOSTI) was sought before commencement of the study. Thereafter, the researcher

visited County Commissioners and Directors of education in Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu counties to seek their consent as required by NACOSTI. Before embarking on the research, the objectives of the study and the interview procedures to be followed were explained to the respondents to reiterate on the information given in the request letter attached to every questionnaire and key informant interview guide. During the research, the principles of voluntary participation, informed consent, risk of harm and anonymity were observed. Confidentiality was a major consideration as well as being courteous in conduct.

3.16 Summary

This chapter described the research design and methodology. The study area was in Kenya, specifically in Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu Counties. A survey research design with both qualitative and quantitative research types was used together with a Historical Research design to trace the China-Kenya diplomatic relation on infrastructure development in Kenya since 1963. Purposive, stratified and simple random sampling techniques were used in the study. The sample population consisted of 26 key informants and 117 respondents from relevant institutions in Kenya. The total sample size for the study was therefore 143. Research instruments comprised of questionnaires and interview guides. The researcher employed Cronbach's Alpha coefficient of internal consistency to ensure reliability of research instruments. Content validity was ensured through consultations with supervisors. Both qualitative and quantitative technique were used for data analysis and presentation. The next chapter, influence of China's mutual development principle on development of infrastructure in Kenya. The chapter discussed the first specific objective of the study.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INFLUENCE OF CHINESE MUTUAL DEVELOPMENT PRINCIPLE IN DEVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE IN KENYA.

This chapter presents analyses and findings regarding the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya using historical design. It gives the findings on the mutual development principles behind the infrastructural projects funded by China in Kenya. In order to understand better the motivation behind Chinese funding infrastructural projects in Kenya, various principles of China's economic diplomacy to Kenya are rated. The study narrows down to the major motivation behind China's interest in funding Kenya's infrastructural projects.

4. 1: Pre-independence

The relationship between Kenya and China was documented as far back as 545 BC'; (Kamau 2007). Chinese traders and diplomatic missions left evidence along the East African coast between Zanzibar and Somalia. Indeed, Chinese artefacts such as coins, porcelains and pottery, as well as Chinese imperial accounts have affirmed this prior contact. Kenya's quest for independence, built on much opposition to British imperial rule, came to a head in the 1950s, with the outbreak of the 'Mau Mau' uprisings in 1951, which had an influential Marxist element to its leadership attracting Chinese attention. In fact, as Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's revolutionary leader, languished in prison for almost a decade, China consistently called for his release.

4.4 Post-independence

4.4.1 The nature of Kenya-China relations since 1963

There are three levels of analysis that are widely used in political science to understand highly complex problems in world politics; individual, state and system. The levels of analysis illuminate different reasons why countries go to war, sign treaties or pursue alliances (Kamau 2007). Individual level analysis states that the personalities of leaders shape foreign policy as they take active role in determining international relations. An instance where individual level of analysis has been used in international relations is for example to explain Second World War through Adolf Hitler or the end of the Cold War through Ronald Reagan or Gorbachev (Mwega 2009).

This study adopted the individual level of analysis to analyze Kenya-China relations since independence solely focusing on the presidents. It is against this background that the study argued that Kenya's economic diplomacy has been molded and directed by the presidents. This type of diplomacy is contextualized through president's selection of the cabinet secretary of foreign affairs. The final authority on economic diplomacy formulation, conduct and projection lies in the hands of the president. Therefore, in an attempt to study Chinese economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructural development in Kenya from 1963 this study analyzed the data looking at the eras of the different presidents. There have been five presidents in Kenya; the founder president Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978), President Daniel Moi (1978-2002), President Mwai Kibaki (2002- 2012), President Uhuru Kenyatta (2012-2022) and President Ruto Kenyan presidents in the past five decades have reacted differently to international geo-political situations and this can be used to explain Kenya-China relations since 1963.

4.4.2 Kenya-China relations during Jomo Kenyatta's Administration (1963-1978)

Kamau (2007) states that, although China embraced communism and Kenya adopted capitalism at independence, the relationship between the two largely remained cordial. The first country to recognize Kenya's independence was Germany (then West Germany), then Russia, Ethiopia and then China. This order of recognition is still reflected in the diplomatic number given to the Embassies of these countries which are 1-CD, 2-CD, 3-CD, and 4-CD respectively.

China was the fourth country to recognize Kenya's independence in 1963 when the two countries exchanged diplomatic representations. On February 5, 1964 Wang Yutien was appointed China's ambassador to Kenya. (Kamau, 2007). During an interview with a Chinese Embassy Senior Officer in Nairobi, the officer stated that:

the Chinese Embassy in Kenya is arguably their largest Embassy in Africa both in terms of size and employees. It is strategically located in a relatively high-security area near the Defense Headquarters, Kenya Army Barracks, and closer to the Kenya's State House. Similarly, Kenya has an Embassy in Beijing which serves China and a few countries in the neighborhood. (Senior Officer, 22/5/2023, Nairobi)

The Sino-Kenya relationship, first established in 1964 was centered on promoting trade between the two countries. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga led a high powered Kenyan delegation to Beijing in May 1964 to discuss enhanced ties between the two countries. On February 5, 1964 Wang Yutien was appointed China's ambassador to Kenya. A Senior Director from the ministry of foreign affairs and international trade confirmed the cordial relationship since independence during an interview by saying that:

Undoubtedly, China has extended financial assistance to Kenya since independence. Between April and May 1964, Kenya's Vice President Oginga Odinga led a powerful delegation to Soviet Union and China where several economic agreements were signed. In return, in July 1964, Chinese Ambassador in Kenya met the Minister for Finance James Gichuru to negotiate for technical and economic cooperation where it was agreed that relevant departments would identify project proposals and forward to the Treasury for financial consideration. (Senior Director, 22/5/2023, Nairobi)

In July 1964, the Chinese Ambassador paid a visit to the then minister of finance, James Gichuru to negotiate economic and technical cooperation between the two countries. They agreed on the dispatch of a Chinese delegation of 15 experts to Kenya in order to nail down specific areas of economic cooperation (Chege, 2008). In August 1964, the then information minister Achieng Oneko followed suit and met the Chinese vice premier, military commander and the minister for foreign affairs Marshall Chen Yi.

This was a major achievement considering Marshall Chen Yi's high profile in China's political establishment at the time (Chege, 2008). Meanwhile government departments in Kenya were invited to forward suitable proposals to the ministry of finance. From a long list of proposals from the Kenyan side, the Chinese delegation in early 1965 committed itself to the construction of a textile factory and a sugar refinery (Kenya National Archives, File AE/4/70, 1965).

The initial stages saw good bilateral ties between China and Kenya, but after 1965 the relations between the two countries were tense and lowered to the *charge d'affaires* level.

Chege, (2008). alluded that, by 1966 Kenyatta and his supporters in the West especially Britain were more convinced that Odinga was a major threat that had to be neutralized. This was effected in the same year when Odinga lost the position of KANU's vice president at the Limuru party conference which saw the creation of eight vice presidents position. In March 1966, Kenya expelled the third secretary in the Chinese embassy, Yao Chun, on suspicions of plotting subversion. Yao Chun had protested the adoption of a motion by Kenya's senate condemning Chou En-Lai's remarks on the five principles for developing relations between China and Africa.

The Chinese Embassy also protested against speeches made by Tom Mboya, J.N Osogo and Daniel Moi in parliament claiming that they had subjected the people's republic of China to slander, vilification and grave provocation (*East African Standard*, Nairobi, July 3, 1966:6). In August 1966, demonstrations were held outside the Kenya Embassy in Beijing, with posters protesting Kenya's reactionary politics. The Kenyan government handed a protest note to the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi but unable to get a satisfactory explanation, it recalled Kenya's Ambassador to China. In retaliation, youths affiliated to the right wing of KANU staged a counter demonstration outside China's Embassy in Nairobi. The relationship between the two states deteriorated ending in a diplomatic break in 1967 when Kenya declared the Chinese *charge d'affaires* persona non grata ordering him out of Kenya (*East African Standard*, Nairobi 8 June, 1967, p.2). In response China too expelled the Kenya *charge d'affaires* in July 1967. With the Ambassadors and their deputies now out of their stations, Kenya and China had severed diplomatic relations which remained severe until when Mao Zedong and Jomo Kenyatta had exited from the scene. At the time of Kenyatta's death in August 1978, Kenya's economic diplomacy was firmly anchored on the Western sphere.

4.4.3 Kenya-China relation in Daniel Moi Administration (1978-2002)

Mwega (2009) noted that the year 1978 saw President Daniel Arap Moi come to power, as Kenyatta's successor. He pursued the same economic diplomacy template with minor variations. By the end of 1980, Kenya was still seen as a client-state of the West. In 1982, the late president Moi had obtained an amendment to Kenya's constitution making Kenya a de jure- one party state. His administration also adopted an intimidating new set of electoral procedures that placed new controls on the press. Soon after, Western aid agencies imposed an aid conditionality requiring the government to allow multiple parties, to establish an impartial elections board, to reinstate secret ballot and to relax censorship of the press.

Affirmation by Barkan (2004) was that the West demanded for change with the democratic tide or bear the consequences. By 1993, President Moi and other beneficiaries of Western-bloc that paid little or no premium on internal democracy during Cold War era, had nothing left as the honeymoon was irretrievably over.

Elmi (2012) augments Barkan (2004) who also confirms that also caught in this scenario were Mobutu SeseSeko of Congo, Kamuzu Banda of Malawi and so were the apartheid rulers in South Africa. President Moi started warming up to newer friends and economic-cum-trade partners especially from the growing Orient due to the West's conditions on pluralism and internal democracy. President Moi, the same man who had accused China of plotting revolution in Kenya in the 1960s, was reaching out to the People's Republic of China.

It was not until 1978 that warm relations between the two countries was restored. The ties were later cemented by high level visits by both President Daniel Arap Moi and Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang in early 1980s. The visits resulted in the signing of two economic, technical cooperation and trade agreements which encompassed several projects. Following the restoration of bilateral ties, financial assistance then grew gradually in various sectors of the economy and heightened as China expanded its engagement on the continent at the turn of the twenty-first century. During an interview of a director with the ministry of foreign affairs and international trade confirmed the restoration of Kenya-China relation. He submitted that:

Kenya dispatched an ambassador to China at the end of 1978, thus opening the embassy that had been technically closed in 1967. China also appointed an ambassador to Kenya. This saw the relations between Kenya- China restored. (Director, 28/6/2023, Nairobi)

Ji Pengfei, the then vice premier of China's State Council, visited Kenya in August 1980 and Kenya's president Moi paid a state visit to China a month later, the first of the three trips (September 1980, October 1988 and May 1994) to China before his retirement in 2002. Moi's first visit to China saw two agreements signed. The first one was on economic and technological cooperation, covering a wide variety of projects: a new sports stadium, technical support to two new universities, scholarships, military and cultural exchanges. The second one was a trade agreement between Kenya and China (Alden & Oliveira, 2008). The most important component of the economic cooperation was the Moi International Sports Centre located outside the Nairobi's central business district. It was built at the cost of 930 million Kenya shillings, 48% of which was financed by Kenya and 52% was funded by an interest free loan from China (Chege, 2008).

Under the economic cooperation grant, China also constructed a new teaching hospital at the then brand new Moi University Eldoret, the Gambogi-Serem highway and building the faculty of Arts complex at Egerton University. China also committed itself to providing 10 scholarships annually to Kenya and two level military exchanges per year. China in 1980 requested Kenya to train Chinese students in tourism management at Utalii College in Nairobi.

President Moi's state visit opened the way for diplomatic exchanges and negotiations at lower levels of government. Wilson Ndolo Ayah, Minister of foreign affairs (August 1991), Bonaya Godana, Minister of foreign affairs (April 1999), Francis Ole Kaparo, Speaker of the Kenyan National Assembly (April 2000), and in October 2000 B. Godana, the Kenyan Foreign Minister headed a delegation to attend the "Beijing Ministerial Meeting 2000 of the Sino-African Cooperation Forum" (China-Kenya Embassy website; <http://ke.china-embassy.org/eng/>). But this was a trickle compared to the number of top level Chinese delegations that came to Kenya during that period. Chinese leaders and officials who visited Kenya during that period included: Ji Pengfei, Vice-premier of the State Council (August 1980), Zhao Ziyang, Premier of the State Council (January 1983), Tian Jiyun and Vice-premier (November 1985).

Zhu Rongji, Premier of the State Council held talks with President Moi at state house in April 2002. President Moi reaffirmed the Kenyan government's adherence to the One China policy and expressed his appreciation for the close cooperation between the two countries in international affairs. Zhu on the other hand expressed confidence that the two countries would continue their good cooperation in international affairs in the

future. By the time Moi left office in 2002, he had laid foundations for improved cooperation with China, diversifying the country's investment sources. President Moi's government had a wanting human rights record thus Western government such as Britain and France had accommodated Kenya until 1990s when they introduced conditionality but China overlooked these realities as it strengthened its economic relations with Kenya.

4.4.4 Kenya-China Relation in Mwai Kibaki's regime (2002-2012)

President Mwai Kibaki took office in January 2003 from KANU that had ruled Kenya for forty years. His NARC government was received warmly by the traditional donors like the UK, Norway and France who had blacklisted president Moi's government (Branch, 2011). Kibaki paid state visits to Washington and London soon after coming to power but he also turned East and paid similar visits to Beijing, New Delhi and Tokyo since he had the desire to diversify Kenya's sources of foreign assistance. This was one of the reasons for preferring Chinese development finance. When the NARC regime took over in 2003, the portfolio of Kenya's foreign assistance was very small. According to Elmi (2012) it was roughly US\$ 750 million and comprised mainly traditional western donors. Therefore, the NARC regime faced the challenge of mobilizing development resources needed for rapid growth. Given that Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) paper encouraged external mobilization. A deputy director from the Ministry of Interior during an interview observed that:

when the NARC regime came to power, it aimed at expanding the scope of its development partner. By this time China had started becoming an important partner in the development. They had started showing strong support for African development. That really opened a new window and so Kenya started leveraging on that window. (Deputy Director, 18/5/2023 Nairobi)

This led to an outcry from western diplomats, investors and financiers, who argued that Kibaki was not supposed to pay such high profile visits to what they believed were not traditional major economic trading partners (New York Times, 24th January, 2008). To illustrate Kenya's determination to diversify foreign assistance in Asian countries, a director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during an interview noted that:

I can only say that in 2003 when the NARC government came in power under President Mwai Kibaki, there was a reenergized relationship between Kenya and China. It was a rebirth. Yes, Kenya has had relationship with China since 1963, even during the Cold War, but 2003 came with the idea of Look East Policy. That meant focusing on new horizons in the East in addition to the traditional development partners in the West. This was given a new impetus when President Kibaki visited China, and from that time there was no stopping between our relationships with China. And from 2003 to now we have had very strong visits by both sides. (Director, 19/6/2023, Nairobi)

According to Chege (2008), China-Kenya relations in the Kibaki era began with high level political contacts between the two states. President Kibaki made an official visit to China in August 2005, accompanied by 11 Kenyan trade and investment seeking delegations. During this visit, President Kibaki held extensive talks with President Hu Jintao and Chinese government officials which resulted in a five-part agreement. The agreement covered grants for infrastructure and energy, extended air services between the two countries, technical assistance, modernization of equipment and training at the state owned Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (Gadzala, 2009). The delegation also visited Shanghai, where discussions were held with its mayor Han Zheng, on the functioning of special export industrial zones. The outcome of this visit was a highly successful Chinese trade exhibition in Nairobi in mid-2006. During this visit President Kibaki held extensive talks with President Hu Jintao and Chinese government officials

which resulted in a five-part agreement. A senior director in the ministry of transport and infrastructural development confirmed in an interview that these visits cemented the relationship:

Beyond the visits, the strong ties have also been cemented by several bilateral cooperation agreements covering a range of activities. In 2011 for example, the two governments in the spirit of mutual agreement signed a total of ten agreements that included a concessional loan to finance the construction of Kenyatta University's Teaching and Referral Hospital, generation of solar energy in various locations, construction and upgrading of hydropower stations among other agreements and more agreements were signed when Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Kenya in May 2014. (Senior Director, 28/7/2023, Nairobi)

Equally a deputy director in the ministry of Transport and Infrastructural development during an interview noted that:

The quest to reach out to China could not have come at opportune Moment. At the top governmental level usually presidential visits are the hallmark of good diplomatic relationship between two countries. These visits have spill-over effects on the kind of cooperation in various sectors. Indeed, the last visit by a Chinese president (Jiang Zemin) in Kenya was in 1996 and so far Kenya had not reciprocated. Kibaki found invitation letter and visited China during the second year of his presidency (Deputy Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

In April 28, 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao held talks with his Kenyan counterpart Mwai Kibaki in Nairobi. Both sides expressed willingness to jointly commit to developing bilateral friendly cooperative relations of long term stability and mutual benefits and continue to deepen friendly cooperation in all areas (G.O.K, 2006).

Under president Kibaki's watch, barriers to Sino-Kenya relations came down. One barrier was that there were only two major airlines, Ethiopian and South African, which had direct flights to Beijing. To overcome this problem, the then Kenyan Ambassador to China, Dr Wario negotiated an agreement that allowed Kenya Airways to do direct flights to Hong Kong via Bangkok (Kioko 2012). Ties between China and Kenya did not stop only at business, from August 8th to 14th 2005; Kenya hosted a week long Chinese cultural festival. The festival yielded positive developments and opportunities as Kenyan authorities approved the setting up of Chinese radio station in Nairobi the first Chinese broadcasting station to operate outside China. In an interview with a director from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed out that:

Although not stated as an official policy, the NARC government quietly embarked on a "Look East Policy" that laid emphasis on improved relations with countries from the East. President Kibaki seemed bent on breaking what had been perceived by the previous government as Western condescending attitude and lectures on human rights and democracy. (Director,15/7/2023, Nairobi).

On the same breath an assistant director from the Ministry of Interior during an interview observed that:

Traditionally, Kenyan relationship has been mainly with the western Countries but it realized that the future was China it is a phenomenal country not only in her great size but also the way it is developing so fast. So the policy of looking eastwards towards China is the cornerstone of Kenya's economic diplomacy agenda and it is a mistake of the past in Kenya that it concentrated for too long in its relations with Europe at the expense of its relationship with Eastern countries. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

4.4.5 Kenya-China Relation in Uhuru Kenyatta regime (2002-2022)

President Uhuru Kenyatta in his second term in office, notwithstanding his personal predicament and of his deputy at the International Criminal Court when they took over office during the first term, President Kenyatta made clear his intentions to steer Kenya to greater heights at the global diplomatic arena. Following ascension to power by the Jubilee coalition and perceived anti-western stance, China was quick to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the political rhetoric. In the process, several major projects were in the pipeline amidst a litany of procurement questions. There was an assumption that the new government would continue with president Kibaki's 'Look East Policy.'

This perception arose from the strained relationship between Kenya and the Western countries over the International Criminal Court cases (Brown and Sriram, 2012). Munene (2013) observed that during the inauguration of President Kenyatta and his deputy on 9th April 2013, China's flag was the only pennant of a foreign country outside Africa that occupied a flag stand. Significantly, Beijing sent a high ranking special envoy to the ceremony while the Western nations were only represented by their Ambassadors. Diplomatically this could be interpreted to show the seriousness China was taking Kenya.

President Uhuru Kenyatta made his first state visit outside Africa to China on August 19th 2013. According to the then state house Manoah Esipisu, the trip was both official and working as the president had diplomatic and bilateral engagements with China's state officials and investors (Ongiri, 2013). Clearly, the visit to Beijing by President Uhuru Kenyatta upon assuming office may have been informed by the growing

economic linkage between the two countries. President Kenyatta led a strong delegation made up of senior government officials, technocrats and business people to China and secured about \$5 billion (Sh425 billion) in investments from China covering railways, energy, wildlife protection and joint ventures. The Key among them was the multi-billion standard gauge railway (SGR), which was expected to cost Ksh 327 billion for the Mombasa-Nairobi phase with China funding 85 per cent of the project. According to an engineer in the Ministry of transport and infrastructural development during an interviewed had this to say:

Since 2003, one of the sectors of the economy that China has increased its visibility is infrastructural funding. When the National Rainbow Coalition(NARC) took over power from Kenya African National Union (KANU) in 2003, it prioritized infrastructure development in its first development blueprint- Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) Paper. China was approachable by Kenya given that it had already developed strong interests in the infrastructure sector in other African countries and President Uhuru Kenyatta climaxed this by coming up with the SGR business. (Engineer,18/5/2023, Nairobi)

The SGR was to link Mombasa port and Malaba that was expected to improve access to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. This was amidst many questions on procurement procedures that appear to have been flouted (Ongiri 2014). The visit by President Uhuru Kenyatta was almost sensational in the media. On the first day of the visit the Hong Kong-based South China Morning Post trumpeted a headline; ‘President Uhuru Kenyatta Looks East from Beijing to Moscow.’ In December 2013, the Star newspaper reported Deputy President William Ruto as praising China as a true friend of Kenya. Ruto had praised the Chinese leadership for refusing to be ‘herded in strange destinies’ by the West. In a veiled attack on Europe and the United States, Ruto saw the Chinese government as a worthy teacher, partner,

true friend and a friend indeed to the people of Kenya. These remarks were made during a ceremony to mark the 50th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Kenya and China.

The Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang in return visited Kenya on May 10th 2014. President Uhuru and the prime minister signed 17 agreements. key among them was the multi-billion Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) which was expected to cost kshs 327 billion with China funding 85 per cent of the project. The two leaders also agreed that a China-Africa Development Bank would be set up in Nairobi and kshs 170 billion would be pumped in. Another major project was the China-Africa Research Centre that was to be funded at a cost of kshs 5.1 billion. On wildlife conservation, Mr Li announced Ksh 860 million financial support for wildlife conservation in Kenya.

On 13th March to 18th March 2017, President Uhuru attended the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) forum in Beijing where he held bilateral talks with president Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang. Wu Peng, the Chinese Ambassador to Kenya on Tuesday April 23 2019 wrote on an article on the Embassy website arguing that in 2018, around 170 Kenyan students were awarded China-sponsored scholarships for further study in China. 686 Kenyans were trained in China. At the same time, over 81,000 Chinese tourists travelled to Kenya. On the same month, 55 outstanding Kenyan employees picked by Chinese enterprises flew to China for a one-week visit. He further argued that China-Kenya relation was standing at a higher stage with new development opportunities. A director from Chinese Embassy in Nairobi during an interview had this to say:

Kenya -China relations was really standing on a higher stage and China will live up to its mission and make into full play the favorable conditions of good timing, right place and right people. Together with Kenyan Brothers and sisters, China will surely promote the bilateral cooperation in all sectors, enhance mutual understanding, and open a new chapter for China-Kenya friendship. (Director,12/07/2023, Nairobi).

In November 2018, the President was also in Beijing to attend the 7th FOCAC summit. He was also supposed to use the September visit to sign financing for the second phase of the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR). But the deal fell through after China asked Kenya to do a feasibility study. Before the visit, transport Cabinet Secretary James Macharia had spoken as if it had been a done deal, that Kenya was going to sign the \$3.8 billion (Sh380 billion) financing deal with Beijing to extend the SGR between Naivasha and Kisumu. It is still a puzzle how Kenya was seeking the project funded without the completion of the feasibility study. In an interview, an assistant director from the ministry of foreign affairs submitted that:

Part of the main reason why China went slow on the project was due to the negative media reports from Kenya, rising debt concerns as well as rising hostilities between the two nations. (Assistant Director 18/5/2023, Nairobi)

In April 2019 President Kenyatta went to China with officials including Orange Democratic Movement leader Raila Odinga, who was the African Union High Representative for Infrastructure Development in Africa. In the meetings he attended, he urged countries to strengthen connectivity, open up markets, commit to rule-based international trade, strengthen multilateral cooperation and ensure sustainable, people-centered development.

Uew *et al* (2017) described the meeting between Presidents Kenyatta and Jinping as "extremely successful" and summed up their results as follows: The signing of a trade agreement for the export of frozen avocados from Kenya to China, which followed the signing of an MoU on Sanitary and Phyto sanitary Standards for the export to China from Kenya of various horticultural products. The signing of a Framework Agreement between the Kenya National Highways Authority and the China Road and Bridge Cooperation for the construction of Kenya's first expressway from Jomo Kenyatta International Airport to Westland. The signing of a financing agreement valued at Sh17 billion between the Kenya and China EXIM Bank for the construction of the Konza Technopolis Data Center and IT infrastructure.

