

**SECURITY-BASED DIPLOMACY INFLUENCING TRANSNATIONAL  
TERRORISM MANAGEMENT BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA**

**Christopher Chumba**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Award of  
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Diplomacy and International Relations of  
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology**

**August, 2016**

## DECLARATION AND CERTIFICATION

### Declaration by the Candidate

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

Signature -----

Date-----

**Christopher Chumba**

**CDR/H/207/13**

### Certification by the Supervisors

The undersigned certify that they have read and hereby recommend for acceptance of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology a research thesis entitled ‘Security-Based Diplomacy Influencing Transnational Terrorism Management between Kenya and Somalia.’

Signature -----

Date-----

**Prof. Pontian Godfrey Okoth, Ph.D.**

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies,

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST).

Signature -----

Date-----

**Dr. Edmond Were, Ph.D.**

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

Kisii University

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## **Dedication**

To my late father, Alexander Kipchumba Arusey, for his relentless encouragement that made my rise on the education ladder possible up to this level.

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May God bless you all.

## Abstract

The shift from diplomacy-based security to security-based diplomacy has been attributed to the fact that generating a comprehensive response to transnational terrorism since September 11, 2001 has proven to be difficult. Multilateralism and bilateralism have been employed in security relations with regard to transnational terrorism. However, the increasing transnational terrorist attacks; particularly terrorist incidences in Kenya with attributes from Somalia have been increasing over time. While the role of the military (as a security-based diplomacy actor) has emerged in supporting foreign policy to promote security and deter transnational terrorism, there seems to be a discernable gap on how each country employs particular military engagement tools. The general objective of this study was to examine security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia. The specific objectives of this study focused on: assessing the historical evolution of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia; examining the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures; assessing the structural capacity of intelligence sharing and evaluating the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The study was grounded on three theories; neo-realism, post-modernism and new social movement. An exploratory research design and descriptive research design were adopted. The study covered Kenya (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa and Mandera) and Somalia (Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni). The choice of these regions was centred on the fact that they have experienced a series of terrorist attacks by al-Shabaab insurgency. The total sample size for the study was 400. Cluster sampling and purposive sampling techniques were used to determine the settings and the participants. Data collection was both interactive (interviews and focus group discussions) and non-interactive involving questionnaire and document analysis. A total of 350 questionnaires were issued to respondents drawn from state and non-state actors, 20 interview guides targeting key informants drawn from state and non-state actors and 30 respondents from religious institutions participated in Focus Group Discussions. A pilot study was carried out at Jommo Kenyatta International Airport and Kenya Ports Authority in Mombasa. Moreover, a pilot interview and focus group discussion was done with a group of leaders and members respectively, drawn from Holy Family Basilica and Jamia Mosque in Nairobi. The reliability of the instruments was determined through the calculation of a correlation coefficient between the first and second administration. The study instruments were tested for validity through consultations and discussions with the supervisors and experts in peace and conflict studies for validation. Data were analyzed by use of descriptive statistics, through quantitative and qualitative techniques. The study found out that the security-based approach involving KDF intervention in Somalia has not been effective in managing transnational terrorism; counter-radicalization programs are weak and disjointed and civil society groups are not fully engaged in such initiatives. The study further established that the structural capacity of intelligence sharing is weak, while border surveillance strategies such as migration controls and technology use are fragile. Overall, the study concluded that a more robust understanding of the effectiveness of particular tools, such as terrorism prevention, is essential in delivering a security-based approach to counterterrorism that is balanced and effective. The study recommended the need for Kenya to reassess its interventionist strategy in Somalia, engage the civil society in counter-radicalization efforts as well as utilizing community intelligence in the management of transnational terrorism.

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

AMISOM:	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU:	Africa Union
CID:	Criminal Investigation Department
CTN:	Counter Terrorism Networks
DC:	District Commissioner
EACTI:	East African Counter-Terrorism Initiative
EARSI:	East African Regional Strategic Initiative
ECOWAS:	Economic Community of West African States
EU:	European Union
G4S:	Group-4-Security
GWOT:	Global War on Terror
ICG:	International Crisis Group
ICU:	Islamic Courts Union
IGAD:	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
INGOs:	International Non-governmental Organizations
JKIA:	Jommo Kenyatta International Airport
KACC:	Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
KDF:	Kenyan Defence Force
KECOSCE:	Kenya Community Support Centre
KMA:	Kenya Maritime Authority
KRA:	Kenya Revenue Authority
KTN:	Kenya Television Network
MNC:	Multi-National Corporations
MoD:	Ministry of Defense
MUHURI:	Muslim for Human Rights
NCTC:	National Counterterrorism Centre
NFD:	Northern Frontier District
NGOs:	Non-Governmental Organizations
NIS:	National Intelligence Service
NISA:	Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency
NSM:	New Social Movement
NTV:	Nation Television

REAC:	Regional East Africa Counterterrorism
SAVE:	Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE)
SCO:	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SDA:	Seventh Day Adventist
SFG:	Somalia Federal Government
SNA:	Somalia National Army
SRRC:	Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council
TFG:	Transitional Federal Government
TNG:	Transitional National Government
TSCP:	Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership
UK:	United Kingdom
UN:	United Nations
UNGCTS:	United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy
UNODOC:	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US:	United States
USSR:	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WWB:	Women Without Borders

## **Operationalization of Concepts**

Witt (2012) defines operationalization as the process of strictly defining variables into measurable factors. According to Newman (2012), the operational definitions will result in empirical observations representing the conceptual model in the real world. This section therefore sets down exact definitions of each variable with reference to the study variables and other key concepts used.

**Al Qaeda:** a broad-based militant Islamist organization founded by Osama bin Laden and operating with other terrorist networks to carry out transnational terrorist activities between Kenya and Somalia.

**Al Shabaab:** a terrorist group in Somalia affiliated to al Qaeda operating beyond Somalia's borders and primarily carrying out terrorist activities and transnational terrorist activities.

**Bilateral security relations:** transnational interactions between state functionaries between Kenya and Somalia with regard to the public safety of their respective citizens.

**Border surveillance:** approaches and security risk management systems undertaken through partnerships with border administrations to manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

**Civil society:** Refers to groups or organizations working in the interest of the citizens in both Kenya and Somalia but operating outside of the governmental and for-profit sectors.

**Community intelligence:** the collection of sensitive information from individuals or communities within and or across the borders between Kenya and Somalia; who have first or second hand access to information on issues with significant implications for the security or strategic interests of these countries as far as transnational terrorism is concerned.

**Counter radicalization programs:** alternative initiatives undertaken by the Kenya and Somalia governments to prevent or to stop people becoming radicalized into terrorist groups or supporting terrorism. Such measures are aimed at increasing the resilience of communities to violent extremism; thereby preventing people from being drawn into transnational terrorism.

**Counter radicalization:** alternative strategies and narrative adopted by Kenya and Somalia to deter violent socialization of youths and militants into violent extremism.

**Counterradicalization:** Counterterrorism strategies that aim to boost Kenya-Somalia capacity to deradicalize or disengage existing militants and to prevent the radicalization of new ones. The aim of these strategies, in essence, is to try to prevent terrorism not only by catching terrorists, but also by preventing their emergence in the first place.

**Diplomacy:** the art and practice of conducting security negotiations between Kenya and Somalia with regard to issues of counterterrorism, peace-making, counter-radicalization and human rights.

**Diplomacy-based security:** the instructive interaction, diplomatic engagements and international alliances between Kenya and Somalia within the framework of transnational terrorism management.

**Extremism:** the quality or state of being extreme-advocacy of extreme measures in promoting terror activities between Kenya and Somalia by use of intolerance to propagate the use of violence to correct ‘what is considered ‘wrong.’

**Foreign policy:** refers to a consistent course of actions followed by Kenya to deal with Somalia and or other states on the issue of national security and counterterrorism.

**Fundamentalism:** refers to a belief in a strict adherence to a set of basic principles between Kenya and Somalia (often religious in nature), sometimes as a reaction to perceived doctrinal compromises with modern social and political life.

**Intelligence community:** Government entity or agency(s) established by the National Security Act mandated to collect and analyze information related to transnational terrorism. Commonly referred to as intelligence agencies. In this study, the intelligence community refers to all agencies that play an important role in providing Kenya and Somalia with the necessary intelligence to make sense of their environment, assess present and potential adversaries, avoid strategic surprises, provide long-term expertise, support the policy process, and maintain the secrecy of information in order to manage the transnational terrorism threat.

**Intelligence:** Refers to processed, analyzed and validated information that comes from various sources in Kenya and Somalia, that is produced to aid the government and security agencies better place to manage transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia.

**International community:** the broad group of people and governments, including international organizations working on a common point of peace and security and involved in the management of transnational terrorism measures in Kenya and Somalia.

**Islamic Jihadism:** Refers to Islamist militant movements perceived as a military movement "rooted in Islam" and existentially threatening to Kenya-Somalia with an aim of advancing transnational terrorist activities.

**Jihadism:** Ideological developments (with an international, pan-islamist scope) of Islamic revivalism aimed at propagating terrorist radicalization and activities between Kenya and Somalia.

**Multilateralism:** refers to collective, cooperative action by states when necessary, in concert with non-state actors between Kenya and Somalia to deal with common problems and challenges related to security.

**National security:** refers to the security and well-being of Kenya and Somalia. In this sense, it is not confined to Kenya and Somalia geographical or political entities but extends to their citizens.

**Radicalization:** the process by which individuals usually young people between Kenya and Somalia are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views.

**Security-based diplomacy:** diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia to counter transnational terrorism where coercive force is used in counterterrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons:** Includes a wide range of medium-caliber and explosives such as guns, portable grenades used to carry out terrorist activities in Kenya and Somalia.

**Terrorism management:** Measures taken in the cooperation between Kenya and Somalia on tackling terrorist threats through changes in both foreign and domestic policies.

**Terrorism:** the use of force or violence against persons or property in violation of the criminal laws for purposes of intimidation, coercion or ransom between Kenya and Somalia.

**Terrorist radicalization:** The compulsion to use violence by groups of people or individuals between Kenya and Somalia to impose their beliefs on the rest of society with an aim of violence and terrorism activities.

**Threat to national security:** Actions or sequences of terror and criminal events that threaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life of the Kenyan and Somalia states and their citizens.

**Transnational terrorism:** refers to terrorist attacks, incidents or other actions perpetrated by a group or organization against the civilian population between Kenya and Somalia in furtherance of political or social objectives.

**Weapon:** refers to any device used with intent to inflict damage or harm and can include guns, hand-made grenades used by terrorist groups to carry out attacks between Kenya and Somalia.



**Weapons of Mass Destruction:** These are nuclear, radiological, chemical or either biological weapons used to carry out transnational terrorist activities in Kenya and Somalia and capable of bringing a significant harm to a large number of humans or cause great damage to human-made structures.

**Globalization:** refers to the is the process in which Kenya and Somalia governments interact and integrate with each other, driven by a combination of economic, technological, sociocultural, political, and biological factors. This interaction and the spread of technological advances and dynamic entrepreneurship may bring about a threat to human security.

# **CHAPTER ONE**

## **INTRODUCTION**

This chapter provides the background to the study, the statement of the problem, the objectives of the study and the related research questions. The chapter also provides academic and policy justification and scope of the study. The last section of the chapter highlights the summary.

### **1.1 Background to the Study**

During the 1990s, the end of the cold war led to an entirely new global security environment, marked by a focus on internal rather than inter-state wars. In the early 21st century, new global threats emerged. The attacks of 11th September 2001 on the United States clearly demonstrated the challenge of transnational terrorism, changing global perspectives on both the threat of terrorism and the tools required to prevent it. Although multilateral instruments against terrorism have existed since the 1960s, the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates constitute a new danger that challenges standing tools and institutions (Miller, 2009). Yet pursuing a regional approach involving “all key players” on any security related issue, let alone the extremely sensitive matter of fighting terrorism still challenges many states. This calls for new and innovative counterterrorism strategies and hence the need for a study on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

Since September 11, generating such a comprehensive response has proved to be difficult. Multilateral approaches have been developed in counterterrorism (Biswas, 2009). For example, the United Nations, the world’s foremost multilateral body, has

made strides in developing legal and normative means to combat terrorism, yet member states' perceptions of the threat of terrorism remain uneven. Measures taken outside the United Nations, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Financial Action Task Force, and others provide encouraging frameworks, but many are nonbinding and voluntary (Biswas, 2009). According to Barry and Brat (2008), the international counterterrorism regime continues to suffer from weaknesses such as inadequate compliance and enforcement of existing instruments and limited resources and expertise. In light of this, the concept of security has taken a new level the debate on how the international community can constructively assist in addressing transnational terrorism. However, building cooperative relations with other states in counterterrorism operations has been a challenging process.

In the context of security, states have recognized diplomatic relations; they exchange diplomatic agents to facilitate dialogues and cooperation to dealing with insecurity and transnational terrorism. Thus through bilateralism, states can result in more tailored agreements and obligations that only apply to particular contracting states (Krishna, 2012). The 'Global War on Terror,' led by the United States, emphasizes the role of international alliances in tackling terrorist threats. For example, at a global level, the United States and Russia determined that "best practice" counterterrorism strategies also required increased multilateral partnerships. At the G-8 summit meeting in July 2006, both countries launched the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Other international collaborative efforts supported by Russia and the United States include the diverse counterterrorism projects of the NATO-Russian Council (Alexander, Weitz & Witter, 2009). Although bilateral security relations have been applied in the wake of global war on terror, by their very nature, international counterterrorism efforts challenge state sovereignty by

requiring changes to both foreign and domestic policies. While studies recognize the presence of cooperative security relations between states (Hoffman 2006); a major focus has been on the developed economies such as China, France, Germany, Russia, Canada. As such, the current study shifted focus to analyze security-based diplomacy and counterterrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

Management of transnational terrorism refers to strategies and responses to a global response to the terrorism threat between and among countries. According to Porter (2014), a number of significant steps have been taken that reflect this concern. This includes the General Assembly's adoption of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in 2006. However, while this milestone in the international initiatives to counter terrorism provides for a comprehensive response to terrorism at the national, regional and global level, Bidisha (2009) argues that the primary responsibility for its implementation rests with the Member States. Moreover, since the effective implementation of the global strategy and other international mandates requires the sustained involvement of a wide array of different national actors engaged in numerous different areas, challenges are bound to occur. For example, Byman (2015) asserts *political* problems limit cooperation in counterterrorism and have altered the perceptions and behavior of states. At the same time, the post-9/11 security environment constrained the sovereignty of other nations and this may explain why terrorism has and still remains a serious concern globally. For this reason, this study examined security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

After World War 1, collective security was reckoned as a better mechanism of ensuring security based on the view that it facilitates a constitutional order to limit and shape the exercise of military power (Cronin, 2012). However, Bjola and

Kornprobst (2013) contend that in the post-Cold War era, the transnational character of terrorist groups has necessarily brought forth certain challenges; global networking with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other terrorist groups, coupled with transnational support. Due to the prevailing Cold War dynamics, various host-governments tacitly or actively permitted the overt or covert operation of terrorist groups (Gunaratina, 2013). This shift from diplomacy-based security to security-based diplomacy could be attributed to the fact that generating a comprehensive response to transnational terrorism since September 11, 2001 has proven difficult. Despite its relevance in the modern era, the concept of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism has not been exhaustively explored in the local context and thus a priority area for research.

Terrorism is a global, regional and local phenomenon and comes in two varieties: domestic and transnational terrorism. Rosendorff and Sendler (2012) point out that the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States clearly demonstrated the challenge of transnational terrorism, changing global perspectives on both the threat of terrorism and the tools required to prevent it. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the international community have achieved over the past years great momentum in enhancing co-ordination between global and regional organizations in counterterrorism (Perl, 2013). Although multilateral and bilateral instruments against terrorism have existed since the 1960s, the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates constitute a new danger that challenges standing tools and institutions. In Kenya and Somalia, recent terrorist threats and experiences still remain a big challenge for law enforcement agencies and thus the need for a study on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

Security-based diplomacy is defined as diplomacy between nation states to counter terrorism where military force is used (Kurlantzick, 2007). The prevailing challenges to national security and measures to meet these challenges cover a wide spectrum ranging from border surveillance, intelligence sharing and counter-radicalization to territorial and intellectual property rights to direct military issues (Cronin, 2012). Over the years, the international community has increasingly sought to develop effective measures to prevent terrorism and counter violent extremism. This agenda has often been discussed in the context of a shift away from narrower “hard” security measures to a broader strategic approach that includes “softer” measures to countering terrorism. Conversely, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the U.S. Government was criticized for adopting a militaristic response to the threat posed by al- Qaeda and affiliated groups (Hughes, 2011). Nevertheless, Chin (2009) argues that the capacity of a state to defend itself will depend on the nation’s ability to use defence as a foreign policy tool to neutralize threats to national security and enhance its own defence capability. These analyses spotlight the fact that security-based diplomacy such as military activities are on the increase and warrant scholarly attention. Yet, despite these efforts, literature dedicated specifically to security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism still remains limited in scope and depth.

In a theoretical perspective, the postmodernist approach advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military fixation on threats; to include a wide range of non-state actors, (Booth, 2004). On the other hand, neorealism argues that the organizing principle of the international system is

anarchy, and that the unit of importance to that system is the state. The neorealist approach offers a window for co-operation if the national interests of the participating members are considered, especially if they are 'weak' states (Booth, 2004). The new social movement theory highlights a new paradigm of social movement activity and collective action. Contemporary social movements are characterized by strategies, goals, and membership distinct from tradition social movements. New social movement theorists and scholars explain new social movements as arising from numerous channels in society. These social networks are the key vehicle for transmission of grievances, for recruitment, and for mobilization (Castells, 2004:18). While these theories offer some contextualization that help identify the positive contributions of states in counterterrorism, they have weaknesses. Moreover, the 'security dilemma' owing to the evolving threat of transnational terrorism means that states have to built tools to defend against the potential threat of other actors.

At the global level for instance, the U.S. and Chinese militaries have exercised common tools of engagement during the practice of military diplomacy in Asia (Wittemen, 2013). The United Kingdom and the United States are key partners in terms of defense industry cooperation, sharing of information and intelligence. Diker (2009) asserts that Israel's return to security-based diplomacy and insistence on Palestinian demilitarization and defensible borders are vital guarantors of the state's dilemma in the face of transnational terrorist threats. While studies recognize the employment of security-based diplomacy in countering terrorism, a major focus has been on the developed economies such as China, France, Germany, Russia, Canada and Israel. More literature is needed at the national level to examine

security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

The US counterterrorism efforts in Syria provides complex scenario of a security-based diplomacy on the war against transnational terrorism (Thomas, 2015). According to Thomas (2015), the case of Syria encompasses multiple actors fighting one another on the ground and foreign powers supporting their preferred proxies. For instance, Iran and Hezbollah are backing Bashar al Assad's regime, which is also now receiving increased assistance from Russia. The Islamic State (often referred to by the acronyms ISIS and ISIL) retains control over a significant amount of Syrian territory. The Islamic State's claim to rule as a "caliphate" still remains viable despite the military intervention in Syria Thomas, 2015). On this note, it is clear that the rise of modern terrorism has been more complex and often tied to diverse ideological/religious and political goals, creating a sense of vulnerability across the world.

The U.S. military involvement in Syria and Yemen has created not simply insurgency, but civil war. These conflicts were sometimes triggered and fed by the actions of outside states, including the U.S. and former Soviet Union, but they escalated because of massive civil failures as well as growing violent incidents and military clashes (Cordesman, 2015). However, while states continue to engage military tools in the war against terrorism, Thomas (2015) points out that states must take a far more realistic look at what is really happening in its present wars, and in how it deals with the broad patterns of unrest and conflict emerging in the Islamic and developing worlds. On the other hand, Masi (2015) posits that the United States has a range of interests in the Middle East; including securing the free flow of oil to



global markets. However, Byman (2015) asserts that despite some notable successes, the security-based approach has led states to miss the broader regional trends undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East.

Based on Nowicki's (2011) views, it also seems all too clear if one looks at the patterns in the various metrics on Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan as well as the overviews of the same patterns in Libya and Yemen that all of these countries will face years of continued civil fighting and tension or revert to authoritarian control even if today's Islamist extremists are defeated. From this arguments, it also seems likely that the a security-based approach has not yet succeeded in creating effective host country forces, and the basis for a meaningful rule of law and civil security. Given the prevailing situation of terror attacks and threats between Kenya and Somalia, this information made the study relevant in the country's effort to combat terrorism.

In Africa, emerging security threats to nation-states of Africa have become a source of problem for most governments in the continent. Further complicating the security landscape is the increase in the outbreak of transnational terrorism that feeds into the so-called terrorist loop in Africa (Carson, 2010). The growing audacity of the Nigerian Boko Haram is one among many developments that have made West Africa a region of growing terror concern (Onuocha & Ezirim, 2013). Okoth (2008) argues that the Horn of Africa represents a reverse of the theory of hegemonic stability, in which superpower hegemony deepens rather than lessens political stability. Military operations have been employed in Mali and Nigeria to counter transnational terrorism. In spite of these interventions, transnational terrorism pervades Africa (Onuocha & Ezirim, 2013). While diplomacy has been used in

Africa to combat terrorism, Kwesi (2012) argues that the challenges of lack of an efficient regional and organizational structure, inefficient early warning mechanisms for intelligence and unclear foreign policy objectives and poor coordination have hindered effective progress. In spite of the progress made, assorted security challenges have prompted the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development member countries to initiate joint security operations to tackle terrorism and other organized crimes. Yet, the comprehensive approaches to bolstering capacity across a range of countries tend to pick and choose current hotspots, potentially neglecting future areas of concern.

The threat of transnational terrorism across Africa and the responses from governments in the region differ in a number of ways and can best be understood in their specific political, cultural and historic contexts. Each country has had its own unique experience with the phenomenon and in countering it, with many having had to confront the threat years before September 2001 (Rosand, 2009). According to Waker (2014), the recent and ongoing terrorism-related activities across North Africa and now moving into the Sahel highlight both the persistence and scope of a threat that affects each country in one form or another and the region as a whole. On the same note, McGregor (2014) argues that despite the considerable efforts by governments in North Africa, there is still a heightened terrorist threat there. A number of terrorist groups are present, most notably al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), that have engaged in suicide bombings, money laundering, smuggling, kidnappings and drug and human trafficking as well as other illicit activities across the neighboring borders of Mauritania, Niger, Libya, Chad and Mali. In addition, Onuocha and Ezirim ( 2013) agree that despite the change of tactic

to engage military tools, the rapid growth of entwined transnational criminal networks operating between North Africa and the Sahel is now threatening the security stability in the region. Yet, there seems to be a dearth of research to examine how security-based diplomacy influences transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia, and hence the need for this study.

According to Gettleman (2013), the Islamic terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa such as al-Qa'ida and its affiliates in the Horn have found Kenya a much more conducive country from which to operate than state-less Somalia. Somalia, it is argued, plays a niche role for terrorists; mainly as a transshipment point for men, money and material into East Africa, and in a small number of cases as a safe haven for al-Qa'ida operatives fleeing from the law in Kenya. But Somalia's condition of lawlessness and complete state collapse produces constraints and dangers for terrorist cells just as it creates what aid agencies refer to obliquely as a "non-permissive environment" (Gettleman, 2013). Given the terrorism attacks and threats witnessed between Kenya and Somalia, a study of this nature is important to build insights to offer a distinct contribution on security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in the Kenyan and Somalia.

Kenya and Somalia have been affected by terrorism both in terms of massive loss of lives and property as well as economic development. The two countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism, they have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets as well as to develop and maintain operations (Ploch, 2010). Since emerging from an era of

colonialism under Italy and Britain, Somalia has passed through military dictatorship, famine, and civil war to regional fragmentation. In the modern period, Americans best remember the loss of U.S. military personnel that followed attempts to secure order in the country as part of a United Nations operation (Sunguta, 2006). Over the course of 2011 Kenya attempted to work with at least six Somali allies Ras Kamboni; the TFG; the self-declared “Azania” regional administration; the Isiolo militia (now referred to as “TFG forces”); the al-Sunna Wal Jamma, or ASWJ, militia; and various Gedo region clan militias. This makes the prospect of crafting a regional buffer state challenging. Whereas Kenya and Somalia and other actors have realized the need for a comprehensive strategy against transnational terrorism, terror activities witnessed in both countries calls for attention.

More recently, the hijacking of ships by pirates operating from the Somali coast has attracted considerable attention globally. But the biggest threat emanating from Somalia comes from a different source: Al-Shabaab emerged as a distinct force during the course of the insurgency. The break between Al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups came in late 2007. In early 2008, when the U.S. designated Al-Shabaab a global terrorist entity, prominent members struck a celebratory tone (Nick, 2008). According to Amed and Herbold (2009), Somalia has been without a functional central government since January 1991, making it the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in post-colonial history. This unique context of state collapse has been an important factor in the evolution of both nonviolent and Jihadi Islamic movements in the country. Moreover, the challenge of weak and failed states present important policy challenges to both terrorists and governments. Failed states offer two potential advantages to terrorist groups. First, they may

provide a safe haven for hierarchical systems that ease terrorists' core organizational problems. Second, the economic conditions that accompany state failure may create a favorable labor market for recruiting militants (Amed & Herbold, 2009). On the same note, Masese, *et al.*, (2014) point out that the existence of Somalia as a failed state has presented serious challenges both within and outside the state. As a failed state, Somalia faces the challenge of exercising proper jurisdiction within its borders and this has had serious security implications (Masese, *et al.*, 2014). While significant strategies have been employed in combating terrorism in Somalia and Kenya, the security-based approach and potential consequences witnessed call for an in-depth analysis and hence the need for a study on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

Kenya has not been exempted in the terrorist attack trends. The country has been hit severally by acts of terrorism: in 1980 when a bomb destroyed the ballroom of the Jewish-owned Norfolk hotel in Nairobi; August 7, 1998 when the U.S. Embassy was bombed; and November 28, 2002 when terrorists attacked the Israel owned Kikambala Paradise Hotel near Mombasa in the Coast Province (Greg, *et al.*, 2003). Subsequent acts of terrorism on Kenyan soil have been minor in scope when compared to those previous acts. This trend, therefore, demands for an extensive study and analysis of various factors that motivate terror organizations and the impacts their activities have on the affected states (Bellamy, 2012). The above attacks demonstrate Kenya's significance in terms of recent transnational terrorism. Moreover, the scale and complexity of attacks in Kenya strongly suggests a permissive environment exists for terror group operations.

A report by Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 2012) indicates that Somali fundamentalist movement, which has been active in Somali politics since the late 1980's, is rooted in the 1950's but was reinforced by state collapse in 1991 and the resultant civil war, international intervention, external influence, and the subsequent efforts made by the Somalis themselves at new patterns of political reconstruction in a bid to shape their own destiny. On the other hand, Kenyan counterterrorism efforts, supported by generous Western assistance, have been at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive. There are strong structural foundations for radicalization between Kenya and Somalia. Radicalization has continued to spread building both on the economic decline, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states (ISS, 2012). The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east, Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalize and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalizing on long-standing grievances against the central state. This problem could grow more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia. Radicalization is a grave threat to Kenya's security and stability (Mohamed, 2013). Formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late is thus a priority. While counterterrorism is a broad and varying concept that has been understood and implemented in numerous ways, available studies on security-based diplomacy and management of terrorism are still sparse and thus a priority area for research.

After the 1998 embassy bombings, Kenya and Tanzania were the primary focus for the US campaign against Al Qaeda. The US responded with the East African

Counter-Terrorism Initiative (EACTI) and later the East African Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSII) in order to disrupt the flow and activities of violent extremists in the sub-region (Amed & Herbold, 2009). However, in the mid-2000s, Somalia was becoming an area of increasing concern for the United States with the rise of violent extremists in the country (Carson, 2010). In response, the US shifted focus and adopted an indirect, but assertive approach in working with sub-regional governments and the AU and IGAD and with warlords in Somalia against terrorism. However, recent terrorist events have witnessed al-Shabaab continue to exploit divisions within Somalia and Kenya and commit asymmetric attacks to destabilize the country (Worcester, 2013). Consequently, Issacharoff (2014) argues that while diplomacy has undergone profound changes in an era of instant information and greater public access to multiple sources of news and political analysis, the sensitive strategic challenges still impact on states' national security agenda. In the case of Kenya and Somalia, persistent reports of terrorist attacks have deepened concern over the spread of transnational terrorism.

In late 2010 Kenya permitted an Ethiopian military incursion against Shabaab through Kenyan territory into the border town of Bulo Hawa, a move that many Somali Kenyans claimed led to subsequent instability and an increase in Shabaab violence in northern Kenya (Menkkhaus, 2012). After the October 2011 intervention strategy by the Kenya Defence Forces, Kenya and Somalia have witnessed sporadic terrorist attacks. These series of cross-border attacks, as well as prior kidnapping incidents, spurred Kenya's military to intervene in Somalia on October 14 (Nzes, 2012). On September 11, a British man was killed and his wife kidnapped from a resort in Lamu; on October 1, a French woman was taken from her Kenyan home;

and on October 13, two Spanish aid workers were kidnapped from Dadaab refugee camp (Nzes, 2012).

The September 2013 al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall, June 2014 attacks in Mpeketoni and Mporomooko in Lamu; November 22, 2014, terrorists ambushed a bus and killed 28 passengers in Mandera, the December 2, 2014 attacks that left 36 people dead at a quarry at Koromey in Mandera County; April 2, 2015 terrorist attack at Garissa University College in Garissa that left about 148 people killed; the recent attack on 15th January 2016 where al Shabaab attacked the Kenya Army (KDF) AMISOM Contingent Forward Operations Base (FOB) manned in El-Adde, Gedo region of Somalia have focused the world's attention on Kenya and Kenyan counterterrorism efforts (Ombati, 2016). These incidences and the growing audacity of al shabaab is one among many developments that demonstrate the challenge of countering the changing threat of transnational terrorism.

The continuing challenge posed by al-Shabaab complicates the task of the Somali Federal Government. Recent suicide attacks in Mogadishu have included the Presidential compound and Federal Parliament in July 2014, the National Intelligence and Security Agency prison in August 2014, AMISOM headquarters on Christmas day in 2014, and the Central Hotel in February 2015. On 20 February 2015, a vehicle laden with explosives smashed into the gate of the Central Hotel in Mogadishu. Gunmen then penetrated the premises and opened fire in the hotel's mosque. In April 2015, al-Shabaab bombed an UN minibus in response to the United Nation's support of the African Union troops in Somalia. In January 2016,



terrorists killed at least 20 people at Somali beach restaurant. Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack and the deadly siege inside the the Liido Seafood restaurant. On 22 January 2016, al shabaab militants launched a surprise attack on the Central Hotel in Mogadishu where various Federal Government of Somalia officials had gathered for Friday prayers at the compound's mosque. Between 11 and 25 people were killed (Williams, 2016). The trend toward higher casualties reflects, in part, the changing motivation of today's terrorism, its scope and destruction. Despite the counterterrorism efforts, these trends underscore the serious threat that international terrorists continue to pose to nations around the world, particularly Kenya and Somalia.

Kenya's counterterrorism efforts and the implications of KDF intervention in Somalia raise issues of concern for investigation. Despite the efforts made in management of transnational terrorism, the polarizing tendencies of terrorist radicalization; the intelligence failures on how government agencies interact and share information with one another (Ozzie, 2013) and the underlying challenges of porous borders can hamper the ability of law enforcement to identify and detain potential terrorists. Moreover, while multilateral and bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent shift to security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism has received little scholarly attention, particularly at the national level. This is why there was need to investigate security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

In the recent past, the concept of security-based diplomacy has expanded to become a dominant counterterrorism strategy. This shift from diplomacy-based security to security-based diplomacy could be attributed to the fact that generating a comprehensive response to transnational terrorism since September 11, 2001 has proven difficult. Transnational terrorism remains a fundamental threat to national, regional and international peace and security. Overtime, terrorist networks have evolved to the extent that they challenge states' capacity and law enforcement agencies and the tools required to prevent them (Rosendorff & Sendler, 2012). To a larger extent, the security-based diplomacy approach has been state-centric and states like Kenya, facing the growth of terrorist attacks, have struggled to balance the need for new security legislation with the worst repercussions from the recent developments in Somalia through military intervention. The coercive strategies employed by the state have not been overly successful since terrorist activities have increased even as more force is employed in attempts to neutralize them (Maina, 2011). Although security-based diplomacy approaches have emerged to promote security and deter transnational terrorism, there seems to be a discernable gap in how often each country employs particular military engagement tools.

A security-based diplomacy strategy in counterterrorism in Kenya was launched to ensure a safe and secure national environment. In October, 2011, the KDF deployed its troops to Somalia to respond to numerous Al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi and subsequent infiltrations into North Eastern during which security personnels were attacked. Although the Government of Kenya in concert with the Somalia Federal Government forces, Ras Kamboni Brigade and the AMISOM was prompted to implement the security-based diplomacy approach as a measure of combat terrorism,

the unprecedented reach and potential of terrorist networks such as al-shabaab and its affiliates constitute a new danger that still challenges existing tools and institutions charged with providing national security.

Counterterrorism measures have been heightened and Kenyan government has been developing a legal architecture through robust military, enhancing the structural capacity of intelligence sharing mechanisms, stringent border controls and counterradicalization programs. Yet, this has tended to create sore relations between Kenya and Somalia, especially in relation to the massive targeting of refugees. In the recent past, security agencies have been put on the alert following terror attacks. However, the security-based approach has continued to face numerous challenges. Among such challenges include the sore historical relations between Kenya and Somalia that have been mediated through brute force and mutual suspicion; and mainly viewed as a matter of security that still impacts on the refugee protection in Kenya. In addition, the influence of extremist element in Somalia has since elicited the challenge of youth radicalization following the 'Operation Linda Nchi' initiative by the Kenya Defence Forces. Furthermore, the structural capacity of intelligence agencies has been questionable owing to terrorist attacks that underscore possible intelligence failures on how government agencies interact and share information with one another.

In addition, Kenya's porous borders necessitate a stable environment in which transnational terrorism to grow, and this porosity has been exacerbated by the failure of succeeding governments to properly administer these borders. For Kenya and Somalia, the presence of the state security apparatus remains marginal in many border areas, which reflects a general inability to prevent terrorist attacks emanating from Somalia. As such, it has not only allowed the movement of

refugees fleeing the conflict in Somalia but also movement of terrorists groups and easy flow of illegal weapons. While strategic measures are being undertaken, such as construction of border walls, gaps remain on adopting a more holistic approach taking into account the nexus between peace, security and development.

The Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remains the primary terrorist threat in Kenya and the region at large. The consequences of the absence of the state in most parts of Somalia in terms of the growth of terrorism are immense. Despite the efforts by AMISOM, the threat of terrorism emanating from Somalia remains real (Masese, *et al.*, (2014: 231). Whereas security-based diplomacy emerges as a strategic alternative in the management of transnational terrorism, it can be challenged by inadequacies in the nature of security-based diplomacy policies, counter-radicalization, intelligence sharing and border surveillance. It is in this regard that this study sought to interrogate security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of this study was to examine the influence of security-based diplomacy on transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

The specific objectives of this study were to:

- i. Trace the historical evolution of security-based diplomacy and its influence on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.
- ii. Examine the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.
- iii. Assess the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.
- iv. Evaluate the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

#### **1.4 Research Questions**

The following questions guided this study:

- i. How has the historical evolution of security-based diplomacy influenced the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?
- ii. What are the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?
- iii. How does the structural capacity of intelligence sharing affect the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?
- iv. What is the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

## **1.5 Justification of the Study**

At the national level, literature on security-based diplomacy and counterterrorism is still scarce. Of critical importance is the appreciation that states like Kenya and Somalia vary along a continuum in terms of institutional strength; their level of dysfunction can represent a variable mixture of inadequate capacity and insufficient will in the management of transnational terrorism. In addition, developing countries like Kenya and Somalia are embedded in a larger global system that exerts both positive and pernicious impacts on their resilience and vulnerability as far as transnational terrorism is concerned (Asamoah, 2014). The peculiarity of Kenya, its geo-political positioning within failed states like Somalia, brings to the fore the need for vigilance against potential terror attacks.

### **1.5.1 Policy Justification**

This study envisaged to add important value towards policy formulation on the role of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Moreover, the study is useful to the Kenya and Somalia Governments in implementing effective and prevention-focused response to terrorism. The study can help address the lack of a visible security strategy and policy framework on war against terror.

### **1.5.2 Academic Justification**

Literature on security-based diplomacy is basically Eurocentric and the few that focus on Kenya and Somalia deal with counterterrorism strategies without relating it to security-based diplomacy and terrorism management. Previous studies have tended to rely more on the operationalization of the multilateralism and

bilateralism, often linking Africa and non-state actors' cooperation, without emphasizing security-based diplomacy and counterterrorism. In Kenya, Aden (2009) studied multilateral negotiation as a counter-terrorism strategy in Somalia. Odhiambo *et al.*, (2013) investigated Al-Shabaab's terrorists' propaganda and the Kenya government response. Onkware and Odhiambo (2010) assessed Kenya's pre-emptive and preventive incursion against Al shabaab in the light of international law while Masese *et al.*, (2014) examined state failure and the growth of terrorism in Somalia. The current study seeks to fill this gap by examining security-based diplomacy by targeting the measures and strategies deployed as well provide its historical evolution in the relations between Kenya and Somalia. Research findings will be useful to other scholars doing research in the same field.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

The study specifically analyzed security-based diplomacy strategies in the context of transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia. It focused on four aspects of security-based diplomacy which include: Kenya-Somalia historical security evolution, counter radicalization; intelligence sharing and border surveillance. The study adopted three theories which were post-modernism, neo-realism and the new social movement theory. Specifically, the study methodology employed exploratory and descriptive research designs, drawing its respondents from state and non-state actors in eight regions: (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa and Mandera in Kenya) and (Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni in Somalia).

Kenya-Somalia security relations in 1963 represents an important period that saw Shifta War (1963-1967) in Kenya that was deeply rooted in long-standing grievances resulting from British colonial isolation and underdevelopment of ethnic

Somali in Kenya. However, the study scope examined the relations between Kenya and Somalia in phases including: Kenya-Somalia historical evolution-Pre-1960s; Kenya-Somalia relations Post 1960s, Kenya-Somalia relations post 1963, Kenya-Somalia relations post 1991, Kenya-Somalia relations post 2011.

### **1.7 Summary**

Chapter one has presented a background introduction on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia from global, regional and national perspectives. The statement of the problem highlights critical gaps the study sought to fill. The objectives of the study and research questions guided the study. The justification and scope of the study provide clear indication of the need for more studies in the local context. The next chapter provides a detailed analysis of literature related to the study.



## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter provides relevant literature on the study and discusses the concept of diplomacy, security-based diplomacy and counterterrorism from the global, regional and national perspectives. The four variables of the study are then explored including a historical context of Kenya-Somalia security-based diplomacy, state-centric counter-radicalization measures, structural capacity of intelligence sharing and effectiveness of border surveillance strategies. An empirical review is also discussed followed by a conceptual framework which is grounded on three theories: neo-realism, post-modernism and new social movement theory. Lastly, a logically developed conceptual model is given to explore the relationship among the study variables. The chapter ends with a summary.

#### **2.1 Security: A Contemporary Historical Perspective**

The concept of security has evolved considerably over the years. Traditionally, security was defined primarily at the nation-state level and almost exclusively through the military prism. This focus on external military threat to national security was particularly dominant during the Cold War (Napoleoni, 2003). The end of the Cold War stunned policymakers and academics alike. None of the existing theories of international relations or security studies had predicted the end of an era that had kept the world in a tight grip. The end of the Cold War offered scholars of international relations and security studies an opportunity to focus on subjects other than deterrence theory and balance of power. Other issues

soon gained heightened attention. One of the most influential issues in this respect is the concept of globalization (Wade, 2003). It has been argued that the events of 11 September 2001 'did more to change the perception of money laundering as public discourse is now focused on methods used by terrorists to secure financing for their nefarious deeds (Serio, 2004). The link between terrorism and global crime reflects the wider debate of the nation state versus non-state actor's in the international system. Particularly complex about these criminal networks is that they are extremely flexible and operate on a global level, which makes them very hard to control for an individual state. Recent international terrorist attacks, for example 9/11, showed that terrorist could use 'globalization' to strike forcefully (Vennesson, 2006). The subsequent campaign against terrorist groups was dubbed by some commentators as globalization's first war (Campbell, 2002). This explains why terrorism has and still remains a serious concern all over the world and that is why the study examined security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

### **2.1.1 Global Governance of Security**

The post-Cold War period has seen a significant drop in high-intensity political violence, defined as conflicts with 1,000 or more battle deaths per year (Hurrell & Sengupta, 2012). While this may be considered an improvement in global security, Collier (2008) argues that poor countries are disproportionately affected by remaining conflicts. Civil wars incur an estimated average cost of \$64 billion each year. Poor countries often remain locked in a trap where they struggle to develop after a conflict. If they cannot do so, the risk of a relapse grows. Where conflict reoccurs, it further erodes development. The stabilization of fragile states

has become a priority on international security and development agendas. Yet the authority of the UN security regime and wider development assistance has been increasingly challenged by failures to deliver effective outcomes.

The high costs of state failure are borne mainly by neighbouring states, which are often fragile themselves. Today's failed states, such as Somalia, are incapable of projecting power and asserting authority within their own borders, leaving their territories governmentally empty. This outcome is troubling to world order, especially to an international system that demands indeed, counts on a state's capacity to govern its space. Failed states have come to be feared as breeding grounds of instability and mass migration and terrorism. This provides clear incentives for cooperation within affected regions, but such action is often obstructed by a lack of resources, sovereignty concerns, and conflict or tensions between states (Prantl, 2013). This is true because states are not created equal. Their sizes and shapes, their human endowments, their capacity for delivering services, and their leadership capabilities vary enormously. More is required of the modern state, too, than ever before. Each is expected to provide good governance; to make its people secure, prosperous, healthy, and literate; and to instill a sense of national pride.

According to Hansen (2010), global security is currently in a state of flux and great uncertainty. The patterns and understandings that evolved in the post-Cold War period are contested. As a result, global and regional security arrangements often overlap and at times compete. Western ideas about security such as 'comprehensive security' and 'cooperative security' dominated in the 1990s. US

hegemony prevailed in the early 2000s. Now the shift in global power has led not only to a diffusion of power, but also to a diffusion of principles, preferences, ideas and values with implications for global governance. On the one hand, emerging powers criticize international cooperation as too Western-centric. On the other hand, Western powers themselves are very critical of international cooperation for not harnessing emerging powers, making statements such as: “China is failing to be part of the solution,” “India is being obstructionist” and “Iran is a rogue state” (Hurrell 2012). These points out the challenges of security cooperation between states like Kenya and Somalia. International security relies on states to protect against chaos at home and limit the cancerous spread of anarchy beyond their borders and throughout the world. States exist to deliver political (i.e., public) goods to their inhabitants. When they function as they ideally should, they mediate between the constraints and challenges of the international arena and the dynamic forces of their own internal economic, political, and social realities.

Hurrell and Sengupta (2012) point out three factors that drive transformation in global security. The first is the quantity and complexity of conflicts dealt with by international organizations. The second is the increased functional and normative ambition of the international community, as epitomized in the concepts of human security, the responsibility to protect and the security-development nexus. Third, international organizations have found it difficult to formally adapt to global power shifts, even as there is increasing pressure on regional and global stakeholders to adjust to new realities. Although Hurrell and Sengupta (2012) outline factors that drive transformation in global security, bilateral security

consultations are still challenged by emerging trends in transnational terrorism require new levels of cooperation. Moreover, global terrorism is seen to be even more dangerous when considering the impact of globalisation and the simplicity of an attack. With increased global flows of people, ideas and information it is becoming increasingly difficult to contain or prevent terrorist attacks.

According to Prantl (2013), contestation of the security order operates at the global and regional levels. At the global or UN level, this is particularly visible in debates surrounding the implementation of the responsibility to protect framework. However, Archer (2001) points out the need for the responsibility of individual states towards their populations, and the responsibility of the international community to address genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity when states fail to do so within their own borders. Despite the universal adoption of the framework by the UN General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit, there is a deep political divide over application. Contestation has become most explicit in the creation of alternative structures of security governance. Yet, despite Archer's (2001), the actions of recent terror groups (as witnessed in Kenya and Somalia); have provoked a response from the major powers, the United States in particular, which may make a global 'clash of civilisations' more likely. In perspective, the twenty-first century global order may be characterised by growing tension and conflict between rival cultures or civilisations, as opposed to the political, ideological or economic conflict of old.

### **2.1.2 Multilateralism in Security Relations for Terrorism Management**

After the Second World War the victors, having drawn experience from the failure of the League of Nations, created the United Nations in 1945 with a structure intended to address the weaknesses of the previous body. Khan (2012) points out that unlike the League, the UN had the active participation of the United States and the Soviet Union the world's two greatest contemporary powers. Along with the political institutions of the UN the post-war years also saw the development of other multilateral organizations such as the GATT (now WTO), Bretton Woods institutions and the World Health Organization (WHO). The collective multilateral framework played an important role in maintaining world peace in the cold war. Moreover, United Nations peacekeepers stationed around the world became one of the most visible symbols of multilateralism in recent decades (Hook & Spanier, 2007). The difficulty with this statement, however, is deciding to what degree multilateral institutions have been successful. In some aspects, multilateral institutions have developed groundbreaking policy and internationally accepted agreements, but on other levels, multilateral cooperation has been in limbo, and crucial issues have gone untouched for years. It is difficult to determine if a national, regional, or global approach would have been the most beneficial counterterrorism strategy to date, however, it is clear that progress on all fronts is required to ensure the safety and long term prosperity of the globe.

Keohane (1990) defined multilateralism as 'the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions. In this case, Keohane's definition gives emphasis to the

number of participating states and the fact that it can take place either in or outside an institution but he fails to refer to the qualities, characteristics or nature of multilateral diplomacy. International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) are multilateral in nature. However, The main proponents of multilateralism have traditionally been the middle powers such as Canada, Australia, Switzerland countries and the Nordic countries. Larger states often act unilaterally; while smaller ones may have little direct power aside from participation in the United Nations (by consolidating their UN vote in a voting bloc with other nations, (Cha & Powerplay, 2010). Recently the term 'Regional Multilateralism' has been proposed suggesting that 'contemporary problems can be better solved at the regional rather than the bilateral or global levels' and that bringing together the concept of regional integration with that of multilateralism is necessary in today's world (Cha & Powerplay, 2010). Nevertheless, Cha and Powerplay's views are limited, as some would argue that there is no international non-partisan body capable of dealing with an issue as large and complex as international terrorism. Candidates like the UN would be considered by most as the most capable means of combating international terrorism, however, the task would be a tall order for the UN, as the decision making process at the global multilateral level is not seamless, and this difficulty would further complicate an already complex matter.

A key milestone towards multilateral security relations is found in the adoption of continental forms of diplomacy formalized under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 which according to Islam (2005), gave rise to a multi-state system on a continental scale improving the conduct of international affairs and reflecting in

professionalism to the conduct of peaceful diplomacy and war. The rise of the European multi-state system is particularly important for the development of multilateral diplomacy as it facilitated the beginning of diplomacy among multiple nations. The European nation-state system, consisted initially of twelve well-defined sovereign states, which accepted codified rules of conduct among sovereign and equal states (Tariqul, 2005). It is believed that the combination of the recognition of diplomacy as a profession, the Treaty of Westphalia, the European multi-states system and the codified rules of conduct among equal states laid the foundation for future forms of multilateral cooperation Muldoon (2007) states that "Westphalia principles of sovereignty and the territorial state that were established in the seventeenth century are the foundation of today's multilateral diplomatic system."

Twentieth century multilateral security relations was significantly influenced by the aftermath of the First and Second World Wars which promoted the establishment of multilateral diplomacy in an institutionalized form. Archer (2001:65) affirms that international organizations as a phenomenon „had evolved during a definite period of international history starting in the mid-nineteenth century and flourishing in the period after the Second World War. It is a fact, that a new diplomatic era started after the First World War when international relations became worldwide (Tariqul, 2005: 62) signifying that a new type of diplomacy more robust and more inclusive of multi state participation was required to accommodate the new needs of a global world. This was the beginning of a new 'global governance system' (Rittberger 2001). While the aforementioned authors and scholars have made significant contributions to the



field, there is still more information needed on how security-based diplomacy influences the management of transnational terrorism at the regional level.

Cooperation in multilateral diplomacy has allowed a world of multiple, competing and diverse states to come together to interact, negotiate and find common solutions through international collaboration. Ruggie's (1992) key principles of multilateralism namely, indivisibility, generalized principle of conduct and diffuse reciprocity are evidence of multilateral diplomacy as an instrument of cooperation. The principle of indivisibility in multilateral diplomacy shows the ability of states to work together to defend common goals such as peace and stability in the world for the benefit of all. However, the notion of collective security in a multilateral environment, where a threat to the security of one state is a threat to the collective, vividly exemplifies of how the collective commitment to peace through multilateral diplomacy makes this an instrument of cooperation in the world. While collective security is important, the presence of the terrorism threat and the need to secure national security has pressed the support of other countries in the region in the way against terrorism in Somalia.

At the multilateral level, Khan (2012) notes that Pakistan and China are focusing on counter-terrorism within the framework of SCO along with Russia and other members of the organization from Central Asia. Pakistan lent its support to the Chinese bid to get an Observer Status in South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which is collectively committed to fight terrorism in the region. The two countries also hold regular consultations with Afghanistan, Iran and other West and Central Asian countries to carry out fight against

transnational terrorism. As members of ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Pakistan and China are partners of the countries of Southeast Asia, and Far East in fight against transnational terrorism (Khan, 2012). Despite its strengths, multilateral diplomacy has at times been an instrument of manipulation by the traditionally politically and economically dominant states. From the examples given by Khan (2012), the UN's many weaknesses on the counterterrorist front impede its ability to become a more effective antiterrorist force in the international community. In general, the world body's consistent failure to overcome transnational terrorism.

According to Armstrong, *et al.*, (2004), multilateral diplomacy has proven to be an instrument vulnerable to the conflicts and the political environment to which it is exposed. In multilateral diplomacy, states are strategically drawn to look for the support of likeminded nations, however, after the Second World War and more specifically with the development of the Cold War years, multilateral diplomacy was influenced and susceptible to the negative effects of the bipolar world of super power states. However, Kahler (2009) argues that the inherited rivalry of the Cold War years made East and West adversaries in diplomacy. States in this multilateral environment were forced to take sides or remain neutral making it difficult to use multilateral diplomacy openly as an instrument of global governance. The tensions of these years have been a constant reminder of the vulnerabilities that multilateral diplomacy is subject to in diplomatic relations therefore representing a weak point for the practice of multilateral diplomacy. From Kahler's argument, it is however critical to argue that international institutions are prominent in the 'global War on Terror'. But there remains variation in the institutionalisation of counter-terrorism, across policy domains and over time.

institutions pursue tasks of counter-terrorism when they are backed by power. Institutions function as ‘swords’ as strong states seek to influence others. Weak states, too, are sensitive to the distributional consequences of cooperation and use institutions as ‘shields’ to resist the powerful. These claims are reflected in patterns of cooperation and transnational terrorism management for countries like Somalia. Yet, in spite of this accumulated evidence, the new and emerging insecurity environment in the region provides significant and novel challenges for managing transnational terrorism.

### **2.1.3 Bilateralism in Security Relations for Terrorism Management**

Bilateralism consists of the political, economic, or cultural relations between two sovereign states. When states recognize one another as two sovereign states and agree to develop diplomatic relations, they exchange diplomatic agents such as ambassadors to facilitate dialogues and cooperation. Thus through bilateralism, states can result in more tailored agreements and obligations that only apply to particular contracting states (Krishna, 2012). However, Biswas (2009) argues that the ‘Global War on Terror,’ led by the United States, emphasizes the role of international alliances in tackling terrorist threats. By their very nature, international counterterrorism efforts challenge state sovereignty by requiring changes to both foreign and domestic policies. This, in turn, creates complex sovereignty issues and raises some interesting questions for closer examination. While Biswas (2009) argues that cooperation in counterterrorism has altered the perceptions and behavior of allies of the United States, it's clear that the post-9/11 security environment constrained the sovereignty of other nations. However, it's

clear that terrorism in the 21st century requires collective political will of all nations to combat the scourge of terror.

Given the transnational nature of many contemporary terrorist groups, it follows that the United States' Global War on Terror (GWOT) emphasizes the role of international alliances in tackling terrorist threats (Sageman, 2004), building cooperative relations with other states in counterterrorism (CT) operations has been a challenging process. By their very nature, international cooperation confronts state sovereignty by requiring changes in both foreign and domestic policies. In many cases, such operations necessitate coordination of overarching federal security issues with local functions such as law enforcement (Byman 2006b). This, in turn, creates complex sovereignty issues. In this context, transnational terrorism has become one of the main concerns with its highly complicated characteristics. However, while Byman and Sageman contend with cooperation, the potentialities and challenges on Kenya-Somalia counter terrorism cooperation needs to be examined given the growing areas of convergences in counter piracy and growing vulnerabilities of both countries towards terror. The challenges faced are numerous in terms of individual national interests, and perhaps more critical as far as military intervention is concerned.

Over a period of several decades, the United Nations, UN functional organizations, a number of inter-governmental regional and sub-regional organizations, groups of States, and a number of individual States responded in various ways to the challenges posed by the terrorism phenomenon (Betts, 2011). However, Byman (2006) argues that the level of response varied significantly

from country to country and region to region, and, in most cases, had been targeted at specific criminal acts, many of which were defined in international instruments as acts of terrorism. Many countries had failed prior to the 9/11 attacks to ratify and implement these international instruments, and many that did lacked the legal and operational underpinnings to implement them effectively. Thus, the responses lacked consistency and universal application, and the challenges of terrorism had not been met by a comprehensive and sustained universal effort. Yet, research at the local level is needed because it is not clear how the shift towards a security-based diplomacy approach in counterterrorism in the context of Kenya-Somalia has been effective. Moreover, gaps relating to unsolvable or unsolved internal ethnic conflicts, power sharing disputes, greater deal of injustice , lack of rule of law, undemocratic and weak institutions, border disputes between countries, religious and cultural differences still challenge states in Africa.

The increasing and dramatic effect of non-state actors on international peace and security energized the response and emergence of new international legal regimes to deal not only with the relations between States in dealing with terrorism generally, but with the relationships and responsibilities of States vis-à-vis non-state actors, including their own nationals. These international instruments criminalized certain acts and were intended to increase cooperation and collaboration in preventing and combating terrorism (Collier 2008). Because of the cross-border nature of transnational terrorism, national counter-terrorism efforts rely heavily on international cooperation the exchange of information; the sharing of intelligence and cooperation between intelligence agencies; and on

mutual assistance in investigation, prevention, and prosecution of terrorists. The vast majority of countries lacked the requisite legal and operational mechanisms for counter-terrorism cooperation, and many still do. Thus the events of September 11, 2001 exposed major deficiencies in the then existing international legal order and the capacity of States to cooperate with each other to prevent and combat transnational terrorism (Betts, 2011). Building cooperative relations with other states in counterterrorism (CT) operations has been a challenging process. Byman (2006) observes that by their very nature, international CT operations confront state sovereignty by requiring changes in both foreign and domestic policies. In many cases, such operations necessitate coordination of overarching federal security issues with local functions such as law enforcement (Byman 2006).

The United Kingdom and the United States are key partners in terms of defense industry cooperation and defense sales. The two countries are engaged in more than 20 joint equipment programs, including the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The United States is the largest overseas supplier of the UK Ministry of Defense (Biswas, 2009). The UK, in turn, is the largest overseas supplier to the U.S. Department of Defense, and the United States is the UK's second-largest defense market overall (behind Saudi Arabia). According to Bjola and Kornprobst (2013), most analysts and officials agree that U.S.-UK intelligence and counterterrorism cooperation is close, well-established, and mutually beneficial. UK agencies routinely cooperate with their U.S. counterparts in the sharing of information and U.S. and British law enforcement and intelligence agencies regularly serve as investigative partners. Although such cooperation are evident, literature on local

context is still sparse. The proliferation of terrorist acts sparked a new shift to new counterterrorism measures beg for research.

The extent of U.S.-China counterterrorism cooperation has been limited, but the tone and context of counterterrorism helped to stabilize even if it did not transform the closer bilateral relationship pursued by President George Bush in late 2001 (Khan, 2010). Schearf (2007) says that since 2005, U.S. concerns about China's extent of cooperation in counterterrorism have increased. On the other hand, the relationship between the US and Canada involves a very high degree of trust. Canada has been a steadfast political, military and economic ally of the US for several decades. The two countries have a relationship of close, albeit highly asymmetric, interdependence. Canada's economic well-being is dependent on its trade with the US, while the reverse does not hold to the same degree. The US and Canada are closely tied through collective security arrangements (Schearf, 2007). Despite the considerable efforts by states, many of which pre-date the attacks of 11 September 2001, the terrorist threat there remains acute. For the case of Somalia and Kenya, despite the high priority that governments place on combating and preventing terrorism within their territories and the increasing recognition of the trans-regional nature of the threat, a number of aspects of the response have hindered its effectiveness. For example, the limited cooperation within the region, which still has neither a trusted multilateral mechanism for facilitating such cooperation or a counterterrorism strategy.

The United States and India have since 2004 been pursuing a “strategic partnership” that incorporates numerous economic, security, and global initiatives. Defense cooperation between the two countries remains in relatively early stages of development (Kronstadt, 2012). However, over the past decade and despite a concurrent U.S. engagement with Indian rival Pakistan and a Cold War history of bilateral estrangement U.S.-India security cooperation has flourished. Malik (2003) adds that this bilateral partnership based on shared values such as democracy, pluralism, and rule of law, numerous economic, security, and global initiatives are underway, among them unprecedented plans for civilian nuclear cooperation. Cooperation on counter-terrorism between Pakistan and China at both bilateral and multilateral levels has been in existence for the last about one decade. The two countries have put in place a bilateral mechanism at the level of interior ministers for mutual consultations, sharing of intelligence information, exchanging expertise and devising the ways and means to make the counter-terrorism measures more effective (Khan, 2012). These authors however fail to address compounding issues such as the lack of a common perception of the threat, the lingering tensions between and the tendency of the ruling regimes to retain control over security issues, fearful that any regional bilateralism would jeopardise their domestic integrity and national development processes. This lack of trust has also been one of the obstacles to deeper integration, economic or otherwise, between countries in Africa.

US-Mexico security relations have been enhanced through ‘The Mérida Initiative: In October 2007, the United States and Mexico announced the Mérida Initiative, a package of U.S assistance for Mexico and Central America that would begin in



FY2008 (Seelke, 2014). The Mérida Initiative for increasing cooperation between U.S. and Mexican officials at all levels through the establishment of a multi-level working group structure to design and implement bilateral security efforts. While bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent weakness of Mexico's criminal justice system seems to have limited the effectiveness of anti-crime efforts. Ineffective and often corrupt police forces, weak and unaccountable prosecutors, and an overcrowded and disorganized prison system have undermined Mexican and bilateral anticrime efforts (Gunaratina, 2013). The above cases example provides a framework of how bilateral security relations at the global level have worked. Yet, despite the high priority that governments place on combating and preventing terrorism within their territories and the increasing recognition of the transnational nature of the threat, a number of aspects of the response have hindered its effectiveness.

According to Masi (2015), much of the U.S. strategy has been based on an intelligence campaign that involves partnering with countries around the world to gather information on suspected top terrorists. Although the U.S. counterterrorist effort has been particularly successful against the so-called al Qaeda core, generally it remains a skeptical intervention abroad and particularly skeptical of intervention in the Middle East. The United States has a range of interests in the Middle East; including securing the free flow of oil to global markets, protecting Israel, and preventing nuclear proliferation. In addition, the United States seeks to prevent anti-American terrorism, particularly as it threatens U.S. territory. However, Byman (2015) asserts that despite some notable successes, the security-based approach adopted by the US has led the United States to miss the broader regional trends

undermining U.S. interests in the Middle East. States like the US should move beyond its standard counterterrorist repertoire and embrace a broader set of strategies; such as energetic diplomacy to lessen the tensions that lead states to support violent groups. While it has been found that such above counterterrorist effort seem successful, it is not clear in the context of Kenya and Somalia setup and whether a similar scenario exists and hence the need for this study on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

A similar picture can be said of the status of the US counterterrorism program in Yemen (Nowicki, 2011). Without broader cooperation that provides a forum for addressing all aspects of a counterterrorism strategy. Yet, the US-Yemen alliance remain stagnant and underlying issues of conflict between the two countries remain unresolved. On the other hand, Russia has employed a security-based diplomacy in Syria. Russia's turn to security-based diplomacy in counterterrorism has not been sudden. Since the beginning of the civil war in Syria, Russian authorities have been reporting numbers of Russian citizens joining the ranks of the Islamic State. Since 1999, Russia has been conducting counterterrorist operations in its very own North Caucasus. Despite the government's repeated declarations of victories over terrorists, the North Caucasus insurgent factions established the Caucasus Emirate in 2007 and have been challenging Moscow's legitimacy in its efforts to establish an independent Islamic state (Pokalova, 2015). While Pokalova (2015) explains the case in Russia's security-base approach in counterterrorism, more studies need to be conducted to find out the case of such approaches in Africa, and so much

between Kenya and Somalia because of their strategic importance to the United States and the indigenous evolution of terrorist cells.

In the present world, while religious inspired terrorism easily overshadows any other form of terrorist acts, there are proponents (Nowicki, 2011) to remind us that religious terrorism also needs other necessary and sufficient conditions in order to blossom. According to Gunaratina (2013), an analysis of Failed States Index 2007 shows that many of the nations that western political leaders have accused of harboring or supporting terrorism are among the top twenty nations that are close to becoming failed states. These states are not just a danger to themselves; they can threaten the progress and stability of countries half a world away from them (Thomas, 2015). The above analysis resonates well with the case of Somalia and counterterrorism efforts in the region. However, religion and doctrines of Islam are extremely complex. Moreover, the emerging anti-terrorism programs, signal by an increased militarization of U.S. policy in Africa for example, questions whether specialized strategies for counter terrorism are necessary.

The above examples provide a framework of how security-based diplomacy and diplomacy-based security have worked at the global level. Yet, despite the high priority that governments place on combating and preventing transnational terrorism within their territories, recent terrorist attacks between Kenya and Somalia give us good reason to reassess the influence of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism. The trends in occurrence of terrorist activities reveal predictable future increase in terrorism activities if the fight against terrorism is not stepped up to reverse the situation. Although these studies have

indicated the role of security-based diplomacy in countering terrorism, most such studies have been conducted in Western countries. Therefore, it was necessary to explore security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

Conventional definitions of security have been challenged in discussions within the academia, and within international relations in particular. The first signs of a trend towards the expansion of the notion of security can be traced back to the late 1960s, when Robert McNamara suggested that security implied the freedom of a state to develop and improve its position in the future. Adopting a broader definition of security, Ullman (2003) contends that security can be understood from its antithesis: A threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that threatens drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or to private, nongovernmental entities (persons, groups, corporations) within the state. However, Bjola and Kornprobst (2013) argue that in the context of increasing counterterrorism cooperation, external partners have struggled to develop a constructive approach for dealing with the rising influence of political Islam. Although many researchers explore the concept of security the issues behind its root cause, literature on bilateral security relations and management of terrorism in the Horn of Africa is still scarce. This necessitated the need for a study on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

#### **2.1.4 Bilateralism in Security Relations for Terrorism Management in Africa**

In Africa, a number of regional inter-governmental organizations, such as the Organization of African Unity (OAU), recognized the challenge of terrorism and took steps to respond. However, many of the anti-terrorism instruments that were adopted were not implemented broadly by their member States. International counter-terrorism efforts are likely to succeed only with significant improvement in cross-border cooperation and collaboration, exchange of information, and intelligence sharing. In essence, States must be able to protect their borders and must have the capacity to provide mutual assistance to each other in the investigation, apprehension and prosecution of terrorists, thereby denying safe haven to them and their supporters (Collier 2008). However, most states lack the requisite legal and operational capacities; terrorism is not comprehensively defined; and most countries treated acts of terrorism as domestic rather than as international crimes, hence acts of terrorism were not defined as extraditable offences in the criminal codes of many countries and in mutual assistance treaties and other bilateral agreements to which they were parties (Betts, 2011). Despite the benefits that bilateral relation provide for its constituents, the shift towards security-based diplomacy in managing transnational terrorism begs for research and hence a priority area for this study.

According to Sheehan (2014), the AU's adoption of counter-terrorism legal instruments OAU Convention (1999) and the Protocol (2004) and the Plan of Action (2002), which establishes a counter-terrorism legal framework, are clear expressions of political will and intent of African States to deal seriously with the issue of terrorism. The Protocol to the OAU Convention, adopted 2004, conferred

on the Peace and Security Council of the African Union the responsibility for implementing regional, continental and international counter-terrorism instruments as well as harmonizing and coordinating efforts in the prevention and combating of terrorism. The AU Plan of Action provided a framework and a roadmap for African States to implement international counterterrorism measures as provided in the OAU Convention, as well as the measures mandated by Security Council resolution 1373 (2001). The Protocol also established and clarified the mission of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism as a structure of the AU Commission. The ACSRT operates as the operational arm of the AU Commission for counterterrorism implementation in Africa (Porter, 2014). While the AU Plan of Action provides a framework and a roadmap for African States, there are possible gaps relating to security-based diplomacy in countering transnational terrorism.

Although AU's framework to countering terrorism has been adopted, part of the Strategy's significance lies in its call for an inclusive, multi-stakeholder response to the threat at the national, regional and global levels involving both traditional and non-traditional counterterrorism actors. Although it reinforces the point that national governments, which have a responsibility to protect their citizens from terrorism, are the primary counterterrorism actors, it highlights the role that the UN system, regional bodies and civil society can play in working with states to implement the framework.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the AU counterterrorism unit at its headquarters in Addis Ababa was tasked with promoting and coordinating counterterrorism efforts

among its member States. The counter-terrorism unit had broad expectations that outside assistance would be available to help it build its capacity to provide the assistance needed by AU member States to implement UN counter-terrorism mandates, in particular UN Security Council mandates (Human Security Report Project 2010). To this end the AU Commission reached out to the UN system and other bilateral partners, including through a meeting convened for this purpose with UN bodies and other partners at its headquarters in Addis Ababa in 2003 to seek guidance and assistance in establishing a viable counter-terrorism unit within the Commission (Sheehan, 2014). However, the Commission's expectations were not met, as UN and other international partners, in particular bilateral donors, preferred to retain control of the assistance they were providing by working directly with AU member States.

Thus the AU's reliance on technical assistance from international partners and donors, both at the AU headquarters and later at the ACSRT, to build its own counter-terrorism capacity and effectiveness has been circumscribed from the very outset by the level of available external assistance. While this dependence on external partners remains, there are efforts and some progress, especially through the ACSRT, to build AU capacity to deliver technical assistance to AU member States directly. However, despite the AU's efforts, and while some progress has been made, carrying out the UN counter-terrorism mandates has proven to be quite challenging to the AU Commission and most African States. Limited financial, human and technical resources, as well as other pressing priorities on the continent, are cited often as reasons for lack of full and effective

implementation (Porter, 2014). This seems to have created a problem and thus the threat and the need to combat transnational terrorism between states is important.

### **2.1.5 Bilateral Security Relations Between Africa and the West**

The concept of security takes to a new level in the debate on how the international community can constructively assist in addressing Africa's deep-rooted patterns of insecurity. In so doing, the limitations of current international approaches to security sector reform (SSR) which tend in practice to be state-centric, externally driven and technical in nature are more clearly revealed. Drawing on recent research on the politics of security decision-making, (Hendrickson (2012) posits that the landscape of international engagement in African security sectors is rich and varied. This reflects a long history of external intervention in Africa's security domain by European powers which started during the colonial era and continues today, notably Belgium, France, Portugal and the United Kingdom. Newer actors such as the United States and the Soviet Union assumed a prominent role during the Cold War as the superpowers competed for the support of client states, while more recently China has become a significant actor (OECD, 2007). In spite of this international actor's role, debate on the role of security-based diplomacy in counterterrorism still remained a priority area for research.

According to Hutchful and Fayemi (2004), the historical backdrop for most of these interventions in Africa's security sectors was the pursuit of national interests and commercial profit. This has resulted in intense competition between external actors and a diverse mix of assistance programmes essentially designed to strengthen and win the favour of client regimes rather than promote the security interests of African populations (Fayemi, 2004). Conversely, (Rosendorff



& Sandler, 2012), argues that while many of the bilateral donor countries have dabbled in one form or another of SSR assistance, few actually have the requisite capacity, resources or motivation to support a major programme of SSR assistance that could bring about significant changes in security sector governance or service delivery in a given country. This is not to downplay the potential value of some of these contributions, for they can have a strategic impact on, say, policy development processes or the functioning of oversight mechanisms that creates space for other reforms to take place. Moreover, because most of the bilaterals now explicitly seek to collaborate on assistance programmes, the value of their interventions should not be assessed in isolation. But the point is that there are very few bilateral security players that can actually have a significant impact on their own. Although (Hutchful and Fayemi, 2004). Highlight emerging challenges in Africa, and given the political tensions in the region that have so far inhibited the establishment of an effective, trusted multilateral mechanism, it is unlikely to develop organically, even with the existence of the UN Strategy. Yet, such bilateral relations in the context of security-based diplomacy as a strategy in the management of transnational terrorism require attention and hence the need for this study.

Among the bilaterals engaged in supporting SSR in Africa are several key countries which by virtue of their approach, the size of their assistance programmes, the aid delivery instruments at their disposal of their relationship with continent- offer interesting insights on working bilaterally (Rosand, 2009). The four countries examined here are the UK, France, the Netherlands and the USA, each of which have embraced the SSR agenda to varying degrees and in

varying manners. Differences in approach reflect a combination of factors, including political interests, legal and administrative frameworks and the nature of their relationship with the continent (OECD, 2007). Although security-based diplomacy approaches have emerged to promote security and deter transnational terrorism there seems to be a discernable gap in how often each country employs particular military engagement tools.

Sierra Leone was the test case for the UK's new SSR policy starting in 1999, where it provided support for a comprehensive restructuring and development of the war-torn security sector. During this period, the UK also supported a defence review in Uganda and a range of other SSR initiatives in Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria and South Africa, some of which are either ongoing or are currently being renewed (Hendrickson, 2012). While such engagements between UK and Africa seem to be bearing fruits, perhaps the crucial agenda has been how security-based diplomacy policies can be employed in the management of transnational terrorism.

In the past France maintained a range of military facilities in key francophone countries. This military presence was principally about supporting friendly governments and French national interests, including the protection of citizens and commercial concerns, rather than providing training or support for SSR initiatives (Gettleman, 2013). Troop numbers have been greatly reduced in recent years, and today France only retains military facilities in Djibouti, Gabon and Senegal. The emphasis of its security engagement has shifted accordingly to supporting the development of African peacekeeping capacity, particularly in

ECOWAS and support for the Africa Standby Forces initiative. This work builds upon the multinational peacekeeping training conducted under the auspices of the Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities Programme since 1996, and is being done in conjunction with the USA and the UK (Hendrickson, 2012). Nevertheless, the shift towards security-based diplomacy and management of terrorism are still sparse and thus a priority area for research.

The events of 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001, as well as the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, have led the USA to reconsider its strategic interest in Africa for both economic and security reasons. This has led it to scale up its military presence and engagement on the continent, most notably with plans to establish a new US Command in Africa (AFRICOM), which became operational in 2008. At the same time the USA has intensified plans for military exercises with African countries, as well as other forms of military-to-military engagement and training. This enhanced military engagement (and the role of AFRICOM in particular) is being publicly pitched in terms of building professional and capable militaries and addressing transnational security threats of mutual concern to the United States and African countries (Onuocha & Ezirim, 2013).

AFRICOM works in concert with other US government agencies, such as the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (USAID), to ensure its activities support US policy objectives. Funding for AFRICOM comes from the US Department of Defense and is largely geared towards operations such as the Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa and the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Partnership, both of which are aimed at countering terrorism

and violent extremism (Williams, 2005). In practice, the immediate requirement of US military engagement in Africa is counter-terrorism. Emphasis is placed on building security cooperation relationships with African states and armies and providing US forces with opportunities for training. While some of the aims pursued under this work could potentially contribute to SSR such as enhancing regional cooperation on security issues or reinforcing policing or intelligence capabilities the approaches taken tend to be short term, focused on US versus African security objectives and weak on governance content given the pressure to show quick results. This diminishes the appeal of systemic investments aimed at improving the governance of African security institutions. The main focus rather is on training initiatives, which fall under the International Military Education Training programme. This has an important normative content, though this is largely delinked from practical reform initiatives (Williams, 2005).

#### **2.1.6 Changing Security Dynamics in the Horn of Africa**

Accelerating processes of globalization and cross-border flows of information, communication, militants and money are reconfiguring the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Schlee & Watson, 2009). Domestic and external drivers of conflict are increasingly intermeshed as problems transcend national boundaries and can no longer be contained within states. Issues have become transnationalized as supra- and sub-state networks of exchange bypass state controls and erode what little remains of Cold War-era distinctions between the internal and external domains. Previously localized conflicts have developed regional and transregional dimensions, knitting together the zones of instability, while the growth of powerful and violent non-state actors poses a profound challenge to existing security arrangements and the international

order. In turn, new mechanisms of collaborative and multilateral approaches have emerged to tackle these issues. However, they have largely failed to address the underlying problems generated by the erosion of local carrying capacities, governing capabilities and a crisis of political legitimacy and authority in the two regions (Ulrichsen, 2011).

According to Ulrichse (2011), these subregional conflicts constitute an unstable zone of cross-border insecurity and informal networks that link the two largely distinct security complexes in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. On the same note, Woodward (2003) observes that the growth of multibillion-dollar shadow business networks spanning the Gulf of Aden complicates conventional counterterrorism and counter-piracy strategies and defies attempts to contain the threat of the spread of radicalization at its source. This has profound implications for the future stability of the oil-rich Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and for the security of the commercial shipping lanes that transit the Gulf of Aden and the Bab al-Mandab. International actors' attention has, however, focused more narrowly on the threat posed by the reconstitution of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen in 2009 (and, to a lesser degree, Al-Shabaab in Somalia), and a succession of high-profile attempted attacks that have attracted global attention (Woodward, 2003).

In the Horn of Africa, the multiple cross-border flows of violence and instability have undermined state-based approaches to conflict resolution and management and rendered them increasingly obsolete. The disintegration of state and society in Somalia after 1991 was the most prominent, but by no means the only, manifestation of the unraveling of boundaries and postcolonial polities

(Ulrichsen, 2011). According to Mazrui (1977), relative peace and security also stimulated economic activity. The overriding priority of colonial administration was to make the colonies self-supporting. Western education emptied the villages, populated the cities, increased mobility and urbanization. Mazrui further argues that if urbanization forced Africans to mix, even if they failed to congeal, it created an awareness of their similarities, as well as their distinctiveness from others. Mazrui (1977) argues that colonialism made Africans realize they are one: “a sentiment was created on the African continent—a sentiment of oneness” (Mazrui 1978).

Conversely, Roy (2009) asserts that conflicts transcended national boundaries in Somalia and Somaliland, and in Ethiopia and Eritrea. The dynamics of conflict in Sudan accelerated its division into separate political entities. These exacerbated the fluidity (and artificiality) of national boundaries drawn and redrawn to suit centralized bureaucracies rather than as a reflection of established socio-cultural and economic realities on the ground (Roy, 2009). On the other hand, notions of statehood were further challenged by the advancement of interventionist foreign policies and the sponsoring of proxy forces in neighboring countries, as external forces regularly intervened in ostensibly domestic contests for a variety of ends (Ulrichsen, 2011). Moreover, cross-cutting economic themes, including the regional impact of localized conflict, drought, land rights and remittances, differential levels of access to the sea and trading routes, inequitable sharing of natural resources, and interstate tensions over the management of water and river flows (particularly in the White and Blue Niles), have long been constants in regional politics and international relations in the Horn. Recognition of their

significance has come in efforts to promote regional and multilateral frameworks of policy making in response (Ulrichsen, 2011).