China has been facing criticism in the recent past for using debt to control African nations. However, it has challenged this narrative on grounds that it was being funded by the West which has been losing its clout on the continent. Social media has also been getting brutal on the President every time he announced any visits to China. This perhaps explained why his communications team changed strategy to focus his messaging on investment deals struck and keep off the controversial issue of debt. In an interview with a director at the Chinese Embassy in Nairobi said that:

Chinese government is committed to having a long-term relationship with Kenya but was concerned by negative political and media reports that are threatening this relationship. (Director, 17/5/2023, Nairobi)

This study found out that among the four presidents Kenya has had, Kenya- China relationship has been at its finest in history during the reign of president Uhuru. President Xi Jinping and President Kenyatta have strengthened China-Kenya relations into Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership.

China's relationship with Kenya has grown exponentially over the past decades and is likely to continue to expand. Kenya has become a foothold for China to expand into East Africa and will likely become a central location for the BRI's development. The relationship between these nations does not constitute an imperialist understanding of international relations. It is mutually beneficial and it assists China's economic growth and the economic expansion and development of Kenya. As a result, Kenya is able to develop and China gains access to a wider trade corridor.

Having reviewed the China-Kenya historical diplomatic relationship since independence, this study examined influence of Chinese mutual development principle in infrastructure development in Kenya to guide it to investigate how Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963.

4.7 Background of Chinese Foreign Policy

According to Diajong (2015), the most important philosopher in Chinese culture and foreign policy is Confucius. He was born in 551 BCE when China was going through a very tormenting political turmoil. Confucius as a young man then, still in his twenties became a tutor to several Chinese disciples. Nevertheless, he still wished to hold a public office. At 50 years, he began going province to province offering his tutorial service to various rulers. Towards the end of his life, he was offered a job as a tutor in his own home province. This job came when he was too old and spent the remaining of his life editing the great Chinese classics. He died at the age of 73 in the year of 479

B.C.E. Although he never reached his political goals, he is today considered one of the world's greatest teachers.

Diajong (2015) further stated that, Confucius lived at a time in Chinese history known for its political problems and governmental cruelty. He tried to solve the problem of government instability by stating that harmony could be found in the ancient ways of the founders of the Chou Dynasty. He referred to this time as the Age of Grand Harmony. He believed that the key to harmony was education while family, temples, schools and government, were all tools by which moral ideals were passed on to the individual. He reinforced certain Chinese ethics such as social and political concerns, importance of family, reverence for the elders, ritual and the value of education. Confucius, the gentleman aims at harmony, and not at uniformity.

An allusion by Graham (2003), however, was that a gentleman may have views that differ from others but he does not blindly follow others instead he seeks harmonious coexistence with them. These ideas have been applied in the Chinese formulation of foreign policy. Its adherence to the principle of seeking coexistence and common prosperity despite diversity is exemplified in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (*he ping gong chu wu xiang yuan ze*), mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence which were introduced by Chinese Leaders in the 1950s to govern relations between states. One of the directors in charge of infrastructure development in the Chinese Embassy had this to submit:

the principles guiding the administration of Chinese development finance in Kenya are non-interference and no-strings attached. (Director, 15/7/2023, Nairobi).

This orientation according to Onjala (2008) has also to do with the Sino centric attitude that the ‘barbarians’ are not well suited to reach the heights of Chinese culture and are best left to themselves as much as possible.

4.7.1 Chinese economic diplomacy and the Exim bank

Economic development aid aims at benefitting the lesser well off, but Brautigam, (2009). warns that in some, economic developmental relationships can still have an exploitative character. In 1960, China’s first office dedicated to economic aid was set up by the State Council: The Commission of Foreign Economic Relations. Together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Commission decided on economic aid agreements, and in ten years, was upgraded to its own Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

In 1982, the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations was merged with the Ministry of Trade to become the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. This merger signaled that China had planned a closer relation between economic development aid and multiple other forms of economic engagement, including generating profit (Brautigam, 2009). As bureaus and commissions under the State Council were transformed into corporations, the Chinese government began moving towards international markets. Such aid corporations, under the State Council, were separate from their main incentive of distributing foreign economic aid and the freedom to seek profitable opportunities (Brautigam, 2009). The Ministry of Foreign Economic

Relations and Trade is now known as the Ministry of Commerce, which houses the Department of Foreign Aid, emphasizing how relations that China establishes with underdeveloped nations under the term ‘developmental partner’ might have underlying economic incentives that favor the Chinese economic diplomacy

The steps taken by China to firstly institutionalize foreign aid, and secondly expand its objectives to include profit-making as well, exemplifies the State Council’s policy of mutual benefits in aid agreements. Through the Ministry of Commerce, the Department of Foreign Aid is able to give out grants and zero interest loans to foreign states. An additional, bigger corporation under the State Council is China’s EXIM bank, which is responsible for concessional loans and ‘preferential credits’.

There are two of such preferential credits: export seller’s credits, which are large loans for Chinese companies that operate abroad; and export buyer’s credits, which are loans issued to those who import Chinese goods or services (Brautigam, 2009). This way, the Chinese government stimulates expanding its economy internationally. Together with the governmental Department of Foreign Aid, EXIM bank distributes foreign aid through concessional loans, which are generous loans with a low interest rate, and/or longer periods of grace for developing countries, specifically issued to promote economic development.

Investments of such sizes and with these beneficial conditions are what Nurkse deems necessary for a nation to be pulled out of poverty; however, Nurkse theorized these investments coming from the domestic government rather than from a foreign nation. China’s policy of mutual benefit underlines these economic agreements, and it must be

noted that the benefits for China must be at least as large as those Kenya, if not grander. For instance, unlike the zero interest loans, the concessional loans cannot be rescheduled or cancelled, meaning that China holds a certain level of power over the nations that have received such loans

Kioko (2012) equally found out that in consistent with its 2007 Guidelines, China Exim Bank conducted an Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) before approving funding for the SGR. The bank's assessment considered the SGR's potential hazards such as pollution, health problems, land acquisition problems, and forced resettlement. The Chinese Embassy in Kenya also said it wanted to ensure that CRBC complied with Kenyan environmental and social laws. It claimed that the project achieved this goal through regular visits, meetings, training, and warnings of Chinese managers who did not comply with local laws. However, many Kenyan activists did not agree. It is from this discussion that the researcher sought to examine the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya.

4.7.2 China's Buddhist Diplomacy

Buddhism on the other hand according to Uwe (2017) began in India around 560 BCE with the teaching of Siddhartha Gautama who upon his enlightenment was called the 'the Buddha.' which means the awakened one. His teaching traveled into China along the famous silk route. For the next several hundred years, Buddhism slowly developed in China through the work of Indian and Chinese monks that traveled to and from India with the Buddhist teachings. Over time, Buddhism developed into a major religious philosophy in China with as many as eight different schools of Buddhism of

which *Ch'an* (Zen meditation) and Pure Land (chanting a Buddha's name) still exist today.

Gautama became well known for his teaching that students called him 'the Buddha,' which means 'the enlightened One.' Followers of Siddhartha's teachings are called Buddhists. He taught his followers to seek balance in their lives. The path to happiness is neither through indulgence nor denial, but a middle way. Siddhartha taught that by putting aside one's ego, one can escape the cycle of death and rebirth to reach Nirvana. The Buddha was an oral teacher, he left no written body of thought.

Dietz et al (2012) assert that at the center of the Buddha's enlightenment was the recognition of the Four Noble Truths: Buddha's first teaching was that life is suffering. This is more than a mere recognition of the presence of suffering in existence. It is a statement that, in its very nature, human existence is essentially painful from the moment of birth to the moment of death. Even death brings no relief, for the Buddha accepted the Hindu idea of life as cyclical with death leading to further rebirth.

Secondly, Buddhists believe that all suffering is caused by ignorance of the nature of reality and the craving, attachment, and grasping that result from such ignorance. The third point is that suffering can be ended by overcoming ignorance and attachment and lastly, is the Buddhist tenet that holds that the path to the suppression of suffering is the Noble Eightfold Path, which consists of right views, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right-mindedness and right contemplation. These eight are usually divided into three categories that form the cornerstone of Buddhist faith: morality, wisdom, and concentration.

Dietz *et al* (2012) continue to reveal that Buddhism gave people a feeling that peace was possible and that it called for an end to all violence and all wars. Millions of Chinese people who believed that they were good turned to Buddhism hoping to avoid being born again into a life with worries and miseries. Buddhism teaches that souls are reborn until they become perfect. Buddhism became part of the daily life of Chinese people. It became part of their religious ceremonies, their buildings, and their arts. More than anything else, it became part of their attitudes.

By portraying itself as a Buddhist nation, according to Will (2012), the Chinese government hopes to assure Kenyans that it is a responsible, trustworthy and friendly nation. As China attempts to increase its influence in the region, its government needs to communicate to wary allied states that the country's rise is a peaceful one. An administrator from the University of Nairobi Confucian Institute in his submission during interview said that:

Kenya is interested in Chinese development finance due to its non-interference as a key reason for interest in Chinese development. (Administrator, 11/7/2023, Nairobi).

China's Buddhist diplomacy is additionally intended to project the country as the global patron and sponsor of the Buddhist world. This type diplomacy appears to be aimed at its domestic audience. The Beijing authorities hope that promoting Buddhism internationally will generate strong appeal among Buddhists in China. They also hope to build stronger ties to both Taiwan and Hong Kong.

4.8 Motivation behind Chinese funding infrastructural projects in Kenya

Despite the fact that Kenya lacks the raw materials that attract Chinese companies, Kenya has not been left behind by China (the Africa Policy Institute 2014). Although Kenya is not known for its wealth of natural resources, this has not deterred China from signing several deals for the exploration of gas titanium and oil. According to Munene (2013), an Anglo-Irish firm found oil in Northern Kenya could be part of China's interest. The US ambassador predicted that if oil was found in Kenya, then China's engagement with Kenya would escalate. It's obvious that China is interested in Africa's natural resources and Kenya is not an exception. China is not secretive about this fact.

However, this study found a very different picture about Chinese motivation on infrastructural development in Kenya. Twenty-three (23) key informants from relevant institutions were required to rate what they felt was China's motivation to invest in infrastructural projects in Kenya.

Table 4. 1: Respondents’ Level of Agreement about Motivation behind Chinese funding infrastructural projects in Kenya (N=23)

Motivation	Totally Agree	Disagree	Uncertain
Resource for China and infrastructure for Kenya	19 (83.6%)	2(8.69%)	2(8.69%)
To promote its model of undemocratic development and amass soft power	7(30.43%)	2(8.69%)	14(60.86%)
Smuggling and poaching	3(13.04%)	17(73.91%)	3(13.04%)
Market its goods in Kenya	20 (86.95%)	2(8.69%)	1(4.35%)
Use Kenya as an entry point to the market in Eastern African region	17(73.91%)	2(8.69%)	3(13.04%)

Source: Field data (2023)

From Table 4.1, the study found out that Chinese are funding infrastructural projects in Kenya to market their goods in Kenya as indicated by 20 (86.95%) with only 1(4.35%) who were uncertain as 2(8.69%) disagreed that Chinese are motivated by marketing its goods in Kenya. This revelation relates to the power theory that states that the changing nature of international framework has re-emphasized the use of intangible forms of power, such as culture, ideology and institutions (Nye 2004). This is soft power that China has used to put their interest first. This is the same assertion by Mwega (2004) who are critical on China’s condition of pegging infrastructural investments to exporting Chinese products to aid recipient states. They argue that there appears to be

growth of small-scale entrepreneurial investment from China often evidenced by the construction of specialized shopping malls, retailing Chinese goods.

However, this does not rule out the search for resources as a motivating factor for China. The search for resources was the second factor that followed closely with 19 of the respondents (82.60%) agreeing that resource for China and infrastructure for Kenya was the major motivation behind Chinese funding infrastructural projects in Kenya. Twenty (20) of the respondents (86.95%) classified that Chinese funding infrastructural projects are purely extractive. This finding is in agreement with most authors who have written on China's relations with Africa. For instance, Brown and Siririam (2012) stated that some of this effort could be seen as an effort by China's political leadership in Beijing to position Chinese economy to continue growing based on long term trends in energy and resource needs. Brown and Siririam (2012) assertion was held by Kioko (2012) who argued that China's interest in regional infrastructure developments which include roads, rail and Lamu project are linked to the presence of oil in Southern Sudan and Uganda which could be exported via Lamu port.

The findings made by the researcher revealed that despite the presence of oil fields in Turkana County, no single Chinese company exploits oil in that county as much as Lamu port and the Kisumu-Kakamega-Webuye-Kitale road (heading to Turkana then Southern Sudan) were done by the Chinese. Chinese motivation could therefore, be targeting resources in Southern Sudan than Kenya. Only (2) two of the respondents (8.69%) disagreed and the same percentage were uncertain with this statement. The findings further revealed that majority of the respondents (14) fourteen (60.86%) were

uncertain pertaining the promotion of Chinese model of undemocratic development and amassing of soft power against (7) seven respondents (30.43%) who totally agreed with the statement. A total of (17) seventeen (73.91%) disagreed that Chinese fund infrastructural projects in Kenya to find a way of smuggling and poaching while (3) three of the respondents (13.04%) agreed and the same percentage were uncertain about the statement. It further showed that (17) seventeen respondents which is (73.91%) totally agreed that Chinese are motivated in funding infrastructural projects so as to use Kenya as an entry point to the market in East Africa region while (2) two of them (8.69%) disagreed as (3) three respondents which (13.04%) were uncertain about the statement. During an interview an assistant director from Kenya investment authority added that:

Naturally, investors choose Kenya because of its advantages like its location, its well-developed business infrastructure and many multilateral corporations hence the region has established it as their regional base. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Equally during the same interview session, an assistant director in the ministry of transport and infrastructure development submitted that:

Kenya also has a completely liberalized economy, a pro-investment administration and is politically stable. Kenya provides a key entrance to the east and Central African region even though it lacks the natural resources that are needed by China. (Assistant Director, 15/7/2023, Nairobi).

Therefore, from the findings, the researcher found out that it was evident that Chinese are motivated to market their goods in Kenya as well as use Kenya as an entry point to East Africa to explore and exploit the resources while smuggling and poaching was not a motivation factor in funding infrastructural projects in Kenya.

4.9 Mutual Benefit in Kenya-China Bilateral Relations

Scholars such as Chege (2015), conducted a case study for the center for strategic and international studies (CSIS) to examine the perception and impact of China's engagement with Kenya. Chege (2015) argued that China's extensive economic entry into Africa had been poorly perceived by most literature. This scholar was critical with the existing literature which alluded that African economies are under threat of the malevolent Chinese investment strategies and a flood of cheap manufactured goods. Some political elites cited mutual conception of developmental visions as one of the motives behind preferring Chinese development finance. When views from Kenyan political elites are compared with Chinese officials, it emerged that Kenya prefers Chinese development finance because of a shared vision of development path. In other words, Chinese officials understand Kenya's development vision in the same way Kenyan policy makers understand Chinese development aspirations. It was established that both sides understand development as rapid economic growth.

Never the less Chege (2008) contended that in the Kenyan case, the relationship has been mutually beneficial. The other study in support of Chege's assertion was that of Finkelstein (2005). According to the two, China maintained and pursued cooperation approaches to international affairs and reiterated that its commitment to the path of peaceful development and the win-win strategy continued its path of opening-up to the outside world. The findings of the study on each of the principles of peaceful coexistence were as shown in Table 4.4.

Table 4. 2: Respondents’ Rating of the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in infrastructure development in Kenya (N=23)

Principle	Rating		
	Totally agree	Disagree	Uncertain
Mutual benefit	21(91.30%)	1(4.34%)	1(4.34%)
Non-interference in each other’s internal affairs	20(86.95%)	1 (4.34%)	1(4.34%)
Equality	1(4.34%)	18(78.26%)	4(17.39%)
Mutual respect for sovereign and territorial integrity	19(82.60%)	3(13.04%)	1(4.34%)
Mutual non-aggression	19(82.60%)	2(8.69%)	2(8.69%)

Source: Field data (2023)

4.9.1 Mutual benefit

From table 4.2, an overwhelmingly (21) twenty-one out of (23) respondents which is (91.30%) rated the principle of China’s economic diplomacy to Kenya as mutually beneficial with (19) nineteen respondents which is (82.60%) rated the principle of China’s economic diplomacy to Kenya as mutually has mutual respect to sovereign and territorial integrity. Twenty (20) of the respondents which is (86.95%) indicated that China upholds the principle of non-interference in Kenya’s internal affairs including

politics while only one (1) which is (4.34%) disagreed and the same percentage was uncertain.

From this statement it can be rightly argued that China does not buy the ICC's principle of complementarity. Ongiri (2014) equally expressed the same sentiments. Yang asserts that China is opposed to the principle of complementarity in international Law that allows the ICC to intervene in cases that it views the judicial system of a particular sovereign state has no capacity or is simply unwilling to bring suspects to justice. This was confirmed by one (1) (4.34%) of the respondents who indicated that China interferes with internal affairs of Kenya. A director with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also confirmed this during the interview session that:

Mutual benefit is manifested where foreign aid for a long time had crippled African countries Kenya included. With the issues of conditions attached to it, many countries that could not meet the Western standards missed out on aid. China is seen as a way out of the mess that the West created. On its part China is interested in economic resources that are plenty in Africa in exchange of foreign aid thus an instance of mutual economic benefit. (Director, 10/7/2023, Nairobi).

Equally during an interview, an assistant director, from Kenya national chamber of commerce and industry submitted that:

When the Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang visited some Africa countries in December 1982, he announced 'Four Principles' of Chinese cooperation with Africa: equality and mutual benefit, emphasis on practical results, diversity in form and economic development (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Mutual benefit is manifested where foreign aid for a long time had crippled African countries Kenya included. With the issues of conditions attached to it, many countries that could not meet the Western standards missed out on aid. China is seen as a way out

of the mess that the West created. This study hence concluded that China upholds the principle of Mutual benefit in its economic diplomatic dealings with Kenya.

4.9.2 China's Non-Interference in Internal Affairs of Kenya

Twenty (20) of the respondents which is (86.95%) indicated that China upholds the principle of non-interference in Kenya's internal affairs including politics while only one (1) which is (4.34%) disagreed and the same percentage was uncertain.

From this statement it can be rightly argued that China does not buy the ICC's principle of complementarity. Ongiri (2014) equally expressed the same sentiments. Yang asserts that China is opposed to the principle of complementarity in international Law that allows the ICC to intervene in cases that it views the judicial system of a particular sovereign state has no capacity or is simply unwilling to bring suspects to justice. This was confirmed by one (1) (4.34%) of the respondents who indicated that China interferes with internal affairs of Kenya. During an interview with a director with Kenya investment authority, the officer had this to say:

China has refused to use its diplomatic power as leverage against governments that commit even the most extreme human rights abuses or corrupt practices. It justifies its "clean hands" stance by pointing to its long standing policy of non-interference. (Director, 13/7/2023, Nairobi).

Since 1950s, China has effectively used the doctrine of non-interference to guide its foreign policy agenda in developing world. China originally used the policy in 1954 when China tried to reach out to non-communist countries of Asia. An assistant director from the ministry of interior had this observation to make during an interview session submitted that:

The non-interference policy is more popular among leaders than the ordinary citizens as the policy does not force leaders to accept democratic standards in order to partner with China. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

China believes its domestic issues are nobody's business, so it has no interest in meddling in the internal affairs of others (Finkelstein (2005)). This policy has been received enthusiastically by most African governments including Kenya thus it's one of the social factors influencing Kenya-China relations. This study hence concluded that China upholds the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of other states.

4.9.3 Mutual Respect for Territorial Integration

A total of nineteen (19) respondents which is (83.06) totally agreed with China's principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity while only one (1) (4.34%) disagreed and a further one (1) (4.34%) was uncertain. This respondent suggested that although China upholds the principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, China is increasingly showing its determination to set aside this principle if its core interests are threatened. This could be as a result an increased Chinese economic interests that should be protected. This same allegation was held by Xi Jinping and former Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo in their speeches where they noted that while some of Beijing's positions on its core interests required clarification, these interests basically relate to maintain its national sovereignty and territorial integrity those matters that fall under its core national interests (Institute of Defense and strategic Studies 2014). A director in the ministry of foreign affairs had this to say during an interview:

China really upholds the principle of non-interference. This was clearly evidenced by Kenya's International Criminal Court's cases

concerning the 2007-2008 post-election violence where China held that it was up to ICC to decide whether national criminal Rules or procedures conformed with the intention to bring the suspects to justice. (Director,2/5/2023, Nairobi).

This study found out that China values its principle of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state hence this principle guides Kenya-China bilateral relations.

4.9.4 Mutual non-Aggression

Nineteen (19) respondent which translates to (82.60%) totally agreed with the principle of mutual non-aggression while one (1) (4.34%) did not agree in this issue as the same percentage was also uncertain. This is in agreement with the findings by (Barkan 2004). who argued that China never acquires resources by coercion but instead it uses a win-win economic diplomacy aimed at multilateralism, mutually beneficial cooperation and the spirit of inclusivity as the core of its economic diplomacy. An assistant director from Kenya National Treasury confirmed this during an interview discussion by stating that:

China has adopted a win-win situation in its overseas Development Assistance policy. The projects are sustainable and stimulate economic growth. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

From this revelation, this study found out that indeed China regards the principle of mutual non-aggression as one of its foreign economic principles.

4.9.5 Equality

For this principle it was unique that eighteen (18) respondent (78.26%) disagreed that the principle of equality is practiced by China in its bilateral relations with Kenya while four (4) (17.39%) were uncertain as only one (1) (4.34%) totally agreed. This revelation is against the assertion by EUCE (2013) that China does not maintain a donor-recipient relationship with its allied states to counter accusations of colonialism. However, EUCE agreed on China's conditionality in assuring privileges for Chinese companies and ensuring promotion of resource diplomacy and access to agricultural products. This in itself dilutes the principle of cooperation among equals as held by China. From these findings, the researcher found out that China does not live up to its principle of equality.

4.9.6 China's Principles of Peaceful Coexistence

Chinese economic diplomacy advocates for good neighborliness (preventing external instabilities from spilling over to fuel frictions). The then Prime Minister Zhou introduced five principles of peaceful coexistence during negotiations with India over the Tibet issue in 1954. These principles included: -mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in internal affairs of other states, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence (Dietz and Kyriakos 2012). Although Sino-African relations are anchored on the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs of other states, China has taken a greater role in security affairs. This was evident when China extended its cooperation with Kenya to the military arena in what appeared to be a desire to secure its interests (Africa Policy Institute 2014). This study sought the respondents' views in order to validate China's application of its principles of peaceful coexistence in the context of development of infrastructural projects in Kenya. An

assistant director from Kenya national chamber of commerce and industry had this to say during an interview session discussion:

The policy of non-interference is embedded in the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence that prevents Chinese leaders from intervening in the internal affairs of another county. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Fang (2012) continues to report that from this realist's perspective it is believed that China's concept of peaceful rise may not last because once a state has achieved that persistent position, it will strive to prevent potential rivals challenging its dominance. China is therefore likely to use force to maintain its status once it becomes a regional power in Asia and possibly Africa.

4.9.7 Economic Viability of Chinese Loans to Kenya's infrastructural development

This study found out that Chinese loans to Kenya's infrastructural projects are given at an interest rate of (2.0%) with a grace period of 7years. This is coupled with a repayment period of 20yers plus a commitment fee of (0.5%) and a management fee of (0.5%). This study revealed that Chinese infrastructural development in Kenya are sustainable as shown in Figure 4.1.

Looking at the key characteristics of how Kenya relates with China, it is evident that China is a core state while Kenya is a peripheral state according to dependency theory. This is because as much as China earns interest from the loans that it gives to Kenya, the terms and conditions are equally favorable to Kenya.




Figure 4. 1: Views from Respondents on Economic Viability of Chinese loans to Kenya

Source: (Field data,2023)

Twenty-one (21) respondents out of twenty-three (23) which is (91.30%) rated this infrastructural investment as economically viable to Kenya while two (2) (8.69%) rated it not economically viable to Kenya. Going by the respondents' view, the researcher concluded that Chinese loans to Kenya is economically viable.