In addition, Ulrichsen (2011) posits that the patterns of civil war and interrelated conflict in the 1980s led to the first creation of a multilateral policy-making framework in 1986. This was the Inter-Governmental Authority against Drought and Desertification (IGADD), which was limited to coordinating approaches to environmental protection, food security and the management of natural resources. It had six members Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda and did not exhibit any desire for political action or greater regional integration in policy making. However, in 1995, its mandate was significantly expanded to include a specific security-cooperation role, particularly with regard to "increasing the capacity of countries of the sub-region in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, both inter- and intra-state through dialogue." Its six member-states also established a secretariat and a specific division with responsibility for addressing issues of peace and security. However, at the time of its creation, two of its members (Ethiopia and Uganda, in addition to Eritrea) were intervening in the military conflict in Sudan, thereby complicating the new organization's mandate (Ulrichsen, 2011)..

The renamed and restructured Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) took part in two sustained efforts at regional conflict resolution. Between 1993 and 2005, it participated in the process leading up to the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that settled the long civil war between north and south Sudan. Rather less successful was its role in the Somali peace process in the 1990s and 2000s, in part because of Ethiopian and Eritrean

mobilization of Somali proxies as part of a conflict that started in 1998. In 2000, IGAD recognised the Transitional National Government (TNG). Once again, though, its institutional effectiveness in supporting a Somali peace process and political reconciliation was undermined when two member states (Ethiopia and Djibouti) continued to support opposing factions within Somalia itself. The IGAD role in Somalia ended with the October 2004 creation of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). As the previous section made clear, however, peace and security remained bitterly and violently contested in Somalia and among regional neighbors (Roy, 2009).

Elsewhere in the Horn, in 2009-10, a stalled electoral process and escalating political crisis in Somaliland, hitherto considered a model of regional peace and stability, produced new conflict. In common with past experiences, regional and transnational characteristics meshed with domestic processes of contestation (Cordesman, 2009). This occurred as groups such as the Northern Somali Unionist Movement (NSUM) supported the creation of a Greater Somaliland that would include parts of western Ethiopia in addition to southern Somalia. This led to clashes between NSUM militias and Ethiopian forces on the Somaliland-Ethiopian border in May 2010. Moreover, regional countries remain divided on the desirability of Somali territorial integrity, with Djibouti and Kenya being particularly insistent that a unified Somalia can best achieve their geopolitical interests by balancing against a strong Ethiopia and destabilizing Eritrea (Healey & Hill, 2010).

According to Murphy (2008), multiple fault lines have thus opened up, facilitated by (and accelerating) processes of state weakness and the relative empowerment



of non-state actors. The result is more political violence and endemic criminality in and off the coast of Somalia and the Horn. Nevertheless, the new dimension to this nexus of terrorism, piracy, gun-running and people-smuggling is its growing transregional dimension. This defines the core challenge facing the regional and global security agenda, in addition to attempts at diplomatic mediation and conflict resolution throughout the area. Intensifying illicit networks and rent-seeking criminality are part of a broader pressure on fragile state structures. They are already struggling to control and adapt to pressures arising from the accelerated flows of information, communication and migration in a rapidly globalizing environment. The coincidence of these processes in Somalia and Yemen is changing the geopolitics of insecurity in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula (Murphy, 2008).

Regional and international responses to the emergence of transnational threats and, increasingly, global threats to security in the Horn of Africa and Yemen thus demonstrate the difficulties of formulating a constructive approach that simultaneously addresses causes as well as symptoms and balances short- and long-term needs (Cordesman, 2009). In addition, the appearance and strengthening of a range of violent and nonviolent non-state actors challenges the state-centric focus of regimes' security considerations that have long held sway in the region, as well as conceptual approaches to international relations and world politics. They involve a rethinking of the concept of security that integrates issues of domestic and international governance and sustainable development while taking care not to securitize them in the way that U.S. officials have done with regard to countering terrorism in Yemen (Cordesman, 2009). Above all, it

requires policy makers to formulate holistic approaches to conflict-affected regions that address the totality of governance and development issues.

#### **2.1.6.1 Globalization in the context of terrorism**

The world has become a global village. Drastic advances in technology and communication have intensified the ever increasing pace of globalization. The interrelation between terrorism and globalization is subject to controversies; on one hand, some views assert that terrorism is spreading not because of globalization but because some people are excluded from globalization. On the other hand, certain views claim that globalization may be one of the main causes of the spread of terrorism because it assists terrorist groups to distribute their literature and enforce their views on like-minded people in other parts of the globe. Cooker (2002) asserts that for a long time, however, globalization was not discussed much, if at all, by the security community. Strategic concerns seemed remote from a world which had been conditioned to believe that the market was the source of contemporary history. Yet, in the new economy, security concerns and terrorism trends are a growing concern for many states.

The success with which the West achieved its material goals in the 1990s removed the impetus to enquire too deeply into the obverse side of globalization: the discontents to which it gives rise and even more the strategies of the discontented (Stibli, 2010). Instead, globalization should be seen as a process which transforms without eradicating the institutions and features of the political landscape in which it is at work. It does not entail the end of territorial geography or ethnicity, much less so religion: these still co-exist in complex inter-

relationships. Against this analysis, it can be argued that what is being witnessed is the impact of globalization on a series of existing global systems, such as the global market and global politics.

Throughout the world, globalized “development” generally entails an influx of external investments that are then used to build up an energy and transport infrastructure. This new infrastructure then shifts the locus of economic and political life from a multitude of villages and towns to a handful of large urban centers (Norberg (2012)). However, Stibli (2010) argues that the creation of a global monoculture in the image of the West has proven disastrous on many counts, none more important than the violence it does to cultures that must be pulled apart to accommodate the process. Globalization is not merely a trend or a fad but rather an international system. It took the place of the old Cold War system and, as it has its own laws and logic, which might influence, directly or indirectly, politics, environment, geopolitics and the economy of any country. Nevertheless, globalization has its own technologies: computerization, miniaturization, digitization, satellite communication, optic fiber and Internet, which reinforces the defining perspective of globalization. Once a country enters into the system of globalization, its elites begin to internalize the perspective of integration and try to fit in a global context.

Khan (2015) points out that the globalization of terror has also changed in character as the world moves away from the state sponsored phenomenon of the 1980s. The statistics tell their own story. Cooker (2002) observes that between 1968-89 the incident rate of terrorism was 1,673 per year. Between 1990-6 there was an increase of 162% on the Cold War years (4,389 a year). The percentage

increase would now be closer to 200% given the escalating number of conflicts since 1996. More alarming is that the new terrorism is primarily conducted against citizens not governments. Secondly, globalization is encouraging religious fundamentalism. Thirty years ago there was not a single religious cult or religious terrorist movement in the world. As recently as 1980 only two of the world's 64 known terrorist groups were animated by religious belief. Since then Shia Moslem groups have accounted for a quarter of all terrorist related deaths. Thirdly it is also producing new network-centred terrorist organizations. Thus Al-Qaeda is largely a franchising agency which functions through religious internationalism and state-less networks rather than through the Cold War mechanism of sponsoring states. The majority of terrorist movements in the Middle East are not transnational despite links with similar movements in neighbouring countries. But some like Al- Queda are truly global in their reach (Cooker, 2002).

After the Sept. 11<sup>th</sup> terrorist attacks against the US, the very discourse of international relations and global politics has been transformed. Prior to Sept. 11<sup>th</sup>, the dominant issues were geo-economic in nature. Globalization and humanitarian issues occupied the agendas of international summits and international organizations. Norberg (2012) asserts that a shift has taken place and now geopolitics and security concerns have once again become the central issue and the "old language and institutions" of the cold war are shaping our thinking about global politics. The world was rapidly moving to realizing the idea of a global village as commonalities in terms of economic aspirations and technological progress were emphasized by politicians and opinion makers, over

differences such as religion, culture and ethnicity. Globalization of the world was the ultimate celebration of the political, economic and social homogenization of the global populations. On the same note Cernat and Vranceanu (2014) (2010) point out that globalization as a process was facilitated by the liberalization of trans-border transactions by the dilution sovereignty. Globalization is essentially a measure of the ease with which, labor, ideas, capital, technology and profits can move across borders with minimal governmental interference. This measure of liberalization is also a surrogate measure for security.

From this perspective, the great sense of insecurity that terrorism now inspires in Kenya and Somalia represent the challenge that has brought about globalization and terrorism. The efforts to prevent terrorists from moving their resources is leading to greater scrutiny of banks and setting up of new measures that will slow down the flow of capital. The fear that porous borders allow terrorists to enter target countries is leading to new rules about border patrol, VISA regulations, and monitoring of foreign travelers. New security measures at airports have already raised the costs of travel and are affecting the profitability of the airline industry. Governments are increasing international cooperation to monitor the flow of information, people and monies across borders (Khan, 2015). These heightened measures are a result of the change in priorities. Cost is now second to security and therefore in pursuit of safety, profits are being sacrificed. If this state of affairs persists, globalization be retarded and the very instruments that facilitate and accelerate globalization will be blunted.

Khan (2015) posits that it is ironic that global terrorism, the phenomenon of terrorists operating in and against several nations simultaneously, was facilitated by globalization and now it has become the biggest challenge to globalization. Global terrorism depends on the success of globalization. In fact one may very conceive of global terrorism as a facet of the global culture resulting from globalization. Indeed, Cernat and Vranceanu (2014) note that in the nineteen eighties as international theorists realized the growing power of economic interdependence they began to theorize what would happen to the anarchic nature of global politics with the increased economic cooperation between nations. Liberals argued that international institutions created to facilitate global cooperation and manage interdependence would eliminate anarchy. The realists however maintained that economic cooperation was not a guarantor of security and therefore we would live in a world that was economically orderly but politically anarchic. Neoliberals and neorealists agreed to describe this condition as a state of cooperation under anarchy.

Lutz (2010) contends that religious terrorism increased greatly towards the end of the twentieth century. On several occasions various religious groups have reacted negatively to the challenges that come with globalization. Globalization by its very nature has the potential to undermine traditional religious values in societies. On the other hand, Targowski (2014) posits that Western secularism has threatened indigenous cultures and local religions exposed to the broader world. The spread of ideas linked to globalization can actually promote rebellions rooted in religion, a reaction to the threat of global homogenization. One consequence of increasing globalization and the spread of secularization has been resurgence in religious beliefs, including fundamentalist views, in all of the

world's major religions. There are Jewish extremist groups in Israel that have reacted to globalization not only by targeting Palestinian Arabs but by attacking Jewish citizens that they see as too secular. Islamic groups have clearly responded to threats that globalization represents to them (Targowski, 2014).

According to Mousseau (2003), the global jihad has represented a continuing response to the threat that exposure to the broader world has represented to Islamic communities. The earlier violence involving Palestinians, especially the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), was more of a nationalist response to the presence of Israel rather than a religious one but reflected at least in part globalization effects. However, Nieman (2011) notes that Boko Haram ("Western Education is Forbidden") in Nigeria is just one of the latest manifestations of this trend. The economic dislocations that came with globalization have marginalized many individuals in northern Nigeria, including groups of Muslims who have lost both their economic and social status. Many of them have been attracted to Boko Haram.

Globalization has had an additional effect on the prevalence of terrorism and the techniques used. The presence of modern communications and transportation has provided opportunities for violent organizations to learn from each other, to communicate with members in distant locations and to reach out to possible recruits. It also provides greater opportunities for violent groups to attempt to influence external actors with their attacks. Targowski (2014) asserts that although anarchists practiced an early form of leaderless resistance attacks with their campaigns of assassinations, this type of terrorism has become more

prevalent with the internet and social media. Cernat and Vranceanu (2014) point out that the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIL) has demonstrated all too well the potential that modern forms of communications have for recruiting potential foreign fighters to its ranks and incite others to undertake lone wolf attacks on their home ground. Modern transportation linkages have facilitated travel, allowing the launching of terrorist attacks in foreign countries.

Clearly, the above analysis shows that globalization can engender religious, ethnic, economic, and ideological opposition movements with splinter groups of them engaging in violent responses, including the use of terrorist tactics.

The technological advances associated with globalization have improved the capabilities of terrorist group to plan and coordinate their operations before any information is link out. In particular technology have improved to the extent that terrorist now have the internet to use as a main to empower individual and cell with the ability to post tracts on the world wide web. Globalization and its technological advancement has also seen the commercially availability of radios and handheld phones, which allowed terrorist cell to operate independently at a substantial distance. Terrorist groups have able to leverage technological development designed to shield identity from unauthorized commercial or private exploitation. Globalization may cause such violence, contribute to it, or be largely irrelevant in some cases. Since there is no single cause for terrorism, globalization will not explain all outbreaks of violence, but there could well be some connection, especially within the context of security-based diplomacy and transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia.



### **2.1.7 The Transnational Trend of Terrorism**

Terrorism remains a transnational threat that entails risks to global interests emanating from and manifested in both the international and domestic environment. The past few years have witnessed an increase in terrorist actions by entities claiming some affiliation with or philosophical connection to Al Qaeda. Global terrorist attacks were conducted by individuals or small terrorist cells that received support ranging from resources and training to having minimal connections, if any, with the terrorist groups to which they claim allegiance (Painter, 2013). The complexities and uniqueness of its approach in the present day sets it apart from traditional forms of terrorism (Stanliland, 2009). As the plague of terrorism increases day by day the authority of the state and its legitimacy has come under severe challenge in the recent upsurges in Kenya and around the world. The very nature of terrorism in the region has a strong cross-border context and content, which is at the core of any discourse on sub-continental terrorism.

Curtis (2008) points out that while terrorism existed in the early 1970s, it was mainly a coercive tactic adopted as part of territorial nationalism fighting to achieve a political objective and contained within regional borders. Established under a well-defined chain of command, it had defined political and economic objectives. Terrorist groups engaged in highly selective acts of violence that included many people alive to watch rather than dead. The principal goal, therefore, was to raise public awareness over grievances, and not necessarily to cause a high number of casualties. Painter (2013) adds that the rise of modern terrorism has been more complex and often tied to diverse ideological/religious

and political goals, an astounding capacity for lethal violence, and a transnational extension beyond regional or local borders. Terrorist groups have mastered a deliberately unpredictable quality in order to achieve greater psychological effect and to create fear and anxiety in a given target group. They have succeeded in creating a sense of vulnerability across the world; gaining attention and publicity by acts of violence and by the use of the media to enhance the effectiveness of their violence; and gaining support from similar groups around the world (Painter, 2013)..

According to Curtis (2008), several factors explain the rise of terrorism as a more global phenomenon and the steady increase in their destructive capacity. First, terrorism now has a global reach due to technology and communication. The development in terrorist weaponry is getting smaller, easier and more powerful. With the dramatic progress in communications and information processing these groups have greater opportunities to divert non-weapon technologies, namely cell phones, the Internet, and publicly available websites; all off-the-shelf technologies to destructive ends. Second, terrorism today has become more lethal and layered in terms of leadership and cadre membership. Groups are more diffuse in structure and the rise of sleeper cells and amateur terrorists has added to the complexity. The lack of a discernible organizational structure with a distinguishable chain of command enables these groups to avoid easy identification and evasion of detection. Third, over the years increased state sponsorship of terrorism has grown in some contexts, where governing state regimes have promoted sub-state actors as an indispensable element of state power (Curtis, 2008).

Stanliland (2009) posits that the greater resources accorded to these groups by state actors have brought about a dramatic proliferation of the groups. These sub-state groups with state support use a mixture of seditious, racial and religious dictates to justify their actions. Fourth, terrorism today is driven by an extreme sense of fundamentalism and ideological leanings that tend to become the core identity of these groups, for which even death is a lesser price to pay (Stanliland, 2009). But Asthana (2010) observes that, with a deliberate unpredictable quality meant to have a psychological effect, the hyper-religious motivation of small groups and a broad enabling environment of bad governance, nonexistent social services, and poverty that punctuates most of the developing world tends to add to the sense of injustice and grievances characterized by many as the “knowledge gap” (Asthana, 2010).

### **2.1.8 Post-Cold War Dynamics and the Evolution of Terrorism**

The end of the Cold War was not just a political landmark but also a historical trigger of extraordinary intellectual event, inviting the emergence of key historical implications that have changed the world even today. In “The End of History?” (1989) and *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992), Fukuyama (1989) controversially asserts that the end of the Cold War marks the End of History. Revisiting Fukuyama’s book, Yang (2010) asserts that the triumph of capitalism and liberal democracy over communism points to the conceivable perfection of human ideology and institutions. According to Darwin (2001). The seemingly self-destructive nature of fascism was revealed during World War II, and its failure has deflated further fascist movements.

The term collective security was coined in the 1930s, but the concept that each nation's security depended upon that of all other nations, that peace was universal and indivisible, was not new. Earlier advocates had affirmed this concept during World War I. The victorious Allies had institutionalized it in the postwar League of Nations (Tucker & Hendrickson, 1992). In 1950, after North Korea attacked South Korea, Tucker and Hendrickson (1992) assert that the United Nations responded with collective defense against aggression. Because the Soviets were temporarily absent, the United States obtained the Security Council's approval for the use of military force to defend South Korea from aggression.

The idea of cooperation between the nations of the Western Hemisphere to address mutual economic and security concerns dates back to the first Inter-American Congress, held in 1889 in Washington D.C (Manwaring, 1993). The end of the Cold War opened another opportunity for the United States to use the United Nations for collective security. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, in 1990, President George Bush organized a broad coalition, including the Soviet Union, to stop this aggression and restore Kuwait's sovereignty. For the first time since the Korean War, the United States was the world's only superpower, it could provide leadership in the United Nations to use military force in the Persian Gulf. During Persian Gulf War of 1991, Bush proclaimed a "new world order" of global collective security (Weiss *et al.*, 1994).

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War potentially triggered a paradigmatic change in the strategic thinking of policymakers. The end of the Cold War brought enhanced prospects for collective security to the

Americas, which was based fundamentally on a shared perception of the security 'threats' faced by nations (Manwaring, 1993). Although many challenges still exist, Marcella (1992:22) point out that the nations of the Western Hemisphere have the realistic potential to advance a common agenda through collective security cooperation.

Social theories generalize from past experience and provide accounts of historical events or periods that attempt to map, illuminate, and perhaps criticize dominant social relations, institutions, forms, trends, and events of a given epoch. In turn, they can be judged by the extent to which they account for, interpret, and critically assess contemporary conditions, or predict future events or developments (Steger, 2002). One major theory of the past two decades, Fukuyama's (1992) 'The End of History' was strongly put into question by the events of September 11 and their aftermath. For Fukuyama (1992), the collapse of Soviet communism and triumph of Western capitalism and democracy in the early 1990s constituted "the end of history." This signified for him "the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government." Although there may be conflicts in places like the Third World, overall for Fukuyama liberal democracy and market capitalism have prevailed and future politics will devolve around resolving routine economic and technical problems, and the future will accordingly be rather mundane and boring (Fukuyanma, 1992). However, Huntington (1996) polemicizes against Fukuyama's "one world: euphoria and harmony" model in his 'The Clash of Civilizations' and the Remaking of World Order (1996).

For Huntington (1996), the future holds a series of clashes between “the West and the Rest.” Huntington (1996) rejects a number of models of contemporary history, including a “realist” model that nation-states are primary players on the world scene who will continue to form alliances and coalitions that will play themselves out in various conflicts. Huntington (1996) also rejects a “chaos” model that detects no discernible order or structure. Instead, Huntington (1996) asserts that the contemporary world is articulated into competing civilizations that are based on irreconcilably different cultures and religions. For Huntington, culture provides unifying and integrating principles of order and cohesion, and from dominant cultural formations emerge civilizations that are likely to come into conflict with each other, including Islam, China, Russia, and the West. On Huntington’s model, religion is “perhaps the central force that motivates and mobilizes people” and is thus the core of civilization (Huntington, 1996).

Although Huntington’s (1996) model seems to have some purchase in the currently emerging global encounter with terrorism, and is becoming a new dominant conservative ideology, it tends to overly homogenize Islam and the West, as well as the other civilizations he depicts. As Stiglitz (2002) argues, Huntington exaggerates the role of religion, while downplaying the importance of economics and politics. Moreover, Huntington’s (1996) model lends itself to pernicious misuse, and has been deployed to call for and legitimate military retribution against implacable adversarial civilizations. In sum, Huntington’s (1996) work provides too essentialist a model that covers over contradictions and conflicts both within the West and within Islam. Both worlds have been divided

for centuries into dueling countries, ethnic groups, religious fractions, and complex alliances that have fought fierce wars against each other and that continue to be divided geographically, politically, ideologically, and culturally (Stiglitz (2002). Moreover, Boggs (2000) argues that Huntington's (1996) ideal type that contrasts East and West, based on conflicting models of civilization, covers over the extent to which Arab and Muslim culture preserved the cultural traditions of the Greece and Rome during the Middle Ages and thus played a major role in constituting Western culture and modernity. Huntington downplays as well the extent to which Western science and technology were importantly anticipated and developed in the Middle and Far East (Boggs, 2000).

According to Steger (2002), the disintegration of post-Cold War states, and the Cold War legacy of a world awash in advanced conventional weapons and know-how, has assisted the proliferation of terrorism worldwide. In addition, Boggs (2000) points out that vacuums of stability created by conflict and absence of governance in areas such as the Balkans, Afghanistan, Colombia, and certain African countries offer readymade areas for terrorist training and recruitment activity, while smuggling and drug trafficking routes are often exploited by terrorists to support operations worldwide. On the other hand, Zalman (2009) posits that with the increasing ease of transnational transportation and communication, the continued willingness of states such as Iran and Iraq to provide support, and dehumanizing ideologies that enable mass casualty attacks, the lethal potential of terrorist violence has reached new heights (Zalman, 2009).

In “The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism” Rapoport (2004) starts by recalling the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States; and describes it as *‘the most destructive day in the long bloody history of rebel terrorism.’* According to Rapoport, this historic event was not only marred by exceptional fatalities and economic losses but also marked a turning point in world landscape after President Bush declared a *‘war’ to eliminate terror.* Rapoport’s theory posited four distinct waves of modern terrorism (anarchist, nationalist, New Left Wing (leftist) and the current religious wave) (Rapoport, 2004). The origin of the first wave, which is generally also seen as the origin of modern terrorism as we know it, is set around 1880 in Russia. The wave was anarchistic in character and was the first global terrorist experience (Rapoport, 2004: 47). It’s commonly referred to as *‘the golden age of assassinations.’* It is the wave that started in Russia and soon swept Europe and eventually reached the United States. The First Wave was characterized by political assassinations, which were the weapon of choice, where high profile figures were assassinated across different borders. The main reason for celebrity assassinations was to gain the support of the public; in the eyes of the terrorism of this time, killing a civilian would lose the public support they needed to gain and maintain their momentum in creating an anarchist utopia. Dissatisfied with leaders and slow pace of reform-they tried to write articles with their philosophical underpinnings which they believed that the state was a force of all evil and should be eliminated for justice to prevail. Their main aim was that they wanted to force government to deal with terrorism in ways that contradicted the rules which they claimed to protect and define; in that if government became brutal-they would attract sympathy (Rapoport, 2004).



In “The Clash of Civilizations (1993)” Samuel Huntington appears to reject Fukuyama’s End-of-History assertion as an illusion of harmony. He starts by acknowledging that indeed the political world is dynamic, with ....*the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism...*”For Huntington, the hypothetical argument is that “*the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primary economic*” (Huntington, 1993). Thus for him, the end of the Cold War only indicates the end of conflicts within Western civilization and the beginning of a new era of inter-civilization conflicts (Steger, 2002). Further, Huntington critically analyzes the nature of civilizations and views civilization as a cultural entity (Huntington, 1993:p.23).

In the second wave, (The Anticolonial wave) which emerged in the 1920s and had its root causes in the Treaty of Versailles signed in 1919 (Rapoport, 2004). Rapoport points out those terrorist activities were significant in establishing some new states such as Ireland, Israel, Cyprus and Algeria. According to Rapoport (2004), the second wave organization required a new language-as the term terrorist had received negative connotations (political enemies/ liabilities). The wave also saw a change of terrorist tactics; with diaspora contributing more money and less bank robberies. Few assassinations occurred during this time as they were seen as counter-productive. The proponents of this wave though by having military replace police; then emerged guerilla tactics; with some groups giving civilian warnings to reduce casualties. International aid of weapons

occurred; and as the second wave continued-a fifth ingredient emerged called supranational organization (Rapoport, 2004).

The third wave, known as the New-Left, emerged in the 1960s was marked by the Vietnam War and had of course the Cold War as broader context. According to Rapoport (2004), the main precipitating causes of the Third Wave are the Vietnam War and the Palestine-Israel conflict (PLO). Terrorist groups were active in Europe, Latin America and the United States and were often aided by Palestinian organizations (most notably the PLO) and state sponsors (for example Libya, Iran and the Soviet Union). The two most infamous groups that operated on European soil were formed by the Italian Red Brigades and the West German Red Army Faction (RAF). Others included: Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA); The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA); The Corsican National Liberation Front (FNLC); IRA, LPO and M-19. The PLO had provided extensive training facilities for other group (Rapoport, 2004).

Airplane hijacking was perhaps the Third Waves signature operations, and they became increasingly flamboyant, culminating in the seizure of four airlines which were landed and blown up in Jordan in 1970. The event was orchestrated by the popular Front for the Liberation of Palestinian and prominently featured terrorist cover girl Leila Khaled. It resulted in a civil war in Jordan, the expulsion of the Palestinian groups from the country, the formation of the Palestinian group Black September, an ultimately another terrorist spectacular in the seizure and killing of Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympics (Rapoport, 2004). Planes were taken to get hostages, and hostage crises of various sorts dominated the era. The targets

reflected international dimensions (Rapoport, 2004). Kidnappings occurred in at least seventy-three countries and were especially important in Italy, Spain, and Latin America. In the fourteen years after 1968, there were numerous international incidents, 409 kidnappings, and 951 hostages taken. Some groups conducted more assaults abroad than on their home territories; the PLO, for example, was more active in Europe than on the West Bank, and sometimes more active in Europe than many European groups themselves. Teams composed of different national groups cooperated in attacks. Libya, Iraq, and Syria employed terrorists in other countries as foreign policy instruments. Soviet Union encouraged out-breaks and offered moral support, training and weapons. In 1980, the third wave began to ebb as revolutionary terrorist were defeated country by country (Rapoport, 2004).

The fourth or 'Religious Wave' began in 1979, and, if it follows the pattern of its predecessors. The aim earlier was to create secular sovereign states, in principle no different from those present in the international world. Religion has a vastly different significance in the fourth wave, supplying justifications and organizing principles for the New World to be established. The 'religious' wave of terrorism has given prominence to suicide terrorism and witnessed an attempt to cause mass casualties by the use of chemical weapons. Islam and Christian terrorism emerged. Islam is the most important religion in this wave. The new technique that came under play was '*suicide bombing*' and became a very deadly innovation. Moreover, the number of terrorist groups declined from around 200 in the 1980s to 40 (Rapoport, 2004).

In view of the above, Huntington (1993) provides an assessment of the torn countries and further explains the role of the '*Confucian-Islamic connection*'; that has emerged as a threat to Western interests, values and power. For Huntington, a historically peculiar fact of today's multi-civilizational era is the ripe possibility of the Clash of Civilizations, as the West hegemony is in a growing tension with the economic dynamism of Asia and the demographic dynamism of Islam. On the one hand, the rapid rates of economic growth have encouraged cultural assertiveness in Asia (Huntington, 1993). Huntington's analysis provides a significant knowledge in the current political, social-cultural and economic setting. The current global politics can draw from his argument on the high levels of political instability and transnational terrorism plaguing countries in the developing world.

The fundamental flaw with Huntington's analysis of 'Islamic Resurgence,' and with much of the book, is that he places all of Islam in a single, inseparable group. He uses historical precedent to posit that different major religions will always wage war with one another because they inherently represent different civilizations (Huntington, 1996). This cynical view presupposes that democratic ideals are limited to western societies. As evidenced by recent revolutions within the Middle-East, brought upon largely by technology, people everywhere see the value in democratic ideals such as freedom of speech and the ability to select their leadership, regardless of religious identity.

Taken as a whole, for Huntington, the post-Cold War era represents a historical watershed where the two parallel historical trends the friend-enemy dialectic and

the progressive amplification of inter-civilization interactions coincide in their latest phases. First, due to technological innovation, civilizations have grown more interactive and multilateral than ever before. Second, alternative sources of identity for civilization (at least largely in the West) have been removed, not necessarily in the sense of being annihilated but in the sense of being dialectically overcome or subsumed. Huntington (1993) then offers an interesting argument about that can be linked to the current trends in the Horn of Africa, and the case of Somalia. As such, more comprehensive planning is needed to achieve an effective counterterrorism mandate and hence the need for this study on security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

The current interest in terrorism focuses on the violence perpetrated by Islamic Fundamentalists (Islamists) Terrorism has been used as a tactic for centuries but has become more pervasive since the 1960s. After World War I and II, colonial powers redrew the maps in many parts of the world and gradually reduced their colonies. This led to a rise in nationalist movements seeking self-determination, or seeking to replace rulers that had been imposed by the colonists. Many of the resulting conflicts have involved revolutionary warfare strategy and guerrilla tactics (Zalman, 2009). Until recently, terrorism has been most closely associated with ethnic and minority group struggles for independence and self-determination. The primary area of conflict could usually be defined, as could the adversaries and their various aspirations. During the 1990s a new form of transnational terrorism emerged that appears less rational, less focused, more international and more deadly- Islamist Terrorism (Esaiasson, 2007).

The end of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the Gulf War brought about a change in the main enemy of Islamic terrorists. Three events helped launch the fourth wave forward. First, the Iranian Revolution- new Islamic century began and Soviets made a motiveless invasion of Afghanistan. The Iranians inspired and helped Shiite terror movements elsewhere, in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Lebanon. Secondly, the disruption of the Soviet Union by 1989 showed that religion has managed to eradicate a secular superpower. The new technique that came under play 'suicide bombing' became a very deadly innovation technique of terrorist regimes. Thirdly, after Soviet Union defeat, America became the new enemy; the American role too changed. Iran called the USA the 'Great Satan.'; Al Qaeda regarded the USA as its antagonist after the Soviet Union was defeated (Rasler & Thompson, 2009).

The fourth wave produced an organization with a purpose and recruitment pattern unique in the history of terrorism; namely, Al Qaeda, led and financed by the Saudi Osama Bin Laden. Some targets and strategies in the fourth wave include: Suicide bombing of one religious settler murdered 29 worshippers in Abraham's tomb (Rasler & Thompson, 2009) and a fundamentalist assassinated Israeli Prime Minister Rabin (1995); Suicide bomb attacks on military posts in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and an American destroyer went unanswered; embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were struck, occasioning heavy casualties in the local populations. It must be mentioned that a specific feature of Islamic terrorists has been their desire to destroy their American targets a pattern unknown in the third wave of terrorism. The single most disastrous act of terror that was committed on 11

September 2001 illustrates their methods of operation (Rasler & Thompson, 2009). The response of the international community to the attack of 11 September 2001 has been as astounding as the attack itself.

For postmodern theorists such as Baudrillard (1993), technologies of information and social reproduction (e.g. simulation) have permeated every aspect of society and created a novel social environment of media, consumption, computers, and socially constructed identities. In the movement toward postmodernity, Baudrillard (1993) claims that humanity has left reality and modern conceptions behind, as well as the world of modernity. For Best and Kellner (2001), this postmodern adventure is marked by an implosion of technology and the human, which is generating an emergent posthuman species and postmodern world. For other less extravagant theorists of the technological revolution, the human species is evolving into a postindustrial technosociety, culture, and condition where technology, knowledge, and information are the axial or organizing principles (Best & Kellner, 2001).

### **2.1.9 East Africa Region and Terrorism**

Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are well aware of the dangers of transnational terrorism. All three governments cooperate with the US on counter-terrorism programs. Kenya has been especially forthcoming and participates in the US Terrorist Interdiction Program. It is one of only two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to have a military access agreement with the US. Tanzania cooperated last year with the US on civil aviation security, anti-money-laundering initiatives, border control, and police training. Uganda joined the coalition of the willing against Iraq, albeit without offering material support. All three countries are

constrained by inadequate resources and lack of trained personnel. They are all soft targets and offer a rich assortment of Western targets. Sixteen people died in 1980 during a terrorist attack on the Israeli-owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi. The *al-Qaeda* attacks against the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998 and then against the Israelis in Mombasa in 2002 underscores this point (Bwakili, 2013).

Tanzania and Kenya are easily accessible surreptitiously by sea and both have a small, radicalized Islamic element that has assisted outside terrorist groups. Kenya has a particularly porous border with ungoverned Somalia. The Kenyan government has long been concerned about the activities of the Islamic Party of Kenya, an unregistered organization with significant strength on Kenya's Swahili coast and one that has had frosty relations with the US. A support network for terrorists has developed along the coast where persons coming from the Gulf States, Pakistan, Somalia, and the Comoro Islands can blend in with ease. Pervasive corruption among Kenyan immigration personnel makes it possible for these individuals to obtain citizenship and engage in legitimate cover businesses (Muiruri, 2003).

Following the 11 September 2001 attacks against the US, Kenyan police arrested about 20 persons in Mombasa on suspicion of links with *al-Qaeda*. Until recently, however, the government of Kenya did not arrest any Kenyan nationals suspected of aiding the *al-Qaeda* terrorists. It chose to ignore the links to Kenyans and the need to provide more assistance to the disaffected Muslim minority on the coast. This began to change after the November 2002 attacks in Mombasa. Nevertheless, the United Nations anti-terrorism committee criticized Kenya,



Tanzania, and Uganda in mid-2003 for failing to submit on schedule a report on terrorist activities in their territory (UN Security Council, Report, 2003). There was another security scare in May/June 2003 reportedly based on intercepted *al-Qaeda* communications. The United Kingdom issued an advisory against travel to Kenya and banned British Airways flights to and from Kenya.

The US issued a similar advisory, authorized the voluntary departure of American embassy personnel and briefly closed the Nairobi embassy in June. In response, Kenya arrested several more suspected terrorists and banned flights to and from Somalia. In mid-September, the US extended the warning to American nationals and interests throughout East Africa. Uganda hosts two organizations the ADF and LRA that the US added to its Terrorist Exclusion List in 2001. There have been numerous attacks by the Christian LRA against civilian targets in northern Uganda over the past two years. Although Uganda's Islamic community is relatively small, it is still capable of being radicalized. A recent Pew Research Center poll in Uganda determined that more than one-quarter of Ugandans thought suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in defense of Islam (UN Security Council, Report, 2003).

#### **2.1.10 Terrorism and Counter terrorism in East Africa**

Kimunguyi (2009) outlines all countries in EA as victims of terrorist acts; either been carried out by and against a country's nationals for a domestic cause or they have focused on 'extra-national' or 'extra-regional' targets, such as Western targets located in the region (Rosand, Millar and Ipe, 2009). Examples include: the 1980 terrorist attacks on the Norfolk Hotel in Kenya; the August 1998 simultaneous attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, and Dar es Salaam,

Tanzania; the November 2002 simultaneous attacks in Mombasa, Kenya, on another Paradise Hotel and on an Israel-bound aircraft at take-off from the Mombasa International Airport, Kenya; the July 2010 attacks during the World Cup finals in Kampala, Uganda and the December 2010 bombing of a Kampala-bound bus in Nairobi. Local communities in the region have borne the burden of the loss of life and property as well as other economic damage from these attacks (Kimunguyi, 2009). Therefore, formulating and executing sound counterterrorism strategies before its too late must be a priority.

According to Kimunguyi, the East African region has experienced prolonged and severe intra- and inter-state conflict, leading to instability, poverty, and political isolation that make it vulnerable to terrorist exploitation. Although considerable improvement has been made in responding to the threat of terrorism in EastAfrica. However, the region is still confronted with many challenges including: extreme intra- and interstate conflict; increasing radicalization; lack of state capacity; competing national priorities; political sensitivity surrounding the very notion of counter-terrorism. Rosand, Millar and Ipe (2009) have observed that most counterterrorism efforts have focused on short-term security and law-enforcement efforts, which have affected longer-term measures to address primary conditions favourable for the increase of terrorist activities. They further argue that the courts do not initiate the laws that govern how terrorism is fought, nor do they execute them (Rosand *et al.*, 2009).

Kimunguyi (2009) argues that EA region is vulnerable to terrorism because countries in the region experience: conflicts, weak governance, collapsed state institutions; porous borders that allow extensive and uncontrolled movement of

people and illegal weapons; increased extremist religious ideology and radicalization of vulnerable groups. Mazrui (1997) argues that the combined effect of the problems we identified above is that political instability has become a recurring feature of African politics. Being plural societies, African states are divided along segmental cleavages. These cleavages may be religious, ideological, linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic in nature; which are advanced in their primordial forms, or promoted, at times, extra-territorially (Mazrui, 1997). These factors generally coincide with poor socio-economic conditions and create fertile ground for the existence of terrorism. Understanding the vulnerabilities as well as the root causes of terrorism in the East Africa region is crucial for ensuring a more proactive approach to enhancing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts in the region (Kimunguyi, 2009). However, although external actors have a major role to help in raising the capacities of countries and organizations in the region, they are faced with many challenges rooted in the socio-economic and political conditions of many countries in the region, and the lack of capacity within countries of the region to effectively respond and counter terrorism.

Since the end of the Cold War, a growing number of researchers have paid attention to diplomacy. According to Klavins (2011), the collapse of the USSR was the end of the bipolar division of the world that characterized the Cold War years. Changes in international agendas were determined by growing hopes for benefits of diplomacy. By the end of the Cold War, international agendas changed considerably -changing with them the character of diplomacy. As White (2010) observes, diplomacy has become more global, complicated and

fragmentary. Thus, changes in diplomacy are especially visible by the involvement of many new actors in the area of international cooperation. The role of the State has changed in response to the rapidly changing transnational environment of terrorism and the involvement of new actors. The result, of course, is that diplomacy has changed with it (Klavin, 2011). As such, it is important to examine in detail how security-based diplomacy influences management of transnational terrorism.

Diplomacy is the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of groups or nations. It usually refers to international diplomacy, the conduct of international relations through the intercession of professional diplomats with regard to issues of peace-making, culture, economics, trade, and war (Pesto, 2010). Diplomats usually negotiate international treaties prior to endorsement by national politicians. Modern diplomatic practice represents a complex set of skills, institutional and extra-institutional international relations, which are not limited to formal contacts between representatives of governments of various countries, as opposed to traditional diplomacy. Today's diplomacy is much more a diplomacy that takes place between the representatives of citizens' associations, informal institutions, non-governmental organizations, intellectuals, analysts, and researchers, than diplomacy between two or more ministries of foreign affairs that is conducted through diplomatic missions in the relevant states (Pesto, 2010). This, however, is not the only novel characteristic of modern diplomacy, although it results in numerous other characteristics of diplomatic communication.

Some other characteristics of modern diplomacy include an increasing emphasis on multilateral relations as opposed to bilateral relations, the increasing role of large international organizations as opposed to strictly inter-state negotiations, as well as the increasing impact of the globalization process on the drafting of agendas of international negotiations (Rosser, 2006). Exactly for these reasons, modern diplomacy is called “multitrack diplomacy,” where traditional actors are participating only to a relatively small extent, and other, new actors participate more and more on an increasing number of different levels with their own new methodologies, interests, access, and ideas (Muggah, 2012). The basic function of diplomacy is to represent a given country abroad, and to promote its interests and goals. Its purpose is to serve as the instrument for the implementation of foreign policy as defined by the responsible governmental bodies (the president, government, parliament, or other bodies authorized under the constitution), and through them by the political party that holds the majority (Pesto, 2010).

Zyck and Muggah (2010) argue that these terminological disagreements stretch back more than two decades. The United Nations’ (1992) Agenda for Peace stated that preventive diplomacy specifically refers to ‘action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur’. Then-UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali differentiated preventive diplomacy from its cousin, peace-making, which he viewed as the resolution of large-scale conflicts through mediation and negotiation, and from its distant relative, peacekeeping. According to Muggah and Sisk (2012), this early definition provides a core understanding of the goals of preventive diplomacy, which the United Nations and others have associated with a specific set of actions such as good offices, facilitation,

mediation, conciliation, adjudication and arbitration. Accordingly, it fails to include what others refer to as conflict prevention, which primarily includes human rights, humanitarian and development assistance intended to ameliorate the underlying sources of conflict by improving the quality of governance, social and economic conditions, equality and the management of shared resources (Muggah & Sisk, 2012).

## **2.2 Diplomacy During the Cold War Period**

### **2.2.1 Cold War shifts and global peace and security**

In 1945, one major war ended and another began. The Cold War started when the Soviet Union refused to recognize obligations incurred during World War II, including moving out of the Middle East and allowing Germany to be a free state. When the Soviet Union also acquired nuclear weapons, the two superpowers found themselves in a precariously balanced position. Neither one was willing to move openly for fear that the other would use those weapons (Schulz, 2010). According to Rozoff (2009), the Cold War lasted for a total of 45 years, and spawned multiple small wars and conflicts, and it only ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. This period of hostility short of open war between the United States and the Soviet Union lasted from 1946 until 1991, according to the National Museum of American history. Jackson (2007) posits that the United States became the leader of the free-market capitalist world. America and its allies struggled to keep the communist, totalitarian Soviet Union from expanding into Europe, Asia, and Africa.

The Cold War was the geopolitical, ideological, and economic struggle between two world superpowers, the USA and the USSR that started in 1947 at the end of the Second World War and lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991. The Cold War was marked by continuous rivalry between the two former World War II allies. Conflict spanned from subtle espionage in the biggest cities of the world to violent combat in the tropical jungles of Vietnam. It ranged from nuclear submarines gliding noiselessly through the depths of the oceans to the most technologically-advanced satellites in geosynchronous orbits in space.

### **2.2.2 Somalia during and after the Cold War**

The position that the Cold War in general was driven by purely material interests or ideological controversy was arguably a rather difficult one. The Horn of Africa as a strategic location turned it into a pawn during the Cold War (Mohamed, 2009). This geo-strategic importance directly at the southern end of the Red Sea, across the Arabian Peninsula, and thus located close to major oil-lines indeed constitutes a prime spot to project power, control politics, and furthermore provide advanced military support in the Middle East and Persian Gulf region (Lefebvre, 1991). According to this proximity, Schulz (2010) argues that Washington began to increase its presence on the Horn, which was necessary to support and stabilize pro-Western governments, control the sea route, and ensure the economic security of the West and restrain the possibility of a Soviet blockade of oil lanes.

Additionally, the United States intended to keep the Red Sea and Indian Ocean open “for Israeli shipping.” Jackson (2007) contends that these strategic

advantages were face to face with Moscow's attempt to permanently include post-colonial societies politically and militarily into its own communist camp. Significantly, Lefebvre (1991) points out that during the 1950's and based on the intensified east-west confrontation, political changes on the Horn became apparent. Americas increasing interest of shielding and protecting third world countries of socialist influence lead to explicit financial and military support of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia. To further prevent any Soviet enlargement on the Horn, President Kennedy tried to cooperate with the Somali as well. The Eastern bloc issued a similar deal offering what Somalia wanted and needed most: military hardware. In 1963 a Russian military aid agreement was established, including the training and arming of Somalia's army (Lefebvre, 1991).

These developments brought a point where Ethiopia became a partner with the United States while Somalia was integrated into the Soviet-led communist bloc. This situation was further strengthened when Siad Barre systematically overthrew the democratic elected government of Somalia and established what was known as "scientific/Islamic socialism" (Birnbaum, 2002). Furthermore, an official Somali government slogan proclaimed, "Tribalism divides where Socialism unites" (Mohamed, 2009).

This situation perfectly fits into political transformations throughout the African continent in the decade between 1969 and 1979 with socialist-motivated governments, assisted by the Soviet Union. According to Rozoff (2009), states such as Angola, Capo Verde, the Republic of Congo, Mozambique to name just a few followed the anti-capitalist path and generated a socialist bloc with the entire developing, non-allied world. Moreover, there was a need to emphasize that both



Somalia and Ethiopia at any time were anxious to benefit from this international political situation by threatening their allies to change sides in case of inadequate support. Accordingly, the Soviet Union extended its military aid and approximately doubled Somalia's armed forces. This collaboration grew over the years toward a significant military alliance. On the political level, Somalia was the first African state to sign a Friendship as well as Cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1974.

### **2.2.3 The United States and the Soviet Union in Somalia**

American and Soviet foreign policy concerning the Horn of Africa "came more into conflict" in the decade of the 1970's. This is especially astonishing since the US policy in that era tried to appease the situation and head towards détente (Parsons, 1995). The larger Soviet presence with highlighted political and military activities occurred at a time when the United States, first under the Nixon-doctrine and then during the Carter-administration, downgraded its efforts and started to retreat from Ethiopia. Summarizing, US foreign policy toward Somalia and especially Ethiopia reflected the international environment together with crucial events and developments like the ongoing growth of the Soviet power, a weakened dollar, and a general "question about American moral legitimacy" (Manzikos, 2010) because of the recent Vietnam War. Overall, this policy aimed to deemphasize a direct confrontation and reformulate its global efforts towards détente. Accordingly, it became evident that US policy concerning Ethiopia and its strategic importance began to shift, and thus Washington gradually began to distance itself from its former key country in the region under Haile Selassie, just as the Committee on Foreign Relations (Subcommittee on African Affairs) of the US Senate recognized. 1973 and 1974

turned out to be “key years” (Parsons, 1995) on the Horn of Africa for the United States because of the apparent weakness and rising lack of allies.

At that very special point of time, Schulz (2010) posits that the Soviet Union supported both rivaling states: Somalia and Ethiopia. Concerning this geopolitical contest, the socialist bloc had achieved an important outcome. As mentioned before, the Carter administration in Washington sought to prevent any further confrontation between the eastern and western blocs and aimed to remove any developing third world countries from this contest. The United States intended to prevent regional conflicts of ending up as proxy wars of the Cold War. President Carter believed in “African solutions to African problems” (Jackson, 2007). Nevertheless, the effect of US during this period certainly is still at play in the context of military, political, or diplomatic relations in counterterrorism efforts.

#### **2.2.4 US military intervention in Somalia**

The roots of the 1992 US invasion in Somalia stretch back decades to the Cold War era. Somalia was a longtime recipient of U.S. aid, especially military funding, during the 1970s and the 1980s. In the early years of the Cold War, Somalia had been a client state of the USSR, while the U.S. supported the regime of King Haile Selassie in rival Ethiopia. But following Selassie’s overthrow in 1974, the superpowers switched sides, and the U.S. shifted its backing to Somalia’s dictator Siad Barre (Blood, 2008). According to Parsons (1995), the U.S. had clear strategic objectives in positioning itself in this Cold War battleground.

Schulz (2010) posits that the global military competition between the U.S. and USSR led to a period of escalating tensions between the superpowers, with one flashpoint being a Somali invasion of eastern Ethiopia in 1977 to gain control of the Somali-speaking Ogaden region. In response, the Soviet Union airlifted 20,000 Cuban troops to Ethiopia to fend off the attack, providing an opportunity for the U.S. to tilt toward Somalia and shore up a new client in the region. Jackson (2007) argues that beyond the geopolitical importance of Somalia's location along the Gulf of Aden that provides access to the Red Sea and Suez Canal, U.S. priorities were driven by oil interests. However, Lefebvre (1991) argues that in the wake of Barre's ouster, the U.S. conveniently donned the cloak of humanitarianism, citing the famine as justification for military intervention. Significantly, the most severe period of the famine had passed several months before the U.S. declared its commitment to ending hunger in Somalia.

The United States was the leading force in the UN deployment, and it carried out increasingly aggressive assaults, culminating in the battle in the Somali capital of Mogadishu in October 1993 that was portrayed in the film *Black Hawk Down* (Lefebvre, 1991): Since 1991, the country has been wracked by civil war, fueled by U.S. support for various sides in the conflict. In 2006, when neighboring Ethiopia invaded Somalia, U.S. backing and funding for Ethiopia was a barely concealed secret. The above analysis provides critical information regarding Somalia and the role of military interventions in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

### **2.2.5 The Ogaden-Battle and its aftermath: Changing allies**

Further political changes took place when Siad Barre felt strong enough to invade neighbouring Ethiopia in July 1977. Because America's Secretary of State ensured military assistance to Somalia, Siad Barre interpreted these intentions as "forthcoming attitudes" (Lefebvre, 1991). However, Schulz (2010) points out that US military aid toward Somalia in 1977 only got advanced under the condition of withdrawing out of the Ogaden region where the border-war with Soviet-backed Ethiopia took place. Although Ethiopia became more and more integrated into the socialist camp, the lost war constituted the beginning of the end for Siad Barre's perfunctory government. Due to this outcome it was even more remarkable that the United States improved its relationship with Somalia and even signed another military agreement in 1980, which was upgraded in 1982. This was a counterbalance in confronting the Soviet impact, based on the Reagan-doctrine to come, which gave a favourable opinion on active military aid for pro-Western states (Schulz, 2010).

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, so did the polarization of the world. From then on, the United States did not have any real need of or interest in Somalia any more. What had been a contest between the two superpowers for more than 30 years was dropped because its former strategic importance systematically vanished (Mohamed, 2010). When the United States finally suspended all financial aid, the Somali regime's full vulnerability surfaced and it swiftly collapsed (Blood, 2008). At any point, Somalia did not have the chance or ability to establish a functional political system because it benefited from the ideological rivalry for a long time. Due to huge amounts of both Soviet and American military hardware, Somalia "became the most militarized state per

capita in the Horn of Africa” (Parsons, 1995). Certainly, those huge amounts of military hardware from Somalia’s former sponsors during the Cold War guaranteed and ensured a long-term destabilization of the country, leaving the situation almost hopeless today. In light of these analysis, and taking into consideration the situation described above, it is clear that the rivalry between the superpowers had its effect on current shift from diplomacy-based to security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia.

### **2.2.6 The UN response after Cold War**

The Cold War evolved out of the international power vacuum created by the demise of European power at the end of World War II. The destruction of Europe as the center of global political and military might left the United States and the Soviet Union as the dominant world powers (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). According to Mohammed (1995), the former balance of power between the European great powers was therefore replaced with one in which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. competed for influence and strategic advantage. Their conflicting political ideologies and economic interests defined international politics and the economic development of the world for the next half-century (Mohammed, 1995).

Doyle and Sambanis (2006) point out that at the end of the Cold War, the member states of the United Nations (UN) expanded its agenda, defining a near revolution in the relation between what is in the legitimate realm of state sovereignty and what is subject to legitimate international intervention. From 1990 through 1993, the UN Security Council adopted a strikingly intrusive interpretation of UN

Charter Chapter VII, the enforcement provisions concerning international peace and security. Member states thus endorsed a radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention just as a series of ethnic and civil wars erupted across the globe (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Unfulfilled commitments, on the one hand, and escalating use of force, on the other, soon provoked a severe crisis in “peace enforcement.” In Bosnia and Somalia “peace enforcement” amounted to “war-making” as the United Nations threatened to impose by force outcomes ranging from disarmament, to safe havens, ‘no fly zones,’ and new state borders on armed factions that recognized no political authority superior to their own. Elsewhere, as in Rwanda, the UN record was a failure even to attempt to exercise enforcement as peace agreements fell apart (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006). Despite this analysis, the post-cold war threats of terrorism challenge states' capacity to manage such threats.

With the end of the Cold War, the strategic context for UN Peacekeeping changed dramatically. The UN shifted and expanded its field operations from “traditional” missions involving generally observational tasks performed by military personnel to complex ‘multidimensional’ enterprises (Sorpong, 2002). These multidimensional, missions according to Sorpong, were designed to ensure the implementation of comprehensive peace agreements and assist in laying the foundations for sustainable peace. The nature of conflicts also changed over the years. UN Peacekeepers were now increasingly asked to undertake a wide variety of complex tasks, from helping to build sustainable institutions of governance, to human rights monitoring, to security sector reform, to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants. After the Cold War

ended, there was a rapid increase in the number of peacekeeping operations (Ramsbotham, 2000). The current balance sheet on UN “war-making” thus suggests that while the UN has served an effective role in legitimizing enforcement coalitions for interstate, armed collective security (as in Korea and against Iraq in Gulf War I), the United Nations has proven to be a very ineffective peace enforcer, or war-maker, in the many intrastate, civil conflicts that emerged in the post–Cold War world (Fromkim, 2009).

### **2.2.7 Diplomacy and Peace Building in the Post-Cold War Era**

Armed conflict has been a pervasive and apparently intractable problem in many developing countries and continues to be a major threat to their prospects for economic and social development. Despite the relative success of post-settlement peace building under UN auspices in Mozambique (and more recently, East Timor) its current prospects are perhaps much less promising. The main challenge to peace building as a form of conflict management in the context of the current international situation is the resurrection of war as a deliberate instrument of foreign policy (in the form of the Bush doctrine of pre-emptive strikes) combined with the threat this poses to multilateralism, represented primarily by the UN. For example, the level of involvement, or lack of involvement, of the international community in post- Taliban Afghanistan provides a stark contrast to the role of ONUMOZ (UN Operation in Mozambique) (Fromkim, 2009).

Peace building emerged as a popular concept through An Agenda for Peace in the early 1990s (1992), in the optimism of the immediate post-Cold War period and George Bush Senior's new world order, although Johan Galtung was already using the term some decades previously (Sorpong, 2002), Both Galtung and

Boutros Boutros- Ghali discuss peace building in connection with the related concepts and activities of peacemaking and peacekeeping. Boutros-Ghali referred to peacemaking as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through...peaceful means”. This can include various forms of mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution as well as more conventional forms of diplomacy. Classic peacekeeping, conventionally associated with UN intervention in armed conflicts (pre-1990), involves the impartial imposition of the armed forces of uninvolved countries between warring or conflicting groups in order to preserve or protect whatever peace agreements or political settlements these groups have been able to achieve. Peacekeeping has also come to include the implementation of the immediate terms of such agreements under UN auspices, as in the case of ONUMOZ in Mozambique (Sorpong, 2002).



### **2.3 Security-Based Diplomacy and Counterterrorism**

According to Kurlantzick (2007), the role of security-based diplomacy has emerged to support states' foreign policy by shaping a global environment that promotes security and deters conflict through building alliances, diffusing regional conflicts, promoting international understanding, and strengthening diplomatic and program capabilities. Wittemen (2013) adds that security-based diplomacy entails the use of military engagements that are classified as regional activities to include state-to-state military protocols, participation in joint military operations to counter terrorism. Indeed, in the rising trends of transnational terrorism, states are employing the military as a diplomacy tool to advance their foreign policy. This has a trend since the cold war for prposes of asserting the coercive authecity of superpowers. The engagment between states in non-hegemonic context in the post-Cold War era is however, a new phenomenon; which the study attempts to address. Transnational terrorism was the ultimate rationale for secuicity-based diplomacy.

This argument resonates throughout the criticisms and strategic prescriptions of many scholars. For instance, Jenkins and Byman (2012) assert that diplomacy tactics during the Cold War achieved some success, but then imprudently nations discarded it as military superiority increased. Byman (2012) adds to this his concern that 'public diplomacy as applied by the US in the Middle East requires heavy investment in measures that will help woo the next generation of leaders and improve America's image.' He stresses the importance of 'winning the hearts and minds of the people;' and avows that to accomplish this would mean the end of the terrorists' recruitment and financing base (Byman, 2012). Cronin (2010) acknowledges that military force is important as a means of responding to,

preempting, and disrupting terrorist operations, but agrees with both Jenkins and Byman (2012) that over time, ‘the more effective instruments of policy are likely to . . . be the nonmilitary ones, “because ‘military force is only effective as part of a multifaceted campaign along with social, economic, legal, diplomatic, and political elements.” Nevertheless, the calibre of premeditated transnational terrorism that spreads terror indiscriminately requires a brand of coercive diplomacy that manifests itself in security-based diplomacy today.

### **2.3.1 Security-Based Diplomacy in Counterterrorism- Global Perspective**

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the U.S. Government was criticized for adopting a militaristic response to the threat posed by al- Qaeda and affiliated groups (Hughes, 2011). Cronin (2009) argues that the use of military power in counterterrorism is contentious, because historical and contemporary examples suggest that it can have the following negative strategic, political, and ethical effects: the state can generate indigenous resentment that terrorist groups can exploit, and can, by resorting to military force, kill or maim a substantial number of civilians (Cronin, 2009).

While addressing these criticisms, Hughes (2011) observes that there are contingencies in which democratic states are obliged to employ military means in order to protect their citizens from the threat of terrorism, whether in a purely domestic context or when facing a transnational terrorist network such as al-Qaeda. Cameron (2012) argues that military force, particularly when wielded by a superpower such as the US, can have a decisive impact. The two prime examples of the use of force are military campaign against the Taliban regime and the Al Qaeda network in Afghanistan in 2001 and the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

However, some scholars (Klavins, 2011, Steiner, 2012) argue that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much intelligence as possible, disrupt terrorist plans and organizations before they act, and organize multinational cooperation against terrorists and countries that support them. Yet, despite the high priority that governments place on combating and preventing terrorism within their territories, literature on security-based diplomacy in counterterrorism is largely from the developed countries.

According to Diker (2009) Israel's shift from a doctrine of "diplomacy-based security" to security-based diplomacy to end the Arab-Israeli conflict has involved the use of defense forces to provide security needs. Diker (2009) further points out that Israel's return to security-based diplomacy and insistence on Palestinian demilitarization and defensible borders are vital guarantors of Israel's security in the face of the profound uncertainties surrounding both the Palestinians and the rise of Iranian power in the region. Therefore, it is important to understand the concept of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somalia, as a key component of counterterrorism.

### **2.3.2 Security-Based Diplomacy and Counterterrorism-Regional Perspective**

In Africa, the existence of militant groups, organized criminal gangs and the nexus between them is not a new phenomenon. The growing audacity of the Nigerian Boko Haram is one among many developments that have made West Africa a region of growing terror concern (Onuocha & Ezirim, 2013). In addition, Okoth (2008) contends that although the post cold war order contributed to the

collapse of the Siad Barre regime in Somalia, the Islamic fundamentalist groups caused Ethiopia to employ artillery and air bombardment to destroy the bases of Islamic groups inside Somalia. Although states are more sensitive to security and military developments in other regions due to increasing terror trends, historical evolution of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia warrants more research as far as management of transnational terrorism is concerned.

Counterterrorism response, such as the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, Partnership or Regional East Africa Counterterrorism has been mixed at best. For instance, Mali's U.S.-trained army fell apart while fighting Islamist extremists in 2012 and 2013, but conversely, a U.S.-trained counterterrorism unit in Chad participated in French-led operations to push extremists out of the country (Waker, 2014). Operation Barkhane is essentially a French anti-terrorist combat force permanently stationed in the African Sahel. It has a centralized command headquartered in Chad to drive away militant jihadists. The anti-terrorist and peacekeeping forces in the Sahel are a patchwork of national, foreign and multinational units (Waker, 2014). Similarly, the Nigerian military, in conjunction with Special Forces from the United Kingdom, United States, Spain and Netherland have begun a joint training to enhance its capacity to combat terrorism in the county's maritime environment (McGregor, 2014). Despite this response, subsequent acts of transnational terrorism demonstrate Kenya's significance in terms of recent regional terrorism trends. Moreover, the scale and complexity of attacks in Kenya strongly suggest that a permissive environment exists for terror group operations and thus a priority area for research.

McGregor (2014) argues that the manifest shortcomings of this mixed record do not indicate that security-based diplomacy should not be a major component of counterterrorism strategy. They do, however, show that security-force assistance is not a counterterrorism panacea (McGregor, 2014). Despite its large and supposedly well-trained army, terrorist attacks have been on the increase raising critical questions on the military operations in Nigeria (Waker, 2014). A more thorough and systematic attempt to assess the successes, failures, and lessons learned on security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism is needed, especially in the context of Kenya and Somalia that have experienced rising terrorist attacks.

### **2.3.3 Security-Based Diplomacy and Counterterrorism Between Kenya and Somalia**

The Somalia-based terrorist group al-Shabaab remains the primary terrorist threat. Somali security forces and the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) continue to make gains against Al-Shabaab, but an inability to undertake consistent offensive operations against the group allows Al-Shabaab to develop and carry out asymmetric attacks, including outside of Somalia. Most notably, Al-Shabaab launched an attack against the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya on September 21 that left at least 65 people dead. The attack, which targeted innocent civilians, was claimed by Al-Shabaab as a response to the involvement of Kenyan armed forces units in Somalia, who in late 2012 expelled Al-Shabaab from the port city of Kismayu, a major revenue source for al-Shabaab. In light of the general state of underdevelopment and fragility that characterizes the subregion, ongoing instability in Somalia, and heightened concern over the threat posed by the al-

Qaida-affiliated, Somali-based terrorist group Al-Shabaab calls for more analysis.

Odhiambo et al., (2010) posit that Al-Shabaab's actions are facilitated enormously by the previous existence of a deep-rooted sense of rancor and hostility toward the West in certain parts of the world. With regards to the perception and psychology of the masses, Al-Shabaab has resorted to a simple but terribly effective mechanism of mobilization: to spur on frustration and provoke the desire of revenge. On the other hand, Macharia (2012) posits that there are few militia groups in Eastern Africa that have recently captured as much attention as Al-Shabaab; it poses two types of challenges. First is the physical threat and destruction that result from its military and guerilla operations. Second is the threat to the mind and the socio-cultural and economic way of life. It has become part of Kenya's national psyche in terms of cultural outlook, has changed the way people think, act and live, and is a reflection of Kenya's, and Eastern Africa's, unpredictable socio-cultural dynamics. It has created such a serious perception of threat that Kenya has mounted military operations in Southern Somalia (Macharia, 2012).

On the same note, the intervention taps into deep-seated Kenyan fears of Somali encroachment and corresponding Somali qualms that Kenya seeks to assert control over territory that was once part of colonial Kenya (ISS, 2009). Various East African countries continued to detect, deter, disrupt, investigate, and prosecute terrorist incidents; enhance domestic and regional efforts to bolster border security; and create integrated and dedicated counterterrorism strategies

(Kimunguyi, 2011). Even with the efforts recently made to enhance security in Kenya, the context in which intervention operations take place within the context of security-based diplomacy has important operational significance on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia, an issue the study seeks to analyze.

In late 2010 Kenya permitted an Ethiopian military incursion against Shabaab through Kenyan territory into the border town of Bulo Hawa, a move that many Somali Kenyans claimed led to subsequent instability and an increase in Shabaab violence in northern Kenya (Menkkhaus, 2012). After the October 2011 intervention strategy by the Kenya Defence Forces, Kenya and Somalia have witnessed sporadic terrorist attacks. These series of cross-border attacks, as well as prior kidnapping incidents, spurred Kenya's military to intervene in Somalia on October 14 (Nzes, 2012). On September 11, a British man was killed and his wife kidnapped from a resort in Lamu; on October 1, a French woman was taken from her Kenyan home; and on October 13, two Spanish aid workers were kidnapped from Dadaab refugee camp (Nzes, 2012).

The September 2013 al-Shabaab attack on Nairobi's Westgate Shopping Mall, June 2014 attacks in Mpeketoni and Mporomooko in Lamu; November 22, 2014, terrorists ambushed a bus and killed 28 passengers in Mandera, the December 2, 2014 attacks that left 36 people dead at a quarry at Koromey in Mandera County; April 2, 2015 terrorist attack at Garissa University College in Garissa that left about 148 people killed; the recent attack on 15th January 2016 where al Shabaab attacked the Kenya Army (KDF) AMISOM Contingent Forward

Operations Base (FOB) manned in El-Adde, Gedo region of Somalia have focused the world's attention on Kenya and Kenyan counterterrorism efforts (Ombati, 2016). These incidences and the growing audacity of al shabaab is one among many developments that demonstrate the challenge of countering the changing threat of transnational terrorism.

The continuing challenge posed by al-Shabaab complicates the task of the Somali Federal Government. Recent suicide attacks in Mogadishu have included the Presidential compound and Federal Parliament in July 2014, the National Intelligence and Security Agency prison in August 2014, AMISOM headquarters on Christmas day in 2014, and the Central Hotel in February 2015. On 20 February 2015, a vehicle laden with explosives smashed into the gate of the Central Hotel in Mogadishu. Gunmen then penetrated the premises and opened fire in the hotel's mosque. In April 2015, al-Shabaab bombed an UN minibus in response to the United Nation's support of the African Union troops in Somalia. In January 2016, terrorists killed ta least 20 people at Somali beach restaurant. Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack and the deadly siege inside the the Liido Seafood restaurant. On 22 January 2016, al shabaab militants launched a surprise attack on the Central Hotel in Mogadishu where various Federal Government of Somalia officials had gathered for Friday prayers at the compound's mosque. Between 11 and 25 people were killed (Williams, 2016). The trend toward higher casualties reflects, in part, the changing motivation of today's terrorism, its scope and destruction.



According to Chin (2009), the capacity of a state to defend itself will depend on the nation's ability to use military as a foreign policy tool to neutralize threats to national security and enhance its own defence capability. Chin (2009) further contends that military tools. Kenya's counterterrorism efforts and the implications of KDF intervention in Somalia raise issues of concern for investigation. Despite the efforts made in management of transnational terrorism, the polarizing tendencies of terrorist radicalization; the intelligence failures on how government agencies interact and share information with one another (Ozzie, 2013) and the underlying challenges of porous borders can hamper the ability of law enforcement to identify and detain potential terrorists. Moreover, while multilateral and bilateral efforts have yielded some positive results, the apparent shift to security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism has received little scholarly attention, particularly at the national level.

At the onset of the entry into Somalia, Kenya advanced the argument of the country's right to self-defence as embodied in Article 51 of the UN Charter, (UN, 1945) which clearly recognizes the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence in the wake of an armed attack against a member of the UN. According to Miyandazi (2012), the use of this particular article as the legal justification for Kenya's invasion raised a lot of questions regarding what constituted an armed attack against the state and whether such actions necessitated an invasion of this magnitude. Furthermore, Menkhaus (2012) argues that Kenya did not follow the right procedure required in pursuit of the right to self-defence as the country did not report its intended actions to the UN Security Council (UNSC). However, even after news of the invasion surfaced, Menkhaus (2012) observes that the

UNSC remained silent, despite the fact that it was not informed of Kenya's intentions to intervene in Somalia. Nonetheless, Akolo (2012) points out that Kenya's intervention was launched 'to protect its territorial integrity from foreign aggression.' Throup (2012) adds that the move marked Kenya's largest military operation since its independence in 1963. At the onset, around 2,400 KDF personnel were deployed (Throup, 2012).

According to Kamau (2006), the lack of stability in Somalia has made it a safe haven for terrorist groups to operate their networks both regionally and internationally. Al-Shabaab are blamed by the Ethiopian, TFG and AMISOM forces for the deterioration of security, the spillover of conflict to neighbouring countries, including Kenya, and the grave humanitarian situation which persists in large parts of Somalia (Kamau, 2006). In addition, Throup (2012) argues that Kenya however, had emerged as a target for terrorist attacks well before the emergence of al-Shabaab. The 7 August 1998 bombing of the American Embassy in Kenya, which killed 213 people and left 4,000 others wounded, played a major role in raising the government's and citizens' awareness on the issue of terrorism as a clear threat to the country. Since then, Kenya has been making renewed strides to curtail terrorism and its networks in the country, including the recent publishing of the Prevention of Terrorism Bill. Menkhaus (2012) points out that the intervention risks adding insult to injury in already existing tensions with Kenya's ethnic Somali community.

As a specialized national security organ, the Kenya Defense Forces is tasked with the security of Kenya and its people. According to the Kenya Constitution (Excerpts from Chapter Fourteen- National Security, Part 1 - National Security

Organs), the primary object of the national security organs and security system is to promote and guarantee national security in accordance with the principles mentioned in Article 238 (2). Moreover, 241 (3) states that 'the Defence Forces (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster. However, the Kenya Defense Forces can only undertake external or internal combat operations lawfully only with the approval of the people's representatives i.e., the National Assembly; as stated in the constitution "241. (3) The Defence Forces (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly When deployed, the Defense Forces are also not authorized to act outside of the Constitution or act in a manner that infringes on the freedoms, rights and liberties of the people of Kenya. Excerpts from Article 238 'The national security of Kenya shall be promoted and guaranteed in accordance with the following principles (b) national security shall be pursued in compliance with the law and with the utmost respect for the rule of law, democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms' (Kenyan Constitution, 2010).

Days into the invasion, the Kenyan government announced a parallel operation to root out al-Shabaab sympathizers in the country, asserting that al-Shabaab was 'like a big animal with a tail in Somalia and a head in Eastleigh' (Menkhaus, 2012). While significant strategies have been employed in combating terrorism in Somalia and Kenya, the security-based approach and potential consequences witnessed call for an in-depth analysis and hence the need for a study on security-

based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

## **2.4 State-Centric Counterradicalization Measures in Transnational Terrorism Management**

Horgan and Taylor (2006) assert that terrorist radicalization is a dynamic process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate, course of action. There is no single profile that encompasses all terrorists, nor is there a clear-cut pathway that leads individuals to terrorism. Schmid (2013) says that possible drivers of terrorist radicalization are varied and complex and combine in a unique way in each case. Profiles built on stereotypical assumptions based on religion, race, ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status, etc. are not only discriminatory but are also ineffective. According to the definition provided by the European Commission in its 2005 Communication 'Terrorist Recruitment: addressing the factors contributing to violent radicalization', "violent radicalization" involves embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism. The term "violent radicalization" originated in EU policy circles and was coined after the Madrid bombing of 11 March 2004. It is not widely used in social science as a concept but it obviously refers to a process of socialization leading to the use of violence. Though the concept is barely disputed, the term radicalization often lacks conceptual clarity and is susceptible to numerous understandings.

Springer (2009) argues that the term can be misleading because the socialization process itself does not have to be "violent." Moreover, there is no uniform usage of the terms "radicalization" and "violent radicalization" in the social sciences

and humanities literature. Some authors (Silber and Bhatt, 2011) refer now to violent radicalization as a path that inherently involves concrete violent behaviour while others qualify the mere acceptance of certain ideas which condone or justify violence as an indicator of violent radicalization. For some authors and experts, the path to violent radicalization is an individual one whereas for others it is considered to be a collective process.

In addition, Alonso (2006) posits that the word “violent” also needs further qualification. Socialization into violence is not necessarily co-terminous with socialization into terrorism. While there are various forms of violence, not necessarily of a political nature, terrorism is a special kind of political violence. Among the various expressions of terrorism, suicide terrorism stands out as a particular phenomenon. Arguably, there is only a partial overlap between the pathways to political violence in general, terrorism in particular and suicide terrorism as a special case where the perpetrator is among the victims of an attack. Furthermore, the term “radicalization” is problematic in that its relationship to “radicalism” as an expression of legitimate political thought, still reflected in the titles of some political parties in Europe, is confusing. With the mounting number of home-grown terrorist attacks, radicalization is becoming an important security priority. With the sudden spurt in home-grown terrorism perpetrated by a new breed of terrorists born and radicalized in their country of residence, conceptions of terrorism have changed and so have conceptualizations of radicalization.

According to Springer (2009), radicalism as advocacy of, and commitment to, sweeping change and restructuring of political and social institutions has historically been associated with left- and right-wing political parties at times even with centrist and liberal ideologies and involves the wish to do away with

traditional and procedural restrictions which support the status quo. But Silber and Bhatt (2011) argue that as an ideology, radicalism challenges the legitimacy of established norms and policies but it does not, in itself, lead to violence. There have been many radical groups in European political history which were reformist rather than revolutionary. In other words, there can be radicalism without the advocacy of violence to strive for the realization of social or political change. When it comes to “religious radicalism” within strands of contemporary political Islam or Islamism, as ideology and movement, one can for instance find Salafist groups which are non-violent. Some of these groups are even reluctant to become involved in politics. However, various strategies that may include political and reformist actions, such as cultural struggle and which call for adoption of state-centric counter-radicalization measures.

Salafism, for instance, seeks to purge Islam of outside influences and strives for a return to the Islam practiced by the “pious ancestors”, that is Muhammad and the early Islamic community. It stresses adherence to a rigorist interpretation of the Quran and the Hadith and aims at reforming the personal behaviour of every Muslim (Springer, 2009). In addition, Silber and Bhatt (2011) note that it also involves the duty to advise other believers to change their way of life in the same sense. Salafi thinkers insist on the right of believers to interpret the fundamental texts for themselves through independent reasoning. Only one specific interpretation of Salafism focuses on the use of violence to bring about such radical change and is commonly known as Salafist Jihadism. Yet, such measures have not proved overly effective owing to the trends of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia often blamed on the growing cases of terrorist radicalization.

In general, radicalization to any form of terrorist violence is a phased process. There are various descriptions in the relevant social science literature with regard to the number and type of phases, stages or steps within the radicalization process (Springer, 2009). In the framework of this concise Report, “violent radicalization” often refers to radicalization to jihadist violence or jihadist terrorism. Yet there are, as will be stressed below, remarkable parallels between radicalization to current jihadist terrorism and radicalization to left-wing, right-wing or nationalist separatist terrorism. In the context of security-based diplomacy as a strategy in the management of transnational terrorism, measures such as peace-building initiatives, still face significant challenges to politicians, policymakers, social science researchers and terrorism experts. Questions of why radicalization occurs, what triggers an individual to engage in it and why some people get radicalized while some others abandon it half way through, arise in academic and political debates.

According to Bellamy (2012) East Africa faces dynamic and complex radicalization challenges. A report by the Institute for Security Studies (2012) the Somali fundamentalist movement, which has been active in Somali politics since the late 1980’s, is rooted in the 1950’s but was reinforced by state collapse in 1991 and the resultant civil war, international intervention, external influence, and the subsequent efforts made by the Somalis themselves at new patterns of political reconstruction in a bid to shape their own destiny. There are strong structural foundations for radicalization in East Africa. Radicalization has continued to spread building both on the economic decline, violent conflicts and lack of strong and legitimate states. According to Alonso (2012), socially or politically frustrated youngsters may go through quite different paths of

radicalization into militancy and terrorism. Usually they personally experience discrimination, unfair competition with other groups over scarce resources or an absence of prospects for a good future (Alonso, 2012). Though the literature on radicalization is often assessed and counter-radicalization policies are critically appraised for their effectiveness, seldom have the aspect of security-based diplomacy been linked especially between Kenya and Somalia.

Kimunguyi (2009) argues that the growth of Islamic extremism in EA appears to be linked to the poor socio-economic conditions of countries in the region where Islamist groups, deliberately leveraging socio-economic grievances, penetrate EA societies (Rosand *et al.*, 2009). Somalia's growing Islamist radicalism is spilling over into Kenya. The militant Al-Shabaab movement has built a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among Muslim populations in the north east and Nairobi and on the coast, and is trying to radicalize and recruit youth from these communities, often capitalizing on long-standing grievances against the central state. This problem could grow more severe with the October 2011 decision by the Kenyan government to intervene directly in Somalia.