4.9.8 Sustainability (interest Rates, maturity and Grace Period) of Chinese Loans

Thirteen (13) of the respondents which is (56.52%) totally agreed that the loans are sustainable while four (4) (17.39%) found the loan unsustainable as the remaining six (6) (26.08%) had no information about the loans sustainability as shown in Figure 4.2.




Figure 4. 2: Views from Respondents on Sustainability of Chinese Loans to Kenya

Source: (Field data, 2023)

During an interview with an assistant director Kenya National Chambers of Commerce and industry the officer had the following to say on sustainability of Chinese funding of infrastructural projects in Kenya:

The projects are sustainable hence economically viable as the support is opening economic opportunities in the region. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

The statement affirms the allegation that although Kenya does not have the resources that attract China to other states, Kenya is strategically placed as a get way for trade in

Eastern and Central Africa. This study therefore, concluded that Chinese loans to Kenya are sustainable and thus viable.

4.10 Greater Beneficiary between China and Kenya

The researcher required the respondents to state which states between Kenya and China do benefit from the funding of infrastructural projects by China both in the long term and short term. The responses found were as follows in Table 4.5:

Table 4. 3: Respondents: Level of Agreement on the Greater Benefactor between China and Kenya (N=23)

China's infrastructural projects in Kenya	Totally agree	Disagree	Undecided
Are beneficial to both states at the same degree	4(17.39%)	14(60.86%)	6(26.08%)
Are only benefitting China	21(91.30%)	2(8.69%)	0(0.00%)
Are only benefitting Kenya	3(13.04%)	15(65.21%)	5(21.73%)
Are largely in Kenya's favor	18(78.26%)	0(0.00%)	5(21.73%)
Are largely in China's favor	21(91.30%)	0(0.00%)	2(8.69%)
Are currently largely in China's favor but will gradually favor Kenya	21(91.30%)	2(8.69%)	0(0.00%)
Are currently in Kenya's favor but will gradually favor China	2(8.69%)	0(0.00%)	21(91.30%)

Source: (Field data 2023)

The findings as tabulated in Table 4.3 revealed that China will benefit more from the infrastructural projects it funds in Kenya both in short and long term. Twenty-one (21) out of twenty-three (23) respondents which is (91.30%) totally agreed that only China is benefitting. On the other hand, twenty-one (21) respondents which is (91.30%) indicated they are largely favoring China. The same respondents of (91.30%) revealed that Chinese infrastructural projects in Kenya are largely in China's favor but will gradually favor Kenya. An interview done to a senior director from Kenya's National Chamber of Commerce argued in favor of the assertion saying that:

Kenya also exports a lot to China and they offer Kenyan companies favorable contracts. This is done in exchange of the infrastructural projects awarded to the Chinese (Senior Director, 3/5/2023, Nairobi).

China's effort to fill the gap of the trade imbalance between itself and Kenya was revealed by this argument. Of the twenty-three (23) respondents, three (3) (13.04%) agreed that Kenya stands to benefit while two (2) (8.69%) revealed that Chinese infrastructural projects in Kenya are currently in Kenya's favor but gradually favor China. They cited resource exploitation in exchange for funding infrastructural projects as a threat to Kenya. A director from ministry of interior had this to say during an interview:

These infrastructural projects funded by China are the ones making our leaders to allow China to import so many products to Kenya thus killing our local industries. Kenya Imports a lot of products from China which make Chinese companies and citizens to benefit. So as much as it looks as if it is favoring Kenya, it will gradually kill our industries in China's favor (Administrator, 18/5/2023, Kiambu).

According to this respondent, there is fear that Chinese imports in Kenya are threatening the local industry. He argued that as much as the current picture seems to favor Kenya, if the trend continued, China would stand to benefit as Kenya industries

would be dying slowly. This assertion is equally held by Fang (2012) who suggested that China really underscores the conditionality in assuring privileges for Chinese companies. However, none of the respondents was undecided on whether these infrastructural projects are only benefiting China but will gradually favor Kenya. Therefore, this study found out that engagements between China and Kenya in infrastructural projects is that Chinese fund in Kenya are largely in China's favor.

4.11 China and Infrastructure Development in Kenya

In this sector, the researcher noted that China Roads & Bridges, China Wu Yi and Sino Hydro companies are the main companies constructing infrastructural projects in Kenya. For instance, in railways, there is the SGR railway line which ought to have been from Mombasa to Rwanda. Unfortunately, both airports and sea ports recorded lower investments as shown by twenty-two (22) and eighteen (18) of the respondents (95.65%) and (78.26%) respectively. This was so because the research revealed that some of the respondents were not aware that Chines are also involving themselves in ports constructions. An assistant director from Kenya Chambers of Commerce had this to say during an interview: -

The value of China's exports to Kenya rose to 93.6 billion from 63.6billion in a similar period in 2014, moving ahead of India which has been the largest seller of goods to the local market since 2011. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Kiambu).

India's export to Kenya dropped to Sh80.6 billion in April from sh84.5billion in April 2014 (Daijong 2015). Hence the study concluded that China is increasingly overtaking some of Kenya's traditional trade partners and that the impact is being felt by a cross

section of Kenyans. This revelation also supports the findings that China's economic diplomacy is beneficial to Kenya's development of infrastructure.

4.12 China's investment in Kenya's infrastructural projects

There are a number of infrastructural projects funded by China in Kenya since 1963. However, the researcher purposively selected the following: The Standard Gauge Railway being the most expensive infrastructure since 1963, Moi international sports center being the largest stadium in Kenya, Kenya University Teaching and Referral Hospital (KUTRH) being the largest hospital funded by China, Lamu sea Port (LAPSSET) being the only sea port funded by China and Thika Super Highway since it's the first complex highway to be funded by china.

The standard gauge railway (SGR), Moi international sports center, Kenyatta University Teaching and Referral Hospital (KUTRH), Lamu sea port (LAPSSET) and Thika Super Highway are part of the most constituent part of the infrastructure purposively selected for this study. A director in the ministry of transport and infrastructural development reiterated during an interview session that: -

China's financial support for Kenya's infrastructural development varied considerably among different projects. The Standard Gauge Railway being the most expensive infrastructure since 1963, (Director,22/5/2023, Nairobi).

It is also evident that these infrastructural projects funded by Chinese government have attracted a substantial amount of money in loan form from China as illustrated on Table 4.4.

Table 4. 4: Infrastructural projects funded by China in Kenya

Project	Loan Value	Comments
Kenyatta University Teaching, Research and Referral Hospital (KUTRRH)	Ksh 9.85 billion	Concessional loan
Moi international sports centre-Kasarani	\$12.2 million funding agency china ministry of commerce	Concessional loan
Lamu Port construction	\$157million	Concessional loan
SGR construction	Ksh 300 billion	Concessional loan
Nairobi Thika Super Highway Improvement Project.	Ksh 9.4 billion	Preferential loan

Source: Kenya-China Economic and Trade Cooperation (2013)

Table 4. 5: Percentage of FDI Inflows According to sectors

Project	Year	Amount	Percentage (%)
SGR	2014 – 2017	US\$3.4 billion	46%
LAPSSET	2012	US\$ 510 million	21%
Moi Sports center	2010	KShs 305million	14%
Thika Super Highway	2009	US\$ 100million	11%
KUTRH	2019	KShs 100 million	8 %

Source: Financing Development and Socio-Ecological Transition: A Review of Chinese Investment in Kenya 2016 and National Treasury 2019

The standard gauge railway (SGR) is the most expensive infrastructural project with (46%) of the FDI, followed by Lamu sea port (LAPSSET) with (21%) of the FDI flow as Moi sports center Kasarani went for (14%) of the FDI inflow while thika super highway at (11%) leaving (8%) for Kenyatta University Teaching and Referral Hospital (KUTRH).

4.12.1 The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR)

The SGR is the most prominent expensively constructed with 46% of the FDI inflows this is because according to Mayer (2013), china considers Kenya as a major part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) as well as the new found corridor signifying enhanced collaboration with Kenya. China also regarded the Mombasa-Nairobi railway corridor

as part and parcel of its Maritime Silk Initiative (MSI). This is confirmed by an assistant director from the ministry of transport and infrastructural development during an interview:

The standard gauge railway when completed will create the highly desired linkage to the landlocked states of East Africa region that both states Kenya and China expected to provide a large market for their products. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

4.12.2 The Response of Kenyans to the SGR Project

The response of the Kenyan populace to the building of the SGR is one of its kind since this is the most unique infrastructure since 1963. The SGR is the latest most expensive infrastructure and the one that was completed a year before the stipulated time as well as the closer ties that have been forged by the government of Kenya with the PRC is one of mixed nature. An assistant director from ministry of transport and infrastructure development said this during an interview; -

Some Kenyans view the infrastructure building by loans from China and intensification of ties as a good thing and a welcome one to challenge the overreliance on Western actors who often impose stipulations on aid or loans rendered. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Here, China provides an alternative that goes against the grain and the age-old narrative of Western domination in a continent and nascent nations that seek to write their own narratives and drive their own development in the African continent.

A good deal of the Kenyan populace sees China in a positive light and perspective for a number of reasons. The Kenyan infrastructure scene had always been mired with delays, corruption allegations and very substandard delivery of services by the

government (Barker 2020). It is not hard to see why China benefits Kenya and how this is a good look and something that some Kenyans use to justify their approval of Kenya's ties with Beijing. According to a Pew Research survey, by 2018, 67 percent of Kenyans were favorable to China and saw the work of China in the country as important, with the potential of developing the country and leading to an overall growth of the economy.

The negative side and grim views on the workings of China in Kenya, and particularly the loans used to fund the SGR as well as the project itself have also played out strongly not only in Kenya but also around the world. The critiques of the SGR project have been quite many, with the critics launching lots of missives towards the government with the aim of getting to the truth about the dealings of the Kenyan and Chinese governments.

To begin with, the huge price tag of the SGR has been the main talking point of the critiques that have been voiced concerning the project. The government of Kenya took an enormous loan totaling upwards of five billion dollars to finance the Phase 1 and Phase 2A of the SGR. At the beginning, Kenya's government had sold the claim that the project would eventually end up paying for itself from the revenue that it would generate but the economics of it, as shown by Kenya's leading economist Dr. David Ndii shows otherwise.

According to Dr. Ndii, the Madaraka Express is a 'lunatic express', one doomed to fail because of the miscalculations of the economics behind it. Ndii writes thus of the SGR project: 'In the beginning was a fiction – that the Chinese railway would freight 22

million tons a year, and in so doing, replace the trucking business. Turns out – and this from the government’s own internal assessments – that the maximum amount of annual freight on the SGR is 8.76 million tons, almost a third of what was promised. Interest alone on the \$3 billion debt is US\$200 million (KSh 20 billion) per year, which works out to KSh 45,000 – KSh 60,000 per container. Contrary to official assurances, the railway will require both State coercion and a massive public subsidy to stay in business. Ndi’s argument is that since the funding of the SGR was mainly done with loans from China, and not using bonds which typically carry low interest rates, Kenya now bears a huge burden as a result of the higher interests accruing from the loans. Many Kenyans are worried that this debt will finally come to haunt them in the long run (Barker 2020).. There have also been cases of corruption that have been reported to have plagued the SGR project. In 2015, two officials of the CRBC were arrested by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission detectives and charged with corruption. Furthermore, the secretive nature of the loan contracts between Kenya and China have only helped to further fuel the negative views of the bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Episodes of alleged racism in the working sector of the SGR have also been reported and this has had negative consequences on the view of Kenyans towards China and the purpose of the project (The Daily Nation, 2018). Despite this outcome an assistant director from Kenya Investment Authority during an interview had this to say:

Nevertheless, the main sentiment of many Kenyans towards China and the Chinese people is a majorly positive one. In 2014, a large majority of Kenyans, (77%), thought that Chinese firms

were having a positive impact on the development of the country.
(Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

This sentiment has held up well although it has fallen ever so slightly to (73%). There is no indication that the sentiment of Kenyans towards China will fall in the near future. Of the nine people that the researcher discussed with in a focus discussion group, five of them were favorable to the presence of China and Chinese-backed projects in the country. The other four saw it as spelling a negative and bleak future for a country with a fledgling economy. Generally, the projects built using the loans from China have been met with approval by a majority of Kenyans. The only thing that will sour this positive view is if the loan situation goes south.

4.13 Summary

This chapter analyzed the first specific objective which examined the influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya. in the nature of Kenya-China relations since 1963. The study found out that the final authority on economic diplomacy formulation, conduct and projection lies in the hands of the president. Kenya's presidents in the past five decades have reacted differently to international geo-political situations and this was used to explain Kenya-China relations since 1963. The discussion has been done by examining the motivation behind China's engagements in funding infrastructural projects in Kenya. This study found out that China's highest motivation is to market its goods in East African region at large. The next revelation was that China's principle of mutual development is an emanation of China's core principles of Peaceful co-existence. Mutual Benefit in China-Kenya bilateral relations was came out as the most highly applied in Kenya among the principles of peaceful co-existence. This chapter further revealed that Chinese loans to

Kenya are sustainable thus viable. It is also worth noting that engagements between China and Kenya in development of infrastructural projects (Thika super high way, Lamu port, SGR, KUTRH and Moi sports center) are largely in China's favor as has been revealed. It has also been discussed that Kenya-China bilateral relations have a positive impact on Kenya's international relations. The next chapter will assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values and technology to infrastructural development in Kenya. This is the second objective of the study.

CHAPTER FIVE

SOCIO-ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CHINESE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSFER OF VALUES AND TECHNOLOGY TO INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA

The Second specific objective of the study was to assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values and technology to infrastructural development in Kenya. The objective aimed at answering the second research question of the study through assessing the acquisition of values, new skills and technology by Kenyans. The study first discusses how Chinese values of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism have been transferred to Kenyan site workers on infrastructural construction firms. It then discusses the type and level of skills and technology transferred to Kenyans. This is followed by an assessment of the effect that Chinese Construction firms have on Kenya's informal sector.

5.1 Impact of China-Kenya Relations on Kenya's Infrastructure development

The bilateral relationship between Kenya and China might not augur well with the rest of the world especially with the Western states and the USA which have traditionally engaged with Kenya either socially or politically. China has boosted its economic diplomacy tremendously in Kenya especially in the infrastructural sector (Mayer 2013). Another Chinese diplomat observed that China-Kenya infrastructure and development relations is likely to improve Kenya's economic development. It appears that Kenyan elites understand that by acquiring Chinese credit lines they support the growth and expansion of Chinese economy. A director with the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural development during an interview observed that:

Kenya had a very serious deficit of infrastructural development and China was willing to support infrastructural development. First of all, for China their interests lie in the manner in which they finance a project, but still a lot of that money goes back to China. Because they bring the equipment, you also pay for Chinese consultancy in the project and the materials also come from China. So we are indirectly supporting Chinese economy. They spend money on project here to support Chinese economy, but we benefit! We get the infrastructure, so infrastructural development here directly supports Chinese economy. But also supports Kenyan economy because we need infrastructure (Director, 10/7/2023, Nairobi).

Equally an assistant director in an interview session from the ministry of Transport and Infrastructural development observed that:

On Chinese side, the purchase of manufactured goods from China during the construction of infrastructure projects was understood as a win-win situation while on Kenyan side it was understood as mutual benefit. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Half of all construction work underway in Kenya is now being done by Chinese firms (Mbaye 2010). On one hand this trend has triggered alarm and protests among the local contractors who have blamed the government for raising the demand on firms during the tendering process in favor of the Chinese, hence taking up all local jobs and leaving them jobless. On the other hand, (EU) construction companies including United Kingdom to whom Kenya was a former colony, used to have an edge when it came to winning such contracts due to the long economic relations since independence, equally, they also have found themselves out competed in the tendering process of the major construction projects lately. To demonstrate that China and Kenya share the same development aspirations, the two countries have development plans that advocate for improvement of socio-economic welfare of citizens as espoused in the Vision 2030. Thus, the Vision 2030 seeks to make Kenya globally competitive and prosperous where

every person will enjoy a high quality of life (Republic of Kenya, 2008), the Chinese Dream is about prosperity of the country, rejuvenation of the nation, and happiness of the people.

In Angola, Dietz *et al* (2012) uses the concept of rear-view mirror to demonstrate how the understanding of development as modernization unites Chinese and Angola elites. Yet, the same mutual conception of development has not contributed to the expected economic development in Angola. Instead, the poor have been robbed off their pieces of land resulting to “reversals and regression” (Dietz et al 2012). It is such awareness of what is happening in Angola that concerns over sustainability has been raised in what appears as success in Kenya’s infrastructure sector. Whereas Chinese leaders have utilized rhetorical devices to allay any fear concerning sustainability, some Kenyans are skeptical. One assistant administrator Kenya investment authority during a n interview observed:

So in terms of sustainability, do we have long term plans? Take for example the Thika-Superhighway. If we have such models like seven across the country, are we likely to maintain them without calling back Chinese? Our governments have failed to think long term. Chinese would come and build the infrastructure but we don’t expect Chinese to be around here for 50 years to come and maintain the project. And in the event we have 10-15 such projects are we able to maintain them? In the case of Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), has Kenya or East Africa Region embarked on the training of maintenance people to check on the trains, wagons, couches and lines for long, so that we don’t look for Chinese 20 years to come to maintain the infrastructure (Assistant Director, 18.05.2023, Nairobi).

Here the respondents were expected to give their opinion on impact of Kenya-China relations on Kenya’s international relations. This was very challenging since Kenya

decided to turn its back away from its traditional trading partner and developing partners in favor of China. The findings are as shown in Figure 4.3:




Figure 5. 1: Views from Respondents on Impact of Kenya China Relations on Kenya’s International Relations

Source: (Field data,2023)

According to Figure 5.1, Eighteen (18) (78.26%) of the respondents agreed that the impact of China-Kenya bilateral relationship was positive. For them, this relationship had challenged the western states hence they needed to increase their diplomatic relations with Kenya. The study revealed that, of the total respondents, three (3) (13.04%) felt that the impact was low while one (2) (9%) felt that the impact was very low. Those who rated the impact as low cited that the impact was still far away that it was yet to be felt.

However, regarding the negative impact of Kenya-China relations on Kenya's international relations, seventeen (17) of the respondents (74%) felt that it was very low because Kenya-China bilateral relations had not weakened Kenya's diplomatic relations with the west. They cited the recent higher exports of Kenya Products to America compared to China. This was confirmed by (4) (17.39%) and ten (2) (8.70%) of the respondents who rated the negative impact as low and high respectively. An assistant director from the Confucian Institute of Nairobi University had the following to say during an interview on the impact of Kenya-China relations on Kenya's international relations:

By Kenya focusing more to the East, the West feel that they are losing ground on the strategic state in East Africa. By China investing in infrastructure in Kenya, Kenya's diplomatic relation with the west is seriously challenged. This is why the US had to send their Most Powerful Person-President Obama to counter the high profile visits by Chinese delegates to Kenya. This visit found when the Chinese prime minister had visited Kenya and signed a number of trade agreements not so long ago. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, director, made similar sentiments during the interview on China's impact on Kenya's relations with the US:

Kenya's economic diplomacy has transformed through the three governments of President Daniel Moi, Mwai Kibaki and Uhuru Kenyatta. Different from Moi's emphasis on good neighborliness with not so much emphasis on economic development, Kibaki's reign on diversifying sources of funding to include new economic pillars. Kibaki adopted a "Look- East Policy" in foreign relations thereby increasing China's funding for large scale Infrastructure developments while President Uhuru's regime, strengthened Kenya-China bilateral relations (Director, 3/5/2023 Nairobi).

It can be revealed that there is high competition for Kenyan market that is occasioned by heightened trade agreements that are marked with high profile face-face visits from this assertion.

Table 5. 1: Respondents’ level of agreement on China’s Impact on Kenya’s Political Economic and Cultural Relations (N=23)

	Yes	No
Political Relations	14 (60.86%)	9(39.13%)
Economic	16(69.56%)	7 (30.43%)
Cultural	3(13.04 %)	20(86.95%)

Source: Field data (2023)

From Table 5.1, it can be revealed that Kenya’s economic relationship with the West has been affected as indicated by sixteen (16) respondents (69.56%). The heavy investment in economic sector by Chinese government and the dwindling West investments are surest way to prove that the relationship between Kenya and the West has strained. Most respondents argued that language barrier is the major hindrance to Kenya’s cultural relationship with China as indicated by twenty (20) (86.95%) of the respondents when they rated No under cultural relationship. Only three (3) (13.04%) confirmed that China’s increased relations with Kenya has affected political relations between Kenya and the West. An assistant director in the ministry of transport and infrastructural development during an interview confirmed this by saying that:

Since China’s donation is pegged on the infrastructure in question, Kenya still rely on the traditional donors for donations for liquid money donations (Assistant Director, 29/6/2023, Nairobi).

The researcher, from this study, found out that Kenya still largely rely on its native bilateral donors for funding. Although China-Kenya relations has challenged the west to appoint that the US has gone ahead to try and strengthen its diplomatic ties with

Kenya, the growing relationship has not weakened Kenya's relation with the west significantly.

5.2 Positive Impacts of Chinese Investments in the Kenyan Economy

Naím (2018) states that, Chinese investment in Kenya has shown some positive aspects. As noted in a World Bank report, Chinese businesses in Kenya employ on average, 360 local employees, far higher than the average local employees employed in other foreign-invested enterprises in Kenya. The investment has also provided students with scholarships through China's Xinhua News Agency set up a branch office in Nairobi since 1985. Furthermore, China has provided significant aid or low-interest loans to fund the construction of the Moi International Sports Center and methane generating pits, the expansion of Eldoret Hospital, and building the Gambogi-Serem Highway, among other projects.

A senior director in the Ministry of Interior reiterated during interview that:

The positive impacts are also seen in infrastructure though government construction projects in Kenya were characterized by inefficiency and these projects took longer than expected due to shoddy work, corruption and procrastination there for many Kenyans have been impressed by how quickly the Chinese can work and complete tasks such as constructing roads and buildings in Kenya. (Senior Director, 19/5/2023, Nairobi).

Thus, compared to the Kenyan government projects, the Chinese workers show how their projects can be completed quickly and cheaply. The local Kenyan response has been one of approval and even amazement as it has also challenged the Kenyan companies to improve on their service delivery. Through these actions, China has

earned much community trust in Kenya and is known for helping create a favorable local business environment.

Western media, particularly the United States, expresses its skepticism about China's involvement in Kenya and views it as a form of 'debt-trap diplomacy' Barkan (2020). The idea of debt-trap diplomacy is rooted in the anxiety of China's rise as a global power rather than Africa's reality. For instance, Evan Feigenbaum of the Paulson Institute think tanks writes that treasury secretary Steven Mnuchin has counseled countries against taking Chinese money, warning it will lead countries into a debilitating cycle of debt, and asset stripping.

Chinese companies have also had a positive influence in the country as they produce quality work, enhance competitiveness, and encourage discipline to deliver within deadlines, which has helped Kenya achieve its infrastructure development goals. In Kenya today, there are many new roads, railways, power grids, and ports built in Kenya at previously unthinkable speeds. Kenya inaugurated a \$3.2 billion railway, funded by China that links the Capital city Nairobi to Mombasa's port. The railway is the biggest infrastructure project since its independence 50 years ago.

Barkan (2020). revealed that, The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), was built with a symbolic meaning behind it as well. It will replace the current railway built by the British colonialists, which was known as a 'monumental folly.' The symbolism is quite apparent as President Uhuru Kenyatta named the new railway line the 'Madaraka Express,' which was named after the Independence Day, June 1st when Kenya gained

its independence from Britain. President Kenyatta seems to be celebrating the new SGR and the freedom from British colonialism. However, many Kenyans fear that they are introducing a new colonial power, China.

5.3.2 China's diplomatic and economic tie

Placing China into Wallerstein's World System, it would find its place in between a core and a semi-periphery state: great volumes of raw materials are imported and technology has advanced tremendously; however, there is still a large part of China that is willing to work for very low labor costs, or living in poverty.

Most African countries have a large labor force that is very willing to work, an abundance of raw materials, and import the high-profit finished goods and thus can be scaled under periphery states. Kenya shares this cheap labor force and a high level of import of such high-profit consumption goods, but has on average little natural resources for other countries to import. Still, the implied movement of capital from the periphery to the core states can be observed between China and Kenya as well, as Kenya's trade balance with China is a deficit, which is rapidly growing (Onjala, 2010). This economic relationship might thus be more beneficial to China than it is to Kenya. However, the influx of Chinese capital does offer Kenya an opportunity to rapidly expand its economy. Trading with China opens up a large platform for exporting products from Kenya, and it can be a great market opportunity.

(Adefolake 2017) states that, the question of how cooperation benefits are divided between China and Kenya is difficult to assess, as many externalities affect both the Kenyan economy as the international trade surround Kenya and China. Furthermore,

China's secrecy around its foreign aid agenda makes it harder to establish clear cooperation incentives. The West has criticized China's foreign policies for collaboration with authoritarian regimes that disrespect the United Nations basis human rights, and for importing Chinese labor for their own benefit

A recurring issue is the integration of environmental and social concerns, as in the African nations where European governments broke off their bilateral relationship due to the violation of human rights and corruption, or disregard of the environment and lack of fostering a sustainable future, China is seen to fill up this gap. Kenya needs competent governmental frameworks and legal systems to channel the foreign investments in order to benefit national economic growth. At the same time, structures to foster the implementation of labor and environmental laws need to be implemented in order to conform the Chinese influences and practices in Kenya to the African benchmarks that focus on a sustainable and fair future (Mwega 2009).

5.3.2.1 Diplomatic ties

Diplomatically, China is aiming to be meddling as little as possible in domestic affairs. However, internationally, the nation is not afraid to engage in diplomatic negotiations. The Chinese State Council has established a presence throughout Africa. A recent measure shows China has the most embassies and consulates in Africa in 2016, with the United States and France as close runner ups.

Of late, 53 out of the 54 African nations have these physical diplomatic ties with China, Burkina Faso committing itself to a Chinese Embassy in 2018. The one nation

that still remains to be swayed being eSwatini (formerly Swaziland). The main reason eSwatini and China do not share such diplomatic ties is that eSwatini recognizes Taiwan as an independent nation. The remaining 53 countries have agreed not to have a diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, which strongly reflects in the Chinese Embassy opening in Burkina Faso (Li *et al* 2017).

It is an effect of the campaign that China launched over the past three years to have the last official diplomatic allies of Taiwan cut their bonds, in order to prevent Taiwan from gaining any formal independence. As China is now possibly one of Africa's most important trading and investment partner, many African nations were pushed towards this diplomatic renouncement of Taiwan due to their socio-economic challenges.

As all 54 African nations make up more than a quarter of the United Nations General Assembly, China made a tactical move with connecting diplomatically with 53 of them. To illustrate the strong force that China has formed for the United Nations negotiations during a vote on the repercussions on North-Korea's violations of human rights in 2007, China clearly defined its oppositional stance to the proposed resolution, whereas every European country, the United States of America, Canada, the most of South America, and Australia approved this resolution.

Nevertheless, subsequently all 43 African nations which received aid or investments from China at that time, voted against the resolution as well, or abstained from voting (United Nations, 2008). The resolution was adopted with a majority of 20 votes, but it showed the diplomatic power China holds over allies.

5.3.2.2 Economic ties

China's growing economy has a sharply increasing demand for raw materials, and the African continent is rich with resources. This is one of the main economic reasons that China moved into African nations, together with its quest to expand the number of markets for import and export and improve its infrastructure worldwide.

As Kenya does not have large reserves of natural resources or crude oil, China engaged with Kenya based on the market and infrastructure possibilities. Kenya has a coast on the Indian Ocean, providing as a great gateway into the landlocked nations in Africa. Compared to, for instance the United States of America and the European Union (EU), Chinese trade with African nations has increased vastly over the past decade. The EU holds the place of the largest trading partner, with an increase of 41% over the past decade; the size of American trade merchandises shrank with 45%; and Chinese trade with African nations increased with 226% (The Economist, 2019). Additionally, large Chinese investments are made in Kenyan infrastructure and factories. Unfortunately, what happens when Kenya is unable to pay back its loans to China, is still unknown. Nevertheless, the loans and investments that the Chinese Department of Foreign Aid and the EXIM bank have made, are economically beneficial to both Kenya as to the African continent, where emphasis may be put on China reluctance to engage in any political affairs.

The South-South relation that China and Kenya share provide a great example for developing countries to join forces and start interacting and cooperating more, creating a powerful body of periphery and semi-periphery states that is able to defend its own rights and wishes (Zezeza 2008).

5.4 Aid, loans and Debt Relief Impact

The study revealed that Chinese loans are offered on favorable terms compared to ancient western financiers. (48%) of the respondents asserted that the advancement of such financial aid by Kenya has brought about socio-economic development but has put more strain on the public. They believed that the loans awarded by the Chinese government to Kenya in some cases have been misused by the government officials through corruption and this has therefore led to sluggishness in socio-economic development. However, (50%) of the respondents to this study were of the opinion that Chinese loans and aid are of very great impact towards Kenya socio-economic development. This is in agreement with the study by Tull who indicated that the loans given by China to Kenya helped in elevating the economic status of Kenya's socio-economic growth for the better. This is confirmed by a director with National Treasury during an interview session who stated that:

China has continued to sign many unconditional loans with Kenya unlike the conventional traditional financiers mainly the IMF and the World Bank which imposed tough structural adjustment conditions in the past. (Director, 12/5/2023, Nairobi).

5.4.1 Continued Growth of Chinese Economic Aid to Kenya after 2013

The Uhuru government entered office when most of Chinese funded projects were still in progress while others were only agreements awaiting implementation from the government. The implementation of Chinese funded projects after March 2013 cannot solely be placed under the regime which took power after this time, but are traced to the previous governments. Since the inception of Uhuru's government, the Ministry of Finance confirmed completed and on-going Chinese funded projects in the country. Among completed projects included the SGR, Moi Sports Centre Kasarani, KUTRRH,

Thika Superhighway and LAPSET whose phase one was finished by the time of this study.

The Chinese government does not only give construction support but also assist in equipping these facilities. For instance, the Chinese people are responsible for funding the construction of Kenyatta university teaching and referral hospital (KUTRRH) equipping the facility and also engage in personnel training (Kenyatta University Finance Department, 2015). An assistant director during an interview asserted that:

The Chinese support for construction, equipping and at times engaging in staff training to the health sector has proved to be of great importance to Kenyans. For instance, the Kenyatta University Teacher Referral and Research Hospital (KUTRRH). (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Kiambu).

However, the Mama Lucy Kibaki Hospital has always hit the news headlines for its poor management with high mortality rates. Different critics have suggested that the poor performance of Mama Lucy Kibaki hospital is a clear indication of donor failure in the country. According to critics, the structure was raised without enough planning and after the construction and equipping, the project lacked donor follow-up. Despite the criticism, the underperformance at Mama Lucy Kibaki hospital cannot be solely blamed on the Chinese people but on Kenyan government too. One of the assistant director in the ministry of health during focus group discussion observed that:

The facility has been given to us, but we are not able to manage. Despite this, the Chinese people have done a lot and still doing a lot in Kenya's health sector among other sectors. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Kiambu).

This study found out that, there exists a general optimistic feeling among Kenya's public and civil servants that Chinese aid to Kenya is strengthening Kenya's efforts to positive development. Chinese aid flow to Kenya has impacted Kenya's internal development. Additionally, this aid has influenced activities of other donors in the country in different ways including making them more responsible hence working in Kenya's interests. A director with the Kenya investment authority during an interview affirmed that:

Chinese aid flow to Kenya has impacted Kenya's internal development. Additionally, this aid has influenced activities of other donors in the country in different ways including making them more responsible hence working in Kenya's interests. (Director, 2/7/2023, Nairobi).

This study therefore found out that it is evident that Chinese people have had a huge presence in Kenya after 2013. This growth is different from the earlier years when the Western traditional donors were the only major donor source to Kenya. This new state has presented new effects and outlook to Kenyan traditional aid donors. The Chinese aid to Kenya by 2015 seemed to have filled up the gaps left by Kenya's traditional donors and at some time competing with these traditional donors in Kenya. The study concluded that the Chinese aid to Kenya complemented other donors at the same time competing with other donors.

5.4.2 A comparative analysis of Chinese Aid and the Traditional donors in Kenya

The complementation of Chinese aid to Kenya with other donors is seen where Chinese aid is directed to areas neglected by Kenya's traditional donors. On the other hand, competition here arises when aid is used as a tool to exert influence rather than

economic support given to a foreign developing state such as Kenya or rather meant to pursue the two.

Despite these competing and conflicting interests, there exists no open competition between Chinese aid flow to Kenya and the Western countries loans to Kenya. United States officials in Kenya from many agencies and members of business community in Kenya always expressed concerns of Chinese activities in Kenya. Among their concerns include their complaint that large inflow of Chinese loans to Kenya, their lower operation costs, Chinese flexibility and lack of transparency on the Chinese engagements with the Kenyan government offers Chinese firms an advantage at the expense of US firms in Kenya (Stanek 2012).

Apart from tying aid to business interests attracting competition among donors, competition also has emerged on donor policies. Traditionally, all aid sources were conditioned and full of bureaucracies which made it unrealistic. Apparently, Chinese aid comes with no strings attached and, in most cases, instant implementation or fewer bureaucracies. China reduced the bureaucratic processes typically fulfilled by one before securing a foreign loan.

Chinese aid goes direct to Chinese companies thereby reducing any kind of process that could have been fulfilled before Kenyan banks receive the loan. The short process typical with Chinese aid has made these loans and grants achieve a bigger success within a shortest period compared to Western sources. An assistant Director from the ministry of foreign affairs during an interview asserted that:

Despite the challenges associated with Chinese aid practice of direct transaction between Chinese government and its companies, the process is better compared to expensive bureaucratic processes by the Western sources. Giving free conditioned aid, which is different from conditioned aid from the Western countries, is a competition in itself. China makes its aid attractive by giving it with no political conditions. Chinese aid also ensures instantaneous results making it more appealing than other sources. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

In addition, the Chinese aid overcomes other donors in Kenya in regard to the amount they give Kenya. China pours a huge sum of money to different sectors aimed at wooing the government officials for a better engagement with China. China's aid measures such as conditioned free loans, instant results, less bureaucracies and large amount flow make its loan more competitive than the Western donors. The outcome of these measures has seen the Western countries losing their monopoly on foreign aid while China has witnessed a tremendous increase on their foreign aid recipients.

The competition between China being a donor to Kenya among other donors has mixed effects. Officials from the ministry of Foreign affairs accept that since Chinese involvement in Kenya, the West has increased its aid to Kenya. The significant increase of funds to Kenya by the western power countries and western conceived organizations come as a result of Chinese serious engagement in Kenya. The western donor's increase of funds is a necessity to make them relevant and protect their original position in Kenya. Other donors in Kenya such as the EU have learned from the Chinese activities in Kenya. For instance, the EU has learned that Kenya's needs and interests occupy an important position in their loan disbursement to Kenya. Mullin (2009) argues that Chinese aid makes all other aid sources more responsible by putting into consideration the receiving country's interests and preferences.

Moreover, it is through the Chinese aid that Kenya's bargaining power among its donors has been increased. Chinese aid has covered Kenya's desperate budget deficit hence having a base to bargain for support from other donors. This has helped Kenya to avoid entering into desperate agreements that would have led into more harm than good. Chinese aid has made Western donors to reduce or relax their conditions for one to attain their loans. A Director from the Ministry of Transport and Infrastructure Development during an interview said that:

At the moment, Kenya does not need to fulfil too many conditions as it used to be in the past before attaining a loan from the Western donors since they have relaxed their requirements. Kenya has been solely depended on the West with no choice. As a result, Kenya has been prone to abuses and exploitation. Therefore, with the emergence of Chinese aid, Kenya has attained itself an alternative source against abuse of traditional donors. (Director, 14/6/2023, Nairobi).

Chinese aid competition has offered a counter balance to the Western traditional sources. Most Kenyans feel that Kenya has been under a wholesale dependence on the Western aid and so Chinese aid is a perfect counter-balance. One respondent alleged that you cannot just dismiss Chinese foreign aid significance as it has greatly improved Kenya's internal development. The respondent further pointed out that from Chinese aid, credit and favorable contracts, Kenya has developed infrastructure in good time such as the construction of schools, stadiums, hospitals, roads, bridges, by-passes, energy production, government buildings, air ports, university buildings among others (Chen *et al* (2016). An Assistant director from the Kenya national chamber of commerce during an interview said that:

Chinese foreign aid in Kenya is so recent compared to traditional Western powers yet its contributions is largely felt than what the West donors have contributed for years. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Despite the positive results attained from donor competition and donor counter-balance in Kenya, Fischer and Katz (2009) argues that there are negative outcomes associated with this competition. The west has acted as Kenya's watchdog advocating and promoting good governance in Kenya. If this position is reduced, then we risk ending up with bad governance. Also, less conditions encourages free borrowing which is also dangerous as it encourages bad governance leading to Kenya's huge debt burden.

Another worrying concern with this kind of competition is that the donors will compete at higher level and loaning Kenya non-accounted for loans. Such money will increase debt burden in the country at the same time encouraging malpractices. However, some respondents feel that in as much as Chinese people are offering Kenya an opportunity to develop, they will never fit into the shoes of the Western powers.

This study found out that, Chinese aid source to Kenya does not only compete with other sources and offer a counter-balance but also complements other sources. Those who find Chinese aid as a complement are few compared to those who see Chinese aid as a competitor. These respondents see a lot of opportunities for Chinese aid in Kenya saying that Chinese aid activities in Kenya do not overlap with duties of other donors in the country. Kenya is a needy country. As such, one donor will not be able to address all Kenyan issues. Therefore, having more donors will fill in the gaps left by other donors without necessarily being seen as a competition or overlap of duties.

In support of this view, a senior director from the National Treasury during an interview had this to say:

Chinese aid complements other foreign aid sources in Kenya. The West who are Kenya's traditional donors are busy putting up measures and giving Kenya support to end poverty and disease control, Chinese people are busy building our infrastructure. Chinese support in the infrastructure sector in Kenya has complemented the United States focus in Kenya on the eradication of poverty and improving the living standards. In most instances, the growth of Chinese foreign aid source to Kenya does not necessarily bring a competition to other sources but rather fills in the resource gap left by other donors and so complements other donor sources. (Senior Director, 28/6/2023, Nairobi).

There is a feeling that Chinese aid to Kenya has no effect to other donor activities. Despite the fact that other donors are curious of Chinese activities in the country, there is a feeling that this aid does not hamper their work or presence. What is so important is how Kenya relates to them and how better it utilizes the given opportunities. Academic experts feel that, if Kenya uses this aid appropriately, the aid will fill gaps not filled over years by the western powers. What Kenya should be careful of is not to misappropriate these funds since it will not only deny Kenya an opportunity to develop, but also destroy the steps Kenya has made.

Equally, Kenyans are optimistic that a good number of donors in the country will improve Kenya's economy. Therefore, having multiple donors in the country will increase the country's capital and if well invested, it will propel the country's development. This will only be realized if there is good division of labor and specializations among the donors and minimum duty duplication.

In addition, technologically, if there is good transfer of technical knowledge from the donors to the country, there is hope for technological advancement and development. This implies that the country will adopt the best and relevant technology for its development. Never the less, there exists an agreement that the above will only be realized if the donors have good coordination among themselves. Good coordination among donors will reduce conflicts and competition between them. (Gadzala 2009).

It is true that many donors in Kenya bring variety of developments which is helpful. However, lack of coordination among donors in the country is quite harmful. Most donors are likely to have overlapping projects in an area or project which may lead to duplication. In addition, the overlap may lead to inconsistency among aid projects (Riddell, 2007). The study identified that though there are less instances in which Chinese aid has been found to be duplicating duties of other donors in the country, some members of the public feel that there are some instances where Chinese aid overlaps with other donors' activities.

Moreover, many donors and projects in the country may destroy institutions. Institutional destruction come as a by-product of many donors and projects in a country. This may occur in instances where there is high cost of keeping in track with the projects, monitoring donor's activities and time to time interactions. Accordingly, donors have unrealistic expectations, too much intervention in the government and failure of the responsible government institution to gain some knowledge from the project implementation leading to the destruction of the government institution (Ngau 2011).

The ministry of roads and infrastructure agreed that they have less to do when Chinese aid funds related projects that the ministry has set out to do. Their work is only to remain in office and only get between and try to bring harmony if any clash arises between Kenyan and Chinese engineers at construction sites. This means the ministry is rendered non-important as a foreign country take over their duty to improve Kenya's infrastructure.

Other practices that lead to institutional destruction include poaching of the best government staff by aid agencies which renders the government institution ineffective. In addition, when a parallel financial institution is formed to handle donor project funds, using aid instead of local taxes, competitions among donors and their changing trends bring too much interference. This denies the recipient government a chance to put into practice its own policy among other challenges brought by proliferation of many donors in a country (Ngau 2011).

For the Chinese people, there are little cases of poaching government staff; in anyway Chinese people rarely employ experts from the receiving country. Chinese also rarely interfere in a country's internal affairs unlike the Western donors. The Chinese people also cannot be off the allegation, Chinese formation of a parallel department to run and monitor infrastructural developments in the country will render the government relevant institution functionless.

Zezele (2008) argue that the more the projects a country engages in, the more the donors fund these projects. Therefore, this requires the receiving country to satisfy the donor's interests and needs. Such a situation hampers the country's capacity to perform its own development. Most respondents for the study were worried of Kenya's capacity to satisfy these multiple donors' interests. If all the Kenyan donors want market for their industrial products in similar manner as Chinese people, then this will automatically kill Kenya's industrial sector. Similarly, if all the donors eye Kenya's natural resources, then, Kenya's natural resources will be drained to zero.

This study found out that despite the negative aspects regarding foreign aid, donors in the country will lead to Kenya's internal development if there is good coordination among them. For instance, donor's participations in different areas of specialization will boost Kenya's economy. However, if there is no good coordination among donors, Kenya risks aid failure which is likely to hamper Kenya's development efforts. If Kenyan donors are too demanding, Kenya's developmental efforts will be directed towards satisfying the donor's interests hence denying the country an opportunity to develop.

5.4.5 Foreign participation and local skill development

According to Pillsbury (2000), the existing literature suggests that one of the key benefits from foreign direct investment, particularly in developing countries, is the human capital development that accrues in host countries through local skill development and technology transfer.

Pillsbury (2000) further observed that as local workers change jobs and bring with them new and improved production methods acquired from foreign enterprises, they contribute to productivity improvements for domestic enterprises. Foreign enterprises may have an incentive to promote local skill development if doing so is more cost effective than importing skilled workers from their home countries. Interviews conducted with construction project managers confirm that importing foreign labor is indeed very expensive and enterprises weigh the costs and benefits of doing so carefully. As noted by director from the Kenya National Chambers of Commerce during interview that:

Bringing workers from China can easily cost up to 10 times as high as hiring workers locally. Expatriate and repatriation compensation and benefits are now too expensive. Finding local employees in the construction sector that can deliver projects that meet quality standards on time and efficiently is therefore vital for foreign enterprises to remain competitive in the market. Where there is a significant skills gap, foreign enterprises often rely on on-the-job training to upgrade the skill set and capacity of locally-hired workers. (Director, 30/6/2023, Nairobi).

The study found out that local workers change jobs and bring with them new and improved production methods acquired from foreign enterprises, they contribute to productivity improvements for domestic enterprises.

Pillsbury (2000) adds that in the case of Ghana, two types of training are observed in the construction sector: short-term general training, and long-term specific training. Short-term general training is typically related to occupational safety, health, and environmental and social awareness; while long-term specific training is often related to the skill set required by a specific profession, such as stone masonry, welding,

plumbing, digital mapping, and surveying. Workers that receive short-term general training often do so as part of a group for short training sessions, usually lasting for up to half a day per session per month.

This type of training is normally recurrent throughout the project cycle in order to maintain workers' awareness of occupational safety, health, and environmental and social issues. Long-term specific training on the other hand typically takes the form of apprenticeship and builds on initial skills already accumulated by the worker through previous work experience or technical education. Workers are normally assigned a supervisor who trains them while working. This type of long-term specific training can last up to three to five years depending on the complexity of the task. Workers usually earn a daily wage during the apprenticeship period, and reach the professional level of competence upon successful completion of the apprenticeship. Estimates show that 13.1% of all employees in Ghana's construction sector were engaged in apprenticeships in 2015.

Short-term general training and long-term specific training ensure that new and improved skills are transferred to local employees. Hence, it is possible to see manual workers or unskilled laborers acquire specific and complicated skills that increase their competencies and competitiveness within the construction sector. The experience of one local employee who rose through the ranks as a manual laborer to a project manager in a foreign-owned construction enterprise better exemplifies this mechanism.

As he noted during a survey, “I have never been to a vocational school, everything I know that got me to this position, I learned through observation and instructions by working with highly skilled foreign workers from other countries. Once new skills are acquired, not only do they help increase the skill set of local workers, but they may also contribute to improvements in the quality of work delivered, reduction in waste, and improvements in efficiency during project construction. An assistant director from the treasury had this to say during an interview: -

China poses as a competitor to the West for relations with African nations. Improving infrastructure on the continent has become China’s comparative advantage, and the construction of the SGR is estimated to have created 46,000 jobs in Kenya. Chinese infrastructure institutions acknowledge the importance of infrastructure for modernization, having themselves experienced this recently. Having experimented with infrastructure technology, Chinese corporations are now able to provide African nations with effective and developed infrastructure technology. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

It must come as no surprise that Kamau (2007) states infrastructure as one of the main areas for investments for a developing economy, and in Kenya, roots in the colonial system have been blamed for the economic stagnation. By literally replacing its colonial past by the SGR replacing and expanding the old British colonial railroad, Kenya has a chance of furthering African cooperation and sharing prosperity. The new railway has decreased the transit into the land from 16-24 hours to a maximum of 8 hours, thus decreasing the transport costs. This is one of the reasons why Kamau (2007) places such importance on improving infrastructure for a developing nation such as Kenya: when transportation costs drop, investment is attracted, regional trade can be stimulated, and new export opportunities present themselves.

According to Jean Marc (2017), the Chinese government has financed some of the largest projects Kenya has even seen, and while aiming to expand Kenya's trade and economy, more than half of Kenya's total bilateral debt has recently been estimated to be owed to China. The largest Sino-Kenyan project is currently the Stand Gauge Railway, which was, as elaborated on above, meant to bring flexibility and prosperity to Mombasa, Nairobi, and all the cities it connects in between; however, profits have had the nation waiting, and in the first years since opening, the railway has been losing money.

At a certain moment in future, according to Chen *et al* (2016) Kenya will have to start paying back these loans to China. Debt repayment is tied to the sustainability and profitability of the large projects it funds. This requires the Kenyan government to adequately evaluate the prospected returns from the (infrastructure) projects, and domestic capacity should be built to operate them in the long run. This means Chinese enterprise should be involved in local training, and ideally, push the Kenyan government to facilitate the transfer of the skills and technology needed to maintain the projects from Chinese to African ownership. In the contrary, an assistant director Kenya Investment Authority said during an interview: -

There is no clear plan on how China SGR loans repayment will happen, in what time frame, and where Kenya will get the proper credits as the promising SGR is not delivering its intended profits. Kenya has accepted an estimated \$4.9 billion for the construction of the SGR, and losses in the first year of operation were reported to be equivalent to \$98 million. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

5.4.6 The transfer of values, skills and technology

According to a study on China in Africa Perspectives on China in Africa, by Branch (2011) Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has various by products, however, an important potential by-product of FDI in Kenya-China bilateral relations is that Kenyan firms might be exposed to transfer of advanced technology or enhanced skills. Such exposure could come along with positive spillover effects on the efficiency and competitiveness of Kenyan firms. It's an open secret that Kenya needs new technology and professionalized training of which China is a key source. China on its side has fulfilled its commitment to help train Africa's emergent professional workforce. For example, between the year 2000 and 2006, a total of 16,000 professionals were trained in China and another 15,000 more in various sectors from 2010 to 2012. He further revealed that the Western world is never prepared to transfer technology-but the Chinese do. Even though Chinese technology may not be as sophisticated and complex as the west one, it's better to have Chinese technology than have none at all.

Branch (2011) in a study on Understanding Kenyan Agency in the Acquisition and Utilization of Chinese Development Finance in the Transport Infrastructure, 2003-2017, revealed that the CRBC was expected to follow Kenyan labor laws in addressing local labor issues. By mid2015, CRBC employed more than 10,000 local workers as masons, mechanics, carpenters, and heavy construction equipment operators. Furthermore, at least 1,000 Kenyans had worked on the project from the level of foreman and middle manager. Over three years the construction of the SGR saw in total the creation of 38,000 temporary jobs. However, there were reported cases of wage discrimination by Chinese managers in both phases of the SGR. The project recruited workers from both rural and urban counties. Some workers were sourced from Nairobi

because of the unavailability of certain skills in counties near the railroad. Some of these workers from Nairobi were resented by the locals as they were seen as outsiders, and this became a source of tension in the construction of the SGR.