The central question in this deliverable is how these levels and types of causes and catalysts relate to each other and how they, when combined, result in radicalization. The main premise is that, in general, radicals are 'ordinary' people: they are not insane psychopaths suffering from mental illnesses (Crenshaw, 2000). Although most factors are assumed to contribute to all forms of radicalization, the present study applies the theoretical framework to cases of Islamic radicalism in post 9/11 Europe, due to the present importance to society of understanding this type of radicalization. Additionally, with the aim of



identifying the most vulnerable segments of society, a closer look will be taken at the way in which members of particular groups are exposed to and affected by the relevant causal factors (Choudhury, 2007). Especially due to one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, there has been a difficulty for cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts (Rosand *et al.*, 2009). Furthermore, although there are studies examining counterterrorism and state strategies, there is still a dearth of research

#### **2.4.1 Push and Pull Factors to Terrorist Radicalization**

According to Muhsin (2012), the two driving factors for recruitment include both "push" and "pull." Push factors are the negative social, cultural, and political features of one's societal environment that aid in "pushing" vulnerable individuals onto the path of violent extremism. Push factors are what are commonly known as "underlying/root causes" such as poverty, unemployment, illiteracy, discrimination, and political/economical marginalization. Pull factors, on the other hand, are the positive characteristics and benefits of an extremist organization that "pull" vulnerable individuals to join. These include the group's ideology (e.g., emphasis on changing one's condition through violence rather than "apathetic" and "passive" democratic means), strong bonds of brotherhood and sense of belonging, reputation building, prospect of fame or glory, and other socialization benefits (Choudhury, 2007). However, concerted efforts by the relevant authorities are required in order to effectively address the risks presented by terrorist radicalization to effectively manage transnational terrorism.

#### **2.4.1.1 Push Factors**

Unemployment: Muhsin (2012) says that although personal poverty is not a reason for joining violent extremism, the cases of these youth show that the effects of poverty, such as idleness and low self-esteem, cannot be ignored in this discussion. The fact that many Somali youth are unemployed and rely on relatives for sustenance, either in Somalia or in the diaspora, dampens their self-worth such that when an opportunity to fend for oneself arises, they are quick to take advantage. Military interventions and fear of victimization: the bombing of Somali towns by the mostly Ugandan and Burundian UN peacekeeping force, AMISOM, built intense hatred toward this group. Roy (2004) asserts that the destruction of property and life is a great cause of distress and some may join terrorist groups to seek revenge as well as to “protect themselves and their families.”

In addition, a lack of education in general and not religious education may push vulnerable groups to pursue different avenues in life if they do not see a bright future ahead. As a result, it becomes easier to join al-Shabab rather than languish in poverty with no chance to “pursue something greater” (Choudhury, 2007). Muhsin, 2012). However, the new terrorism trends exhibits characteristics that contrast with traditional terrorism. With groups more likely to form networks, rather than hierarchies or cells; this is particularly true of the groups emerging from decentralized radical Islamic movements organized around charismatic clerics. As such, unemployment cannot be opined as a reason why individuals join an organization in pursuit of these aims. The forces that impel individuals to

become terrorists and insurgents are thus timeless and, in fact, have less to do with one's chosen profession than perhaps with other factors.

#### **2.4.1.2 Pull Factors**

Reputation (hero for defending country and religion): In the case of most youth, the reputation that one earns by joining Al-Shabaab is attractive for two main reasons. First, it delivers them from irrelevance to prominence. In a society that places great emphasis on age, the economically dependent youth command little respect and are seen as powerless (Choudhury, 2007). By becoming a member of a terrorist group, some believe they are able to gain immediate respect and access to power, thereby strengthening their sense of self-worth. Second, it strengthens a particular identity: in this case, "defender of country and religion." This is important for two reasons. It highlights the centrality of Islam in Somalis' sense of identity. The role of religion is especially magnified in the identity of youth for whom clan politics has brought nothing but chaos and destruction. This doesn't necessarily indicate religious zealotry, but rather the intertwined nature of religion and nationality in their sense of identity (Schwartz, 2009). Radicalization is certainly complicated, difficult to comprehend and tricky to address. However, understanding the different sides of radicalisation is fundamental to developing a sound strategy.

According to Choudhury (2007), *Mental Manipulation and Fighting Islam's Enemies*: Mental manipulation through religion may pull vulnerable groups to join terrorist organizations as their religious duty. Framing it as manipulation indicates that these youth may never have fully believed that it was a religious duty to join al-Shabab. But Schwartz (2009) posits that firm opposition by those

who chose to use “manipulation” also hints at the power of disillusionment and betrayal, since they have come to see it as manipulation after the fact. Therefore, formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies is critical. On the other hand, obtaining paradise as a reason for joining terrorist groups stems from the belief that terrorist, such as Al-Shabaab, conducts valid jihad in defense of God’s religion. All schools within orthodox Islam, both Shia and Sunni, accept that paradise is a reward for those who die as martyrs. It is one of the surest paths that guarantee meeting God. The disagreements arise as to what exactly constitutes valid jihad (Schwartz, 2009). In light of this, a more comprehensive strategy is needed to achieve an effective counterterrorism mandate is needed

#### **2.4.1.3 Radicalization : Catalysts and Causes**

Contemporary events, arising from the foreign and domestic policies of both Western and Muslim governments, have had significant effects on the politicization of Muslims, especially those in the diaspora (Post, 2005). But Roy (2004) says that the identification with the ummah and resentment at the perceived oppression of Muslims worldwide have had unforeseen repercussions. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was the beginning. No matter that Shias rather than Sunnis deposed the secular and autocratic Shah, Muslims were united in seeing this as a victory for Islam and evidence that at last a pure Islamic state could be established despite corrupt Arab governments and their Western supporters (Roy, 2004). However, the effect on Muslim consciousness and sense of identity was immense. Revolutionary Iran galvanized Muslim politics and also gained the support of the most militant Sunni elements within it. Although violent

extremists in East Africa adhere to diverse ideologies, the strategies that they employ to enlist youth into their ranks are often similar.

According to Schwartz (2009), the effects flowing from the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan in 1979, which coincided with the Islamic revolution in Iran and the rise of militant political Islam in general, cannot be overestimated. Thousands of Muslims from across the world traveled to Afghanistan for the specific purpose of expelling Soviet infidels from Muslim lands. Both mainstream and radical clerics and scholars approved and encouraged the jihad as a defensive struggle which pitted Muslims against atheist (communist) non-Muslims. For example, Afghanistan provided training opportunities and a secure base for aspiring jihadis to learn the skills they needed in local struggles; it allowed religious nationalists fleeing the security authorities of Muslim regimes to regroup; and critically, it provided a small fringe group of extreme Islamist revolutionaries with face-to-face opportunities for selecting and indoctrinating mujahideen and seasoned nationalist fighters for global jihad. On the contrary, Weine (2009) points out that the slaughter of Muslims in Bosnia by Serbs (Christians) was interpreted as an attack upon the ummah, who despite being European, were not protected by the UN against Serb attacks. From these authors, resentment and fear of religious persecution elsewhere can be factors to be investigated in recruiting diaspora Muslims for jihad in the cases of Kenya and Somalia.

#### **2.4.1.4 Contributing Factors of Terrorist Radicalization**

Although a number of contributing factors may be singled out as facilitators for the emergence of radicalization processes leading to terrorism, it is impossible to identify one single root cause. Soper and Fetzer (2007) point out that the convergence of several possible contributing variables can usually be found at the origin of the radicalization process. Since terrorism and radicalization leading to it may arise for a number of reasons, precipitant factors vary according to each individual experience of and pathway to radicalization. On the other hand, Wene (2009) says that a considerable variety of contributing or facilitating factors can trigger the radicalization process in varying degrees at the intersection of personal history and that enabling environment (Weine, 2009).

As there is no set hierarchy of facilitating factors that lead towards radicalization into violence the examples described here are not listed in any particular order. The enabling environment may for instance contain historical antecedents of political violence or, on a more contemporary level, concrete experiences of civil war or brutal encounters with unjust authority. Excessive repression by state authorities is likely to contribute to a climate of mutual distrust among those affected and assists in creating an atmosphere in which disparate social aggregates will be inclined to antagonism and entrenchment instead of conflict resolution (Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman, 2009). Ideally, a necessary caveat when approaching issues related to radicalization is the treatment of religion; and thus inclusion of religious perspectives and faith-based organizations' efforts could help address this challenge.

Further examples of facilitating factors would be linked to profound social changes such as the breakdown in social bonds of individuals caught between different cultures and generations. Alienation or the sense of a personal identity crisis can furthermore increase or add to sentiments of frustration. This in turn may be linked with the experience or the perception of prevalent social injustice that creates barriers for entry into mainstream society. Finally, lack of integration and the experience or perception of discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origins can be other significant facilitating factors (Soper and Fetzer, 2007). The causes for terrorist radicalization as posited by Hoffman and Rosenau (2007) include: experience of unemployment, social exclusion, racism and discrimination, which cause them to become marginalized and radicalized; the generational gap between first and second, third- generations of Muslim immigrants, and loose of family roots with country of origin; the lack of single religious authority and religious schooling, and as consequence self-teaching and individualization of faith, which lead young Muslims to radicalization and extremism; the influence of "imported" radical imams and their hate speeches; foreign policy, in particular, some of the European countries' support of Israel in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or war in Afghanistan and Iraq and the failure of successful Muslim integration and absence of institutionalization of Islam in many countries. The difficulties of urban life are a source of youth frustration and may render certain young people vulnerable to radical influences. Therefore, state-centric counter-radicalization programs may offer special efforts to reach people struggling to survive in large cities.

#### **2.4.1.5 Socio-political Alienation and a Failure of Integration**

Perhaps the most often cited precursor of radicalization and homegrown terrorism is the lack of socio-political integration particular Muslim communities have with their broader society, and relatedly, their experiences of discrimination, victimization, and xenophobia (Wilner, 2009). Jenkins (2004) adds that the assumption rests on the notion that individuals and fringe groups who fail to properly associate with their host (or native) country and nation - the so-called “unassimilated” eventually seek other like-minded individuals to associate with. In so doing, they construct a narrow social network that is distinct from broader societal ones and establish identities that reflect the “clique” rather than the nation. As a result, some radicalized individuals distance themselves politically, socially, and even ideologically from the broader community, eventually rejecting the national identity shared by their fellow citizens, along with the collective’s underlining political ideology, historical narrative, and related value-systems. Anti-democratic action and violence is one possible outcome. The socio-political dynamics in counterterrorism call for a more comprehensive planning to achieve an effective counterterrorism mandate and hence the need for this study.

The polarization of society between different religious and cultural groups weakens the bonds of state identity, civil association, and nationalism. In time, the broader communities in which the radicalized individuals live risk being characterized as enemies. “The reality in Western Europe,” Granatstein (2007) notes that, “the second and third generation of Muslim citizens is more fiercely Islamist than their parents. The issue is the widespread failure to socially and politically integrate particular individuals into society and to properly teach,



diffuse, and ingrain the lessons of democracy, peaceful dispute resolution, and the rule of law. The results are individuals who spur acceptance of their nation's identity and fail to appreciate the state's social and political norms, both of which ease the use of violence if and when it is contemplated (Hendrickson, 2012). The country contexts in which Kenya and Somalia; and the larger Africa youth are formed also impact their vulnerability to radicalization, especially the prevalence of conflict.

At the global level, the Muslim diaspora communities now constitute the largest immigrant population in the EU. Contrary to expectations that Muslim immigrants would successfully assimilate, they are reaffirming their Islamic identity, as a new political identification, and some of them turn to terrorism against their adopted country (Anspaha, 2008). However, Hendrickson (2012) cites ineffective Muslim integration and political representation, as well as the social exclusion, unemployment and discrimination that the Muslims experience in their adopted countries- all have led to their deeper exclusion and marginalization, facilitating the development of Islamic radicalism and home-grown terrorism. In the context of security-based diplomacy as a strategy in the management of transnational terrorism, concerted control efforts by the relevant authorities are required in order to effectively address the risks presented by terrorist radicalization in the management of transnational terrorism.

The terrorist threat comes primary from European indigenous Muslim immigrant population, and only then from "imported" radicalism. That's why the significant step forward in the EU counterterrorism strategy is putting in the forefront four main pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. In the context of Islamist

terrorism the first pillar “to prevent” is particularly important, because it addresses the main drivers of the process of radicalization at the “pre-radicalization” phase. This information is relevant in the Kenya-Somalia situation, and enables not only to disrupt the radicalization process and prevent the terrorism threat currently, but also to stop the next generation of terrorists from emerging in the region

#### **2.4.1.6 Reaction to Foreign Policy**

Another factor considered a precursor to radicalization is the reaction to, and eventual violent rejection of, a host or native state’s foreign policy (Wilner, 2009). For example, Western militant jihadists, some argue, are motivated by perceived injustices taking place against Muslims around the globe. “Perceived provocation” insults against Islam (i.e. the publication of *The Satanic Verses* (1988), the *Mohammad Cartoons* (2005), and the screening of films *Submission* (2004); these and other developments, the argument suggests, humiliate and anger some Western Muslims to the point that they feel justified to take revenge against the citizens and states that condone or participate in these perceived injustices (Neumann, 2009). Therefore, the diverse interactions that states maintain and their foreign policy is critical in ensuring counterradicalization programs are effective.

#### **2.4.2 Recruiting Strategies into Terrorist Radicalization**

The academic study of terrorist groups since September 11 has been prolific and provides insight regarding how terrorist groups form, become motivated to violence, and eventually lose their appeal to the public ultimately resulting in the

terrorists group's failure and disintegration. Hoffman and Jenkins (2010) have produced substantial works that suggest radicalization is a principal concern for the foreseeable future. Social identity theory (SIT) "is based on an insistence that human action needs to be understood in its social context" (Reicher, 2004). This theory may provide a foundation for understanding the radicalization phenomenon, but there are disagreements regarding its core components. Rational actor theory, which suggests that most individuals tend to act in accordance with their perceived best interests, will also inform this study. Likewise, instrumental approaches contribute to the study at a macro-level, when exploring the nature of terrorist groups. However, sufficient discourse available in academic literature to explore how these aspects might apply to counterterrorism strategies is still scarce.

According to Reicher (2004), terrorism is the extreme consequence of radicalization, the early signs of which are likely to be involvement in a variety of support activities, including criminality. Individual profiles based on such personal characteristics as sex, age, national origin, religion, education and socioeconomic background are of little value in identifying future terrorists, but pattern analysis identifies broad groups from which recruits to global jihad have been drawn. Scholars and analysts have come up with various conceptual frameworks for examining the factors that lead to radicalization. The most prominent among these divides the radicalization process into three categories: situational, psychological, and social. In his landmark work, Sageman (2004) profiled 172 terrorists using social, psychological, and situational variables. Bakker used the same variables as Sageman to profile 242 terrorists in Europe

from September 2001 to August 2006. Bakker then compared these terrorists to the 172 terrorists in Sageman's (2004) study. Usually scholars and analysts attempt to work within the standard conceptual framework, or at least some aspect of it, while focusing on a certain radicalized population.

In a notable work titled *Radical Islam Rising*, Silber and Bhatt (2011) conducted a detailed case study of al-Muhajiroun a radical Islamic movement based in the United Kingdom. Silber and Bhatt (2011) found that joining the al-Muhajiroun movement is a multi-step process. First an individual must experience a "cognitive opening," which opens him up to alternative belief systems. With an open mind the individual begins a process of religious seeking, and at some point during this process he is exposed to the movement. If the individual accepts the movement's sacred authority as legitimate, he undergoes a process of socialization whereby he learns the movement's ideological tenants. Once the individual accepts the movement's ideology he is eligible for formal membership (Hendrickson, 2012). However, when the concept of religion comes into play, a conflict of interest occurs comparable to that of the contradictory and opposing views of scientific and religious beliefs.

Past radicalization studies have focused on ethnic diaspora in Europe, although a few of them have singled out the Somali-Kenya case for investigation. Bakker (2006) examined radicalization and recruitment of Somali-American youth and young adults from a psychological perspective. The researchers identified various "push" and "pull" factors competing for the attention of vulnerable youth and young adults (Gartenstein-Ross, and Grossman, 2009). Within the framework described above, scholars and analysts have developed a multitude of specialized

theories to explain radicalization. Typically, these theories model radicalization within a specific community usually an ethnic diaspora. As such, these theories are not always applicable to radicalized communities across the board. In reality, there is no one-size-fits-all theory; different combinations of theories must be assembled to explain radicalization in different contexts.

There are several suitable radicalization theories to draw upon when examining terrorist recruits some are based on situational variables, some on psychological variables, and some on social variables. Situational theories, although they have been in use for quite some time, are still hotly-debated. Sageman (2004) empirically tested popular situational explanations of radicalism by focusing on the background of a group of global Salafi mujahedin. Sageman found that, contrary to popular belief, members of the global Salafi jihad were generally middle-class, well-educated, married young men. However, most of the mujahedin had strong occupational skills, few were employed full-time. The lack of clarity and consistency that characterize how we define radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism also extends to the measures taken to counter them.

Scholars have developed a plethora of psychological theories to explain terrorist radicalization. While most of these theories are useful to some degree, like situational theories of radicalization they remain highly controversial. Individual motivations for participating in terrorism are so varied that it is a pointless endeavor to construct a psychological profile for all would-be terrorists. Crenshaw (2012) declared that “the outstanding common characteristic of terrorists is their normality.” Post (2005) agrees with Crenshaw that terrorists exhibit no major psychopathology. An oft-cited NYPD report concludes that “there is no useful profile to assist law enforcement or intelligence to predict who

will follow this trajectory of radicalization.” However, concerted control efforts by the relevant authorities are required in order to effectively address the risks presented by the terrorist radicalization in the management of transnational terrorism.

Sageman (2004) identified two major radicalization pathways for the individuals in his sample. The first pathway involved a “bunch of guys” who collectively decided to join a terrorist organization. The second pathway involved individuals who decided to join childhood friends. When these individuals emigrated to the West they looked up their former friends, and, if these friends were part of a terrorist group, the individuals ended up joining that group. In both *Leaderless Jihad* and *Understanding Terror Networks*, Sageman makes a persuasive argument for the importance of friendship and kinship bonds in the radicalization process (Sageman, 2004). On the other hand, Bergman et al., (2011) argue that radical Islam poses many threats, only one of which is violent acts of global terrorism. There are radicals, for example, who advocate intensive religious discipline as the solution to Islam’s ills (Bergen, Hoffman and Tiedemann, 2011). This non-violent, personal strategy, based on strict and literal imitation of the life of the Prophet Mohammed, seeks the conversion of others through individual promotion of the call to Islam. This context includes the local conditions prevailing in the country where they are located, the type of behavior being targeted, and the degree of control that those responsible for delivering the program are able to exert over the targeted individuals

Radical Muslims, for whom the call to Islam is central, oppose the values and the political and economic power of the West, but instead of militant jihad (struggle), focus on peaceable means by which to restore the purity of Islam and achieve

fundamental changes in society. Their goals are no less radical than violent jihadis, but the means are different. Peaceful political activism, grounded in religious principles, is another strategy for redressing the declining power of the ummah (Muslim community) (Bergen, *et al.*, 2011). For example, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a 19th-century Muslim revivalist, advocated a pan-Islamic movement of political solidarity to counter the values and domination of the West. The various strands and movements comprised by radical Islam share a common faith, but espouse different goals and means (Gerges, 2005). When political activists demand the imposition of Shariah (strict Koranic law) in Muslim states and urge personal and communal jihad to bring that about, they become militant jihadis (Gerges, 2005). While the literature bring no doubt on radicalization into terrorism, such aspects for Kenya and Somalia still threaten the security of both countries in managing transnational terrorism.

According to Devji (2005), violent acts of global terrorism, and the support activities which underpin them, daily threaten the safety and values of citizens in both the West and the East. Dependence upon external funding from Saudi Arabia, for example, leaves many Arab and Muslim institutions in the West vulnerable to the influence and inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics a point made later in this paper. Keppel (2003) argues that any analysis of radicalism requires an understanding of Islam as a political and social system within which religion is dominant. Islam fails to recognize the Western concept of the separation of religion and politics. While some scholars like Keppel (2003) view the development of political Islam in historical and cultural terms, the merging aspects such as sociological factors may come into play given that terrorism is ever changing.

Political Islam has two interconnected aims; solidarity with the ummah (the Muslim community worldwide) and the re-establishment of Islamic polities under a Caliph (a pan-Islamic ruler). The next section attempts to trace the development of militant global jihadism as a prelude to the review which follows of the catalysts, causes and categories of radicalization. However, Lewis (2002) maintains that there is no clear genealogical process which has produced global militant jihadism: it is the product of “the fragmentation of traditional structures of Muslim authority within new global landscapes”. Prior to 9/11, a type of formal recruitment took place in the camps in Afghanistan. The dismantling of those facilities by Coalition forces weakened Al Qaeda to the point where it metamorphosed into a loose affiliation of terror networks, a development which has had an effect on recruiting strategies.

Rather than a top-down formal recruitment procedure, there is now a bottom-up process whereby potential new members are sensitized to Salafist ideology through the dissemination of propaganda (Lewis, 2002). They join decentralized networks of dispersed cells that talent-spot cell leaders and recruiters. It is they who provide the contacts that link the recruit, jihad, and training camps. While camps like Mansehra in Pakistan near the Kashmir border continue to provide radicalized Muslims with instruction in handling arms and explosives, there are also indications that camps have now been set up in Western Europe for homegrown terrorists. Structural developments in the recruitment strategies of Islamist groups have affected the composition of new adherents by broadening the pool from which they are drawn. Williams (2005) posits that this change has been in parallel with and facilitated by an explosion in the dissemination of



propaganda. While Salafi propaganda has many channels, including university campuses, the battle for Muslim minds has been waged through two key agents: the internet, and the mosques which give a platform to radical Wahhabi clerics. This is as true between Kenya and Somalia as it is elsewhere, and relevant in the context of formulating policies and practices to reduce the incidence of radicalization within the larger context of managing transnational terrorism.

#### **2.4.2.1 The Internet**

Social movement theory essentially operates on the same premise as social networking theory, namely, that informal group ties play an important role in the process of mobilization (Stroink, 2007). Similarly, Neumann and Rogers (2010) used social movement theory as a framework for looking at recruitment to the militant Islamist movement in Europe. They found that, “in the vast majority of cases, the transition to violence takes place within the confines of tightly-knit groups, and that the social forces which unfold here have a strong influence on their judgment and behavior.” Social networking and social movement theory both state that individuals need social interaction with other like-minded individuals to make the leap to violent radicalization. In the past such fraternizing might have taken place in person, but today much of it takes place online via social media. With such social forces on the increase in this technologically advanced internet network society, states must therefore evaluate the counterterrorism measures in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia and hence the need for this study.

According to Roy (2004), the internet is a critical component of that remedy, allowing individuals to create an “abstract and virtual community of believers”

that rests outside the confines of a specific city, country, or region. Instead of following a local group or religious leader as had been the norm in previous generations today's youths surf the Internet and "choose, quote, or follow whomsoever he/she wants." The Internet has also become a resource for disseminating terrorist propaganda and instructions to young persons that might not otherwise have direct contact with group recruiters or supporters. Some terrorist groups have established websites that are youth-oriented, with colorful comics, games, and links to videos (Weine, 2009). These sites, many of which are available in English, help to get the groups' propaganda and messages out to a worldwide audience. It is necessary to promote awareness that any young person with an Internet connection can access websites that promote terrorist groups or provide graphic depictions of acts of terrorism that are commonly portrayed as acts of heroism. While there are discreet examples of young persons who have become radicalized online, the magnitude to which this is occurring is not known. Although youth recruitment and radicalization is not occurring domestically to the extent that it has happened elsewhere, the degree to which it may or may not be happening within the Kenya is unknown. Similarly, it is not clear how the radicalization that is occurring in other countries might impact us domestically.

Self-radicalization on the Internet with no face-to-face interaction is a rare phenomenon indeed (Stroink, 2007). Nevertheless, Sageman (2004) admits that "the Internet can help bridge the gap from the isolated potential mujahed to the global mujahed," but adds that the Internet is not persuasive enough by itself. In fact, none of the mujahed in Sageman's sample went straight from interacting on the Internet to joining the global Salafi jihad. Although the Internet can familiarize an individual with the global Salafi ideology, the Internet cannot

prove the individuals commitment to the cause. The individual needs a period of intensive face-to-face interaction in which to demonstrate loyalty. Undoubtedly, all programs and initiatives are created with the intention of achieving positive outcomes. However, even when the desired outcomes are achieved, the programs may also have unforeseen and undesired consequences.

Al Qaeda has been called a web-based phenomenon. The web's independence of national boundaries and ethnic markers fits exactly with bin Laden's founding vision for Al Qaeda as a base from which to stimulate revolt among the worldwide Muslim ummah (Sageman, 2004). According to Keppel (2003), this group is led by educated engineers and other professional technology enthusiasts; it adapted early to the technologies of globalization and used them to sensitize potential recruits to global Salafi jihadism. The internet, chat forums, videos, cassette tapes and cell phones are used as recruitment tools to disseminate propaganda. They spread the myth and promise of the jihad to alienated young Muslims in search of a collective social identity (Williams, 2005). Living rooms are transformed into radical madrassas as audio and video files of sermons, communiqués, poetry, songs, martyrs' testimony, Koranic readings and scenes of battle and suicide bombings are downloaded. In light of this, concerted efforts by states and security agencies are required in order to effectively address the risks presented by the emerging and evolving terrorist networks.

Cesari (2003) observes that the message projected is that there are two ways to remedy Muslim grievances: to participate in jihad in non-Western conflict zones and work towards the establishment of the rule of the Caliph (in order to prepare for the future consolidation of the Islamic state and conquest of non-Muslim; and to participate in violent jihad against all 'enemies of Islam' as advocated by Al

Qaeda. Online videos of jihadists in combat often accompany such a call to arms. Bell asserts that internet connections create a bond between individuals and a 'virtual' Muslim community which is an approximation of an ideal Islamic society: one that is all that is just, egalitarian, and universal in its simplicity and purity (Bell, 2005). On the one hand, it connects isolated individuals to others who share their intense views; on the other, it leads them to spend more time with a virtual community at the expense of interaction with a real one - their immediate social environment. The internet connection can thus impede assimilation. While the internet does not provide individuals with a direct means to contact the leaders of Al Qaeda affiliated organizations, it does facilitate networking and by connecting dispersed individuals, enable them to form their own cells. These cases illustrate the complex legal and practical problems to be addressed when taking steps to target radicalization at the individual or group level.

#### **2.4.2.2 The Mosques**

The fundamentalist religious debate has been taken outside of traditional institutions in the diaspora and removed from mainstream scholars. This secularization has resulted in traditional values being left behind so that they no longer exercise a moderating influence or provide the alternative interpretations which could check the radicalization process. Fundamentalists dismiss the teachings of learned ulema as apostate, and mainstream clerics and scholars accuse radicals of 'hijacking' Islam for their own political purposes (Devji, 2005). For instance, Crenshaw, (2012) says that despite a clamp-down by Saudi authorities on the sources of these funds, dependence on external funding leaves many Arab and Muslim institutions in the West vulnerable to the influence and inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics and their materials. Charismatic imams

such as Abu Hamza al-Masri, who took over the formerly moderate Finsbury Park mosque in the UK, preach an intolerant Wahhabi interpretation of the Koran which incites Muslims to engage in violent acts. Unconfirmed reports linked Khan to the Finsbury Park mosque. Whereas both mainstream and radical clerics fundamentalists have used mosques to give implicit and explicit approval to the 9/11, Madrid and London bombings as well as those in Jordan, Bali and elsewhere (Crenshaw, 2012). The cultural contexts from which these movements arise are of great importance and must be addressed to justify all possible facets of religiously inspired terrorism.

### **2.4.3 Terrorist Radicalization Among Youths**

International Islamic terrorism is an evolving phenomenon. In the years since 9/11, a preponderance of the terrorist attacks carried out in USA, Kenya, and Somalia and elsewhere, have involved radicalized citizens. Loosely labelled as “homegrown terrorism”, perpetrators have been autonomously organized, have had little direct assistance from transnational terrorist networks, and prepare their attacks within the countries they plan on targeting (Wilner, 2009). Radicalization is best understood as a personal process in which the individual adopts extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justifies the use of indiscriminate violence (Wilner, 2009). According to Jenkins (2004), “radicalization comprises internalizing a set of beliefs, a militant mindset that embraces violent jihad as the paramount test of one’s conviction.” It is a mental process that both prepares and motivates an individual to pursue violent behaviour. Understanding what drives extremism and radicalization is perhaps the most challenging aspect of countering homegrown terrorism.

According to Precht (2007), in Western Europe, for many, the process of radicalization begins when they are teenagers looking for a cause and a stronger Muslim identity and increasingly finding the answer in the ideology of radical Islam. Often people are rather secular before they enter the radicalization process and, in general, radicalization is taking place within loose social networks of friends and peers (Precht, 2007). An important factor in radicalization is the presence of a charismatic person who can easily deliver persuasive speeches not only in Mosques but also in schools, universities, or even prisons. “Official sources indicate that many American homegrown Islamists have also been radicalized while incarcerated, including the members of the prison- formed Jamiyat al-Islam al-Sahih cell in California that was convicted in 2007 for its plans to attack not only synagogues but also the Israeli consulate in Los Angeles” (Benraad, 2009). Many of young potential radicals are not fully aware of their country’s history, as well, they lack proper knowledge of Islam and have not read the Quran to see that Islam is actually one of the more peaceful religions.

The fact that preachers of Wahhabi Islam find to their advantage is that many young disenchanted individuals are not knowledgeable about the entire scope of religion they are trying to embrace. Another important factor to consider is the role of social networks in the process of radicalization (Bizina & Gray, 2014). “Social links are key to the dynamics of terror networks” (Sageman, 2004). Group phenomenon is a strong factor in creating such network, because the potential jihadists were close friends or relatives when joining terrorist network and have done so not individually but as a group. Jenkins (2004) points out that many youth enter the circles of radicals after the society rejected them by finding virtual networks online, or in youth clubs and places of worship. Krueger (2007)

asserts that the local community, by remaining disinterested in its youth, misses the cues that indicate the process of radicalization, as was the case with the Millennial Plot bombers in Montreal. Perhaps, this lapse in judgment was due to the same British multicultural approach that Canada has adopted to its immigration policies.

Krueger (2007) posits that terrorism is akin to voting. High opportunity cost of time, such as high paying job, should discourage people from voting, but on the contrary, it is precisely them who vote, because they care about influencing the outcome and consider themselves sufficiently informed to express their opinions. Having been seen as “a bunch of guys” involved in petty crimes, living in an apartment on welfare, they were not taken seriously by the authorities, although their circle revolved around Kamel, who undergone military training and fought jihad in Bosnia (Sageman, 2004). Terrorists also care about influencing political outcomes: they care about a cause so deeply that they are willing to die for it. Terrorists are responding to geopolitical issues, and understanding the causes of terrorism can help prevent countries from pursuing counterproductive courses of action (Krueger, 2007). However, the process of radicalization apart from social isolation also involves the desire to affect political change.

#### **2.4.4 Religion and Terrorist Radicalization**

At the global level, polarizing tendencies and radicalization processes can be witnessed within many religious, ethnic and cultural population aggregates. Within this global mood that is also characterized by widespread feelings of inequity and injustice a very acute sense of marginalization and humiliation exists, in particular within several Muslim communities worldwide as well as

among immigrant communities with a Muslim background established in European countries. These perceptions and feelings are often underestimated by Western observers. Today's religious and political radicalization should however not be confounded. The former is closely intertwined with identity dynamics, whereas the latter is boosted by the aforementioned feelings of inequity whether real or perceived. Both expressions of radicalization processes are thus the result of very different individual and collective dynamic (Alonso, 2006).

According to Richardson (2012), the widespread feeling of humiliation and uncertainty basically rests upon a whole array of widely diverging specific local circumstances. As in the past, it offers fringe groups an opportunity to justify their recourse to terrorism. However, as all opinion polls indicate, such terrorist violence is condemned by large majorities in most countries of the Muslim world as well as within Muslim communities inside Europe. From the late 19th century to the present day, all such diverse significant political radicalization waves that resulted in terrorist action share a number of structural features. Firstly, they all thrive in an enabling environment which is essentially characterized by a widely shared sense of injustice, whether real or perceived, among concerned segments of the population or whole societies. Sentiments of injustice, exclusion and humiliation have always been powerful forces in politics and prime movers for change (Richardson, 2012). Radicalization contains many subsets of issues; socio-economic factors, leadership in community relations, demographics, and religion are focal points. To develop and effectively implement counter-radicalization strategies, it is important to identify related factors impact or influence radicalization. Socioeconomics play an important role in contemporary terrorism.



Roy (2004), in his monumental work, 'Globalised Islam' (2004), explains that the forces associated with globalization (modernization, urbanization, secularism, displacement, hi-tech communications, and so on) creates tension for young Western Muslims who find themselves caught adhering to traditional socio-religious beliefs in a non-religious environment. What results is a confused identity. Radicalization, Roy (2004) posits, is one way disenfranchised Muslim youths in the West have gone about reasserting their religious identity within non-Muslim contexts. Individuals find “a way to recast and rationalize their sense of exclusion and uprootedness”, replacing missing interpersonal ties and kinship and re-establishing a sense of belonging. Increasingly, radicalization is occurring well outside the Mosque. The result is a “de-territorialization” of religious practice and belief. That the images Western jihadists and groups like al-shabaab weave together events from a number of different regional contexts helps explain how and why individuals between Kenya and Somalia could find common ground with their supposed counterparts in Pakistan and Egypt despite profound differences in their experiences. This means that states must therefore evaluate the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures; given that Islamic communities are confronted with the great threat of “foreign” cultural systems and identities, and are overwhelmed by societal pressures.

But, as in the case with alienation and integration, neither religious practice nor globalization ferments Western radicalism in and of itself. There are plenty of converts and newly practicing Muslims (a vast majority, in fact) living in the West that do not radicalize. Instead, they vociferously and unabashedly condemn violence in the name of their religion (Wilner, 2009). Conversely, Sageman

(2004) suggests that “the terrorists in Western Europe and North America were not intellectuals or ideologues, much less religious scholars. It is not about how they think, but how they feel.” Stewart (2006) adds, that “religion plays an important role,” in the radicalization process, “but for some it rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals.” While religious adherence and globalization may help create an environment in which jihadi radicalization can more easily occur, they do not in and of themselves cause radicalization. Achieving a sense of identity is integral to the psyche, mainly because it allows some measure of “individual autonomy and differentness. Previous experiences of protracted processes of radicalization leading to terrorism should therefore offer some useful guidance.

Weine (2009) asserts that nothing creates so fertile a breeding ground for political radicalization than the feeling of belonging to the camp of those left behind in the progress of mankind but at the same time upholding potent and aspirational symbols of empowerment. When people resent injustice they tend to be more prone to radicalization on the other hand, Alonso (2006) says that a common characteristic of all forms of radicalization leading towards violence is that it always takes place at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory. Not all individuals who share the same sense of injustice or are living in the same polarized environment turn to radicalism and even less so to violence or terrorism. Somali fundamentalist movement, which has been active in Somali politics since the late 1980's, is rooted in the 1950's but was reinforced by state collapse in 1991. As such, concrete personal experiences, kinship and friendship,

group dynamics and socialization into the use of violence are needed to trigger the actual process.

In addition, Richardson (2012) observes that a feature of radicalization processes is that the actual use of violence involves only a very limited number of individuals. It is always the action of a few within the larger group or community whose fate is claimed to be at stake and whose plight they invoke to try to justify their acts. They form small groups that present themselves as a self-declared vanguard. In all past processes of radicalization the number of individuals who choose violence as their preferred method has been extremely low. Violent radicalization is indeed only at the far end of a wide array of possible radical expressions (Richardson, 2012). Ideally, the challenges faced by the states may have been confronted with the task of maintaining a balance between protecting national security interests and preserving the constitutional rights of citizens.

#### **2.4.5 Counterradicalization Programs**

Schmid (2013) argues that radicalization is not a threat to society if it is not connected to violence or other unlawful acts, such as incitement to hatred, as legally defined in compliance with international human rights law. Radicalization can actually be a force for beneficial change. Schmid (2011) points out that countering terrorist radicalization requires a sophisticated, comprehensive response. This should include both effective criminal-justice action, in compliance with international human rights standards and the rule of law, against those who incite others to terrorism and seek to recruit others for terrorism, and multidisciplinary efforts to address conditions that are conducive to terrorism

(Schmid, 2011). Although efforts towards counter-radicalization have been enhanced, it appear analysis of these programs is more in the developed economies like USA, and hence more research in this area between Kenya and Somalia was needed.

According to Virta (2008), initiatives to counter violent radical groups have been developed in many of the locations studied. The approach taken in each of these regions varies, with some focusing primarily on law enforcement and government actions or initiatives aimed at preventing acts of terrorism and shutting down terrorist networks. Some of the regions studied have implemented counter-radicalization initiatives aimed more at understanding why people are susceptible to radicalization and then using that knowledge to minimize its occurrence (Virta, 2008). However, very few of the counter-radicalization initiatives appear to be aimed specifically at addressing or preventing radicalization and recruitment.

According to Anspaha (2008), there are a few initiatives or programs identified in some of the regions that directly address youth, or are aimed at stemming recruitment attempts in venues frequented by youths. For example, school-based programs have been implemented in some regions that seek to educate both students and teachers about radicalization and potential signs of extremism (Anspaha, 2008). In addition, Albrecht (2014) contends that curricula have been updated in some countries to promote integration and multiculturalism, as well as to teach skills that would be useful to young persons seeking employment. In at least one of the locations studied, new schools are being opened in areas where existing schools were either established or infiltrated by terrorist groups in order to provide educational alternatives. Other youth-based programs that were

identified include: ensuring that job opportunities are available for young persons; tackling discrimination that could lead persons to become radicalized; and, developing rehabilitation programs for young persons who have been implicated in terrorist or extremist activity. With respect to countering internet-based recruitment or radicalization, that existing initiatives are not focused on youth as a distinct group. Given the apparent increase in youth involvement in terrorist organizations, and the changing demographics of those involved or implicated, it is necessary to promote awareness that young persons are susceptible to terrorist recruitment and radicalization between Kenya and Somalia.

As has been shown by the situation in Europe (Anspaha, 2008), many of the young persons that are perceived as being most vulnerable to radicalization or recruitment (based on incidents that have already occurred) have been second- and third-generation immigrants. It is believed that these young persons often struggle with identity problems, fail to integrate, and may feel excluded or marginalized vulnerabilities that have been utilized by terrorists to gain their support (Anspaha, 2008). It is important to gain a better understanding how terrorist groups are recruiting, radicalizing, and utilizing youth.

There likely are existing internal and external resources that could be utilized to help enhance our knowledge of what makes some young persons susceptible to radicalization, as well as assist in identifying approaches for countering potential threats (Albrecht, 2014). For example, although known cases of U.S.-based young persons that have radicalized or been recruited into terrorist groups is limited (Albrecht, 2014), there are some examples that could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to get a better understanding of the context in which radicalization has occurred domestically. Recent events in the Kenya Coast-

Mombasa, of young persons allegedly to train or fight alongside an al-shabaab terrorist group could provide insight into the type of situational variables that make some persons or communities vulnerable. Just as terrorist organizations exploit situational factors and grievances and specifically tailor their messages to appeal to youth, any initiatives that are developed to counter youth recruitment and radicalization should also address underlying causes and contextual factors that make some young persons and communities more susceptible. Virta (2008) points out that these initiatives should be locally tailored and should engage members from across the community who are in a position to address specific underlying factors or identify potential radicalization indicators. Counter-recruitment and radicalization initiatives must also evolve with the young audiences they are intended to reach, adapt along with the adversaries, incorporate new developments in technologies, and address changes within environments where young persons are susceptible.

#### **2.4.6 State-Centric Counterradicalization Measures**

As the international community has struggled to respond to contemporary terrorism and violent extremism, there has been recognition that enhancing good governance and strengthening democratic institutions can offer a strategy as a counter-radicalization initiative (Vidino & Brandon, 2012). Similarly, Fink and Barakat (2013) point out that counter-terrorism policies are being developed that include more proactive approaches with an emphasis on preventing terrorism and violent extremism by reducing the appeal of, and support for, extremist groups and ideologies. This evolution is reflected in a number of emerging norms and practices developed at the multilateral level, including the United Nations' Global Counterterrorism Strategy (2006), which promotes a multidimensional approach

and urges states to address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism (Fink & Barakat, 2013).

Anzalone (2012) points out that democracy and good governance are set of principles and concepts to be practiced by state leaders for promoting the security, stability, harmony, and prosperity of their people in the face of complex challenges from diversity and difference in religion, individual greed and ambition, opinions, and clan rivalries. State fragility arises or persists when the actions and behaviors of the leaders are in clear violations of the objectives and requirement of good governance principles. On the same note, Abdisaid (2008) posits that fake democracy and governance fuel abuse of power, corruption, and conflict and can't create a stable Somali State. The flagrant incompatibility between the democratic values, principles, and rights enshrined in the provisional constitution and the anti-democratic decision making political process of Somali government institutions corrodes public trust and sets in social disenfranchisement. As such, peace-building is primarily a national challenge and responsibility. It is the citizens of the countries where peace-building is underway, with support from their governments, who assume the responsibility for laying the foundations of dealing with radicalization.

On the other hand, Bangura (2010) points out that organizations referred to different areas of work ranging widely from community conflict resolution to developing alternative livelihoods to sexual and gender-based violence. A series of critical issues surrounding assessment of the effectiveness and outcomes of specific de-radicalization programs exist. Mustapha (2004) posits that this

illustrates not only the unique, context-specific circumstances in which these programs originated and developed, but also reveal the challenges inherent in attempts at generalization from one or more programs, including, but not exclusive to, efforts to assess the success of these initiatives states s all over the world have had to grapple with the problem of inter-group relations. Ethnic discrimination represents one of the problems of inter-group relations in any society. According to Ojie (2002), this is a situation which people of the minority ethnic groups are given unfair or unequal treatment simply because they are from a different ethnic group. It could be referred to as tribalism, which emanates from the ethnocentric feeling of the dominant group.

In light of the above, states can enhance good governance, empower democratic institutions and engage in promoting co-existence across ethnic/religious groups in counterradicalization. Mustapha (2004) says that when there is feeling of superiority by one ethnic group, the tendency is to look at the other ethnic groups with contempt. Intolerance is a blind refusal to understand and respect views or positions that are opposed to one's cherished religious views. Hence, by religious intolerance, Bangura (2010) opines that it is a blind and fixated mental and psychological negative attitude towards religious beliefs and practices that are contrary to one's cherished beliefs and practices. Such negative attitudes exhibit themselves in situations whereby leaders or groups in any society blindly refuse to understand and respect contrary religious views and practices except the ones they consider to be true. For example, in Nigeria today, ethnic discrimination has become a chronic social disease, in fact a canker worm, which has eaten deep into the heart of Nigerians.



Discrimination based on ethnic nationality is common to all ethnic groups in Nigeria (Ojie, 2002) as such; several solutions have, and can be proffered as ways of promoting inter-ethnic and religious relations. The same case for Kenya and Somalia are no doubt a complex given its numerous ethnic groups with varied cultural characteristics and interests. To eliminate the problems of ethnic discrimination and religious intolerance, Ojie (2002) calls for the establishment of a more humane social order. To him this can be achieved through increased utilization of the intellectual resources of the land by encouraging social research and using the results for solving social problems, which of course include those relating to inter-group relations. As a further step to promote inter-ethnic and religious relations, leaders must address the problem of educational imbalance. Also, government must ensure that the economy of the country is nationally integrated. Besides, emphasis from now must be on actual production, not mainly on the distribution of national wealth. State of origin, religious sentiments and ethnicity must be de-emphasized in all issues of national interest. To further reduce the problems of ethnic discrimination and religious intolerance, a concerted effort to bring about cross-cultural awareness among the citizenry of this country should be advocated. Thus, the study of the people, their culture and religions should be made compulsory all through our educational system. Efforts should also be geared up towards enhancing greater interaction between the various ethnic, religious and political groups.

Bangura (2010) adds that there is also the need for dialogue among different ethno-religious groups in the country. Ethnic and religious groups in the country

should not only talk about the need for dialogue among themselves, they should also act by organizing a forum for dialogue in all states and local governments of the federation. Dialogue will help to create ethnic accommodation, religious tolerance, understanding and peaceful co-existence among the different groups in the country. The challenges faced by the Muslim community like sectarian and inability to confront radicalisation; and mounting tensions with other major faith groups, are blamed on the lack of Kenyan-Muslim leadership. There is great disaffection with the “official” Muslim leaders, many of whom are widely viewed as elitist and self-serving; their integrity sullied through ties with the regime or foreign interests; and disconnected from harsh community realities (Mohamud, 2010). This trust and credibility deficit compounds the leadership crisis and undermines community cohesion. Radical organisations have emerged in the last decade to challenge the “official” leadership and institutions. Their political activism and radical anti-establishment politics are attractive to many youths, disillusioned with what they see as timid, pragmatist and moderate political views and style of the established institutions.

#### **2.4.7 Role of Non-State Actors in Counterradicalization**

Counter-terrorism policies often lead to stigmatization and discrimination against certain individuals based on characteristics such as religion, racial or ethnic origins. It is important to find a proper balance in working on prevention with target groups without unduly labeling them. In line with this, the study addresses various groups and their role in counterradicalization.

#### **2.4.7.1 Role of Youth in Counterradicalization Measures**

Radicalization of youth that leads to terrorism seems to be spreading faster than the development of prevention policies. Bizinam and Gray (2014) argue that although there is strong political will to counter VERLT, the path from commitment to tangible results on the ground appears to be long. At the same time, recruitment methods and activities of extremist groups are maturing and becoming ever more sophisticated and a return to nationalist policies of exclusion is getting stronger on an electoral level. Moreover, Precht (2007) points out those un-educated, disenfranchised individuals lacking a clear perspectives to live up to their true potential, are vulnerable to VERLT. They may seek and find acceptance and appreciation in radicalized groups, which seemingly offers them a mission and a powerful alternative and productive role. Lack of knowledge, trust and understanding fuels hate and extremism (Precht, 2007). This call for creating an enabling environment and opportunities for youth to participate and engage voluntarily and freely in public life and in the promotion of human rights, tolerance, non-discrimination, dialogue, mutual respect and understanding, and to facilitate their access to social services

On the other hand, Briggs (2010) points out that youth can enhance international co-operation and public-private partnerships to develop practical measures to counter the use of the Internet and other means for the purposes of inciting violent extremism. Such international co-operation and public-private partnerships could foster communication efforts, including via social media, to counter violent extremist messaging, while fully respecting the right to freedom of opinion and expression. According to Kristin and Tindall (2007), supporting youth-led and

youth-focused awareness-raising initiatives, including through the Internet and social media, can prevent and counter their radicalization to terrorism, and promote respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, tolerance and non-discrimination.

Radicalization of youth is becoming one of the most important threats of transnational terrorism in the world today. According to Bizina and Gray (2014), socially isolated, disenchanting young men turn to extremism in their search for identity, acceptance and purpose. On the same note, Kristin and Woehrel (2005) point out that radicalization of youth especially in Western Europe and North America is becoming one of the most important threats of transnational terrorism in the world today. In this situation, the implication for counter-terrorism policy is the difficulty of identifying and intercepting terrorists. For Kenya and Somalia, the situation is further exacerbated by state weakness in the case of Somalia, and ethnic minority grievances; the population's opinion in regards to the foreign policy of their government, which can be seen as the motivational point for joining the jihad by young members of the society. Benraad (2009) asserts that a comprehensive approach to the problem of radicalization could be most effective for successful counter-terrorism policy, and as such should include youth engagement to prevent radicalization and highlight the understanding of the detrimental impact the individualistic society has on the development of the youth. It is crucial for law enforcement and social workers to build trust with local population, and be culturally sensitive to the community they serve, in order to correctly gauge potential for radicalization.

East Africa's burgeoning youth population is increasingly defining the region's security environment. Population growth over the past several decades has made East Africa one of the youngest regions in the world and is projected to continue. At the same time, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) remain active in the region and have extended their influence in a number of areas. Since the potential for East Africa's youth to serve as drivers of economic growth are apparent when comparing its demographic trends to other world regions, such as East Asia; the same youth can play a key role in counterradicalization. In South Korea, for example, the country's youth bulge was converted into a national asset through a blend of educational programs and youth-oriented services that prepared young people for jobs in a modern and globally connected economy (Bizinam & Gray, 2014). However, most East African countries have not conducted sufficient government planning, attracted adequate amounts of private sector investment, or fostered the social awareness necessary to convert these demographic trends into national advantages, or even to properly accommodate their current and future young citizens.

Youth can seek a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. Young men frequently convey a longing for adventure, glory, and heroic or iconic status, and search for outlets that enable them to break from convention. Leiken (2008) suggest the need for governments to encourage the celebration of local cultural diversity and establish centers to ensure youth participation in cultural activities, social clubs and professional and sports organizations. Furthermore, Leiken (2008) supports the promotion of greater inter-national and inter-religious interaction among the youth. Nevertheless, Kenya's challenge emanates from alienation; for example where Somali communities still feel vulnerable to

government crackdowns, particularly in the case of further strikes by Al Shabaab on Kenyan soil.

Another important factor to consider is the role of social networks in the process of radicalization. “Social links are key to the dynamics of terror networks” (Sageman, 2004). However, Benraad (2009) asserts that group phenomenon is a strong factor in creating such network, because the potential jihadists were close friends or relatives when joining terrorist network and have done so not individually but as a group. Since many youth enter the circles of radicals after the society rejected them by finding virtual networks online, or in youth clubs and places of worship; youth can play key role in combating radicalization, going hand in hand with addressing the need to fight relative deprivation and alienation. Youth could encourage educational initiatives and other measures to promote tolerance and non-discrimination, non-violence, and to raise public awareness of, and counter xenophobic stereotypes, intolerance and discrimination, as part of efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism.

Kepel (2010) points out that in the wake of Arab spring, radicalization will increase as many youths see this as their opportunity to shine and to belong and to make a difference. In light of these developments, Benraad (2009) suggests that in the international arena counter-terrorism agencies should cooperate fully with local law enforcement as well as with their counterparts in foreign countries in order to slow down the process of radicalization. Unfortunately, in the context of Kenya-Somalia, and many other states, bureaucratic processes and geopolitical goals of various countries do not allow for swift reorganization of various

agencies and their increased cooperation with local communities, especially youth; thus leaving open the dilemma of youth radicalization.

Precht (2007) points out that in order to effectively commit to the elimination of VERLT, it is crucial to invest more in prevention measures targeting young people, while including them in shaping of such measures. Similarly, Leiken (2008) asserts that cooperation and work toward mutual values of peace and stability can pave the way for long-term change. Without the participation of youth, the protection of youth is not as certain. Briggs (2010) adds to this and emphasizes that comprehensive human right education is one of the tools to tackle radicalization. However, taking into account psychological factors behind sliding into destructive behaviors, emotional and social literacy are also crucial factors in early empowerment of the young generation and in strengthening their capacity to make sane choices for themselves and society in general.

On the same note, Biggs (2010) further notes that protecting youth from violent radicalization and extremism and combating terrorism in general is a task for all participating States, which requires a multidimensional approach, involvement of all stakeholders in society and cooperation and further research in order to develop feasible and effective prevention measures. The counterradicalization programs implemented in Western countries differ greatly from one another in terms of aims, budget, and underlying philosophy. Since each experience is deeply shaped by political, cultural, and legal elements unique to that country; the experience points to certain key characteristics and challenges common to all counterradicalization programs. Given the apparent increase in youth involvement in terrorist organizations, and the changing demographics of those involved or

implicated, it is necessary to promote awareness that young persons are susceptible to terrorist recruitment and radicalization between Kenya and Somalia.

#### **2.4.7.2 Community-Based Approached as a Counterradicalization Strategy**

At the global level, Ramirez (2008) points out that counterterrorism and counterradicalization requires a detailed and sophisticated understanding of individual and community dynamics and how these relate to the wider social context. However, Jackson (2005) asserts that within security policies and strategies tackling Al Qaeda-linked terrorism in the UK, there are significant tensions between approaches that emphasize community cohesion and those that emphasize liberal freedoms associated with liberal democracy. The former can problematize Muslim identities as a whole; for Islamic ideology here is portrayed as dangerous and in conflict with western values (Jackson, 2005) and so Muslims are viewed as not integrating with wider British society. The need to acknowledge and address the risks to communities as well as state agencies highlights the fundamental connection between state and community security; which resonates with the current shift to security-based diplomacy that Kenya and Somalia face in the context of managing transnational terrorism

Spalek (2015) points out four reasons why governments need to put communities at the heart of counterradicalization approaches. First, they offer important sources of information and intelligence: This is especially important against a group such as al Qaida, which is willing to inflict mass carnage with no warning whatsoever. Second, communities picking up these signs are best placed to act pre-emptively to divert their young people from extremism: the self-policing



society. Third, while the state must also play a role, communities must take the lead in tackling problems that either create grievances or hinder their ability to organize, such as poverty, poor educational and employment attainment, and the paucity of effective leadership and representation. Within security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism, the security service cannot act without the consent of the communities they are there to protect (Spalek, 2015).

Briggs and Fieschi (2014) argue that a community-based approach to counter-radicalization and counterterrorism must be locally based and recognize and respond to the differences within the Muslim community, which is far from homogenous. Furthermore, it needs to be rooted in an understanding of faith, without which it is easy for government and security forces to misread the signs within the community (Briggs & Fieschi, 2014). Nonetheless, Spalek (2015) observes that communities with a strong and rich infrastructure are more resilient and better equipped to deal with internal problems. In theoretical perspective, the social-movement approach to Islamic activism stays deep within the recesses of the rise of transnational terrorism. To be clear, social movement theory can provide valuable and instructive insights into how groups form and behave, but as a unitary and all-encompassing lens through which to view Islamic terrorism and extremism. Therefore, a community-based approach can offer a deeply influential strategy on counter-terrorism policy between Kenya and Somalia.

Mirahmadi and Farooq (2010) provide a good example of the Dutch government's approach moves beyond a strictly law enforcement approach to one that involves broader community engagement, particularly with local imams. The

Netherlands created “information houses” that local community members can turn to, to report and seek guidance on specific at-risk individuals. The information house acts as a liaison between the law enforcement agencies and the community. They attempt to address most conflicts at the local level before the law enforcement officials are involved (Mirahmadi & Farooq, 2010).

On the same note, Jacobson (2010) asserts that the Saudi government pursues a community and family-level approach which focuses on radicalized individuals who have not yet taken violent actions. Once an individual is apprehended, imams and religious clerics are involved in providing religious re-education. In addition, the Saudis offer various incentives to former detainees and their families to try to keep them from reverting to radicalism, including assistance in finding a job, helping a spouse and providing financial or housing assistance (Jacobson, 2010). Although the program forces the individual to renounce violence, it does not necessarily change the underlying cause for what motivated the violence in the first place: the radical ideology.

According to Nawaz, and Husain (2010), the UK’s national counter-radicalization strategy, PREVENT, involves a bottom-up approach that brings together local moderate Muslim networks and law enforcement authorities to work at the regional and district level to counter-radicalization. The PREVENT plan involves raising an awareness of Islamic radicalization within Muslim and non-Muslim communities (particularly focusing on at-risk youth), establishing a broad network of Muslims from across the country from different ethnic backgrounds, and establishing and strengthening existing organizations that can counter radical

Islamist narratives. In addition, the program funds local organizations that can provide youth with civic education, and channel youth energy towards positive activities such as volunteering, sports and the arts (Nawaz & Husain, 2010).

On the same note, Maher and Frampton (2009) point out that to date, the British government has funded a number of projects such as the “Ambassadors for Islam” project which provide young Muslims with “theological arguments to counter extremist ideologies, to dispel misapprehensions and develop their role as citizens, leaders and positive role models, so that they can become ‘ambassadors’ for mainstream Islam and assert their British identity.” De-radicalization resources were created by local partners based on the Quran and prophetic traditions that focused on encouraging respect, tolerance, harmony and a positive role in the community. In order to teach civic engagement, the government invested in the development of citizenship teaching materials for Islamic schools across the country. Moreover, they strengthened the moderate Muslim voice with leadership and communications training through “Continuous Professional Development Programs” for faith leaders and workers (Nawaz & Husain, 2010). While the UK PREVENT program is a good model that works with a broad spectrum of Muslim voices, existing frameworks in the local context of Kenya and Somalia reveal challenges relating to mainstream Muslims and hard-line Islamist groups. Nevertheless, the lesson to be gained from the UK experience is that community level work with Muslim groups will require a better understanding of the difference between the Islam practiced by millions of moderate, mainstream Muslims and those who ascribe to radical ideologies.

### **2.4.7.3 Role of Women in Counterradicalization**

The roles of women in international peace and security efforts have been underscored by the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 in 2000 and subsequent thematic resolutions on women, peace, and security issues (Couture (2014)). The roles of women as they relate to terrorism and counterterrorism issues, however, have remained less explored by policymakers and international counterterrorism actors. Over the recent years, the United Nation's work to combat global terrorism has expanded dramatically (Majoran, 2015). Through the initiatives of the General Assembly and Security Council, Majoran (2015) further points out that a complex institutional architecture has formed that draws on the expertise of a range of UN entities and brings a new range of actors into the focus of counterterrorism work. Couture (2014) adds that the strategy, adopted unanimously by UN member states, offers a comprehensive plan to combat terrorism. It calls on actors engaged in development, education, human rights, security, and capacity building at the UN to join together in addressing this common threat. In a first for the Counter-Terrorism Committee, the Security Council body holds open briefing on the role of women in countering terrorism and violent extremism (Couture, 2014). However, despite the growing awareness of women playing an important role in terrorism and violent extremism, the potential for women to act as a vital resource in policy and planning on countering violent extremism (CVE) has traditionally remained largely untapped.

A more recent Security Council resolution, 2178 (2014) on stemming the flow of foreign terrorist fighters, encourages Member States to engage relevant local communities in developing strategies to counter the violent extremist narrative

that can incite terrorist acts and address the conditions conducive to the spread of violent extremism, which can be conducive to terrorism, including by empowering inter alia youth, families, and women (Majoran, 2015). But Carter (2013) points out that until recently, terrorism has been viewed predominantly as a male problem. In reality, women have been specifically targeted for terrorist radicalization and taken up action in violent extremist groups. Women are also key to counter-terrorism efforts. Women play crucial roles in families, communities, educational institutions, law enforcement agencies and the broader public sector, and can bring important unique perspectives to understanding and countering violent extremism and terrorist radicalization (Carter, 2013). As states shift from a diplomacy-based to security-based approach regarding terrorism and violent extremism, the need for a more comprehensive multi-stakeholder approach to addressing these challenges has become apparent. Yet, little attention has been paid to integrating a gender dimension into many national efforts to address the problems of terrorism and violent extremism.

In the last few years, some counter-terrorism initiatives have begun to recognize that only through a gender-sensitive and human rights compliant approach can counter-terrorism measures become sustainable and effective. These initiatives take into account how violent extremism, terrorism and counter-terrorism impact differently on women and men. According to Fink and Barakat (2015), with regard to the women now joining the fight in Syria, particularly with ISIS but also other extremist groups, the UAE-based think-tank Hedayah indicated that women and young girls have been recruited primarily through social media and for some, the notion of marriage is an important factor. Although the estimated number of foreign women who have joined ISIS is only 10% of the total Western men

fighting, it is still significant that women are joining an organization that a majority of the world deems oppressive towards women and extraordinarily violent (Fink & Barakat, 2015).

On the other hand, Majoran (2015) observes that terrorism eradication efforts have long been considered the exclusive purview of men. This comes from the assumption that terrorism, like war and violence, is primarily the preview of men. However, certain groups today involve women in terrorist activities, as seen with the group Boko Haram and the Pakistani Taliban. Given this background, it follows that women's participation in various fields, including combat, counterterrorism, and conflict resolution can bring better results. Despite their demonstrated potential, the capacity of women in the peace-building field remains underdeveloped. The susceptibility of women to radical religious indoctrination demonstrates the importance of mainstream religious training of women as an often overlooked preventative strategy in countering violent extremist narratives.

Women can also be valuable agents in the peace process. Lierde (2012) cites the Liberian Peace Movement as one example. The movement mobilized thousands of women protesters against the Liberian civil war, employing acts of silence, advocating against violence and even denying men sexual relations. This movement contributed to the civil war's end in 2003 (Lierde, 2012). Considering these measures, women can be engaged in counterterrorism activities in a variety of ways. Usmita (2012) points out that as mothers, and in their traditional status, women have important roles within the family, particularly in children's character formation. Similarly, Verveer and Benjamin (2012) add that in the community, women have a great impact on and access to community information. They

further note that women also possess diverse perspectives that can be applied to problem solving and can complement the work of men. As seen in cases listed above, women's deployment as main agents for conflict resolution promises enhanced results. These roles can be applied to their involvement in anti-terrorism task forces, law enforcement, and decision making processes. In areas where women are not viewed as family and community authorities, Couture (2014) suggests that they must be equipped with the necessary knowledge and self-awareness to become active in the prevention of extremism in the security arena. In order to ensure women as mothers and wives in these areas are given the necessary tools to become agents for change, governments and charitable organizations must step in.

Devasahayam (2009) points out that as a field of policy and practice, countering violent extremism (CVE) has emerged rapidly in recent years and represents the most significant development in counterterrorism over that time. But Steven and Gunaratn (2004) argue that ideologically driven violent extremists are a primary threat to national and human security in the developed and developing worlds, suggesting that, in some form or other, CVE will remain on the counterterrorism agenda in the short and medium terms. According to Couture (2014), radicalization processes follow different and non-linear paths and the conditions conducive to it vary from one individual to another. Therefore, understanding a given instance of radicalization requires taking into account the specific contextual and personal factors at play, including historical, political, socio-economic and psychological considerations. Couture (2014) points out that governments, civil society and international organizations should re-assert and be

guided by the principle that terrorism should not be associated with any particular religion, culture, race or ethnicity. Governments should also respond in a balanced and proportionate manner to terrorist threats inspired by various ideologies to avoid focusing disproportionately on certain groups.

Devasahayam (2009) observes that as violent extremism and terrorist radicalization are still often considered a male issue, the question of women terrorist radicalization is characterized by bias and misconceptions. Conversely, Lierde (2012) points out that in situations of conflict and violence, women are often seen as passive, victims, helpless, subordinate and maternal. Such assumptions reinforce gender stereotypes. As a result, women are neither considered to be potential terrorists, nor perceived to be as dangerous as their male counterparts if they were to be involved in terrorism. Usmita (2012) suggests that in order to effectively engage with women in their communities, governments should strive to better interact with small women's organizations at grassroots level rather than partner with often self-proclaimed community leaders or large, well-established organizations only. Usmita (2012) adds that raising women's awareness and understanding of VERLT is necessary for them to be able to stand up against it. However, defining early warning signs of this process is difficult practically. As there is no single pathway to radicalization and no single terrorist profile, there can be no set of easy-to-identify, specific and definitive benchmarks. While further research is needed into the roles that women play as perpetrators of terrorism, and particularly what motivates them, it is recognized that women can play a critical role in preventing and countering radicalization. In particular, given women's central role in families and in



communities, they are uniquely positioned to intervene in the radicalization of their children since they are most likely to spot changes in their children's behavior, but may not have the confidence or access to police to share these concerns

In the field of counterterrorism, Verveer and Benjamin (2012) point out that women participate primarily in preventing terrorism through anti-extremism and anti-violence campaigns. Non-governmental organizations and religious women's organizations are the main actors. Organizations like Women Without Borders (WWB) and Sisters Against Violent Extremism (SAVE) are anti-terror platforms tailored exclusively for women, encouraging them to use their powerful roles as mothers and wives to deter violent terrorist activities and radicalization. Despite policymakers' efforts to address violent extremism, uncoordinated and gender-insensitive responses have left marginalized communities wanting for services and, paradoxically, in some cases, more prone to radicalization. For instance, the lack of an organized, local first-response system following terrorist attacks has left many communities unsure of where and how to seek help, and from whom (Verveer & Benjamin, 2012).

According to Couture (2014), women have been involved in counterterrorism effort in many countries, directly or indirectly; among these are Bangladesh, Morocco, Indonesia and Pakistan. In Indonesia, there are two Muslim women's groups Fatayat NU and Aisyiyah that are wings of Indonesia's two largest Muslim organizations. Fatayat NU is a wing of Nahdlatul Ulama and focuses on empowering Muslim women. In the field of counterterrorism, Fatayat NU has

cooperated with the government to hold national seminars, forums, and workshops (Wulan, 2014). In many cases, engaging women in counterterrorism strategies have yielded positive results. Involvement can grow in all sectors, to include economic empowerment, family education, religion, law enforcement, and community based information and early detection. Based on an understanding that terrorism is rooted in poverty, Bangladesh emphasized economic development. Women are selected as empowering agents within several programs: micro-credit and micro-lending for women; the inclusion of women in the garment industry, and the improvement of education and learning opportunities equation for girls (Couture, 2014). These initiatives provide an opportunity for women to work and enhance their roles household decision-making processes.

On the other hand, Bangladesh government's prioritization of female education has positively impacted women's bargaining position within society and economic resources. In part, this has been achieved through controlling their age of marriage and reduction of radical thinking. Such programs within Bangladesh have successfully reduced the number of terrorist incidents. For example, since 2005, Bangladesh has not experienced a significant terrorist attack. Counterterrorism strategies in Morocco focus on spreading moderate teaching that opposes the spread of radicalism. Women are actively involved as religious preachers.. To create religious preachers, the government has trained and educated women to facilitate a more moderate understanding of religion (Couture, 2014). These women are employed in the community, mosques, and prisons in Rabat and Casablanca. In 2005, the government gave preaching certificates to 50 women; this number increased by 1,000 percent in 2014. Meanwhile, the

Moroccan government has also increased the position and role of women in the household with a formal law that includes equal status for women, the ability to initiate divorce, and the right of equal inheritance. This has resulted in decreasing terrorist acts in Morocco, which currently ranks at less than 1 percent per year and has had no terrorist attacks since 2011. These cases represent successes of women engaged in counterterrorism (Couture, 2014). These cases possess similarities in increasing women's rights and opportunities to compete. In the context of Kenya-Somalia relations and management of transnational terrorism, it is imperative to reshape and foster the mindset of women to actively engage in counterterrorism.

In conclusion, it is evident that women hold a very important role in the future of countering violent extremism, and excluding women from community based de-radicalization efforts is counterintuitive. Globally, women as mothers and wives possess the ability to inspire positive change within families and in their communities. Professionally, much has been done to ensure that women and men are seen as equals, and although there is still a long way to go to achieve complete equality in this respect, the progress made over the last decade has been astounding. It is imperative that governments and international organizations work to include women not just professionally in security policy, but to engage and inspire women as mothers and wives. These actions have the potential to promote safe and healthy communities by countering extremist ideologies, especially in at-risk communities, and in societies where women as mothers and wives are not viewed as figures of community and family authority.

#### **2.4.7.4 The Role of Civil Society in Counterradicalization**

Since 11 September 2001, terrorism and the reaction to it by many governments and intergovernmental bodies, including the United Nations, have had an increasing impact on civil society (Rosand & Millar, 2008). According to Rosand and Millar (2008), non-governmental and other civil society organizations (CSOs) have played a critical role in encouraging governments and the United Nations to calibrate their response to terrorism by working to be effective against those who mean harm without eroding human rights and the rule of law. In 2006, with that challenge in mind, Harrison (2006) points out that the United Nations General Assembly unanimously agreed to a global strategy that outlines a holistic approach to countering terrorism and calls for the collective effort of an array of stakeholders, including civil society, to implement it. Indeed, some governments recognize that civil society organizations are critical players in the design and implementation of any effective long-term strategy to address terrorism and counterradicalization. Nevertheless, the extent to which governments seek to engage civil society organizations in their counterterrorism efforts and perhaps even to co-opt them still differs. At the international level, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly, for instance, in its resolution adopting the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8 September 2006, affirmed the determination of Member States to “further encourage non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy Rosand & Millar, 2008),

Keane (2001) defines civil society to consist of groups and organizations, both formal and informal, which act independent of the state and market to promote diverse interests in society. According to Keane (2001), civil society represents

self-generating, self-supporting, state-independent organizations that allow citizens to act collectively in the public sphere to express their interests. Kumar (2001) on the other hand observes that civil society foster citizen participation and civic education. They provide leadership training for young people who want to engage in civic life but are uninterested in working through political parties (Kumar, 2001). In light of this, Chandhoke (2002) suggests that civil society in this sense is an arena in which modern man not only legitimately gratifies his self-interest and develops his individuality, but also learns the value of group action, social solidarity, and the dependence of his welfare on others, which educate him for citizenship and prepare him for participation in the political arena of the state. Ideally, on matter of security and transnational terrorism, civil society can provide a platform to masses so that they may initiate action for redressal of their grievances. In light of the Kenya-Somalia security situation, the civil society, through redressing the grievances and empowering voice, can assist in fostering a just and accountable democracy that is its true spirit.

Scholte (2001) points out that civil society often does play a valuable role in helping advance democracy. It provides a normative basis for legitimating democratic rule. It can discipline the state, ensure that citizens' interests are taken seriously, and foster greater civic and political participation. Moreover, Cheema (2011) asserts that the core problems of poverty, lack of representation, inequality, and attendant violence, corruption, and polarization require complex and long-term solutions, which must be based on strengthening fundamental elements and principles in societies across the region. Among these elements is the need for information and ideas that provide citizens, politicians, and policy makers with a common basis for informed discussion and decision making

(Cheeem, 2011). Furthermore, Paffenholz (2009) points out that there is a need for heightened transparency and accountability in government activity to ensure that these shared visions are being implemented by elected officials. In all these respects, civil society provides a way to enhance public participation, consultation, transparency, and accountability that may foster democratic governance.

One of the important contributions of civil society in the arena of democracy is its mass awareness activity. An effective democracy requires informed citizens to be aware about their governance system. According to Scholte (2001), civil society organization is capable of conscientizing masses through various means like publication of handbooks, information booklets, organizing seminar and workshops, spreading information through curricular materials in educational institutions, advocating certain policy issues through mass media, and so on. As such, on matter of terrorist radicalization, civil society educates the people about their rights and responsibilities, consequences of certain policies on their lives, and strategy of government authorities behind any agreement or treaty. Cheeem (2011) adds that civil society can play a role of making the elite and general masses more committed to democracy through disseminating democratic principles and ideas. As such, civil society brings access to information, transparency, and consultation in decision-making process that ensures that interests of those excluded people may be addressed by policy makers.

The concept of new social movement's theory consists of three main parts being "a group of people with a conflictual orientation towards an opponent, a collective identity and a set of common beliefs and goals, and a repertoire of collective actions" (Kriesi, 2011). With emerging trends of terrorist radicalization

in Kenya and Somalia, civil society may assist in bridging gaps between various groups and garner social and political consensus among masses. Scholte (2001) argues that civil society acts as a public forum for reviewing various decisions of the government; they initiate a process of provoking masses for dialogues in case certain policies are arbitrary (Scolte, 2001). Through this strategy, the civil society becomes successful in strengthening democracy and linking a grass-root individual with decision makers which can enhance counterradicalization efforts. According to Harris (2001), civil society develops and helps in imparting conflict resolution strategies. Indonesia has been a crucial example for exhibiting role of civil society in counterradicalization (Lowry, 2008). They also emerged as “watchdog” of governance and almost all aspects of state started to be monitored by them (Lowry, 2008). In India, the civil society organizations have been quite instrumental in social service and in strengthening people’s power to promote just and democratic governance. Civil societies are being called on to play increasingly important roles in development efforts.

Harrison (2006) points out that civil society can help to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable peoples, including victims of terrorism, and provide a constructive outlet for the redress of grievances. Cheema (2011) add that they have important roles to play in activism, education, research, oversight, and even as potential assistance and service providers. He asserts that they can also play a critical role in ensuring that counterterrorism measures (CTMs) respect human rights and the rule of law, and help generate awareness of a range of other Strategy-related issues however, Rosand and Millar (2008) argue that although civil society are undertaking an array of activities that both directly and indirectly contribute to implementation of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN

Strategy), often they receive little or no acknowledgement that those efforts contribute to implementation of the Strategy or even combating terrorism generally.

On matters of counterradicalization, Rosand and Millar (2008) point out that civil society are helping to build networks of moderate Muslim leaders by working with religious, education, government, and media leaders on projects aimed at promoting a pluralistic, tolerant Islam. For example, one civil society in Indonesian partnered with popular music star to create an album promoting Islam as a religion of peace. Rosand and Millar (2008) emphasize that this work is an important contribution to efforts to counter distortions of Islam being propagated by terrorists and discredit the notion that Islam or any other religion justifies terrorism. On the same note, Cheema (2011) notes that partnerships involving governments and civil society on important contributions of preventive counterterrorism and related efforts; for example, interaction between governments and civil society on the issue of small arms and light weapons has developed into an effective partnership in the United States. Conversely, while the importance of involving civil society in a comprehensive and multidimensional response to the threat of terrorism has been stressed by various international documents; it appears at the local level much remains to be done.

Harrison (2006) asserts that although civil society are sometimes seen as potential allies of the state in promoting development, good governance, and human rights and other issues that help prevent terrorism and other forms of violence, too often they have been viewed with suspicion because they might be working among marginalized populations or be perceived as supporting political opponents of sitting governments. The result is that governments are increasingly reluctant to



seek partnerships with CSOs (Harrison, 2006). Howell (2006) argues that rather than stimulating greater civil society support for government counterterrorism initiatives and “using social development and other ‘soft’ measures as a means of countering terrorism, civil society organizations are being pushed into a highly defensive position about carrying out social development work with marginalized groups.”

In addition, Rosand and Millar (2008) point out that civil society are growing increasingly cautious of their own association with governments as it might undermine their own legitimacy within constituencies and other vital partners. In light of the above, it is important for governments to make conscious and significant contributions to measures to prevent terrorism in the implementation and monitoring of security sector reform activities, which are linked to a state’s ability to carry out effective law enforcement and other security-related counterterrorism measures. Civil society can also play more specific roles by facilitating dialogue, monitoring the activities of the security forces, and expressing views on security policy as well as providing policy advice. This may be particularly useful where state capacity is weak as in Somalia, in the context of a security-based diplomacy approach in management of transnational terrorism.

Despite the progress civil society are making in counterradicalization and counterterrorism, their capacity shortages place a limit on the extent to which they can contribute to counterterrorism capacity-building efforts. In most cases, Kaldor and Darcy (2005) point out that civil society are themselves reliant on donors (be they philanthropic foundations, individuals, or donor states and multilateral

bodies) for resources, or are themselves recipients of capacity-building assistance. Therefore, the degree to which they can contribute to building the capacity of states to prevent terrorism is in large part dependent on the extent to which their donors make such efforts a priority. Despite these challenges, civil society can make substantial contributions to building the capacity of states to prevent terrorism not only in their more traditional roles as development partners and in promoting human rights and the rule of law, but also in the realm of security and prevention. Key to maximizing their potential, as Rosand and Millar (2008) point out, is raising awareness of the contributions that civil society can make to building states' capacity to prevent terrorist radicalization and terrorism; and ensuring that such work is given priority treatment by donors.

#### **2.4.7.5 Media and Counterradicalization**

This strategic shift toward a more preventive approach to counterterrorism, of which countering violent extremism (CVE) has become an increasingly prominent component, has broadened the scope of actors beyond those traditionally associated with counterterrorism/countering violent extremism (CT/CVE) efforts (Naureen, Karin & Barakat, 2013). As a result, policymakers have begun to consider new audiences, constituencies, and organizational actors whose work can inform, shape, and contribute to transnational terrorism prevention efforts. In these efforts, the Internet and the media have taken on roles of greater proportions (Naureen, et al., 2013). According to Hyklov (2010), violent extremist groups have used the media, and in particular platforms like the Internet, to link local narratives and grievances to global narratives, and to radicalize and mobilize supporters, consequently diminishing the need for direct

contact between potential attackers and a centralized terrorist organization or support facilities. However, the media is also a vital platform for challenging extremist narratives, through the provision of balanced information and alternative voices. As a professional body, the media can also help shape perceptions through reporting practices, thereby offering audiences a space for critical debate where extremist ideologies and groups can be challenged and delegitimized.

Globally, after the end of the war, the media received stringent criticism for the form and tone of the Iraq War coverage that was characterized as being rather propagandistic, holding the official line Bush administration was promoting (Hyklova, 2010). According to Hyklova (2010), the media failed to perform its watchdog role arising indirectly from the freedom of the press guaranteed by the United States Constitution. On the other hand Perl (2007) argues that the media today is not so “free” to critically report on such issues as war. Therefore, information strategy applied by the government focuses on the media as a powerful tool for forming public opinion. Media has played a significant role in Kenyan-Somalia context of counterterrorism and the security-based approach. The role of the media to scrutinize decisions made by governmental officials is particularly crucial in connection with national involvement in a military conflict.

Violent extremist groups have used the media, and in particular platforms like the Internet, to link local events and grievances to global narratives of conflict and intolerance, and to radicalize and mobilize supporters through targeted communications materials including online chat rooms, magazines, videos, and other publications that can be transmitted virtually (Senadhira, 2006). However,

the media is also a vital platform for challenging extremist narratives through the provision of balanced information and alternative voices. As a professional body, Perl (2007) points out that the media can also help shape perceptions through reporting practices, thereby offering audiences a space for critical debate, a space where extremist ideologies and groups can be challenged and delegitimized. For these reasons, Naureen, et al., (2013) suggest that efforts to develop CVE policies and practices have increasingly focused on the roles of the media. However, the potential role of the media to be a force in CT/CVE is closely tied to the perception of the media as a credible interlocutor, which is in turn associated with the standards of reporting and analysis (Naureen, et al., 2013). Therefore, ensuring space for the media to function independently is critical to its ability to be a trusted resource for analysis and information, the availability of which can limit extremists' abilities to hold a monopoly on framing narratives and to enhance recruitment.

In the age of global communication and international media the messengers of hate and terror are no longer impeded by national borders or regions; media can easily spread powerful words and images around the globe and condition impressionable men and women to be recruited into terrorist cells and networks (Nacos, 2006). However, Hyklov (2010) argues that international and domestic terrorists exploit the traditional and the new communication means to achieve a host of crucial objectives -most of all the media-dependent dissemination of their "propaganda of the deed" among friends and foes. Conversely, Bennett and Serrin (2009) point out that while the press has always been interested in reporting violence, the proliferation of television and radio channels and the emergence of mega-media organizations has resulted in greater competition and

insatiable appetites for shocking, sensational infotainment that is believed to keep audiences captivated and boost ratings, circulation, and, most importantly, increase profits. Few, perhaps no other events fulfill the requirements of gripping infotainment more than acts of terrorism and the plight of terrorist victims. To be sure, the most fundamental function of the free press is its responsibility to fully inform the public (Bennett & Serrin, 2009).

Just as terrorists utilize and exploit the domestic and international triangles of political communication, government officials as well take advantage of this form of mass communication while displaying less expertise than terrorist groups in using the Internet for their purposes (Perl, 2007). Indeed, Bennett and Serrin (2009) argue that whereas terrorists must resort to violence or make credible threats to be admitted to the triangle of political communication by the gatekeepers of the traditional media, highly placed public officials do not have to unleash violence to gain such access because they form one corner of the domestic communication triangle and are part of the international triangular communication linkages as well. From this position of strength governmental sources tend to dominate reporting on foreign and security policy especially when this involves military conflict or the likelihood of military deployment (Bennett & Serrin, 2009). Because of its capacity to relay information, frame narratives, shape public opinion, and inform both politics and policy-making, the media is a critical vehicle to convey ideas that legitimize or delegitimize terrorists to potential supporters and recruits.

The transnational nature of contemporary terrorism and its dependence on a compelling narrative that not only radicalizes but mobilizes that is, can move individuals from passive support to operational action makes the media essential for both terrorists and their opponents (Hyklov, 2010). It is therefore unsurprising that efforts to address violent extremism have centered to a large extent on the role of the media, both as a tool or platform as well as a professional community. According to Senadhira (2006), the content and polish of products demonstrate the importance placed on outreach to a wide group of current and potential supporters. For counterterrorism practitioners, the media has been a means of information and data collection about individuals, groups, and ideologies (Perl, 2007). To some extent, Nacos, 2006) adds that many states and organizations engaged in CVE issues have developed programs to directly engage users in extremist for a and attempted to delegitimize or challenge their narratives and ideas, or offer a compelling alternative. However, Perl, (2007) points out that governments and international organizations constrained by bureaucratic protocols and departmental silos have often struggled to catch up to the speed with which some terrorist groups are able to produce and disseminate audience-specific messages and narratives. Perl (2007) further argues that the advent of new communication technologies and social media has empowered consumers to demand coverage of certain stories, contribute to news reporting, or influence and be influenced by the media.

Media organizations and personalities are accessible through “comment” or “have your say” sections and through Facebook or Twitter accounts; individuals can share their own perspectives, images, and experiences more directly than ever

before. On the same note, Naureen, et al., (2013) point out those CVE practitioners have therefore sought to engage the media in trying to develop and disseminate narratives and information to counter those put out by extremists. Thus, even though some media professionals have been reluctant to be associated with CVE or any formalized guidelines that impinge on their freedoms, there has been increasing recognition among them of the role they can play in substantiating or contradicting extremist narratives and messaging. Radicalization is a grave threat to Kenya-Somalia security and stability. Therefore, formulating and executing sound counter-radicalization and de-radicalization policies before it is too late must be a priority. This is why the current study examined the influence of state-centric terrorist radicalization in management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

## **2.5 Intelligence Sharing and Management of Transnational Terrorism**

The threat of transnational terrorism has significantly altered international intelligence sharing. Though terrorism is by no means a new threat, the scope and global reach of terrorist networks like al Qaeda leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks has placed intelligence at the forefront of the war on terrorism (McGill, 2012). The crucial need, in relation to the States in the regions from which terrorists originate, is to address not only their capacity but their will to fight terror; but also intelligence -sharing, where possible; denial and interdiction, when required; and financial controls; building State capacity to prevent terrorist recruitment and operations (McGill, 2012). Despite the efforts made, the inability to deter a potential terrorist threat, the immediacy of today's threats and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by terrorists call

for intelligence cooperation among and between states. The current study sought to assess the contribution intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

### **2.5.1 Contribution of Intelligence Sharing in Counter-Terrorism**

In his article “Old Allies and New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror”, Derek Reveron states “the war on terror requires high levels of intelligence to identify a threat relative to the amount of force required to neutralize it” as opposed to the Cold War where the opposite was true. As a result, intelligence is the cornerstone of effective counterterrorism operations in the post 9/11 world. As a result, a greater focus has been placed on intelligence which allows nations to predict the otherwise unpredictable. However, there are significant challenges in expanding counterterrorism (CT) networks to the extent demanded by global terrorism (McGill & Gray, 2012). Despite the efforts, the polarizing tendencies of intelligence failures that accompanied the September 11, 2001 attacks (Ozzie, 2013) demonstrate a vital need to reform how government agencies interact and share information with one another.

The recent attacks at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Lamu and Mandera demonstrate that there were some clear deficiencies with the organization of Kenya’s counterterrorism intelligence community. Although studies highlighted above indicate the role of intelligence sharing in counterterrorism; yet what is known about this area remains limited in scope compared to what might be discovered with adequate research, especially in the context of security-based diplomacy influencing the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and



Somalia. While it has been found out that strong intelligence systems yield significant increase in police performance and counterterrorism efforts, it is not clear in the context of Kenya-Somalia.

Though terrorism is by no means a new threat, the scope and global reach of terrorist networks like al Qaeda leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks has placed intelligence at the forefront of the war on terrorism (Walsh, 2006). Unlike traditional wars where the enemy was identifiable, easy to locate, and largely predictable, terrorist networks are flexible, highly mobile, and are not constrained by international laws (McGill & Gray, 2012). As a result, Walsh (2006) points out that a greater focus has been placed on intelligence which allows nations to predict the otherwise unpredictable. However, there are significant challenges in expanding counterterrorism (CT) networks to the extent demanded by global terrorism. This study examined intelligence sharing role in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

The failure of the U.S. Intelligence Community to provide better warning of the September 11, 2001, attacks has been widely attributed to the existence of “walls” between intelligence and law enforcement agencies (Best, 2007). The walls arguably kept analysts from talking to each other and from sharing pieces of information that, if they had been viewed in close relationship, might have yielded a coherent picture of the emerging plot. According to McGill and Gray (2012), this theory cannot of course be fully proven the overall plot might not have been discerned even if the best analysts had had access to all available information in every agency. Nevertheless, the fact that available data had not in fact been shared focused public and congressional attention on the real or

perceived walls that inhibited the exchange of information among agencies. Best (2007) states that: within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11 terrorist attack in the US. This breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies' missions, legal authorities and cultures. Information was not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. For Kenya and Somalia which are being subjected to a steadily expanding arc of terrorist actions, intelligence sharing is key.

According to McGill and Gray (2012), the importance of sharing intelligence and law enforcement information is not limited to issues relating to transnational terrorism but extends to banking fraud, narcotics smuggling, and a variety of international concerns (Walsh, 2006). However, Best (2007) notes that terrorism, of course, is uniquely threatening and in combating terrorists more vigorous non-law enforcement approaches are considered more legitimate than is the case with drug smugglers or embezzlers. What is advantageous in all cases is assembling the full range of information about the activity and subjecting it to rigorous analysis.

There is, however, the possibility that the current consensus may unravel. The political controversy surrounding electronic surveillance efforts and other data mining programs may come to focus on the sharing of information that some argue was not lawfully obtained, and this concern could lead to efforts to restrict information sharing across the boards. There is also a possibility that the use of

information obtained by surveillance might ultimately not be allowed. Despite the widespread acceptance of the need for information sharing, concerns that sharing information could lead to governmental abuses persists across the political spectrum. These concerns are tenaciously held, and have in the past made legislating very controversial (Best 2007:9).

The potential threat to civil liberties does not, of course, represent the full extent of the issues raised by increased information sharing. Sharing sensitive information inevitably raises the danger that intelligence sources and methods may be compromised either accidentally or purposefully. For intelligence professionals, in particular, the danger to valuable sources that may have taken years to develop is a fundamental concern. Moreover, when a human source is compromised there is not only a danger to a particular individual, but also a potential loss of confidence in a country's intelligence agencies by other actual or potential sources (Walsh, 2006). Erwin (2013) argues that making cooperation effective presents substantial leadership and managerial challenges. However, Miller (2013) asserts that the needs of diverse intelligence "consumers" must all be met, using many of the same systems and personnel. Nevertheless, broader questions have also been raised about whether intelligence agencies have become too focused on counterterrorism to the detriment of other national security priorities and whether some of those functions should be transitioned to military control, allowing intelligence agencies to focus on traditional collection and analysis (Miller, 2013).

### **2.5.2 Possible Deficiencies in Intelligence Sharing**

Many arguments have been posited as the main causes of failure within the intelligence community by the three main schools of thought: the orthodox school, the intelligence reformist school and the Central Intelligence Agency critics' school. Dahl argues that in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, three main schools of thought have emerged to explain the intelligence community's failure to significantly impact the threat posed by terrorism (Dahl, 2010). This section reviews each of these schools of thought, and considers what the analysis of each school would imply for the management of transnational terrorism in Kenya and Somali

The Orthodox School proponents adopt a very pessimistic approach, arguing that intelligence failures are bound to happen and that nothing can be done to prevent their occurrence as they are difficult to predict. They advocate that the best course of action is to develop plans to deal with the effects of terrorist attacks. They claim that surprise attacks are more likely if those responsible for decision making in the fight against terrorism disregard the warnings of the intelligence community. However, they admit that there is fierce competition for the attention of policy makers, in the massive amount of intelligence about a wide range of threats, as well as between such threats and other pressing policy issues. When there is a multitude of dots, the number of ways to connect the dots increases, adding more complexity to already complex issues (Dahl, 2010). This school of thought offers few lessons that can be used in the establishment of counterterrorism measures in Kenya. The goal of the new measures to prevent terrorist attacks wherever possible. Because the orthodox school believes that

prevention is very difficult, governments must look elsewhere for useful advice and suggestions for accomplishing a mission of prevention.

The Intelligence Reformist School is less pessimistic than their orthodox counterparts. They claim that failures occur because of the lack of communication between agencies of the intelligence community, and this lack of communication is due to organizational structure. Zegart (2011) argues that counterterrorism efforts are less effective when there is no central mechanism with a common strategy to coordinate agencies that are often scattered and underfunded. The intelligence reformist school argues that the analytical processing of information is not assigned enough importance, and the imagination to make sense of information already at hand is lacking. In this context, Dahl argues that very often too much emphasis is laid on developing tactical level intelligence which is not adequate for generating the strategic- level intelligence assessments required by current threat (Dahl, 2010). This school of thought suggests that interagency cooperation and coordination among agencies, as well as in-depth analysis of information, are important factors that the Kenya and Somalia governments could consider to support their ability to collect information and produce actionable intelligence in the management of transnational terrorism.

The Central Intelligence Agency Critics' School was developed and named following scholarly analysis of the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency in the September 9/11 attacks. It argues that the success of terrorist attacks can be attributed to inadequate strategies for dealing with a phenomenon unlike the type of threat we were used to in the past (Dahl, 2010). As a remedy to

this problem, Jenkins (2003) supports building up the institutional intelligence capabilities of the intelligence community to collect information, and argues that more focus should be put on human intelligence and intelligence units at the local level. The lessons from this school of thought for Kenya and Somalia are very enriching. From this perspective, it is worthwhile for the governments to consider using or tapping into the security agencies' existing information collection network as a strategy to manage transnational terrorism.

Mutual trust is fundamental in international relations and critical in intelligence sharing. Sharing sensitive information also exposes nations to a certain degree of vulnerability, whether it is an outed source, a blown operation, or a threat to national interests. Furthermore, the receiver of intelligence must be able to trust the validity of the intelligence it is given or else it is useless unless corroborated by a third party (Rees & Aldrich, 2005). According to Walsh (2006), “trust exists when the interests of a first actor are ‘encapsulated’ in or congruent with the interests of a second actor” (Walsh, 2006). While this trust is more readily found amongst traditional allies who have supported and defended the US and share many political and cultural values, and through their democratic institutions or common histories, it is far more scarce and thinly developed amongst new allies. Saudi Arabia’s alliance with the US in the war on terror is based on the shared interest in undermining a common foe. However, as illustrated previously, when they did not share this interest there could be no real trust nor progress. In the Pakistan situation, US distrust over the treatment of diplomats and Pakistan’s nefarious relationships with other terrorist networks coupled with the Pakistani

populace's distrust of US intentions has created a crisis in US-Pakistani relations (Ree and Aldrich, 2005).

### **2.5.3 Capacity Building of Intelligence Community on Intelligence Sharing**

Under the auspices of combating terrorism, training on ways to share intelligence is important. One country may collect and analyze in a particular area and share the intelligence in exchange for intelligence in another area. One country may also provide training in return for services rendered by the Foreign Service, such as translation. Or, a country may grant another the use of its territory to collect intelligence in exchange for sharing the information. In other cases, states may share collection capabilities with a foreign intelligence service that would share the results of the collection. In the best case of operational collaboration, a country and a foreign service may undertake combined collection operations (Richelson, 2008). Yet when it comes to interstate collaboration on intelligence sharing, gaps exist owing to the context of managing transnational terrorism.

What is clear from intelligence activities during the last decade is that states depend more on trusted sources of intelligence information from foreign liaison services, law enforcement agencies, and internal security services to identify terrorist threats than it did in the past. As new diplomatic relationships have been forged during the last several years, the definition of "coalition" has changed dramatically. For many governments that lack either the domestic political support or military interoperability standards to use their armed forces alongside other interstate forces, intelligence-sharing is perhaps the easiest non-public way

for governments to show a commitment to efforts to combat terrorism (Best, 2007).

In the context of training and capacity of intelligence community on intelligence sharing, the United States National Intelligence Strategy establishes three core objectives for developing these intelligence relationships. First, “engage and invigorate friendly foreign intelligence services’ efforts that could aid in the identification and disruption of terrorist organizations abroad and within U.S. borders” (Marrin, 2009). This requires high levels of trust on the part of all countries involved and increased acceptance of U.S. intelligence operating on another government’s territory. Second, “coordinate closely with foreign intelligence services to inform a common assessment of threats and options in response.” With coalition warfare the norm in U.S. foreign policy, the United States recognizes the importance of allied governments’ operating from a common intelligence picture global issues require global consensus. Finally, “ensure that insights gained from our foreign intelligence relationships inform intelligence judgments and develop effective options in response.” Just as the U.S. intelligence community depends ever more on open-source information in intelligence assessments, so too does it expect to derive additional value from foreign government information. While the benefits to expanding the network of intelligence agencies are obvious, it is difficult to overcome suspicion and traditional statist practices that eschew sharing (Richelson, 2008). Despite such efforts, the threat of espionage remains, but cooperation is the imperative guiding counterterrorism efforts. The challenge is to mitigate counterintelligence threats while enhancing counterterrorism operations.



### **2.5.3.1 Training on Improving Analytical Processes**

While sharing may be a virtue in international politics today, it is essential that sharing produces results. At a minimum, a re-conceptualized international intelligence community should be able to improve intelligence analysis through three distinct activities. First, parse all-source intelligence in order to determine as many of the available, credible pieces of information (henceforth “dots”) as possible. Second, separate the credible information from all the irrelevant data (wheat from chaff). Finally, organize and connect the credible “dots” to produce a sound analytical judgment (Richelson, 2008). These three things are essential elements of good intelligence analysis, but there are significant challenges and hence the need for training and capacity building amongst the intelligence community.

When it comes to information sharing, there is “secrecy versus efficiency dilemma.” Many of the “dots” of relevant information are part of sensitive operations/investigations and are jealously guarded by the responsible agency/government. While it makes sense to subject data to the widest possible group of analysts, there are genuine operational security concerns that must be met. All intelligence services owe it to their sources to protect their identities. This has given rise to the debate about “need to know” versus “need to share.”

A more mundane challenge to intelligence sharing is transliteration and naming conventions (Levi and Wall, 2004). Until better naming algorithms are used to capture the many ways to transliterate names from one alphabet to another, there is a fundamental communication problem.

A more serious concern is how different services understand the “enemy.” As more countries share intelligence analysis, it is important for analysts and policymakers to understand national biases. This is critically important within the context of Kenya and Somalia in efforts to manage the growing trends of transnational terrorism. The maxim, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend,” has guided countries to share intelligence throughout history. Today, the shared enemy is transnational and preys on weak states and provokes the response of developed states. Terrorism, human trafficking, and drug smuggling are central concerns of both strong and weak states (Mitsilegas, 2005). Intervention lessons of the last decade underscore the importance of non-traditional intelligence support to post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Political exploitation of ethnicity, organized crime, political corruption, and at-large war criminals undermine international efforts of state building. For Kenya and Somalia to be successful in counterterrorism, a new approach to intelligence is required and hence the need for this study.

According to Levi and Wall (2004), training is needed in real-time uncovering of a previously unknown and untracked terrorist through interpretation of clues in travel documents or from an interview, based on other records and terrorist mobility information (Levi and Wall, 2004). Data and investigation information collection leading to analysis that reveals patterns and practices of illicit travel and forms the basis for defensive and offensive improvements and operations; and Information system design and practice that facilitate sharing among allies, which is essential for tracking terrorists (Levi and Wall, 2004). All of these functions require a mix of classically collected intelligence information and capacity building of agencies involved (Ginsburg, 2006).

#### **2.5.4 Structural Capacity of Surveillance on Intelligence Sharing**

Surveillance is a vital component of intelligence operations geared to securing sensitive facilities or combating terrorism or insurgency. It is primarily intended to protect and secure the individual, his property or commercial entity and the nation-state. In the modern day, especially with the ever-present danger transnational terrorism,(Ranade, 2011), new innovative methods have been progressively introduced. Yet, in many countries, this aspect of the intelligence craft unfortunately continues to be neglected, possibly because by its very nature it is low profile, secretive and subterranean. The current study sought to assess the contribution intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

Narayan (2014) notes that rapid advances in science today ensure that technology contributes considerably to more effective surveillance and additionally plays a predictive role. It can relay advance intelligence on hostile activity as soon as it commences or begins to approach the target. While human intelligence (or HUMINT) is crucial and irreplaceable, technological enhancements are today an important part of surveillance. Monitoring of internet, landline and mobile communications of terrorist suspects gives vital advance information on plans and movements. This monitoring is part of the surveillance too. Today, when scarce vital resources worth billions of dollars lie in offshore locations or difficult inaccessible terrains, surveillance technology can play a meaningful role. In some cases, in fact, it will be the sole source of surveillance (Marrin 2009).

## **2.5.5 Structural Capacity Aspects of Intelligence Agencies in Intelligence**

### **Sharing**

An analysis of intelligence agencies reveals that they share some common characteristics: adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, and relationship with the intelligence community, and a mechanism to ensure accountability (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007). This section provides an analysis of the development of intelligence services dealing with terrorism from France, England, and Australia to identify the important characteristics for developing a counter terrorism unit (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007). These countries are chosen because of their relevance to the situation in Kenya and the region within the context of intelligence sharing and management of transnational terrorism.

#### **a) Adaptability**

In France, the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), set up during World War II, was responsible for gathering intelligence at the domestic level. Their focus was to identify Axis agents and collaborators. During the Cold War, their field of operation broadened. In addition to monitoring the threat posed by agents of the Soviet Komityet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosty (KGB), the agency played an active role against the national insurgency in Algeria. It is argued that the real shift of the DST to counter terrorism proper happened in the 1970's, when it confronted Carlos the Jackal and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. The DST became the principal agency monitoring threats from domestic Arab groups supported by Iran after the involvement of French forces in the first Gulf War and in Lebanon. Nowadays, the focus of the DST is on the threat posed by cells that are associated with the Al Qaeda network and to

Al Qaeda for the Islamic Maghreb, which emerged from the Algerian Salafist Group for Prayer and Combat (Johnson, 2010).

In the United Kingdom, the Security Service, also known as MI5 (Military Intelligence, Group 5) was created in the early twentieth century attempted to mitigate the threat posed by Germany. Germany was conducting an espionage campaign in Britain aimed primarily at military targets and the British were concerned with a probable invasion. After World War II, the Security Service was given the primary responsibility for defense from acts of subversion aimed at overthrowing the government by unlawful means. MI5 continued to operate alongside the police Special Branches. The most significant change is the close relationship that developed between the security and intelligence agencies beginning in the late 1960s and early 1970s. With emerging threats of domestic and transnational terrorism, the Security Service started gathering intelligence on foreign nationals operating in the UK and members of terrorist organizations based abroad, in collaboration with other intelligence agencies including the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), which is responsible for intelligence, and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), known as the signals intelligence agency (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007).

#### **b) Organizational Tasks of Intelligence Agencies**

The mission of advising the state after identifying and investigating threats to national security is the ultimate goal of all intelligence agencies. However, they also perform other tasks to make the country more resistant to terrorist attacks. For example, the primary task of the Australian Security Intelligence

Organization (ASIO) is to produce tactical and strategic threat assessments on a regular basis. The focus of the former is on the probability that specific places, events, or categories of people will be targets of terrorist attacks. Strategic assessment, on the other hand, focuses on monitoring the evolution of regional and transnational terrorism and its probable impact on the country. The ASIO advises the private and public sectors on how to protect critical infrastructures through outreach programs designed to sensitize them to the risk of terrorist attacks. They have also set up a network for sharing classified materials with their partners to enhance the protection of their assets as well as the protection of those working in their organization (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007).

### **c) Organizational Command**

Given the very small window of opportunity for effective response to imminent threats, intelligence agencies need a command structure that allows rapid decision making. The leadership of intelligence agencies needs access to the highest level government decision makers with the shortest possible delay and without having to go through the normal bureaucratic channels. For example, in the United Kingdom (UK), the Director General (DG) of the MI5 and the officers in charge of the other intelligence services have the right to direct access to the prime minister, who bears the overall responsibility for national security. There is a need to ensure that those entrusted with such powers have the required expertise to shoulder their responsibilities and at the same time make judicious use of their power. It is important to note that while it is common practice in some countries for intelligence agencies to recruit the individual to head the organization from within their own agencies, in some places there is a complete departure from this

practice. For example, in Australia, the tendency is to recruit the Director General of the ASIO from outside the agency, to avoid the impression that it is a family business–old-boy inside trading and to prevent it from becoming a self-replicating bureaucratic structure (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007).

#### **d) Relationship with Law Enforcement and Other Intelligence Agencies**

Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. A conducive environment is therefore of paramount importance in creating an intelligence sharing network. In the United Kingdom, the Security Service Act of 1989 and a number of ministerial guidelines enable the Security Service to collaborate closely with the Special Branches of the police forces at regional and local levels for counterterrorism activities. From a structural perspective, the Security Service has a number of regional offices; the police have Counter Terrorism Intelligence Units (CTIUs) and Counter Terrorism Units (CTUs) at the regional level to facilitate the information gathering and intelligence sharing process. The Security Service subsequently coordinates with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) and the GCHQ for an overall domestic and international threat analysis (Reveron, 2008).

#### **e) Accountability and Oversight**

Intelligence agencies rely a lot on people in order to fulfill their mission, and people are among their most important sources of information. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary that these agencies project legitimacy and trust to ensure effective cooperation with the population. This requires proper oversight of

intelligence agencies and guarantees that they will operate legally and in accordance with the rule of law (Loch, 2007). For example, in Australia, the roles and functions of the ASIO are overseen by the Inspector General of Intelligence and Security (IGIS) and the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS). The former can access organizational staff and documentation in order to investigate the legal compliance of both past and current operations. The latter has the authority to investigate matters pertaining to the administration and expenditures of the ASIO (Loch, 2007). Although these studies provide a good model and framework of intelligence sharing, research on this aspect in the context of the shift towards security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism is still sparse.

### **2.5.6 Inter-Agency Coordination and Interstate Cooperation in Intelligence Sharing**

Intelligence plays a fundamental role in the development of an effective counterterrorism strategy. Among other advantages, it can help identify individuals and groups engaged in terrorism as well as their locations and sources of recruitment. It enables security agencies to track down the suspects and their logistic and financial supports (Jenkins, 2003). In addition, Clein (2011) points out that intelligence provide advance warning of potential terrorist threats. It can provide tactical information for counterterrorism operations to disrupt terrorist activities and terrorist command and control structures; and it can aid management of an actual or potential crisis by providing decision makers with actionable intelligence (Clein, 2011).



Accordingly, the collection and analysis of information have always been considered extremely valuable to states. The emergence of agencies to address national, regional, or international security issues is a common feature of many countries around the world, especially in the last century. Commonly referred to as intelligence agencies, these special organizations play an important role in providing states with the necessary intelligence<sup>22</sup> to make sense of their environment, assess present and potential adversaries,<sup>23</sup> avoid strategic surprises, provide long-term expertise, support the policy process, and maintain the secrecy of information, needs and methods (Botha, 2009). However, it is important to note that the process of collecting raw information and converting it into actionable intelligence is part of larger cycle. In a democratic framework, intelligence gathering must be conducted in compliance with the rule of law to ensure that the civil rights of individuals are not violated. Indeed, there is a need for a democratic control so the roles and responsibilities of the intelligence community are directed by the civilian authority, the parameters within which it operates are defined in law, and there are established procedures for reviewing issues such as use of resources and personnel management. For example, in the U.S., a legal framework regulates the work of intelligence agencies and various control mechanisms ensure that they operate within a democratic framework (Botha, 2009).

Since September 11, the United States has cultivated intelligence relationships with traditional allies like the United Kingdom, and nontraditional partners like Yemen. Intelligence sharing is not only essential in the war on terrorism, but it also provides a non-public way for governments to cooperate with the United States. For US, s cooperation is primarily focused within the formal intelligence

community, e.g., from FBI to CIA, and between the intelligence community and the law enforcement community, e.g. from FBI to NYPD. In 2007, the United States government issued a National Strategy for Information Sharing, which notes: “success in preventing future terrorist attacks depends upon our ability to gather, analyze, and share information and intelligence regarding those who want to attack us, the tactics that they use, and the targets that they intend to attack”(Richelson, 2008).

The new emphasis on intelligence-sharing creates new challenges, including how to widely disseminate classified information, overcome sensitivities regarding intelligence sources and methods, and maintain counterintelligence vigilance. Even with regard to combating transnational terrorism, national interests still govern states’ behaviors. And when expanding beyond traditional allies, a variety of practical and counterintelligence concerns arise. The fear of introducing fabricated intelligence is best exemplified by the 2002 National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program (Richelson, 2008). Though domestic information sharing is an important undertaking and represents a better understanding of how to combat terrorism, this approach overlooks two important points. First, states increasingly rely on other states either for their security or the necessary training and equipment to perform security functions. Second, to combat transnational threats effectively, states must share intelligence at the international level. Against such background, this study explores the importance of intelligence in combating transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia; and informs discussions to create an international intelligence community to effectively compete with and combat terrorist networks.

### **2.5.7 Community Intelligence in Counterterrorism**

There has been a growing recognition that the broader public and individual communities are stakeholders and partners in countering terrorism, rather than simply the passive object of law enforcement activities. According to Hughbank (2010), developing community-oriented intelligence approaches to countering terrorism that emphasizes public support and participation can increase accountability and effectiveness. These approaches consist of locally tailored and locally driven initiatives that draw on partnerships among a wide range of actors, beyond traditional security practitioners, to include other public authorities, as well as civil society organizations, businesses and/or the media. A community might generally be thought of as consisting of individuals, groups and institutions based in the same area and/or having shared interests. This can be interpreted in the sense that a community is a stakeholder group, concerned about particular issues, measures or policies (Hughbank, 2010).

On the other hand, Price (2014) points out that community intelligence rely on the notion that the security of a community is closely related to the degree of cohesion and resilience of that community. National counterterrorism policies, therefore, sometimes aim to build resilient communities that reject violent extremist, terrorist ideologies and propagandists, as well as to mobilize citizens, individuals and groups in society in support of counterterrorism goals. While counterterrorism policies have traditionally focused on developing technical resilience, e.g., by protecting critical infrastructure and strengthening emergency response, there is growing recognition that insufficient emphasis has been placed

on fostering resilience at the level of community intelligence to counteract the appeal of violent extremism and terrorism (Price, 2014).

On the same note, Hughbank (2010) adds that targeting communities for intelligence-gathering and enforcement activities driven by the security priorities of the state is important. According to Hughbank (2010), community intelligence can be a valuable tool for law enforcement; it gives marginalized communities an opportunity to bring their concerns to police. However, Currier (2015) argues that involving communities in countering terrorism may be challenging. There can be a history of misperceptions and tensions between the police/ intelligence agencies and the public at large, or with some communities in particular, especially following cases of repeated police misconduct. Furthermore, state authorities, while seeking to develop partnerships, should keep in mind that some individuals and groups may be driven by personal agendas that do not necessarily correspond to the interests of the community (Currier, 2015). Price (2014) asserts that community intelligence should aim at increasing involvement of community members with police and the intervention project to improve public safety and the community environment. Moreover, the strategy must increase communities' roles in "affecting positive change" through various ways, including reporting crimes, seeking protection and intervention from police and volunteer community policing (Price, 2014).

The need to empower communities against terrorism has been stressed in particular with regard to preventing terrorism and countering violent extremism. According to Topping (2008), capacities and initiatives at the community level need to be identified and supported or otherwise developed. Public authorities

should be cautious, however, not to stigmatize particular communities by attempting to empower only them, exclusively against terrorism. Public authorities can both diminish this risk and be more effective if they engage a broader number of people on a diverse range of issues, especially those of concern to the communities themselves (Topping, 2008). On the same note, Hughbank (2010) points out that community intelligence approaches to countering terrorism should aim to strengthen public confidence in, and support for, counterterrorism policies and measures, including police action, thereby contributing to their legitimacy in the eyes of the public at large and certain communities in particular. Such approaches emphasize effective accountability of state authorities in their counterterrorism efforts to the public in general and, in particular, to those individuals and communities most directly concerned with counterterrorism policies and measures. They seek, in particular, to provide opportunities and mechanisms to increase transparency, accessibility and consultation in decision-making, implementation and review (Hughbank, 2010).

In addition, Price (2014) contends that community intelligence sharing approaches seek the involvement, support and trust of men and women from local communities in the formulation, implementation and evaluation of counterterrorism measures to increase their effectiveness. They are based on the idea that terrorism are threats to community security, not just state security, and that communities are stakeholders and partners in counterterrorism, not just the passive object of law enforcement tactics. Nevertheless, Topping (2008) emphasizes that communities need to be empowered against terrorism and, in particular, against violent extremism.

## **2.5.8 Challenges to Intelligence Sharing in Transnational Terrorism**

### **Management**

Reveron (2008) points out that the image of a “global war on terror” highlights the transnational nature of terrorism, and the necessity of international cooperation to combat it. Fundamental to this effort is enhancing bilateral and multilateral intelligence-sharing. While most public attention has focused on the “strategic surprise” of the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States, the events of that day have also spurred a critical, though inconspicuous, examination of how the United States collects, analyzes, and disseminates intelligence. However, Mueller (2103) argues that in the first instance, U.S. intelligence underestimated al Qaeda’s capabilities to execute attacks; in the second case, U.S. intelligence (and many other countries’ intelligence services) overestimated Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction programs and poorly assessed Iraq’s intentions.

According to Reveron (2008), intelligence failures taught nations two very different lessons. First, the September 11 attacks have been characterized as a failure to “connect the dots.” If only intelligence agencies had shared their data, analysts could have predicted al Qaeda’s attack, and neutralized al Qaeda’s operatives. Setting aside that it was unlikely the dots were specific enough to connect the overall attack plan with individuals’ names and locations within the United States, “connecting the dots” or sharing intelligence is now a national priority. The second lesson, derived from pre-war intelligence on Iraq, offers a contradictory lesson “collect more dots.” Although there was human intelligence informing conclusions about Iraq’s weapons programs, it was too limited and just

plain wrong (Reveron, 2008). While very few studies separate these lessons, their effects have fundamentally changed the intelligence community at the agency and community levels. Despite this global understanding, the effectiveness of intelligence sharing within the context of transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia is still unclear. Major changes to the intelligence community, culminating with the intelligence reform and terrorism prevention act of are still a work in progress.

Practically all information about Iraq's alleged biological weapons programs came from a single human source (an Iraqi chemical engineer) code-named "Curveball." In 2000 a foreign liaison service brought Curveball to the attention of the U.S. intelligence community which did not gain direct access to the source until May 2004, a year after the Iraq war began (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007). But between January 2000 and September 2001, the Defense Intelligence Agency disseminated almost 100 foreign intelligence reports from Curveball regarding mobile biological weapons facilities in Iraq, which formed the basis for Secretary of State Colin Powell's 2003 presentation to the UN Security Council (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007). While subsequent investigations determined that Iraq had no new plans for biological weapons after 1996 and that Curveball had fabricated the information he provided to the foreign service (Richelson, 2008); this episode exposed serious shortcomings in intelligence tradecraft particularly verification of the source's bona fides and the dangers of relying on a foreign service for intelligence.

Additionally, Freedman (2002) notes that there are countries that have a wealth of information to share about terrorists, but with whom relations create problems for U.S. foreign policy. Intelligence successes and failures in recent years suggest

significant improvement has been made in the area of information sharing. A White House review of the 2009 Christmas day bombing attempt, for example, found that “Information sharing does not appear to have contributed to this intelligence failure,” and that information about a pending attack had been shared with those in a position to disrupt the plot. A Senate investigation into the 2012 attack on the diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, similarly concluded that intelligence was effectively shared between the Department of State and other intelligence agencies prior to the incident (Erwin, 2013). While the intelligence community is not entirely without its legacy “stovepipes,” Miller (2013) argues that the challenge more than a decade after 9/11 is largely one of information overload, not information sharing.

#### **a) Collection Capabilities**

Intelligence agencies collect vast quantities of information on a daily, even an hourly, basis. The ability to locate fixed installations and moving targets has become an integral component of military capabilities. On almost any subject, the intelligence community can provide a wealth of knowledge within short time frame (Pillar, 2013). Inevitably, there are “mysteries” that remain unknowable; the effects of unforeseeable developments and the intentions of foreign leaders. Miller (2013) notes that the emergence of the transnational terrorist threat has posed major challenges to intelligence agencies largely designed to gather information about nation states and their armed forces. Sophisticated terrorist groups in some cases relay information only via agents in order to avoid having their communications intercepted. Human collection has been widely perceived as inadequate, especially in regard to terrorism. Whereas the intelligence community was a major technological innovator during the Cold War, today both intelligence



agencies and their potential targets make extensive use of commercial technologies, including sophisticated encryption systems (Ree and Aldrich, 2005). Despite these new acquisitions, the threat of transnational terrorism continues to pose even greater danger across the globe.

### **b) Analytical Quality**

The ultimate goal of intelligence is to provide accurate analysis in a timely manner. Analysis is not, however, an exact science and there have been, and undoubtedly will continue to be, failures by analysts to prepare accurate and timely assessments and estimates (Ree and Aldrich, 2005). The performance of the intelligence community's analytical offices during the past decade is a matter of debate; some argue that overall the quality of analysis has been high while others point to the failure to provide advance warning of the 9/11 attacks and a flawed estimate of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction as reflecting systemic problems. The quality of intelligence community analysis may be tested by emerging national security challenges, such as those associated with Iran's nuclear program (Best, 2007).

Intelligence is a key factor in countering terrorism as it can provide the means to anticipate, pre-empt, and respond to this threat. Generating actionable intelligence for effective, efficient, and timely responses is a cycle which involves several processes, including collection and analysis of raw information (Dahl, 2010). However, Hoffman (2006) says that the cycle is incomplete if intelligence is not properly shared. From this perspective, it can be argued that the failure of the

intelligence community to respond to terrorist attacks can be attributed to failures in any of these three processes, collection, analysis, or sharing (Hoffman, 2006).

#### **2.5.8.1 Obstacles to the Intelligence Cycle within the Intelligence Community**

According to Jenkins (2003), factors such as competing interests, organizational culture, technical incompatibilities, and the absence of a coordinating body can act as obstacles to cooperation between agencies of the intelligence community. Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. Factors such as competing interests, organizational culture, technical incompatibilities, and absence of a coordinating body can impede the creation of the conducive environment necessary for an effective intelligence sharing network (Hoffman, 2006).

##### **a. Competing Interests**

With limited resources, governments nowadays place increasing emphasis on performance-based budgeting in the public sector so as to more efficiently and effectively manage public expenditures. Consequently, this increases the competition between the agencies of the intelligence community over finite governmental resources. Indeed, these agencies continuously strive to increase their visibility within the government sector, as higher visibility is synonymous with higher budget allocation. This has become a major obstacle to interagency cooperation, as there is less willingness to collaborate and to share information. Worse still, they are now competing against each other (Jenkins, 2009).

##### **b. Organizational Culture**

Each organization has its own set of values, beliefs, norms and practices developed over time that have worked well enough to be considered valid. An organizational culture determines how individuals within the organization behave and how they expect others to behave. More importantly, it drives the way the organization conducts business and interacts with the wider community (Jenkins, 2003). Consequently, Cline (2011) argues that organizational culture can hamper effective cooperation between agencies. With time, an organizational culture can create an even more complex set of rules and encompass a wider set of beliefs that discourages agencies within the intelligence community from even seeking to share information (Cline, 2011).

#### **c. Technical Incompatibilities**

Cline (2011) argues that differences in agencies' levels of sophistication, especially in technical matters, can act as a barrier to effective coordination. In a number of countries, information sharing cannot be effected because of basic problems like incompatible computer operating systems or absence of common databases, issues that sometimes occur when agencies do not yet see technology as an important asset. Technical incompatibilities can be explained by the lack of common procedures for the acquisition of equipment, lack of resources, or simply some organizations' resistance to change (Cline, 2011).

#### **d. Absence of a Central Coordinating Body**

The intelligence community is composed of a multitude of agencies that often do not fall under the same department or chain of command (Miller, 2013). It is not uncommon to find that by virtue of their roles and responsibilities, these agencies

occupy equal status in the hierarchy. Thus, finding out who is in charge is problematic. Under these circumstances, agencies are not bound to cooperate or share information unless there is a central body with the relevant legal provisions to act as the coordinating mechanism. Erwin (2013) argues that this is a prerequisite for putting together the various pieces and strands gathered by individual agencies. Even more importantly, because the window of opportunity to respond to an imminent threat is very small, a coordinating mechanism is necessary for fast and effective decision making.

In perspective, this literature review reveals that intelligence failures happen for a number of reasons: the difficulty of predicting terrorist attacks, the lack of interagency cooperation, insufficient emphasis on the analytical processing of information, and/or the reluctance of the intelligence community to focus more on human intelligence (Hoffman, 2006). Furthermore, Erwin (2013) asserts that the lack of communication between intelligence agencies due to organizational structure, technical incompatibilities or competing interests, along with the absence of a central mechanism for coordinating among agencies, can all increase the propensity for intelligence failures. These observations motivate a systematic examination of an integrated model involving a judicious mix of the defense, diplomatic, intelligence and law-enforcement capabilities of the state. Pooling all available resources and drawing together multiple strands of expertise can remove the barriers to effective interagency cooperation so the dots can be connected more accurately (Erwin, 2013).

## **2.6 Border Surveillance and Transnational Terrorism Management**

### **2.6.1 Conceptualizing Border Surveillance**

Conceptually, “surveillance” can be viewed from different perspectives. In the context of this study, surveillance is explained as the activity of gathering information on individuals by security agencies within and across the Kenya-Somalia border as a strategy to managing transnational terrorism. First, it includes human and technological gazing where officials watch the physical movements and activities of persons. Second, surveillance involves the acquisition of personal data (Romero, 2003). This includes the collection of biographical, biometric, or transactional data on individuals harvested from personal communications, electronic transactions, identifiers, records, or other documents. In the former, observations can be used for identification or may act to advance an investigation as a component of a larger body of evidence, as in the case of CCTV data. The latter involves voice or documentary information that can be used in criminal investigations or prosecutions (O'Harrow (2005).

The meaning given to border surveillance here is the collective action of official gathering of information on persons for the stated purpose of preventing crime and transnational terrorism or prosecuting offenders. As the police gather more personal information through surveillance, search, and seizure, a greater number of persons come within their official purview vis-à-vis suspicion profiles, threat assessments, or specific investigations (Ford (2005). While it has been found that strong technological in border management is key, it is not clear in the context of Kenya-Somalia setup whether a similar scenario exists.

Views of surveillance and privacy have changed dramatically in recent years. Some commentators assert that the U.S. has experienced a progressive shift in the balance between police surveillance authority and individual privacy rights (Chang, 2003). Others cite the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11 hereafter) as a watershed event that provided the catalyst for the widening of police surveillance and search authority (Posner, 2003). The record is replete with examples of U.S. official responses to perceived public safety threats that have precipitated an increase in police surveillance activity (Brown, 2003). However, Kenya-Somalia border security threats pose greater security concerns as far as countering transnational terrorism is concerned.

Terrorism policies provide evidence that U.S. public safety strategies commonly involve a prominent police surveillance and search role (Abrams, 2005). Faced with modern transnational crime and terrorism, operating in a technologically fluid global environment, the extant official strategy obligates the police to ensure greater public safety under increasingly unpredictable circumstances of porous borders (Posner, 2003). In what Cole (2003:13) refers to as “preventive law enforcement,” the legal and operational response has been to use greater surveillance to reduce threats and prosecute transnational offenders. Since the police often lack the manpower and technical expertise to keep pace with global terrorists and criminals, O'Harrow (2005) notes that security agencies need to widen their surveillance capability by collaborating with private commercial enterprises to obtain personal data on the public. Yet, surveillance capabilities for

Kenya and Somalia in light of security-based diplomacy in managing transnational terrorism require further analyses and hence the need for the study.

Controls of cross Border activities on borders require some of the important and strategic heights important for the security of the nation. Both external and internal situations of the country are changing at an incredibly fast pace with the developments in nuclear weapons and missiles, increasing cross border terrorism, the emergence of non-state actors, the growth of Islamic fundamentalists, the narcotics arms nexus, illegal migration and left wing extremism, gravely impacting upon the security of the country and thus posing challenge to management of borders. According to Ford (2005), globalization, media revolution and technological development in various fields have immensely impacted the border management framework. Geocentrality of Kenya and the fear of the unstable neighbouring States of Somalia, economic resources and military strength has impacted on mutual relations. Now more comprehensive planning is needed to achieve peace and progress on borders and hence the need for this study.

### **2.6.2 The Importance of Border Surveillance in Counterterrorism**

Borders serve many vital functions. All legitimate cargo trade passes over these borders, generating customs and other revenues and duties. In this sense, the borders facilitate the flow of trade, which is increasingly important to national economy. Borders are also a “choke point” for monitoring the arrival and departure of people (Carafano, 2004). Mitsilegas (2005) points out that the recent years have witnessed calls for the intensification of surveillance and monitoring

of the movement of people globally. These calls, led in particular by the US after the 9/11 events, were also echoed in EU Member States. This intensification of surveillance of movement, realized by both ‘widening’ (by increasing the transmission of data) and ‘deepening’ (by introducing biometrics) controls, appears to be at odds with the minimization of checks within many nation. However, some scholars (Haggerty and, 2010) argue that the standards it entails, but also the manner in which these standards have been proposed and adopted, further raise a number of questions regarding legitimacy, democracy and the protection of fundamental rights.

Surveillance and protection is intended to enable security measures to be taken in the event of threats of risks aimed at individual people, objects or services. The point of departure is safe and unhindered functioning (Haggerty and Ericson, (2010). However, Ginsburg (2006) notes that the term security covers all measures, both policy-related and operational, which focus on preventing attacks on people, objects or services, whether during events or in a specific area, such as an airport. Compared to security, surveillance is more preventive, for example in the form of cameras or guard posts. Despite the literature on border surveillance, an understanding of this phenomenon is important in the Kenyan context, given the shift towards security-based diplomacy in managing transnational terrorism.

Travel and various forms of migration constitute a growing challenge with regard to the monitoring interstate state external borders. From the point of view of counterterrorism, these borders must be guarded effectively enough that terrorists wanting to execute their plans do not have an opportunity to pass these borders without being detected. At the same Ford (2005) points out that states have an



economic interest in the rapid processing of passenger flows. It goes without saying that border surveillance is a field of work that requires close cooperation with other states and international partners.

According to Ball and Webster (2005), terrorist networks are organized and oriented at international level. Actions are, for example, prepared in one country but executed in another. It is very important to terrorists that they can move about freely. Adequate border surveillance functions as an obstacle to the cross border methods of terrorists and terrorist organizations. Within the framework of counterterrorism, proper information exchange between intelligence and security services, an adequate local detection capacity and a specific assessment of incoming and outgoing people are very important. However, for Kenya-Somalia case, the absence of effective legal migration channels is responsible for large scale illegal immigration, which diverts law enforcement resources to combating it:

### **2.6.3 Strategies Employed in Open Border Control**

The process of securing borders can never be complete, because the environment is too complex and the volume of activity is too great. Carafan (2004) notes that it is prudent to consider what the future of border security might hold as well trends and what issues of policy each country is likely to confront. However, Rosenblum, et al., (2013) observe that understanding border risks begins with identifying key threats. Various strategies in open border control entail surveillance, patrols, joint control operations, information exchange and intelligence assessment

At their roots, border-related threats are closely linked to the flow of people (travelers) and goods (cargo) from one country to another. Any smuggled item or

individual hidden among the legitimate flows potentially constitutes a threat to security or interests. The intentions and actions of unauthorized travelers separate them into different threat categories, including terrorists, transnational criminals, and other illegal migrants. Illegal goods are distinguished by their inherent legitimacy or illegitimacy (Haggerty and, 2010). Certain weapons, illegal drugs, and counterfeit goods are always illegal and categorically prohibited, while other goods are legal under most circumstances, but become illegitimate if they are smuggled to avoid enforcement of specific laws, taxes, or regulations

In general (Mitsilegas, 2005), border threats may be divided into actors and goods. Threat actors include potential terrorists, transnational criminals, and unauthorized migrants, Threatening goods include weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and certain other weapons, illegal drugs and other contraband, counterfeit products, and products illegally smuggled and/or with potentially harmful effect .However, the diversity of border threats and the complexity of border security and border management in Kenya and Somalia create challenges for border security policymaking and planning These challenges are amplified by the uncertainty and fear surrounding many border threats. Rather than attempting specific predictions about where, when, and how border threats will be realized, analysts often rely on risk management as an approach to border security, and on probabilistic risk models as a framework for analyzing and describing different types of potential threats On the same note, Carafano (2004) asserts that risk management and risk assessment procedures are rooted in economic theories of consumer behavior and formal models of decision-making that are used in a wide range of industrial, environmental, business, legal, and other settings.

According to Rosenblum *et al.*, (2013), “risk management” refers to a variety of methodologies for choosing the optimal response to a potentially hazardous situation by comparing the costs and benefits of possible interventions with the expected value of projected outcomes. The standard components of many risk models include estimates of the likelihood of a threat (or other adverse event) and the potential consequence of the threat. Risk models based on likelihood and consequences describe risk as a positive function of these two components, so that risk increases with the likelihood and potential consequences associated with a given threat. Conversely, Ranade (2011) posits that the likelihood-times-consequences framework is a standard way to evaluate risk, but the use of such a framework to understand border threats presents unique challenges and therefore remains somewhat controversial. Even where such models are well developed, as in industrial engineering and the insurance and finance industries for example, risk projections are probabilistic and may have a high degree of uncertainty. Predicting the likelihood of border threats may be far more difficult. Moreover, traditional risk management approaches were designed as unilateral decision systems. Yet when it comes to border security, risk models are limited, owing to the context of managing transnational terrorism.

#### **2.6.4 Migration Controls and Management of Transnational Terrorism**

Migration controls have become an increasingly important component of counter-terrorism policy over the last few years (Lugna, 2006). After the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, strengthening cooperation on migration controls was identified amongst various actions to be taken, but was not given any priority. For instance, at the global level, in the case of EU, Martin (2006) points out that it is only after the terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 that it was identified as a

strategic objective in the EU fight against terrorism. Since then, this dimension of the counter-terrorism policy has continued to grow in importance. This trend is set to continue in the future, as a significant number of proposals regarding migration control measures are currently being negotiated in the EU (Haggerty and, 2010). However, the development of these initiatives has not been justified by any systematic analysis of the success of migration controls as a counter-terrorism instrument, especially in the developing nations like Kenya and Somalia.

From the viewpoint of counterterrorism, counterespionage, and law enforcement authorities, the borders of states have historically presented rare opportunities to detect and intercept adversaries, who are forced to surface at this point and engage with governmental authorities (Ford, 2005). When terrorist adversaries transit official access points they must take measures to conceal themselves that provide governments and their security partners with opportunities to detect and disrupt them. Ginsburg (2006) argues that legal entry channels visa offices and official ports of entry at land, air, and sea access points located before and at national frontiers are therefore newly critical infrastructure for counterterrorism. In light of this, such themes are key for Kenya-Somalia case and critical for responding to pandemics and other security threats and for the safe and efficient management of trade and travel.

Most scholars have argued that security concerns have led to the strengthening of border controls and the tightening up of asylum and migration policies, at both the national and interstate levels; as a international protection and for would-be migrants to legally move to another country (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). In the first months following the terrorist attacks, the EU rather focused on enhancing

police and judicial cooperation on counter-terrorism amongst EU Member States, with the adoption of important instruments such as the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism and the European Arrest Warrant, and tackling terrorist financing (Kaunert, 2010). The Declaration on Combating Terrorism, adopted on 25 March 2004, in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Madrid, represented a turning point with regard to the use of migration controls in EU counter-terrorism. For the first time, migration control measures were clearly identified as a priority in the development of the EU counter-terrorism policy (Winterdyk and Sundberg, 2010). Section 6 of the Declaration was entitled ‘Strengthening border controls and document security’ and called for ‘expediting work on measures in this area’, including the establishment of the European Borders Agency, the adoption of a Council Directive on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data and the adoption of proposals for the incorporation of biometric features into passports and visas. Yet, such measures have not proved overly effective owing to the trends of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia often blamed on the porous borders.

In addition, Section 5 of the Declaration on ‘Building on existing cooperation’ emphasized the importance of ‘maximizing the effectiveness of information systems’, most of which (Schengen Information System (SIS), Visa Information System (VIS) and EURODAC) contain data pertaining to asylum and migration matters (Kaunert, 2010). To a broader trend in the literature on counter-terrorism, it tends to focus more on counter-terrorism strategies such as the use of force or intelligence gathering than on other measures such as migration controls (Martin, 2006); and for this reason the current study sought to look at border surveillance

issues such as migration controls and how they influence transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

According to Brouwer (2009), there were two main reasons for the increased emphasis placed on migration controls as an instrument of EU counter-terrorism. First of all, the location of the March 2004 terrorist attacks - on European soil, in contrast with the attacks on 11 September 2001 had a profound effect on the EU counter-terrorism policy. These events accelerated the development of the EU counter-terrorism policy and led to a considerable expansion of its scope. Secondly, the fact that most perpetrators of the Madrid terrorist attacks were non-EU nationals (first-generation migrants from Morocco in this case) led EU policy-makers to give increased attention to migration controls as a dimension of EU counter-terrorism (Brouwer, 2009).

In the revised Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism adopted in June 2004, the importance of ensuring effective systems of border control was once more presented as one of the seven EU strategic objectives to combat terrorism (Bossong, 2008). In addition, as this Action Plan was considerably more detailed than any of its predecessors, the objectives of the EU in this policy area were presented in greater detail for the first time and most of them were assigned deadlines for their completion (Winterdyk & Sundberg, 2010). In addition to this Plan of Action on Combating Terrorism, which was to be updated every six months, the EU adopted a Counter-Terrorism Strategy in December 2005. It is based on four pillars: 'prevent' 'protect', 'pursue' and 'respond.'

'Prevent' refers to activities aiming to tackle the root causes of terrorism, whilst 'protect' concerns activities aiming to decrease the vulnerability of people and

infrastructures to terrorist attacks. 'Pursue' refers to the investigation of terrorist activities, whilst 'respond' concerns the reactions to terrorist attacks (Lugna, 2006). Again, migration control measures were given a prominent place under the 'protect' heading as evidenced by the following excerpt of the EU Strategy. Improvements in technology for both the capture and exchange of passenger data, and the inclusion of biometric information in identity and travel documents, were adopted to increase the effectiveness of border controls and provide greater effectiveness of migration controls in the fight against terrorism (Lugna, 2006). Despite this mandate, the EU institutions have not provided any analysis of the impact and success of using migration controls in the fight against terrorism. In the context of Kenya and Somalia, it seems particularly challenging to assess the effectiveness of migration controls to combat terrorism. This is because the best indicator of their success is the absence of terrorist attacks. However, it is impossible to conclusively prove that a terrorist attack did not take place because of one specific counter-terrorism instrument, rather than another, as information on non-existent terrorist attacks is by definition scarce..

Whilst it is unclear to which extent reinforced migration controls contribute to combating terrorism, it has become increasingly evident that they have negative externalities, notably as far as the right to privacy and data protection are concerned (Bullock, 2006). The creation of an expanding number of databases containing data pertaining to asylum and migration matters and the emphasis put on their 'interoperability' for use in the fight against terrorism are particularly good examples. Given the lack of robust justification for and demonstration of the effectiveness of using such instruments for fighting transnational terrorism, it is

therefore important to explore how such measures can influence transnational terrorism management in the Kenyan and Somalia context.

### **2.6.5 Strategies Employed in Control and Surveillance of the Land Open Border**

Border Management essentially entails controlling and regulating the flow of people, goods and services across a country's borders in the national interest and usually for the maintenance of peace and security. These tasks are typically undertaken by government agencies (Customs and Excise, Immigration and Police) with different combinations of agencies according to the country's laws (Lamprey, 2010). But Kaunert (2010) says that border Management encompasses a complex and dynamic set of activities. In the context of counter-terrorism, effective border management plays an important role in combating the global terrorist threat. Agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation are confronted with the common challenge of facilitating the movement of legitimate people and goods while maintaining controlled and secure borders.

Bures (2006) points out that the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy reflects a clear affirmation, on the part of Member States, that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting, but rather complimentary and mutually reinforcing goals, and that human rights and the rule of law constitute the fundamental basis of the global counter-terrorism effort. In adopting the Global Strategy and its Plan of Action, Member States resolved "to recognize that international cooperation and any measures that we undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with our obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant



international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.” The General Assembly has also emphasized the overarching need to ensure respect for human rights in counter-terrorism efforts in over 60 resolutions on transnational terrorism. With specific regard to border control, the Assembly called upon States 'to ensure that guidelines and practices in all border control operations and other pre-entry mechanisms are clear and fully respect their obligations under international human law, particularly refugee law and human rights law, towards persons seeking international protection' (Rosenblum, et al., 2013).

On the other hand, the Compendium of Border Control Instruments, Standards and Recommended Practices Related to Counter-Terrorism is a comprehensive compilation of international legal instruments, standards, recommended practices and other guidance material, intended to serve as a single point of reference on the various legal and practical matters relating to counter-terrorism aspects of border management. Notably, the Compendium fully recognizes the national sovereignty of Member States when implementing border management initiatives to counteract terrorism (Chebel & Reich, 2008a).

According to Chebel and Reich (2008a), the nine main border management themes according to which the Compendium is organized are as follows:

1. Mobility and processing of people
2. Integrity and security of document issuing process
3. Movement of cash and other bearer negotiable instruments
4. Movement and processing of goods
5. Movement of small arms, light weapons, ammunition, explosives

6. Maritime security
7. Aviation security
8. Early warning and alert systems
9. Control of the land open border

Unfortunately, the security architecture of Kenya and Somalia has not overly embraced these themes. Along with political and economic instability comes an increase in crime and disorder. The porous borders between Kenya and Somalia as the extensive coastline make it difficult to accurately track and pursue criminal activity. While many international organizations with a border-control mandate utilize or promote early-warning and alert systems, whether with tools developed by the individual organization or with tools developed for use by the international community, the recent terrorist attacks emanating from Somalia call for more research on the role of border and counterterrorism.

According to Harns (2005), borders and security focuses on the following areas: establishing or strengthening border systems, including the data systems used at checkpoints and at central management sites, improving the business process at the border, and, assisting countries in moving toward more integrated border management approaches.; improvement of travel documents and their issuance systems, primarily passports but also at times visas; building administrative and management structures related to migration and security; improving the policy and legal base for border management. Kaunert (2010) asserts that beyond migration controls, strengthening training and human resource development systems that support all features of migration management, including those most directly linked with migration and security; improvements of border systems and

of travel document systems, review and enhancement of the policy and legal base for these systems, strengthening of training systems and inter-governmental dialogue and coordination all require resources and expertise; ensuring that countries have secure travel documents and enabling inter-governmental technical cooperation and dialogue on migration management matters, including migration and security. Although such border border systemstrategies indeed counter terrorism measures have been developed, persistent reports of grenade attacks in Nairobi raise concern and the need to evaluate the role of management in police agencies reduce the national terror burden.

Hobolth (2010) notes that the open border (the frontier between official land-border and seaport check points) continues to facilitate the illegal cross-border movement of people, including terrorists and criminals, and of goods (including small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material). Despitethe progress, Kenya-Somalia case provides a need for analyzing the importance of securing the open border and attempt to do so through a variety of measures, including surveillance, patrols, physical barriers, joint control operations and patrols, information exchange, intelligence assessments, and engagement with border communities on control and policing issues.

#### **2.6.6 Legitimacy and Effectiveness of Border Surveillance**

Rapid globalization has led to increased flows of capital, services, ideas, information and people between countries. As such, problems and challenges that face one nation often have a rippling impact throughout the region and globally. The growing list of cross-border issues cannot be resolved by isolated policy

action at the national or sub-national levels. It is essential to forge strategic alliances at the regional level which support the development of consolidated approaches through regional platforms for dialogue and action (Rozemarijn, 2013). Howeverm Bullock (2006) argues that regional governance mechanisms and institutional arrangements to respond to emerging cross-border issues and trends are critical; such as the movement of people including refugees and illegal migrants, regional trade integration for human development, effective and efficient water management, human trafficking, and health focusing on infectious disease surveillance and response (Cheema, 2011). To a broader trend in the literature on counter-terrorism tends to focus more on counter-terrorism strategies such as the use of force or intelligence gathering than on other measures such as migration.

According to Kaunert (2010), developing a framework for coordinated border management that focuses on the activities of border-control agencies during the pre-arrival, arrival and post-clearance phases of a border crossing is still a challenge for many states. In relation to transnational terrorism management, use of databases specifically, raises the issue of impact on privacy, especially where the data bases might be used to base decisions on: “one impact that’s potentially worrying is that the more unified the system is, the more vulnerable it is to privacy. On a range of privacy, discrimination, data protection concerns come up in this respect with harmonization and centralization of data (Rozemarijn, 2013). On the other hand, Argomaniz (2009) argues that the impact of border surveillance should be seen in a broader perspective, especially by comparing the relative importance of the different aims of border surveillance i.e. protecting the border and protecting the lives of the concerned countries. However, Bigo and

Tsoukala (2008) point out that the discussion on the legitimacy of border surveillance revolved around three main issues: the procedure by which (the change in) the measure is instigated; the timing and arguments used in that procedure; and the relative importance of the aims of border surveillance is sparse.

Boswell (2007) asserts that the effectiveness of border surveillance can depend on the definition of the original aim, and whether this aim might have been political: on whether these policies are not effective; but views effectiveness to be a measure of the degree to which the measure is able to reach its stated aims. However, it is difficult to establish effectiveness in general as the stated aims might differ depending on one's perspective. In the particular context of border surveillance, effectiveness would be felt to be of little relevance as the goal of protecting borders is, in principle, a worthy cause and therefore the effectiveness of the measure seem to be less relevant, particularly in relation to the discussion of the social acceptability of the measure. Contrary to this analysis, According to Cheema (2011) posits that the main issues relating to effectiveness, according to Cheema (2011), is that the measurement of effectiveness heavily depends on political agendas and aims. Measuring effectiveness in the case of counter terrorism is particularly difficult, as it would measure something that is prevented. Effectiveness can also often be referred to in terms of financial costs and benefits yet, there seems to be little correlation between the effectiveness of a measure and its impact or legitimacy.

### **2.6.6.1 Integrity and Security of Document Issuing Process in Counterterrorism**

Border security is a dynamic and evolving process. Because the illegal cross-border movement of people adversely affects not only the security, but also the political, economic and social welfare of States (Cheema, 2011). According to Baldaccini and Guild (2007), Governments now focus on cooperative security efforts, in the understanding that unilateral actions are no longer effective. However, Bossong (2008) emphasizes that comprehensive early-warning and alert systems are key components of effective border management systems: they strengthen the collective capacity of States to detect, prevent and combat terrorism, by facilitating inter-agency cooperation and the timely sharing and exchange of pertinent, reliable information, thereby enabling critical decisions to be taken in a responsible manner.

Travel-document security and identity management are important tools in preventing terrorist mobility and in combating trans-border crime. On the same note, Rozemarijn (2013) notes that in the hands of terrorists, a fraudulent travel document can be as dangerous as a weapon. As modern passports have become more secure and more difficult to forge, criminals and terrorists have increasingly attempted to falsify supporting documents (birth certificates, national ID cards, etc.) or to apply for “officially issued” passports. It is therefore essential that States develop and implement universal specifications for identity management and travel-document security (including in the issuance process) in order to address these vulnerabilities. This is important for the study since Kenya has been experiencing terrorism cases with a rising threat from Al-Shabaab terror group in Somalia.

According to Bossong (2008), the smuggling of cash and/or bearer negotiable instruments (BNI) across borders is among the preferred methods employed by terrorists to move funds across international borders, whether for the purposes of terrorist financing or in order to launder the proceeds of illicit activities. Governments entrust their customs services with the implementation of border control measures that comply with international norms, as a means to detect and prevent the illicit movement of cash. As such, rigorous compliance with these norms would improve border control effectiveness in this area. For example, the fight against terrorist financing is an integral part of the United Nations counter-terrorism approach, as reflected in many of its resolutions and conventions. Yet, analysis of such threats in the context of Kenya and Somalia beg for more research.

Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) posit that global trade and the international supply chain are particularly vulnerable to manipulation by terrorists. In order to minimize this vulnerability, these authors emphasize that a range of measures should be taken, including ensuring receipt of advance electronic cargo information about inbound, outbound and transit shipments; employing a consistent risk-management approach to address threats to cargo security; using non-intrusive detection equipment; promoting cooperation among customs administrations (e.g. by performing outbound inspection of high-risk containers and cargo); and establishing partnerships with the private sector for the implementation of secure practices at every stage of the supply chain, through Authorized Economic Operator (AEO) programmes. Implementation of these and related measures is essential in order to increase the security of international trade and facilitate the flow of goods across international borders.

Similarly, Baldaccini and Guild (2007) observe that the illicit trafficking and movement of small arms, light weapons, conventional ammunition and explosives, as well as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) materials and dual-use goods, compounded by changing patterns in the arms trade and the involvement of non-trade actors, presents significant problems that must be addressed by global counter-terrorism efforts. In the hands of terrorists, these munitions and materials become the ingredients for terrorist attacks (Cheema (2011). As such, effective regulation, export controls and border management, including legislative and enforcement measures, can minimize the risk that such items will be either diverted to, or illicitly acquired by non-State actors. These measures should respect the need to maintain a proper balance between export controls and the facilitation of legitimate trade. However, the new and emerging security environment provides significant and novel challenges for security agencies and their ability to respond appropriately is critical.

Boswell (2007) points out that the security of the maritime domain is an issue of global importance. The aims of maritime security are to detect and deter security threats; to take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities; and to safeguard passengers, crews, ships and their cargoes, port facilities and the people who work and live in port areas, while still allowing for the safe and efficient movement of maritime trade. According to Argomaniz (2009), acts of terrorism remain serious and consistent threats to international civil aviation. Addressing these threats requires the establishment of comprehensive and responsible policies and security measures aimed at ensuring the physical security of aircraft and airports. However, Harmon (2008) posits that the adoption of legislative provisions to criminalize acts of unlawful interference



against civil aviation, and the effective implementation and enforcement of relevant aviation security standards and practices, would significantly enhance the capacity of states to defend against these threats. Against such threats, effective implementation of the relevant legislative and practical security measures is necessary in order to prevent unlawful acts of transnational terrorism.

### **2.6.7 Technology in Border Surveillance in Transnational Terrorism**

#### **Management**

Given the nature of transnational terrorism, across national borders, security agencies face new challenges in promoting public safety, investigating crimes, and apprehending offenders (Kegley, 2003). Terrorists and criminal offenders have become increasingly adept in the use of technology to perpetrate transnational illegal acts (i.e., terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime, (Grabosky & Smith, 1998). Perceived threats, posed by global terrorists and criminals, have provided the impetus for many of the legal changes that have contributed to the enhanced surveillance powers of the U.S. police in recent years (Whitaker, 2003). Changes in technology have contributed to the ability of the police to engage in electronic surveillance of citizens. Personal electronic communications (i.e., internet, voice-over-internet- protocol, cellular telephone, wireless transmission, etc.) are able to be intercepted with greater ease, and to some extent, with less physical intrusion. Therefore, part of the motivation for the police to increasingly adopt the use of electronic technology is to make them more effective at pursuing elusive criminals on a global scale.

Some scholars contend that, unlike past crime threats, modern terrorism poses unique risks to public safety (Hoffman, 2004). Whitaker (2003: 53) describes the

modern terrorist as “flexible, adaptable, diversified, transnational, de-centered, a network of networks.” Since their motives, objectives, and tactics differ significantly from localized street crime, the police have altered their counter-terrorism approach to crime prevention and public safety (White, 2006). Central to this adaptation is their greater dependence on technology and surveillance to gather and disseminate information (Davis, 2004). Supported by new federal eavesdropping legislation, the police are working to be more effective at gathering a broad range of data on the public. Emerging border surveillance programs such as Internet Surveillance are designed to monitor internet traffic and gather user IP addresses, site visitation, and related user activity that are contained in a predetermined “packet” of information.

Harns (2005) points out that ensuring that all countries have adequate data systems at all international checkpoints is key to the management of terrorism. For some States this requires establishing the basic system, and for others there is a need to upgrade old systems to more easily capture and analyse data, and to link with other systems when appropriate. IOM’s programme history, and our current activities, is quite extensive and from this experience we can make a few observations or suggestions. According to Lamptey (2012), there are a range of options for responding to this need. These border data systems, which record entry and exit, check documents and persons against watch lists, and at times actually assist in inspecting the travel documents, have strong potential to reduce security threats while also serving to facilitate normal border passage. However, lack of vigilance, commitment or authority to collect or use such data at the border; and in some countries, a lack of data systems resulting in problems

incorporating and using national data, data provided by Interpol, or other data provided bilaterally.

Following the 9/11 attack on USA, border security became one of its centerpieces, largely replicated by other countries (Levi & Wall, 2004). The EU, for example, linked the monitoring of the movement of people with the 'war on terror' by stressing that 'improved border controls and document security play an important role in combating terrorism. According to Ball and Webster (2005), biometrics and databases have two elements in this approach: the inclusion of biometrics in visas and passports, which can be prioritized and relevant measures be adopted; and the enhancement of the interoperability between databases and the creation of 'synergies' between existing and future information systems (such as SIS II, VIS and Eurodac) 'in order to exploit their added value within their respective legal and technical frameworks in the prevention and fight against terrorism.'

Biometric data will be of value to enforcement agencies if they form part of databases which are easily accessible. It is thus no coincidence that in the EU, as in the US, calls for the introduction of biometrics went hand in hand with calls for facilitating their inclusion in databases and enhancing the 'interoperability' of these databases so that data would be easily exchanged (Ball & Webster, 2005). There needs to be interoperability of various databases, even though these serve different purposes and contain different kinds of data, because all these data may help in the 'war on terror'. And this is why it is deemed essential that law enforcement authorities have access to these databases, even though they do not contain 'crime' data (Haggerty and Ericson, 2010). Despite this evidence, to a

broader trend literature is majorly on the developed countries like USA, and hence the need of more investigation in the local context.

### **2.6.8 Border Communities and Transnational Terrorism Management**

Another key factor that is useful for border management is the inclusion of border communities in the management of the borders. At the local level, most border management efforts do not take advantage of border communities (Kaunert, 2010). In addition, Hoffman (2004). posits that the local community usually has intimate knowledge of the terrain, the criminal syndicates, meeting places and other security issues. Nevertheless, they are not always involved in managing the borders. Their inclusion and incorporation of local perspectives is useful in informing state actors of the threats in the border areas. The gaps created by these omissions are filled by transnational criminal networks. Thus, border agencies must actively involve the local community thereby earning their trust and gradually reducing their reliance on other non-state groups.

According to Ginsburg (2006), developing the roles and responsibilities of border personnel so they are effectively engaged in what have been viewed as exclusively intelligence and crime control functions will require adjusting training and career paths among border agencies, between intelligence and screening units, and between agencies primarily dedicated to border functions and full-time intelligence agencies. Similarly, to equip border officers and transit points today with the information and process tools needed to attack terrorist mobility can only be accomplished through a combination of terrorist-specific tools (e.g., a terrorist travel document capability), and general information collection and compliance systems (e.g., establishing a requirement for capturing biometric records of

foreign travelers and a system for tracking student visa status) that must be designed for multiple purposes, including counterterrorism (Ball and Webster, 2005). In the case of Kenya and Somalia, persistent reports of terrorist attacks have deepened concern over the spread of transnational terrorism, and such important border management strategies are thus a priority area that made this study relevant.

### **2.6.9 Border Wall as a Strategy in Counterterrorism**

The concept of border security has undergone a sea change with the growing vulnerability of the coastline and also of the airspace. Various countries have employed this strategy of constructing physical barriers as walls as a security measure. For example, in an attempt to prevent the kind of violent spillover experienced in Kenya, Saudi Arabia began construction on a 600-mile 'Great Wall' along its border with Iraq. Reportedly intended to protect the kingdom from 'Islamic State/ISIS militants, the project was first proposed during Iraq's civil war in 2006. The nascent barrier was already tested in early January when ISIS militants attacked a border post at Arar, reinforcing officials' conviction that the kingdom must be insulated from the chaos engulfing its northern neighbor. This is not the first time Riyadh has sought to secure its borders with a long wall. In 2013, it began construction on a 1,100-mile security barrier along the southwestern border in response to heightened sectarian conflict in Yemen (Hoffman, 2004).

The multi-billion-dollar barrier, complete with concertina wire, floodlights, and thermal cameras, has reportedly stemmed the flow of terrorists, criminal elements, and economic refugees into the kingdom. Despite this apparent success,

the Yemen-based al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) routinely boasts about its ability to infiltrate the border. Regardless of the veracity of AQAP's claims, much remains to be done: areas of lush vegetation and mountainous regions interspersed with deep valleys and Yemeni villages remain difficult for Saudi border guards to patrol (Segawa & Gilkes, 2015).

**Israel Border Wall:** Since 2003, Israel has been building a wall around the West Bank in the name of security from terrorism. While Israel calls this the "Security Fence," most Palestinians think of as a degrading and illegal land grab. Israelis would say that it's been effective noting that in the three years before it was built, suicide bombers killed 293 of their citizens; in the three years after it went up, that number dropped. Since its construction, terrorist attacks have dwindled. Palestinians would counter by saying that this decline is not because of the wall (Segawa & Gilkes, 2015).

**Bulgaria-Turkey:** In contrast to the Kenyan and Saudi barriers, proposed primarily as counterterrorism measures, Bulgarian officials approved the construction and expansion of a 100-mile fence along the border with Turkey to combat the swelling number of asylum seekers streaming in from the south. A combination of economic pressure, fears of militant infiltration, and a desire to be included in Europe's Schengen Area pushed officials to bolster the country's defenses. According to news accounts, construction on the initial twenty-one-mile stretch of barbed wire fencing along a popular refugee crossing point was approved in early October 2013 and concluded approximately a year later. In

January 2015, officials announced plans to extend the fence by eighty miles, covering the remainder of the border with Turkey (Segawa & Gilkes, 2015).

**Malaysia-Thailand:** Barriers between Malaysia and Thailand were first built as early as the 1970s, purportedly to combat smuggling. They were chiefly constructed of concrete, steel, and barbed wire, with iron fencing in some parts. Both countries built their own 340-mile walls, up to eight feet high, with a thirty-foot no man's land between them. In 1991, Malaysia announced that it would build a sixty-mile concrete wall in the province of Kelantan, the only part of the Thai border that did not already have fencing. And in 2001, the two countries agreed to demolish the double-wall system and replace it with a single barrier composed of steel fencing on top of a concrete base. In September 2013, Malaysia declared plans for a new ninety-mile stretch of electrified fences along the Kolok River in Kelantan, to which Thailand agreed. The project was expected to be completed in three years. The stated purpose of the new fences was to combat smuggling. Malaysia reportedly loses up to \$1.9 billion every year from the smuggling of goods such as rice, gas, diesel fuel, alcohol, cigarettes, fertilizer, and herbicides. Human trafficking is a concern as well (Segawa & Gilkes, 2015).

**Botswana-Zimbabwe:** Following an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease around the border with Zimbabwe in 2003, Botswana began building an electrified fence ostensibly to control the epidemic. Thousands of cattle had to be put down, in a country where cattle farming is the second largest industry. Yet Zimbabwean officials and many other observers believed the fence was at least partially aimed at keeping out refugees and illegal immigrants. At the time, the much smaller

nation of Botswana (with a population of 1.7 million, compared to Zimbabwe's 11.8 million) felt threatened by the thousands of refugees fleeing the political and economic crisis spurred by strongman Robert Mugabe according to authorities in Botswana, as many as 2,500 Zimbabweans were being repatriated every month prior to the barrier's construction. The resultant fence, which cost some \$3.7 million, is six feet high and stretches over 300 miles. It was designed to deliver a 220-volt shock painful, but not lethal but the electricity was never turned on. Similarly, police and army units were reportedly assigned to patrol the border, but they apparently have yet to do so on a consistent basis. In fact, Zimbabweans have torn down parts of the barrier, and fence cutting is common (Segawa & Gilkes, 2015).