Li (2017) in Technology transfer in China–Africa relations found out that yet another source of tension was the frequency of strikes by Kenyan workers. A Chinese manager at a construction site complained that Chinese companies often complied with local labor laws and yet he could not fathom why they could not sort out their labor issues amicably with Kenyan workers. A contribution relating to Li (2017), and Branch (2011) was from a director in China Embassy during an interview submitted that; -

Technological skill transfer also was a key component in the construction of the SGR. CRBC established training, in Kenya, in railway operation and management and railway engineering. CRBC also established an advanced training program in China for some 18,000 Kenyans. (Director, 5/7/2023, Nairobi).

Under the management of China’s Ministry of Commerce, high performing trainees were offered opportunities to travel to China for further studies. One of the assistant director from the ministry of transport and infrastructural development during an interview submitted that:

Kenyan firms might be exposed to transfer of advanced technology or enhanced skills. Such exposure could come along with positive spillover effects on the efficiency and competitiveness of Kenyan firms. For example, Technological skill transfer also was a key component in the construction of the SGR. (Assistant Director 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

The study found out that it is an open secret that Kenya needs new technology and professionalized training of which China is a key source. China on its side has fulfilled its commitment to help train Kenya's emergent professional workforce especially those that deal with their funded infrastructure. For example, it was because of SGR that a TTI funded by China was started at Voi.

5.4.7 Transfer of Values to Kenya's Workers on Chinese Firms

Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism are the three philosophies that influence China's foreign policy. Chinese orientation is based on Confucianism's tenet of leading by example rather than forceful conversion (Dietz and Kyriakos 2012). They further stated that Confucianism, in T'ang times, was a social rigid code of behavior that honored ancestors and ancient rituals. Everything had to be done in a particular way. They added that Confucius moral values on interstate affairs were well reflected in the great historical works produced in the Confucian era. A director at Nairobi University's Confucius Institute confirmed this during an interview by saying that:

Among the criteria used by the Chinese in interstate affairs are: respect to the superior status of the Chou royal house, the observance of the legitimacy of authorities at different levels and of their mutual relationship and the distinction between the Chinese and foreigners. The first category of respect to the superior status of the Chou royal house condemned any division of the Chou China by the vassal states. The second category of observance of the legitimate authorities at different levels held that vassal states should be subordinate to the Royal house. In the third category of distinction between the Chinese and foreigners, culture was deposited as the defining standard and not race. Assimilation of foreigners was approved while the opposite was not (Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

This revelation highlights on the foundation of China's national values that are reflected in its principles of peaceful development. The major ones that are highlighted here are mutual respect for sovereignty and mutual benefit. This observation is also held by Cho-Pillsbury (2000). These authors assert that China was to serve as a model for barbarians to civilize themselves. They added that these principles shaped China's economic diplomacy.

Proponents of Confucianism believed that law could not achieve much. The followers of Taoism aim to achieve harmony with the principle of the way by stealing and emptying the mind. In Taoism, Yin and Yang are negative and positive principles of the universe. One cannot exist without the other, and they often represent opposites in relations to each other. As one gets more and more Yang one has, eventually, Yin will appear and replace this increase. Similarly, in the opposite direction, Yang will appear to replace the increase in Yin. What seems like Yin is often supported by Yang, and vice-versa. As an example, to truly know well, one must know what evil is, and without good as a comparison, nothing is evil. Thus, while keeping to one end, do not shun the opposite end, but embrace both as they are. Allowing Yin to flourish, you welcome Yang. By letting go of Yin, one is waiting for its return. As an example, before one can possess something, one must be willing to let it go. A senior director at the Chinese embassy during an interviewed on Chinese foreign policy and had the following to say on Taoism:

The Taoist principle of leaving in harmony greatly influenced Chinese Foreign policy of a harmonious world. The most valuable traditional Chinese values are harmony and cooperation. Examples are Chinese values like cooperation, mutual benefit, and "win-win" (Senior Director, 4/5/ 2023, Nairobi).

This revelation clearly outlines the most critical Chinese values of cooperation and mutual benefit that cultivate bilateral relations that do not end in a zero-sum game. While quoting Stanek (2012) a director at the Chinese Embassy in Kenya had the following to say during an interview:

China uses Buddhism to improve its image internationally. China is too often portrayed in foreign media for negative reasons. For example, Tibetan self-immolations, violations of human rights, crack-downs on Christian underground churches, corruption, pollution, food safety scandals, and others (Director, 4/5/2023, Nairobi).

This observation indicates that Buddhism is often perceived as a peaceful religion. China could be using it as a strategy to wade off suspicion from Kenya. It is however argued that Chinese companies overseas do not work in harmony with their government to their national values. Sun (2014) argued that the proliferation of Chinese commercial actors in Africa broadens the scope of Sino-African interactions beyond the traditional intergovernmental realm. Not all Chinese companies represent or even respect China's policy toward Africa, although they are frequently perceived to do so. Chinese companies tend to follow their traditional operational model in China: the pursuit of low costs, a lack of respect for social and environmental issues, poor labor conditions, a diligent work ethic, etc. Following this model, in many cases, results in direct conflicts with local customs and communities. Among Chinese companies, large companies and SOEs have relatively better track records due to the high profile of their projects and close supervision and management by the Chinese government (Sun 2014). Such supervision and management hardly exists for small, independent, private Chinese companies and individuals.

For many of these actors, the primary goal is to maximize profits and eventually to return to China; there is no long-term or strategic vision. However, when China's broad relationship with Africa is assessed by Africans or outsiders, these actors are seen as implementing China's Africa economic diplomacy, and Beijing gets most of the blame for not properly regulating them (Sun 2014).

The study found out the degree of values gained by Kenyan workers on Chinese Firms and results were indicted as per the graph on Figure 5.2.




Figure 5. 2: Views from Respondents on Degree of Values and Skills Gained from Chinese Firms

Source: Field data (2023)

Figure 5.2 shows that Kenyans learnt very few values from the Chinese. This is shown by 20 of the 43 site workers (46%) who rated the values learnt as low. Some of the respondents who felt that there was very little to learn as a value from the Chinese

counterparts in these companies cited harassment and dismissal without notice even during sickness as reasons for their ratings. Fifteen (15) (35%) rated the values as high. Among the values mentioned were time management, respect to seniors, cooperation and honesty which are coherent with the teachings of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Four (4) (9.91%) and 5 (9.09%) of the respondents rated the values as insignificant and very high respectively. Adida (2008) cautions against premature hypotheses regarding easy cross-cultural exchange between different ethnic groups with similar cultural traits. Guanxi which means social networks (Wasike (2001) is similar to African social networks that are based on ethnicity. She argued that these similarities tend to worsen integration between the immigrants and host communities as host-citizens normally tend to reject those immigrants for fear that they may easily blend in and thus compete for scarce resources.

This study therefore found out that although Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism are the three philosophies that influence China's economic diplomacy to Kenya on development of infrastructure, China's business class such as construction companies might be doing very little to the philosophies as propagated by their National government. The same values are present in African culture and this could be a reason why respondents could not see any new values from the Chinese.

5.6 Transfer of Skills and Technology to Kenya's Informal Sector

This argument is also advanced by Brautigam (2009) who gives the example of the Angolan government which has a regulation that (70%) of all workers must be locally hired. The scholar contends that regulations like these are vital for capacity building

and to ensure that a Sino Africa partnership is mutually beneficial. This author is however careful to note that it is fair to consider that even though local civil servicemen receive training that does not ensure that they will stay with the project. In a country like Kenya where there is a serious shortage of skilled manpower, a brain drain to international organizations is very common. Brautigam (2009) explains that skilled Kenyan civil service worker will receive five times more pay if he works for an international aid agency. This scholar notes that Chinese aid packages also contribute significantly to Africa's capacity building through their training programs, technical assistance in the disciplines of health and agriculture and with their scholarships and cultural exchange programs.

Gathaya *et al*, (2015) concluded in their findings that Chinese companies train domestic workers who later transfer skills and knowledge acquired to local firms. The same observation was made by Blomstrom *et al*, (2002) who stated that workers already trained by or worked in foreign affiliates may be potentially available to work in domestic firms or start their own firms in the same industry. These authors add that training and human capital development are often more important in service industries because training in service sectors is more directly focused on strengthening the skills and know-how of employees, while training in manufacturing sectors is often to facilitate the introduction of new technologies embodied in machinery and equipment. What Blomstrom did not capture was whether the same scenario is reflected in the construction sector especially in infrastructures.

Respondents from the ministry of transport and infrastructural development officers to information about the situation of the skill and technology transfer to workers in a Chinese firm. The results are as shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5. 2: Level of Agreement by respondents on Transferring of New Skills and Technology to Kenya's Workers by Chinese Firms (N=143).

	Are transferring	Are not transferring
Chinese construction firms in infrastructure	88(61.53%)	55 (38.46%)
Bridge construction by Chinese firm	84(58.74%)	59(41.25%)

Source: Field data (2023)

From Table 5.2, it is evident that 88 of the respondents (61.53%) admitted having acquired new skills from Chinese firms engaged in infrastructure developments in Kenya. Fifty-five (55) of them (38.46%) however, felt no skills were being learnt. Pertaining bridge constructions, 84 of the site workers (58.74%) stated that they had learnt new skills against 59 (41.25%) who said that they had not learnt any skills as shown in Figure 5.2.



Plate 5. 1: A research assistant interviewing a Senior Director in the Ministry of transport and infrastructure development

Source: Field data (27/6/2023)

The study sought to find out the types of skills learnt and the results were as shown on Table 5.3:

Table 5. 3: Skills Learned by Kenyan Employees on Selected Chinese Construction Firms. (N=120)

Skills Learned	Percentage
1 Civil Engineering	5(4.16%)
2 Concrete walling	5(4.16%)
3 Truck driving	6(5%)
4 Environmental Health (e.g dumping)	5(4.16%)
5 Laboratory technology/soil analysis	6(5%)
6 Leveling	5(4.16%)
7 Loading	5(4.16%)
8 Machine operator (e.g. shovel, grader)	30(25%)
9 Automotive engineering	31(25.83%)
10 Metal works (metal binding, steel fixing)	5(4.16%)
11 Welding	5(4.16%)

Source: field data (2023)

In accordance to Table 5.3, it was established that out of the 120 site workers under the study, a majority of 31 site workers (25.83%) affirmed that they had acquired skills in automotive engineering followed closely by machine operation at 30 (25%). One of the respondents who had work at Lamu port had the following to say about the skills that she had acquired from COVEC Ltd. This statement actually alluded to the fact that China is keen to ensure capacity building as espoused in its economic diplomacy. Other respondents from- Synohydro Corporation also had similar sentiments.



Plate 5. 2: The Researcher with staff at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after an interview

Source: Field data (3/5/2023)

Truck Driving and Laboratory Technology/Soil Analysis skills were the third highly learnt skills on Chinese construction firms in Kenya. This revelation was represented by 6 of the respondents (5%) in each category. Civil Engineering, concrete walling, Environmental health (e.g. environmental guidelines on dumping), levelling, loading, metal work (metal binding and steel fixing) and welding skills were also mentioned as having been learnt by a smaller percentage of 5 (4.16%) each.

This study therefore established that these were the major skills applied for capacity building by Chinese project(s)/investments to Kenya's informal sector.

From this assertion it can be argued that Kenya is likely to achieve its vision of becoming an industrialized country through its bilateral relations with more developed countries like China. Ten (10) purposively sampled key informants from Agencies from Ministry of Transport and Infrastructural Development, Kenya National Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Kenya Investment Authority, supervisors from respective Chinese construction firms and the Chinese Embassy in Kenya were required to state whether this level of capacity building was beneficial or threatening Kenya's economy. The results were as shown in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4: Level of Agreement by Respondents on Effects of the Chinese Project(s)/investments to Kenya's Informal Sector (N=120).

Rating	Agree	Disagree	Uncertain
Beneficial	102(85%)	9(7.5%)	9(7.5%)
Threatening	39(32.5%)	66(55%)	15(12.5%)
Both beneficial and threatening	91(75.83%)	15(12.5%)	14(11.66%)
More beneficial than threatening	75(62.5%)	23(19.16%)	22(18.33%)
More threatening than beneficial	11(9.16%)	102(85%)	7(5.83%)

Source: Field data (2023)

Table 5.4 reveals that 102 (85%) of the 120 respondents agreed that Chinese project(s) / investments in Kenya's informal sector are beneficial to the economy as there is increase in employment both casual and contractual to the Kenyans. However, 9 of the respondents (7.5%) viewed it as threatening due to the competition that they have given to local contractors. Although Fischer and Katz (2009) agree with Onjalla that prospects of technology transfer are real, they suggest that along with these emerging trends, there is displacement of existing and potential local producers; less spin-off to local economy than other foreign contractors; while increased Chinese FDI could lead to disinvestment and relocation by other foreign investors (for example, clothing and furniture).

It is therefore worth noting that if these allegations are anything to go by then the Kenyan government should put necessary measures to ensure China exports quality

products to Kenya. Kenya should further ensure that the same does not kill local industries. However, 91 of the respondents (75.83%) revealed that it's both beneficial and threatening.

The respondent was fair enough to cite challenges of Chinese products to Kenya but had to highlight on the good side of it such as opening up rural areas for transportation of products to the market. This was further shown by (62.5%) (75) of the respondents who indicated that China's infrastructure development projects are more beneficial than threatening. (19.16%) (23) of them disagreed that these projects are more beneficial than threatening citing cut throat competition from Chinese firms. Only (9.16%) (11) of the respondents viewed it as more threatening than beneficial to the Kenyan economy with (85%) (102) of the respondents disagreeing that is more threatening than beneficial. An assistant director from the ministry of transport and infrastructure development who happened to have worked in one of the Chinese firms during an interview submitted that:

When I was employed by this firm, I could only drive a truck. However, I was curious to learn how to operate other machineries. I was taught slowly until now I can operate the shovel, the grader and others. The good thing about these people (referring to the Chinese), they do not regard your papers so much but they look at your experience. This is unlike other companies (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

A deputy director who had worked at moi international sports center during its construction under the Chinese firm had this to say during an interview:

When I joined this firm I already understood civil engineering. What I had never done was to use that knowledge on construction. This work added more skills to my Knowledge (Deputy Director, 4/5/2023, Kiambu).

From this assessment this study concluded that Chinese investment in Kenya's development of infrastructure is largely beneficial to Kenya's informal sector. This is because all the lower cadre of employees 117 (100%) acquired skills that could make them start their own businesses. This is in relation to modernization theory used in this study. Through capacity building Kenya is expected to fast track its modernization. If site workers were equipped with the requisite skills in whatever infrastructure development, they may be engaged later on as contractors in construction and maintenance. This will reduce overreliance on China thus making it cheaper for the Kenyan government. This study therefore, concluded that Chinese construction firms are transferring skills to Kenyan workers as per their economic diplomacy principle of transfer of values, and skills. This is expected to spur economic growth in Kenya.

5.6.3 Training from Infrastructural projects: A case study of SGR

Many Kenyans as well as business, entrepreneurs and the Kenyan government expected that one of the benefits of the realization of the SGR in Kenya would result in both a transfer of important technology and skills to the Kenyan populace. In the case of Kenya's SGR, much of technology and skills transfer occurred for unskilled laborers through learning by doing. The majority of the unskilled labor employed to work within the various roles in the building of the SGR got to have hands-on learning during their employment period and this allowed them to gain new skills.

In addition, in order to cement the transfer of skills to Kenyan citizens and workers, a Technology Transfer Competence Training(TTT) facility in Voi was financed by the CRBC's Corporate Social Responsibility budget. The facility was opened as a part of

The Belt and Road International Vocational Education Collaboration Alliance, a platform for technical and vocational education and training institutions to deepen cooperation toward harmonization and internationalization of the tertiary training sector (Li *et al* 2017).

According to Uwe Wissenbach and Yuan Wang of the China-Africa Research Institute, the TTT facility was officially opened and training commenced in August 2015, and was welcomed by the governor of Taita Taveta, John Mruttu, who claimed it as one of his initiatives (Maher 2013). The private technical training school is owned by the CRBC, which runs the school jointly with a local private training institute, the Descartes Training Institute. The tutors and teachers involved in helping out with the TTT are provided by CRBC staff. The successful students and workers who enroll and graduate from the school obtain a certificate recognized by the Kenya Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology. The two major sources of students are the local workers employed by CRBC in Voi. The tuition of the students from the Voi area is paid by CRBC, while the students from the rest of the country who go through the training provided by the institute are required to cover their own tuition. As of 2018, there were 150 students training in the school.

It is important to note that despite the much touted technology and skills transfer, there have been lots of accusations towards the SGR staffing policies alleging that even though the premise of transfer of technology and skills was incorporated into the SGR project, the transfer has not really taken place. These allegations posit that the local people hired and trained to do the jobs within the project are not actively involved as

workers from China perform most of the work. According to Paul Wafula, a correspondent for The Standard, one of Kenya's leading newspapers, as of July 2018, while 38 Kenyans were trained in China to be locomotive drivers for the project, 50 Chinese workers had since been hired to perform that task (Kioko 2012). The government of Kenya has refuted these claims and gone on to claim that Kenya will take complete control of the SGR after 10 years as per the contract.

Although the government of Kenya has maintained that there is going to be a demand for the skills gained by Kenyans within the SGR project in other infrastructure sectors, there have been no guarantees whatsoever and there exist no other structured opportunities for continued training other than the Voi facility (SAIS-CARI, 2017). It should be noted however, that even though the future of the Voi TTT facility is not clear, it is by far the better positioned model to meet industry demand for skilled and semi-skilled workers than the Kenyan vocational training system currently in place.

This study found out that, although the government of Kenya has maintained that there is going to be a demand for the skills gained by Kenyans within the SGR project in other infrastructure sectors, there have been no guarantees whatsoever and there exist no other structured opportunities for continued training other than the Voi facility.

5.7 Summary

The findings of the second specific objective which was to assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values and technology to infrastructural development in Kenya, have shown that Chinese social orientation is guided by the

three Chinese philosophies of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. It was isolated that the transfer of these values as entrenched in China's economic diplomacy is however, low in Chinese construction firms in Kenya. The findings have revealed that new skills and technology were being transferred to Kenyan site workers. The imbalanced trade between China and Kenya could be regulated by the Kenyan government as in the case of Angola, Zeleza (2008)

The study further revealed that China's capacity building is expected to spur economic growth in Kenya. This revelation confirmed the truth behind China's principal of mutual development in its bilateral trade relations. The next chapter discusses the findings of the third objective which is to evaluate opportunities and challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya.

CHAPTER SIX

**OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES EMANATING FROM CHINESE
ECONOMIC DIPLOMACY IN INFRASTRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT IN
KENYA**

As Chinese economic diplomacy underscores the need to make the most of their economic benefits from Africa, their pragmatic, mercantilist approach has undermined the foundation for political relations. Most Chinese analysts point out that the Chinese business community's narrow-minded pursuit of maximum economic gains has left little or no room or regard for social, economic and environmental impact, or for the sustainable development of local African communities.

This is believed to underlie the perception that China is the new colonial power. Chinese companies' behavior has, in many cases, alienated local governments and populations, and seriously undermined the soundness of bilateral political relations. The result of such a failure, as Chinese analysts have pointed out, is a reactive diplomacy in Africa, where China deals with individual problems only as they erupt. This pattern delays crisis management and damage control, affecting China's international image, credibility and reputation (Sun 2014). The researcher studied the third research question of evaluating opportunities and challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya.

This is done through an analysis of the terms and conditions of Chinese loans to Kenya and an evaluation of China's respect to Labor laws. Lastly, an evaluation of China's environmental and social standards and corporate social responsibility has been done

6.1 Opportunities emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy

Generally, any reference to African interests in Chinese development finance is often conflated within the broader discussion of drivers of China-Africa relations that bundle Chinese finances, trade and investments on the continent. Rarely does the literature on “China-Africa relations” explain why specific African states are interested in Chinese development finance. Instead, the following five recurring themes on drivers of China-Africa engagement seem to suggest why African states have increasingly preferred Chinese finances: solidarity, diversification of economic partners, regime stability, strategic partnership and exemplar for development experience.

On deriving scholarly strength from a study by Zeleza (2008), this study confirms that proponents of China-Africa relations see African interests as driven by the imperatives of historical solidarity rooted in the Bandung Conference of 1955. At the conference mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, noninterference in domestic affairs of others, equality and mutual benefits were outlined as the Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Since then, these principles especially on non-interference and mutual benefits have continued to dominate Chinese rhetoric around financial support. A director in the ministry of transport and infrastructural development during an interview commented that:

Chinese have a totally different approach to project Implementation. You approach them with what you want, they come and see where you want the project implemented, they quickly provide funds and the following day they are on the site. If it were the World Bank you would still be embroiled in the feasibility tests, then lengthy tendering procedures which sometimes collapse midway over flimsy integrity issues. (Director, 14. 07.2023, Nairobi).

Some scholars Chege (2008); Zeleza (2008) have advanced the argument that some authoritarian African regimes are attracted toward Chinese development finance because it comes without any conditionality that have hitherto been tied to liberal democratic principles such as holding periodic elections and observing and promoting human rights values among others. According to this line of argument, China acts as a safety valve in the event that Western countries and their international financial institutions withhold their economic investments and development assistance, then regime continuity would not be adversely affected.

Chege (2008); Zeleza (2008) further viewed Chinese development finance as a way of diversifying economic partners. In the context of globalization and the declining foreign direct investment from the West, the increasing financial appetite from Africa countries and the eagerness of Chinese firms to invest in Africa terrain otherwise perceived as too risky, has to a large extent contributed to diversification of finances, trade and investment opportunities, consequently leading to economic growth For Zeleza (2008) the ‘China Card’, gives Africa a break from western investors as China emerges as one of the leading economic superpowers. The following studies, Chege (2008) and Zeleza (2008) augment the views of a director in the ministry of transport and infrastructural development during an interview who commented that:

China has totally a different approach to project Implementation. You approach them with what you want, they come and see where you want the project implemented, they quickly provide funds and the following day they are on the site. If it were the World Bank you would still be embroiled in the feasibility tests, then lengthy tendering procedures which sometimes collapse midway over flimsy integrity issues. (Director, 14. 07.2023, Nairobi).

For Moss and Rose (2006) Chinese development finance is viewed as an instrument through which African states forge strategic partnership with China. At the height of the debate on whether Africa deserves a seat at the UN Security Council, Gadzala (2009) suggested that Nigeria and South Africa counted their hope on China's vote. Similar thinking has been advanced for Africa dalliance with China during trade negotiations at the WTO. Through FOCAC, China and African countries have strategically come together to advance for a just world order that would protect their interests.

In lieu of China's impressive economic growth, Zeleza (2008) think that African leaders perceive China as exemplar model of development experience. This thought is augmented by an assistant director view during an interview said that: -

African continent is often viewed in broad terms yet the continent has a variegated history and China has a diverse historical relationship with various Africa countries, and has been more visible in some countries than others (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

And that being a model student, African countries can go ahead and obtain development finance from China. Whereas the debate is insightful and sheds light in understanding China's recent renewed interests on the continent, the above themes tend to generalize all African states as a monolithic entity despite the inherent diversity on the continent. African continent is often viewed in broad terms yet the continent has a variegated history and China has a diverse historical relationship with various Africa countries, and has been more visible in some countries than others. According to this observation, it would be fallacious to assume that these general themes apply to all African states.

6.1.3 Challenges Ahead for China-Africa Relations

While there are more opportunities for the deepening of the China-Africa relationship as the MSR proceeds, new challenges are emerging for both sides on their way to closer exchange and cooperation. A major challenge is growing criticism, especially from Western countries like the United States, on China's "neo-colonialism" in Africa, an allegation that China has always refuted. Take Chinese companies' performance in Africa, for example. Without a doubt, Chinese companies are Africa's first choice for infrastructure building because projects can be completed quickly and cheaply with minimal bureaucratic procrastination.