Kenya-Somalia: In response to the gradual expansion and strengthening of security so far, mainly along what has long been perceived as a sensitive land border, the Kenyan government has opted for a new strategy. Following attacks and threats of terrorism, the Kenyan Government proposed 700km anti-terror security wall separating Kenya and Somalia from border point one in Mandera and Kiunga in Lamu is on course. The project which was mooted in the aftermath of the Garissa University College terror attack is one of the most ambitious anti-terror strategies to bar off Al-Shabaab terrorists from Kenya.

Kenya's primary contribution to supporting counterterrorism capacity building in other nations was its significant troop contribution to AMISOM. In addition, Kenya hosted numerous trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighboring nations to build counterterrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation. Kenyan authorities announced plans to construct a barrier along the



border with Somalia in order to prevent further spillover attacks by Al-Qaeda affiliate Al-Shabab. While the plan made international headlines, it is far from the first instance in which barriers have been proposed or constructed in the name of bolstering national security and well-being, with concerns ranging from militants to migrants to infected livestock. In addition to the well-publicized and much-criticized barriers along the Israeli-Palestinian and U.S.-Mexican frontiers, various regions have a long history of major border security projects. By no means exhaustive, the following list details the impetus and plans for the Kenyan barrier as well as similar projects in Saudi Arabia, Bulgaria-Turkey, Malaysia-Thailand, and Botswana-Zimbabwe (Segawa & Gilkes, 2015).

Although Kenya was no stranger to terrorism in the past, the frequency and lethality of al-Shabab's recent attacks are unprecedented. Given the reported failure of other measures -- including new counterterrorism legislation, increased police presence, and significant Western security assistance Kenyan officials felt compelled to pursue an extreme solution: constructing a border wall that will extend from Mandera County at the country's northeastern tip to the Indian Ocean. According to news accounts, the government believes such a wall is the best way to insulate Kenya from al-Shabab's hit-and-run attacks in the short term. While officials concede that the 424-mile barrier - described less as a wall than a collection of 'fences, ditches, and observation posts' is neither the ultimate nor the ideal solution to Kenya's desperate security situation, they nevertheless hold that it will, at the very least, do what previous measures have failed to accomplish: prevent al-Shabab terrorists from entering the country in the first place (Segawa & Gilkes, 2015).

Beyond the military response, focus has concentrated on the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya's North Eastern Province. Further it appear that the Kenyan government is taking dramatic new steps to secure its border with Somalia by erecting a wall designed to keep out militants after a series of cross-border raids by al-Shabab militants. But experts are divided on whether the initiative is the long-awaited solution to Kenya's security problems, or a misguided effort. Kenya's decision to build a wall along its border with Somali is not a new phenomenon in the world. Most countries have had to construct perimeter walls to deter a belligerent neighbour or to try and protect it from cross border attacks. Israel has the most infamous wall that separates its territory with Palestine. Spain has built fences to deter African illegal immigrants, United States of America has a wall to deter Mexican illegal immigrants, and Saudi Arabia too has a wall separating it from Yemen. While such strategies are ideal in the emerging terrorism trends, the shift towards security-based diplomacy in countering transnational terrorism within the context of border surveillance for Kenya and Somalia begs for more research.

#### **2.6.10 Challenges and Obstacles in Border Security and Counterterrorism**

While a great deal of progress is evident, significant challenges and obstacles remain in improving border management and security. Responses to border management challenges in West Africa, for example, at the ECOWAS level, there are some protocols and regulations that provide for interventions on border management. The 1999 ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, for instance, under Article 46, talks about control of cross-border crime but makes little mention of related areas of border management (Bassey and Oshita, 2008).

The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons of 2006 under Article 22 also encourages the strengthening of border controls through sub-regional cooperation and capacity building but, understandably, it stops short of prescribing a more comprehensive border management strategy such as the AU's draft strategy. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework in turn emphasizes cross-border initiatives<sup>13</sup> as a means of reducing tensions, fighting cross-border crime and enhancing community welfare, among other concerns. ECOWAS has also been reviewing the Counter- Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan in response to the terrorist activities and threat in the region. These initiatives address aspects of border management but do not address comprehensively border insecurity issues as a whole (Lampthey, 2012).

Lampthey (2010) further argues that despite the challenges and threats posed by border insecurity, there is a lack of a common approach in terms of policy formulation, at the national and sub-regional levels. The AU's strategy, therefore, offers the blueprint from which ECOWAS and national governments can formulate their own context-specific strategies for a more integrated regional response to the challenges of border management. Despite the many challenges associated with the implementation process, the strategy will nevertheless be useful as a starting point for national and regional efforts at border management. However, the primary responsibility for managing borders rests with the state, which must necessarily put in place the structures and policies required to maintain national sovereignty and protect its citizens.

According to Bassey and Oshita (2008), lack of office space and accommodation for border patrol and control personnel, coupled with inadequate means of

communication have also severely tested the capacity of these agents to carry out their work effectively. Additionally, inadequate skills and poor understanding of the job are prevalent. Aggravating these problems is the poor awareness of national constitutive laws and regional agreements<sup>8</sup> relevant to the effective conduct of their work. In Mali and Niger, for example, personnel posted to the border areas complained of lack of adequate training and logistics to effectively carry out their work (Lamprey, 2010). Compounding the issue are understaffed agencies and unmotivated staff who do not effectively collaborate and coordinate their activities nationally and regionally.

In the Sahel region, for example, the lack of comprehensive national border management strategies has meant that most countries derive their responses to border management issues from documents such as the Customs and Police legislation, leading to a scattered policy approach (Asiwaju and Adeniyi, 2013). Nonetheless, Senegal has taken bold steps in this regard by being the first Sahel country to develop a national border management strategy. Large-scale migration and the increase in transnational trafficking coupled with its strategic location as an important transit point for irregular migrants from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe have informed Senegal's efforts at the national level to prioritize border management (Sawadogo, 2012). Even with such developments, in the case of Kenya and Somalia, persistent reports of terrorist attacks call for more research.

According to Hoffman (2004), document issuance systems lack integrity; significant weaknesses in the chain of identity documentation leading to the issuance of official travel documents allow for duplicate issuance of passports, or

issuance to non-nationals or non-qualified nationals. The lack of integrity of these systems also increases the chances that operator misuse or abuse will go unchecked. The solutions here include more integration of data systems related to identity, and where possible the introduction of biometrics into the travel document application process, and into the management and audit system of the issuance process. This is different from introducing biometrics into the travel document itself, or creating an e-passport. It is, however, not a counter-strategy or at odds with e-passports; rather it is quite complementary.

Another challenge, according to Harn (2005), concerns data use and data sharing within governments and between governments. Government reports and news stories are replete with references to security breaches caused or contributed to by lack of data sharing. Some of the limitations are technical and financial; it is impossible to use available data, such as Interpol passport data, if there is no reliable data system at the borders to channel it through. Other limitations are political and legal. Personal data, the kind needed and used at border crossings and in international travel document issuance, is important and potentially powerful data; it needs to be adequately protected. Clearly a balance must be struck between the collection and justified use of such data, including biometric data at times, and the protection of individual rights and privacies. Human rights and privacy rights need to be treated as integral to the strategies of increased security and built into the decision-making process at all levels from the beginning. They can not easily be added on at the end, as an afterthought. This is a significant challenge.

On the other hand, the challenge of putting in place consistent and long-term support to assist under-resourced countries to address security issues related to border management. Too often an initial investment is made for an assessment or start-up component of a national system, but follow-up funding to complete the process and tie all elements together is not forthcoming or is delayed. Somehow, the contributors and partners to these initiatives must find ways to work with longer timeframes and longer commitments, providing consistent support to complete the work with the partner countries and partner Organization (Lamprey, 2010). Similarly, the challenge of seeing security from all perspectives. At times security initiatives may appear to be designed to be carried out on the territory of one State, but for the primary benefit of another State. Better security is in everyone's interest, and the priorities of the less vocal or less-resourced States should be integrated into a full plan that suits all parties. Finally, coordination mechanisms and strategies should, of course, be as inclusive as possible. However, coordination among donors and assistance agencies is useful and needed, but coordination that includes the less-resourced countries is also essential. Viewing Security from a Migration Management Perspective Systems supporting the normal functions of migration management is not a world apart from those for security management in migration.

#### **2.6.10.1 The Challenge of Porous Borders**

Porous borders represent a major challenge to ensuring security and stability for national governments in East Africa and the Horn of Africa at large. The presence of the state security apparatus is marginal in many border areas, which reflects a general inability of the governments to enforce order within each country's territorial boundary (Rosand *et al.*, 2009). This allows for free movement of

people and illicit trade across borders. This is particularly true in the case of the Kenya-Somalia border, which has not only allowed the movement of refugees fleeing the conflict in Somalia but also allows movement of terrorist and easy flow of illegal weapons (Kimunguyi, 2011). In addition, Mativo (2014) asserts that along the borderlines, there are few urban centres that are far apart and inaccessible. The rest of the expansive land is only ventured into by pastoralists who graze their livestock and cross their border at the dictate of weather patterns and not immigration controls (Mativo, 2014:7). Although measures and security have been beefed up in Nairobi and across Kenya's borders, cases of grenade attacks and hostage taking and demanding ransom have been on the increase. Against such challenges, the current study sought to evaluate the effectiveness of border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

There is lack of agreement on the level of terrorist operations inside Somalia itself. This could partly be because of the lack of accurate intelligence that is an effect of the operational difficulties of running human sources in such complicated operating environments especially in Central and Southern Somalia which are held by Al Shabaab and Hizb Islam. However, there seems to be a consensus that the country serves as a transit and shield for al-Qaeda operatives in the region (ICG, 2005, p.11); has been linked with a number of terrorist attacks in neighbouring states, and in each of these cases al-Qaeda used Somalia as a co-ordination point and transit route. Of note are the use of the Somali borders for safe passage for the 7 August 1998 terrorist bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and the November 2002 hotel and

international airport attacks in Mombasa (Kenya), for which al-Qaeda claimed responsibility (Kagwanja, 2010).

At present there are fears that foreign Islamist fighters may move into Somalia through its numerous porous entry ports to join forces with Islamist fundamentalist groups such as Al Shabaab. From late 2006, the steady influx of jihadi volunteers from across the Muslim world (including numerous young radicals from the Somali Diaspora around the world) was estimated to range from several hundred to, less plausibly, several thousand. Okoth (2010) point out that the Somali warlords reached an agreement in Nairobi in 1994 to establish a new government in Mogadishu; but Kenya remains vulnerable to an influx of refugees and weapons across its northern border.

#### **2.6.10.2 Security Flaws and Cross-Border Exchanges Between Kenya and Somalia**

It is argued that a more holistic approach is necessary when looking at border issues, taking into account the nexus between peace, security and development. Adetunji (2014) posits that more efficient border management as well as bilateral infrastructure development should be at the heart of the efforts to make the border regions between an economically viable and safer environment. The various cross-border flows depicted pose a challenge to security. They not only challenge the state by circumventing its control and threatening its institutions, but this also puts individuals at risk: they are the ones who face increasing insecurity when crossing the border.

For instance, while Kenya's border problem is related to this colonial history, its porosity has been exacerbated by the failure of succeeding governments to



properly administer these borders. As Okumu (2012) notes, “the high level of insecurity on African borders is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists drew them.” In this respect, these borders are known for the limited presence of security and law enforcement officials. The few that are deployed are poorly trained, work with inadequate and obsolete equipment, and sometimes poorly remunerated. In addition, most border communities have for long been neglected by the government, making it difficult for government to leverage on their position to curtail illicit cross- border activities.

Osiche (2008) argues that the experience of measures such as the Rapid Results Initiative (RRI) implementation in Kenya on security matters has been hampered by poor organizational evaluation and accountability systems. In recent years, governments around the world have established procedures to try to analyze the impacts of new regulatory proposals before they are adopted (Malyshev, 2006). By contrast, they have paid remarkably little attention to analyzing regulations after adoption or to evaluating the impacts of the procedures and practices that govern the regulatory process itself, so-called regulatory policy. Corruption, which is deep-rooted in Kenya, has largely been blamed for scaling down domestic saving and investment and the misallocation of inventive talent. While in the last few decades transparency and accountability have been catchwords in the Public Service of Kenya, this is yet to completely tame corruption therein (Osiche, 2008).

In response to the foregoing, the government of the Republic of Kenya while acknowledging that corruption is serious development bottleneck, has come up

with several control mechanisms to fight it. The foregoing is the institutional framework that is expected to provide the necessary guidelines on the conduct of government business as well as check against individuals and institutions that act otherwise (Mbitha, 2010). The link between development and security supporting the quest for human security is the striking fact that border regions often exhibit a low level of development compared to the core centers of the country. The institutional framework for transparency and accountability in the Public Service of Kenya consists of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, laws, policies and attendant guidelines with regard to the conduct of public business. The general aim is to cushion the public against malpractices especially by public officials in cahoots with individuals and institutions in the private sector. Such malpractice especially corruption have the potential to divert resources meant for the public good and into use that is generally sectarian in nature (Okumu, 2012).

According to Finlay *et al.*, (2012), the ability of al-Shabaab and other terrorist organizations to operate and strike throughout Eastern Africa is in part the result of the region's porous borders, weak government structures, and inadequate judicial and law-enforcement mechanisms aimed at combating these dangerous and lawless groups. Additionally, the presence of disaffected Muslim groups, and the close proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, have long raised fears that terrorists could exploit weaknesses to conduct planning and operations in Eastern African countries. As terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda, encounter greater operational difficulties in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan, it is feared that they will shift operations to alternate areas where resistance is less. There is emerging evidence that this may already be occurring in Somalia (Finlay, 2012). Because of its

territorial proximity to Somalia, as well as the current lack of border security and resources to carry out a concerted counterterrorism offensive, Kenya is perhaps most susceptible to further terrorist attacks (Menkhaus and Boucek, 2010). At present, as noted by Harnisch (2010), because of resource constraints, as well as the practical challenges in monitoring the 400-mile border between the two countries, terror groups operating in Somalia “can essentially enter and leave Kenya freely, opening the door to hit the country’s soft targets more or less at will.” Other countries are also at risk, for example Ethiopia, whose border with Somalia is practically void of security.

### **2.6.10.3 Border Security Issues in Kenya**

Kenya-Somalia borders have a variety of problems and issues and need a comprehensive focus for durable settlement. At many places, the social contours of our border are mercilessly cut across and divided into various ethnic groups. In time of conflict in neighbouring countries this has become a source of acute tension. The inter-ethnic relations are characterized by existence of number of bilateral disputes some of them rooted in historical past, others in current dynamics of bilateral issues (Finlay *et al.*, 2012). Despite Kenya’s centrality, different geographical areas require different standards of security.

According to Menkhaus (2012), there can be no horizontal stratification for accessing the standard of border security; on a specific segment of the border one has to go through many factors and not just geographically induced threat perception. Other trigger elements are: strategic importance of area, population pattern, and incidence of trans-border crime, disputability and security posture of opposing country. However, at border guarding level, reduction of tension

amongst the neighbouring countries is of utmost importance. It helps, as administrative machinery can continue border regulation even in disputed areas. Border misunderstandings and clashes which has potential to trigger major confrontation can be reduced and borders can be better managed. A decisive posture, coupled with preparedness and constant vigil will help generate respect for us and reduce tensions. Therefore, proper management of borders is vitally important for the national security (Menkhaus, 2012). Different portions of extensive border have a variety of problems specific to them which have to be appropriately addressed. These problems have become aggravated in recent times with Kenyas's policy of cross- border terrorism along with its intensely hostile alshabaab propaganda designed to mislead and sway the loyalties of the border population is a growing trend. The intensification of cross-border terrorism targeted to destabilize Kenya and Somalia has thrown up new challenges for border management policy (Menkhaus, 2012).

### **a) General Constraints**

External threats Kenya's security are not the only border management issue dealt with at present by the national security apparatus. Kenya's rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours and this has generated problems like mass migrations into and out of Kenya. Other threats and challenges have also emerged. The border security scenario is marked by; increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants; emergence of non-State actors; nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers; illegal migration; radical extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and the establishment of madrasas (training schools), some of which are potential security hazards (Menkhaus, 2012).

### **b) Undemarcated Borders**

One of the important problems in managing the borders is their delimitation and demarcation on the ground (Mueller, 2008). Kenya has an undemarcated border with Somalia. The fact is that the boundaries are a mix of well recognized demarcations; as argued, al shabaab has been using covert action in the guise of terrorism as an instrument of State policy against Kenya. It has recruited, trained, financed, armed and infiltrated terrorists in the region. When a border is not demarcated on the ground and when there is no common understanding between two sides such intrusions are bound to take place from both sides. Such intrusions used to be a recurring feature across the Kenya-Somalia border in the Northern region. Undemarcated areas continue to remain a source of tension and pose a hindrance towards normalization of relations between two nations. India had to defend its territory by going to war over these issues (Mueller, 2008).

According to Menkhaus (2012), illegal migration, infiltration of anti-national elements, smuggling of arms/explosives and drug trafficking are some of the serious problem. The terrain and the demographic composition of the border area make it conducive for terrorist groups to sneak into Kenya and also to get easily assimilated into the local populace. Migration from Somalia to Kenya, especially in Mandera and Wajir, has primarily been driven by the quest for better economic opportunities. Many Somalis have also crossed over into Kenya to escape political and religious persecution. Over the years, the magnitude of this illegal migration had reached such an astounding proportion that it had begun to alter the demographic profile and threaten the socio- political fabric of the Border States. The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of the people have also made it easy for Insurgents Groups to cross over into Kenya. The increasing influence of Islamic fundamentalism has resulted in the large- scale push, of not only economic migrants, but also the foot- soldiers of jihad terrorism and pan-Islamic fundamentalism, all of which have the potential to destabilize the country and threaten national security (Menkhaus, 2012).

### **c) Difficulty in Identifying Foreign National**

According to Prestholdt (2011), Somali population bordering Kenya and Somalia look alike, speak the same language, wear the same dresses and have similar set of culture and traditions, thus making it difficult to identify a foreign national in the absence of identify cards in the border areas. Connivance of the locals with intruders for a payment makes the task of detection more difficult. Their similar face, attire, posture and behaviour resemble In one sense, the porous border has helped to initiates rebellion activity in both nations to some extent. At many

places, the social contours of our borders are mercilessly cut across and divided into various ethnic groups. In time of conflict in neighbouring countries this becomes a source of acute tension. The impact of the situation in Somalia on neighboring states is significant. For example, northeastern Kenya has been severely affected by the near absence of state control in Somalia, where interclan rivalry and banditry have further weakened border security and created additional space and income (through the illegal sale and transit of commodities, mainly livestock and grain) for criminal and terrorist elements to operate (Prestholdt, 2011).

#### **d) Passive and Indifferent Attitude of Border Population**

The major problem in combating cross border terrorism is that all border crime takes place in an organized manner. The population residing in the border areas is either dependent on the kingpins or are scared to speak against such criminals. This sometimes happens due to indifferent attitude of the administration where some of them are also a part of the nexus (Aronson, 2013). One of the main reason for surviving and thriving of terrorists and subversive groups is that the people no longer willing to tolerate the inequity, poverty, and corruption in which States in these areas have been mired. Disgusted with the governments and despairing of the prospect for peaceful and incremental change within the existing order, the people are looking for an explanation of their personal suffering and societal degradation. The denial of basic human needs like genuine decent livelihood, civil liberties; some have taken to terrorism due to various grievances and instigation by the religious, fundamentalist and jihad organizations (Aronson, 2013).

#### **e) Nexus Between Criminal-Administration and Police**

The cross border crimes in the border regions flourish due to the connivance and close nexus of the criminals, police administration triumvirate. It has been found in certain cases that before the illegal migrants enter a country, certain important documents like ration cards, are all prepared and handed over to them to allow them escape detection on the border (Aronson, 2013). These illegal migrants are then helped to reach any part of this country, including crossing over to fences also. State police force has been found inadequately trained to deal with situation as such border guarding forces are frequently withdrawn to combat insurgency.



They have also been withdrawn many a time to deal with law and order problems. Withdrawal of forces limits their capabilities to guard the borders efficiently. Even the military officers are alleged to have ordered weapons on the basis of how large the kickback will be. There are instances where soldiers and policemen have extorted rather than defended the public (Aronson, 2013).

#### **f) Limitation to Applicability of Law of the Land**

Indulgence in across the border crimes like cattle lifting, kidnapping, crossing over of under trials extremists, trafficking of women and children have become a phenomenon and a way of living because the law of the land ceases to apply after a person crosses over to the other side. Terrorists have entered into an understanding to provide shelter to each other in their respective countries to avoid legal proceedings. Some of the legal constraints are also contributing in enhancing the cross border terrorism between Kenya and Somalia (Finlay, et al., 2012). The jurisdiction of border guarding forces differs from border to border. There is no clear cut demarcation regarding the jurisdiction.

The presence of local police is also grossly inadequate. Absence of vehicles with the police, inadequate staff, ambiguous laws and poor road network are also severe constraints for the border guarding forces. The legal system has several loopholes, which are fully exploited by the terrorists. The Police are naturally under a lot of pressure, not only to deal and arrest terrorists, but also to collect evidence. There should be proper border guidelines framed for the border guarding forces of all the countries. The aim of these border guidelines was to ensure co- operation between both the border guarding forces over cross border

crimes and exchange of information and intelligence at appropriate levels (Finlay, et al., 2012).

#### **2.6.11 Border Surveillance and Counter-terrorism Measures in Kenya**

To combat the terrorism threat in the region, countries have, to varying degrees based upon political will and local capacities, enacted an array of counterterrorism measures. Uganda passed the Suppression of Terrorism Act in 2002, while Tanzania passed its Anti-Terrorism Law in 2003 (Shinn, 2007). Due to the threat posed by al-Shabaab and Al Qaeda, Uganda recently enhanced security at many government sites and popular civilian locations, and it allowed the US Antiterrorism Assistance Program to conduct an assessment of the country's counterterrorism capabilities.<sup>68</sup> Tanzania has established a National Counterterrorism Center, which participates in several programs aimed at strengthening law-enforcement and military capacities, improving border and aviation security, and targeting terrorists' financing (Harnisch, 2010). The passage of an anti-terrorism bill met stiff resistance in Kenya's Parliament, but in comparison to many other states, Kenya has received substantial amounts of foreign assistance for its counterterrorism programs, and it too operates a National Counterterrorism Center (Finlay, et al., 2012). Despite progress made by each of these countries, there is still concern that anti-terrorism laws remain inadequate and, more importantly, that capacity shortfalls in border surveillance mechanisms, law enforcement, intelligence gathering and the sharing of information may hinder the effectiveness of newly implemented initiatives and leave local residents vulnerable to the persistent terrorist threat.

Recognizing the serious threat posed by SALW, the government of Kenya launched an array of efforts designed to shore up that country's ability to prevent trafficking. For example, the Kenya Ports Authority has made remarkable strides in implementing the International Maritime Organization's ship and port facility security measures. In April 2008, the Kenyan government set up a new monitoring unit to control trafficking along its coastline. Kenyan authorities are also strengthening border security through the acquisition of sophisticated detection and inspection equipment for border points and providing training to relevant personnel (Smith, 2010). In spite of this accumulated evidence, the new and emerging insecurity environment provides significant and novel challenges for such agencies to effectively deal with border challenges.

In conjunction with heightened port and security measures, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission together with the Kenya Revenue Authority have stepped up efforts to investigate and prosecute customs control and border-security violations involving the diversion of transit goods. A recent investigation uncovered a tax-evasion syndicate operating at major Kenyan border posts, including Busia, Malaba, Isebania, Lokichoggio, Taveta, Namanga, and Lunga-Lunga on the Kenya-Uganda border, which led to the arrest of three people, including one customs official (Finlay *et al.*, 2012). Yet, the increasingly transnational nature of terrorism threats is placing ever greater pressures on such custom control measures.

The Kenyan government is also providing incentives to traders that comply with stricter regulations. For example, the Kenya Revenue Authority has started a new initiative designed to integrate modern risk-management measures into the regulation of transit trade. The Authorized Economic Operator status will reward

responsible traders and freight-forwarding companies by enabling trustworthy traders those with a satisfactory system of financial and customs record-keeping to gain access to expedited shipment processing, lower storage costs, and minimal intervention at border crossings. In aggregate, these initiatives are meant to prevent the transshipment of small arms and light weapons as well as other crime and terrorist activities across the borders of Kenya (Nzumbi, 2010).

Border-security cooperation, designed to combat organized crime and terrorism insurgencies, is also ongoing between Kenyan, Ugandan, and Somali authorities. More importantly, Kenyan officials have pragmatically leveraged the link between security and development objectives even while the donor community has been slow to implement its rhetoric. Although economic development, including infrastructure upgrades, is the primary impetus behind a recent project to improve roads and transportation networks between Kenya and Tanzania, the project also incorporates the concept of a one-stop border post designed to significantly shorten customs clearance times by standardizing customs procedures and improving the capacity of customs agencies. The initiative will not only enhance economic development through improved and ubiquitous trade, it also promises to yield more secure trade (Noor, 2010). Nevertheless, the shift towards security-based diplomacy in countering transnational terrorism within the context of border surveillance has not been largely explored.

## **2.7 Conceptual Framework**

The complexity of achieving greater security between Kenya and Somalia-and the Horn of Africa at large within the new international security order can be appreciated by understanding the debate on the new security outlook. The debate

on security-based diplomacy can be located within two major contemporary theories of international politics (Rosand & Ipe, 2009). These are post-modernism and neo-realism. On the other hand, there are various theories that can be used to understand the dependent variable of the study, which is transnational terrorism. However, only one was used to understand terrorism aspect of the study, namely, the new social movement theory.

### **2.7.1 Neo-Realism**

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory first outlined by Kenneth Waltz (1979). Neorealism is an international relations theory, whose worldview is rooted in the assumptions that the international realm consists of sovereign political units called states, and that states are the primary actors interacting in an anarchic international system (a system with no central authority to protect states from one another) (Lamy, 2009). Neorealists believe that since the basic motive driving states is gaining, maintaining, and maximizing power in order to obtain security and stability, states are in constant struggle for power and potentially dangerous to each other (Lamy, 2009). Furthermore, Neorealists believe that the only path to international order and security is for the international system to be dominated and led by a single state, which imposes its will, but creates peace. To maintain and maximize its dominance, the dominant state uses its supremacy to restore order and stability. In addition, it utilizes various strategies including covert and overt intervention in other states' politics and imposing state policy of regime change (one single model of national success), deterrence (displaying power), preemption (preventive war), and powerful political socialization through which norms and expected behavior is transmitted (Chandler, & Gunaratna, 2007).

The neorealism theory emphasises the importance of the structure of international system and its role as the primary determinant of state behavior. Unlike Waltz (2009), realism that views states behavior directed by its self-interested nature, Waltz argues that structure directs states conduct. The structure of the international political system is defined first by its organizing principle, which is anarchy. Where every state (as units in the system) have similar ultimate interest for survival. Neorealism's underlying description of the international system is in many ways similar to the situation of diplomacy. Neorealism holds that the organizing principle of the international system is anarchy, that the unit of importance to that system is the state. The first concept of neorealism, inherited from classical realism that can be easily found in Diplomacy is that of the 'security dilemma.' That is that forces built to defend against the potential threat of other actors may cause those other actors to feel themselves threatened. Diplomacy provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. The security dilemma is all the more 'real' in Diplomacy given the fact that all players are inherently expansionist (Rosen, 2011). This concept remains integral to security-based diplomacy and world peace that states remain primary referents of security.

Instead of seeing the system as states existing separately within a sphere of anarchy, neo-realism attempts to examine the force of the international system on the state and the influence of the individuals within a state. As noted in Baylis (2008:14) 'according to Waltz, structure is defined by the ordering principle of the international system, which is anarchy, and the distribution of capabilities across units, which are states.' Neorealism is often called "structural realism," which signifies that the theory primarily centers on the effects of the structure of

the international system when it seeks to explain outcomes in international politics. In Waltz's (1979) conception of structure, two things are especially noteworthy about the international system; Firstly, the international system's ordering principle is anarchy. This simply means that there is no such thing as a world government; there is no higher authority above the main units that exist in the system the states. The second defining principle of the structure of international politics is the distribution of capabilities across the units inhabiting the international system. Capabilities, or power, vary significantly between states; states, though functionally undifferentiated, are differentiated according to how much power they possess.

Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system: a unipolar system containing only one great power; a bipolar system which contains two great powers, and a multipolar system which contains more than two great powers. Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances (Kaufmann, 2004). While most states needs are the same, capabilities to obtain these needs differ between states. The relative differences in capabilities among states to meet their needs therefore results in distrust and fear within the international system. It is the fear that other states, with the capabilities, will become more powerful which result in the uneven globalization process and an uneven distribution of power in the international system. In addition, and

supporting Waltz's theory, neo-realists view globalization as a challenge but still see politics as international, and states as the principal actors in the international political arena. Their main concern, in regards to Globalization is uneven distribution of power, which results in inequality and therefore conflict.

Neo-realism is suitable for this paper since transnational terrorism is a threat to sovereignty and the nation state, which according to neo-realism is the most important issue for states. Therefore, this thesis applies neo-realism as a theoretical framework in order to fully understand, explain and analyze transnational terrorism (Chandler, & Gunaratna, 2007). According to Rosen (2011), units used for defense of territory are precisely the same units that are used in offensive action to gain new territories, often at the expense of neighboring powers. Thus any unit is always simultaneously a force for defense, and a force of threat. The security dilemma also applies to territorial position. In the local context, this theory brings in the aspect of Operation Linda Nchi and concerns on whether Kenya has the authority to make such a decision. Although these processes are not always compatible, neo-realists argue that a security regime, which involves co-operation and collaboration that is linked to and informed by what is in the best interest of individual states, is the most appropriate framework for security co-operation among states.

Viewed within the context of security-based diplomacy and counterterrorism, a neo-realist, nevertheless, notes that such co-operation can only be institutionalized if the national interests of the participating members are considered, especially if they are 'weak' states. Weak' states, according to Swatuk and Omari (2004), 'inhibit the capacity to build a stronger region.' States



will, therefore, require a framework that accommodates the strengthening of individual states, while simultaneously co-operating with each other. As such, neorealism is suitable for this study since terrorism is a threat to sovereignty of the nation state (Osterlind, 2009). Today, however, states must consider new dimensions of security (Nye, 2009). Considered as a failed state, Somalia case demonstrates clearly how complex any approach to terrorism must be. Neorealism is thus important to the understanding of transnational terrorism in the region and the security-based approach to the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Despite its relevance however, the second defining principle, units' capabilities to pursue their interest is not equally distributed. It varies, with the more capable ones, of course, shaping the realm, posing the problems that the others have to deal with. The unequal distribution of states capabilities create states' balance of power behavior either multipolarity or bipolarity.

Despite its relevance and advantages, Neorealism fails to explain most types of state behavior and state interaction cannot usefully be accounted for by Waltz's parsimonious theory. In essence, Neorealism is often faulted for failing to explain or predict events or behavior that Neorealists have never set out to explain or predict in the first place. In addition, Neorealism on its own is usually unable accurately to account for the specifics concerning each case of war, or of the avoidance of war, or of power balancing, or power seeking, or of the death of states, or security competition and arms races, or alliance formation. Moreover, the assumption about anarchy as the ordering principle of the international system leads to the simple but inherently correct contention that wars will occur because there's nothing there to stop them from occurring. Yet, states will always have

conflicting interests; sometimes these conflicting interests center on vital issues, sometimes adversaries make mistakes when they are trying to gauge relative power, and sometimes states make mistakes when they try to estimate the resolve of adversaries (Chandler, & Gunaratna, 2007). The neo-realist school does not focus on the domestic policies and their effect on foreign policy; and in this case, Kenya has its domestic policies on war against transnational terrorism yet, the neo-realist approach which disregards domestic policies.

Neorealism has also been widely criticized by other scholars. For instance Cox (2006) claims that neo-realism has sacrificed the interpretive richness of classical realism as a critical theory in order to transform it into a positivistic problem-solving theory. Cox argues that the inability of this particular approach in differentiating between times and places are the cause of major flaw in Waltz's (1979) theory of neo-realism. Neo-realism is unable to explain structural transformation, since the positivist approach cannot account for variations whether in the basic nature of the actors (power seeking) or in their mode of interaction (power balancing). In addition, neo-realists denied the recognition to global collectivist concepts on transnational class relations or the interest of human kind. Moreover, the utilitarian perspective of neorealism has undermined the notion of state as actor whose interest and interactions shape the structure of international system. By embracing positivist approach neo-realism disregards the value laden social action such as social consensus that may perhaps coordinate practices as well as distribution of resources. Neo-realist defines international structure not as an independent internal relation prior to and constitutive of social actors, but as a joining of states. Therefore the international structure is not

established independent of the parts taken together, since it is emerged as a result of joining the parts together.

Arguably, neorealism has not only ignored changes in the density of interactions in systems, but has been too quick in assuming that the differentiation in units can be dropped as a characteristic of the structure of the international system. In the short term, states may be the dominant units and play a similar functional role, but over long periods other units may grow in importance, and roles may alter. Another critics comes from Keohane (2009), a liberal institutionalism theorist. Keohane (2009) accepts basic tenets of the neo-realist argument such as, the assumption that states act rationally, and the assumption that states seek power to affect other states. However, Keohane (2009) argues that the concepts of states “maximizing power” and states creating a “balance of power” are in fact contradictory. According to Keohane (2009), “states concerned with self preservation do not seek to maximize their power when they are not in danger.” It is clear that Neorealism fails to account for many of the specific causal mechanisms at play in most cases of interstate armed conflict. For that, additional theoretical knowledge; the assistance of other theories about transnational terrorism and peace are required.

### **2.7.2 Postmodernism**

The postmodernist approach advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military fixation on threats. In addition, the post-modernists stress quite explicitly that the state must be dislodged as the primary referent and encompass instead individual human beings, ethnic and kinship groups, nations

and the entire global community of humankind (Booth, 2004). However, Krause (2011) argues that the new international security agenda requires new approaches to diplomacy. Its issues are highly interdependent, requiring holistic solutions, international cooperation and, increasingly, collaboration between international civil societies. Booth (2004) in expanding the concept security, horizontally and vertically, has argued that human security is ultimately more important than state security.

Postmodernists subsequently argue that the primary referent of security must be broadened to include a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, (MNC's), international nongovernmental organizations (INGO's), and the entire humankind. From this theoretical perspective, the Kenya-Somalia case can demonstrate clearly how complex any approach to terrorism must be. Issues of transnational terrorism, which is the prime concern of Kenya and Somalia, are inextricably bound with other sources of conflict, border disputes, historic grievances, and broad regional involvement. In this regard the state is no more than the sum of its parts and as such 'leads to an interpretation of national security which places great emphasis on values derived from the interests of individual citizens' (Buzan, 2001). This view to security subsequently challenges the state as an effective and adequate provider of security, "in an increasingly interdependent world" (Tickner, 2005).

Postmodernism theory looks at how subjects of international relations relate and can be understood; how their physical security can be addressed. Postmodernist argues that a security community is the most appropriate framework for the

institutionalization of security at the regional level. In relation to the study, the Horn of Africa has been the most conflicted part of Africa during the last 50 years (Buzan, 2001). Indeed, the postmodernist approach is relevant to the study, since the Kenya-Somalia case demonstrates clearly how complex any approach to terrorism must be. Issues of terrorism, even transnational terrorism, which is the prime concern of the two states, are inextricably bound up with other sources of conflict, border disputes, historic grievances, and thus require a broad regional involvement. Despite its relevance, the post-modernist theory is a limited analytic tool. While, it offers some interesting insight into the broadening of security measures to include a wide range of non-state actors, it seems that most of those advantages can be secured and perhaps secured better through a modified modernist framework. It seems to cut off political struggles and groupings at the knees with respect to communication, collaboration, and political institutional change. What is interesting about postmodernism is not what postmodernists say about it, but how it functions in the real world) in terms of social change. Fukuyama and Laqueur (2000) do not consider the ultimate, underlying reason why acts of terrorism have increased so much and so fast. The fact that terrorist organizations operate under the guiding principle of fighting an occupying enemy earns them the support of their community.

Despite its relevance, the postmodernist misconception arises from treating terrorism as a cause and not a symptom. Postmodernism questions the current construction of security and risk. Security can be varied depending on the power relations among the different actors. Societies in the developing world can gain support to overcome security challenges if international community categorized

them as risk as a part of security discourses. However, vulnerable societies in the developing world are in a difficult position to question the security discourse that can jeopardize them. This may create more insecurity to vulnerable societies in the developing world. Furthermore, the current approach to security as a development tool to combat poverty can damage more the security in the developing world and create more insecurity. It creates an interventionist attitude that can disempower societies and states in the developing world. The inclusion of non-state actors is challenged in the sense that they (non-state actors) have no coercive power to influence. This interventionism is pursued in the name of humanity. However, this humanity encloses a particular model of human life that excludes different model of life (Acharya, 2010). The expansion of postmodernism to involve other actors can provoke more insecurity for societies with different models of human life. Thus security challenges can facilitate further the development of modernity in societies in the developing world although it has its price.

Although postmodernism calls for holistic solutions and international cooperation in broadening the concept of security, it ignores the real human suffering while condemning institutional bureaucracies in solving them. Postmodernism sees itself as a response to identity politics, but to the contrary its a hyperindividualism which destroys group cohesion and identity. Broadening security to include a wide range of non-state actors poses great challenges to defense transformation, which requires a shift in paradigms. These actors lack the coercive power to influence and hence limited in their capacity. Moreover, the emergence of a multiple and diverse pool of violent and defiant non-state actors, empowered by

the globalization impact and diminishing role of states, and enabled by radical ideologies, access to finance and open-source technologies challenges the postmodernist approach in the management of transnational terrorism.

As a proponent of postmodernism, Edward Said, adopts a discourse analysis and postcolonial theory as tools for rethinking forms of knowledge and the social identities of postcolonial systems. An important feature of postcolonialist thought is its assertion that modernism and modernity are part of the colonial project of domination. According to Said (1975), debates about postcolonialism are unresolved, yet colonialism as a discourse is based on the ability of Westerners to examine other societies in order to produce knowledge and use it as a form of power deployed against the very subjects of inquiry. As should be readily apparent, the issues of postcolonialism are uncomfortably relevant to contemporary anthropological investigations.

According to Nye (2004), soft power is as important as hard power, and even more so in international politics. Indeed, soft power enables a change of behaviour in others, without competition or conflict, by using persuasion and attraction. Furthermore, the use of hard power in the modern day would be more costly (both financially and politically), whereas it is possible to say that soft power is “free”, in the sense that it does not require substantial resources and has limited consequences in case of failure. Furthermore, Nye (2011) argues that ‘the military can sometimes play an important role in the generation of soft power.’ Indeed, attraction and seduction of the opposite camp may be crucial in wartime, such as being seen in a positive way by the people or persuading soldiers to

desert. However, even though Nye (2011) admits that military force may be useful, it does not challenge his theory of soft power, nor is he contradicting Liberalism. Indeed, he instead introduces the notion of smart power, ‘the ability to combine hard and soft power effectively’. He argues that soft power is always more important, in the long-run, than hard power. It is therefore legitimate to use military force in exceptional circumstances, but one should mainly focus on soft power.

### **2.7.3 New Social Movements Theory**

The term new social movements (NSMs) is a theory of social movements that attempts to explain the plethora of new movements that have come up in various western societies roughly since the mid-1960s (i.e. in a post-industrial economy) which are claimed to depart significantly from the conventional social movement paradigm (Buechler, 1999). According to Gunning (2009), a social movement organization is generally conceived as self-conscious group acting in concert to challenge the existing social order by confronting existing authorities. On the other hand, Castells (2004) points out those social networks are the key vehicle for transmission of grievances, for recruitment, and for mobilization. Terrorists thus, according to this perspective, should be understood and studied as small minorities within larger counter-cultures and radicalization should be seen as a result of social relations rather than structural background factors or innate individual characteristics (Castells, 2004).

According to Castells (2004), the central claims of the new social movements theory include, first, the rise of the post-industrial economy is responsible for a new wave of social movement and second, that those movements are significantly



different from previous social movements of the industrial economy. Second, the primary difference is in their goals, as the new movements focus not on issues of materialistic qualities such as economic wellbeing, but on issues related to human rights. Third, the advent of the post-industrial economy resulted in a new wave of social movements distinct from those social movements arising during the industrial economy. Lastly, in these new social movements, more importance is attached to social and cultural concerns, rather than economic or political considerations. NSMs are normally centered on a single issue, or a limited range of issues which are related to a broader theme, such as the environment (Castells, 2004).

According to Gunning (2009:4), a social movement organization is generally conceived as a self-conscious group acting in concert to challenge the existing social order by confronting existing authorities. On the other hand, Castells (2004) points out that these social networks are the key vehicle for transmission of grievances, for recruitment, and for mobilization. Terrorists thus, according to this perspective, should be understood and studied as small minorities within larger counter-cultures and radicalization should be seen as a result of social relations rather than a structural background factors or innate individual characteristics (Castells, 2004).

The new social movement theory refers to a new paradigm of social movement activity and collective action. Contemporary social movements are characterized by strategies, goals, and membership distinct from tradition social movements (Lentin, 2009). New social movement theorists and scholars explain new social movements as arising from numerous channels in society. For example, new

social movements are seen as expressions of civil society's desire for structural change and arise from the growing importance and ubiquity of information in our increasingly knowledge-based society. New social movements are also seen as an inevitable outcome of changing social, economic, and political relationships in the postindustrial society. New social movements are movements for change based on the desire for structural reform rather than revolution, do not attempt to dismantle the existing political and economic systems and are characterized by their self-limiting radicalism. New social movement helps to explain the changing forms of political organization and the shifting relations between public and private spheres in postindustrial societies (Lentin, 2009).

The most noticeable feature of new social movements is that they are primarily social and cultural and only secondarily, if any, political. It is clearly elaborated by Habermas (1999) that new social movements are the 'new politics' which is about quality of life, individual self-realization. Social movement theory can contribute a necessary conceptual framework for understanding transnational terrorism. Terrorism is a form of contentious politics, analyzable with the basic social movement approach of mobilizing resources, political opportunity structure, and framing. Previous research on movement radicalization, repression, and cycles of contention has direct bearing on militancy. On the other hand, the theory is relevant because terrorist groups are organizations first and foremost, subject to similar dilemmas and dynamics of other movement organizations. Terrorism is rarely random, but takes place in the context of a wider environment with a political opportunity structure (Beck, 2008). The rise of the post-industrial economy is responsible for a new wave of social movement and second, that those movements are significantly different from previous social movements of

the industrial economy. Al Shabaab's operating structure is based on networks of a number of small cells (nodes), where some (hubs) provide centralized direction and communication linkages to others that are decentralized and are many in number (while some cells may operate entirely independently from hubs). The theory is relevant because terrorist groups are organizations first and foremost, subject to similar dilemmas and dynamics of other movement organizations (Nye, 2009).

In general, social movement organizations develop goals comprising a particular dyad: goals that allow for the organization to perpetuate itself (process goals); goals that realize the purpose for which the organization has come together in the first place (outcome goals). Process goals target constituents, bystanders, and the primary audience capable of satisfying their demands for change (usually a governing body at some level). The purposes behind these goals include the generation of revenue, recruits and public concern, and the disruption of governance or in the words of Tarrow (2011), to 'maintain solidarity, attract new supporters, and keep opponents off-balance.'

According to Buechler (2009), terrorism is a form of contentious politics, analyzable with the basic social movement approach of mobilizing resources, political opportunity structure, and framing. From a social movement perspective, terrorist networks are thus crucial not as much for their structure but for their effects on commitment and recruitment. Militant groups require the commitment of participants to undertake sustained campaigns of political violence (Gambetta, 2005). Given the emerging issues of radical militancy in the Horn of Africa, transnational terrorism is affected by the innovation of modular

collective action, movement diffusion, and international conditions. While the new social movement theory dominates current social movement research and allows for the study of macro external elements and micro internal elements (Fuchs, 2006), it has some weaknesses. Joining a social movement is rather easy since there is typically no membership as the thing that holds the group together is a strong common identity. This is an advantage to social movements as they allow citizens to engage in political participation only to some degree, and thus they do not have to sacrifice too much. Interest groups on the other hand has more of a weakness on this point since they have to take into account the selective incentives of people, meaning that people will want to make some sort of private profit in order to participate (Erne, 2011).

Although the new social movement theory is applicable to transnational terrorism, critiques of the theory argue that non-materialistic movements existed in the industrial-era and materialistic movements persist in the post-industrial economy. There is doubt in terms of whether contemporary movements are specifically a product of postindustrial society and translate to transnational terrorism or not. Moreover, the theory focuses almost exclusively on left wing movements and does not consider right wing. Since social movement theory began as an attempt to answer the question of why individuals participate in group action against the status quo, the idea of shared grievances recognizes that conditions beyond shared grievances, such as the availability of resources, might play essential roles. As such, SMT is limited because contemporary social it recognizes that social movements are realized only after certain conditions are present. As such, where resource mobilization and mobilization of a variety of resources (i.e., human,

financial, political, structural) is limited, creating a base of support and forming recruitment networks is difficult. New social movements rely a lot on asymmetrical warfare where they need to operate beyond their level, inside people and dwell on radicalization to advance their course.

Moreover, the political environment must be amenable to the formation of such organizations and the vocalization of such grievances. For social movements to evolve into successful organizations, these grievances must be framed in a manner that will garner the support of those directly involved in the grievances as well as the support of those with the resources required for the development of the movement while utilizing the opportunity structures available within the political environment (Goodwin and Jasper 2009). Another limitation of SMT is that first and foremost among these conditions is that individuals harbor significant grievances of some kind, which means that these individuals must recognize that others share these grievances and that by organizing themselves they can effect some change concerning them. Yet, this may seem difficult where there are no marginalized groups or grieved parties. Grievances of course, social movements would never occur in the first place if there were no issue, real or perceived, over which some individual or group felt wronged or harmed to such a degree as to voice a dissident opinion. Furthermore, sufficient resources must be made available to such organizations in order for them to operate independently, and since such movements may not have a strong organizational structure, advancing their mission becomes difficult. Therefore, the existence of grievances, the manner by which they are presented to the masses, the level of support this presentation garners in the way of resources all culminate in a


sustained expression of discontent toward the opposition of a new social movement.

## **2.8 Conceptual Model**

The threat of terrorism and the responses from governments in the region differ in a number of ways and can best be understood in their specific political, cultural and historical contexts. From the conceptual model, security-based diplomacy and management of transnational terrorism may be influenced by key aspects including historical context of Kenya-Somalia security-based diplomacy, state-centric counter-radicalization measures, structural capacity of intelligence sharing and effectiveness of border surveillance strategies. First, security-based diplomacy relations, in the case of Kenya and Somalia, have been implicated by state failure, colonial legacy, the refugee crisis and military intervention. However, management of transnational terrorism requires human capital, political will and financial resources. At the same time, critical factors such as corruption and infrastructure might compound matters; as well as social, economic and/or political alienation or marginalization.

Second, terrorist radicalization may encompass push factors of (unemployment, fear of victimization, revenge and lack of education) as well as pull factors reputation, mental manipulation and fighting Islam's enemies and the notion of obtaining paradise). Recruiting strategies have affected the composition of new adherents through propaganda, the internet and the mosques. Without proper institutional framework, implementing counter-radicalization within the context of managing transnational terrorism may prove difficult. Third, intelligence sharing is important to effectively deter a potential terrorist threat. Intelligence

failure could be caused by a lack of interstate or and inter-agency cooperation which is a fundamental role in the development of an effective counterterrorism strategy. More importantly is the inclusion of community intelligence and technology to engage communities who can provide a conducive environment in creating an intelligence sharing network. Lastly, border surveillance and protection is important at interstate level. Since porous borders represent a major challenge to ensuring security and stability between Kenya and Somalia, enhancing effective migration controls and early warning systems, inclusion of border communities and technology can increasingly help manage the threat of transnational terrorism.



**Figure 2.1 Relationship between security-based diplomacy and transnational terrorism management**



The conceptual model (Figure 2.1) shows the relationship between the theoretical framework and the study variables. The three theories, neorealism, postmodernism and new social movement theory provide a basis for analyzing the Kenya-Somalia security situation within a security-based diplomacy approach.

Neorealism emphasizes the importance of the structure of international system and its role as the primary determinant of state behavior. In the context of this study, peace building efforts in Somalia have had limited effect due to the use of traditional mechanisms in a constantly evolving, sensitive situation (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). While many outside actors have influenced the situation in Somalia, the military interventions and co-operation that is linked to can be informed by what is in the best interest of individual states including national, regional and religious interests. Counter-terrorism policies have emerged to fight the causes of terrorism and extremism by thwarting the radicalisation process. Despite the lack of a specific stand-alone plan or strategy for countering radicalisation, the wider counter-terrorism strategy incorporates a multidimensional approach which includes border surveillance and intelligence sharing. The military intervention in Somalia has generated hostile views and the emerging counterradicalization efforts by states through state-centirc counterradicalization measures, border surveillance and structural capacity of intelligence sharing are challenged.

The construction of these dynamics, in addition to the sense of transnational terrorism have created an environment that call for a postmodernist approach; which advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a

military fixation on threats. International entities reengaged with the Somali conflict upon the production of a Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000, which was inspired the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). As such, state, regional and non-state actors can play a role within the postmodernist approach that supports a security community framework for the institutionalization of security. On the other hand, the transnational nature of terrorism has given rise to new social networks. This compact seems to reflect the Kenya-Somalia security situation, which includes the social, political and regional contexts.

## **2.9 Summary**

The literature first discussed the contemporary historical perspective and how the concept of security has evolved considerably over the years. It indicates the transformation in global security and complexity of conflicts which now challenge states and international organizations and hence the need to adjust to new ways of managing transnational terrorism. On one hand, cooperation in multilateral diplomacy has granted the ability of states to work together to defend common goals such as peace and stability. On the other hand, the benefits that bilateral relations have been witnessed; but the changing security dynamics still challenge many states.

The chapter also explored that post-cold war dynamics and the evolution of terrorism, diplomacy during the cold war period and peace building in the post-cold war era. Security-based diplomacy and counterterrorism was discussed within the global, regional and national perspective. Furthermore, the key variables of the study were discussed including security-based diplomacy and

transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia, state-centric counterradicalization measures, structural capacity of intelligence sharing and border surveillance. Moreover, three theories central to the study were explored (Neorealism, Postmodernism and New Social Movement Theory). The chapter ends with a logically developed conceptual model that explains the relation between the theories and specific objectives. Security-based diplomacy has emerged as a recent manifestation and state and non-state actors have emerged who can play a critical role in managing transnational terrorism. Overall, the literature review has demonstrated that despite its strengths, security-based diplomacy as a tool in management of transnational terrorism has created complex sovereignty issues and raises some interesting questions for closer examination. The next chapter provides the study methodology and explores the various aspects that were undertaken during the study.

## **CHAPTER THREE**

### **RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

This chapter focuses on the research methodology that was used in the study. It presents the research design, study area, sampling strategies, data collection methods and research instruments namely, questionnaire, qualitative interviewing, focus group discussions and documentary analysis. In addition, the chapter describes data analysis method and spells out the manner in which data gathered were processed, analyzed and interpreted. A brief discussion of reliability and validity of research instruments is undertaken. Lastly the limitations of the study and ethical considerations are discussed. The chapter ends with a summary.

#### **3.1 Research Design**

This study employed two research designs: exploratory research design and descriptive research design. The choice of these designs was influenced by the purposes and circumstances of the researcher as well as the strengths and limitations of each approach. The study design was also anchored on the theoretical underpinnings of the study aimed at gaining a holistic inquiry on the study. The three theories (Postmodernism, neorealism and the new social movement theory) formed a key part of the study's qualitative techniques, aimed at explaining real phenomenon and stimulating meaning on how security-based diplomacy has influenced transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

The study first employed an exploratory research design to explore the variables and provide an opportunity for the researcher to collect systematic information on the extent to which security-based diplomacy influences the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Given that the concept of security-based diplomacy was an emerging phenomenon in the Kenya-Somalia context, exploratory research design was used as an initial method to lay the groundwork that led to descriptive research design. The purpose was to discover new ideas and diagnose the situation regarding the specific research objectives including historical security relations between Kenya and Somalia, state-centric counterradicalization measures, structural capacity of intelligence sharing and border surveillance strategies best described using the qualitative analysis approach. Furthermore, exploratory research was used to guide the survey design and question building process and thus enabled the researcher to provide rich quality information useful to identify the main issues with regards to security-based diplomacy and management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Overall, the exploratory design consisted of the collection and analysis of qualitative data followed by the collection and analysis of quantitative data (Creswell, 2009). As observed by Creswell (2009), priority was given to the qualitative phase and the two methods were integrated at the interpretation phase of the study.

Once the groundwork was established, the newly explored field of security-based diplomacy and transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia needed more information. Thus the researcher's next step was to employ the descriptive research design, with an attempt to describe the characteristics of the groups, determine the proportion and make predictions. Descriptive research

design was geared towards finding the extent to which the study variables on security-based diplomacy influence transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia. Gay (1986) points out that descriptive study determines and reports the way things are and commonly involves assessing attitudes and opinion towards individuals, organizations and procedures. Descriptive research design was chosen because it was seen as an efficient method of determining the relationships between the study variables. Moreover, it allowed the use of mixed research methodology that combines elements of qualitative and quantitative methods. Mixed methods research seeks to build on the strengths (Rauscher & Greenfield, 2009) and reduce the weaknesses (Plainkaset *al.*, 2011) of both qualitative and quantitative approaches to draw inferences which can lead to an increased understanding of the topic being researched. The design allowed the researcher to reach a wide population of respondents and to scan a wide field of issues.

### **3.2 Study Area**

The study covered Kenya (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa and Mandera) and Somalia (Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni). The choice of these regions was centered on the Kenya-Somalia relations. The Kenyan-Somali attempt to join Somalia to fulfill the expansionist plan of the time; conjoining Somalia, Djibouti, the Ogaden of Ethiopia, and the northeastern province of Kenya to comprise one large state called *Soomaaliweyn* was brutally suppressed. Since then, the interaction between the state and northern Kenya has been mediated through brute force and mutual suspicion, and mainly viewed as a matter of security (Amed & Herbold, 2009).

The ongoing war in Somalia has definitely impacted on refugee protection in Kenya. Additionally, Kenya's porous borders necessitate a stable environment in which to grow, requiring security and safety (Besteman, 2009). The Islamic Courts, which were ousted, had strong support in the country but fell victim to the influences of 'extremist elements' within the country and have since elicited the challenge of youth radicalization which poses a challenge to intelligence sharing. Mogadishu has been targeted by Al Shabaab (Banadir High Court and close to the UN Common Compound). The Kismayu port has been an illegal trade of charcoal in southern Somalia; and Al Shabaab has relied heavily on revenues from charcoal exports to finance its terrorist operations (Downing, 2012).

Kenya has been victim of sporadic terrorist attacks. The most prominent of these incidents was on August 7, 1998, when al-Qaeda attacked the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, killing 213 people. On November 28, 2002, al-Qaeda militants attacked the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 15 people (Tres, 2014). The recent escalation of terrorist attacks in Kenya, however, is the direct result of the al-Shabaab insurgency in neighboring Somalia. These series of cross-border attacks, as well as prior kidnapping incidents, spurred Kenya's military to intervene in Somalia on October 14 (Nzes, 2012).

Kenya launched an offensive operation against al Shabaab in Somalia code-named "Operation Linda Nchi" (Operation Protect the Nation) on October 16, 2011 (Migue et al., 2014). The pretext for the start of the operation was a series of kidnappings in northern Kenya: on September 11, a British man was killed and his wife kidnapped from a resort in Lamu; on October 1, a French woman was taken

from her Kenyan home; and on October 13, two Spanish aid workers were kidnapped from Dadaab refugee camp (Nzes, 2012).

The Somali government is heavily reliant on AMISOM forces fighting in coordination with their local proxies. Such a strong role for foreign forces, compounded by the absence of a democratic mandate, makes it difficult for the Somali government to claim local legitimacy and raises concerns of transnational terrorism and security-based diplomacy tools being employed (Omar, 2013). Even if Al-Shabaab is defeated in Somalia, Kenya's role in that defeat has now made it a target for Islamist militants seeking revenge. As such, the need for a study on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia was critical. In the face of a new common threat from international religious extremism, Kenya and Somalia have to address modern terrorism through increased levels of international cooperation and individual domestic policy efforts (Findlay, 2014).



## Map of Africa



Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Kenya-Somalia Overview Map (2012)


## Map of Kenya



**Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Kenya-Somalia Overview Map (2012)**

Coordinates: 1.2667° S, 36.8000° E Latitude of 1°00'N ;Longitude of 38°00'E

## MAP OF SOMALIA



Source: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2012)

Coordinates -2.0333° N, 45.3500° E ;

Latitude of 2° 2' 13 N; Longitude of 45° 20' 37 E

### 3.3 Study Population

The target population comprised individuals from various institutions as follows: state actors including but not limited to: Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior and coordination, Police Headquarters, Kenya and Somalia Embassies, Immigration department; AMISOM, Somalia National Army, (Kenya-Somalia borders).

Non state actors including but not limited to International Crisis Group, Institute of Security Studies (ISS), Media houses, refugee camps, NGOs, Civil society) and religious institutions. The study targeted eight regions: two cities (Nairobi and Mogadishu); as well as other towns including Mombasa, Lamu, Mandera and Garissa in Kenya, Kismayu and RasKamboni in Somalia as shown in Table 3.1.

**Table 3.1: Distribution of study population by region (town/ city)**

No.	Categories	Region	Population
1	Nairobi		3, 138, 136
2	Mombasa		1, 200, 090
3	Lamu		101,539
4	Mandera		1,025,756
5	Garissa		623, 060
6	Mogadishu		1,353,000
7	Kismayu		183, 300
8	Ras Kamboni		76,000
<b>Total</b>			<b>7, 700, 881</b>

**Source: The World Fact Book (2014)**

The following cities and towns in Kenya and Somalia were clustered based on the prevalence of terrorist attacks. The towns included Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu,

Mandera and Garissa in Kenya; and Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras Kamboni in Somalia. Nairobi is the capital of Kenya, and has emerged as one of East Africa's hotspots for terrorist attacks mounted by radical Islamist groups; the brazen attack on Westgate Mall in Nairobi is one example (Brady, 2014).

Mombasa has grabbed the spotlight as the country's terrorism and counterterrorism focal area. Since the early 2000s, Mombasa and the wider western Indian Ocean have been a "hot zone" featuring US's global "War on Terror." In 2013, the Mombasa-based rights organization, Muslims for Human Rights (MUHURI) accused Kenya's Anti-Terrorist Police Unit (ATPU) of extra-judicial killings. In November 2014, five mosques were closed for more than a week as Muslim youths engaged the police in street battles with security concerns related to terrorism and radicalization. Furthermore, there have been tensions with the meteoric rise of the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and its secessionist demand "*Pwani si Kenya*" ("The coast is not Kenya").

Lamu's position with Ras Kamboni border places it as a key terror theater such as the Mpeketoni massacres where terrorists attacked residents in June 15, 2014 leaving at least 48 people dead (Bosire, 2014). Garissa is strategic considering the Dadaab refugee camp, the largest refugee center in Africa hosting Somali residents that were set up in 1991. On April 2, 2015, Al Shabaab raided the Garissa University College and killed 147 people. Most of victims were students. Mandera has been recently described as Africa's new tri-state terrorism hot spot. The geographical proximity of Mandera County to Somalia makes cross-border movement extremely easy. The porous border has been blamed for the infiltration

of Al-Shabaab terrorists. At least 28 people were killed on November 22, 2014, after suspected Al-Shabaab militants attacked a Nairobi-bound bus in Mandera. The attack involved putting their victims through a religious test. Similarly, Al-Shabaab attacked a quarry on the outskirts of Mandera, near the Kenyan-Somali border, and killed 36 quarry workers.

Mogadishu is the capital city of Somalia and its position makes it prone to terrorist attacks. Al Shabaab has been a major player and instigator in the ongoing fight to win control of Somalia. In April 2015, al-Shabaab bombed an UN minibus in response to the United Nation's support of the African Union troops in Somalia. In January 2016, terrorists killed at least 20 people at Somali beach restaurant. On 22 January 2016, Al-Shabaab militants launched a surprise attack on the Central Hotel in Mogadishu where various Federal Government of Somalia officials had gathered for Friday prayers and killed at least 11 and 25 people. Kismayu is a key city for Somalia. The port city of Kismayu has been identified as the most important current source of revenue for the terrorist groups in Somalia. In 2008, al Shabaab took over Kismayu, the third-largest city in Somalia, after fighting a fierce three-day battle, later called the "Battle of Kismayu," against pro-government militias (Kambere, 2015). Ras Kamboni is located near the Kenyan border which once served as a training camp for the militant Islamist group Al-Itihaad al Islamiya. The Ras Kamboni Movement is an Islamist militia in Somalia that emerged as a splinter group of the Ras Kamboni Brigade in 2010 (Shinn, 2010). The Ras Kamboni Movement strongly opposes Al Shabaab and has allegedly cooperated with government forces against it. The conflict between the Ras Kamboni Movement and Al Shabaab reportedly stemmed from the latter's attempt to monopolize control

of Kismayu. In 2012, the RasKamboni Movement allegedly worked with a coalition of African Union, Kenyan, and Somali government troops to drive Al Shabaab out of Kismayu. However, some Somali officials denied this cooperation (Atta-Asamoah, 2014).

### **3.4 Sampling Procedures and Sample Size**

#### **3.4.1 Sampling Procedures**

This study utilized cluster sampling and purposive sampling to determine the settings and the participants. The researcher preferred this strategy so as to be in a better position to examine and explore a wide array of dimensions of the study including Kenya-Somalia historical evolution of security-based diplomacy; state-centric counter-radicalization measures; structural capacity of intelligence sharing and border surveillance strategies. Whereas quantitative studies strive for random sampling, qualitative studies often use purposeful or criterion-based sampling, that is, a sample that has the characteristics relevant to the research question(s) (Mason, 2006). In this study, purposive sampling was used to select the state and non-state actors' institutions as well as the respondents and key informants.

On the other hand, the study employed cluster sampling technique which was suitable in generating a sampling frame of clusters and thus economical (Jackson, 2011). Although other elements in the same cluster may share similar characteristics, this method was ideal considering the study intended to draw responses from both Kenya and Somalia, and hence a geographical cluster was necessary. The clusters of regions and participants that represent the population were identified and included in the sample. Each state (Kenya and Somalia) was

divided into clusters and primary data were collected from each cluster to represent the viewpoint of the whole area. The regions were selected based on the prevalence of terrorist attacks.

### 3.4.2 Sample Size

A sample is a small representation or a subset of the entire population (Welman, 2005). The sample size was drawn from various respondents purposively selected from various institutions including but not limited to:

**State actors:** Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Interior and coordination, Ministry of Defence, Department of Defence, Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI), National Intelligence Service (NIS), National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC), Immigration officers (Kenya-Somalia Border), Kenya and Somalia Embassies based in Nairobi, AMISOM, Somalia National Army, Somalia local administration, Somali National Intelligence & Security Agency (NISA).

**Non-state actors:** NGOs, Civil society and Lobby groups, religious-based institutions, Media stations, Private Security Firms and civilian population.

The sample size for the study included 120 from Nairobi, 100 from Mombasa, 42 from Garissa, 28 from Mandera, 24 from Lamu, 36 from Mogadishu, 26 from Kismayu and 24 from Ras-Kamboni. The total sample size for the study was 400 as summarized in Table 3.2. Determination of the sample size was done using a mathematical formula developed by Mora and Kloet (2010).

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + (e)^2}$$

Where,

n=Sample size;



N=Population size

e=the level of precision (or the margin of error or the confidence Interval).

Accordingly, given the population size of this study as 7, 700, 881 (Table 3.1), with a level of precision at  $\pm 5\%$  while confidence level of 95%, the calculated sample size was;

$$n = 7,700,881 / (1 + \sqrt{7,700,881(0.05)^2})$$

$$n = 400$$

Table 3.2 provides a summary of the sample size determination for the Study.

**Table 3.2 Determination of Sample Size for the Study**

Population cluster	Sampling Frame	Sample fraction	Sample Population Per category	Sampling Strategy	Total Sample size
Nairobi	1200	10%	State actors 56 Non-state actors 64	Purposive	120
Mombasa	1002	10%	State actors 42 Non-state actors 58	Purposive	100
Garissa	422	10%	State actors 18 Non-state actors 24	Purposive	42
Lamu	240	10%	State actors 14 Non-state actors 10	Purposive	24
Mandera	280	10%	State actors 8 Non-state actors 20	Purposive	28
Mogadishu	360	10%	State actors 12 Non-state actors 24	Purposive	36
Kismayu	262	10%	State actors 12 Non-state actors 14	Purposive	26
Ras Kamboni	244	10%	State actors 12 Non-state actors 12	Purposive	24
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4010</b>		<b>400</b>		<b>400</b>

Source: Author (2015)

The sample size determination for the study included information about sampling frames and their coverage. This study based its sampling on Gay (1987) because he argues that the minimum acceptable sample size for a descriptive and explorative research is 10% of the population. Furthermore, the choice of the sample was seen appropriate as supported by Cresswell (2005) indicating that in qualitative research, the inquirer purposefully selects individuals and sites that can provide the necessary information (Cresswell, 2005).

### **Nairobi**

In Nairobi, sixty (60) respondents were selected purposively from fifteen state actors/institutions to respond to questionnaire while forty (40) respondents were purposively selected from twelve (12) non-state actors to respond to questionnaire. In addition, eight key (8) key informants were purposively selected for a face-to-face interview schedule from the state and non-state actors. The key informants were drawn from institutions including the Ministry of Interior and Coordination, the National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC), Somalia Embassy in Nairobi, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (state actors); as well as Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Safer World, International Crisis Group (ICG) and Africa Centre for Open Governance (AfriCOG) (Non-state actors). In addition, twelve-member (12) focus group discussion was conducted drawing participants from various religious-based organizations. According to Cresswell (2009), a group ranging from 8-12 is ideal for a focus group discussion to balance between the need to have enough people for a lively discussion and the danger of an overwhelming group size. A summary of the sample size determination in Nairobi is presented in Tables below.

**Table 3.3a Sample determination for Nairobi for state actors**

	<b>State Actors-Nairobi</b>	<b>Sample</b>
1.	Ministry of Interior and Coordination	4
2.	National Counterterrorism Centre (NCTC)	4
3.	Police Headquarters	4
4.	Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI)	4
5.	National Intelligence Service-Kenya (NIS)	4
6.	Ministry of Defence/ Department of Defence (DoD)	4
7.	Immigration Office	4
8.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	4
9.	Kenyan Embassy in Somalia/ Somalia Embassy in Nairobi	4
10.	National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC)	4
11.	KNHRC	4
12.	Regional Centre on Small Arms	4
13.	Kenya Partnership for Peace & Security	4
14.	Kenya National Focal Points for Small Arms	4
15.	National Steering Committee for Peace Building	4
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>60</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

**Table 3.3b Sample determination for Nairobi for non-state actors**

	<b>Non-state actors-Nairobi</b>	<b>Sample</b>
1.	Institute for Security Studies (ISS)	3
2.	Amnesty International	4
3.	World Vision	4
4.	Safer World	3
5.	Africa Centre for Strategic Studies	4
6.	Africa Peace Forum	4
7.	Peace-Net-Kenya	3
8.	Media (KTN, K24, CITIZEN TV)	3
9.	USAID-Kenya	2
10.	International Crisis Group (ICG)	4
11.	African Nazarene University	2
12.	Civil Society Groups (Haki Africa Group, KECOSCE)	4
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>40</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

A summary of the sample size distribution for Nairobi is given in Table 3.3c. In total, 120 individuals were sampled to participate in the study from Nairobi region.

**Table 3.3c Summary of sample categories for Nairobi**

	<b>Instruments</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
1.	Questionnaires (state actors -60 (Non-state actors -40)	100
2.	Interview (key informants)	8
3.	Focus Group Discussion	12
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>120</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

### **Mombasa**

In Mombasa, forty (40) respondents were purposively selected from state actors' institutions to respond to questionnaires item; while 45 respondents were

purposefully selected from the non-state actors to respond to questionnaire. In addition, a face-to-face interview was conducted among five (5) key informants purposively selected from both state and non-state actor institutions. Specifically, one key informant was drawn from each of the following: Kenya Maritime Authority, National Intelligence Services (NIS), Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI), Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) and Haki Africa Group).As well, a focus group discussion was conducted drawing participants from various religious-based organizations. Ten (10) respondents were purposively selected to participate in the focus group discussion.A summary of the sample categories for Mombasa is presented in Table 3.4.

**Table 3.4aSummary of sample categories for Mombasa**

	<b>State Actors</b>	<b>Sample</b>
1.	Administration Police	8
2.	Regular Police	8
3.	National Intelligence Services (NIS)	8
4.	Kenya Maritime Authority	8
5.	Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI)	8
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>40</b>
	<b>Non-state actors-</b>	<b>Sample</b>
1.	Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI),	4
2.	Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE)	4
3.	Haki Afrika Group	4
4.	International Association for Religious Freedom	4
5.	Business Community	20
6.	Religious leaders	9
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>45</b>
1	Key informant interviews	5
2	FGD	10
	<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

**Table 3.4b Summary of sample categories for Mombasa**

<b>Summary of sample categories for Mombasa</b>		
	<b>Instruments</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
1.	Questionnaires (state actors -40 (Non-state actors -45)	85
2.	Interview (key informants)	5
3.	Focus Group Discussion	10
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>100</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

### **Garissa**

In Garissa, eighteen (18) respondents were purposively selected from the state actors to respond to questionnaire while twenty two (22) respondents were purposefully selected from non-state actors' institutions to respond to questionnaire. Furthermore, a face-to-face interview schedule was used to obtain information from two (2) key informants (one from National Intelligence Services and the other from Concern Worldwide. The sample size was thus 42 in total as summarized in Table 3.5.

**Table 3.5 Summary of sample categories for Garissa**

	<b>Sate actors</b>		<b>Sample size</b>
	State actors	Administration Police	6
		Regular Police	6
		National Intelligence Services (NIS	6
	Non-state actors	Religious leaders	4
		Business community	12
		Concern Worldwide	3
		World Vision	3
	Interview	Key informants	2
		<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>42</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

In Lamu, fourteen (14) respondents from state actors were selected purposefully to respond to questionnaire while 10 respondents were also purposefully selected from the non-state actors to respond to the questionnaire item.

**Table 3.6 Summary of sample categories for Lamu**

Category	Sample groups	Number
State actors	Administration Police	4
	Regular Police	4
	National Intelligence Services (NIS)	6
Non-state actors	Religious leaders	2
	Business community	5
	Red Cross	3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>24</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

In Mandera, eight (8) respondents were purposefully selected from the state actors institutions to respond to a questionnaire while twenty (20) respondents were purposefully selected from non-state actors.

**Table 3.7 Summary of sample categories for Mandera**

Category	Sample groups	Number
State actors	Administration Police	2
	Regular Police	2
	National Intelligence Services (NIS)	4
Non-state actors	Religious leaders	4
	Business community	10
	Habiba International Women & Youth Affairs	3
	Red Cross	3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>28</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

In Mogadishu, twelve (12) respondents were purposively selected from state actors to respond to questionnaire while eleven (11) respondents were purposively selected from the non-state actors to respond to questionnaire. Moreover, a face-to-face interview schedule was administered to five (5) key informants purposively

selected from the state and non-state actors. The five key informants were drawn from institutions including; Somalia National Army (SNA), Somali National Intelligence & Security Agency (NISA), Somalia Muslim Council, USAID-Somalia and Youth for Peace-Somalia. Furthermore, an eight (8) member focus group discussion was conducted (consisting youth, women and a clan elder). Table 3.8 gives a summary of the sample size determination for Mogadishu.

**Table 3.8 Summary of sample categories for Mogadishu**

<b>Category</b>	<b>Sample groups</b>	<b>Number</b>
State actors	Somalia Federal Government officials	2
	Somalia National Army	2
	Somali National Intelligence & Security Agency (NISA)	3
	Foreign Affairs Office-Somalia	2
	Local administration leaders	3
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>12</b>
Non-state actors	Muslim Council-Somalia	2
	USAID-Somalia	2
	Youth for Peace	3
	Business community	4
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11</b>
	Key informants (interview)	5
	FGD	8
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>36</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

In Kismayu, twelve (12) respondents were purposively selected from state actors to respond to questionnaire while fourteen (14) respondents were purposively selected from the non-state actors to respond to questionnaire. A summary of the sample size determination is presented in Table 3.9.



**Table 3.9 Summary of sample categories for Kismayu**

Category	Sample groups	Number
State actors	Government officials	4
	Somalia National Police	4
	Local Administration	4
<b>Non-state actors</b>		
Non-state actors	Religious leaders	4
	USAID-Somalia	2
	Youth agenda-Kismayu	4
	Business community	4
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>26</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

In Ras-Kamboni, questionnaires were distributed among 12 officials from state actors and 12 members from non-state actors selected through purposive sampling. A sample size of 24 was considered for Ras Kamboni. A summary of the sample size determination is presented in Table 3.10.

**Table 3.10 Summary of sample categories for Ras Kamboni**

Category	Sample groups	Number
State actors	Government officials	4
	Ras-Kamboni Brigade	4
	Clan leaders	4
Non-state actors	Religious leaders	4
	Business community	4
	IGO (USAID)	4
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>24</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Overall, the sample size for the study included 120 from Nairobi, 100 from Mombasa, 42 from Garissa, 28 from Mandera, 24 from Lamu, 36 from Mogadishu, 26 from Kismayu and 24 from Ras-Kamboni. A total of 350 questionnaires were issued to respondents drawn from state and non-state actors, 20 interviews targeting

key informants drawn from state and non-state actors and 30 respondents from religious institutions participated in Focus Group Discussions.

**Table 3.11 Summary of sample categories for the study**

<b>Summary of Sample Size</b>		
	<b>Instruments</b>	<b>Sample size</b>
1.	Questionnaires	350
2.	Interview (key informants)	20
3.	Focus Group Discussion	30
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>400</b>

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

### **3.5 Sampling of Towns and Groups**

In this study, the researcher selected groups and sites that provided the necessary information. Cluster sampling was used to select the regions (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa, Mandera, Mogadishu, Ras-Kamboni and Kismayu). In identifying the sample, the researcher made use of the background information about the regions and towns hit by terrorist attacks, key institutions involved in matters of counterterrorism and his own experience to select participants who were representative of the population under study. Respondents from the state actors and non-state actors were selected using purposive sampling. The researcher intentionally selected participants who had experience with the central phenomenon of security-based diplomacy and terrorism. The central idea was that if participants are purposefully chosen to be different in the first place, then their views can reflect this difference and provide a good qualitative study (Strauss & Corbin, 2001).

Purposive sampling was useful since the study relied more on qualitative research; and hence important question of focus regarding security-based diplomacy and

management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia were addressed. Moreover, the study enabled the researcher to draw valid inferences and make analytical generalizations on the basis of careful observation of variables (Kenya-Somalia historical evolution of security-based diplomacy; state-centric counter-radicalization measures; structural capacity of intelligence sharing and border surveillance strategies).