Yet there is concern that the cheap fix in the short term may turn out to be expensive in the long run, as large-scale Chinese projects in infrastructure, mining and agriculture may bring about displacement and environmental damage to the livelihoods of host communities in Africa. Besides, many Chinese companies tend to bring their own workers for construction projects rather than hire the local labor, which is not helpful to the development of local job markets.

The second challenge is the negative social effect that the MSR may cause as it proceeds. In many African countries, the civil society tends to 20See, for example, Al Mariam, "Chinese Neocolonialism in Africa: The Dragon Eating the African Lion and Cheetah? (Part I)," Al Mariam's Commentaries, September 3, 2017 Revisiting the Resurrected Debate About Chinese Neocolonialism oppose various infrastructure, projects that are deemed to have adverse effects on the community. For instance, in Kenya, the government had to pay millions of dollars as compensation to communities

affected by building the SGR line. In some cases, the project has to be suspended by the courts until all compensation is settled. Environmentalists also took the government to court on the railway line passing through the Nairobi National Park, arguing that it would affect the natural habitat of wildlife within the park. Local laws are sometimes very complicated and time is needed to fully understand and abide by them. Unfortunately, Chinese companies do not always have the patience to familiarize themselves and understand these legislations before starting business.

In this sense, ineffective communication is a major hurdle for future progress of the MSR.²¹ Behind China's trillion-dollar attempt to build a modern Silk Road is a lending program of unprecedented breadth, one that will not only help build ports, roads and rail links, but could also cause many problems to local banks and national economic programs. At the heart of the massive Chinese funds are China's two policy lenders, China Development Bank (CDB) and EXIM Bank, which have already provided US\$200 billion in loans throughout Asia, the Middle East and Africa. As the MSR grows, so do risks for policy banks, commercial lenders and borrowers, all of whom are entangled in projects with questionable business logic, bankers and business evaluation companies. Besides, several Chinese economic practices including heavy reliance on imported Chinese labor despite generally high unemployment among indigenous populations, indifference to workers' rights, direct or indirect support for corrupt and/or dictatorial regimes, to name but a few are fostering grassroots resentment, which may significantly undermine China's popularity and thus weaken the advance of the MSR.²² Yet the biggest challenge to the MSR in Africa is the state of perpetual warfare and chaos experienced throughout the continent.

War and conflicts of different types anti-colonial, international, antiterrorist, inter-state, and intrastate have caused a heavy burden to Africa's development since the early days. At present, terrorism poses a major threat to the security and stability of countries along the MSR, while many countries in Africa are experiencing turbulence from regime change, with the Democratic Republic of Congo being a salient example. Not only does such conflict deteriorate the local environment for investment, it also threatens the safety and efficiency of existing projects, thus undermining the confidence of all parties involved. Therefore, China must work more closely with related African governments to promote the stability and security of those African countries, so as to create a favorable and sustainable investment environment for the MSR initiative to succeed.

6.1.4 Terms and Conditions of Chinese Engagements with Kenya

A major Challenge to Chinese economic diplomacy on Kenya's development of infrastructure is lack of transparency in the terms and conditions of the agreements. The deals between China and Kenya are shrouded in secrecy, and the local population is kept in the dark about the conditions and costs of these agreements. It is therefore worth mentioning that lack of transparency is a real threat to Kenya's fight against corruption. The fact that both Kenya and China have a tradition of bribery could prove an explosive chemistry. China is notorious for using bribes in their ventures overseas. Transparency International listed them at number thirty in their 2006 Bribe Payer's Index for their overseas bribes.

Nevertheless, it is perhaps fair to note that many Western banks and oil companies do not disclose the terms/sums of their transactions in corrupt countries either. In no way

does this justify China's lack of transparency but it does raise issues over Western hypocrisy. Fortunately, there has been a rise of international watch-dog programs (i.e. Transparency International, Oil Watch) that are calling for more transparency and accountability. Additionally, there are concerns that the large amounts of credit from China will be embezzled; fortunately, this is a common misconception. The money that China wishes to invest is so tightly tied to goods and services that it is almost impossible for any of it to pass sticky hands. Money to be invested in development projects abroad is kept in escrow accounts in China. This is a temporary pass through account held by a third party during the process of a transaction between two parties. This money is then transferred directly into Chinese company accounts.

One of the informants however objected to this argument. This assistant director at the Kenya National Chambers of Commerce and Industry said the following during an interview about terms and conditions of China's contracts with Kenya on infrastructure development in Kenya that:

it is not the amounts of China's investment on development of Kenyan infrastructure that is an issue here but the specific terms on which they are lent. Interest rates alongside other conditions could severely harm Kenya's economy not well analyzed. They could also be signing contracts to exploit all our resources in exchange for Infrastructural developments (Assistant Director, 5/5/ 2023, Nairobi).

China's history of secrecy and resource for infrastructure conditionality were the main points brought out by this respondent. Uncertainties surrounding this issue create mistrust. This assertion is also shared by Graham (2011). According to this author "China's continual opaque nature on the matter causes suspicion amongst the local population as people fear that they are being cheated or exploited and it hardly inspires

the West to view China as a conscientious and trustworthy stake-holder. China is wrong to assume that only political elites from both sides of the partnership can remain the only players. As Africa's civil society grows fed up with the lack of transparency in this engagement, their raised voices will become hard to ignore.

One of the respondents revealed that terms and conditions for Chinese trade agreements are treated as confidential information and that he could not divulge the details. An assistant director from Kenya's National Treasury however gave the following terms and conditions for the stated Chinese Infrastructural developments in Kenya during an interview session:

The interest rate of 2.0% with a grace period of 7 years makes the project economically viable. This is coupled with repayment period of 20 years plus a commitment fee of 0.5% and a management fee of 0.5%. The Terms and conditions indicate that Chinese contractors must implement the project. This makes Chinese loans economically viable to the Kenyan government (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

This revelation however came from the Kenyan side and not the Chinese government.

The study therefore, found out that although China-Kenya bilateral agreements seem economically viable, Chinese firms' terms and conditions are shrouded with a lot of secrecy. This is causing mistrust and might lead to an outburst that may harm both countries.

6.1.5 Chinese Firms' Respect of Labor Laws and Human Rights

Table 6. 1: Chinese' Firms Respect of Labor Laws and Human Rights

	Totally agreed	Agreed	Uncertain
Respect for labor laws	28 (19.4%)	53(37.1%)	62(43.5%)

On labor laws issues, 28 (19.58%) of the 143 respondents totally agreed that the Chinese companies followed the labor laws with 53 (37.06%) of the respondents agreeing as a further 62 (43.35%) said they were uncertain about the companies followed the labor laws. These were mostly government officials in relevant ministries. The study further revealed high levels of mistreatment by Chinese Supervisors.

The respondents complained of abuses from their Chinese counterparts. Those who refuted this claim however cited language barrier that could have made some Chinese supervisors to look arrogant due to their limited diction in English and Kiswahili languages. This has a link with the earlier findings in chapter 4 that cited Language barrier as an impediment to cultural relations between China and Kenya.




Figure 6. 1: Views of Respondents on Mistreatment by Chinese Firms

Source: (Field data, 2023)

Figure 6.1 indicates that 79 (55.24%) of the site workers felt mistreated by the Chinese firms that they were working for while 56 (39.16%) felt that Kenyan site workers were being humanly treated well as 8 (5.59%) of the respondents did not know how the Chinese firms treated site workers. Of the three companies under the study, China Wu-Yi recorded the least levels of alleged mistreatment followed by Sino hydro Corporation. One of the scholars from Confucian Institute in University of Nairobi who was on attachment in a China Wu Yi firm confirmed this by saying:

These people are so good. Imagine they even provide lunch for us. As you can see, they have given us protective gears (A scholar, 5/5/2023, Nairobi).

In this study the revelation from this respondent showed the disparity in treatment of employees by Chinese construction firms.



Plate 6. 1:A Researcher Explaining a Questionnaire to the Respondents

Source: Field data (18/5/2023)

The study therefore established that most workers on Chinese construction firms were being mistreated.

Construction Industries with China Road and Bridge Corporation, China Sino hydro Corporation, China Overseas Corporation, and China Jiangsu International have contracts to guide their operations. The collective contract includes standard clauses on recognition, disputes resolutions mechanisms, wage rates and payment, overtime, travel, transfer and housing allowances, leave allowances, injury compensation, maternity leave and redundancy and retirement provisions and termination procedures. However, the clauses on the responsibility of the main contractor for conditions of employment in sub-contracting are not binding. The agreement states that the company "shall draw the attention" of sub-contractors and labor contractors to the existence of

the agreement and "urge" them to adhere to fair labor practices in all work sites and to guard against underpayment to their employees.

6.1.6 China Infrastructure projects continue to be faced by challenges

Although China's involvement in African development has brought positive trends to the continent the relationship between the two parts are facing crucial challenges that needs to be dealt with in order for the positive trends that already exist remain and for new ones to arrive. One of the significant challenges is that China has no long-term strategy under national agenda that points out what the aims and goals are of their continuing presence in Africa. Not only does this reflect badly upon China's intentions for the African people but it also leaves a big empty gap for sceptics to push on the argument that China is only a new colonial power, if no grand plan is presented to the international community. Furthermore, another challenges that is very much linked to the one mentioned above is the internal bureaucratic conflicts. Without a grand set strategy plan the conflict between China's economic and political goals will intensify between different political and economic groups within themselves. Furthermore, the conflict between economic and political aspects of China's role in Africa will have a direct negative effect on existing Chinese companies and businesses in Africa. During an interview an assistant director from Kenya Investment Authority asserted:

A challenges include internal bureaucratic conflicts. Without a grand set strategy plan the conflict between China's economic and political goals will intensify between different political and economic groups within themselves. Conflict between economic and political aspects of China's role in Africa will have a direct negative effect on existing Chinese companies and businesses in Africa. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Some are even arguing that there is a lack of knowledge among Chinese companies that establish themselves in Africa, for instance they do not know much about significant factors such as risk assessments therefore it would be important that this knowledge reaches the Chinese before any further decisions are taken. Not only can this harm the Chinese firms but most likely also the African country they are investing in if investigating it from a long-term perspective (Sun, 2014). The ultimate goal for African government is to make sure that the relationship continues to be as cooperative as it, if not even more, in order to avoid being exploited at any times.

6.1.6.1 Challenges to Sino-Kenya Relations Strategy

Kenya-China trade cooperation has recorded the highest trade involvement since the cooperation was established with China controlling heavy infrastructural investment in the country when Kenya becomes the biggest beneficiary of bilateral debt. These total debt comprises of exports from China along with direct investment of China to Kenya. This therefore, has led Kenya's importation of fake commodities, the inability of the country to expand its industrial sector due to over dependence on cheaper industrial products from China along with threat of employment as the government has been found to increase foreign influx of the Chinese labor force to Kenya.

6.1.6.2: Trade: challenges and opportunities

Data relating to the trade component of China's approach showed that bilateral trade has grown dramatically, particularly over the last decade. Indeed, when the trade relationship is investigated more thoroughly, the research uncovered that trade is overwhelmingly in favor of China. When we look at the goods exported to China, we

notice that Kenya relies on primary commodities such as tea, fruits, and fish. However, China exports value-added manufactured goods such as telecommunication equipment, machinery, and textiles to the Kenyan market. this bonds poorly for Kenya's *net-barter terms of trade* which favored China, to the tune of \$1.5 billion in 2010.

This raises crucial questions: what is the wider significance of China's trading relationship with Kenya and how will this impact Kenya's developmental plans? To begin, Kenya has promoted the idea of diversifying its economy away from being commodity centric to one that is industrial in nature. The orientation towards industrial trade would result in a largely export-led economy particularly of manufactured products. The export-led model was utilized by East Asian economies, including China, to help them rapidly industrialize in the 1980s. An assistant director with the National Treasury stated during interview that;

Kenya's industrialization efforts have come under significant pressure due to Chinese competition, as evidenced by the goods imported into the Kenyan market. Such cheap Chinese goods are double-edged in their effects. Chinese goods have negatively impacted Kenya's small but vital industrial sector by depriving them of a home market. (Assistant Director, 14/7/2023, Nairobi).

This has been noticed by the Kenyan Government, best illustrated by a question put forward by a member of the opposition when asking what the government would be doing to stop this negative trend "most of the factories in this country have closed down because of cheap imports from China...as long as we encourage cheap imports from China, most of our factories will close down and we will not be able to generate employment for our people. The government responded by reminding the opposition member that Kenya's free market policy encourages Kenyan companies "to compete

with foreign companies and improve their efficiencies.” The current dominant international economic order, which China has wholeheartedly embraced, is often at the center of the discourse.

As Munyi (2011) noted, whatever one thinks of Chinese methods, it must be granted that the Chinese have a perfect understanding of a liberal economy, including the huge opportunities it offers as well as well as the many flaws.

This line of analysis was also articulated by Ian Taylor (2009) when he posited, "Chinese economic policies, if at times arguably neomercantilist, are fundamentally capitalist. The post-Mao Chinese leadership is thus doing precisely what the West wants it to do and yet it is, on occasion castigated for doing so in areas formally held to be in the West's sphere of influence. Further, Chege (2008) also argues that fears about China are overstated and that this mainly due the fact China is challenging the current world order by being nimbler in the African market. Others, such as David Harvey, have gone further by asserting that China is part of a global political and economic order that has transported a capitalist regime through a process of 'accumulation by dispossession'. Marcus Power and Giles Mohan have labeled this 'Chinese Neoliberalism' which has its own characteristics, but which is centered on the international market - attracting FDI, technology transfer, and an abundant supply of cheap labor (Power & Mohan, 2011). Importantly, the market fundamentalism that swept the world became a conduit for China to move into African countries.

Beginning in the 1980s, Kenya implemented neoliberal reforms as part of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) mandated by the IFIs, these reforms also necessitated the removal of trade barriers to international trade. These perceived barriers to international trade included the restriction of financial flows, the removal of tariffs to protect local industries, and the strict enforcement of intellectual property rights. Consequently, SAPs were implemented in areas traditionally left under the direction of the recipient countries, including policies that related to industry, market liberalization and privatization. Additionally, countries were encouraged to devalue their currencies, remove price controls on consumer goods as well as policies that 'let the market work.

In Kenya, SAPs became entrenched in government policies after the country experienced a balance of payments crisis as the 1970s came to a close. In the early 1990s, the government had capitulated to donor countries and IFIs after its SAP credits were suspended and started instituting neoliberal policies that pried open the country's market. A confluence of events led to the dramatic shift in policies which included: "the liberalization of imports and exports, the removal of exchange controls and freed exchange mechanisms; [and] removed barriers to foreign investment. As mentioned, especially in 1993, a direct outcome included a striking rise in China's imports into Kenya, this shift to free markets resulted in a number of Chinese companies taking advantage of a less strict business environment which has provided stiff competition to local industries (Chege,2008).

Markedly, China has extended its reach into the Kenya natural resource sector. Chen *et al* (2009) posited that China can be directly credited with the increased demand for

such raw materials globally. The authors argue that African markets are doubly benefiting, firstly, as consumers of the cheap Chinese made goods and additionally as African investors benefit from lower capital costs with an increased access to more products. Secondly, as noted by many African countries such as Kenya can benefit in some instances because the commodities they are sending to China are increasing in price and the cost of the goods imported are reduced. However, this can be a double-edged sword because Kenya can also negatively be affected by the increase in prices of commodities as a resource-poor country.

This is particularly true in the case of oil, which has increased in price due to the emerging economies ever-increasing demand (Chen *et al* 2009) This has raised questions about the true beneficiary of China's resource thirst framing how its development aid is granted in Kenya. Some have pointed to China's strategy of securing natural resources through bilateral agreements rather than trying to acquire them through the open market, especially in the energy sector. In Kenya, the oil for aid strategy was most visible in a 2006 oil agreement the two countries signed. This was reinforced in 2010, when the Kenyan president signed an agreement to transfer oil exploration rights for six blocks in exchange for \$7.5 million in aid grants. Even though, this agreement called for lower exploration fees than both what the Spanish and Swedish oil companies offered to the Kenyan government.

At the time of the agreement, no large oil deposits had been found in Kenyan territory, yet China persuaded the Kenyan government to remove some oil exploration blocs from the open bidding process in exchange for aid. In Kenya, warnings have been issued

with regards to China's move into the resource sector, within which Chinese firms, both state-owned and private, are now major players. Chinese firms have been rewarded with rights in coal mines, the previously mentioned exploration of oil, and into titanium (Onjala, 2008) An assistant director from Kenya Investment Authority had this to say during an interview that:

if the underlying goal of China's aid to Kenya is the drive to access raw materials and markets in Kenya, it will hurt Kenya's economy in the long run by undermining the ability of local firms to exploit the same market and resources (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

For this reason, many have argued that the 'Angola mode' of aid delivery is very much evident in Kenya, including the fact that China ties the aid which it gives to Kenya. To illustrate, the assistance that has been made available is transferred to Chinese companies to build projects. It should be noted that the Kenyan government denies this comparison and in fact, one government official denied the Angola mode applies to Kenya when directly asked in an interview with this researcher. Kenya's embrace of China exposed the growing tensions with its traditional Western donors. For example, a row which became public when German ambassador to Kenya Margit Hellwig-Boette and her French counterpart Etienne de Poncins voiced concerns that the Kenyan president was refusing to meet with Western envoys under the belief the Kenyan government was giving priority to the Chinese government.

The response from the Kenyan government was the "President has been strategic and has not been unreachable to any nation that works for the good of the Kenyan people

and appreciates the role played by external partners in endeavors to uplift the lives of Kenyans and citizens of neighboring states. Consequently, Kenyan government has been cautioned, by the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton among others, of blindly following China's approach to the detriment of other donors, which could bind the country to China. Furthermore, in bid to match China's economic rise in Africa, the United States government released a new Africa strategy that closely resembles China's approach emphasizing trade and investment while reducing the grant provisions, in addition to democratic ideals and security. Meanwhile, the EU has tried, with little success, to engage China directly by proposing the establishment of a tri-lateral method between China, EU, and Africa to cooperate.

Accordingly, some negative intentions of China's financing of transportation infrastructure in Kenya are frequently raised. Many claim such projects facilitate easier access to these raw commodities (Rich 2004) China's focus on infrastructure has aroused suspicion that it is simply acting in its own self-interest in order to access the resources of Kenya's neighbors who have proven caches of natural resources such as crude oil, cobalt, and diamonds. The Chinese government "seized on the opportunity to develop major transport links to support its own economic interests.

This hypothesis had already been widely circulated, as noted by a report in an American news service that countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and Ethiopia rely on Kenya to export their vast deposits of oil and minerals. Infrastructure development in Kenya is crucial to the economic prosperity of the entire region. Likewise, in a prominent example, the U.S.

Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, while traveling in Tanzania and Zambia in June 2011, warned against what she termed 'new colonialism' in reference to China and its approach in Africa.⁴¹ Clinton warned against investors and countries only interested in Africa's natural resources and reinforcing the power of the elites. This forceful pushback by Western countries regarding China's involvement in Africa - and Kenya specifically - has exposed the inherent suspicion China's forceful role engenders.

6.1.6.3 Importation of Counterfeit goods from China

Both statistical and qualitative data of this study indicate that the country is overwhelmed by goods from China, most of which are not long lasting. This finding is in line with the findings by Yang, who further indicated that the entrance into the Kenyan market of Chinese counterfeit goods hampers the entry of the genuine products, hence unfair competition with the genuine products. Identifying differentiating counterfeit products is not easy even when one has the two products. This is because the producers of these products have devised ways of thwarting strategies like barcodes on packaging meant to assist consumers to differentiate between genuine and counterfeit products. Counterfeit products infiltrating into Kenyan markets from China include electronics, pharmaceuticals, clothes, footwear, spares, foodstuffs cigarettes and alcoholic beverages. In this regard an assistant director from the Kenya National chamber of commerce and industry during an interview had this to say:

Anti-Counterfeit Authority have heightened efforts to intercept counterfeit and contraband goods. This crackdown sparked protests from small traders claiming that their businesses suffered while waiting for customs to clear the goods. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

6.1.6.4 Killing infant industries in Kenya

The findings to this study as indicated by majority of the respondents that is (60%) revealed that the implementation of the Sino-Kenya relations strategy has always led to killing of infant industries. Only (5%) of the respondents supported the fact that the adoption of this strategy promoted industrialization in Kenya. This study finding corresponds to the study findings by Yang who stipulated that the fast rate of infuriation of Chinese manufactured products into the East African market, could jeopardize Kenya's prospects for industrialization. As a core component of development strategy, Chinese growing presence in Africa poses various threats to industrialization. An assistant director from the Kenya Investment Authority had these to say during an interview:

These kind of challenges have both direct and indirect impact with the direct impact being affecting country to country cooperation while the indirect are impacts on competition in third country markets. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

With this impact in play, combined with poor domestic conditions such as inadequate infrastructure, high taxation and expensive energy rates, Kenya faces a possible decline in industrialization. Evidently, Kenya's manufacturing growth declined from (5%) in 2013 down to (3.4%) in 2014. The manufacturing sector decline has been worsened by China's taking over of the regional markets of Uganda and Tanzania which Kenya had traditionally supplied. A director officer from the ministry of Interior, during an interview observed that:

Exports from Kenya to East African region are quite similar to those from China, which means that they are easily displaced by those from China which are cheaper. (Director,10/7/2023, Nairobi).

In addition, China is projected to start mass production of agricultural products most of which developing agricultural products most of which developing agricultural countries relies on for exports globally causing a lot of concerns. Some of the products that China plans to perform mass production are flowers, tea and coffee of which Kenya has for long time been leading global supplier especially to European markets. Historically, coffee and tea have been Kenya's leading export commodity. A director from Kenya Investment Authority commented as follows during an interview:

If this comes to pass, then Kenya will be faced with an uphill task given that Chinese products will be cheaper and may venture further into the market. (Director, 11/7/2023, Nairobi).

6.2. Debt-trap Diplomacy

A majority of the respondents to this study, which was (85%) believed that Chinese loans placed Kenya as the recipient into a debt-trap. They were of the view that the funds sourced from China made Kenya heavily dependent on the donor nations. This study finding agree with the findings by Dolan, who concluded that the debts advanced by the Kenyan government from China put the nation at a trap. Kenya has borrowed extensive loans from China in order to develop infrastructures such as loans to build SGR, thika Super Highway, KUTRH, LAPSET and Moi Sports center projects. During an interview, assistant director from National Treasury observed that:

In addition, China also increased importation of its fish and other products to the local Kenyan markets. However, to public uproar over Chinese fish flooding Kenyan markets, president Kenyatta suggested ban of Chinese fish import. In retaliation Chinese government threatened to stop the SGR funding against Kenya besides threats imposing more other trade sanctions. Soon after the government lifted that ban of the importation of Chinese fish to avoid such eventuality. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

This is not the first time that threats related to debt have happened. In 2018 December, it had been speculated that the government of Kenya could lease its largest port, the port of Mombasa to be used as a collateral for Chinese loans that were used to construct the SGR by Chinese. This was because it was feared that Kenya would default on Chinese loans forcing her to surrender the port control to China. Kenyans have questioned whether debt traps emanating from Chinese loans are worth the risk, drawing analogies from Sri-Lanka and some analysts have argued that these loans could put Kenyan independence and sovereignty at jeopardy. Reaping full benefits from China-Africa cooperation will require change of strategy in governance, debt management, transparency and public participation as the citizen eventually carry the greatest load of paying the debt.

One prominent reading of China's role in Africa portrays Chinese infrastructure investments as potential debt traps for African countries. This framing frequently features in media reporting on China-Africa relations – most prominently in the US, Europe, and India, as well as in policy discourses in these countries. For example, US Secretary of the Treasury Janet Yellen recently called Chinese lending practices “predatory”, resulting in “unsustainable debt and influence on countries”. World Bank President David Malpass singled out China's role in some developing countries' debt crises, expressing concerns about the nondisclosure clauses in Chinese lending agreements. The framing is also common in Kenyan public discourse.

A study suggests that “China” and “the Chinese”, are referred to, at times, almost synonymously with loans, debt, and local corruption. Proponents of the “debt trap” framing emphasize the uneven character of the relationship between China and African partner countries, pointing to China’s suspected hidden agenda on the continent. According to this framing, this imbalance of power is intentionally brought about through “aggressive” Chinese investments as China aims to dominate African markets, exert political influence, and exploit the continent’s resources. Proponents of this reading emphasize the anticipated risks of the relationship, for instance regarding supposed collaterals

African countries are portrayed to be at risk of losing critical infrastructure to China or even their sovereignty if they default on their debt servicing obligations.