### **3.6 Description of Data Collection Instruments**

Data collection was both interactive (interviews and focus group discussions) and non-interactive involving questionnaire and document analysis. This triangulation enabled the researcher to obtain a variety of information on security-based diplomacy and the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

#### **3.6.1 Qualitative Instruments**

Qualitative research is interpretative research where the inquirer as the primary data collection instrument is typically involved in a sustained and intensive experience with participants. Patton (2002:53) refers to the fact that a qualitative research strategy entails that the researcher assumes an active and involved role. Qualitative data were collected through face-to-face interviews and Focus Group Discussions. Participants and sites were identified on the basis of places and people that could best assist with understanding the central phenomenon of security-based diplomacy and management of transnational terrorism. During the empirical study, the researcher made descriptive and reflective notes based on the interviews and FGDs.

### **Face-to-face interviews**

A face-to-face interview schedule was used to obtain information from individuals within the state and non-state actors. The interviews were specifically conducted in Nairobi (8), Mombasa (5) Garissa (2) and Mogadishu (5). Specialized one-on-one interviews with some specific individuals were used to augment the information that was presented in the study findings. In many aspects, these selective interviews were used to shed light on the controversial issues such as Kenya-Somalia historical relations, counterradicalization programs, border security, intelligence sharing and KDF intervention in Somalia. In some cases, the interviews were used to explain some inconsistencies in the quantitative data. In other cases, it was simply to put emphasis on some of the issues raised through the other survey tools and to highlight historical and other factors that may have an impact on the issues raised. The reasons the above variables were chosen for this technique is related to the sensitivity of the information and fear of discussing the issue publicly by the interviewees. It was also considered necessary for the recollection of specific events that took place at known time and locations, if possible. This kind of selection enhances the ability of participants to validate the authenticity of the report presented. In order to encourage the interviewee to have confidence and freedom to speak about their thoughts, free space and time was given to express their views about the variables. Fontana and Frey (2000: 645) point out that interviews yield direct quotations from the participants about their experiences, opinions, feelings and knowledge.

## **Focus Group Discussions**

In addition to interviews, the study utilized other research tools such as Focus Groups Discussions to gain an in-depth understanding of the issues under discussion, relating to the study's research questions. Focus group discussions were conducted on individuals drawn from the various religious-based organizations comprising Christians and Muslims. The goal of these daylong sessions was to allow members of the community, the public drawn from various backgrounds and religious institutions with the most knowledge on the variables (Kenya-Somalia relations, state-centric counterradicalization measures, structural capacity of intelligence sharing and border surveillance strategies) to share their experience with the researcher.

Unlike the one-on-one interviews, the focus groups discussions were intended to add deeper knowledge on the variables discussed. Focus Group Discussion participants were identified for the consultative meetings based on their unique position in the community and their demonstrated capacity to contribute to the discourse. The researcher sought experienced research assistants who helped in facilitating the FGDs. Opinions and suggestions of the group participants were recorded and also key points noted, organized into themes and analyzed. Focus groups are appropriate in situations where highly efficient data collection is necessary. The researcher considered a group of between eight to ten (8-10) members focus group; as supported by Cresswell, indicating that group size should be kept between 8-10 (Cresswell, 2009). In total, 30 respondents participated in the FGDs. Venues were convenient for all participants in each community in terms of access, transportation, security and facilities. To encourage complete participation

by all and ensure maximum use of the time for the group deliberations, meals and refreshments were provided to the participants. In the process of selecting well informed individuals in the FGDs, the researcher consulted with religious, through whom potential candidates for FGDs were recommended. After the selection was made, based on their background experience and knowledge on the variables to be discussed, the researcher gave them an expanded orientation to synthesize the importance of the study and its implication in the peace and security of both Kenya and Somalia in management of transnational terrorism. Wilkinson and Birmingham (2003: 90) state that focus group interviews are used to elicit rich, descriptive data from participants who have agreed to focus on a topic of mutual interest in a small group format.

### **Document Analysis**

Various published reports and other pertinent policy documents on Kenya-Somalia, periodical academic journals, newspapers, archival newsletters, books, security reports, and articles and recent publications were extensively consulted to assist the analysis. This analysis was further enhanced by the field data, as well as to provide information about the historical security relations between Kenya and Somalia. They were also used to provide an opportunity for the researcher to read between the lines of official discourse and then triangulate this information through interviews and observations.

According to Best and Kahn (2006: 257), document analysis serves to add knowledge to research and explains certain social events. In this study, sources of documentary data included archival reports on Kenya-Somalia relations (Shifita War, clan dynamics and Refugees). This technique involved studying excerpts,

quotations or entire passages from these documents. Patton (2002:307) observes that document analysis provides a behind-the-scenes look at the phenomenon that may not be directly observable and about which the interviewer might not ask questions without the leads provided through documents. This data collection strategy helped the researcher to gather more knowledge for the study and to explain certain events pertaining to security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

### **3.6.2 Quantitative Instruments**

Questionnaires were designed for state and non-state actors. A three-point Likert-scale questionnaire (agree, neutral, disagree/great extent, moderate extent, less extent) was used. The questionnaires were divided into five sections. Section one solicited general information of the respondents (demographic data) section two, three, four and five carried questions on the four aspects namely: security-based diplomacy approaches, radicalization, intelligence sharing and border surveillance. A total of 350 questionnaires were issued to respondents drawn from state and non-state actors. The questionnaires were self-administered whereby respondents were asked to answer the questions themselves.

### **3.7 Pilot Study**

The pilot study was defined as mainly a try-out of research techniques and methods, and involved administering the research instruments to selected individuals. In this study, respondents were purposively selected including four (4) immigration officers from Jommo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi and four security personnel from Moi International Airport in Mombasa. During this process, the researcher also tested a brief interview from one key informant from the media fraternity as well as one key informant from one civil society organization in

Nairobi. Furthermore, a five-member focus group discussion was conducted on a group of members from Holy Family Basilica and Jamia Mosque in Nairobi's CBD. The intent for the pilot study was to help the researcher determine possible flaws, limitations, or other weaknesses within the instrument design and allowed making the necessary revisions prior to the implementation of the study (Kvale, 2007).

### **3. 8 Reliability and Validity of the Research Instruments**

#### **3.8.1 Reliability**

The reliability of the research instruments for this study was measured and using the test-retest method. Thus, the questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions were administered to a pilot group twice with a break interval of two weeks between the first and the second administration. The reliability of the questionnaires was determined through the calculation of a correlation coefficient between the first administration and the second (Douley, 2004). The computed correlation coefficient obtained was used to measure reliability of the instruments. The same questionnaire was given the same test to the same test respondents on two separate occasions. The first time the test was given as T1 and the second time that the test was given as T2. The scores on the two occasions were then correlated and a coefficient of stability of 0.9 was obtained. Since test-retest method indicates the repeatability of test scores with the passage of time, the correlation coefficient estimate also reflected the stability of the characteristic being measured by the test, and thus the coefficient was interpreted and the degree of results was consistent.



### **3.8.2 Validity**

Validity in this research was aimed at how accurately the study answers the study question or the strength of the study conclusions, and more importantly, how well the assessment tool actually measures the underlying outcome of interest of the study objectives. Since validity of assessment instruments requires several sources of evidence to build the case that the instrument measures what it is supposed to measure, the researcher employed various tools to measure the instruments validity. First, content validity was used and involved a description of the steps used to develop the instrument. National experts conferred greater validity, and thus consultations and discussions with the supervisors and experts in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology were sought for validation. Their valuable comments, corrections, suggestions, enabled the validation of the instruments. Moreover, the researcher sought key stakeholders using face validity. Although this is not a very scientific type of validity, it was seen as an essential component in enlisting the study's objectives. The content experts provided useful information, as well as piloting of the instrument prior to the actual study. The researcher also trained two research assistants by examining the items and obtaining their feedback. This response process included information about clarity of questions and whether the thoughts of the responses actually matched the objectives of the study.

### **3.9 Data Collection Process**

Because this study sought to generate a large amount of data from multiple sources, systematic organization of the data was a key factor to prevent the researcher from becoming overwhelmed by the amount of data and from losing sight of the original

research purpose and questions. The researcher trained 2 research assistants in advance of field work, and conducted a pilot study with the research assistants in advance before moving into the field in order to remove obvious barriers and problems (Patton, 2008). The face to face interviews and the focus group discussions were organized with respondents at a convenient time and place so as to accord both the respondents and the interviewer the opportunity to create rapport and facilitate the process of interviewing to be done in a conducive atmosphere. The questionnaires were administered by the principle researcher and one research assistant.

### **3.10 Data Analysis and Presentation**

Data were analyzed by use of descriptive statistics; through quantitative and qualitative techniques. Qualitative data were drawn from open-ended questions in the questionnaire, document analysis, interview guide and focus group discussions to present the findings. This involved a critical assessment of each response and examining it using thematic interpretation in accordance with the specific objectives of the study, which were then presented in narrative excerpts within the report. Due to the qualitative impressions and feelings regarding security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management, they were more likely be suitable for qualitative analysis. The information generated from the analysis was presented through direct quotes. Content and thematic analysis of the information from interviews and FGDs were undertaken to arrive at the objectives. Quantitative analysis involved use of numeric measures to evaluate the role of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Analysis was done based on descriptive statistics. Under descriptive statistics, frequencies and percentages were used to describe the data sets and results were presented in tables and charts.

### **3.11 Limitations of the Study**

The description of terrorism remains salient today; hence the nature of security-based diplomacy and transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia is a sensitive matter. Reluctance from some respondents to give information out of fear was observed. Moreover, the geographical distance of Mogadishu and Kismayu posed other challenges of accessibility and reach. The sampled regions are cosmopolitan areas which pose language barrier which hindered or delayed the study, especially in Somalia. To counter this challenge, the researcher sought translators where language was a barrier and also assured confidentiality of the study to get as much information as possible. The strength of relying on mixed methods (qualitative and quantitative techniques) eliminated any bias. Insecurity was another challenge; confronting the threat of terrorism anywhere requires at least a rudimentary level of local political will and security capacity, particularly in terms of intelligence and law enforcement.

Some regions like Kismayu and Mogadishu required proper security arrangements which delayed the data collection process. The researcher sought the support of two research assistants from Mogadishu who helped collect data in Mogadishu and Kismayu. In addition, based on the researchers experience in the security sector, the researcher sought help from Kenyan security officials working with AMISOM who helped in data collection in Ras-Kamboni.

While observation is a method in qualitative studies employed in data collection, the study did not employ this techniques. While data obtained through participant

observation serve as a check against participants' subjective reporting of what they believe and do, the main disadvantage of participant observation is that it is time-consuming. Given the nature of the study and its sensitive issue of terrorism, it was not practical for this study, which necessarily required a shorter period of data collection. In addition, a second disadvantage of observation is the difficulty of documenting the data; it is hard to write down everything that is important while you are in the act of participating and observing.

Although observation enables a researcher to develop a familiarity with the cultural milieu that will prove invaluable throughout the project, the tools employed, interview and focus group discussion sessions were adequate to give a clear understanding of context. The researcher was able to uncover factors important for a thorough understanding of the research problem but that were unknown when the study was designed through FGDs and face-to-face interviews.

### **3.12 Ethical Considerations**

According to Okoth (2012), the nexus between research and quality assurance lies in the provisions of quality and its control. In addition, Okoth (2012) observes that this involves evaluation of research quality in regard to the type of research, particularly applied research, taking into consideration ethical concerns that must be jealously guarded (Okoth, 2012:53). In this study, participants' right to privacy was protected ensuring confidentiality and the guarantee that data would not be shared with unauthorized people. Informed consent was secured by visiting the participants at their respective institutions to explain the purpose of the study. The researcher sought for authority to collect data between Kenya and Somalia from the National

Council for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), University Administration (MMUST), local administrations (in Nairobi and Somalia), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International trade in Kenya and the Somalia Embassy based in Kenya. Participants were assured of confidentiality regarding the aims and objectives of the study.

### **3.13 Summary**


The chapter has described the research methodology including the research design. This study employed both exploratory and descriptive research designs. Mixed methods research was employed. The study covered Kenya (Nairobi, Mombasa, Lamu, Garissa and Mandera) and Somalia (Mogadishu, Kismayu and Ras-Kamboni). The total sample size for the study was 400. The study used both probability and non-probability sampling techniques; and utilized cluster sampling and purposive sampling to determine the settings and the participants. Piloting of the study was discussed with the view of demonstrating reconnaissance and validity of the instruments. The chapter has also shown how data was collected and analyzed, amidst certain limitations which, however, were overcome. The ethical issues for the study were also explored and undertaken. This Chapter therefore, sets the stage for providing and discussing research findings in Chapter four, five six and seven based on the four specific objectives. Thus, the next chapter (Chapter Four) is based on the first objective which interrogates the historical evolution of security-based diplomacy in managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

**CHAPTER FOUR**  
**HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF SECURITY-BASED DIPLOMACY IN**  
**THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM BETWEEN**  
**KENYA AND SOMALIA**

This chapter provides findings and discussion on the first objective of this study, on the historical evolution of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The chapter comprises secondary data, document analysis and primary data obtained from the field. The chapter first provides an overview of secondary data on key attributes of Kenya-Somalia relations pertaining to transnational terrorism management; which then provides a background on the key themes that is further explored within the primary data analysis and discussion. The chapter ends with a summary.

**4.1.1 Demographic information**

The study first sought to establish the gender and age of respondents. First, respondents were thus asked to indicate their gender. Data were collected, analyzed and the findings summarized and results are presented in Figure 4.1.



### **Figure 4.1: Respondents gender**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The results in Figure 4.1 indicate that 65% of respondents were male, while 45% were females. The gender aspect had a key implication on the study, given that females are currently gaining entry in sectors that were largely dominated by males such as security. The significance of such a study on security-based diplomacy viz-a-viz transnational terrorism management provides a useful backdrop to assess efforts to use mainstreaming as a tool to bring gender into the equation within peacekeeping and peace and security frameworks, not only in Kenya and Somalia, but in Africa.

Indeed, as the findings suggest, majority were male, this representation is demonstrated even in recruitment processes. Although it represents an important historical advance, recognizing the potential role of women in counterterrorism is key. Women remain largely marginalised from participating in mediation in conflicts in Africa, yet their participation increases the inclusiveness, relevance, implementation and indeed the sustainability of such agreements and subsequent peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction of the country. Women's representation within mediation teams and the number and frequency of consultations between mediation teams and women's groups have at least been increasing at grassroots levels. What is needed is active and equitable participation in matters such as transnational terrorism management and in particular, in counter-radicalization programs.

In the past few years it has come to the attention of both media and policy makers that women are also involved in political violence. It is of no surprise

therefore to see significantly more women arrested and convicted of terrorism related offenses as the range of behaviours criminalised moves further from actual terrorist violence. In light of these two trends, it is not unreasonable to expect a shift in counter-terrorism policies generally, and counter-radicalisation programmes specifically, so that women's recruitment and the role of gender ideologies can be addressed. Across the globe, women are still only a tiny portion of the security sector. As of 2015, reports reveal that 97 per cent of military peacekeepers and 90 per cent of police officers are men. In 2009, the UN launched a global effort to increase the number of women in police forces, with the goal of reaching 20 per cent of officers in peace operations (Hamidi, 2013). During an FGD, the gender aspect was raised:


On matters of terrorism women are a missing link in counter-terrorism. Counter-radicalisation programmes should address issues of women's empowerment and women's awareness of radicalisation at the community level (FGD female with religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

The statement above clearly demonstrates the importance of gender perspective in the management of transnational terrorism. While men play a key role, perhaps another reason was attributed to the fact that counter-terrorism in practice and in policy remains stalwartly male and reinforces gender hierarchies, the programmes rely on particular notions of masculinity and femininity. This was particularly established in Somalia, where female respondents held reservations on issues of security. The consequence of this gender essentialism is that at best, there is a missed opportunity to holistically understand the role of gender in transnational terrorism management, especially on issues like radicalisation, and at worst, these policies not only fail to prevent terrorism but further



reinforce the insecurities of women.

The study further sought to establish the age of respondents. Data on the same were collected, analyzed and the findings presented in Figure 4.2.



**Figure 4.2: Respondents' age bracket**  
**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The results in Figure 4.2 indicate that those in the age bracket of 18-24 years were 12%, 25-35 years were 35%, 36-45 years were 25% and those between 46-55 years were 16, while 12% were aged above 55 years. Age diversity in the workplace is now strongly encouraged in progressive organizations, and an increasing number of sectors are enacting diversity-related policies. Conventional literature indicates that age diversity may in fact hamper performance especially where top management appears to hold negative age stereotypes. Indeed, age diversity has also received much attention, with many countries enacting legislation to regulate 'ageism' in the workplace. As the findings show, those aged between 25-35 years scored high; indicating the youth generation and also more responsive to information. Age diversity in security studies is encouraged, and the analysis results point towards more

research, forgoing, on integrating age factor in counterterrorism and provide equal opportunities irrespective of demographic attributes.

## **4.2 Overview of Security-Based Diplomacy and Transnational Terrorism**

The overview of security-based diplomacy and transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia is explore in five key phases as follows:

### **4.2.1 Pre-1960s Kenya-Somalia Relations**

An understanding of the geographical, demographic and historical context of the NFD is of paramount importance in discussing the historical backdrop against which the Shifta War happened. Although its constituency changed over time, the NFD generally refers to the physical area of about 102,000 square miles occupied presently by the following Kenyan counties: Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Marsabit, Isiolo and Moyale (Pankhurst, 2004). It consists of a cast, low plateau and a semi desert and therefore most of it supports little vegetation like thorn-bushes which are fodder for camels, goats and cattle kept by its inhabitants as their main source of livelihood and pride (The region is predominantly inhabited by Somali people who practice Islam. However, other non-Somali people such as the Borana and the Galla also live in this region. Historians contend that the Somali people in the NFD arrived relatively late in the area (Pankhurst, 2004).

In the 16th century, they are believed to have joined Iman Ahmed bin Ibrahim al-Ghazzi as he conquered Ethiopia in a holy war after which they migrated southwards and westwards such that by the sixteenth century they had occupied the vicinity of the Shabelle River in Somalia. By the early 20th century, the Somalis had already displaced the Galla groups to the more eastern and southern parts to consolidate their dominance in the NFD (Elliot, 2012). The Somali south-

western migration was powered by the dynamic effect of Islam and their abilities in war and assimilation as well as the occupation of European colonial powers such as the French in Obuk in 1862. In the late 19th century, these European powers were to eventually partition the Somali people among themselves and put them under their different colonial systems, with the NFD Somali falling under the British East African Protectorate (Elliot, 2012).

#### **4.2.2 Post 1960s Somalia Kenya relations**

Somalia was created in 1960 by the merger of British Somaliland Protectorate and the colony of Italian Somaliland. The United Republic of Somalia was ruled by a democratic government for nine years until it was toppled by a military coup and Major General Muhammad Siad Barre took power. Barre established a socialist state, which lasted until 1991 when opposition clans overthrew him. After Barre's expulsion, northern clans formed the de-facto, self-declared Republic of Somaliland, which, though internationally unrecognized, has maintained a relatively stable existence. In the south, violence between rival warlords killed thousands of civilians, prompting the UN Security Council to sponsor a U.S.-led intervention in 1993. The intervention ended shortly after a brutal firefight in the streets of Mogadishu led to an unsuccessful incident that has become known as Black Hawk Down (Cohn, 2010).

#### **4.2.3 Post 1963 Kenya-Somalia Relations**

During the transition-to-Kenyan-independence period, between 1960 and 1963, more events and activities that significantly contributed to the build up of the Shifta War happened. The first event to bring the NFD secessionist claims to official recognition was the 1960 London Constitutional Conference in Lancaster

House (Bjorn, 2009). The Legislative Council representative of the NFD, Ahmed Farah, articulated the feeling of alienation felt by the people of the NFD and predicted that if the administration of the area was not reformed, then the Somali-inhabited areas would turn to Mogadishu while the non-Muslims in the area would join Ethiopia. The feeling expressed by Ahmed Farah was to be manifested in 1961 Kenya national elections when most of the people in the NFD boycotted it. Only 1,622 people registered to vote as most Somalis believed that doing so would mean accepting Kenyan citizenship, something they felt alien to. The election boycott only served to intensify the self-determination campaign in the NFD which now looked to newly independent and unified Somali Republic for support for its cause (Cohn, 2010). Delegations were sent to Mogadishu to drum up support both from the Somalia Republic government and the public in Somalia. The fruits of this lobbying were visible as in November 1961, the Somali national assembly passed a resolution welcoming unification between the NFD and Somalia Republic and urging the government to use all means possible to pursue this ideal. In addition, the publicity campaign created an atmosphere of solidarity amongst the Somalis in the Republic and those of the NFD going into the Second Constitutional Conference in the Lancaster House in London (Bjorn, 2009). In light of these developments, one respondent noted as follows:

I remember in 1963, the aspirations of the people of the Somali Republic and the NFD were receiving negative responses and since the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was being born in Addis Ababa, Somalia Republic's position was not gaining support in Addis. It was evident then that border disputes would lead

to further unrest. Infact, some of the disputes you see today started long way back then (Interview with male key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, the current situation can thus be assessed from a historival perspective and underlying factors to managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Winds of nationalism and pan-Africanism swept across Africa, very few were willing to listen to the opinion of the people of the NFD and the Somali Republic, let alone support them. Thus even before a resolution of inviolability of colonial boundaries was passed in 1964, it was clear that few African countries were sympathetic to the wishes of the people of the NFD and a more radical approach had to be taken if their goal was to be accomplished (Cohn, 2010).

#### **4.2.4 Post 1991 Kenya Somalia Relations**

The conflict in Somalia is unique in comparison to other international conflicts because it began with a civil war within a relatively hegemonic culture in terms of religion, language and ethnicity (Samatar, 2001). Historically, Somalia was a European colony that was divided into five states. These dynamics, in combination with the Cold War stimulating exploitation and oppression and Somali wars with neighboring states, created a clash of political ideologies in Somalia (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). The dictator of Somalia, Siyad Baare, was overthrown in 1991 due to the instability that resulted when Western foreign aid was withdrawn after the Cold War (Bjorn, 2009). This event was followed by a series of cross-clan disputes, which resulted in massacres, famine, mass displacement within and

outside of Somalia, and the collapse of social and economic infrastructure. This ultimately ended in the divide between the northern and southern regions of Somalia. However, challenges still emerged as noted by one respondent:

Peace building efforts in Somalia have had limited effect due to the use of traditional mechanisms in a constantly evolving, sensitive situation. I think there are many outside actors that have influenced and exacerbated the situation in Somalia, which includes the surrounding states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti, as well as United States. The feeling is that foreign nations are taking stake is what is currently being propagated by al shabaab and their ideologies to rule Somalia (Interview with key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The statement above demonstrates generated hostile views; where some communities have been working towards establishing governance structures in order to develop public administrations and civil governments. From these efforts, a series of decentralized administrations, autonomous governments, and unstable and uncoordinated informal governance structures have emerged (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). These establishments improved security in Somalia and shifted the phase of conflict from crisis to unstable peace (USIP, 2008). With the absence of Western assistance came the rise of reconciliation initiatives by regional states that operated under social, economic and political agendas. In the context of security-based diplomacy, the clash between the objectives and approaches of each of these parties can worsen the instability and regional divisions in Somalia.

International entities reengaged with the Somali conflict upon the production of a Transitional National Government (TNG) in 2000, which was inspired the Somalia National Peace Conference in Arta, Djibouti. The success of this conference can be attributed to collaborative, participative and representative methods used for the inclusion Somali society in the decision-making and planning process. Unfortunately, TNG did not enact efforts for reconciliation established by the conference, which created a sense of mistrust and betrayal amongst Somali citizens who were not associated with the benefiting Mogadishu clans and business class. As a result, the crises resurged as the opposition coalition labeled the Somali Restoration and Reconciliation Council (SRRC) surfaced with support from Ethiopia (Cohn, 2010).

The construction of these dynamics, in addition to the sense of international insecurity that resulted from 9/11, created an environment in Somalia that became of interest to international terrorists. This led to the reengagement of the international community due to a concern for global security. TNG was already dominated by Islamists and continued to gain support from and work under the influence of Islamic Courts and Islamic charities that are associated with militant Islamists. This led to a shift in power from TNG to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which was dominated by federalist coalition supported by the Darood clan and Ethiopia. This was followed by the formation of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which sought to institute an Islamic state in Somalia. ICU was ultimately ousted by TFG with reinforcement from Ethiopia and the Western governments (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). Upon conclusion of the transitional period of government, the new Federal Government of Somalia was elected in

2012 in an effort to rebuild social, economic and political structures in Somalia (Bjorn, 2009).

The former Northern Province, Somaliland, declared its independence from Somalia in 1991. As such, the British invested little in the region, utilizing it more as a wildlife hunting zone (Gettleman, 2013). In the aftermath of colonialism, the newly independent Kenya continued to treat the northern part of the country the same way as the British, if not worse. According to one respondent;

Historically, the relations between Kenya and the Kenyan-Somalis have been fraught. Kenya's independence in 1963, the British considered Northern Kenya, where Kenyan-Somalis reside, as a buffer frontier first against the Menelik in Ethiopia, and latter against the Italians, who briefly occupied Ethiopia. These dynamics even of today still threaten the security situation in Kenya, Somalia and even Ethiopia (Interview with key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, the implication of colonial era; the northeastern part of Kenya is populated by ethnic Somali and was claimed by Somalia at the close of the During the first few years of independence, the Kenyan army fought low-level counter urgency against rebels supported by Somalia. Joint enmity to Somalia and hostility to Soviet involvement in the region led to very close ties between Kenya and the Ethiopian emperor, Haille Selasie (Okoth, 2010). From this perspective, the study seeks to look at how security-based diplomacy influences transnational terrorism particularly in the recent worrying terrorist attacks across the Kenya-Somalia borders. The relationship between Kenya and Somalia is further complicated by their opposing ideas concerning a shared common security problem, despite mutual economic and security interests (Amed & Herbold, 2009).



According to Gettleman (2013), the revolving-door politics of Somalia brought the country fourteen separate governments between 1991 and 2010. On June 5, 2006, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) defeated a group of CIA-backed warlords and took control of Mogadishu, instigating what, for the first time, became a period of relative peace. Bronwyn Bruton, working at the time with about fifty local NGOs in Somalia, says, "Groups operating in Mogadishu were consistently telling me they had never had a better operating environment." However, fringe extremist voices within the ICU particularly from terrorist group al shabaab that claimed affiliation with al-Qaeda worried many in the West. In December 2006, Ethiopia, with U.S. backing, intervened to end the ICU's rule and instated the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). The courts fell in a day; however, the coup drastically stoked extremist flames and catapulted al-Shabaab--previously a mere fringe movement into a full-blown insurgency (Cohn, 2010).

In 2008, alarmed by the prospect of Somalia, the United States, the UN, the African Union, the League of Arab States, and other actors endorsed the UN-sponsored Djibouti Peace Process. This led to the election of Shaykh Sharif Shaykh Ahmad, a moderate figure in the ICU, as president of the TFG. However, these efforts backfired. Al-Shabaab and other hardliners quickly and successfully labeled Ahmad a Western puppet, and his appointment triggered the creation of a new fundamentalist Islamist group, Hisbul Islamiyya (HI), led by Shaykh Aweys, allied with al-Shabaab but with a more nationalist agenda (Cohn, 2010). In January 2009, Ethiopian soldiers withdrew from Somalia, leaving behind African Union forces (AMISOM) to help protect the coalition government and enforce its authority. On May 7, the opposition rebels attacked and captured most of the capital of Mogadishu. AMISOM managed to halt the opposition forces and

protect a few square kilometers of government buildings, now the only territory under TFG authority. In June 2009, the TFG government declared a state of emergency and requested immediate international support (Cohn, 2010).

#### **4.2.5 Post 2011 Somalia Kenya Relations**

The joint Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces have achieved their goal of taking control of Kismayu, which was Al-Shabaab's last stronghold. While taking Kismayu represents a huge victory for AMISOM, it does not mean that the threat of Al-Shabaab has been eradicated (Findlay, 2014). There are indications that Al-Shabaab is planning to resort to unconventional warfare methods, including deploying suicide bombers and other guerrilla tactics, to make the area ungovernable (Walker, 2013). The joint Kenyan Defence Force (KDF) and African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces have achieved their goal of taking control of Kismayu, which was Al-Shabaab's last stronghold (Findlay, 2014). However, an Ekuru (2014) note that in the case of the Kenyan government, the assumption was that internal instability in Somalia enhances Kenya's security. The truth is that increased instability in Somalia not only exposes conflicts within Kenya, but also constitutes Kenya as a test-space in engaging and fighting Somali conflicts. According to one respondent:

I think when you trace back on the incidents of attacks by alshabaab, one sees the dire need why KDF was forced to undertake the operation. But even now, given the domestic vulnerabilities evident in the consequent counter attacks launched by al-Shabaab militia on Kenyan civilians, the need for revising strategies is clear (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

On an altruistic level, Kenya had many reasons to use military intervention and intervene at a humanitarian level. As aforementioned, Somalia suffers from many humanitarian failures and has poor indicators in development and has suffered from food security and famine issues for the last several decades. Interestingly, on a more national-interest, self-interest perspective, Kenya also has legitimate cause for entering into war with Somalia and intervening with military force (Bademosi, 2012). As noted by one respondent;

Somalia has become a terrorist playground threatening the security of Kenyans and the region at large. The instability in Somalia has led to an undesirable increase of Somali refugees in Kenya. Such an environment is a danger to dealing with a global threat (Key informant interview with a security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

From the foregoing, Kenya has long suffered from spillover as a result of Somalia's 20-year crisis. Armed conflict and lawlessness from Somalia have at times destabilized Kenya's Somali-inhabited northeast province and placed much of it beyond the effective control of Kenyan authorities. The Somali neighborhood of Eastleigh in Nairobi in particular is a booming commercial center that is largely beyond the control of Kenyan authorities. It has served as a center of Shabaab recruitment and fund-raising. Though for most of the past decade it has been considered one of the more stable regions of Kenya thanks to impressive local-level civic governance efforts the northeast of Kenya has over the past year seen a worrisome deterioration in security, manifested especially in a spike in assassinations that in some cases appear to be linked to Shabaab (Menkhaus, 2012).

Okoth (2010) argues that America's wars with Iraq and Afghanistan have strained Washington's relations with Africa. The continent is in the eye of the storm of the US-led global war on terrorism. Kenya, hit by terrorists in 1998 and 2002, is even softer target under the Obama administration... (Okoth, 2012). On the other hand, Munene (2014) points out that the war on terrorism may only be rationalized from a political, not legal, perspective. Overall, the presentation highlights the two ongoing conflicts in Somalia. Firstly, there is the internal conflict which has an element of civil war, and it may be said that the entity called Somalia is at war with itself. Secondly, there are the ongoing foreign military incursions into Somalia which are examined through the conceptual dimension of the War on Terrorism and its relationship to international human rights law according to one respondent;

Smuggling of consumer goods across the poorly patrolled border is depriving Kenya of customs revenue, while smuggling of people, even the Somali piracy has raised concerns of money coming into Kenya and with vulnerable youth with no jobs, they are easily radicalized. Such cases are challenging security forces since some elements may hide within civilians and plan for terror attacks (Key informant interview with a security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

The statement confirms what Teyie (2009) points out, that radicalization in Somalia, fueled especially by the Ethiopian military occupation of southern Somalia in 2007 through 2008, has had a contagion effect in portions of Kenya's large and marginalized Muslim population as well. Most recently, a spate of cross-border kidnappings by Somalis of Western tourists and aid workers has devastated tourism along Kenya's northern coast. The kidnappings were the pretext for Kenya's offensive against Shabaab, but the plans for a Kenya-backed

military operation in the border area have been in place for some time. For years Kenya was surprisingly passive in the face of spillover from Somalia's decades long disorder. Unlike Ethiopia, which shares a long border with Somalia and has a substantial Somali population, Kenya did not try to shape Somali political developments to advance its interests, sponsor local militia along the border to create a buffer zone, or engage in cross-border military operations against armed groups (Teyie, 2009).

But as the costs of the Somali crisis mounted for Kenya, Menkhaus (2012) points out that the Kenyan government became more pro-active. From 2002 to 2004 Kenya sponsored a lengthy Somali peace process that culminated in the creation of the Transitional Federal Government, or TFG. Kenya subsequently became a strong diplomatic supporter of the TFG, which earned it Shabaab's wrath. Shabaab occasionally issued threats against Kenya starting in 2007, but with the exception of a few minor incidents, it did not act until late 2010. The prevailing wisdom has been that Shabaab did not want to risk provoking a Kenyan law enforcement crackdown on the large Somali community inside Kenya, a move that could jeopardize millions of dollars of Somali investments and deprive Somalis including Shabaab sympathizers of an invaluable site for residency, refuge, transit, and business.

Over the past year Kenya's Somalia policy has taken a new, more assertive and interventionist turn. In late 2010 Kenya permitted an Ethiopian military incursion against Shabaab through Kenyan territory into the border town of Bulo Hawa, a move that many Somali Kenyans claimed led to subsequent instability and an

increase in Shabaab violence in northern Kenya. Faced with disappointing performance by the TFG and Shabaab's consolidation of control of the Jubbaland border regions, Kenya has also sought to engineer the creation of a friendlier buffer zone along its borders. In doing this, Kenya is taking a page from Ethiopia's "containment" policy on Somalia, in which the latter has sought to cultivate and maintain local Somali allies along its long border with Somalia. In carrying out this policy, however, Kenya has made the situation more complex by seeking alliances with a disparate set of Somali actors who see one another as rivals (Abdi & Hogendoorn, 2011).

#### **4.2.6 Stakeholder Analysis**

There have been a series of armed conflicts since 1978 that involve a number of Somali clan-based liberation groups, Somali militia groups, Somali governments and militant Islamist groups, as well as secondary actors such as Ethiopia, Kenya, Radio Halgan and the international community. The following identifies the primary and secondary actors, as well as third parties and external actors, and their roles and impacts throughout the Somali conflict. These key players can be placed into five categories: militia groups, clan-based liberation movements, nonviolent political oppositions, opposition clan-based groups, and government organizations (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

##### **Primary Actors**

The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), led by Abdullahi Yusuf, is a militia that was established in 1978 with a mission to fight the Somali Army and overthrow Somali dictator, Siad Barre, after losing the Ogaden War with

Ethiopia. Somali warlords formed the Somalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC) militia group, which was in opposition to the Transitional National Government (TNG). The Al-Shabaab militant group is a radicalized faction of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was created in opposition to the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and later identified as the Somali Al-Qaeda. The Sufis ASWJ is a moderate militant group against Al-Shabaab (Bradbury & Healy, 2010). Munene (2013) argues that the previous aim of the AU was to maintain the position of the Somali TFG, but the common goal now is to defeat al-Shabaab militants; the defeat of al-Shabaab will require the effort of every country and state. The Hawiye, Isaaq, Ogadeni and Majerten clans formed the clan-based liberation movements United Somali Congress (USC), Somali National Movement (SNM), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) and Somali Salvation Democratic Movement (SSDM), respectively. A war between the SNM and the Somali military led to the proclamation of Somaliland in 1991. Nonviolent political oppositions include the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG) (Mohammed, 2013).

Ultimately, the Somali National Alliance (SNA) overthrew Siad Barre and his Supreme Revolutionary Council (SRC) in 1991. Following this, the Abgal clan and Habargidir clan, two parties of the Hawiye clan and the Hiraab sub-clan, took control of Somalia. Eventually, a power struggle arose between these two groups that was inspired by the fall of Mogadishu to USC. Upon the fall of the Somali government, opposition clan-based groups formed and experienced power struggles due to opposing goals. These groups include the Isaaq, Ogaden,

Hawiye, Digil and Mirifle clans. There were also other conflicts over resources that involved opposition leaders Mohamed Farah Aideed (SNA) and Ali Mahdi Mohamed (Sisay, 2013).

There have been a number of changes in power and governance since Barre was overthrown, which includes the establishment of the three Somali regions: Somaliland, Puntland and South-central Somalia, in addition to the TNG, TFG and ultimately, the Federal Government of Somalia. Initially, President Salat Hassan and Prime Minister Ali Khalif Gelayadh were elected to govern Somalia when TFG was established. The Islamic Courts Union (ICU), led by Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, arose in opposition to TFG and gained control of Southern Somalia. ICU was defeated in 2007 and was dispersed into factions, some of which were radicalized (Mohamud, 2011).

### **Secondary Actors**

Secondary actors in the Somali conflict include neighboring countries and international actors who support humanitarian and peace building efforts in Somalia. Djibouti facilitated the Somali government formation meetings and supports African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which was authorized by the UN to replace the proposed Peace Support Mission to Somalia, designed by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and facilitated by the UN Security Council (Sisay, 2013). IGAD supported both sides because it was compiled of secondary actors with varying agendas, which includes Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. AMISOM, “supports transitional governmental structures, implements a national security plan, trains



the Somali security forces, and assists in creating a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid,” (Menkhaus, 2012). AMISOM is also supported by a number of secondary actors, which include Malawi, Nigeria, Burundi, Tanzania, the European Union (E.U.), Ghana and Kenya. Kenya also housed Somalia’s new government in 2000 due to the severity of the conflict and helped to restrain al-Shabaab Islamist militants in Somalia. Finally, Sudan hosted transitional government and UIC peace talks (Mohammed, 2014).

There have been a number of secondary actors who have contributed to the exacerbation of the Somali conflict. There has been evidence that some countries such as Egypt, Iran and Yemen of provided support to UIC, the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia (ARS) or al-Shabaab, and Eritrea provided soldiers to the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts. Ethiopia has participated in many activities that have blocked peace-building efforts in Somalia in order to “maintain a weak and divided Somalia,” (BBU, 2013:1). Ethiopia has supported Somali warlords, provided shelter and arms to individuals and groups, undermined the Cairo Accord 1997 and Arta Agreement 2000 (peace accords), manipulated the Somali peace process in Kenya, manipulated the transitional government, supplied weapons and occupied areas in southern Somalia. A third party, The Monitoring Group reported arms supporters, which includes Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Pakistan and Malaysia have played roles in oppressing new Somali leaders. The African Union peacekeepers ultimately ousted the rival ICU (Abdi & Hogendoorn, 2011).

### **Third Parties**

There are many third party international actors that play a role in the conflict in Somalia. These parties have become involved sporadically throughout history in relation to global events. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union and the United States were suppliers of resources to Somalia. When the Somali Civil Wars began, the United Nations (UN) provided aid but was subjected to extreme violence. The UN established the International Somalia Contact Group as a leader to end the transition government through means of peace and reconciliation. The UN continued humanitarian and stabilization efforts through the establishment of the peacekeepers coalition, United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II), which ended in the Battle of Mogdishu (Abdi & Hogendoorn, 2011).

The United States led many humanitarian efforts in Somalia, which includes UNOSOM II, in addition to facilitating equipment distribution to AMISOM along with France. The United Kingdom (UK) is particularly interested in the Somali conflict and provides extensive development assistance due to its concern for the Somali people and the direct affects this conflict has on the UK. The Arab League promotes peace and is responsible for the provision of funding for the negotiation process. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF) is currently responsible for security assurance in Somalia. There are many humanitarian aid organizations involved in the Somali crises, which include the Red Cross, Medicins sans Frontieres, CARE, CARITAS, OXFAM, Save the Children, in addition to fifty-two aiding or supporting NGOs. International Maritime Organization and the World Food Program have reported on the issue of piracy in Somalia (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

## **External Actors**

The 2009 DIIS Report examines the role of external actors in the Somali conflict since dictator, Siyad Baare, was overthrown in 1991. International interventions, which include those by the United Nations and the United States, have failed to alleviate and have even exacerbated the conflict in Somalia, which ultimately allowed Islamist extremists to gain control. The following identifies the external actors and how these actors have contributed to the crises. These actors may be placed into four categories: neighboring states, international organizations, non-regional foreign powers and non-state actors (Bjorn, 2009).

Actions by the international community to address the Somali conflict seem to have been inspired by the issues of piracy that has resulted from the lack of security in this country, which has impacted international shipping. The international community essentially ignored the humanitarian issues in Somalia until the 1990s when the United Nations launched UNOSOM-I, which was designed with weak strategies and a lack of resources. The US led UNOSOM-II within the US intervention, UNITAF, which produced ill-defined roles in terms of authority. The US proceeded to declare war against warlord Mohammed Aideed, which led to the occurrence of Black Hawk Down and the withdrawal of US forces in 1994. This ultimately created more chaos than that which was aimed to be resolved with the original mission of UNOSOM-II, thus generating feelings of resentment and mistrust by the Somalis for the US and the UN (Bjorn, 2009).

Upon disengagement of international forces, Ethiopia played a role in disabling anti-Ethiopian factions fighting in Somalia. Al Qaeda failed to establish support

in Somalia during this time. When the peacekeepers departed, Somalia operated without a functioning state through the organization of clans that were managed by clan elders. Islamic institutions took on the role providing a social welfare system and a judicial system with the support of the entrepreneurial business community, which increased security. Unfortunately, these systems did not fairly represent all Somali citizens and eventually required a transitional government. The TNG was formed at the Djibouti peace conference in 2000 and was meant to provide fair representation to all Somali groups. TNG was weak in terms of power and security, thus lacking legitimacy against the US and the EU (Bjorn, 2009).

Ultimately, TNG was ousted and a transitional federal charter was adopted to outline the transitional federal institutions (TFI), which includes the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP) and the TFG. These institutions failed to effectively address the shortfalls of TNG by creating a system of appointment for TFI, which hinders fair representation, as well as failing to establish a system of governance within TFG. During the time of its formation, TFG was harbored in Kenya due to the extreme violence and lack of security in Somalia. TFG was unable to solicit support from the UN and the AU to relocate to Baidoa in Somalia, which led to the providing of their protection by Ethiopia. TFG denied the presence of Ethiopian troops until the invasion in 2006, which allowed TFG to take control in Mogadishu and caused the resurgence of the civil war. These actions denied TFG the international support needed to succeed, thus creating the need for another transformation in collaboration with the ARS, which resulted in an expanded TFP and a unity TFG (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

By 2006, the northern part of South/Central Somalia was under the control of the UIC, Somali warlords had formed a counter-terrorism alliance and Ethiopia was continuing to meddle with the stability of the country. After 9/11, the US began to solicit support from Somali warlords for the war on terror, some of which came from former associates of TFI and TFG who ultimately formed the US supported Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter-Terrorism (ARPCT). This organization inspired the construction of a counter-alliance of UIC that ultimately defeated ARPCT and proceeded to reduce conflict and improve stability, security and mobilization in Somalia. The relations between UIC and TFG remained unstable and uncertain in terms of collaboration due to conflicts of interests in relation to foreign forces (Bjorn, 2009).

UIC formed a jihad against TFG supported Ethiopian military intervention. UIC also supported Ogadeen National Liberation Front (ONLF) and the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), in addition to forming relations with Eritrea, an anti-Ethiopia state. Eventually, Ethiopia drove UIC out of power with the support of TFG, which ultimately inspired terrorist activities against Ethiopian militias, humanitarian organizations, UN agencies and Somali civilians. This put TFG in the position of dominant control at Somalia's capital with the support of Ethiopia but without legitimacy. These activities produced a humanitarian crisis in Somalia due to the resulting mass displacement and malnutrition, stunted humanitarian assistance and emergence of piracy. These transitions were followed by counterinsurgent warfare by TFG, Ethiopia and AMISOM, in addition to many acts of terrorism, particularly those by al-Shabaab whose leader, Ayro, was assassinated in a US airstrike in 2008. Ethiopia eventually withdrew its forces

after the Djibouti peace agreement between TFG and ARS, leaving Somalia weak and divided (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

#### **4.2.7 Kenya-Somalia Relations and the Jubaland Process**

In the battle against Islamist fighters in Somalia, the liberation of Kismayo in October 2012 was symbolic of the progress made in ridding the country of Al-Shabaab's influence. The port city and its environs is a melting pot of several clans, a business hub linking neighbouring countries and the Middle East, and, until its liberation, the base and financial nerve centre of Al-Shabaab (Sisay, 2013). Months after its liberation, however, the struggle over the control of Kismayo and its surrounding areas continues. Various stakeholders have an interest in the formation of Jubaland state - made up of the Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba regions and this has become a bone of contention capable of derailing the progress achieved thus far (Atta-Asamoah, 2013).

According to Abera (2013), tensions have been simmering since the idea of creating a Jubaland state was first mooted by Kenya as a buffer zone between its territory and south-central Somalia. On 1 March 2013 the Somali Prime Minister, Abdi Farah Shirdon, declared publicly that the convention of delegates to craft the state was unconstitutional. This pronouncement came after the breakdown of talks between his team and the leadership of the Kismayo local administration, in which the creation of a local government for the area, security and other related matters had been discussed. With this open declaration, the issue has become the next crucial test for progress in Somalia (Abera, 2013).

According to Atta-Asamoah (2013), the sources of the tension over the Jubaland process are many. First is the procedural issue originating from disagreements over who is driving the process. Sisay (2013) points out that the Mogadishu leadership prefers to facilitate the formation of SFG-mandated local administrations to enable the eventual formation of federal states, as is the case with the Baydhabo and Beled Weyne regions. Given that the on-going process to create Jubaland is not driven by Mogadishu, the SFG considers the process to be unilateral and thus unconstitutional (Sisay, 2013). Related to this are underlying regional and local interests. Prior to Kenya's military incursion into Somalia in 2011, security on the Kenyan side of the border had worsened due to attacks blamed on Al-Shabaab elements and fears that Kenyan recruits in Al-Shabaab would return to threaten Kenya's stability. The creation of Jubaland has, therefore, long been on Kenya's agenda as a buffer zone to prevent Al-Shabaab incursions (Sisay, 2013).

Ethiopia is also interested in a similar arrangement to secure its borders, which is why its forces crossed into the Gedo region to attack Al-Ittihad Al-Islami's (AIAI) bases in 1996. Given the historical tensions surrounding the Ogaden issue, Ethiopia would like to see a local administration that will not be sympathetic to the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), whose members share a Darood clan identity. The Darood and Hawiye clans and their sub-clans have spread across the Somali borders into Ethiopia and Kenya and have an interest in events on the Somali side. This introduces clan dynamics into the Jubaland process and partly explains Puntland's motivation for keeping a close eye on its formation (Atta-Asamoah, 2013).

The common interests between Kenya and Ethiopia formed the basis for the 2012 IGAD Grand Stabilization Plan for South Central Somalia, which seeks to establish the rule of law, local administration, and promote reconciliation. Independent business elements are also interested in events in Jubaland because the area is a conduit linking Kismayo, Kenya and other parts of the region (Atta-Asamoah, 2013). The interests of locals such as Sheikh Ahmed Madobe, whose pro-government Ras Kambuni militia is credited with liberating Kismayo with the support of Kenyan troops, are also clear. Given these multiple local and regional interests, the formation of Jubaland is perceived in certain Somali contexts to be locally-fronted but regionally driven. This creates discomfort for the leadership in Mogadishu, who see the regional dimensions as an affront to the sovereignty of Somalia (Atta-Asamoah, 2013).

Jubaland State of Somalia, also known as Jubaland is an autonomous region in southern Somalia. Its eastern border lies 40–60 km east of the Jubba River, stretching from Gedo to the Indian Ocean, while its western side flanks the North Eastern Province in Kenya, which was carved out of Jubaland during the colonial period. Jubaland has a total area of 87,000 km<sup>2</sup> (33,000 sq mi). As of 2005, it had a total population of 953,045 inhabitants. The territory consists of the Gedo, Lower Juba and Middle Juba provinces. Its largest city is Kismayo, which is situated on the coast near the mouth of the Jubba River. Bardera, Afmadow, Buaale, Luuq and Beled Haawo are the region's other principal cities (Muhumed, 2011).

In antiquity, the Jubaland region's various port cities and harbours, such as Essina and Sarapion, were an integral part of global trade. During the Middle Ages, the



influential Somali Arujan Empire held sway over the territory, followed in turn by the Geledi Sultanate. From 1836 until 1861, parts of Jubaland were nominally claimed by the Sultanate of Muscat (now in Oman). They were later incorporated into British East Africa. In 1925, Jubaland was ceded to Italy, forming a part of Italian Somaliland. On 1 July 1960, the region, along with the rest of Italian Somaliland and British Somaliland, became part of the independent republic of Somalia. Jubaland was later the site of numerous battles during the civil war. In late 2006, Islamist militants gained control of most of the region. To reclaim possession of the territory, a new autonomous administration dubbed *Azania* was announced in 2010 and formalized the following year. In 2013, the Juba Interim Administration was officially established and recognized (Muhumed, 2011).

In 2010, residents of Somalia's Juba region established a new secular regional administration. This Jubaland Initiative was created to bring about local stability, in the model of the autonomous Putland and Somaliland regions in the northern part of the country. On 3 April 2011, it was announced that the new autonomous Jubaland administration would be referred to as *Azania*, led by Mohamed Abdi Mohamed.(Gandhi). On 28 August 2013, the autonomous Jubaland administration signed a national reconciliation agreement in Addis Ababa with the Somali Federal Government. Under the terms of the agreement, Jubaland will be administered for a two-year period by a Juba Interim Administration and led by the region's incumbent president, Ahmed Mohamed Islam (Muhumed, 2011).

The literature review analysis provides an important perspective in studying Kenya-Somalia extensive history, which allows us to have a better understanding

of the nature of its issues and where problems may stem from. In addition, it facilitates a clearer context for the study of the Kenyan intervention and its morality. Overall, the overview of the historical phases discussed above demonstrates that Kenya-Somalia relations have a rich history. In perspective, the current security challenge and threats emanating from Somalia, especially from Al-Shabab, coupled with the security-based approach to managing transnational terrorism needs further analysis. It is against this backdrop that the chapter provides deeper analysis of primary data to provide strong response and assessment regarding Kenya-Somalia relations on transnational terrorism management.

#### **4.3 Attributes of Kenya Somalia Relations on Transnational Terrorism Management**

The study sought to establish the level of agreement on general issues pertaining Kenya-Somalia relations within the context of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism. The attributes considered included: historical evolution and relations between Kenya and Somalia, Kenya's intervention strategy in Somalia, Somalia's instability after state collapse, the refugee crisis and collaboration between Kenya and Somalia on security matters.

**Table 4.1 Attributes of Kenya-Somalia relations on transnational terrorism management (Kenya) (N=277)**

	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Somalia instability after state collapse has influenced the extent to which management of terrorism in Kenya.	194(70%)	61(22%)	22(8%)
The refugee situation in Kenya is a major implication for terrorist trends in both Kenya and Somalia	111(40%)	72(26%)	94(34%)
Collaboration between Kenya and Somalia has improved in the fight against terrorism	22(8%)	150(54%)	105(38%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

**Table 4.2 Attributes of Kenya Somalia relations on transnational terrorism management (Somalia) (N=73)**

	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
Somalia instability after state collapse has influenced the extent to which management of terrorism in Kenya.	15(20%)	29(40%)	29(40%)
The refugee situation in Kenya is a major implication for terrorist trends in both Kenya and Somalia	7(10%)	5(7%)	61(83%)
Collaboration between Kenya and Somalia has improved in the fight against terrorism	15(20%)	37(50%)	22(30%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings reveal the challenge of managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia has roots related to the history of the two countries; 122(44%) agreed, 50(18%) remained neutral while 105(38%) disagreed. The 44% who agreed could be attributed to the erosion of civil liberties on the national level which corresponds to the marginalization or undermining of national sovereignty in the relations between states. These processes are two sides of the same coin; they can be seen as corollary of the self-assertion of a superpower through the “war on terror” the strategic aim of which is to make that power’s global position

unchallenged for the foreseeable future. However, the 38% who disagree may be attributed to the new wave of terrorism, where religious fundamentalism challenge state capacity in managing transnational terrorism. Nevertheless, 18% remained neutral. Okoth (2010) points out that the northeastern part of Kenya is populated by ethnic Somali and was claimed by Somalia at the close of the colonial era. During the first few years of independence, the Kenyan army fought low-level counter urgency against rebels supported by Somalia. Joint enmity to Somalia and hostility to Soviet involvement in the region led to very close ties between Kenya and the Ethiopian emperor, Haille Selasie (Okoth, 2010). The relationship between Kenya and Somalia is further complicated by their opposing ideas concerning a shared common security problem, despite mutual economic and security interests (Amed & Herbold, 2009). One key informant noted the following:

Border dispute and the continued marginalization have kept the historical injustice. The lack of identity -Somalis is denied basic needs such as identity cards denying them movement. Kenya-Somalis are treated as second class society and do not enjoy constitutional rights like others (Key female informant interview with a security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

In light of the above, it is clear that the global war on terror, waged by one major power with other states following albeit reluctantly not only has had the above-described serious impact on the sovereignty of states and citizens alike, on national as well as on individual rights; this new kind of war may, if not accompanied by a comprehensive social, economic and political strategy for the eradication of the root causes of terrorism, lead to a considerable increase of terrorist incidents. Somalia has been without a functional central government since January 1991, making it the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in post-colonial

history. This unique context of state collapse has been an important factor in the evolution of both nonviolent and jihadi Islamic movements in the country. Moreover, the challenge of Weak and failed states present important policy challenges to both terrorists and governments. Failed states offer two potential advantages to terrorist groups. First, they may provide a safe haven for hierarchical systems that ease terrorists' core organizational problems. Second, the economic conditions that accompany state failure may create a favorable labor market for recruiting militants (Amed & Herbold, 2009).

Distinguishing characteristics of the Kenya-Somalia border areas include: the complete absence of a state counterpart on the Somali side of the border; the existence of more robust forms of local, informal governance and conflict management than anywhere else in Kenya's border regions; the rise of vibrant cross-border trade of commercial goods and cattle; and the dominance of a single ethnic group, (the Somali), on both sides of the border. Okoth (2010) points out that the northeastern part of Kenya is populated by ethnic Somali and was claimed by Somalia at the close of the colonial era. During the first few years of independence, the Kenyan army fought low-level counters urgency against rebels supported by Somalia. Joint enmity to Somalia and hostility to Soviet involvement in the region led to very close ties between Kenya and the Ethiopian emperor, Haille Selasie (Okoth, 2010).

Since 1995, a number of local factors have contributed to improved security and informal governance on both sides of the Kenya-Somalia border, especially in Northeastern Kenya. Progress suggests that local peace and conflict prevention

mechanisms have real promise; however, since 2004, serious armed clashes in Mandera and El Wak have rendered the region highly insecure and are indicators that local conflict prevention mechanisms are not a panacea and face limits in their ability to stem conflicts born of much broader, structural forces at play in the region (Mohamud, 2013). According to Gordon (2002), there are underlying conditions in East Africa and the Horn that contribute directly to conflict and the use of terrorist tactics. Poverty and social injustice are widespread. Borders are porous even by African standards. Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, and Eritrea have long and poorly patrolled coasts on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean. Weapons are readily available throughout the region, but especially in Somalia. All of the countries have a severe shortage of financial resources and trained personnel to counter the activities of terrorist elements. According to one key informant:

Rainfall and drought -nomadic clans fought over water and grazing lands. This created clan based violence between bordering neighbors, coupled with political instability in Somali that spilled over to Kenya (Interview with a male government security officer in Garisa, 22nd September, 2015).

As observed above, multiple factors both natural and unnatural may have undermined state-based approaches to conflict resolution and management and rendered them increasingly obsolete. The disintegration of state and society in Somalia after 1991 was the most prominent, but by no means the only, manifestation of the unraveling of boundaries and postcolonial polities (Ulrichsen, 2011). Semi-arid, pastoralist zones in the border areas of Kenya constitute the “frontier” area, where state capacity to exercise authority is weak to non-existent. The absence of the state in these areas breeds lawlessness and compels local communities to rely upon informal systems of protection, usually involving a

combination of tribal or clan militias (for deterrence and retaliation) and traditional authorities and customs (for conflict management and justice). According to one key informant:

Chronic instability along the Kenya-Somalia border zone is part of a larger pattern of state failure, lawlessness, and communal violence afflicting the Kenyan border areas from Uganda to Somalia, frequently described as “not peace not war.” Local communities suffer levels of displacement and casualties akin to civil war, but in a context of sporadic, low-intensity communal clashes punctuated by extended periods of uneasy peace (Interview with key informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

In view of the above, it is clear that the level of poverty, unemployment, and underdevelopment in the Kenya-Somalia border area is among the highest in the country and is a major contributor to crime, insecurity, and alienation. Environmental degradation of rangelands contributes to increased communal competition and pastoral conflicts over water and rangeland are endemic. In light of these challenges, Amutabi (1995) argues that problems afflicting this part of Eastern Africa have their origins in globalization due to the fact that all the combatants have a certain connection to global forces in history. Amutabi (1995) further posits that many conflicts in Eastern Africa, whether violent or non-violent, usually occur over scarcity of resources, which compounds into militarization that leads to amassing of arms by different ethnic groups for survival.

A long and on-going western expansionism by Somali pastoralists at the expense of other groups contributes to periodic clashes over land. Competition over new and growing urban settlements is a more immediate driver of conflict in the Kenya-Somalia border area. Towns and villages are important sites of trade and

aid. On the Kenyan side of the border “locations” serve as seats it was revealed during the interview with key informants that spoilers embrace armed conflict not in pursuit of victory but to create conditions of “durable disorder” from which they profiteer. Conventional conflict prevention and management approaches have generally been frustrated in the face of these unconventional conflict dynamics.

Clearly, the findings point out the exacerbated fluidity (and artificiality) of national boundaries as a reflection of established socio-cultural and economic realities on the ground. Notions of statehood were further challenged by the advancement of interventionist foreign policies and the sponsoring of proxy forces in neighboring countries, as external forces regularly intervened in ostensibly domestic contests for a variety of ends (Ulrichsen, 2011). Moreover, cross-cutting economic themes, including the regional impact of localized conflict, drought, land rights and remittances, differential levels of access to the sea and trading routes, inequitable sharing of natural resources, and interstate tensions over the management of water and river flows, seem to be constants in Kenya-Somalia relations.

As shown in Table 4.1, 39% felt the refugee situation in Kenya is a major implication for terrorist trends in both Kenya and Somalia, although 34% disagreed with 26% who were neutral. The 39% Kenya response who agreed could be as a result of the new security dilemma that has seen the government take stringent measures on refugee repatriation, following terrorist attacks linked to the refugee camps in Kenya. However, 27% remained neutral; an implication that terrorism is still a challenge in Kenya and the counterterrorism agenda is complex.



However, Somalia response shows 10% agreed, 7% remained neutral while 83% disagreed. The refugee dimension is explored further in the subsections of this chapter.

Majority (54% said neutral) from Kenyan response were skeptical on whether collaboration between Kenya and Somalia has improved in the fight against terrorism, although 8% agreed, with 38% who disagreed. Response from Somalia shows 20% said agree, 50% neutral whereas 30% disagreed. For the response from Kenya, the 38% from Kenya and 30% from Somalia who disagree point to the historical relations between Kenya and Somalia have been marred by tensions. During the colonial period, the British considered Northern Kenya, where Kenyan-Somalis reside, as a buffer frontier first against the Menelik in Ethiopia, and latter against the Italians, who briefly occupied Ethiopia. As such, the British invested little in the region, utilizing it more as a wildlife hunting zone (Gettleman, 2013). In the aftermath of colonialism, the newly independent Kenya continued to treat the northern part of the country the same way as the British, if not worse.

Despite the security tensions, results show 8% from Kenya response and 20% from Somalia agreed that collaboration between Kenya and Somalia has improved in the fight against terrorism. In the wake of transnational terrorism, interstate and regional cooperation, along with involvement of non-state actors are playing a role in security arrangements; and it may be that Kenya and Somalia cooperation is bearing fruits to some extent. In October, 2011, the KDF deployed its troops to Somalia to respond to numerous Al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi and subsequent infiltrations into North Eastern during which security personnels were attacked.

The Government of Kenya through KDF in concert with the Somalia Federal Government forces, Ras Kamboni Brigade and the AMISOM was prompted to implement the security-based diplomacy approach as a measure of combat terrorism. Furthermore, counterterrorism measures have been heightened and Kenyan government has been developing a legal architecture through robust training and capacity building of Somalia police. New mechanisms of collaborative and multilateral approaches have also emerged to tackle these issues.


The idea to use postmodern concepts to understand transnational terrorism, or even the terrorist himself, is based on several characteristics of Islamist terrorism. Freedman (2010) suggested in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks that the postmodern war had finally begun. He stated that these attacks do not have physical consequences, but human, and are directed against symbols, which illustrate US superiority. Throughout the lawlessness of the country, warlords and clan militias fought for the control of power and resources. This war for resources and power never remained between only the armed groups but it also continued within every group and clan (Elmi and Barise, 2006).

The International Community has made efforts to bring peace and stability back to Somalia in different approaches. For example, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a unilateral UN military intervention to Somalia in 1992 (Harper, 2012). According to Murphy (2008), multiple fault lines have thus opened up, facilitated by (and accelerating) processes of state weakness and the relative empowerment of non-state actors. The result is more political violence and endemic criminality. The new dimension to this nexus of terrorism, piracy, gun-running and people-smuggling is its growing transregional dimension. This defines

the core challenge facing the regional and global security agenda, in addition to attempts at employing the security-based diplomacy approach in countering transnational terrorism.

#### 4.4 Factors Influencing Security Relations Between Kenya and Somalia

The study further sought to establish factors influencing security relations between Kenya and Somalia Data on the same was analyzed and results shown in Figure 4.3.



**Figure 4.3 Factors influencing sore relations between Kenya and Somalia**  
**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings reveal a number of factors influencing security relations between Kenya and Somalia. On the colonial legacy in Northern Kenya 139(50%) was majorly highlighted by Somalia respondents although Kenya response 33(12%) scored low. The 37(50%) response from Somalia could be attributed to the Kenyan-Somalis' sore relations with the government of Kenya that have a rich history. Carved out of Somalia by the British, the arid northern region was neglected by both colonial and post-colonial administrations. Born out of this

history of marginalization, Kenyan-Somalis identify more with their ethnic group in Somalia than with the rest of Kenyans. The response above resonates with views expressed by one key informant who noted that:

Kenya's North Eastern Province emerged as a distinct administrative entity dominated by ethnic Somalis after independence. It is, by most accounts, the worst victim of unequal development. A history of insurgency, misrule and repression, chronic poverty, massive youth unemployment, high population growth, insecurity, poor infrastructure and lack of basic services, have combined to produce some of the country's bleakest socio-economic and political conditions (Key informant interview with a security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

From the above view, it is clear that the formation of a Somali nation state from the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia raised the issue of the status of Somali inhabited areas in neighbouring states, including the Northern Frontier District of British Kenya. The comments agrees with an observation made by Warner (2012) indicating that with Kenya's independence imminent, many Kenyan Somalis agitated for merger of their region into Somalia, a call supported by the Somali government. Although the majority opinion in the Northern Frontier District favoured secession, Menkhaus (2012) asserts that the Regional Boundaries Commission, set up in 1962, recommended that the predominantly Somali inhabited areas remain in Kenya as the North Eastern Province. Kenya's Somalis saw this as betrayal. They boycotted the 1963 elections to select the government that would take over from the British after independence on December and began a rebellion (Menkhaus, 2012).

Response from Kenya on the colonial legacy in Northern Kenya show 12%, an indication that could be attributed to the fact that Kenya branded the revolt unlawful banditry recasting legitimate local grievances as a treacherous gambit by Somalia to annex its North Eastern province. Despite brutally defeating the insurgency, however, the Kenyan government did little to reconcile its strained relations with Kenyan-Somalis. This deepened the community's sense of marginalization (Halakhe, 2014). The Kenya-Somali colonial legacy in Northern is also challenged by the border area where a number of major ethnic groups overlap. The region offers up ample evidence of how in the past local groups embraced and utilized flexible ethnic identities to negotiate access to resources and protection. According to Schlee (1994), contemporary political systems of representation, voting, administration, rights, and land access in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia are increasingly based explicitly or implicitly on ethnicity. The result is not only an epidemic of localized and partial but insidious ethnic cleansing, but also a hardening of previously fluid ethnic identities in the region, and a level of ethnic mobilization not seen previously in the area. Current political forces in the border area are transforming ethnic identity into a much more toxic, inflexible, and dangerous factor than has ever been the case in the past.

Another factor was Somalia statelessness, in which Kenya response revealed 69(25%) while 4(6%) from Somalia response. The 69(25%) response from Kenya demonstrates the extent to which the conflict in Somalia has had a long-standing security situation being witnessed in Kenya and the region. The context of complete state collapse poses unique difficulties. It complicates issues of representation at the bargaining table and adds the daunting task of state revival to

the challenges of reconciliation and power-sharing. In the words of one key informant:

Somalia has been exceptionally prone to disputes over representation, making it difficult to deal with security issues. The lack of a stable government in Somalia has definitely affected security in Kenya; from border issues to refugees crisis which are now linked to the terrorist attacks being witnesses such as in Mandera and Garissa (Key female informant interview with a security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

The views resonate with Miyandazi (2012) who points out that the conflict in Somalia started prior to 1991, the toppling of military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of central order accelerated civil unrest, resulted in the country experiencing over two decades of conflict. During the lengthy conflict, thousands of lives were lost, property was destroyed and people were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge in other countries, while others became internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in Somalia. For Somalia, only 6% noted Somalia statelessness as a factor contributing to Kenya-Somalia relations. This could be due to the Kenyan state and related legitimate security concerns; often marred with mutual suspicion between the Kenyan state and Kenyan-Somalis. It could be that Somalia citizens view arbitrary arrests and physical abuse known to routinely target Somalis, many of whom are refugees who escaped the According to one FGD:

If you look at our history with Somalis, then it is very clear that Somalia's statelessness has highly contributed to security disintegration; the refugee influx is an additional factor. Also the longer border corridor which is unmanned helps illustration of terror. The lawlessness in Somalia following the removal of Said Barred as the president in 1991, has seen Somalia being used by terror operators including Al-Qaeda and pirates due to lack of a functional government (FGD female participant with religious groups in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

The response above highlights ethnic profiling of Somali's and the ugly past which feeds into the uneasy and tense historical relations between Kenya and Somalia. The foregoing statement clearly demonstrates the challenge of profiling along ethnic and religious lines. Because of the civil war, thousands of people have moved back to their traditional places for safety (Little, 2004). The new safe heaven could not cope with the needs of the new urban people, in housing, water, health facilities, education, and employment opportunities. In fact, they became a burden to already fragile communities. Following these large displacements of people, a whole generation of young people does not have access to proper schooling and health facilities. In this respect, political instability has resulted from two, quite distinct social conflict scenarios: instability associated with the original formation of self-governance and instability in established governmental structures (Little, 2004).

The state is also a factor in conflict on the Somali side of the border, for three very different reasons. As is clear from the results, the complete and prolonged collapse of the Somali state has had disastrous impact on the regions, producing a context of lawlessness and anarchy that is only partially mitigated by attempts to strengthen local governance. According to Brown (2002), the representation in Somali national fora is an explicitly clan-based, state-building negotiation encourages clans to maximize territory they can claim to control. Loss of a presence in or control of a district can carry serious consequences for political elites vying for top seats in the transitional government. In light of these dynamics, the effective management of transnational terrorism is challenged.

The findings also indicate war lords and militias as a key factor, with 55(20%) Kenyan response, but 4(6%) from the Somalia counterparts. The response from Kenya (20%) relates to the current challenge of militias and terrorist groups that have been blamed for the ongoing terrorist trends emanating from Somalia. As the intrastate conflict was not addressed during Somalia state collapse, Somalia was essentially left with factions and clan-violence, and clan members who were heavily armed from the violence that erupted from the coup of Barre (Menkhaus, 2003). Although Somalia response reveals only 6% attributing the challenge of militia as a factor in Kenya-Somalia security relations; the first half of the 1990s was a period when, at times and in some locations, northern Kenya was widely viewed by both locals and international aid workers as less safe than southern Somalia. Heavily armed clan-based militias and gangs, sometimes organized by business and political elites, engaged in looting of livestock and vehicles, terrorizing both Somali and non-Somali communities. These views were strongly supported by one key informant from Kenya:

The militia problem is a historical mark that Kenyans cannot forget. At one point the range of Somali bandits engaged in cattle-rustling reached as far south as northern Tanzania. In an infamous incident in December 1996, a band of 600 Somali militia launched a raid against the Samburu, killing fifty people, stealing 10,000 head of cattle, and shooting down an aircraft carrying the Samburu MP. Land travel from Nairobi to Dadaab or Mandera could only be conducted with armed military escorts in convoys. Kenyan police and army outposts were themselves not immune from attack (Interview with key female informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

The above response relates to with conflicts over pasture and wells in Northern Kenya that have been endemic since independence, when the government lifted old colonial clan boundaries for rangeland, introducing an era of unclear tenure on land



that is formally government trustland and hence open to universal use, but in practice informally understood to “belong” to one clan or another (Menkhaus, 2003).

The challenge of warlords and clan militias was also cited by one key informant in Somalia:

Militias have played a role in the tensions of Kenya-Somalia relations. But the lack of clarity over land use systems and the breakdown of old ways has led to large clans trying to expand their land by attacking and terrorizing their weaker neighbors. This confusion has contributed to misuse of locations as zones of ethnic exclusion, either by weaker clans seeking to protect their land rights from stronger newcomers, or by dominant clans seeking to institutionalize their claim to land and seal their victory (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the spillover from protracted state collapse gave rise to war lords and militias which has been a major driver of conflict in both states. But Somalia's collapsed state is not the sole or even most important source of insecurity in northern Kenya. Since the mid 1990's, the Kenyan government has been willing but unable to extend its authority into the border regions. The result has been a 'mediated state' arrangement, in which the Kenyan government partners with local non-state, civic, and traditional actors to fulfill core functions including conflict mediation, cross-border diplomacy, and the dispensation of justice, normally associated with the state; for communities along the Kenyan-Somali border the mediated state approach is a major departure in local experience with the state.

In addition, the results show 10% Kenyan respondents cited Shifta wars and border disputes as another factor influencing security relations between Kenya and Somalia.

However, response from Somalia score low at 4%. The 10% response from Kenya highlights the historical links of Kenya-Somalia relations that seemingly are in play in the current security dilemma. While emerging trends of transnational terrorism are complex, Kenya and Somalia present a special case based on the historical relations. According to Hornsby (2013), the Shifta War can be broadly divided into two main phases: the pre-1965 phase i.e. before the Shifta used mine warfare and 1967–1967 phase i.e. when the Shifta used mine warfare.

During the earlier phase, the Shifta adapted their strategies to their strengths and weaknesses. Since they had less potent weapons but could navigate the area better, especially during the rainy seasons had incredible loyalty from their kinsmen and could also run into the Somali Republic, the Shifta employed psychological tricky operations (Lewis, 2002). They were organized into small groups of five to eight guerillas who would lure the Kenyan officers into baits and ambush them. Attempts by the Kenyan forces would then prove unsuccessful as the Kenyan forces would not cross the border without leading to a state of war with Somalia and even when the Shifta remained in Kenya, their fellow tribesmen would loyally shield them. This stage of the war was also marred with defections by Kenyan Somali soldiers; this not only empowered the Shifta but it also demoralized the government to the extent that the it decided that to move all ethnic Somali soldiers away from the NFD in February 1964 (Lewis, 2002). However, Hornsby (2013) further points out that the Kenyatta government also made attempts to break the loyalty of the people of the NFD towards the Shifta by using two soft approaches: splitting the clans and offering amnesty. One key informant states as follows:

Beyond the Shifta War, several massacres were committed by the Kenyan government in the North Eastern Province and thrown under the carpet; Bulla Karatasi Massacre in 1980, the Wagalla Massacre in 1984 and the Malka Mari Massacre. But the government has not shown commitment to establish the truth about these cases and like the Shifta War responses, mass punishment of entire communities were seen and yet nobody has been prosecuted for perpetrating them (Interview with key male informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

The above statement highlights the historical security challenges the Kenya has faced; which Adow (2013) argues that the plight of young Kenyan Somalis still experience today from the post-Shifta War governments. From the findings, it is therefore quite clear that Kenyan Somalis have not really enjoyed the fruits of independence that freedom from colonization by the British was expected to bring.

One key informant was categorical and said following:

Whether you like it or not, the Kenya Somalis feel excluded..and the shifta war and how the government handled the matter shows the Kenyan state continues to treat them in a manner similar to that of the colonizers. I think when the NFD Somalis were completely alienated from Kenya and expressed their strong desire to unite with their fellow Somalis in the Somalia Republic through the NFD Commission; I am of the opinion that the British should have honoured their pledge of respecting the opinion on the ground and granted the NFD its wishes. That would have prevented the costly Shifta War and probably, we could now be having a stable and stronger Kenyan and Somali nations (Interview with female key informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

From the foregoing, the shifta war dynamics underscore the need for both Kenya and Somalia to deal with colonial issues and the need for a more radical approach on security relations. Related to this is the Somali-Kenya border doubly troubled by the chronic failure of the Kenyan government to establish a meaningful administration in its border areas, and by the complete and prolonged collapse of the state in

Somalia. Goldsmith (1997) points out that the instability which periodically plagues the Kenya-Somalia border area is part of a broader, complex pattern of state failure and communal violence afflicting much of the Horn of Africa. In Kenya, the vast, remote, and arid frontier areas bordering Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Uganda were never entirely brought under the control of the state in either colonial or post-colonial eras. Thousands of Kenyans have died in periodic communal violence in these border areas over the past fifteen years, in clashes which sometimes produce casualties levels normally associated with civil wars.

While response from Somalia represent only 4% on the Shifta War as a factor, the underlying problems during this phase appear to have worked against the Somalia people. Mburu (2005) points out that the Kenyan military launched an operation dubbed *Operation Fagia Shifta* which was aimed at clearing off the Shifta from the entire NFD region and confiscating livestock. According to Mburu (2005), as the support of the Shifta declined due to the worsening conditions in the *manyattas*, the Kenyan government attempted political means towards further weakening the Shifta. Political rallies were organized in the NFD with an aim of getting the residents to renounce the Shifta and the Somali government and instead express their support for the Kenyan government. In light of this, Lewis (2002) argues that the Shifta War was indeed Kenya's invisible conflict, waged in a remote corner when human rights reporting was in its infancy and mass media state controlled. Lewis (2002) further asserts that the Shifta War left a powerful legacy that continues to disfigure politics, perception and discourse. Its history and aftermath have given rise to instrumentalized narratives by one side to radicalize, by the other to justify policies of exclusion and repression. Since the insurgency was ended through military

means, with no formal peace agreement or closure to the grievances, this could explain the different views observed from the Kenya and Somalia response.

Regarding alienation of Northern Frontier as a factor influencing Kenya-Somalia relations, results show 66(24%) from Kenya while 24(33%) from Somalia response. The 33% response from Somalia could be attributed to the fact that the problems in the former NFD have been aggravated by the unstable situation in the former Somali Republic especially after the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991. For Kenya, the 24% response can be attributed to the NFD crisis; with Kenya's independence imminent, many Kenyan Somalis agitated for merger of their region into Somalia, a call supported by the Somali government. Although the majority opinion in the Northern Frontier District favoured secession, the Regional Boundaries Commission, set up in 1962, recommended that the predominantly Somali inhabited areas remain in Kenya as the North Eastern Province. Kenya's Somalis saw this as betrayal (Goldsmith, 1997).

#### **4.5 Factors Contributing to Disintegration of Security Situation in Both Kenya and Somalia**

Kenya-Somalia security-based diplomacy has taken a new phase in the emerging transnational terrorist events. An assessment was made to determine the factors that could be contributing to disintegration of security situation in both Kenya and Somalia. Data on the same was collected, analyzed and results presented in Table 4.3.

**Table 4.3 Why Kenya and Somalia are vulnerable to transnational terrorism**

	<b>277- Kenya</b>	<b>73 -Somalia</b>
Availability of illegal arms	150(54%)	47( 65%)
Internal clan conflicts	94(34%)	58(80%)
Poor socio-economic conditions	238(86%)	51(70%)
Foreign interference	61(22%)	43(60%)
Geographical factors	177(64%)	33(45%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The factors that could be contributing to disintegration of security situation in both Kenya and Somalia are diverse. From the results in Figure 4.2, Kenyan response show availability of illegal arms (54%) while 65% from Somalia response. The 54% response from Kenya could be attributed to the ongoing challenges that lie ahead for the Kenya government in trying to maintain a tight grip on arms control and weapons possession. The issue of illegal arms as also observed by one key informant:

Kenya and Somalia governments need to deal with illegal arms. I think there is no effective system in place to track weapons and be held accountable for missing weapons and individuals and groups who are in possession of weapons. Unless this problem is thoroughly investigated and addressed, al shabaab and terror groups will continue attacking us (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

From the above statement, it is evident that oftentimes, in crises and conflict, the offensive side places a significant amount of resources into the defense and security of its forces and troops. Though understandable and reasonable, this poses additional

threats to security because often, weapons become unaccountable and become available to rogue entities as supported by Rutherford (2008).

The widespread ownership and easy availability of small arms in the border area is widely cited as an intensifier of armed conflict. The results point to what Menkhaus (2008) argues that the flood of small arms is the devastating impact of semi-automatic weaponry on communal conflicts in the region. Given the chronic insecurity and porous borders between Kenya and Somalia, small arms proliferation remains a dangerous reality.

For Somalia, the 65% response could be due to the 1991 armed intervention in Somalia by the United States; the aftermath saw flood of guns and other weapons into the hands of security forces and clan militias. This threat is real and is one that also challenges Kenya-Somalia counterterrorism efforts. According to one key informant:

Here in Somalia, anyone can get a firearm. They are everywhere and mostly this trade of firearms now is common to the Kenya borders. Despite the federal government's effort, Mogadishu has a big challenge of getting illegal arms from the militias and other groups like al shabaab (Interview with male key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The above statement adds to the underlying issues of managing transnational terrorism. In addition to the threat of lack of arms control, is the threat of conflict between many of the different non-governmental entities that currently exist. The emergence of “governance without government” has been observed and documented in southern Somalia in some detail. There, a mosaic of formal and informal local

authorities has emerged from the protracted collapse of the state. As with the conflict drivers enumerated above, most of these are capable of fomenting violence and conflict as well as peace and security. The findings agree with Cohn's (2010) observation; that the Somali civil war produced a major weapons flow in the Kenya-Somalia border area. Both government troops and liberation fronts looted the enormous Cold War armories of the army, producing a free flow of weapons and ammunition on the street. At the same time, the fall of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia and the disbanding of the Ethiopian army in 1991 flooded the regional market with cheap weaponry (Brown, 2002). Still more arms found their way into Somalia via the rapidly growing global arms trafficking in the immediate post Cold War era. Some of these weapons found their way into Kenya, where they helped to produce destabilization in the border area and gave criminal elements in Nairobi greater access to cheap semi-automatic weapons. The challenge of managing terrorism thus should extend to analyzing the arms crisis between Kenya and Somalia.

Another factor was clan conflicts, indicating 94(34%) from Kenya while Somalia response was cited by 58(80%). The 34% response from Kenya relates to the trend toward clan or tribally-based locations in Kenya and proportional clan-based representation in Kenya Somali's ethnic identities in northern Kenya where identity is still an issue; and some ethnic groups now face an increasingly exclusionist political environment. Competing clans increasingly view control over locations not merely in administrative terms but as a means for establishing exclusionary zones within which they can evict or block other clans from access to pasture and business



activities. The result is misuse of locations to engage in localized ethnic cleansing, which in turn greatly increases the political stakes for control over locations.

The clan factor was majorly cited from the Somalia respondents (80%), which could be attributed to the competing clans in Somalia that increasingly view control over locations not merely in administrative terms but as a means for establishing exclusionary zones within which they can evict or block other clans from access to resources. The result is misuse of locations to engage in localized ethnic cleansing, which in turn greatly increases the political stakes for control over locations (Pankhurst, 2004). The trend toward clan and proportional clan-based representation in Somalia's nascent federal government has led to a "hardening" of ethnic identities in northern Kenya (where identity was previously more flexible and nuanced) and some ethnic groups now face an increasingly exclusionist political environment. Spillover from protracted state collapse in Somalia has been a major driver of conflict in the border areas, producing destabilizing flows of refugees, gun-smuggling, banditry, warfare, and clan tensions. But Somalia's collapsed state is not the sole or even most important source of insecurity in northern Kenya. This point is further demonstrated by one key informant:

The Kenyan government and the Ethiopian government favours the Ogaden against us the Marehan, if you can look at the Jubbaland administration from Madobe and the entire population, there is not a single representative of our Marehan clan. We need power sharing to control resources especially the port of Kismayu. Some officials of Kenyan administration and the Ogaden of Kenya and Ethiopia are driving the Marehan out from controlling the port of Kismayu so that they can benefit from the business of Kismayu. This provides a reason why most of our youth have joined the Al-Shabaab. KDF is here to help Madobe to rule over us, we call upon the government of Kenya to accept us the Marehan just as they accepted our fellow Somalis, the Ogaden in Kenya, we need fairness here (Interview with a male key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The above statement demonstrates the challenge of security dilemma in Somalia and management of transnational terrorism. In Somalia, the clan-families are an important part of Somalia. After Siad Barre's fall from power in early 1991, the clan-families assumed critical significance as in political parties and this has prevailed for all these years. For example, much of the internal conflicts plaguing the Marehan clan in Gedo region are animated by tensions between indigenous (*guri*) and *galti* Marehan. The current conflict in El Wak has drawn heavily on outside Marehan from Kismayu and Garre militia from Ethiopia (Lidwien, 2010).

From the foregoing, the prevalence of intra state conflict and the erosion of civil order continued to fuel internal conflict and dysfunction in Somali society. With the absence of a functioning government, identifying with a clan offered an economic and political safety blanket for clan members. Fitzgerald goes on to highlight this issue noting, "...some clan in a clan family might unite for political and military purposes, and some lineages with a clan might associate to pay and receive blood compensation in cases of homicide, injury and other offenses" (Fitzgerald 2002, 44).

Another key informant was quoted as follows:

Here in Mogadishu things are difficult, you see the ongoing terrorism on one side, yet on the other side an overall breakdown of Somali society and infrastructure. The clans are essentially taking to themselves to perform duties and obligations that would likely otherwise be provided by a government. From the start, we thought clanship method seemed as if it could provide a means of protection, justice for Somalis, but in reality it has even just fueled the overall tension and breakdown (FGD female respondent in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

Indeed, from the foregoing, the clan dynamics challenge state capacity to managing transnational terrorism. After gaining independence from the British and Italian

powers in 1960, Somalia was once a democratic state (Norris 2011). However, in 1969 Siad Barre overthrew the government and installed a socialist government. After years of human rights abuses and mass atrocities committed by the Barre regime, Somali clans overthrew the Barre government, taking control over Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia. The Center for American Report, *Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting* recounted the coup and its aftermath noting, “After deposing Barre, the warlord-led clan factions quickly descended into intense internecine battles, plunging Somalia into a violence civil war” (Norris, 2011).

Within the context of new social movements theory, it can be argued that state collapse can give rise of new movements and the emerging issues of radical militancy in the region. Since Barre administration was overthrown, Somalia has never returned to any form of stability and has been frozen in a state of anarchy. *Twenty Years of Collapse and Counting* expresses this stating, “Effective national governance has never been restored despite multiple efforts by Somalis and the international community.”

After the fall of Barre in 1991, the northwest area of Somalia is considers itself to be independent from Somalia and is known as Somaliland (Norris 2011, 8). However, despite these efforts, it does not have official statehood. As the intrastate conflict was not addressed, Somalia was essentially left with factions and clan-violence, and clan members who were heavily armed from the violence that erupted from the coup of Barre (Atta-Asamoah, 2013). These views were also expressed by one key informant during an interview who noted as follows:

Clan conflicts are a norm here in Somalia; the total collapse of the previously centralized institutions of government has resulted to clan-based warring factions competing for the leadership of the state. Ever since the major civil war ended in 1992, there has been sporadic low-intensity fighting between clan-based rival factions throughout Somalia, particularly in the south-central region. Most of the present conflicts are based on power struggle between various armed groups (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, the politicized mistrust between the clan and the state gave way for the multiplication of armed groups engineered by the clan-based political factions. It appears the hierarchical identities within clans matter a great deal as well. In the transJubba regions of Somalia and northern Kenya, social hierarchies are quite complex. Arguably the lowest status groups are the Somali “Bantu” along the Jubba river and now in Kenyan refugee camps. Somali Bantu are still casually referred to by ethnic Somalis as *addoon*, or slaves, are subjected to blatant discrimination, and have been the victims of land grabbing, forced labor, and predation at the hands of Somali militias since 1990. Even in Kenyan refugee camps at Dadaab and Kakuma, Somali Bantu are subject to abuse, ranging from appropriation of food rations by ethnic Somalis to rape of their women (Lidwien, 2010). Another key informant was quoted as follows:

Clan rivalry is a big problem here in Somalia. For example, in July 1991, only six factions attended the first Djibouti conference right after the collapse of the former military government. In March 1993, two years after the first reconciliation conference held in Djibouti, 15 factions attended the UN-sponsored Addis Ababa peace conference. In 1997, the Cairo conference was attended by 20 factions. And you can recall how our peace problem was in Nairobi, chaos as well because of the clan issues (Interview with male lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The statement above clearly demonstrates Somalia's challenge and peace process to ensuring a stable government. The above comments concurs with Sisay (2013) who

points out that another source of tension arises from the Somalia Federal Government's (SFG's) concerns about the representivity of the process and associated fears over the possibility of Ogaden sub-clan dominance. Many clans inhabit the Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba areas of Somalia. These include the Darood, Hawiye and Dir. Historically, even within the Darood, the three main sub-clans, namely the Ogaden, Marehan and Harti, do not have a history of peaceful coexistence (Sisay, 2013). The SFG fears that unless representivity in the Kismayo process is dealt with, clan-based grievances could undermine reconciliation in the country. Actors driving the process, on the other hand, feel that every effort has been made to achieve representation and that if certain groups dominate, traditional leaders and authorities from marginalized areas will deal with the issue through consultation meetings that have been held since the process started several years ago. This implies that representivity, shared governance and coexistence among the many clans are vital for the sustainability of the local administration and its contribution towards federalism in Somalia.

On the other hand, foreign interference was cited as another factor contributing to disintegration of security situation in Kenya and Somalia; with 61(22%) response from Kenya and 44(60%) from Somalia. The 22% response from Kenya relates to the war against transnational terrorism in Somalia which has raised concerns that Kenya's military operation into Somali territory could work to Shabaab's advantage, by rallying Somalis against a foreign occupation, in much the same way that Shabaab enjoyed significant popular support when Ethiopia occupied Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008.

The Somali crisis raises important questions about the role of international community and foreign states institutions, both in terms of maintaining and restoring peace, and also with respect to the protection of individuals. The extent to which they have shaped events in the current Somali crisis calls for adequate examination and analysis. Though Somalis are exhausted from war and are devoting most of their resources to assisting relatives affected by the famine, a sustained Kenyan military presence, with inevitable reports of civilian casualties, runs the risk of generating a new wave of Somali jihadi recruits and fund-raisers for Shabaab; and this could explain the 60% response from Somalia respondents. The question of the legality of the military action by the United States in Somalia is important; Beyond the realm of legality, the military action and the ensuing asymmetrical war involving the Ethiopian and the TFG forces on one hand and an unspecified number of armed groups with alliances across borders on the other, ushers an era of uncertainty with regard to regional peace and security.

The heightened US foreign policy focus on the region has taken the form of technical and financial support to allied governments as part of the broader covert war on terrorism. The model for this US action has close parallels to its Cold War policy in the Global South (Throup, 2012). This has raised fears over the fate of human rights in the region. Within Kenya and the rest of Somalia's neighbours, there has been concern that the United States has been applying pressure on governments to curtail the rights of individuals suspected of having links with groups such as Al Qaeda. This view was supported by one key informant in Mogadishu:

Part of the bigger problem that most people here in Mogadishu are against is foreign interference and the cooperation by Kenya, Ethiopia and United States. We somehow feel our rights and sovereignty is under siege. Part of the al shabaab war is their pursuit to defeat the 'enemy' since they feel the US has self interest in Somalia affairs in the name of counterterrorism (Interview with male civil society official Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The above comment raises important questions that touch on international law, regional security and human rights. At a broader level, Kenya's military intervention in Somalia feeds into the larger debates on the uses of military force since the last decade of the 20th century. In the long run, a broader, more holistic conceptualization and approach to countering violent offers a truly sustainable approach.

Regarding poor socio-economic conditions, 238(86%) response from Kenya while 51(70%) from Somalia. The 86% response from Kenya could be attributed to the high rates of unemployment that is becoming a threat of transnational terrorism in the region today. The challenge of socially isolated, disenchanting young men turning to extremism in their search for identity, acceptance and purpose has been highlighted in Kenya, especially in the coastal region. In Kenya, perceptions revolved around a number of socioeconomic and political grievances. Among the marginalized communities of coastal Kenya, the counterterrorism agenda is perceived to have contributed to what they see as a series of repressive practices by state security forces. Despite ongoing reform initiatives, many Kenyans seemed unconvinced of their impact on current law enforcement practices. Discussions in Kenya revealed a range of grievances against the government. Relative economic deprivation has long been the subject of local dissent, dissatisfaction, and opposition to the national government. The general socioeconomic and political marginalization

of local youth and ethnic discrimination against Muslim communities also figured highly.

For Somalia, 70% could be attributed to state failure and collapsed economy that is becoming one of the most important threats of transnational terrorism. Somalia state collapse and the rise of al shabaab in Somalia has created socially isolated, disenchanted young men who turn to extremism in their search for identity, acceptance and purpose which they are unable to find in the community more often concerned with wealth accumulation rather than healthy relationship-building. There was a consensus that unemployment and a general lack of economic opportunity was a major source of general insecurity and can potentially contribute to opening pathways to violent extremism among individuals in vulnerable local communities. In this situation, the implication for counter-terrorism policy is the difficulty of identifying and intercepting terrorists. Another key informant was quoted as follows:

Poverty and huge unemployment that has seen the increase of the number of jobless and idle youths as the available resources decline. An idle mind is a devils workshop and there is no doubt the idle minds can be easily lured into joining criminal and terror groups (Interview with male government security officer in Garisa, 22nd September, 2015).

From the foregoing, the relationship between inequality and conflict extends beyond socioeconomic or even political conditions. According to the World Bank Report (2004), high inequality can lead to *latent social conflict*, which manifests itself through political struggles for public resources. Inequality can mean that different social groups have different interests, and the outcome of the political process through which those interests are reconciled can lead to reduction in aggregate



outcomes. This may happen because political processes (electoral or otherwise) seek to effect redistributions, but may do so in ways that have high economic costs.

Poverty alone is not driving people to radicalization, but poor socioeconomic circumstances undoubtedly make individuals more susceptible to it. A key factor is the unequal opportunity for upward social mobility as a result of religious, ethnic or political differences. Creating new jobs is not the responsibility of only government; it requires innovative thinking by ordinary people. However, government can create an environment that encourages innovation. By offering tax breaks and low-interest loans to start changing the mentality of future entrepreneurs at school, much can be done to encourage and equip young people not only to become educated, but also to contribute to the financial stability of the country and to their own well-being.

The complex social integration that is the foundation of modern economies was severely hampered, or even thwarted, in the more immediate interests of preserving the relative power of the dominant group or groups. Competition between and among social groups was thus focused on control of the state and trust and cooperation was undermined by the instrumental methods used to secure political power and influence. Similarly, the more recent push to institute democratic reforms has often induced political leaders to court political support from loyal kin groups and broader ethnic support bases to help secure electoral victories, limit support for political rivals, and restrict the mobilization of potential challengers (Gettleman, 2013). Consequently, Muslim youths in Kenya feel marginalized and feel that there is no justice for them in Kenyan society, which declares every Muslim 'guilty of terrorism until proven otherwise'. Joining extremist groups for such youths is,

therefore, a virtually accepted or expected option. They are already viewed as terrorists, whether they are or not, so in their mind it makes no difference if they actually become terrorists. In the words of one respondent:

Despite being born and regarded as Kenyan nationals, fellow Kenyans and especially police officers treat us as ‘foreigners’. Particularly as a result of the growing insecurity in Kenya since the intervention of Kenyan forces in Somalia, we are told to ‘go home’ (Interview with key a male informant peace and security expert in Nairobi- on 24th September, 2015).

Associated with this perception of not belonging to the broader Kenyan populace is the reality that Somali nationals, including Kenyan-Somalis, are suspected of being ‘terrorists’ and treated as such. For example, Kenyan nationals turned against and attacked Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals following the detonation of an explosive device on 18 November 2012 in Eastleigh, Nairobi. This was, however, not the first occasion on which people had retaliated against Somalis: On 30 September 2012 an angry mob armed with sticks and stones attacked Somalis living in Eastleigh after a grenade attack on St Polycarp Church killed one child and injured nine others. During this incident at least 13 Somalis were injured and property was destroyed.

Roy (2004) says that latent social conflict caused by factors such as inequality, ethnic and linguistic fragmentation, and social distrust in government institutions play a key role, directly impacting on the state’s ability to deal with social conflict. In other words, the greater the latent social conflict, the less state institutions will be able to effectively manage that conflict. Inhabitants of the coastal region in Kenya, where 30 percent of the country’s Muslim population lives, complain that this area is

less developed than the rest of the country. What makes this uneven development more volatile is the perception that the religious divide in the country ultimately contributes to this situation. It is, therefore, not only a debate about development, but it becomes a religious and eventually a political debate. Subsequent calls for self-determination and independence from the rest of the country become intertwined with religious, political and economic circumstances that are increasingly difficult to separate.

Regarding geographical factors (Table 4.3), results show 177(64%) response from Kenya while Somalia response was 33(45%). The response from both Kenya and Somalia could be attributed to the geography, rainfall, and vegetation of the Somali-Kenya border plays an important role in shaping human activities including armed conflict. From coastal south to northern interior, rainfall steadily decreases, temperatures rise, and vegetation patterns shift from dense bush to semi-arid conditions (Ulrichsen, 2011). The Kenya-Somali border area is partially framed by two perennially flowing rivers, the Tana River in Kenya (to the west) and the Jubba River in southern Somalia (to the east). The riverine valleys are narrow further upstream but widen as they approach the Indian Ocean, creating two fertile ribbons of tropical flora and forest. The lower portions of the river valleys also harbor tsetse flies and so have historically been avoided by pastoralists. According to one key informant:

It is clear that here in North-eastern, clashes over resources like grazing land is a problem. The rangeland degradation in the southern half of the border area, from the Dadaab refugee camp (near Dobley/Liboi) to the coast means that communities are vulnerable. This human activity has dramatically altered and damaged much of the region's ground cover, reducing the carrying capacity of the land. Predictably, this has led to an increase in communal conflict over access to increasingly scarce pasture (Interview with key male NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

The statement above resonates with observation made by Finlay, et al., (2012), indicating the isolated and often inaccessible terrain of the border area makes for an appealing location for terrorist and armed criminal activity, though the extent of terrorist activity in the border area has at times been overstated. Coastal areas of the border feature numerous small islands and remote inlets where dhows and fishing vessels can freely come and go undetected; the dense bush and lack of roads in much of the Lower Jubba region and coastal zone provides safe haven.

Virtually every analysis of Kenya's troubled pastoral areas emphasizes that environmental stress and severe poverty and underdevelopment combine to render these semi-arid zones chronically vulnerable to armed conflict, communal clashes, and violent crime. The Kenya-Somalia border area partially supports this claim. According to Walker (2002), most of the conflicts in the Kenya-Somali border area are driven principally by other, mainly political factors, but environmental stress and underdevelopment are critical underlying sources of instability. Particularly in the northern half of the border area, growing evidence suggest that the poorer tier of pastoralist households are increasingly facing immiseration. Destitute pastoralists form an important portion of the new urban populations, where prospects for employment are bleak. Uneducated and unemployed young men are easy marks for

recruitment into militias or criminal gangs. Heightened communal anxiety over access to scarce resources pasture, wells, jobs are easily exploited by politicians and others to promote divisions and foment violence. Very poor access to social services, especially education, and the almost complete absence of a government presence beyond a few police and military garrisons breeds a profound sense of alienation in much of the Kenyan border area.

Overall, the findings show a broad spectrum of factors contributing to the vulnerability of Kenya and Somalia to transnational terrorism. While it is equally true that the impressive improvement in regional peace and security has been the result of positive Kenyan government intervention and policies, the assessments of conflict in northern Kenya all point to an array of underlying factors which make the region exceptionally prone to armed conflict and the current trends of Kenya-Somalia security dilemma. As such, the results point to the need for a more comprehensive peace building strategy that requires policies which address the most dangerous underlying drivers of conflict. This analysis points to several possible entry points where external aid may help reshape sources of conflict into factors promoting peace and security. Having examined the factors contributing to the vulnerability of Kenya and Somalia to transnational terrorism, the study further analyzes the Shifta war dynamics and how they have influence the security relations between the two countries.

#### **4.6 Document Analysis of the Shifta War and Kenya-Somalia Security Relations**

The study analyzed two reports on Shifta War, and how the dynamics of this war influence Kenya-Somalia relations (Appendix XI and XII).

##### **The Shifta War: 1963–1967**

Given the shrinking options, Britain's decision to stop the NFD's self-determination marked the beginning of violence that would escalate into the Shifta War. Pro-secession demonstrations were held in towns in the area with the Somali Republic flag being flown; the Kenyan government responded to the demonstrations quite violently and even arrested some of the protesters. Moreover, thirty three Somali chiefs resigned in protest against both the decision and the colonial chieftaincy which went against the Somali clanist power structure. In the next month, all political parties in the NFD boycotted national elections, again. The levels of civil disobedience skyrocketed even as the number of killings increased (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

The assassinations of two Boran senior officials, Chief Haji Galma Dida and District Commissioner Daudi Debaso Wabera, was particularly significant especially after it emerged that their killers had eluded across the border into Somali Republic (Bjourn, 2009). The Somali Republic refused to extradite the assassins for trial in Kenya amidst a parliamentary discussion that claimed that the Somali Republic had stockpiled weapons ready to attack Kenya to force secession. According to one respondent:

Given that Kenya had attained internal self-rule on the 1st of June 1963, the new Kenyan government was under pressure from Kenyans in the rest of the country to show its ability in protecting the country's territorial integrity and therefore in response a police operation was mounted to secure the long border with Somalia and travel restrictions imposed within the NFD. In addition, the Kenyan government let loose its propaganda machine by distributing leaflets that claimed that people in the NFD would enjoy similar rights to all other Kenyans (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

From the foregoing, it is evident that NFD was a critical factor in shaping Kenya-Somalia relations; and further in attracting the NFD loyalty to the government because, firstly, most of the people in the area were illiterate due to colonial marginalization and also because the NFD politicians, some of whom were consequently incarcerated, were simultaneously spreading militant propaganda against the Kenyan government (Bjourn, 2009).

Analysts consistently view November 1963 as the time when the Shifta War started formally. At this point, it was clear that the Somali Republic would receive military assistance from the Soviet Union to support the NFD secessionists. Also, the Northern Frontiers Districts Liberation Army (NFDLA) was already spreading insurgency and making strategic attacks on government installations. On the other side, Kenya had signed a pact of defence with Ethiopia, which was largely seen as a way to fend off their mutual irredentist neighbour. In November 1963, with no signals of NFD separation from Kenya one month to the latter's independence, the war changed from low-key to major attacks on government facilities. Guerillas who had been trained and armed by the Somali National Army (SNA) inside the Somali Republic launched audacious attacks into the Kenyan territory. For instance, on the

22nd of November, the Shifta attacked a King's African Rifle camp in Garissa killing several policemen. The Kenyan government retaliated by sending Kenyan soldiers but again the Shifta were able to take advantage of the long and porous border and elope into the Somali Republic (Bjourn, 2009).

The goals of the Shiftas and some of the factors that emboldened them to fight against the Kenyan government backed by her colonial master, Britain. As discussed before in this paper, the ultimate objective of the Shifta was to disaffiliate the NFD from Kenya and unite it with Somali Republic. The means of achieving this goal give insights into their other goals. These goals included: forcing European administrators out of the NFD, proving the Kenyan government incapable of ruling the region so as to obtain international sympathy, preventing NFD government loyalists from getting into power and overstressing the government expenditure in the war so that it gave up the region as an economic burden (Pankhurst, 2004). In fighting for these goals, the Shifta were strengthened by the Somali Republic's support, their deep knowledge of the geographical terrain, utilization of their unique clan system as well the weaknesses of their opponent, the Kenyan government. One key informant was quoted as follows:

During the shifta period, many of us at that time in government were facing many challenges in other areas and therefore attention to the war in the NFD was quite limited. Also you have to remember that people angry at what they saw as betrayal of their dreams of independence as the Kenyatta government failed to address their socio economic needs. The Shifta therefore felt they still stood a chance in achieving their objectives against the weakened government through guerilla warfare (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).



In December 1963, Kenya finally gained independence but the NFD did not celebrate but instead continued its violent clamour for secession. Towards the end of the month, Prime Minister Kenyatta declared a state of emergency in the NFD, a dusk-to-dawn curfew and empowered the military to shoot anybody found in an exclusion zone which was defined as five miles within the Kenya-Somalia international boundary. The British military that had been left to train the Kenyan military sided with the Kenyans and together they pursued the Shifta using better technology such as aerial bombardment while the Shifta used less powerful arms from the Second World War (Bradbury & Healy, 2010).

### **Somalia and the Shifta Conflict**

At independence Kenya's only outstanding dispute with a foreign country was with Somalia, independent since 1960, which had irredentist claims on the Northern Frontier District (NFD), including post-independence North-Eastern Province. Although poor and arid, the area constituted nearly one-fifth of Kenya's territory and was the home of about 200,000 ethnic Somali and Oromo. Somalia's concern for these mostly nomadic people reflected its policy of pan-Somalism, in line with which Somalia sought the unification of all Somali-inhabited areas, including the NFD and the Ogaden region in Ethiopia. In pre-colonial days, greater Somalia was comprised of what is now the Ogden District of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District (NFD) of Kenya, Djibouti, Somali Land and Northern Somalia, unofficially known as Puntland. Colonial administration namely; Britain and Italy necessitated the decentralization of authority to enable collaboration with other clans to achieve some aspect of governance. Three of the five districts, namely the Ogden, Kenya's NFD, and Djibouti, found themselves in Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti respectively,

at the time of independence in 1960, with Somalia remaining with British Somalia land and Italian Somalia land. This new state system challenged the traditional structure of governance in Somalia's pastoral system. Upon independence, the leadership challenges and pre-occupation with greater Somalia shaped the character of the formation of Somalia and led to the build up of the Somalia military and ultimately to the shifta resistance of Northern Frontier District of Kenya in 1963-68 (Branch, 2012).

In the colonial era, the British did not incorporate Somalis living in Kenya into the prevailing order. At independence, the British reversed previous colonial policy and decided to force unity among disparate ethnic groups (including Somalis) in Kenya. In 1961 the establishment of the Republic of Somalia inspired Somali political leaders in Kenya to rally for secession from Kenya and incorporation into Somalia. Subsequently, the Somalian government supported the Shifta ("the lawless") (Fitzgerald, 2002). Even after British control had been established in Kenya, Somali clans were still migrating into the trans-Juba region, extending their range southwestward to the banks of the Tana River. In their movements the Somali paid no regard to political boundaries, and those who crossed the Juba River, where the British sphere of influence began, maintained their contact with fellow clansmen in Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Kenya's border with Somalia was a result of the secret arrangements that brought Italy into World War I on the side of the Allies. In 1916 Britain promised to cede part of its own colonial holdings in compensation for Italy's exclusion from the postwar division of German colonial territory already agreed to by Britain and France (Fitzgerald, 2002).

A treaty drawn up in 1920 and ratified in 1924 provided that Italy take over the area west of the Juba River up to 41° east longitude, including the port of Kismaayo. Known as Jubaland, it was incorporated into Italian Somaliland the following year. The new colonial boundary left a Somali-populated area within Kenya that was equal in size to the ceded territory. Although a number of Somali had settled in towns or as farm workers elsewhere in the colony, British authorities prohibited the nomads from moving over the internal frontier of the NFD as a precaution against ethnic conflict and the spread of interclan warfare. Other barriers (including taxation at a higher rate) were erected as well, setting the Somali apart from the rest of the African population.

According to Mohamoud (2005), these distinctions, all of which indirectly recognized the Somali as an alien element in Kenya and therefore emphasized their ties with Somalia, remained in effect until Kenya's independence and continually reinforced the Somali sense of exclusiveness. The Somali in the NFD were convinced that their interests were neglected by colonial authorities, and they expected them to be similarly neglected by an independent Kenya. They looked to fellow Somali across the border for political leadership, particularly after Somalia's independence (Mohamoud, 2005).

Somalia's constitution stated prominently in its preamble that it promoted "by legal and peaceful means, the union of the Somali territories," and its fundamental laws provided that all ethnic Somali, no matter where they resided, were citizens of the republic (Compagnon, 1992). Somalia did not directly assert sovereignty over adjacent territories in Kenya and Ethiopia but rather demanded that Somali living there be granted the right to self-determination. At the London talks on Kenya's

independence in 1961, Somali representatives from the NFD called on Britain to arrange for the region's separation from the colony before Kenya was granted self-government.

The British government appointed a commission to ascertain popular opinion on the question in the NFD (Compagnon, 1992). The results of its investigation indicated that separation from Kenya was almost unanimously supported by the Somali and their fellow nomadic pastoralists, the Oromo. These two peoples, it was noted, represented an overwhelming majority of the NFD's population. Despite considerable diplomatic activity by Somalia, the British government decided not to act on the commission's findings (Lewis, 2007). Anxious that independence negotiations proceed smoothly, the British were reluctant to alienate Kenyan nationalist leaders, who were all opposed to giving away a large part of their country. It was also felt in London that the federal format then proposed in the Kenyan constitution would provide a solution through the wide degree of autonomy it allowed the predominantly Somali region within a federal system. This solution did not ease Somali demands for unification with Somalia, however, and even regional autonomy disappeared when Kenya amended the constitution and introduced a centralized form of government in 1964 (Lewis, 2007). The denial of Somali claims led to steadily increasing unrest in the NFD. Adapting easily to life as *shifita* (bandits), Somali dissidents conducted a guerrilla campaign against the police and army for more than four years. Kenya's charges that the guerrillas were trained and equipped with Soviet arms in Somalia and that their activities were directed from Mogadishu were denied by the Somali government. But it could not hide the fact that Somali radio exerted an influence on the level of guerrilla activity by the militant tone of its broadcasts beamed into Kenya (Lewis, 2007).

Meanwhile, clashes between Ethiopian police and Somali in the Ogaden had grown steadily in scope, eventually involving small-scale actions between army units along the border. In February 1964 armed conflict erupted along the entire length of the Somali-Ethiopian frontier (Gettleman, 2013). A cease-fire was arranged in April 1964 under OAU auspices, but the potential for future hostilities remained high. Consequently, Ethiopia and Kenya concluded a mutual defense pact shortly after the latter became independent in December 1964, in response to what both countries perceived to be the continuing threat from Somalia. Most OAU members were alienated by Somali irredentism and feared that, if Somalia were successful in detaching the Somali-populated portions of Kenya and Ethiopia, the example might inspire their own restive minorities divided from their brothers by frontiers imposed in the colonial period. In addition the Somalis had challenged two of Africa's most important elder statesmen, President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya and Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia (Gettleman, 2013).

Under OAU auspices a number of efforts were made to settle the differences between Somalia and its neighbors. The resulting agreements between Kenya and Somalia were usually honored for a time, until some reported incident in North-Eastern Province once more inflamed public opinion on both sides (Compagnon, 1992). The propaganda level would then rise and with it the level of hostilities. This situation eased only after a change in government in Somalia brought Mohamed Ibrahim Egal to office as prime minister in 1967. Without relinquishing Somalia's commitment to uniting the Somali people, Egal sought rapprochement with Ethiopia and Kenya through the good offices of the OAU, hoping to create an atmosphere in which the questions of self-determination for Somali outside Somalia could be peacefully negotiated. After a meeting between Kenyatta and Egal, diplomatic

relations were restored in January 1968, and the state of emergency in effect in North-Eastern Province since before independence was at last related. Tensions were so reduced that Kenyatta by mid-1968 could refer to them in the past tense as "a little quarrel" (Compagnon, 1992).

The military junta that took power in Somalia under Major General Mohamed Siad Barre after a coup in 1969 pledged to continue that country's peaceful relations with Kenya. Nevertheless, Kenya remained mindful of Somalia's long-range goal for the unification of "Greater Somalia," and its caution was heightened by the knowledge that the Soviet-trained and Soviet-equipped Somali army was nearly three times the size of its own. Misgivings about Somalia's intentions seemed to be confirmed in 1974 by a revival of guerrilla activity in North-Eastern Province by the clandestine United Liberation Front of Western Somalia. The Kenyan attorney general, Charles Njonjo, heatedly invited Somali dissidents to "pack up their camels and go to Somalia" if they were not satisfied with their lot in Kenya. Protests were also directed at Somalia for allowing the installation of Soviet bases on its soil in violation of the zone of peace that Kenya (among other nations) sought to establish in the Indian Ocean region (Compagnon, 1992).

According to (Gettleman, 2013), Kenya reaffirmed its alliance with Ethiopia after Haile Selassie was deposed by a military government in 1974. However, Compagnon (1992) points out that Kenya's fear of Somali subversion proved more compelling than even that of Soviet influence in the region, sustaining the alliance after Somalia expelled the Soviets in 1977 and after Ethiopia was drawn within Moscow's orbit. During the Ogaden war in 1977-78 Kenya openly sympathized with Ethiopia against Somalia. Although Somalia tried to assure Kenya that it wanted

peace along their common border, the Kenyans took the renewal of fighting by shifta insurgents early in 1978 as a more reliable indication of Somali intentions. Citing unrest in the region, Kenya had already undertaken to upgrade its armed forces with purchases of military equipment from the United States and Britain. Despite increased political pressure to "Kenyanize" the armed forces, the upsurge of guerrilla activity on the part of ethnic Somali in northeast Kenya dictated the retention of experienced British officers. The campaign against the shifta, which continued until late 1967, gave the army the opportunity to cast itself in the role of defender of the national honor and integrity against a threat that had some element of foreign instigation. The shifta challenge also heightened the civilian leadership's understanding of the need for an effective military force (Compagnon, 1992).

Although British officers were retained during the shifta conflict, the political fallout of the 1964 mutiny did accelerate the Kenyanization of the armed forces. The small elite officer contingent produced at Sandhurst, at Mons Officer Cadet School, and in other Commonwealth countries was inadequate to meet the army's revised staffing requirements in the 1960s. For a time in the mid-1960s, a number of young men received specialized officer training in other countries, such as Egypt, China, the Soviet Union, and Bulgaria, under private arrangements between these countries and political factions in Kenya. Many of these hopefuls, however, found upon their return to Kenya that their credentials for a commission were unacceptable to the Ministry of Defence, which regarded their officially unsanctioned foreign training as politically suspect. Israeli-trained personnel were accepted, but only after they retrained in Kenya.

Eventually, the Shifta depended too much on Somalia and lost its internal drive for self-determination. The Shifta war colored Kenya's relationship with pastoralists from the 1960s onwards and helps to explain (along with a number of other factors) state failure to deal with growing populations and development problems that have threatened the way of life and ecosystems in much of the north of the country. Mutual antipathy toward Somalia induced Kenya and Ethiopia to join in a ten-year treaty of friendship and cooperation in January 1979, although their political systems had little in common (Gettleman, 2013). The government in Nairobi refrained from directly blaming Somalia for a resurgence of shifta (bandit) activity in 1980, but Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi joined Ethiopia's Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam in a harsh condemnation of Somali goals and activities during their meeting of December 1980. The two leaders demanded that Somalia renounce all territorial claims to Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti, and pay reparations for damage caused during the Ogaden war.

From the foregoing, it is clear that Kenya-Somali relations have been sore and historical issues are still at play. According to Fitzgerald (2002), the opposition to Somali secession resulted in a low-intensity war in northeastern Kenya between 1963 and 1967. The official number of insurgents killed is 2,000, but it is likely that many more died during the war. Thousands more were forced from their homes during a campaign of compulsory resettlement. Once the war was over, promised development funds never materialized.

As Somalia spun into crisis in the 1980s, so cross-border incursions by armed gangs became more common. But efforts by the Kenyan government to restore a semblance of order made little effort to discriminate between those from Somalia




itself and those from the local Somali population of the North Eastern Province. Restrictions were placed on movement on Kenyan-Somalis and the community was subject to numerous incidents of gross human-rights abuses. None was as significant or remembered with as much bitterness by Kenyan-Somalis as the Wagalla massacre in February 1984 when at least 1,000 civilians were killed by the Kenyan security forces (Fitzgerald, 2002).

The literature analysis has explored the shifta war dynamics and security situation between Kenya and Somalia. The analysis paved way to further probe the relation between shifta war and current terrorism trends between the two countries.

#### 4.6.1 Shifta War as a Historical Bearing on Transnational Terrorism

The study sought to establish the link between Kenya-Somalia historical action in the Shifta War and the current challenges of terrorism and other security challenges between the two countries. Data on this question were collected, analyzed and presented in Figure 4.4.



**Figure 4.4 Shifta War as a historical bearing on transnational terrorism**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Findings show Kenya response 28% noted great extent, 22% moderate extent, 32% felt it was to a less extent while 18% said not at all. Response from Somalia revealed 36% noted great extent, 34% moderate extent, 20% felt it was to a less extent while 10% said not at all.

As the findings demonstrate, 78(28%) response from Kenya noted great extent while 61(22%) said moderate extent indicating the shifta war has a historical bearing on transnational terrorism. This could be attributed to the fact that the shifta war dynamics indirectly recognized the Somali as an alien element in Kenya and therefore emphasized their ties with Somalia, remained in effect until Kenya's independence and continually reinforced the Somali sense of exclusiveness. The Somali in the NFD were convinced that their interests were neglected by colonial authorities, and they expected them to be similarly neglected by an independent Kenya. They looked to fellow Somali across the border for political leadership, particularly after Somalia's independence (Mohamoud, 2005). However, the results further show 89(32%) said less extent while 50(18%) said not at all, which could be seen as Somali Kenyans felt doubly betrayed by the Somali government, which talked the talk of irredentism but failed to back up the shifta fighters, and by the Kenyan government, which treated administration of the North-East province as a form of military occupation (Lewis, 2007). One respondent was quoted as follows:

It has a bearing, we are in a dynamic rule the previous history is shaping the future and current history. Shifta war in one way or the other contributed to the challenges being witnessed as most Somalis have remained unpatriotic to Kenya (FGD female with religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

In an attempt to find a solution to the Shifta uprising, the Somali community was allowed to vote in the first referendum since independence on whether to remain part of Kenya or join Somalia. The outcome of the referendum was obvious the Somalis chose to join Somalia but the authorities told those who voted for independence that they were welcome to leave Kenya for Somalia, as Kenya was not prepared to surrender its territory. This marked the beginning of the Shifta separatist war, during which Somalis claimed part of the Kenyan coast from Kilifi to Lamu as part of Somalia and started a guerrilla war to reclaim it (Okoth, 2010a).

The Kenyan government responded with brutal force by declaring the entire north-eastern part of Kenya and all regions bordering the Somali-populated regions security operation zones. Because of the Shifta War and the fact that the Somali-Kenyans in many ways represent the face of Islam in Kenya, the entire Muslim community has been marginalized. As a result of this, many Muslims in Kenya have grown up with some sort of 'rage' against successive Christian-dominated governments, thus making it easy for young Muslims to join extremist groups in the name of 'defending' their faith (Gettleman, 2013).

Response from Somalia revealed 26(36%) said great extent, 25(34%) noted moderate extent while 15(20%) stated less extent, 7(10%) said not at all. The 36% who noted moderate extent could be for the reason that in fighting for these goals, the Shifta were strengthened by the Somali Republic's support, their deep knowledge of the geographical terrain, utilization of their unique clan system as well the weaknesses of their opponent, the Kenyan government. At independence, a central pillar of the Republic of Somalia was irredentism a rejection of the colonial

boundaries and an insistence on the political unity of all the Somali people of the Horn of Africa. In Kenya, some members of the Somali population in the North-East Province mounted a low-level insurgency against the Kenyan government in the mid-1960s known as the *shifto* wars, a pejorative term which today is used to describe any armed banditry (Lewis, 2007). However, 20% stated less extent with 10% who indicated not at all, which may be related to the fact that the insurgency failed to attract much direct support from the new Somali government and was quelled. Worse, it resulted in the imposition of draconian emergency rule in North-East Province which was only lifted in 1992. However, interview results showed mixed reactions:

No relations because the Shifta war had different agenda that was to have succession of north eastern into Somalia but current terrorists want to drag economy by scaring away terrorists and that use supporting their enemies (FGD male respondent in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).


Following independence, the Kenyan government adopted the British model, while the seat of political power was based in Nairobi, a predominantly Christian area. Consequently, while further strengthened by a geographical divide (see above), Muslims in post-independence Kenya have been kept on the fringes of the national agenda. This caused the Muslim community to feel that it was not part of Kenya. Equally, it caused the government and non-Muslims to question the patriotism of Muslims, a perception that was strengthened by the fact that after independence the Kenyan-Somalis started agitating for a separate homeland with the option of joining their brethren in Somalia (Mburu, 2005).

This feeling of not being part of Kenya started when Kenya's independence was being negotiated. During forums such as the Lancaster House conferences, many

ethnicities were adequately represented, except for the Kenyan-Somalis. Consequently, when Kenya attained independence in 1963, the Somali community in Kenya felt that it had been left out and was not part of the new government. This ultimately led to the Shifta separatist war (1963–67). This war, initiated by the Somali ethnic community, was an attempt to have the Northern Frontier District (NFD) secede from Kenya to join a Greater Somalia (Okoth, 2010a).

#### 4.7 North Frontier District and Kenya-Somalia Security Relations

With Kenya’s independence imminent, many Kenyan Somalis agitated for merger of their region into Somalia, a call supported by the Somali government. This aspect was critical in assessing whether the Northern Frontier District still threatens new security arrangements; within the context of security-based diplomacy in transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia. Data on the same were collected, analyzed and results presented as shown in Figure 4.5.



**Figure 4.5 North Frontier District and Kenya-Somalia Security Relations**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Findings show response from Kenya 94(34%) noted great extent, 39(14%) moderate extent, 28(10%) felt it was to a less extent while 116(42%) said not at all. The 34% response who noted great extent indicates Northern Frontier District still threatens new security arrangements. Given that Kenya had attained internal self-rule on the 1st of June 1963, the new Kenyan government was under pressure from Kenyans in the rest of the country to show its ability in protecting the country's territorial integrity and therefore in response a police operation was mounted to secure the long border with Somalia and travel restrictions imposed within the NFD. In the words of one key informant:

The northern frontier will still remain a threat both security and economic wise since the continued existence of people of Somali ethnic group across the border and continued marginalization of the area still pose a great threat, however with the new era of discovering of minerals might help in changing this (key informant interview with male senior government official in Nairobi, 21st September, 2015).

However, 10% said less extent while 42% noted not at all. This could be attributed to the fact that the changing waves of terrorism transcend historical aspects. For example, the Somali crisis has been an especially challenging case and the context of complete state collapse poses unique difficulties. Recent syntheses of social movement theory stress an integrative approach to all forms of political contention (McAdam et al. 1996, 2001). In this view, those of social movements are one form of contention, while the actions of states, elites, and counter movements constitute other dimensions. The contentious politics approach sees tactics, movements, and actors arrayed along a spectrum of related phenomenon rather than boxed in by formal, discrete categories. Findlay (2014) adds that the formation of a Somali

nation state from the union of British Somaliland and Italian Somalia raised the issue of the status of Somali inhabited areas in neighbouring states, including the Northern Frontier District of British Kenya. Nonetheless, challenges may exist within the framework of security-based diplomacy and hence the study's priority focus.

In the case of the Kenyan government, the assumption was that internal instability in Somalia enhances Kenya's security. The truth is that increased instability in Somalia not only exposes conflicts within Kenya, but also constitutes Kenya as a test-space in engaging and fighting Somali conflicts. In view of the findings, Bestman (2009) posits that in the 1980s especially as the Somali state began to collapse, several regional problems began to emerge. The Kenyan economy began to expand indirectly into Somalia while the political space of the Somali state expanded indirectly into the Kenyan state. In turn, Somalis who were politically excluded from the state increasingly penetrated the state by grabbing the economic spaces. Somalis in the collapsed Somali state maximize on the capital from that country and export it and buy "space". So the first reconstruction within the state is the ability to capture the economic space (Bestman, 2009).

Response from Somalia revealed majority 47(64%) stating not at all, 4(6%) said less extent while 6(8%) noted moderate. Only 1(2%) said great extent. The 2% who noted great extent and 8% cited moderate could be linked to the ultimate objective of the Shifta which was to disaffiliate the NFD from Kenya and unite it with Somali Republic. The means of achieving this goal give insights into their other goals. These goals included: forcing European administrators out of the NFD, proving the Kenyan government incapable of ruling the region so as to obtain international

sympathy, preventing NFD government loyalists from getting into power and overstretching the government expenditure in the war so that it gave up the region as an economic burden. In fighting for these goals, the Shifta were strengthened by the Somali Republic's support, their deep knowledge of the geographical terrain, utilization of the unique clan system as well the weaknesses of their opponent, the Kenyan government. However, 64% said not at all meaning majority from Somalia felt the Northern Frontier District doesn't threaten the new security arrangements between Kenya and Somalia. This could be attributed to the al shabaab prospect that is being viewed as a new security dilemma. The group's capacity has been significantly diminished, but they have yet to be eliminated. As supported by one key informant as follows:

NFD doesn't hold in the new security relations. When Somalia and the idea was new in the mind of the old generation, however, the new generation and the lack of lawlessness in Somali has totally changed minds of people and never taught of integration o Somalia. However that still exists in the minds of Kenya. Somali community in northern frontier feel marginalized and harbors a feel that they should be autonomous so as to manage their own affairs (Interview with male key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

With a mixed reaction as observed in the statement above, the relationship between Kenya and Somalia is further complicated by their opposing ideas concerning a shared common security problem, despite mutual economic and security interests. Decades of marginalization and the inability to maximize on the resources in that the NFD area generates human insecurities that the state begins to experience may be the reason for 8% who noted moderate as well as 2% said great extent. Ideally, there is always the logic individuals residing near borders depend on more than one state. To the extent that they cut across the borders, that marginalisation, presupposes that at one level, there is a potential of infiltration to the detriment of the state.




In view of the foregoing, beyond the argument for defending Kenya's borders from foreign militants, Kenya's ethnic Somali majority in North Eastern Province have historically been threatened by the Greater Somalia movement and deeply rooted notions of pan-Somali irredentism. From November 1963 to April 1968, a pro-Somali movement fought government forces in what was then called the Northern Frontier District. Ideally, colonialism had its own share in the country's inequality and poverty as it promoted rural-urban, regional and class differences in development. As a consequence the contradictions that characterized colonial Kenya have been accentuated. Moreover, income inequality and poverty have become more prevalent since independence (Ndege, 2008).

According to Lewis (2007), the problems in the former NFD have been aggravated by the unstable situation in the former Somali Republic especially after the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991. Given the proximity of the two areas and porous nature of the long Kenya-Somali border, a lot of Somali citizens sought refuge in Kenya from fighting during the warlord and extremist regimes. It is estimated that more than 500,000 Somali refugees live in the Dadaab Refugee Camp in North Eastern Kenya alone and while most of these pose no security threat, their mere presence has been used by ill intentioned extremists to infiltrate the Kenyan society and cause damage. This security threat has been of great concern in the recent years especially after the rise of the Al-Shabaab extremists in Southern and Central Somalia after the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union in 2006 (Lewis, 2007). However, Gettleman (2013) point out that the Kenyan military incursion into Somalia in October 2011 after several attacks on tourists along the Kenyan coast has further complicated the security situation. While the Kenyan military, in cooperation with African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has been mostly successful in

fighting the Al-Shabaab, it has done so at the expense of the safety of the Kenyan nation. Despite the fact that the recent Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi is the popular point of reference when citing examples of repercussions of Kenyan entry into Somalia, Adow (2013) reports that over a hundred terrorist attacks have occurred in the North Eastern Province in the past few years. Following these attacks, some responses that smack of Shifta War attitudes of mass punishment have been come into existence:

#### 4.8 The Link Between Refugee Camps and Terrorist Attacks

Kenya is facing challenges from hosting a large number of Somali refugees in the country. Due to the changing dimensions of the conflict in Somalia, the study further sought to establish the extent to which Somalia refugee camps can be used as launching pads for terrorist attacks between Kenya and Somalia. Data on this particular aspect were collected, analyzed and results presented in Figure 4.4.



**Figure 4.6 The link between refugee camps and terrorist attacks**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Findings show Kenya response 89(32%) noted great extent, 61(22%) moderate extent, 83(30%) felt it was to a less extent while 44(16%) said not at all. Response from Somalia revealed 4(6%) noted great extent, 13(18%) moderate extent, 25(34%) felt it was to a less extent while 31(42%) said not at all.

Kenya response 32% noted great extent, which could be attributed to the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Somali refugees into northeastern Kenya and Nairobi in the early 1990s; a situation which created significant tensions between the Reer Somali and Kenyan Somali, even though many shared the same clan and sub-identity. For Kenyan Somalis, the Reer Somali brought unwanted levels of violence, a predisposition to engage in illegal activities, and aggressive demands on aid agencies and local resources. In the process, the Somali refugees were blamed for stigmatizing all ethnic Somalis, making life much harder for Kenyan Somalis, who were increasingly seen by the rest of Kenyans including the police as indistinguishable from the Somali refugees. From the results, 22% moderate extent which relates to recent reports linking refugees with terrorist activities in Kenya. From the interview response, one official noted as follows:

One of the biggest terrorist attacks in Kenya occur due to terrorist hiding in the camp and then scheduling their evil deeds i.e. the Westgate attack. The camp offers sanctuary to terrorists to plan and launch attacks within Kenya. The presence of refugee camps in the country is one of the breeding ground for terrorism and radicalization and terrorist points for terror element from Somalia to Kenya (Interview with NGO female officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

From the foregoing, it is likely that the refugee issue had a significant impact on Kenya's decision to intervene. While it is in Kenya's interest to have a stable

neighbor that is able to accommodate its own citizens and not be a burden to its neighboring countries, the refugee crisis in Kenya is serious and quite possibly one of the triggers debate. However, 30% felt it was to a less extent while 16% said not at all. While the war on terror has been blamed partly for the refugee crisis, it indicates that some view the rise of terrorism trends in Kenya and Somalia a global challenge not related to refugees. While the collapse of the Barre government triggered a massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somalis into the Jubba regions and northern Kenya; their arrival into the border area overwhelmed the region. So far, Kenya is one among many states which have put in place laws, policy measures and a range of programs aimed at raising the barriers to entry for migrants into their territories, tightening border controls and generally discouraging asylum entries. While it may be argued that these measures prevail mainly in the industrialized countries, the backlash has affected policies and practices on refugee protection across the globe, seriously undermining the quality of refugee protection.

The territory around Liboi, across from Doble Somalia in the southern portion of the border zone, was dramatically transformed in the early 1990s by the establishment of an enormous refugee camp called Dadaab. Over 100,000 mainly Somali refugees were encamped there, making Dadaab the largest settlement in the entire Northeast Province-Jubba Valley area. Dadaab's impact on the local population and economy was immediate and profound. Over time, Dadaab has become increasingly integrated into and integral to the regional economy on both sides of the border. Somali men keep their families in the camp to access the food and services, while they return to the Jubba valley; Garissa merchants benefit from the large new market the camp affords them; and the entire region exploits the

availability of WFP food rations which are sold by refugees or diverted from them (Otunnu, 1992).

The international refugee protection regime has changed drastically from tolerance in the 1970 80s, to hostility in the 1990s, and now refugees are seen as a force of national and regional insecurity and instability. On January 4, 2007, Kenya denied entry to asylum seekers from Somalia in the interests of preventing the entry of ousted UIC militia which the government has linked to terrorism. It is possible that the Kenyan government may have been reading from the script that was set by the US Homeland Security Department, which declared in August 2005 that it would enforce stricter security measures along US borders; extensive background checks of migrants; new full-proof visa security systems and the sharing of intelligence information with international allies to deter the entry of migrants and by extension, terrorists into US territory (Katumanga, 2012).

Response from Somalia revealed 6% noted great extent, 18% moderate extent, 34% felt it was to a less extent while 42% said not at all. Contrary to response from Kenya, the results from Somalia reveal majority feel refugees are not linked to terrorist trends. The 34% who said less extent and 42% said not at all could be attributed to the ongoing war in Somalia that has definitely impacted on refugee protection in Kenya. On the contrary, Menkhaus (2012) posits that the threat of terrorism is ever-growing in Kenya also, due to the influx of Somali refugees, some of whom have allegiance with the Al-Shabaab and are becoming increasingly autonomous and becoming “a center of Shabaab recruitment and fund-raising” (Menkhaus, 2012). The first reaction of the Kenyan government was to close its

borders with Somalia and to return over 400 asylum seekers in early 2007. This directly violated international law related to refugees, specifically, Article 33 non-refoulement provisions of the UN convention and Article 2 (3) of the 1969 OAU convention. The sentiments from the analysis above were supported by one FGD who categorically noted the following:

No, Somali refugee are peace loving people, they inform anything they inform anything they see that is a threat to their security to the administration. Terrorists understand the assistance offered by the international agencies in the refugee camps even though they don't have gain; they respect that and no incidence in terrorist has been reported in the camp despite the normal boundary conflicts (FGD male respondent in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

In view of the foregoing, the presence of refugees is further compounded by armed groups of exiles actively engaged in warfare with political objectives. While the Kenyan government pursues an encampment policy for refugee protection in Kenya, there is a large population of Somalis living in Nairobi and other urban areas. But with heightened concerns about terrorism, there is a possibility that the Kenyan government employed this particular policy in a stricter way to confine refugees, and especially Somalis, to the camps, thereby severely restricting their freedom of movement and other human rights such as the rights to work, education and travel outside the country of asylum among others. It must be acknowledged that the encampment policy violates the fundamental right to freedom of movement which is essential for the enjoyment of other human rights. Also, it cannot be doubted that camps constitute a unique setting for the arbitrary exercise of power as supported by Wakahiu (2013).

On the other hand, the dilemma between a humanitarian concern for refugees, and a realization that refugees can be a source of tension is key in the management of

transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Kirui and Mwaruvie (2012) point out that the three camps of Ifo, Dagahaley and Hagadera accommodated an approximate of 300,000 refugees as of July 2009, a number that far exceeds its capacity of 90,000 refugees. The recent influx of economic refugees fleeing from famine and Al shabaab stricken Somalia has further pushed the number to 470,000 refugees as of January 2012. These camps have had several cases of reported and unreported violence since its inception in 1991. As of July 2009, Dadaab refugee camp has remained the largest in the world. These camps are dominated by Somali refugees who depend on livestock keeping for their livelihood. Despite the Government of Kenya(GoK) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees( UNHCR's) effort to promote security in and around Dadaab refugee camps, the problem seem to be deeply rooted hence calling for attention from the government, the academia and the general public concerned with peaceful coexistence in society. It is argued that refugee settlement impacts on physical security not only in and around the camps, but even nationally and internationally (UNHCR, 2014).

Wakahiu (2013) asserts that the war in Somalia and the anti-terror campaign in the Eastern and Horn of Africa region are unfolding against the background of heightened state insensitivity to the plight of refugees. To begin with, the international refugee protection regime has changed drastically from tolerance in the 1970 80s, to hostility in the 1990s, and now refugees are seen as a force of national and regional insecurity and instability. The Tripartite Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Governing the Voluntary Repatriation of Somalia Refugees lining in Kenya 2013 (Appendix X of

the study) was signed in 10 November 2013 and was welcomed by NGOs, UNHCR, and various stakeholders as representing an important step in the development of durable solutions for Somali refugees (UNHCR, 2014).

The Tripartite Agreement has been carefully drafted so that the option of returning refugees to Somalia is not treated as an alternative to asylum. Return can only be carried out in specific circumstances, as it does not entail the cessation of refugee status and therefore there still exists insufficient protection from persecution in the country of origin. Thus the principle of voluntary return and the right to return in safety and dignity form the backbone of the Tripartite Agreement. The Preamble of the Agreement also reaffirms the prohibition of refoulement, which protects refugees from being sent to places where their lives or freedoms are in danger. In April 2014, Kenya launched a massive security crackdown on Somali refugees following terrorist attacks in several areas, culminating in the forced deportation of 359 refugees. (UNHCR, 2014). These strategies have brought about sore relations between Kenya and Somalia. In the words of one respondent:

Although the war on terror needs to be fought against all fronts, the plight of Somali refugees and the unlawful activities committed by the Kenyan security forces against the refugees of Somalia in Kenya is uncalled for, it is very wrong to implicate all refugees as terrorists (Interview with a University Lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).


From the foregoing, it is evident that refugee crisis in Kenyan and Somali impacts on the security relations of the two countries. It is, therefore, clear that even in security-based strategies of managing transnational terrorism, the geo-political stakes inherent in a refugee situation are such that security of camps and border areas cannot be reduced to a mere question of law enforcement. Host countries have



become reluctant to host refugees because of the fear that the refugees are no longer seen as a short-term challenge as earlier thought in the 1940's during the Second World War (Kirui & Mwaruvie, 2012). A study by Mwakasege (1995) in Tanzania established that the presence of refugees is a source of tension in the relations between Tanzania and Burundi and to a certain extent Rwanda, arising from suspicions that the refugees are regrouping and training in warfare for attacking the countries of origin. Kenya thus is not the only country finding refugees as a threat to its national security. It is evident that the host country and refugees often have a big mistrust towards each other. Even though refugees are welcomed by host states, the reception in most cases is cold and full of suspicion leading to mutual avoidance.

#### **4.9 Kenya Military (KDF) Intervention Strategy in Counterterrorism**

Kenya as well as Somalia national security and stability have been destabilized by waves of terror attacks. In this context, the study sought to establish the extent to which Kenya's military (KDF) intervention in Somalia had offered an effective counterterrorism strategy to assure security and safety of citizens in both countries. Analyzed data concerning this question are presented Figure 4.7.



**Figure 4.7 Kenya military (KDF) intervention strategy in counterterrorism**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Findings (Figure 4.5) from Kenya show 111(40%) noted effective, 67(24%) fair while 100(36%) felt it was not effective. Response from Somalia revealed 15(20%) noted effective, 11(16%) fair while 47(64%) felt it was not effective.

Regarding the response from Kenya, 40% noted that Kenya's military (KDF) intervention in Somalia had offered an effective counterterrorism strategy. This could be attributed to the events before KDF intervention, marred by attacks claimed by al shabaab including kidnapping and grenade attacks. These implications caused a regional and international arena threatening the well-being and national security of Kenya. This may have very well been a contributing factor in Kenya choosing to invade Somalia in October of 2011. Furthermore, 24% response from Kenya shows fair; while it may be difficult to get to the full truth regarding the intention of the Kenyan government, it is possible to address likely and conceivable reasons that may have been precursors to the Kenyan invasion in Somalia. Indeed, the terrorism

threat in Somalia continues to grow and be a source of angst and worry in the international community.

Although a military intervention was in the works, the timeline was accelerated by a string of cross-border kidnapping attacks targeting Western tourists on the Kenyan coast and aid workers from the refugee camp in Dadaab. Tourism is a key industry, and Kenya, particularly Nairobi, is host to a large UN presence, including many international and local NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and other activities. When several Europeans were seized in the Lamu area in September and October 2011, the key tourism industry was hit hard. The last straw appeared to be when two Spanish aid workers with Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) were kidnapped in a Dadaab refugee camp, near the Kenya-Somalia border, on 13 October (the third incident in less than a month). Several days later, Kenyan troops moved into Somalia (Pelton, 2011).

However, 36% of respondents from Kenya felt it was to a less extent indicating Kenya's military (KDF) intervention in Somalia had not offered an effective counterterrorism strategy. The reason for such response could be linked to the recent retaliatory terrorist attacks in both Kenya and Somalia. Kenya itself is rapidly emerging as a theatre of conflict. Since the intervention was launched in October 2011, Kenya has experienced a number of attacks linked to Al-Shabaab. One FGD was of the following view:

No if the operation was effective then there should be no rampant attacks. KDF invasion into Somalia has worsened our security here in Somalia and even in your country (FGD male respondent in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, it can be retraced that in the first few weeks, attacks mainly targeted bars and nightclubs, including a Nairobi nightclub bombing on 24 October, but also churches. With the build-up of security across the country, particularly in Nairobi, the majority of subsequent attacks have been in North Eastern Province, along the Somalia border. These increasingly target military and other security forces.

The Kenya Defense Forces is mandated within the constitution to provide security of Kenya and its people. According to the Kenya Constitution (Excerpts from Chapter Fourteen- National Security, Part 1 - National Security Organs), the primary object of the national security organs and security system is to promote and guarantee national security in accordance with the principles mentioned in Article 238 (2). Moreover, 241 (3) states that ' the Defence Forces (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic; (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster. In light of this, Kenya puts forward a variety of reasons, linked to the insecurity caused by al-Shabaab in the Horn of Africa region, to justify its military intervention in Somalia. According to one respondent:

As well as having concerns over border security, there were issues like al-Shabaab's frequent kidnappings and killings of tourists in its coastal and north-eastern provinces had become a threat to trade and tourism, both of which are vital sectors of Kenya's economy. They had to intervene strongly because the situation was getting worse. I think they have made some gains despite the challenges, but a strategic move is need because al shabaab are changing tactics (FGD with male religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, it is evident that although the scale of the operation launched by Kenya indicates that plans for such an offensive had been underway long before the actual invasion, questions have been raised over the overall preparedness and coordination of the Kenya Defence Force (KDF) for the operation, given the domestic vulnerabilities evident in the consequent counter attacks launched by al-Shabaab militia on Kenyan civilians. While various actors, both on the Kenyan and Somali side, have debated on the pros and cons of the decision to intervene, the study findings point to the underlying challenges of a security-based diplomacy approach to managing transnational terrorism.

In view of the response from Somalia, majority (64%) felt Kenya's military (KDF) intervention in Somalia has not offered an effective counterterrorism strategy. The implication for this response could be that although Al-Shabaab has been weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximize its asymmetric advantage. Somalia has also suffered terrorist attacks despite KDF intervention strategy; and one tactical change has already become clear that rather than fight in the open, al shabaab has melted into the background, posing a threat to peace and security to the Somalia populace. The results reflect the increasing demands to withdraw KDF from Somalia. In the case of Somalia, some would likely argue that it was immoral for Kenya to enter Somalia with the use of force, as it is not ethical to use force under the pacifism approach. One key informant was quoted as follows:

KDF intervention strategy has not been effective; and the measurement of the effectiveness could be cited to stability in Somalia, which has not been achieved yet. Yes we know some towns have been reclaimed from al shabaab, but the challenge of a stable Somalia cannot be achieved through military tools alone. Attacks are still reported here in Kenya and Somalia (Interview with NGO female officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

From the foregoing, the implications of a security-based approach in the management of transnational terrorism depict the challenges that come with employing military tools. In the absence of improved international coordination, Somalia could in effect be carved into spheres of influence. The issue of self-interest comes into play as well. While Keohane (2009) accepts basic tenets of the neo-realist argument such as, the assumption that states act rationally, and the assumption that states seek power to affect other states. However, in the case of Kenya and Somalia, states must consider new dimensions of security and hence a postmodernist approach security must be broadened to include a wide range of non-state actors, such as individuals, ethnic and cultural groups, regional economic blocs, and the international nongovernmental organizations in the management of transnational terrorism.

It is worth noting that 20% noted effective while 16% cited fair from Somalia. This could be attributed to the success of KDF and AMISOM in taking over the cities like Kismayu which were breeding ground for terrorists and transnational groups. On an altruistic level, Kenya had many reasons to use military intervention and intervene at a humanitarian level. As aforementioned, Somalia suffers from many humanitarian failures and has poor indicators in development and has suffered from food security and famine issues for the last several decades. Interestingly, on a more national-interest, self-interest perspective, Kenya also has legitimate cause for entering into

war with Somalia and intervening with military force (Bademosi, 2012). Somalia has become a terrorist playground threatening the security of Kenyans and Kenyan economic interests, Somalia's increasingly growing instability has led to an undesirable increase of Somali refugees in Kenya and a drain on Kenyan resources and infrastructure, and last but not least, Somalia's downfall is just an overall threat to the Kenyan well-being (Bademosi, 2012).

The Kenyan decision to intervene seems to have been one that was made without significant U.S. involvement and influence. But, the ultimate truth is unknown as there have been several contradictory accounts concerning the United States' contribution and connection to the Kenyan operation. It is without question that the United States would be slightly hesitant considering the outcome of the previous interventions in 1991 and 1992 and the lessons learned from that experience. In the words of FGD:

Yes before even KDF getting into Somalia, the terrorist were with increasing intention terrorizing the coastal getting in Somalia has just proven the brevity of Kenya to protect its citizen more less it is not a fight to end soon. Even if KDF was to pull out today they will still terrorize the land. More has also been done to curb other attacks in our country (FGD with male religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, and as the occupation of Somalia ensues, there are arguments on both sides of the spectrum, some arguing that the invasion of Somalia is ethical and morally justifiable on the grounds of just war theory, and that the Kenyan government has acted morally, and others concluding that Kenya's decision was immoral and unethical to intervene with military force in Somalia. The decision for Kenya to intervene in Somalia on some accounts was a very lengthy and strategic decision and the government had coordinated the preparation for the intervention for

months prior to the actual invasion into Somalia in October 2011 (Gettleman 2011). However, Bjola and Kornprobst (2013) contend that in the post-Cold War era, the transnational character of terrorist groups has necessarily brought forth certain challenges; global networking with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other terrorist groups, coupled with transnational support. The results disagree with a study by Chin (2009) indicating that the capacity of a state to defend itself will depend on the nation's ability to use military as a foreign policy tool to neutralize threats to national security and enhance its own defence capability. Chin (2009) further contends that military tools are effective in the wake of changing security environment.

Despite conflicting accounts, it does appear as though the United States has assisted in certain areas and has played a more covert and undercover role; a sharp contrast from the US/UN intervention in the 1990s. In July of 2012, the *Los Angeles Times* reported that the United States has been training African troops to aid in the Kenyan intervention in Somalia (Cloud 2012). The media report notes, "The U.S. has been quietly equipping and training thousands of African soldiers to wage a widening proxy war against the Shabab, the al Qaeda ally that has imposed a harsh form of Islamic rule on southern Somalia and sparked alarm in Washington as foreign militants join its ranks" (Cloud 2012). The results of this study disagree with a study by Newt (2003) indicating that military force is considered to be the primary instrument used in the fight against terrorism all over the world (Newt, 2003). From the Somalia side, the findings revealed a strong case of clan disputes arising from KDFs strategy in Somalia. One respondent was quotes as follows:



Clan disputes have been on the increase after KDF came here in Kismayu. KDF troops are neither impartial nor neutral in the region. The KDF rather than unifying the clans are repopulating the area with loyalist clans, in particular, the Ogaden clansmen who are not indigenous inhabitants of lower Juba region. This is why some clans feel rejected and fight back. In fact, they have sided with Ogaden militia and directly participated in the conflict by using heavy weapons contrary to their mandate as peace keeping force. We have no option but to take arms and participate in the defence as well as liberation of Somalia's sovereignty (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The above statement confirms the challenge of clan dynamics in countering terrorism in Somalia. Since the civil war broke out in Somalia in 1988, many parts of the country have been zones of deep contestation by clans over rangeland, farmland, towns, and cities. Indeed, debates have raged and wars waged for two decades over the question of who has the right to claim Kismayu, other valuable towns, and irrigable farmland along the Jubba River. Each clan has its own claims based on their own interpretation of historical patterns of settlement, demographics, power, and citizenship rights in a country that has never resolved the fundamental question of who has the right to live where. Political and militia elites hoping to enrich themselves through control of key real estate in the Jubba regions have mobilized and manipulated clanism in the region (Lidwien, 2010).

Just War theory has three essential components: *jus ad bellum*, *jus in bello* and *jus post bellum*. The *jus ad bellum* portion dictates that the intervening nation has just cause and reason to override the sovereignty of another state and intervene. The *jus in bello* aspect of Just War Theory mandates that after the decision to go to war has been made, the war must be fought ethically and morally, as will be discussed in the latter portion of this chapter. The third and last aspect of the Just War Theory, the *jus*

*post bellum* looks at the aftermath of intervention and how the intervening state helps reorganize the intervened state.

Walzer (2002), a contemporary Just War Theory expert, argues that Just War Theory is a dynamic theory that allows states and leaders an opportunity to truly measure the morality of decisions to go to war, which is why perhaps the ancient theory still serves as an asset to decision making in regards to wars and interventions. According to Walzer (2002), there are no reasons of states for fighting justly. One might almost say that justice has become a military necessity Walzer (2002) also argues that the framework of Just War Theory allows for actors to incorporate justice and a holistic approach when making decisions to enter into and conduct war.

Not only does it allow for this, but the structure of just war theory in many ways forces leaders to think critically about justice and closely examine scenarios in their entirety to ensure that decisions regarding war are taken seriously. Walter reiterates this point saying, “Justice still needs to be defended; decisions about when and how to fight require constant scrutiny, exactly as they always have” (Walzer, 2002: 935). Using the framework and structure of Just War Theory, the unique and specific characteristics of the Kenyan decision can be reviewed.

As mentioned previously, one of the first and most crucial components of just war theory is *jus ad bellum*. This is a fundamental component of just war theory as a whole because it addresses one of the most important aspects of just war: ample cause and proper intentions. Policy and decision makers must address these points and answer them before claiming just cause and declaring that there is legitimate jus

ad bellum. In the cause of the Kenyan intervention, much can be said regarding the *jus ad bellum* piece of the just war theory. One respondent notes the following:

The agenda of the Kenyan government is to create a satellite state called Jubbaland in Somalia in total violation of Somali sovereignty. The creation of Federal entities in Somalia should be wholly Somali owned contrary to the imposition by Kenyans an administration that is unrepresentative of the communities in Lower Jubba region. The KDF should withdraw and the Kenyan government should refrain from meddling in the internal affairs of Somalia (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

From the foregoing, it is clear that KDF interventionist strategy has not been clear from the onset, and this confusion continues to fuel tension and revenge mission from the Somalia populations, especially clans that feel have been marginalized and left out. The major question at hand when approaching the *jus ad bellum* aspect of the Kenyan intervention begs the question of whether the intentions of the Kenyan government were proper, whether there was just cause for the intervention and if the military action was proportionate in regard to the conflict or issue itself and whether the Kenyans' interests were truly altruistic or more self-concerned in nature.

Within the *jus ad bellum* philosophy lie several subcomponents that comprise the overall theory. The author of the article, Paradox of Just War notes that it is important, in this beginning stage, to ensure that there is "public declaration" (Calhoun 2011). This essentially warns the opposition of the decision to go to war beforehand. This is critical because it ensures a sense of transparency and that, "tension is not merely due to a breakdown in communication (Calhoun 2011). Kenya's intervention in Somalia is an interesting one because the notion of state is somewhat absent in Somalia. There is no stable, central government; therefore, theoretically Kenya would have no viable authority to warn. Essentially, the

government is comprised of a weak Somali National Army (SNA) that lacks control of the country, the terrorist group Al-Shabbab and clan factions.

Even so, Kenyans are obliged to give warning, as per just war theory. In addition to giving proper warning, as an intervening state, Kenya is morally obliged to closely examine whether there is “reasonable prospect for success” (Calhoun 2001, 47). This aspect of *jus ad bellum* takes into consideration the value of adequate planning and organization and encourages states to assess whether the intervention or war can actually be successful. Given the prior history of interventions in Somalia by the United States and Ethiopia, it is very likely that the Kenyans acknowledged the shortcomings of previous interventions and intervened to defeat the clans and the Al-Shabaab and restore regional peace and stability.

Also crucial in the *jus ad bellum* stage is the acknowledgement that the intervention is truly a “last resort” and is fought with appropriate “proportionality” (Calhoun 2011, 48). In the case of Somalia, it is without question that the intervention was, indeed, necessary and very much the most viable option for Kenya to make. In addition, given the magnitude of the issues such as terrorism and piracy which have great risks and implications, it was absolutely necessary to intervene with military forces as an attempt to gain control of the Somali crisis and address imminent life-threatening issues such as famine and starvation, terrorism and piracy among others. (Calhoun 2011). While it may be difficult to get to the full truth regarding the intention of the Kenyan government, it is possible to address likely and conceivable reasons that may have been precursors to the Kenyan invasion in Somalia. There is

no question that the current state of despair in Somalia is on the world's radar and has had undesirable effects on its neighbor, Kenya.

The world has become increasingly aware of the growing threats of Somali violence and piracy that have affected the Horn and world as a whole as many of the issues have had significant consequences to neighbors and nations around the world. Mohamed Sahnoun, author of, *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities* notes the following about internal conflicts, "Apart from their impact on the local population, such conflicts might present a serious threat to peace and security in entire regions of the world" (Sahnoun, 2010). Some of these issues have included terrorism, piracy, famine, food security issues and the overall breakdown of Somali society and heightened refugee and immigration tensions due to increasingly poor living conditions and violence in Somalia. Response from FGD revealed the following:

To some extent, the intervention has weakened the al-shabaab because their source of getting finance have been captured that is the big turns and port Kismayu (Interview with key a male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

Through KDF has succeeded in dismantling most of the Al-shabaab military bases and sources of income, small scale terror activities will still remain a thorn in the flesh to both countries because the military intervention by KDF has been the local support of the group grown. The military intervention however should be complemented with the other strategies (Interview with a male senior police officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The above comments relates to the study's theoretical underpinnings of postmodernism, which advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military fixation on threats. The Al Shabaab, an insurgency military group in Somalia, has been linked to Al-Qaeda (Cohn 2010: 2) A 2010 Council on Foreign Relations article highlighted the threat of terrorism in Somalia due to its lawlessness

and anarchy, such that: Its porous borders mean that individuals can enter without visas, and once inside the country, enjoy an almost complete lack of law enforcement...These aspects make Somalia a desirable haven for transnational terrorists, something that Al-Qaeda has tried to capitalize on before, and is trying again now. (Cohn 2010).

Frendrick (2004) says that counterterrorism efforts put into place require the application of instruments of power so as to assist in ending the terrorist groups. It is true that the ending of any terrorist attacks requires use of intelligent policy instruments, which involve political affiliations as well as military intervention, in addition to humanitarian assistance. Before any instruments of power can be put into place, it is necessary to understand the goals of the terrorist group and their depth. This is based on the fact that a group which has narrow goals can easily achieve them without causing excessive violent action.

The second instrument of power that has been very effective in the fight against terrorism is military tools. The military is mainly engaged in an insurgency, in cases where the terrorist groups are well armed, well organized and very large. This is justified by the capability and lethality of insurgent groups, among terrorist groups, hence, facilitating the use of military as the most necessary component. Despite the fact that the military is considered to be a very blunt instrument, it is very efficient in the fight against terrorism because; the increased lethality and precision of weapons, in addition to imagery has made it less difficult to monitor terrorist movement. The United States has substantially used its military power to help in dealing with terrorism in the East African region, which has proven to have significant effects on the reduction in the level of terrorism.