Recent debates focused on Uganda’s airport Entebbe and Kenya’s key seaport in Mombasa. In both cases, however, evidence is lacking, while rumors about their status as collaterals persist. Cliff Mboya, Africa Editor and Consultant for the China Africa Project, explains this persistency by suggesting that this reading of China-Africa relations is politically loaded: Questioning its basic assumptions would often be interpreted as taking China’s side. Kenya’s public debt is indeed a subject of concern. The overall debt-to-GDP (gross domestic product) ratio stands at close to 70%. This means that the level of debt has almost reached the GoK’s own set ceiling for borrowing entitlements.

According to Kenya's Business Daily newspaper, debt servicing has recently become the biggest expenditure item in Kenya's national budget. Multilateral financial institutions have raised concerns over potential debt distress in Kenya, also because of a shift from concessional to commercial loans during the last decade. While the African Development Bank assessed Kenya's debt situation in February 2022 as sustainable, it also found that risks to Kenya's debt sustainability have increased. Chinese loans for Kenya's flagship infrastructure projects have contributed to the debt burden. And Chinese creditors have proven reluctant to negotiate debt servicing suspensions. Yet, Kenya's debt is composed of external (multilateral, bilateral, and commercial) loans and loans from the domestic market. China's share of Kenya's overall debt stands at an estimated 10.6% (as of March 2021).

In 2022, Chinese loans to Kenya have again dropped significantly, as China has reportedly started to move away from large infrastructure investments in Africa compared to previous years. Kenyan media outlets recently reported that Japan overtook China as Kenya's largest bilateral creditor, in terms of new financial commitments, while the World Bank overtook China as Kenya's largest external lender. An assistant director officer from the national treasury during an interview submitted that:

Reaping full benefits from China-Africa cooperation will require change of strategy in governance, debt management, transparency and public participation as the citizen eventually carry the greatest load of paying the debt. (Assistant Director, 18/7/2023, Nairobi).

Multilateral loans from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), though favorable in terms of low interest rates and long grace periods, come with conditions for reforming national policies. Starting in the 1980s, IMF conditional loans

required the GoK to implement structural adjustment programs (SAPs). While some of those SAPs contributed to improving Kenya's macro-economic stability, others were experienced by citizens as having adverse effects on the Kenyan economy, for example in the agricultural sector, and as hampering access to social services, including education and health.

Therefore, those IMF restructuring measures were largely perceived as anti-poor, instead of targeting the wealthy. And they are not a matter of the past. In coordination with the IMF, the GoK has initiated a fiscal consolidation plan in 2021 to lower the country's debt distress, comprising revenue mobilization and spending rationalization measures. The IMF recently expressed satisfaction with the GoK's performance under the programme. In light of Kenya's mixed experience with externally-initiated economic reforms, these recent IMF requests have raised concerns among some public finance experts and civil society actors. According to a Kenyan development finance expert, those austerity measures are "no less aggressive" than Chinese lending practices. They come at a time when Kenya continues to grapple with economic hardships aggravated by the Covid-19 crisis, compounded by an ongoing drought in the Horn of Africa and a weakening shilling.

The study concluded that in 2022, Chinese loans to Kenya have again dropped significantly, as China has reportedly started to move away from large infrastructure investments compared to previous years

6.2.3 Staffing and Employee Relations on Chinese Infrastructural Developments in Kenya

Formed in 1988, CHINCA is the national trade association of international contracting, labor contracting and engineering investment companies. Although it is a membership-based organization, it is directly under MOFCOM supervision. CHINCA promotes itself as the official representative of contracting companies in international platforms. This guide was commissioned by MOFCOM and although it remains quite a general framework and does not refer to Chinese national laws or the project country laws, there is a reference to the "relevant ILO Conventions" though they are not specified (Building and Wood Works International (2013).

It states Remuneration and Benefits wages should not be lower than local minimum wages nor common industry standards and benefit provisions should be according to local customs and business practices. An employee salary growth mechanism should be established. Employee Communication and Participation: employer-employee negotiation mechanism should be established in accordance with local laws and practices; there should be two-way communications" (Building and Wood Works International (2013). The respondents were required to rate the population of employees' working on Chinese construction firms and the results were as shown on Figure 6. 2:




Figure 6. 2: Percentage of employees' Nationals on Selected Chinese Construction Firms in Kenya.

Source: Field data (2023)

From the findings, 77 (64.16%) of the employees were Kenyans while 43 (35.83%) were of Chinese origin. This study therefore revealed that the population of Kenyans was more than that of their Chinese counterparts on Chinese construction firms in Kenya. Views of respondents were also sought to establish how employees were being remunerated and result.




Figure 6. 3: Views of Employees on salary Distributions

Source: Field data (2023)

Figure 6.3 reveals that 116 (97%) of the respondents agreed that Kenyans earned less than Chinese nationals on Chinese construction firms. None of the respondents however indicated that they earn the same or Chinese employees earn less than their Kenyan counterparts. 4 (3%) of the respondents did not know about salaries of Chinese employees citing the secrecy on the matter. An assistant director from the Kenya investment authority submitted that during an interview:

wages should not be lower than local minimum wages nor common industry standards and benefit provisions should be according to local customs and business practices. An employee salary growth mechanism should be established. (Assistant Director, 19/7/2023, Nairobi).

This study therefore, highlighted that Kenyans are earning less than their fellow Chinese employees of the same job group

6.3 Environmental and Social Standards and Corporate Social Responsibility

China does not have a law to regulate foreign aid and investment projects and there is no single government body responsible for environmental and social standards. Instead there are various bodies, including the Policy Banks, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MOFCOM. Environmental and social risk assessment and corporate social responsibility are relatively new areas for China and are in large measure a response to international criticism. The current standards are weak, difficult to apply in practice and do not refer explicitly to ILO labor standards. There are a number of overlapping guidelines and mechanisms, which could potentially be useful to the BWI and its affiliates (Building and Wood Works International (2013)).

In 2007, China EXIM and the CDB issued environmental and social impact guidelines. The guidelines were criticized by the environmental campaigners, International Rivers and Friends of the Earth, because they contained vague principles and no specific standards or indicators to ensure enforcement. In 2012, the China Bank Regulatory Commission issued the Environmental Risk Assessment Guidelines. Again, the guidelines are weak and do not refer to specific ILO standards. Article 21 states that banking institutions shall strengthen the environmental and social risk management for overseas projects to which credit will be granted and make sure project sponsors abide by applicable laws and regulations on environmental protection, land, health, safety, etc. of the country or jurisdiction where the project is located. It adds that the banking institutions shall promise publicly that appropriate international practices or international norms will be followed as far as such overseas projects are concerned, so

as to ensure alignment with good international practices" (Building and Wood Works International (2013).

6.3.1 Poaching and Smuggling in Relation to Chinese infrastructural Development in Kenya

In Kenya, it has been widely documented that in instances where Chinese infrastructural projects run close to national parks, there has been a rapid increase in poaching. In fact, 90% of those caught smuggling ivory at Jomo Kenyatta Airport are Chinese. This is very worrying not only for Kenya's endangered species, but also because increased poaching may jeopardize Kenya's tourism industry (Munyi 2011). However, Infrastructure construction is perhaps the best example of the Chinese promise of a win-win 'paradigm. Improving Kenya's infrastructure capacity is vital for their aspirations of becoming a newly industrial, middle-income country by the year 2030.

More than half of the elephants were killed in an area where Chinese construction crews have recently arrived to tarmac hundreds of miles of gravel tracks. In the first eight months of 2008, 57 carcasses were found across Kenya with their tusks hacked out, 15 per cent more than the total for all of 2007 and the third annual increase in a row. An assistant director from Kenya investment authority during an interview confirmed that:

there may have been a link between the workers' arrival and the increase in poaching. More than 50 per cent of the dead elephants had been in that area in the north where the Chinese were working on the road, said an elephant programme coordinator for the Kenya Wildlife Service. We can perhaps assume that they might have had a hand in it, maybe not all of them, but the coincidence is causing us great concern. (Assistant Director, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

At the same time, wildlife service officials said that the majority of ivory smugglers arrested at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi were Chinese nationals, some of them carrying up to 100kg of raw or carved tusks. Poaching in Kenya, especially in its empty northern areas, has long been a problem. The elephant migration routes running through there, linking water holes and fresh foliage, had long been targeted by poachers, often armed by Somali gun runners. After years of patrols, ivory trade bans and improved policing, conservationists had hoped to have largely eliminated the slaughter. These Chinese newcomers may be stimulating the local market for poached ivory. A director from the ministry of transport and infrastructural development had this comment to make during an interview:

poaching of elephants is real. There is so much corruption still here for anyone plus the Chinese, the Somalis and even Kenyans themselves if they can find people who will bring them tusks to sell. some tusks are passed to smugglers who fly them out of Nairobi. Majority are hidden on trucks heading to Ethiopia, where controls are more relaxed with regular passenger and cargo flights to the Far East. Kenyan officials place much of the blame for the surge in poaching on the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (Cites), which in July 2015 allowed Botswana, South Africa, Namibia and South Africa to sell a total of 108 tons of ivory to China and Japan (Director, 25/6/2023, Nairobi).

This has revived a market which until then had been starved of supply after a 19-year blanket ban on the sale of ivory. Broken only in 1999 for an earlier one-off sale of 50 tons to Japan. An administrative assistant from the ministry of Transport and infrastructural development who was once an assistant director for K WS and who led the airport arrest teams had this to say during an interview:

The poachers in the bush got the wrong message from the decision. This made at least eight Chinese nationals be arrested and charged with smuggling ivory. They thought that there was a legitimate market and they started setting more and more traps. China itself does not have the mechanisms to keep the legally bought ivory separate from illegal

ivory, so the market is there and the poachers took advantage of that (Assistant Director, 18/5/ 2023, Nairobi).

The respondents were required to state their opinion on whether Chinese infrastructural development had led to an increase in smuggling and poaching in Kenya. The results are shown in Table 6. 2:

Table 6. 2: Levels of Agreement by Respondents on Poaching and Smuggling by Chinese Nationals in Kenya (N=124).

Statement	Agree	Disagree	Uncertain
An increase in Chinese nationals in Kenya has led to an increase in poaching activities.	54(43.55%)	35(28.22%)	35(28.22%)
There is no increase in poaching and smuggling by Chinese nationals despite them increasing numbers in Kenya	24(19.35%)	94(75.80%)	10(8.06%)
Chinese nationals involved in poaching and smuggling work on infrastructural projects in Kenya	80(64.52%)	14(11.29%)	30(24.19%)
Chinese nationals involved in poaching and smuggling was colluding with Chinese workers /officials on infrastructural projects in Kenya.	67(54.03%)	21(16.94%)	36(29.03%)
Chinese nationals involved in poaching and smuggling was colluding with government officials in Kenya.	59(47.58%)	19(15.32%)	46(37.1%)

Source: Field data (2023)

From Table 6.2, it's clear that the increase in Chinese nationals in Kenya led to an increase in poaching activities as shown by 54 (43.55%) of the respondents in this study. Empirical evidence such as evidence from courts was however not provided. These allegations were further exemplified by 94 (75.80%) of the respondents who disagreed that there is no increase in poaching and smuggling by Chinese nationals

despite their increasing numbers in Kenya. It was further revealed by 80 (64.52%) of the respondents who agreed that Chinese nationals involved in poaching and smuggling work on infrastructural projects in Kenya. However, 14 (11.29%) of the respondents did not agree that Chinese nationals involved in poaching and smuggling work on infrastructural projects in Kenya.

More than half of the respondent 67 (54.03%) indicated that Chinese nationals who were involved in poaching and smuggling were colluding with Chinese workers/officials on infrastructural projects in Kenya. Where construction of road was done, there had been cases of carcass of elephants found which further indicated that there was collusion between Chinese national involved in poaching and Chinese workers in roads. Majority of the respondents revealed that Chinese nationals involved in poaching and smuggling were colluding with government officials in Kenya as shown by 59 (47.58%) although 19 (15.32%) of the respondents disagreed that there was collusion between the two camps.

This revelation gave hope in the fight against poaching in Kenya. However, 46 (37.1%) of the respondents were undecided due to lack of information on the same. This was confirmed by the researcher who visited a high court in Kenya but could not get convincing evidence connecting Chinese worker on Kenyan roads with Poaching and smuggling. A director in the Ministry of Interior in Nairobi had this to say during an interview with the researcher:

You know this is a sensitive issue and we cannot divulge precise details of the cases involving the Chinese unless we get express permission from the registrar's office from the headquarters (Director, 8/5/ 2023, Nairobi).

The records from the registrar's office however revealed that most cases revolved around general damages against Chinese Road construction firms. One of the respondents said that the major reason for poaching and smuggling was the presence of ready market in China and south Asia countries. It was further suggested by the respondents that corrupt officials both at the airport and wildlife service made poaching to thrive. They suggested that to curb poaching and smuggling, mutual cooperation between the countries on the same as well as the ban trade on elephant and rhino products were inevitable. It was also proposed that life imprisonment should be imposed on those found guilty of trading in the animal products to deter further poaching and smuggling. More use of modern technology also featured among the recommendations by respondents. A director from Kenya's Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported this by saying during an interview that:

The government of Kenya has burnt ivory alleged confiscated enrouted to Asia market. This shows how the government is committed to end the menace of smuggling and poaching. The fact that Chinese citizens were being prosecuted and charged for dealing with illegal ivory was also surest way to portray that government officials were not colluding with Chinese in poaching and smuggling (Director, 8/5/2023, Nairobi).

This study therefore found out that although there were arguments that an increase in Chinese construction firms had coincided with an increase in poaching and smuggling, there was no evidence in court that implicated Chinese construction firms along the infrastructure under the study.

6.4 Forms of challenges emanating from China's economic diplomacy

6.4.1 China's Construction Firms and Kenya's Environment.

China has a notorious reputation for its disregard of the environment. Apart from their recent slower economic growth, their impressive rapid development has come at a very high price to the environment. It is estimated that each year China loses 9% of its GDP to environmental degradation. There is grave concern that if China cannot protect their environment at home, they will not be able to do so abroad; especially in developing states with weak environmental legislation and regulation (Graham 2011).

It is revealed that the silver lining is that China is becoming more conscious of the consequences of creating a negative image of themselves. China knows that it cannot continue with business as usual if they do not wish to outstay their welcome. China has realized the need for greater converge between Africa's development needs and its own economic interests. In the 2006 Forum On China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) conference, China promised to work towards protecting Africa's environment. The real issue lies with the proliferation of private Chinese companies abroad. It will be up to host states to improve the capacity of their environmental legislation and regulatory institutions to deal with this challenge.

The fact that China needs Africa's partnership to sustain its 1.3 billion population gives the Kenyan governments a degree of bargaining power. Africa is the one that will suffer from environmental degradation by Chinese firms so the recipient host states must be the ones to monitor the situation and investigate any allegations (Graham 2011).. Apart from National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) which is a state agency, Kenya is host to a thriving civil society. The biggest green social movement in Africa

(the Green Belt Movement started by Nobel prize winning Wangari Maathai) together with other related agencies should demand accountability of the Kenyan government and Chinese firms. A strong eco-conscious civil society will help put pressure on the government to negotiate issues with China (Gadzala 2009).

A respondent from the Kenya's National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA) gave guidelines to be followed by COVEC during construction of the thika super highway road.



Plate 6. 2: The Researcher in an Interview with a Senior Director in the ministry of transport and infrastructure development

Source: Field data (15/7/2023)

Plate 6.2 indicates the researcher with a senior director ministry of transport and infrastructure development discussing forms of challenges emanating from China's economic diplomacy.

On environment conservation as one of the forms of challenges emanating from China's economic diplomacy, an administrative assistant from the Kenya Investment Authority confirmed during an interview session that:

According to the guidelines by NEMA, the development objectives of the Transport Sector Support Project for Kenya is to increase efficiency of road transport along the Northern Corridor and the Tanzania-Kenya-Sudan road corridor to facilitate trade and regional integration (60 percent). Secondly it has to enhance aviation safety and security to comply with ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and US FAA category one certification standards (20 percent), the third objective is to improve institutional arrangements and policy environment in the transport sector (20 percent). (Administrative Assistant, 18/5/2023, Nairobi).

Negative impacts include: air quality, noise water quality, waste management, toxic/hazardous waste management, infrastructure for medical waste management, direct and indirect hazards to public traffic and pedestrians by construction activities, and dust.

Mitigation measures for these problems included the surrounding environment (sidewalks, roads) which should be kept free of debris to minimize dust. There should also be no open burning of construction/waste materials at the site, and there will be no excessive idling of construction vehicles at sites. Another mitigation measure states that during operations the engine covers of generators, air compressors and other powered mechanical equipment shall be closed and equipment placed as far away from residential areas as possible.

These guidelines add that the site should establish appropriate erosion and sediment control measures such as e.g. hay bales and/or silt fences to prevent sediment from moving off site. Construction waste is supposed to be separated from general refuse, organic, liquid, and chemical wastes by onsite sorting and stored in appropriate containers. More so whenever feasible the contractor should reuse and recycle appropriate and viable materials (except asbestos). Apart from that, temporarily storage on site of all hazardous or toxic substances will be in safe containers labeled with details of composition, properties and handling information and the containers of hazardous substances shall be placed in a leak-proof container to prevent leaching and leaking.

Finally, these guidelines stated that traffic management system and staff training, especially for site access and near-site heavy traffic, provision of safe passages and crossings for pedestrians where construction traffic interferes, and active traffic management by trained and visible staff at the site, if required for safe and convenient passage for the public (World Bank 2011).

All the 143 respondents were required to rate the extent of environmental pollution by Chinese infrastructural developments in Kenya. The results are as shown in Table 6.3.

Table 6. 3: Agreement Level of Respondents on the Extent of Environmental Pollution by Chinese Construction in Kenya (N=143).

Totally agree	20(13.98%)
Disagree	120(83.91%)

Uncertain

3(2.09%)

Source: Field data (2023)

From Table 6.3, out of 143 respondents, 120 (83.91%) of them disagreed that Chinese workers on infrastructural development in Kenya are involved in environmental pollution. However, 20 (13.98%) of the respondents totally agreed that there was environmental pollution. They cited too much dust along Chinese road construction sites as a reason for their rating. One of the respondents argued that villagers from a village in Kiambu County had staged a demonstration in protest of pollution caused by Chinese road development firms in the county. He added that a quarry that had been dug by the Chinese was threatening the lives of some residents in Kiambu County. Three (3) (2.09%) remaining undecided because they were not conversant with set down guidelines on environmental protection. This challenge is becoming increasingly more common with the proliferation of independent Chinese companies working abroad to maximize their profits (Dickson 2003). This is where it becomes clear that the issues raised in this partnership, lies not so much with China but with Africa's governance and regulatory body (Graham 2011).

China's State-to-State engagement style is grounded in pragmatism. So African governments must negotiate carefully to ensure the partnership develops in a way that is mutually beneficial (Taylor 2009). The aim of Chinese economic diplomacy, like any other states', is to serve their own best interests. It is not China's job to look out for Africa's interest; the responsibility will fall on African leaders to negotiate a mutually beneficial outcome. More worrying is what happens when the government does not reflect the best interests of their citizens? The nature of power relations in Kenya- the

winner-takes-all mentality, will limit the benefits of this engagement to the elite peripheries.

This is where Kenya's civil society will play a critical role in holding their government's accountable and in critically examining the terms and conditions of the deals struck with China. In short, Chinese involvement in Kenya offers a wealth of opportunities for the country, but only if it approaches them prudently as earlier stated by Taylor (2009). A constitution amendment has empowered Kenya's civil society to confront the government's shortcomings and to challenge their inclination for taking unconstitutional liberties.

The study concluded that Chinese firms are adhering to environmental standards but the role of ensuring adherence remains to be a responsibility for Kenyans.

6.5 Summary

This chapter discussed the third objective of the study which is to evaluate opportunities/challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya. This study raised questions about the opportunities that Kenya got during the economic diplomacy engagement and terms and conditions of Chinese engagements with Kenya. The researcher further evaluated challenges to China's rhetoric of mutual benefit on development of infrastructure in Kenya were allegations against lack of transparency in their bilateral trade agreements, disregard of labor laws, human rights abuse and poaching. It was however revealed that respect to environmental conservation by Chinese road construction firms in Kenya was

above board. It was found that Chinese companies- behavior of secrecy in their dealings with governments was affecting China's international image, credibility and reputation. The researcher further isolated that although Chinese construction firms are doing significant work towards Kenya's development through development of Kenya's infrastructure, little is being done towards respect to human rights, adherence to International labor laws and curbing of poaching activities. This is believed to underlie the perception that China is the new "colonial power." It is also fair to reveal that although Chinese firms were involved in poaching and smuggling, no substantial evidence was provided by the respondents to confirm that most Chinese construction firms were engaging in poaching and smuggling. It was advanced that China's State-to-State engagement style was grounded in pragmatism and that the Kenyan government must negotiate carefully to ensure the partnership develops in a way that is mutually beneficial. The next chapter presents a summary, conclusions and recommendations of the three specific objectives of this study.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

This chapter presents summary of study findings of the three specific objectives as well as conclusions objectively drawn from the findings. The researcher's recommendations from this chapter gives suggestions on how the findings can be applied to ensure China's principle of mutual development is adhered to in development of infrastructure in Kenya. Finally, the suggestions for further studies draw attention to areas that can be researched on to extend the knowledge in ways that would strengthen bilateral relations between China and Kenya. This is intended to address areas that the study has slightly touched but left out due to limitations of scope.

7.1 Summary of Findings

The first specific objective examined the influence of Chinese principle of mutual benefit to the infrastructural development in Kenya. From the findings it is evident that Chinese are motivated by the ready market for their goods in Kenya. This is evident by the fact that China is currently the highest exporter of goods to Kenya after overtaking India. It has also been found that China's second motivation to invest in Kenya's infrastructure sector is aimed at using Kenya as an entry point to East Africa to explore and exploit the resources. Smuggling and poaching are not found to be the motivation factor for the Chinese engagements with Kenya.

It has been explained that China's economic diplomacy is guided by its five principles of Peaceful coexistence. They were introduced during negotiations with India over the Tibet in 1954 by the then Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. These principles are: Mutual respect for sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, Non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. The most popular principle in China-Kenya relations has been cited to be that of mutual benefit.

The second specific objective of this study was to assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values and technology to development of infrastructure in Kenya. Regarding terms and conditions of Chinese engagements with Kenya on infrastructure developments, the study revealed that Chinese loans to Kenya's development of infrastructure are given at an interest rate of 2.0% with a grace period of 7 years. This is coupled with a repayment period of 20 years plus a commitment fee of 0.5% and a management fee of 0.5%. These revelations were however marred with a lot of secrecy. These terms and conditions have been described as being economically viable and sustainable but largely in China's favors.

This study has also exposed that Chinese investment in Kenya's development of infrastructure is significantly beneficial to Kenya's informal sector. This is because the lower cadre of employees who are actually the majority are acquiring skills that can make them start their own businesses. This is expected to spur economic growth in Kenya- a country whose informal sector contributes around (90%) of the national GDP.

This study has further revealed that Kenya is still largely reliant on its traditional donors for funding and that its relations with China has even strengthened its ties with Western countries. This is due to the fact that Western states are fighting for their place in Eastern Africa that is gradually being taken over by China.

The third specific objective of the study evaluated opportunities/ challenges to China's principle of mutual development to development of infrastructure in Kenya. This study found out that although China-Kenya bilateral agreements seem economically viable Chinese firms' terms and conditions are shrouded with a lot of secrecy. Regarding China's respect to International labor laws in Kenya study has revealed that the population of Kenyan low cadre employees more than that of their Chinese counterparts on Chinese infrastructure construction firms in Kenya. Along this line it has been established that most site workers on Chinese construction firms were being mistreated

7.2 Conclusions

The first specific objective examined the influence of Chinese principle of mutual benefit to the infrastructural development in Kenya. This study concluded that China's economic diplomacy is guided by its five principles of Peaceful coexistence where its most popular principle is that of mutual benefit.

The second specific objective of this study was to assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values and technology to development of infrastructure in Kenya. This study concluded that Chinese investment in Kenya's development of infrastructure is significantly beneficial to Kenya's informal sector because the lower

cadre of employees who are actually the majority are acquiring skills that can make them start their own businesses which is expected to spur economic growth in Kenya- a country whose informal sector contributes around (90%) of the national GDP.

The third specific objective evaluated the opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya. This study concluded that although China-Kenya bilateral agreements seem economically viable Chinese firms' terms and conditions are shrouded with a lot of secrecy.

The overall conclusion of the study is that Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963. Kenyan government has enthusiastically turned towards China to access development assistance. As noted earlier, the availability of Chinese development aid has spurred the traditional Western donors to re-examine the relationship with Kenya. This could, in turn, give the Kenyan government the ability to negotiate better 'conditionality' from both the Chinese and Western donors. The Chinese approach which promotes trade, encourages direct investments, along with development assistance to help improve Kenya's development outcomes.

The next Chapter will offer recommendations that could help ensure that Kenya maximizes the advantages offered by China's approach and does indeed benefit from it.

7.3 Recommendations

The first specific objective examined the influence of Chinese principle of mutual benefit to the infrastructural development in Kenya. The researcher recommended that

Kenyan government needed to capacity build its policy makers and implementers to understand what China has in its principle of mutual benefit in its economic diplomacy engagements with its partners.

The second specific objective of this study was to assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values and technology to development of infrastructure in Kenya. The researcher recommended that Kenyan government should formulate a policy that will ensure that the technological skills impacted on Kenyan workers by the Chinese construction firms should be improved and included in the Kenyan schools' curriculum.

The third specific objective evaluated the opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya. The researcher recommended that, as China brings its finished products to Kenya, its both an opportunity to buyers because the goods are cheap and a challenge to local manufacturers so the Kenyan government should put policies in place to protect the local manufacturers.

7.4 Suggestions for Further Studies

The first specific objective examined the influence of Chinese principle of mutual benefit to the infrastructural development in Kenya. More studies should be done to bring to perspective to the policy makers and implementers what China actually means with its rhetoric of its principle of mutual benefit to its partners during its economic diplomacy engagements.

The second specific objective of this study was to assess the socio-economic impact of Chinese principle of transfer of values and technology to development of infrastructure

in Kenya. There is need to establish through further research the aggregate economic impact associated with running costs and failing revenue returns on investments in the infrastructure section in Kenya.

The third specific objective evaluated the opportunities/ challenges emanating from Chinese economic diplomacy in infrastructural development in Kenya. More studies should be done on the opportunity of exports like the Mpesa cash transfer that Kenya can exploit from the China's large market to leverage on the trade relations which highly favors China

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APPENDICES

Appendix I.

Introductory Letter

Dear Respondent;

I am a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science Technology, Kenya, pursuing doctoral studies on how Chinese economic diplomacy is fostering infrastructural development in Kenya since 1963. The findings of this study will be instrumental in informing policymakers, practitioners and scholars of international relations on appropriate approaches to investigate how china's economic diplomacy has influenced infrastructural development in Kenya. You are kindly requested to provide truthfully the information that will help achieve this objective. The information you provide will be strictly used for this study and confidentiality will be maintained. Please do not indicate your name or any other personal information in this questionnaire.

Thank you in advance.

Winnie Winfrade Awuor Oyugi

CDR/H/14-53371/2018

Cell Phone 0722448250

Email: awuoron@yahoo.com

Appendix II

Questionnaires for middle cadre respondents from Ministry of Transport and infrastructural Development (SGR, Lamu port and thika superhigh way), Ministry of Health(KUTRRH) and Ministry of Sports, culture and Heritage (Moi Kasarani)

SECTION A

Respondent's particulars.

- 1. What is your gender? (Please tick appropriately): male female
- 2. What is your nationality?.....
- 3 What is your designation?.....
- 4 Which Ministry do you work for?

SECTION B

The influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya.

1 a) Kenya-China has had a long period of bilateral relations. Comment on the historical background of Kenya-China economic diplomacy since 1963.

.....
.....

1a) What do you think is the motivation behind Chinese aid in infrastructure projects in Kenya? Tick (√) (1) totally agree (2) disagree and (3) uncertain

Resources for China and infrastructural development for Kenya (1) (2) (3)

To promote its model of undemocratic development and mass soft power (1) (2) (3)

Market its goods in Kenya..... (1) (2) (3)

Use Kenya as an entry point to the market in East African region (1) (2) (3)

Smuggling and poaching (1) (2) (3)

b) Give a brief explanation for your assertion in 1(a) above.

.....
.....

2 a) How do you rate the following principles of China's economic diplomacy to Kenya? (1) for totally disagree (2) for partially agree (3) for totally agree. () Tick in the appropriate box).

Mutual benefit	1	2	3
Non- interference in each other's internal affairs	1	2	3
Equality	1	2	3
Mutual respect for sovereign and territorial integrity	1	2	3
Mutual non-aggression	1	2	3

b. Please give a brief account of your ratings for the principle of non-interference.

.....
.....
.....

3. How do you rate the impact of Kenya-China relations on Kenya's international relations?

(Tick in only one appropriate box in front of the statement that you agree with).

i). Positive impact: Very big High Low Very little
 Non-existent

ii). Negative impact: very high High low very low Nonexistent

Give a brief explanation

.....

4 i) In a scale of (1) to (3) where (1) is I agree (2) is I disagree (3) is I'm uncertain, rate by ticking in the appropriate box, the following statements:

Kenya's bilateral relations with China:

Has challenged Western countries to increase their diplomatic relations with Kenya	1	2	3
Has Weakened Kenya's diplomatic relations with Western countries	1	2	3
Has not affected Kenya's diplomatic relations with Western countries	1	2	3

ii). If Kenya's diplomatic relations has been affected in either way, what relations specifically have been affected? Tick in the appropriate box.

Political relations

Economic

.....
.....
ii. What is your view of the sustainability of the contracts mentioned in (8i) above?

.....
.....

SECTION C

**Socio-economic Impact of Chinese Principle of Transfer of Technology on
infrastructural development in Kenya.**

8. How do you rate the economic viability of these investments to Kenya? (Tick in ONLY ONE appropriate box). Attach any details of your findings if you used any.

They are economically viable to Kenya ()

They are not economically viable to Kenya ()

a) Rate the social problem that you relate to the infrastructural projects in Kenya funded by China? Circle the scale where (1) totally agreed (2) fairly agreed (3) totally disagree

Problem	Rating
Environmental pollution	(1) (2) (3)
Human rights abuses.....	(1) (2) (3)
Poaching	(1) (2) (3)
Smuggling	(1) (2) (3)

None of the above

(1) (2) (3)

b). Identify any other social problem. (Specify)

.....
.....

c). Briefly justify where and when the activity mentioned in a) or b) above was reported
(Attach documentary evidence if possible)

.....
.....

d). Are Chinese nationals working on the infrastructural projects in Kenya linked to any
of the social problems indicated above? Tick appropriately. Justify your assertion.
(Attach documentary evidence if possible)

Yes ()

No... ()

I do not Know... ()

Justification:

.....
.....

9 i). How do you rate the sustainability (interest rates, maturity and grace period) of the
Chinese loans in Kenya?

I find the loans sustainable... ()

I find the loans unsustainable.... ()

I do not have information about the loans.... ()

ii). Give reasons for your argument in i) above.

.....
.....

10 a) Outline the Chinese infrastructural development companies that you know in Kenya? (Attach a list if possible)

.....
.....

11. How do you rate the population of employees in the infrastructural projects in Kenya funded by Chinese government?

Mostly Kenyan...

Mostly Chinese ...

Both Kenyan and Chinese nationals almost same ratio ...

12. How do you compare the number of Kenyans to that of Chinese nationals working at Chinese project sites/companies in Kenya? Tick appropriately.

Kenyans are more than Chinese...

Chinese employees are more than Kenyan counterparts...

They are almost the same in number...

13. How do you rate the salaries of both Chinese employees and Kenyan employees working with Chinese companies /projects in Kenya? Tick in ONLY ONE appropriate box.

I do not Know about salaries of employees...

Kenyans earn less than their fellow Chinese employees

Chinese employees earn less than their Kenyan counterparts... ()

They earn the same salaries... ()

14i). How are workers being treated in Chinese companies? ONLY ONE appropriate box

a) Humanly () b) Inhumanly () c) I don't Know ()

ii) Give reasons /examples for the assertion you have made in 17a) above.

.....
.....

15. Rate by ticking in ONLY ONE appropriate box in front of the statement that you agree with:

Kenya's acquisition of new skills and technology from China has been:

Very high () High () Low () Very low () Not worth mentioning ()

16 a) In a scale of 1 to 3, where (1) is totally agree (2) disagree (3) Uncertain, rate by taking in the appropriate box, the following statements:

Infrastructural projects in Kenya funded by china government;

Are beneficial to both states at the same degree..... (1) (2) (3)

Are only benefiting China (1) (2) (3)

Are only benefiting Kenya (1) (2) (3)

Are largely in Kenya's favour..... (1) (2) (3)

Are largely in China's favour (1) (2) (3)

Are currently largely in China's favour but will gradually favour Kenya (1) (2) (3)

Are currently in Kenya's favour but gradually will favour China ... (1) (2) (3)

Kindly give reasons for your answer(s) in 19 a) above.

.....
.....

17 a) How do you rate the infrastructure projects in Kenya funded by China government? Tick appropriately in ONLY ONE box in front of the statement that you agree with.

Durable () Not durable () Durability is doubted ()

b). Give reason (s) for your assertion

.....
.....

18. Which of the following economic strategies would you recommend for Kenya?

a) Beijing's strategy of nation-state directed economic system based on semi-free markets and illiberal political system ()

b) Washington's strategy of liberalized economic system based on a free market and liberal political system..... ()

19. Give any other observation concerning existence of trade barriers (both tariff and non-tariff) that are slowing down Kenya's infrastructural development funded by China

.....
.....

20. Give any recommendations that you think either Kenya or China should consider in improving their bilateral relationship.

.....
.....

21 i). Using a scale of 1 to 3, where (1) is totally agree (2) is totally disagree (3) Not aware

Rate by circling the following statements (indicate by ticking if they are benefiting or losing).

i) Are the Chinese firms' engineers transferring technology, new skills and values to Kenya workers on their project sites? (1) (2) (3)

ii) Briefly explain your assertions in 24i) above.

.....
.....

22a) In a scale 1 to 3, where (1) I agree (2) I disagree (3) I'm uncertain, rate the following statements. Tick the appropriate number in the box.

The effects of the Chinese infrastructural projects to Kenya's informal sector are:

Beneficial..... (1) (2) (3)

Threatening (1) (2) (3)

Both beneficial and threatening..... (1) (2) (3)

More beneficial than threatening (1) (2) (3)

More threatening than beneficial..... (1) (2) (3)

b). Explain the reason behind the above assertion in 25a) above

.....
.....

SECTION D

Opportunities/Challenges emanating from China’s economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructural development in Kenya

(Attach copies of documentary evidence and further clarifications where possible).

23i). Rate in a scale of 1to3, where (1) I agree (2) I disagree (3) I’m uncertain by ticking the appropriate box.

The following informal sector groups in Kenya have benefited from Chinese infrastructural projects to Kenya.

Sector	1	2	3
Welding			
Textile industries			
Retail shops			
Building and construction			
Others (mention)			

.....
.....

24. According to your records, how do you rate the extent of influx of Chinese nationals in Kenya? Rate by ticking () in ONLY ONE appropriate box in front of the statement that you agree with:

Very high () Low () Very low () Insignificant ()

28 i). How do you rate the impact of hawking by Chinese Nationals in Kenya to Kenya's economy? (√) in ONLY ONE appropriate box in front of the statement that you agree with).

Very high () Low () very Low () Insignificant ()

ii). Justify your assertions in 28 i) above

.....
.....

25 i) Name the types of commodities that are mostly hawked by Chinese Nationals in Kenya.

.....
.....

ii). What are the challenges that emanate from the Chinese nationals in actions in 29 i) above?

.....
.....

26i). What is the Percentage of Chinese Nationals among those found in 29 i)activities that are legally in Kenya?

.....

ii). What official reasons do the Chinese Nationals arrested for hawking have for being in Kenya?

.....
.....

27. How do you rate the following statements? Use a scale of 1 to 3, where (1) agree (2) disagree (3) uncertain, rate by ticking (√) in appropriate number, the following statements:

i) The increase in Chinese nationals in China funded projects work force in Kenya has led to challenges in transferring of skills and technology to Kenyans.

1 () 2 () 3 ()

Justify.....
.....

ii) Kenyan nationals that work together with Chinese nationals in the Chinese funded projects participate in the technical work at the project sites

1 () 2 () 3 ()

Justify.....
.....

iii) The Kenyan government is aware that Chinese companies bring Chinese nationals to work in the Chinese funded projects in Kenya. 1 () 2 () 3 ()

Justify.....
.....

iv) Chinese companies that bring Chinese nationals to work in their sites instead of Kenyan nationals collude with government officials in Kenya

1 () 2 () 3 ()

Justify.....
.....

28 i). What do you think is the major cause for 31 iv) above?

.....
.....

ii). What proposals would you give to curb the problem(s) in 32 i) above?.....

.....

Appendix III

Interview Guide for senior officers from Ministry of transport and infrastructural development, ministry of foreign affairs and international trade, national treasury, ministry of health, kenya chamber of commerce and industry, ministry of sports, culture and heritage, Confucian institutes, Chinese embassy and Kenya investment Authority.

SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS

Name.....

Ministry.....

Position.....

Appendix III

Interview Guide for senior officers from Ministry of transport and infrastructural development, ministry of foreign affairs and international trade, national treasury, ministry of health, kenya chamber of commerce and industry, ministry of sports, culture and heritage, Confucian institutes, Chinese embassy and Kenya investment Authority

SECTION A:

Respondent's particulars.

1. What is your gender? (Please tick appropriately): male female
2. What is your nationality.....
- 3 What is your designation.....
- 4 Which Ministry do you work for?

SECTION B

The influence of Chinese mutual development principle in development of infrastructure in Kenya.

- 1) Kenya-China has had a long period of bilateral relations. Comment on the historical background of Kenya-China economic diplomacy since 1963.

2) What do you think is the motivation behind Chinese aid in infrastructure projects in Kenya? Give a brief explanation.

3. Please give a brief account of the principle of mutual benefit and non-interference in Kenya-China economic diplomacy relations.

4. How do you rate the impact of Kenya-China relations on Kenya's international relations?

Give a brief explanation.

5. How has the economic diplomacy relationship between Kenya-China affected Kenya's diplomatic relations with the western countries?

6a) Chinese government has funded many infrastructural projects in Kenya. Comment on the following projects: SGR, KUTRRH, Lamu port Moi Kasarani and Thika superhighway

b) Kindly indicate the Chinese firms/contractors of each of the Chinese infrastructural projects in Kenya mentioned above.

c). Please provide data on amounts of money invested by China in each of the infrastructural projects mentioned above (Attach copy if possible)

7a). What are the terms and conditions (e.g. interest rates of loans) of the contracts awarded to China in each of Kenya's infrastructural projects mentioned in 5a above?

b). what is your view of the sustainability of the contracts mentioned in (8i) above?

.....
.....

SECTION C

Socio-economic Impact of Chinese Principle of Transfer of Technology on infrastructural development in Kenya.

8a. How do you rate the economic viability of these Chinese funded projects (SGR, KUTRRH, Moi Kasarani, Lamu Port and Thika superhighway) to Kenya?

b) What are the social problems that you relate to the infrastructural projects in Kenya funded by China?

c). Briefly justify where and when the activity mentioned in (b) above was reported.

d). Are Chinese nationals working on the infrastructural projects in Kenya linked to any of the social problems indicated above? Justify your assertion.

9 i). How do you rate the sustainability (interest rates, maturity and grace period) of the Chinese loans in Kenya?

ii). Give reasons for your argument in i) above.

10) Outline the Chinese infrastructural development companies that you know in Kenya?

11. How do you rate the population of employees in the infrastructural projects in Kenya funded by Chinese government?

12. How do you compare the number of Kenyans to that of Chinese nationals working at Chinese project sites/companies in Kenya?

13. How do you rate the salaries of both Chinese employees and Kenyan employees working with Chinese companies /projects in Kenya?

14. How are workers being treated in Chinese companies?

Give reasons /examples for the assertion you have made.

15. Give your opinion on Kenya's acquisition of new skills and technology from China

16. Explain the benefits of Infrastructural projects in Kenya funded by china government to Kenya economy.
17. Comment on the durability of the infrastructure projects in Kenya funded by China government?
18. Give your views on the following economic strategies for Kenya?
 - a) Beijing's strategy of nation-state directed economic system based on semi-free markets and illiberal political system.
 - b) Washington's strategy of liberalized economic system based on a free market and liberal political system.
19. Give an observation concerning existence of trade barriers (both tariff and non-tariff) that are slowing down Kenya's infrastructural development funded by China
20. Give any recommendations that you think either Kenya or China should consider in improving their bilateral relationship.
21. Are the Chinese firms' engineers transferring technology, new skills and values to Kenya workers on their project sites? Briefly explain your assertions.
22. Explain the effects of Chinese infrastructural projects to Kenya's informal sector

SECTION D

Opportunities/Challenges emanating from China's economic diplomacy in fostering infrastructural development in Kenya

23. Explain how the following informal sectors have benefited from Chinese infrastructural projects to Kenya. (Welding, Textile industries, Retail shops, Building and construction)

24. According to your records, explain the extent of influx of Chinese nationals in Kenya?

25a). How do you rate the impact of hawking by Chinese Nationals in Kenya to Kenya's economy? Explain.

b) Which types of commodities are mostly hawked by Chinese Nationals in Kenya.

c). What are the challenges that emanate from the Chinese nationals in actions in 25 a) above?

d). What is the Population of Chinese Nationals among those found in 25 a) who are legally in

26). Comment on Chinese nationals in China funded projects work force in Kenya has led to challenges in transferring of skills and technology to Kenyans.

27b) Do Kenyan nationals that work together with Chinese nationals in the Chinese funded projects participate in the technical work at the project sites

Explain

28. Do Chinese companies that bring Chinese nationals to work in their sites instead of Kenyan nationals collude with government officials in Kenya

Explain

28 a). What do you think is the major cause for 28) above?

b). What proposals would you give to curb the problem(s) in 28) above?

Thank You

Appendix V: Approval of Proposal



MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870
Fax: 056-30153
E-mail: directordps@mmust.ac.ke
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke

P.O Box 190
Kakamega – 50100
Kenya

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099

6th April 2023

Winnie W. A Oyugi
CPC/H/14/53371/2018
P.O. Box 190-50100
KAKAMEGA

Dear Ms. Oyugi

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your PhD proposal entitled: “*Chinese Economic Diplomacy Fostering Infrastructural Development in Kenya Since 1963*” and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. Pontian G Okoth - SDMHA - MMUST
2. Rev. Dr. Elijah S. Odhiambo - SDMHA - MMUST

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee and Chairman, Department of Peace and Conflicts Studies. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of two years from the date of registration to complete your PhD thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours Sincerely,



Prof. Stephen O. Odebero, PhD, FIEEP
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

Appendix VI: NACOSTI

 <p>REPUBLIC OF KENYA</p>	 <p>NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION</p>
Ref No: 285825	Date of Issue: 24/April/2023
RESEARCH LICENSE	
	
<p>This is to Certify that Miss. Winnie Awuor Oyugi of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Kiambu, Lamu, Nairobi on the topic: Chinese Economic Diplomacy fostering Infrastructural Development in Kenya since 1963 for the period ending : 24/April/2024.</p>	
License No: NACOSTI/P/23/25242	
Applicant Identification Number 285825	Director General NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION
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See overleaf for conditions	

THE SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION ACT, 2013 (Rev. 2014)
Legal Notice No. 108: The Science, Technology and Innovation (Research Licensing) Regulations, 2014

The National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation, hereafter referred to as the Commission, was established under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act 2013 (Revised 2014) herein after referred to as the Act. The objective of the Commission shall be to regulate and assure quality in the science, technology and innovation sector and advise the Government in matters related thereto.

CONDITIONS OF THE RESEARCH LICENSE

1. The License is granted subject to provisions of the Constitution of Kenya, the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, and other relevant laws, policies and regulations. Accordingly, the licensee shall adhere to such procedures, standards, code of ethics and guidelines as may be prescribed by regulations made under the Act, or prescribed by provisions of International treaties of which Kenya is a signatory to
2. The research and its related activities as well as outcomes shall be beneficial to the country and shall not in any way;
 - i. Endanger national security
 - ii. Adversely affect the lives of Kenyans
 - iii. Be in contravention of Kenya's international obligations including Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN).
 - iv. Result in exploitation of intellectual property rights of communities in Kenya
 - v. Adversely affect the environment
 - vi. Adversely affect the rights of communities
 - vii. Endanger public safety and national cohesion
 - viii. Plagiarize someone else's work
3. The License is valid for the proposed research, location and specified period.
4. The license any rights thereunder are non-transferable
5. The Commission reserves the right to cancel the research at any time during the research period if in the opinion of the Commission the research is not implemented in conformity with the provisions of the Act or any other written law.
6. The Licensee shall inform the relevant County Director of Education, County Commissioner and County Governor before commencement of the research.
7. Excavation, filming, movement, and collection of specimens are subject to further necessary clearance from relevant Government Agencies.
8. The License does not give authority to transfer research materials.
9. The Commission may monitor and evaluate the licensed research project for the purpose of assessing and evaluating compliance with the conditions of the License.
10. The Licensee shall submit one hard copy, and upload a soft copy of their final report (thesis) onto a platform designated by the Commission within one year of completion of the research.
11. The Commission reserves the right to modify the conditions of the License including cancellation without prior notice.
12. Research, findings and information regarding research systems shall be stored or disseminated, utilized or applied in such a manner as may be prescribed by the Commission from time to time.
13. The Licensee shall disclose to the Commission, the relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee, and the relevant national agencies any inventions and discoveries that are of National strategic importance.
14. The Commission shall have powers to acquire from any person the right in, or to, any scientific innovation, invention or patent of strategic importance to the country.
15. Relevant Institutional Scientific and Ethical Review Committee shall monitor and evaluate the research periodically, and make a report of its findings to the Commission for necessary action.

National Commission for Science, Technology and
Innovation(NACOSTI),
Off Waiyaki Way, Upper Kabete,
P. O. Box 30623 - 00100 Nairobi, KENYA
Telephone: 020 4007000, 0713788787, 0735404245
E-mail: dg@nacosti.go.ke
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke

Appendix VII: Authorization Letter


**OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERNAL SECURITY
AND
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION**

Telegraphic Address: "Rais"
Telephone Nairobi 2227411

P. O. Box 30516-00100
NAIROBI

When replying, please quote
Our Ref: MICNG/SEC. 6/4

Date: 2nd May, 2023

The County Commissioner
NAIROBI

The County Commissioner
KIAMBU

The County Commissioner
LAMU

AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH, MS. WINNIE AWUOR OYUGI

The above subject matter refers.

The request for an authority to conduct academic research In Nairobi, Kiambu and Lamu Countries has been granted.

Ms. Awuor is a PhD student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology conducting research in the field of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance on the topic: *Chinese Economic Diplomacy Fostering Infrastructural Development in Kenya*. She already acquired the necessary licence form National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), a copy of which is herewith attached.

This is to request you to accord him the necessary support as she conducts the research.


THOMAS SAKAH
FOR: PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/INTERNAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Appendix VIII: Lamu County Authorization Letter



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Email: lamucounty12@yahoo.com

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
LAMU COUNTY,
P.O. BOX 41-80500,
LAMU.

When replying please quote:

REF: NO-ADM.15/3 VOL.VI/23

Date: 11th May, 2023

All Deputy County Commissioners
LAMU COUNTY

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – WINNIE AWUOR OYUGI- ID. NO.6057160

This is to confirm that the person mentioned above is a PHD student, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance, at Masinde Muliro University. She has been authorized to carry out research on **"Chinese Economic Diplomacy Fostering Infrastructural Development in Kenya since 1963"** in Lamu County, Kenya which comprises the 3 Sub-Counties for the period ending 11th May, 2024. NACOSTI License Number is NACOSTI/P/23/25242.

Please accord her all the necessary support to facilitate the success of her research.

Thank you.

(LOUIS RONOH)
COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
LAMU COUNTY.



Copy to: -

County Police Commander,
LAMU COUNTY

Winnie Awuor Oyugi,
Masinde Muliro University,
KAKAMEGA.