The third instrument is the establishment of diplomatic relations, which has the benefit of reinstating the economic and ideological independence of the East African states, on top of curbing terrorism. Somalia is an example of a country that has had diplomatic linkages with the United States over the last few years, because of its unending terrorism and violence; which is mainly supported by external forces. The main reason why diplomacy is an effective instrument in handling terrorism is the ability to table mediation efforts, as well as reconciliation attempts with the local groups to direct them towards efforts for helping the country. The diplomatic assistance offered to Somalia by the U.S has made the country stable to a large extent, resulting in political transition and significant reduction in both terrorism and local violence.

Diplomacy is used as an instrument of national security, which assesses the power potential of a country in an effort to maximize its freedom of action and establish ways of protecting it from terrorism. This is the moral aim of maintaining the core values of a state hence, its overall survival (Jones & Libicki, 2008). Diplomacy makes negotiation one of the key factors in helping deal with terrorism; by negotiating with terrorists so that they stop their attacks and are offered better ways of stating their demands, and having their demands satisfied, other than killing innocent civilians. By so doing, the national security of a country is protected and the interests of the terrorist groups are dealt with, without running the risk of insurgency.

Other than the three named instruments of power used in tackling terrorism in East Africa, Kroeing and Pavel, (2012) point out that there are other tools that work well. These includes deterrence, a strategic interaction working to convince terrorists that

the cost of carrying out attacks will have detrimental impacts than any potential gains. This works by shifting the perception of the groups involved, so that they can adopt a more beneficial course of action that is capable of benefitting both parties. The country can also work through cost imposition whereby, it threatens the terrorists that a particular cost will be imposed on them if they go ahead with their destructive activities. Deterrence can only be achieved through a prior analysis of the terms and goals of the various terrorist groups so as to come up with a good deterrence strategy that is more applicable to the situation at hand (Kroeing & Pavel, 2012).

#### 4.10 The implication of Security-Based Diplomacy on National Security

**Table 4.4 Sustainable Security in Transnational Terrorism Management**

	Kenya		Somalia	
	Yes	No	Yes	No
Improved economy	111(40%)	166(60%)	26(36%)	47(64%)
Freedom of movement	122(44%)	155(56%)	2(30%)	51(70%)
Safety of citizens	144(52%)	133(48%)	28(38%)	45(62%)
Improved homeland security	166(60%)	111(40%)	29(40%)	44(60%)

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**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The results point to the effects of transnational terrorism on Kenya-Somalia sustainable peace and security. For Kenya, while 40% stated improved economy, 60% declined, which could be attributed to the recent attacks by al shabaab that has led to destruction of property and loss of lives. The decision in October 2011 to



deploy thousands of troops in Somalia may as well be explained in economic terms, and concerns that the strategy has worked to military spending which affects Kenya economy cannot be overlooked.

For Somalia, 36% said Yes, while 64% said No. While efforts by AMISOM to bring stability in Somalia are underway, the threat of terrorism and terrorist attacks threaten freedom of movement as well as safety of citizens. Kenya and Somalia have been affected by terrorism both in terms of massive loss of lives and property as well as economic development. The two countries have not only struggled against domestic terrorism, they have also been challenged by the emergence of transnational terrorist groups that have used Africa as a theatre to carry out attacks against both domestic and international targets as well as to develop and maintain operations.

Ideally, Kenya response on improved homeland security (60% said Yes, while 40% said No). Over the course of 2011 Kenya attempted to work with at least six Somali allies Ras Kamboni; the TFG; the self-declared “Azania” regional administration; the Isiolo militia (now referred to as “TFG forces”); the al-Sunna Wal Jamma, or ASWJ, militia; and various Gedo region clan militias in Somalia. While these measures were underway, local concerns of homeland security were put to task owing to retaliatory terrorist attacks emanating from Somalia, which may explain the 40% response from Kenya who said No.

Although a military intervention was in the works, the timeline was accelerated by a string of cross-border kidnapping attacks targeting Western tourists on the Kenyan coast and aid workers from the refugee camp in Dadaab. Tourism is a key industry, and Kenya, particularly Nairobi, is host to a large UN presence, including many

international and local NGOs involved in humanitarian relief and other activities. When several Europeans were seized in the Lamu area in September and October 2011, the key tourism industry was hit hard. The last straw appeared to be when two Spanish aid workers with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) were kidnapped in a Dadaab refugee camp, near the Kenya-Somalia border, on 13 October

#### **4.11 Challenges of Adopting Security-Based Diplomacy in Counterterrorism**

The notion that states are more sensitive to security and military developments in their regions due to increasing terror trends means that states face a number of challenges. In this research question, the researcher sought to establish challenges that hinder the success of such engagements in the context of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia. A number of challenges were highlighted.

Response from Kenya revealed various challenges including the indisputable security threats emanating from Somalia, the refugee crisis and the challenge of massive targeting of refugees, mistrust between state and Somalia population hence a challenge in winning the hearts and minds of its Somali population; mutual suspicion between the Kenyan state and Kenyan-Somalis, cross-border gaps and corruption, limited resources, insufficient training, and endemic corruption, operational challenges emanating from poor coordination within the security agencies and gaps within the judiciary and the legislature.

On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed a challenges including the clan nature of Somali society that challenges intelligence sharing, ideologically polarized systems within the Somali society, lawlessness and previous factors of state collapse produces constraints and dangers for effective counterterrorism efforts, low morale

and gaps related to organizational capacity of state security agencies to remain abreast of the ever-changing terrorist trends. From these views, social movement theory can contribute a necessary conceptual framework for understanding terrorism. Terrorism is a form of contentious politics, analyzable with the basic social movement approach of mobilizing resources, political opportunity structure, and framing. Terrorist groups are organizations first and foremost, subject to similar dilemmas and dynamics of other movement organizations. Terrorism is rarely random, but takes place in the context of a wider environment with a political opportunity structure (Beck, 2008).

Although Al-Shabaab has been weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximize its asymmetric advantage. One tactical change has already become clear. Rather than fight in the open, it has melted into the background, allowing Kenyan mechanized infantry to move deeper into its heartland. Its fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons. This is a result of lessons learned during the December 2006 Ethiopian intervention, when the Union of Islamic Courts deployed many of its combatants, including Al-Shabaab, conventionally in the vast arid plains of south-western Somalia, and they were decimated by ground and air fire. Most initial reactions to the Kenyan offensive have focused on the substantial problems and risks of the incursion from a military and security perspective. Some of the chief concerns include the following:

**Kenya's military capacity to wage war:** Kenya's military has very limited experience in direct combat, and, with the exception of some peacekeeping deployments, has never waged war across the Kenyan border. Some analysts worry that Kenya's untested forces will fare poorly in clashes with Somali forces on Somali terrain. Related to this concern are worries that Kenya initiated this attack in the early weeks of the dheere rainy season, when track roads become impassable and heavy military equipment gets bogged down. This is one of the reasons Kenyan forces moved so slowly in the first two months of the campaign. This gave many observers the impression that the Kenyan offensive was not adequately planned (Abdi & Hogendoorn, 2011).

**Unclear objectives:** Kenyan officials have expressed divergent goals. They have at different points claimed the aim is to prevent Shabaab from engaging in cross-border abductions of tourists, defeat Shabaab, capture the strategic seaport of Kismayo, and to secure the border area. Shabaab terrorist reprisal attacks in Kenya. Kenya is exceptionally vulnerable to Shabaab terrorist attacks. Shabaab moves freely in and out of Kenya, where the group does business, recruits, and engages in fundraising. A major Shabaab terrorist attack in Kenya would have devastating consequences for Kenyan tourism and business.

As evidence of this, foreign embassies have elevated security alerts for Kenya. Two grenade attacks in Nairobi, carried out by a professed Kenyan Shabaab member and recent convert to Islam, have amplified these fears. Shabaab leaders have implored their followers in Kenya to launch jihadi attacks in Kenya, a tactic that could produce "lone wolf " terrorism in addition to planned Shabaab attacks. The actual

threat may be overstated, however, as Kenya's value to Somali interests makes it risky for Shabaab to launch a major terrorist attack there. But the danger could grow larger the longer Kenyan forces stay inside Somalia.

**Kenyan offensive as tool for Shabaab recruitment:** Abdi and Hogendoorn (2011) observe that Kenya's military operation into Somali territory could work to Shabaab's advantage, by rallying Somalis against a foreign occupation, in much the same way that Shabaab enjoyed significant popular support when Ethiopia occupied Mogadishu in 2007 and 2008. Though Somalis are exhausted from war and are devoting most of their resources to assisting relatives affected by the famine, a sustained Kenyan military presence, with inevitable reports of civilian casualties, runs the risk of generating a new wave of Somali jihadi recruits and fund-raisers for Shabaab. The ill-advised public announcement of Israeli counterterrorism support to Kenya was exactly the kind of misstep that Shabaab could parlay into propaganda to turn the Jubbaland intervention into a jihadi cause.

**Prospects of quagmire in Kismayu:** Questions have been raised about how Kenyan forces will fare if and when they take the city of Kismayo. In a crowded urban setting, Kenya's military will lose some of the advantage it enjoys from its armored vehicles and heavy weapons, and will be more vulnerable to urban guerilla warfare and the use of roadside bombs. It could become bogged down in counterinsurgency warfare that Ethiopian forces and now African Union peacekeepers, or AMISOM, have faced in Mogadishu since 2007.

**Complications of “rehatting” to an AMISOM force:** This highly unusual move was driven mainly by Kenyan hopes to have the expensive operation underwritten by wealthy nations, and to give the offensive greater legitimacy. Questions have been raised about how or whether the rehatting would restrict Kenyan military operations, as it would have to abide by the much narrower peacekeeping mandate of the AMISOM mission. Kenya is seeking a broadening of the mandate; but even if it does not succeed, it will likely be able to finesse an interpretation of the current mandate to continue its operations against Shabaab.

**Governance without Government:** Contrary to much of what is written in the popular press, the prolonged collapse of central government has not led to complete anarchy. Important changes have occurred since the early 1990s in the nature of armed conflict, governance and lawlessness, rendering the country less anarchic than before, as explained by one respondent:

Contemporary Somalia is without government but not without governance. Armed conflict is now more localized, less lethal, and of much shorter duration. Criminality, though still a serious problem, is much better contained than in the early 1990s. However, the terrorism trends are deeply rooted and a well planned strategy is needed (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The foregoing statement confirms Steiner's (2012) observation that a variety of local forms of governance have emerged to provide Somali communities with at least minimal levels of public order. Informal rule of law has emerged via local *sharia* courts, neighborhood watch groups, and the reassertion of customary law and blood compensation payments and the robust growth of private security forces protecting business assets. More formal administrative structures have been established at the

municipal, regional and transregional levels as well. Somaliland in the north is by far the most developed of these polities, and has made important gains since the late 1990s in consolidating rule of law, multi-party democracy, functional ministries and public security. However, the challenge of weak states as Somalia compounds underlying challenges of poorly equipped and underpaid security officers within the military, which remains a problem in managing transnational terrorism in Somalia.

One respondent was categorical and stated as follows:

Somalia National Army morale is low and there are instances when the soldiers have been reported to sell firearms to get money for survival. This I know because some soldiers left their camp bases and joined Al shabaab. This is bad because they betray their counterparts in KDF here in Somalia. Our government needs to find ways of paying our military better to boost their morale (FGD female participant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The above statement confirms underlying challenges of managing transnational terrorism. Indeed, such challenges as leaking of information across enemy line means that the fight against terrorism is still a challenge. As such, many resources are needed to be allocated to the Somalia National Army to ensure effective countering of terrorism. Although Al-Shabaab has been weakened, it remains a formidable adversary that understands local dynamics better than its foreign foes and can maximize its asymmetric advantage. One tactical change has already become clear, that Al shabaab keeps changing tactic which makes their identification even more difficult for KDF. One respondent was quoted as follows:

Nowadays, it is very difficult to know who Al shabaab is and who is not. KDF have a bigger challenge because rather than fight in the open, al shabaab are now hiding into the background, and some of these al shabaab fighters blend into the civilian population and distribute weapons. They have an efficient guerrilla force and in this way they can even recruit members easily because they even reward their recruits well (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

Other sub-state administrations have tended to be vulnerable to spoilers and internal division or have had only a weak capacity to project authority and deliver core services (Steiner, 2012). Collectively, these informal and formal systems of governance fall well short of delivering the basic public security and services expected of a central government, but they provide a certain level of predictability and security to local communities. Indeed, this literature clearly shows that Kenya-Somalia challenge of transnational terrorism requires a wider scope to understand the underlying challenges.

**Interests and State Collapse:** This phenomenon of “governance without government” has been driven by gradual shifts in the interests of key local actors and in the manner in which they seek to protect and advance those interests. The general trend is toward greater interests in improved security, rule of law and predictability. This shift in interests can be traced to the inadvertent impact of the UNOSOM presence in Mogadishu in 1993- 1994 (Lochery, 2012). In the words of one key informant:



The military intervention has opened a door to self-made cartels that use resources from the state and external donors; The result is that today the businessmen's private security forces are the largest and best-armed militias in the city, and warlords now challenge the efforts of a unified Somalia (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

From the foregoing analysis, it is important to recognize, though, that some Somali constituencies which have a growing appreciation for improved public security are not necessarily strong advocates of a return to centralized government. A revived central state poses a potential threat to impose taxes, restrict or regulate certain types of economic activities, and potentially turn into an instrument of predation and dominance that empowered clans and groups that wield at the expense of their rivals. The collective Somali experience of the central state has not been a positive one and tends to produce "zero-sum" thinking about a revived state. This tends to multiply the number of spoilers when peace talks reach discussions of power-sharing (Hersi, 2015).

### **The rise of non-state actors**

The rise of non-state actors as essential components of informal governance and security systems in Somalia has posed a challenge to external organizations accustomed to dealing only with state counterparts. Over the past fifteen years, most development agencies have learned to adapt to this unusual operating environment by creating Memoranda of Understanding with whatever local authorities they encounter on the ground. These MOUs range from agreements or provision of security to international aid workers to procedures for hiring and allocation of contracts. The UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS) oversees MOUs with local authorities and militias on security matters; and neighboring states

Ethiopia and Kenya routinely conduct diplomacy with clan leaders in border areas to manage cross-border security issues. These relationships are fragile and if mishandled can compromise local counterparts. Indeed, from the study's findings, this critical analysis demonstrates challenges of security-based diplomacy approach in the management of transnational terrorism. The ability of external actors to partner with local non-state actors remains a challenge and a work in progress

Both progressive and hard-line Islamic movements have benefited from the prolonged collapse of the central state in Somalia. The complete collapse of government social services, for instance, has provided Islamic charities the opportunity to become the primary provider of education and health care services. The absence of a formal judiciary has enabled local *sharia* courts to step into the vacuum at the neighborhood level. For the most part, these social service providers and local *sharia* courts were and are not radical. Most *sharia* courts are controlled by clan elders and businessmen and operated by traditional Sufi clerics, while most of the Islamic social services are associated with more progressive Islamists.

However, hardline Islamists have also exploited the prolonged collapse of the state in Somalia. Hardline Somali Islamists were able to capture control of the Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) in 2006 and drive that umbrella movement into increasingly radical and ultimately self-destructive policies. These Islamists also forged links to foreign al-Qa'ida affiliates in the 1990s and later provided several terror suspects safe haven in Somalia. Hardline Islamists in Somalia were very successful at exploiting two commodities which Somali communities desperately craved after

fifteen years of civil war and state collapse; a sense of public security and a sense of unity.

The balance of power between “moderates” and “hardliners” among Somali Islamists has been in a constant state of flux and is shaped principally by a combination of access to resources, coercive capacity to intimidate and the broader political context. Generally, situations marked by heightened external threats play to the interests of hardliners, while conditions favoring negotiations, compromise and normalization play into the hands of moderates. Not surprisingly, Islamist hardliners have sought to manufacture conditions of jihad with Ethiopia as a means of consolidating power and marginalizing moderate rivals.

**State collapse and terrorist safe havens:** It is often claimed that zones of complete state collapse are ideal safe havens for al-Qa’ida and other terrorist groups. The case of Somalia suggests a more complex relationship between “ungoverned space” and terrorist activity. Recent research reviewing empirical evidence of Islamic terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa demonstrates that al-Qa’ida and its affiliates in the Horn have found Kenya a much more conducive country from which to operate than state-less Somalia. Somalia, it is argued, plays a niche role for terrorists mainly as a transshipment point for men, money and materiel into East Africa, and in a small number of cases as a safe haven for al-Qa’ida operatives fleeing from the law in Kenya. As one respondent noted:

But Somalia’s condition of lawlessness and complete state collapse produces constraints and dangers for terrorist cells just as it creates what aid agencies refer to obliquely as a “non-permissive environment (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

Ideally, the sentiments above compound the threat of foreign terror suspects operating in Somalia are prone to extortion and betrayal; can get caught up in clan conflicts; are easily visible in a context of few foreign visitors; and face difficulties of communication, transportation, disease and access to clean water. The Harmony documents provide an excellent opportunity to test these claims in the existing literature. The formation of Somaliland and Puntland challenge the convention of a single Somali sovereignty. The growth of major urban centres not confined to Mogadishu and the fact that populations have become increasingly sedentary have also brought about significant social and economic change (Ringquist, 2011).

The establishment of a large diaspora has made Somali society more transnational and encouraged the development of new forms of identity and ideas of 'belonging.' The rise to power of militant Islamic groups in Somalia underlines the profound changes that have occurred in the course of the war. It has dramatically reconfigured the conflict in Somalia away from a purely clan-based power struggle towards an ideologically influenced conflict with a regional and global dimension (Ringquist, 2011).

Al Shabaab, the latest manifestation of transformation in the Somali conflict, represents a particularly pernicious change from the perspective of conflict resolution. Its rejection of the legitimacy of social organization by clan, generation and established religious practice undermines the scope for using established Somali templates of dialogue and negotiation based on kinship. International engagement is not perceived as neutral, bringing with them competing interests that shape the

nature of diplomatic responses and the policy framework: migration, disease, arms proliferation and transnational terrorism.

Politics rather than religion lies at the heart of the fighting today, with rival religious ideologies mobilized to support personal and political ambitions. The reality is that the current debacle has undermined the authority of the *Ulema* and has done serious damage to the reputation of Islamic leaders. One key informant noted the following during an interview:

The militant Islamic organizations are too violent and ideologically polarized to bring together all sections of the Somali society and their actions have highlighted the sensitivities of putting religion at the centre of modern governance. The failure to uphold peaceful Islamic principles has created the current chaos and has damaged Islam in Somalia. Paradoxically, the militants' violent pursuit of an Islamic state may be pushing the prospect of an Islamic state further away than ever (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

It is evident from the foregoing statement that Although Somaliland has in effect been operating separately since 1991; many people in Somalia do not accept Somaliland's declaration of independence and consider it to be part of what should become the unified state of Somalia. In 2006 demarches to the Somaliland government seeking to involve them in the constitutional process were rebuffed, and the practice of including members of Somaliland clans in Somali institutions will not change the reality that those in power in Somaliland currently reject unification. In the words of one respondent:

Somaliland provides another challenge to achieving consensus on a vision for the future of the state. The clan nature of Somali society provides one of the challenges to envisioning a coherent Somali state, as does Somalia's negative experience of governance. This should not mean that there is no scope for improving the existing laws and interpretations to better comply with international standards of human rights, but rather the reality must be taken into account when designing the constitutional rules on these issues (Key informant interview with a female civil society member in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Displacement is not only a side-effect of violence and political upheaval, but may also be orchestrated as a war strategy by armed actors seeking to control territory, resources and people. The presence of large numbers of displaced people or returnees can be evidence of the relative stability of the host location, but it can also create economic and political pressures that affect the consolidation of peace in post-conflict communities who are themselves still recovering.

The judiciary and the legislature remain weak. Despite the existence of a constitution, in reality the absence of tangible checks and balances leaves the executive vastly stronger than these other branches of government. Parliament cannot exercise its constitutional authority to oversee the executive. The legislature lacks the resources, expertise, unity and the political will to hold the executive to account. Displaced people have a huge stake in peace-building and reconstruction processes, and yet they are routinely excluded from conflict resolution and peace-building efforts for a variety of reasons (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Whatever the causes of their movement, displaced people can find themselves doubly disenfranchised. Their departure from their former place of residence often consolidates and reinforces the voice of powerful social actors in local peace processes, further marginalizing dissenting voices. In places of refuge, both within the country of origin and without, displaced people often struggle to access

resources, work and political representation. This has been the experience of many southerners in Puntland, Somaliland and Kenya.

### **Kenya-contextual challenges**

Of all the countries in the Horn of Africa, Kenya boasts the most stable, most effective, and most democratic government. Kenya has also experienced the most terrorist attacks against Western targets and has been the most useful operational base for terrorists. This “Kenyan Paradox” is driven by the convergence of four factors. First, Kenya provides a target-rich environment for terrorists because of its relatively advanced economy and its long-standing ties with the United Kingdom, United States, and Israel. Second, Kenya maintains a functioning sovereign government, one increasingly subject to public opinion.

The former limits the operational freedom of Western intelligence and counterterrorism units, and the latter heightens the cost of being seen to be doing others’ bidding in the “War on Terror.” Third, Kenya suffers from weak governance in a number of critical areas, including security and the criminal justice system. This discourages those Kenyans who might have relevant information from providing it to the authorities. Fourth, the presence of a disaffected minority Muslim population, especially along the Kenyan coast, provides terrorist operatives an environment in which they can operate with less security pressure than elsewhere in the region.

The level of development and stability have increased the density of targets and logistical convenience of conducting operations in Kenya while the combination of a more responsive political leadership and weak governance reduces the security costs

of doing so. Though few in number, the foregoing attacks demonstrate Kenya's significance in terms of recent global terrorism. Moreover, the scale and complexity of attacks in Kenya strongly suggests a permissive environment exists for terror group operations. Understanding what it is about democratic, economically successful Kenya that makes it a relatively frequent target of jihadi terrorism is of paramount importance. A combination of international and domestic factors result in Kenya's targeting. Two specific international factors enhance Kenya's attractiveness (Mburu, 2005). Kenya's foreign policy reflects a long history of close relations with the United States and Israel, as well as the United Kingdom; the former colonial power. Both the United States and Israel maintain a significant official and private-sector presence in Kenya (Chau, 2010).

In addition to current foreign policy issues, Hornsby (2013) argues that these historical relationships provide both an ideological justification for attacks in Kenya and a range of targets. The use of Mombasa as a supply-station for Western military operations and patrols in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf brought increased attention from al-Qa'ida beginning in the early 1990s. The foregoing examples, taken together with Kenya's weak record in apprehending, holding and prosecuting high-profile terrorism suspects, apparently serves as a serious disincentive for Kenyans contemplating going to the authorities, whether with regard to issues of general "public safety" or indeed, their own problems.

A final governance issue that also seems to contribute to the government's inadequacies in this area, is, ironically, a reflection of the recent expansion of the country's "democratic space." Kenya returned to competitive, multi-party politics in



1992 after more than three decades of either *de facto* or *de jure* one-party rule. Over the last three national elections, intense competition for votes in both parliamentary and presidential contests reflects in part the country's highly fluid partisan political landscape. This issue of political sensitivity can influence the government's response to security-based approaches. For instance, there have been mixed reactions across the political divide regarding the pulling out of KDF from Somalia (Gettleman, 2013). In addition, Kenya's country's geography puts it in close proximity to long-running conflicts in northern Uganda, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Rwanda. Kenya's porous borders permitted al-Qa'ida operatives to enter and leave the country clandestinely. However, the expense of doing so may explain why most al-Qa'ida operatives traveled to and from Kenya using normal channels.

In contrast to Somalia, Kenya boasts a relatively robust state equipped with a national police force, capable intelligence services, and a pervasive system of provincial administration. Its overwhelmingly Christian population would also seem to bolster its capacity to deter terrorist activity. Yet a number of domestic factors appear to trump such disincentives, making Kenya a more positive environment for al-Qa'ida. One is the presence of a small but significant Arab, Arab-Swahili and Somali minorities concentrated in coastal Kenya, Somali populace that feel marginalized, a huge youth group that are unemployed, historical injustices and the recent security-based diplomacy (military approach to fight terrorism). These historical connections and the cover provided by a diverse population significantly reduce the visibility of foreign operatives and challenge the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

Deep-rooted and continuing shared economic interests strengthen the coastal Kenya-Arab relationship still further. The centuries-old maritime culture along the East African coast has given rise to many interlocking networks of kinship and commerce that the “modern” national borders of the Comoros, Zanzibar, mainland Tanzania, Kenya, Somalia, Oman and Yemen have not obliterated. Further, modern transportation and communication that fosters rapid and detailed transmission of both political and religious information and messages significantly bolster this situation. The net effect of all the above is that al-Qa’ida operatives have been able to employ a mixture of “mosque, madrasah, marriage” and money to move about relatively freely while establishing more permanent local roots (Adaw, 2013).

Beyond these regional, historical and demographic factors, Kenya’s weak governance climate makes a considerable contribution to the country’s terrorist threat. Central here is its lack of effectiveness in investigating, arresting and convicting terrorists as well as more ordinary criminals (Lewis, 2007). While mundane bureaucratic ineptitude no doubt accounts for some of this, the general “culture of impunity” that has been said to reign in Kenya may be equally responsible, as put forward by one respondent:

Kenyan law enforcement has been hampered by limited resources, insufficient training, and endemic corruption. Operational effectiveness has sometimes been impeded by poor coordination among and within police, intelligence, and military forces; as well as unclear command, control, and overt political interference (Interview with civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The attack, which targeted innocent civilians, was claimed by al-Shabaab as a response to the involvement of Kenyan armed forces units in Somalia, who in late 2012 expelled al-Shabaab from the port city of Kismayu, a major revenue source for

al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab issued persistent threats to other countries contributing troops to AMISOM. Driven out of major urban areas, al-Shabaab has returned to a strategy focused on asymmetric attacks intended to discredit and destabilize the nascent Federal Government of Somalia. In 2013, the United States continued to support AMISOM and the establishment of a stable Somali government, and worked to enhance counterterrorism capacity in Somalia and throughout the broader region.

#### **4.12 Strategies for Enhancing Effective Security-Based Diplomacy**

After assessing the challenges of security-based diplomacy, the researcher further probed respondents' views on recommended strategies they considered ideal for the government to employ in enhancing effective security-based diplomacy in management of transnational terrorism. The study established building trust and resource distribution as one strategy of enhancing effective security-based diplomacy. In the words of one respondent:

First to address the existing mistrust between the Somali community in Kenya and Somali towards their Christian fraternity in Kenya. The international agencies like UN to ensure Somalia government is stable government with proper structures which offer democracy (Interview with female civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

There is need for equal distribution of resources and social amenities, integration of local communities in the fight against terrorism and use of local communities fighting terrorism. The youths should also be empowered to job creation (Interview with female NGO official in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

In light of the above discussion, initiatives are needed to re-establish Kenya's national identity and put in place constructive programmes to enable effective political participation with visible impact. The concept of a Kenya for all Kenyans recognizes diversity, but the real test lies in the way in which individuals from

different backgrounds treat others. Government can set an example in this regard. Individual politicians need to accept responsibility for what they say and do that divides society; equally, it is essential not to use ethnic affiliation to secure votes. This strategy divides people in the long run. According to one respondent:

The electorate, for their part, need to be educated that they should vote for policies, not tribal affiliations. Education programmes should be started in schools, government departments, and businesses to raise awareness on diversity and respect for the background and viewpoints of the 'other' (Interview with female key informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

Additionally, many Muslims are still very suspicious of Western policies in and towards the Muslim world, and view concepts such as democracy and human rights as an insult to Islamic teachings and ploys by the 'enemies of Islam' to undermine and weaken the religion. Moreover, appreciating concepts such as democracy and human rights are still a challenge because many Muslims, under the influence of conservative ideology, are sceptical about whether these are legitimate norms and values, and have not yet internalized the ethos of human rights, democracy and participatory governance. This is made worse by the 'global war on terror' and the push for democracy across the world, which arouses scepticism among Muslims, who see this as being in the interests of the West. Addressing these issues is not an easy matter and is completely beyond the control of Kenya alone. The solution is to encourage critical thinking and open discussion on sensitive topics. Failure to openly defuse misconceptions and provide a different interpretation of international developments will provide a foothold that extremists will capitalize on, as observed by one respondent:

Addressing these perceptions that all terrorists are Muslims is key, and this will require the responsibility of the police and Kenyan government to work with citizen support. But the government can set an example and provide some of the tools to prevent radicalization and enable de-radicalization (Interview with a male senior police officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

What comes out from the foregoing statement is that counterradicalization can only be achieved if the Kenyans take heed to the sensitivities and vulnerabilities of Somalia and work on making them less destructive. For example, one of the criticisms and perceptions of the Somali National Army is its lack of inclusiveness for all groups as clan divides in Somalia have been a major factor in war and conflict. Realizing this as part of the reality, the Kenyans should work with Somali stakeholders to identify ways and measures of being inclusive and prioritizing the incorporation of all players and stakeholders in the decision-making process and government structure. Recognizing that this is an issue is the first step and Kenyans may help facilitate this step, but Somalis will have to truly work towards defeating the notion of othering and becoming more unified and inclusive of all groups and clans.

In the case of Somalia, this has been one of the major issues with governance and building a society that is inclusive of everyone. As Gopin (2012) points out, government cannot be seen as legitimate if it continually excludes members of the society from participating or undermines their ability to contribute. Because the idea of clanship is so closely tied to identity, the idea of a 'me versus you' notion is entrenched in self, family, community, society and the country as a whole. In order to move forward, it will be absolutely essential to properly handle this issue and in a truthful and productive manner, which will need to include the remake and

makeover of Somali nationalism and identity. An interview with a key informant noted this:

To truly begin the peace process, the first step that Kenyans will need to complete is to capitalize on various forms of non-traditional diplomacy efforts towards Somalia. Somalia presents a non-traditional, more contemporary diplomacy issue that is appearing in many post-colonial areas around the world in areas such as Nigeria and Libya. What we see is an area consumed by intra-state conflict stemming from clan and tribal conflicts, religious extremists fighting for control and the elevation of non-state actors such as extremists and terrorists who cannot be tamed by traditional, old school diplomatic efforts, especially in regards to religion (Key informant interview with a male peace and security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

Given that part of the issue in Somalia is Muslim extremism, Kenya will need to devise more inclusive plan of engaging more moderate Muslims and including them in their intervention and long-term strategy. If Kenya is to instill long-term peace and resolution to Somalia's conflict, it must understand the complex religious tensions and how this may affect the intervention and long-term stability. One contemporary tool to meet the challenges that religion and religious differences bring is the utilization of faith-based diplomacy. Faith-based diplomacy capitalizes on the opportunity to use faith and religion not as a divisive force, but as a chance to bring people together and find a common ground. Former Secretary of State, Madeline Albright has said, "Faith-based diplomacy can be a useful tool for foreign policy" (Albright, 2006). However, as the findings demonstrate, the capabilities of faith-based diplomacy and the opportunity that it provides because of its known effect on people's lives and belief systems and religion often impacts how people think, feel and act.

In recognizing this, Kenya has the opportunity to be a leader in the movement to include religious dialogue and discussions in the realm of foreign policy and diplomacy in large-scale issues that could truly benefit from this more contemporary phenomenon. By engaging faith communities, Kenya can have the opportunity to have a greater reach in Somalia and perhaps avoid being seen as an outsider or foreign entity that disregards the faith that so many Somalis hold dear, but that has become politicized and used as a pawn for extremists to garner support for their cause. Gopin (2002) reaffirms this notion suggesting that continued exclusion of groups and repeated efforts to highlight separateness are dangerous, noting, “In other words, exclusion and othering are a crass tool of power maintenanc.”

In the context of managing the threat of transnational terrorism, the opportunity to possibly dismantle such negative efforts and expose the dangers of politicizing religion. Religious figures are generally considered part of the problem, but not part of creative solutions by most people in the public policy arena. According to one respondent:

Without governance, law-abiding citizens cannot be protected and rule of law will not be available to enforce laws. Rule of law and governance needs to be intact for violence and crime to be stabilized and brought down. With crimes such as piracy and kidnapping, it becomes increasingly difficult to have a functional society with successful business and development as people have no protection or faith that the rule of law can prosecute those who do not abide by it. Kenya-Somalia historical relations perhaps leaves room for more chaos as it promotes a sense of instantaneous justice and lawlessness (Interview with key female informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

In view of the foregoing, a key step then calls for promoting rule of law and governance is enhancing Somalia's infrastructure and ability to confront weak democratic institutions. For Kenya, any other intervention to be successful in Somalia, there must be a heavy emphasis placed on the restoration of order after the intervention.

#### **4.13 Summary**

Virtually every analysis of Kenya's troubled pastoral areas emphasizes that environmental stress and severe poverty and underdevelopment combine to render these semi-arid zones chronically vulnerable to armed conflict, communal clashes, and violent crime. The Kenya-Somalia border area partially supports this claim. Most of the conflicts in the Kenya-Somali border area are driven principally by other, mainly political factors, but environmental stress and underdevelopment are critical underlying sources of instability.

Destitute pastoralists form an important portion of the new urban populations, where prospects for employment are bleak. Uneducated and unemployed young men and women are easy marks for recruitment into militias or criminal gangs. Heightened communal anxiety over access to scarce resources pasture, wells, and jobs are easily exploited by politicians and others to promote divisions and foment violence. Poor access to social services, especially education, and the almost complete absence of a government presence beyond a few police and military garrisons breeds a profound sense of alienation that influences Kenya-Somalia relations.



As findings suggest, it is evident that from the case material above, the complete and prolonged collapse of the Somali state has had disastrous impact on the region, producing a context of lawlessness and anarchy that are only partially mitigated by attempts to strengthen local governance. The Kenya-Somali border area is an area where a number of major ethnic groups overlap. The region offers ample evidence of how in the past local groups embraced and utilized flexible ethnic identities to negotiate access to resources and protection. That strategy, which has been so effective for centuries, is today facing a hostile political environment.

Contemporary political systems of representation, voting, administration, rights, and land access between Kenya and Somalia are increasingly based explicitly or implicitly on ethnicity. The result is not only an epidemic of localized and partial but insidious ethnic cleansing, but also a hardening of previously fluid ethnic identities in the region, and a level of ethnic mobilization not seen previously in the area. Assessments of the historical relations between Kenya and Somalia point to an array of underlying factors which make the region exceptionally prone to transnational terrorism and armed conflict. In this light, more comprehensive counterterrorism initiative and peace building strategy requires policies which address the most dangerous underlying drivers of conflict. This chapter has pointed out possible entry points where counterterrorism strategies could be used in promoting peace and security between Kenya and Somalia. It follows then that aid interventions should seek to work with the Kenyan government to help shape the context in ways which tap into the constructive aspects of these factors as far as its relations with Somalia, within the security-based diplomacy approach is concerned.

Kenya-Somalia relations present a diverse set of regional and country-specific challenges. Understanding the threat from terrorists operating in the region requires

an appreciation of how terrorists' core organizational challenges play out in light of the peculiar history of the region. These submissions lead to the presentation of findings and discussion of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia, the subject of the next chapter.

**CHAPTER FIVE**  
**THE EFFECTS OF STATE-CENTRIC COUNTER-RADICALIZATION**  
**MEASURES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL**  
**TERRORISM BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA**

At the global level, polarizing tendencies and radicalization processes can be witnessed within many religious, ethnic and cultural population aggregates. Within this global mood that is also characterized by widespread feelings of inequity and injustice, an acute sense of marginalization and humiliation exists, in particular within several Muslim communities worldwide as well as among immigrant communities with a Muslim background established in European countries. These perceptions and feelings are also witnessed in the region and thus critical for investigation. This chapter discusses the second objective of the study on the effect of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia, followed by a brief summary of its findings.

**5.1 Push and Pull Factors to Terrorist Radicalization**

A number of contributing factors may be singled out as facilitators for the emergence of terrorist radicalization processes leading to terrorism. The study sought to establish respondents' views on the push/pull factors influencing terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia. Results of the analysis presented in Table 5.1.

**Table 5.1 Push factors influencing terrorist radicalization**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Unemployment	33(12%)	10(13%)
Fear of victimization	100(36%)	18(25%)
AMISOM intervention	51(18%)	9(13%)
Revenge	77(28%)	25(35%)
Lack of education	16(6%)	9(13%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 5.1, the response from Kenyan respondents, 33(12%) said unemployment, 100(36%) mentioned fear of victimization, 51(18%) cited AMISOM, 77(28%) said revenge while 6% said lack of education. On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed that 13% said unemployment, 25% mentioned fear of victimization, 18.5% cited AMISOM, 35% said revenge while 13% said lack of education.

Overall the varying response suggest that although a number of contributing factors may be singled out as facilitators for the emergence of radicalization processes leading to terrorism, it is impossible to identify one single root cause. The convergence of several possible contributing variables can usually be found at the origin of the radicalization process. Since terrorism and radicalization leading to it may arise for a number of reasons, precipitant factors vary according to each individual experience of and pathway to radicalization.

While a variety of contributing or facilitating factors can trigger the radicalization process in varying degrees at the intersection of personal history and that enabling

environment, the findings indicate unemployment, religion issues such as revenge scored high. The 36.4% and 25% (Kenya and Somalia response respectively) could be attributed to the enabling environment which may for instance contain historical antecedents of political violence or, on a more contemporary level, concrete experiences of civil war or brutal encounters with unjust authority. Excessive repression by state authorities is likely to contribute to a climate of mutual distrust among those affected and assists in creating an atmosphere in which disparate social aggregates will be inclined to antagonism and entrenchment instead of conflict resolution.

On the other hand, 12% and 13.3% who mentioned unemployment suggest earlier discussion on which are linked to profound social changes such as the breakdown in social bonds of individuals caught between different cultures and generations. Most Kenyan youth struggle to access employment, education, housing, health services, and other necessities. Achieving culturally recognized adulthood in Kenya is difficult for poor and non-elite youth, especially the young men among them. The prevalence of conflict, high rates of unemployment, lack of education offer a platform for radical groups to seek new recruits. The findings agree with Oruku (2012), indicating young people caught in this “in-between” stage may become frustrated with their inability to achieve culturally recognized adulthood and seek validation by joining violent extremist groups, which give them an adult-like status through responsibility, purpose, and often financial compensation.

An important finding is the 27.2% (Kenya) and 35% (Somalia) who said revenge. After Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia, Al-Shabaab terror group warned that it would retaliate by attacking Kenya. The first incident targeting

Kenyans in post Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) incursion into Somalia occurred on October 24, 2011, when Al-Shabaab terror group member hurled a grenade into the Mwaura public house (pub) on Mfangano Street in Nairobi, wounding 12 people (Wabala, 2011). As noted by one respondent during a FGD:

KDF military invaded Somalia to pursue Al-Shabaab, but the warning that they would revenge has proved that Al-Shabaab are on a revenge mission to make sure the enemy pays for their loss (Somalia). Some feel small children were killed mercilessly, even the pain of losing family and friends make most revenge no matter the cost (FGD with female religious groups in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

From the foregoing push factors to terrorist radicalization are varied; and eliminating extremism is not possible without having an understanding of all push and pull factors responsible for fostering it. Owing to KDF intervention in Somalia, the response above demonstrates what is really needed to prevent political, ethnic, religious and sectarian extremism in an effective partnership way, especially between the police and communities.

From the findings, AMISOM, 18% response from Kenya and 13% from Somalia, which could be associated with what locals, consider foreign interference. The AMISOM peace-keeping mission could thus be a precursor to radicalization with seeming reaction to, and eventual violent rejection of, a host or native state's foreign policy. As noted by one respondent during an interview:

When you walk around this city, you realize that we are a nation whose sacred symbols have been robbed and whose wealth and resources are being plundered. And I think it is normal for us to react against the forces that invade our land and occupy it; just like any other country (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Although empirical studies indicate that radicalization is fundamentally an individual process, the study findings suggest that the unequal or inconsistent application of the rule of law is a major driver of youth frustration. Impunity among politically connected elites causes young people to lose confidence in their legal institutions, especially when youth receive harsh punishments for seemingly small offenses; as observed during the Focus Group discussion:

In Kenya, politicians capitalize on us young people before elections in order to gain the youth vote. But they use us for their gains, after winning their elections, most of ignore or abandon us youth supporters, leaving us politically charged and idle. They practice corruption and scandals, but it's like the law is there to protect them, yet if the common 'Mwananchi' is in problem, they are not there to offer help (Interview with member of the civil society in Mombasa 28th August, 2015).

The above statement clearly demonstrates that political manipulation leads young people to feel disillusioned with politicians and electoral politics. This feeling may contribute to the conclusion that solutions to youth problems must be achieved outside of mainstream politics, and perhaps some opt for joining some of these radicalized terrorist groups.

The study further sought respondent's views on pull factors influencing terrorist radicalization. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5.2.

**Table 5.2 Pull factors influencing terrorist radicalization**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Reputation to defend religion	105(38%)	33(45%)
Mental manipulation-to fight enemy of Islam	183(36%)	23(31%)
Obtain paradise	133(26%)	17(24%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 5.2, the response from Kenya shows reputation to defend religion at 38% , 36% said mental manipulation (to fight enemy of Islam) while 26% cited the desire to obtain paradise. On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed 45% said reputation to defend religion, 31% mentioned mental manipulation (to fight Islam) while 24% cited to obtain paradise.

Pull factors influencing terrorist radicalization, as the findings suggest; 36% (Kenya and 31% (Somalia) noted mental manipulation (to fight enemy of Islam) philosophy of terror groups lies in promoting radical ways to address issues. These groups have also radicalized youth to violently eject Imams not buying into radical philosophies, destroy churches, actively and violently demonstrate against the state and display intolerance to “non-believers.” Terror activities have a potential of undermining the stability of Islam in the coastal region and Kenya in general. They also present a possible route to sectarian violence such as that witnessed in Nigeria through Boko Haram. As noted by one key informant during the interview:

Jihadist speeches and literature in our religious institutions such as Mosques have contributed to the formation of a radicalized, secretive group of youth jihadists



between Kenya and Somalia. The mental manipulation seemingly intoxicates young vulnerable minds that look to Al-Shabaab as a source of emulation, while supporting its jihad by sending money and recruits to Somalia as well as attacking civilian targets in Kenya (Interview with civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The results also indicate 38% (Kenya) and 45% (Somalia) mentioned reputation to defend religion, suggest this secularization that has resulted in traditional values being left behind so that they no longer exercise a moderating influence or provide the alternative interpretations which could check the radicalization process. For instance, Crenshaw (2012) says that despite counter-radicalization efforts made, external funding leaves many young people and institutions vulnerable to the influence and inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics and their materials. As findings suggest, 26% (Kenya) and 24% (Somalia) indicated the motivation to obtain paradise. The reputation to defend religion could be likened to the preaching of intolerant Wahhabi interpretation of the Koran which incites Muslims to engage in violent acts (Crenshaw, 2012). The interview findings revealed it was a combination of factors that lead them to terrorist radicalization.

## **5.2 Recruiting strategies for Terrorist Radicalization between Kenya and Somalia**

Terrorist recruitment strategies can have a profound effect on state-centric counter-radicalization measures in an effort to manage transnational terrorism. In order to understand the recruiting strategies as a vital aspect, the study sought to establish the possible recruiting strategies for terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia. The obtained responses regarding the aggregate percentages of the analysis are given in Table 5.3 below.

**Table 5.3 Recruiting strategies for terrorist radicalization**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Religious ideologies in religious organizations	33(12%)	10(13%)
Internet	100(36%)	29(40%)
Dissemination of propaganda	50(18%)	9(13%)
Financing and affiliation of terrorist networks	76(27%)	15(20%)
Rhetoric extremist materials and clerics	18(6%)	10(13%)

**Source: Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 5.3, the response from Kenyan respondents, 12% said education system to transmit group ideologies in religious organizations, 36% said internet, 18% mentioned dissemination of propaganda, 27% said financing and affiliation of terror networks while 6% said inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics and their materials. On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed that 13% said education system to transmit group ideologies in religious organizations, 40% said internet, 13% mentioned dissemination of propaganda, 20% said financing and affiliation of terror networks while 13% said inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics and their materials.

### **Religious ideologies in religious organizations**

Results show response from Kenya 12% said terrorist radicalization occur through religious ideologies in religious organizations while response from Somalia was 13%. The 12% response from Kenya could be attributed to terror attacks and radicalization trends that have taken root in the Coastal and North Eastern regions of Kenya. In the recent past and mainly after Kenya deployed its forces to Somalia to support the TFG in flushing out *Al-Shabaab* militants, there has been a marked

increase in religious-linked ideologies and youth drawn to extremism as evidenced by rising recruitments and terrorist attacks in various parts of the country and re-emergence of radical groups such as the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). Most of these youths are made vulnerable to the forces of radicalism and criminality due to the feelings of real and perceived marginalization, hopelessness, identity crisis, exclusion from national resources, frustrated expectations, and relative deprivation. The obtaining idleness and widespread unemployment makes most of the youth to be easily recruited. The heightened radicalization is mostly due to the presence of local extremists and foreign radical preachers who import the ideology to the country. Radical groups have also been able to take advantage of perceived historical injustices and marginalization to recruit and radicalize vulnerable youth to their cause. The radicalization of youth in Kenya has spread throughout the country but has particularly escalated in Coast, North Eastern regions.

The implication of these findings is that forms of radicalization and emergence of Islamic groups were linked to moments of closure of political opportunities at both national and international levels. The assumption here is that political opportunities to a large extent are dependent on the socio-political structures and geo-political realities within and outside the societies, with which the oppositions identify. And that these factors do influence the emergence and evolution of militant activism within such opposition groups.

In the Kenyan context, radicalization has evolved over time as a process by which a section of Kenyans, usually young people, are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages them to move from beliefs that are

generally moderate and mainstream, towards very extreme views, which are violent in nature. This has been manifested in the committing of violent terrorist acts, burning of churches, targeting of religious leaders, security agencies and security installations. Attacks in Nairobi, Mpeketoni, Lamu among others have nurtured fear and suspicion among Muslims and Christians and could tilt the balance of inter-religious harmony and threaten to trigger religious violence in the country.

The country's social fabric has also been threatened by pitting communities against communities and religious groups against one another as exemplified by attacks on mosques, churches and clergy. Radicalization has affected the family structure as youth have split away from family and community to join radical groups. Most of the radicalized youths returning from Somalia, have undergone military training on the use of explosives and are capable of launching lethal attacks which aside from the loss of lives and property, could undermine state stability and therefore regional stability. These views were reiterated by one FGD:

In most cases youths are being recruited through religious ideologies that advocate for terrorism as a means to fight the enemies of Islam. But Islam is not a religion for war-its for peace. They intoxicate these young people with false doctrines and set them against what they purport the 'enemy.' We have seen al shabaab use this tricks to recruit many young people in both Kenya and somalia (FGD with male religious groups in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

From the foregoing, the transnational nature of terrorism and emerging trends as observed above call for efforts and emphasis on building community resilience. While efforts are being made to tackle radicalization and potential for violent extremism by young people; a growing problem is the open rejection of and denunciation of Muslim leadership and clerics by radicalized youth groups. A paralyzing fear has spread through affected Counties as such clerics have been

physically assaulted and ejected from Mosques. In Mombasa, two Mosques (Masjid Musa and Masjid Sakina) have been taken over by the extremist groups and one vocal anti-Jihadist Islamic Sheikh (Chairman of Council of Islamic Preachers and Imams) was shot dead in the Coastal city of Mombasa by suspected Al-Shabaab agents in recent months (UNDP, 2016).

From Somalia, 13% response underscores the challenge of terrorist radicalization that has been reported to spill over into Kenya. Kenya's invasion of southern Somalia, which began in October 2011, has turned into an occupation of attrition while “blowback” from the invasion has consolidated in a series of deadly Al-Shabaab attacks within Kenya. In the midst of the 2013 surge, the KDF's problems in southern Somalia were small compared to the struggles emerging back home in Kenya. From the beginning of the invasion, there was awareness that Al-Shabaab had the potential to mount retaliatory attacks in Kenya. The spectacular assault by Al-Shabaab on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall, beginning on 21 September 2013, provided the most substantive indication that radicalization is real. Al-Shabaab's threat against moderate Muslim preachers has been evident since before 2011, but their tactical response seems to have begun in December 2013, with the assassinations of two men in Malindi, accused of ‘giving information to local and international security agencies’ (Anderson, 2012).

According to Anderson (2014), the most prominent victim of Al-Shabaab retaliation was Sheikh Mohammed Idriss, shot through the chest at close range in Mombasa on 10 June 2014. The murder of Idriss was viewed as a direct response from Al-Shabaab to the activities of the ATPU. Idriss was chairman of the Council of Imams

and Preachers of Kenya (CIPK), and had been at the centre of a power struggle with radical Muslims at the Sakina Mosque in Mombasa. Idriss had emerged as a leading campaigner against radicalization and *jihadist* teachings, although the Kenya security forces had previously implicated him and other CIPK leaders in supporting terrorism.

Radical activists and organizations usually have a tense relationship with authorities. Depending on their character and the society in which they are active, they may be subject to a range of measures spanning from surveillance to outright repression and persecution. Consequently, radical organizations and their activists exist in relative isolation from the outside world. This social isolation fosters a number of dynamics that could be seen as conducive to radicalization processes in Kenya and Somalia as one respondent noted:

Isolation and the larger picture of marginalization may draw young people to radical activity and terrorism. No attention is given to preventing radicalisation before it has a chance to take hold (Interview with male security official in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

From the statement above, the role of social capital (satisfaction with residential area, trust in neighbours and feelings of safety) cannot be underscored; and can play an important role. Higher social capital can actually facilitate the formation of terrorist groups through greater opportunities provided by and exploitation of an open, democratic political system.

In contrast to the study findings, della Porta (2009) describes the identity and worldview transformations occurring on the path towards radical activism: 'Conversion to violence requires a specific redefinition of reality, which the

individual arrives at by adopting new beliefs and values.' The emergence of such countercultures involve, among other things, a dichotomous view of the world in which the organization is increasingly seen as a harbour of truth and the good, while the rest of society is evil and misled. In its most extreme versions, such transformations also involve the depersonalization or dehumanization of the organization's enemies for an extended treatment of the dehumanization processes in terrorist organizations). The enemy is placed in a different moral category, which legitimates the use of violent actions against individuals and groups considered to belong to this category (della Porta, 2009).

The strong socialization tendencies detected in leftwing radical organizations also appear to be central in radical Islamic organizations and can be linked to the study area. Moreover, they seem to work in combination with some of the factors described in relation to cultural strain. For individuals suffering an identity and integration crisis of the type outlined above, the radical organization thus offers to quench 'the material and immaterial longings of the individual' and provide new self-esteem. In this manner, the organization becomes a second family, especially for those who have severed ties with their family on the path towards radicalization.

In contrast to personal networks, organizations and institutions are a formal type of mobilizing structure. The guiding idea behind this argument is that activism is more likely to occur or at least more likely to occur faster in social settings with a dense organizational and institutional structure. Formal mobilizing structures can cover both movement and non-movement forms. Formal and movement types of mobilizing structures include all forms of civil society-based organizations in a

specific setting or community. By stressing their location in a specific community, it is suggested that mobilizing structures in a society are highly diverse in the sense that they follow certain social, cultural and political identity cleavages. In his study of the mobilization of the American Civil Rights Movement, McAdam (1982) thus identified a set of central civil society organizations specific to the black community in the American South.

Similarly, working class activism in the early 20th century also had its own distinct mobilizing structures (unions and clubs). This indicates that activism is a The insights from new social movement theory presented above suggest a number of important points for students of radical Islamic activism; first, on the question of networks, and, second, on the role of organizational and institutional aspects of recruitment and radicalization. Although the tracing of network relations in the case of Islamic recruitment and radicalization faces a number of methodological obstacles, a deeper understanding of how people are recruited and eventually radicalized must deal with these aspects seriously.

### **Mosques**

McAdam's (1986) discussion of the importance of black churches for the mobilization of the American Civil Rights Movement has a relevant parallel in the role played by mosques in recruitment to radical Islamic activism. The mosque plays an integral role in Muslim communities: "They are not just centres for worship and spiritual enrichment, but they also host educational activities, perform welfare functions, and serve as a gathering place for different generations" (ICSR, 2007). This makes mosques an ideal recruiting ground for activist entrepreneurs and an



obvious place for the formation of radical groups and networks. According to one key informant:

While it cannot be generalized, some Mosques are breeding grounds for recruiting terrorist groups and its ideal for both governments to pput measures to combat these trends. Incidences witnessed in Mombasa are clear indicators that some clerics can advance false doctrines within Mosques to support terrorism. but the government should go betond mosques and investigate prisons as well because the terrorism trends are changing and recruitment strategies are now broad (interview with male government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

The observation above concurs well with the ICSR report (2007), indicating that mosques attract the segment of the Muslim population who are most likely to “be open to the religiously framed political message which Islamic militants hope to convey.” Evidence concerning the Hamburg group that was central in the 9/11 attacks on New York also suggest that the group's core members embarked on a radical/terrorist path after beginning to attend the radical Al Quds mosque in Hamburg (Taarnby, 2005). Mosques are largely defined by their imams and, as noted in McAdam's study of the black churches, leadership therefore plays a crucial role in the extent to which a mosque becomes a hub for radicalization processes.

According to one respondent;

These mosques or their leading clerics have radicalized attendees to become terrorists, supported terrorist organizations, made radical Islamist remarks or hosted others that have, or are financially backed by radical individuals or organizations. There are certain denominations such as the Sunni waging religious war against the Shia and other Islam sects which have different influences Isolation and the larger picture of marginalization may draw young people to radical activity and terrorism. No attention is given to preventing radicalisation before it has a chance to take hold (Interview with male security official in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

From the above statement, the view that mosques act as recruiting centres in any general sense only depends strongly on the extent to which the mosque and its imams preach a radical version of Islam. Mosques are often controlled by the older generation and therefore rarely open to radical interpretations of Islam. Radical interpretations thus typically emerge at the fringes of the traditional structures of the mosque and often on the basis of intense conflict with the mosque leadership. In other words, it may not be the mosque as such that provides a mobilizing structure for radicalization, but rather the competing groups and interpretations existing in and around it. For Kenya, the challenge has been met with mixed reactions according to one respondent:

Mosque plays a key role in counter-radicalization. On November 27, the Kenyan government reopened four mosques in Mombasa, which it had shut down over fears that they were involved in the radicalization and recruitment of local youth for Somalia's Islamist militant group, al-Shabaab. But the violent confrontation between police and Muslim youth has seen a strategic focus on mosques by security agencies (interview with male government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

From the foregoing, it confirms the government raids on the mosques that seemed to confirm local and official suspicions. On November 19, the security forces raided and closed down the Masjid Musa and Masjid Sakina mosques, which radical youth had violently taken over and renamed as Masjid Shaduda and Masjid Mujahideen respectively. In the operation, the police killed a grenade-wielding youth and detained 250 other suspects.

There is an obvious interaction here between the network perspective and the organizational/institutional perspective on mobilizing structures. It might thus be argued that the very networks serving as channels for recruitment often emerge in and around the mosques. Networks, in other words, do not emerge of the blue, but

often in certain institutional settings (though they may also develop in cyberspace, as discussed above). For an individual attracted to radicalism at some level, mosques provide a particularly conspicuous location to attend if they are interested in pursuing a radical path. This suggests a somewhat different perspective from that expounded by McAdam, which seems to indicate that recruitment occurred among those who already attended the church regularly. The process described in the ICSR report, where individuals with a developing radical outlook approach specific mosques, outlines a different dynamic.

### **Internet**

Results show response from Kenya 36% said terrorist radicalization occur internet while response from Somalia was 40%. Kenya response (36%) could be attributed to recent calls to enhance cyber security following the Westgate terror attacks and subsequent attacks in Garissa and Mandera. For Somalia (40%) response indicates the growing wave of youth radicalization that has been blamed to media aspects. While the Federal Government of Somalia has made approaches in strengthening of social and development programmes in areas of need, encouraging job creation and access to education and credit to prevent situations where disaffected youth are drawn to a life of purpose via radicalisation; the role of the internet is critical.

There is no doubt that the internet with its low cost, ease of access, speed, anonymity, de-centralisation, size, global connectivity and weak or lacking regulation has played an important role in the dissemination of radical messages, the creation of a virtual ideological community, the raising of funds, the communication between members of terrorist organisations, the radicalisation of vulnerable individuals and, to some extent, also the recruitment of new members. Indeed, as

evidenced from the response during interview, one key informant noted the following:

The question is not whether the internet has influence. I think that radicalization is a concern: We're in an era of social media Internet usage where it's very easy to find like-minded people online and connect up with them. "A lot of young people can be an easy prey. We know for sure that it is has a big and diverse influence on many of its users here in Kenya. However, we do not yet know how such an influence can be countered without reducing the right to freedom of expression and establishing some form of censorship. The sheer volume of traffic on the internet in so many languages and at various levels of sophisticated encryption has made the task of countering terrorist propaganda difficult (Interview with civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The statement above suggests that the internet has also become a resource for disseminating terrorist propaganda and instructions to young persons that might not otherwise have direct contact with group recruiters or supporters. Some terrorist groups have established websites that are youth-oriented, with colorful comics, games, and links to videos. These sites, many of which are available in English, help to get the groups' propaganda and messages out to a worldwide audience. It is necessary to promote awareness that any young person with an Internet connection can access websites that promote terrorist groups or provide graphic depictions of acts of terrorism that are commonly portrayed as acts of heroism. While there are discreet examples of young persons who have become radicalized online, the magnitude to which this is occurring is not known.

Although it's demonstrated that youth recruitment and radicalization is not occurring domestically to the extent that it has happened elsewhere, the results provide

evidence that the degree to which it may or may not be happening point to the need for more detailed, focused research with between Kenya and Somalia. This may go a long way in understanding these relationships, assessing current policy and practice and evaluating interventions on role of internet in terrorist radicalization. On the same note, the interview responses revealed one respondent who noted the following.

Social media plays a significant role in the security problems we have been facing for the recent some years in Somalia. It became a soundless but effective element for Al-Shabaab or other radicals groups to post their propaganda and misinterpreted religious views on it. They even could do fundraising campaign for the militants in Somalia and Kenya to execute their transnational terrorists (FGD youth participant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The above statement provide evidence to what Roy (2004) observed, that the internet is a critical component of that remedy, allowing individuals to create an “abstract and virtual community of believers” that rests outside the confines of a specific city, country, or region. Instead of following a local group or religious leader as had been the norm in previous generations , today’s youths surf the Internet and “choose, quote, or follow whomsoever he/she wants. Taken as a whole, the findings suggest that while the Internet appears to have been the main instrument of radicalisation, in most cases financing and affiliation of terrorist networks and dissemination of propaganda go hand in hand. Clearly, most governments have focused on technical solutions, believing that removing or blocking radicalising material on the internet will solve the problem. Yet this study's findings shows that

any strategy that relies on reducing the availability of content alone is bound to be crude, expensive and counterproductive.

These findings indicate that the internet is nowadays the main tool; social media in particular have gained ground as an efficient channel for recruitment and indoctrination. Since these channels provide easy access to a wide target audience, terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda and its affiliates use YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and other social media. Given that radicalization is largely a real-world phenomenon that cannot be dealt with simply by “pulling the plug.” Any strategy that hopes to counter online radicalization must aim to create an environment in which the production and consumption of such materials become not just more difficult in a technical sense but unacceptable as well as less desirable. The findings disagree with a study by Stroink, (2007) indicating that although the Internet is increasingly playing a larger role in the process of radicalization, it has yet to play a dominant role. Self-radicalization on the internet with no face-to-face interaction is a rare phenomenon indeed According to an FGD:

Social media is the largest power they use for spreading of their messages and hypes or propagandas. They disseminate bulk of information and propagandas that associated with religious misinterpretations and delusions as well. Provocative clerks normally do target young people most probably for those whose experiences about religion is less. They post their propaganda and misinterpreted religious views on social media and often engage young people even from foreign countries with no more ideas about the religion (Interview with key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The statement above confirms that terrorist radicalization recruitment not only includes citizens of Kenya and Somalia but also other citizens from other nations.

Media and communication approach to the issue of recruitment and radicalization indicates that recruitment and radicalization can be spurred and/or inspired through the individual's exposure to symbols and messages in their communicative and media environment. The assumption here is not that exposure to for example radical messages in itself will propel individuals towards recruitment and/or radicalization. Nonetheless, such exposure may prime the individual in ways that can enforce and accelerate some other factors. According to Reid and Chen (2007), the presence of globally available master frames and symbols and the global circulation of terrorist images via the media suggest the existence of a global information space in which there is a constant flow of frames and images related to radical Islam. The presence of frames and images does not in itself increase recruitment and radicalization. On the other hand, it is also plausible that the availability of easily accessible information can prime individuals for radicalization and recruitment attempts by organization entrepreneurs or even inspire individuals without prior network contacts to actively approach radical milieus. The Internet appears to be of particular importance in this regard. While the mainstream media may readily diffuse images of terrorist acts, they will typically do so in a manner that is unsympathetic to the terrorists and their acts. The media thus serve as a filter and interpreter of the events. The Internet, in contrast, enables frames and images to bypass the filters of the traditional media (Reid & Chen, 2007). In this manner, the Internet facilitates the formation of a global counter-public in which radical frames and images can circulate more or less freely and where radical and pre-radical individuals can exchange ideas (Olesen, 2005).

While the Internet thus facilitates the breaking down of time and space restraints, Internet-based communication also tends to become relatively isolated and self-

affirmative. Internet-based communication differs from the traditional media in that it is structured around already-established interest communities or counter-publics. Internet-based communication can thus acquire some of the traits that were suggested for isolated organizations in the section on individual and socio-psychological explanations. One of the main differences, however, is that access to Internet-based communities and counter-publics is relatively easier than is the case with informal and formal organizations. Consequently, the radicalizing dynamics being observed in Kenya and Somalia for isolated organizations, within the context of security-based approach, may affect a potentially larger number of people on the Internet.

From the findings, 20% (Somalia response) and 27% (Kenya response) viewed financing and affiliation of terror networks as a recruiting strategy indicates the financial assistance and better livelihood-terrorists to take advantage of poverty to exploit those who are vulnerable in society and thus manage to recruit them. The favourable environment enticing the youth with shaky minds with money and promised them heavier. Fulfilled promises where the youth are given enough money and if they die in the jihad he/she will directly enter the paradise.

From the findings (Table 5.3), 18% and 13% (Kenya and Somalia respectively) mentioned dissemination of propaganda as a recruiting strategy. The implication for this is that online propaganda is essential to legitimizing extremist views, highlighting both real and imaginary grievances, magnifying the tensions between 'believers' and the 'enemy', and building a group identity (McCauley & Moskaleiko, 2011). They further point out that t online sites also allow them to use 'narrowcasting' to target their recruits. It may be that negative measures such as



censorship are not only ineffective and costly and even counter-productive, whereas positive measures such as publishing counter-extremist content and promoting the fight against radicalism are more effective in challenging extremist views.

While the use of internet for recruitment and propaganda is undeniable, it is argued that it should not be overestimated; most individuals have some sort of contact with extremism before becoming further indoctrinated online. Yet, given the suggestions from this study, it's clear that since transnational terrorism involves a combination of violence and communication; the communication linked to violence has skyrocketed with the advent of mass print media, radio, television and ultimately the internet.

Additionally, the findings show 13% and 12% (Kenya and Somalia response respectively) who said education system to transmit group ideologies in religious organizations as a recruiting strategy. Given the trends in transnational terrorism, these views cannot be under-estimated. Ideology often plays an important role in that it can provide the true believers with a license to kill. In recent years the role of radical narratives (how terrorists see the situation) (Canna, 2011) has emerged as an important dimension in explaining radicalization. Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) like Al-Shabaab terror group cannot sustain themselves without young recruits. Radical groups are astute observers of the challenges facing young people in Kenya, and they tailor their recruitment strategies to exploit youth vulnerabilities. Indeed, the report of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation noted that: "ideology appears as an important and constant factor in the radicalisation process towards terrorism. Ideological indoctrination plays a crucial role in turning a small but significant minority dissatisfied with existing

social and political arrangements into militants. Ideology contributes to the acceptance of violence as a method to bring about political change and also leads to the creation of a subculture of violence."

Another important aspect from the findings regards the inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics and their materials (with 13% response from Somalia and 6% from Kenya). In recent months, there have been reports of mosques delivering extremist rhetoric (Ibid). Al-Shabaab's primary source of support in Kenya has been purported to revolve around the Pumwani Riyadhha Mosque, located near Eastleigh in Nairobi. Until recently, individuals at the mosque handed out jihadist pamphlets and articles authored by the late Anwar al-`Awlaqi, the Yemeni-American member of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula who was killed by a U.S. drone in September 2011 (Bahadur, 2012).

Internet-based recruitment can also have a more social aspect. The social movement literature seems to be primarily concerned with already-existing personal networks as channels for recruitment. Nevertheless, the Internet may also offer a means to creating networks that might push the individual towards radicalization. Through chatrooms, discussion lists and different types of Web applications (such as Facebook), individuals attracted to radical Islamic activism but without already-existing personal or organizational contacts may use the Internet to forge virtual relationships. What is interesting here is the potential for such virtual networks to also attain a physical dimension at a later point (ICSR, 2007).


In the clearest case of domestic radicalisation, the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) was formed at the Pumwani Riyadh Mosque in 2008 (Odhiambo, 2014). The MYC, also known as the Pumwani Muslim Youth, was established by Sheikh Ahmad Iman Ali purportedly to express the grievances of impoverished Muslim youth (Navanti Group, 2013). “In practice, however, the MYC has recruited hundreds of Muslims in Kenya to fight with Al-Shabaab in Somalia (Ibid). It promised to sustain attacks for the “Al-Shabaab brothers” until Kenya withdraws troops from Somalia (Bosire, 2012). Similar findings have been reported elsewhere. A report of the British Change Institute (2013) concluded that ‘violent radical narratives may call on the common narratives in efforts to create new constituencies but also reframe them and promote an ideological coherence and interpretative power via an ‘ideational framework.’ In the context of the study on security-based diplomacy, the effect of ideologies has an effect on state-centric counter-radicalization measures. This is so since ideology is used to reduce potential moral inhibitors and to justify the resort to extreme methods from a broader repertoire of methods of waging political conflict. Taken together, these findings suggest that targeting programmes to particular themes of terrorist radicalization is likely to be difficult and governments may require different kinds of counter-radicalization programs.

### **5.3 Radicalization Among Youths**

Kimunguyi (2009) argues that EA region is vulnerable to terrorism because countries in the region experience: conflicts, weak governance, collapsed state institutions; porous borders the allowing extensive and uncontrolled movement of people and illegal weapons; increased extremist religious ideology and radicalization of vulnerable groups. These factors generally coincide with poor socio-economic

conditions and create fertile ground for the existence of terrorism. Understanding the vulnerabilities as well as the root causes of terrorism in the EA region is crucial for ensuring a more proactive approach to enhancing the effectiveness of counter-terrorism efforts in the region. However, although external actors have a major role to help in raising the capacities of countries and organizations in the region, they are faced with many challenges rooted in the socio-economic and political conditions of many countries in the region, and the lack of capacity within countries of the region to effectively respond and counter terrorism.

The study sought views on why youths are vulnerable to recruitment in terrorist activities. Data on the same was collected, analyzed and results presented in Figure 5.1.



**Figure 5.1 Why youths are vulnerable to recruitment in terrorist activities**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 5.1, the response from Kenyan respondents, 44(16%) said lack of education, 120(37%) cited unemployment, 83(30%) said religious issues, 22(8%) said marginalization while 17(6%) mentioned others.

On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed that 7(10%) said lack of education, 15(20%) cited unemployment, 22(30%) said religious issues, 11(15%) said marginalization while 4(6%) mentioned others. Overall, the results revealed that majority of the respondents in Kenya believe youths are vulnerable to recruitment in terrorist due to unemployment while in Somalia majority of the respondents believe youths are vulnerable to recruitment in terrorist due to religious issues, although unemployment was also cited as a key factor.

While religious education can in certain cases facilitate the transition into more radical views, that the younger generation, seemingly more integrated into the host society, is more vulnerable to turning to religious fundamentalism and seeking to become part of the terrorist radical groups. Indeed, young people searching for identity are fertile ground for terrorist radicalization recruitment. On the other hand, Kenya is facing a great challenge in dealing with the 'enemy within. Resentment toward the government is high, and extremists are able to exploit unemployment factors; chronic youth unemployment, for example, that makes Al-Shabaab's promise of limited income attractive.

Unemployment is a disease that the government has failed to cure...; young people remain idle and are prone to anything that can get them cash. We hear of parents complaining their youths disappear without trace, only to be linked to Al Shabaab. 'They say an idle mind is a devil's workshop!' Although terrorist radicalization is bad, I think the government has not done enough to explore employment to the vast

population of young people, who are idle (Interview with a University Lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The above response reveals the youth unemployment crisis between Kenya and Somalia has created a considerable reservoir of discontent and some of the disaffected young men and women are likely to be tempted by the ‘philosophy of the bomb.’ Credibility and legitimacy are core ingredients of any political narrative hoping to catch the imagination of people at home and abroad. They are also key resources in counter-radicalisation and CT. As the findings suggest, both Governments need not be perfect before they can effectively engage in successful counter-radicalisation efforts. As one respondent pointed out:

Lack of education translates to limited employment opportunities. Conversely, marginalization as earlier observed, majorly experienced by minority communities, alongside failed integration, feeds the conflict between the extremes in society. Clearly, the findings suggest that as long as the circumstances that produce terrorist radical grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the vulnerable youth will often appear as a ‘rebel without a cause.’ As noted from the focus group discussion:

The salutation of the Kenya labour market chance on employment and indiscriminate which makes youths marginalized and poor. This favourable environment enticing the youth with shaky minds with money and promise them heavier rewards. In addition, focal point persons in various organization e.g. state, societies, business people (Interview with government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

Thus, from the above statement, nothing creates so fertile a breeding ground for radicalization than the feeling of belonging to the camp of those left behind in the progress of mankind but at the same time upholding potent and aspirational symbols of empowerment. When people resent injustice they tend to be more prone to radicalization. Similarly, Alonso (2006) says that a common characteristic of all forms of radicalization leading towards violence is that it always takes place at the intersection of an enabling environment and a personal trajectory. These findings are in considerable agreement with Hoffman and Rosenau (2007) who posits that the causes of terrorist radicalization include: experience of unemployment, social exclusion, racism and discrimination, which cause them to become marginalized and radicalized. Another respondent was quoted as follows:

The problem is exacerbated by counter-terrorism programmes by the Kenya police who carry out mass raids rather than targeted arrests. It keeps the youths feeling repressed generally. They then identify that as oppression based on religion (Interview with male informant-NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

The response points to the need for the security agencies review of strategies used in counter-terrorism programmes. The sectarian element of al-Shabaab's raids in Lamu and Mandera between July and December 2014 and a growing trend of radicalisation among Mombasa's youth brought the threat of political Islam to the forefront of Kenya's political discourse.

There are a lot of implications that can draw from these results. First, violence can be seen as a part of a wider, evolving spectrum of movement's tactics, which may or may not arise in movement organizations. To a large extent, the evolution and the kind of radicalization and violence that arises in militant organizations may depend on the movements' interactions with the political structures and powers at play

within their environment. Second; violence is placed within a wider social context, thereby encouraging investigations into the interactions between the militant organizations, the society and political systems of which they form part of. Third; this approach can also enable the researcher to see the choice to adopt violence as a dynamic process, rather than simply as a static, individual disposition prior to movement participation (Della Porta, 2009).

From the findings, the possible contribution of social movement theory could be found in its understanding of the relationship between the emergence of social movements and political opportunities. Again, looking at the choice of repertoires of actions by different social movement actors; political process theory projects mobilization as a mechanism that is hugely dependent upon and affected by political and social structures. A lot of empirical social movement studies have confirmed that movements arise, interact, and tend to be sensitive to the kinds of political opportunities, which exist within their environments (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

While unemployment and religious issues were cited as reasons behind youth engagement in terrorist radicalization, real transformation for individuals to participate in this kind of activity often begins with participation with militant organizations through a process he called 'political socialization'. Here the individuals can be groomed, and over the course of time, can develop strong affinities with one another and to the cause; so much so that they conceive themselves as inseparable from the group. Della Porta (2009) also observed in the Italian case in 1995 that radicalization and dispositions to participate in certain political violence among most of activists she interviewed developed as a strong bond, which emanated from socializations within the group. According to her,




people didn't just get motivated to participate just because of the groups' ideology or because they were members of the group. Rather, participation grew out of a processual dynamics, which may or may not take place when individuals get involved in groups. Often through actions of opposition and other forms of activism, individuals have investments in terms of their own identities and emotions that tend to create strong links with individuals within the groups. Often this bond is so strong that it motivates and continues to mobilize participants to adopt any means possible.

As the findings suggest, the steady indication of al-Shabaab’s infiltration into Kenya has made it increasingly clear that they have sources of support within Kenya and that the country is not simply “an innocent victim in the war on terror. Thus, unemployment, religious issues, marginalization all compound to fuel the very extremism between Kenya and Somalia.

#### 5.4 Religion and Terrorist Radicalization

Given the emerging trends of terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia which continues to evolve in nature and scope, the researcher further probed the question pertaining the link between religion terrorist radicalization in both Kenya and Somalia. Data collected was analyzed and results on the same presented in

Figure



5.2.

N=277 (Kenya)  
N=73 (Somalia)

## **Figure 5.2 Religion and terrorist radicalization**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The result (Figure 5.2) shows that there is a link between religion and terrorist radicalization, with 150(54%) indicating a great extent, 39(14%) mentioned moderate extent, 28(10%) noted less extent while 61(22%) said not at all (Kenya response). On the other hand, response from the Somalia side revealed 4(5%) great extent, 26(35%) moderate extent, 15(20%) less extent while 29(40%) said not at all. Thus, that the Kenyans view the link between religion and terrorist radicalization to be to a larger extent than response from Somalia respondents.

The 54% great extent (Kenyan response) could be due to the events that have raised concerns among Kenyans of young people linked to terrorist radicalization in religious institutions. Kenya's madrasas have been dominated by well-resourced Wahhabi charities and foundations that have been linked to extremist support facilities; for example around the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, located near Eastleigh in Nairobi in addition, Jihadist speeches and literature and the teaching in Mosques in Mombasa have raised alarm over the link between terrorist radicalization and religion (Mayabi, 2011).

From the above findings, conventional literature identifies the rise of religious movements has been historically associated with increased intergroup conflict, and even terrorism. In fact, empirical evidence shows that religiosity is associated with prejudice and closed-mindedness and those religious individuals, for example, tend to be prejudiced against less religious individuals. Religious pluralism, for instance, might blame globalization for creating a religious marketplace. The "new religious pluralism," however, is associated with "intolerance, closed rather than open

societies, and increased prejudice against other religions” (Ortmeier & Meese, 2009). Global images associated with religion concern insecurity and instability, as well as violent extremism; the interdependencies and interconnected changes bring forth sudden intergroup contact, which breed home-grown terrorism, and therefore, result in increased threats to national security.

From the social movement theory perspective, the success of modern social movement organizations rely on the interactions between the opportunity structure available to the potential organizers, the presence of grievances against some larger and more powerful group (often the state), the capacity to frame these grievances effectively, the ability to mobilize and coordinate sufficient resources, and the selection of actions intended to bring the organization closer to its goals. The interrelatedness of these components are key indicators of emerging movements in Africa. Religion plays a powerful and central role in human security, particularly in helping individuals to achieve a positive and distinct identity because it is essential to human needs; the social identity theory proposes this concept. Furthermore, religion reminds members of an in-group of the distinctiveness or differences that exist within. On the other hand, faith can serve to create or promote peace and help individuals’ better cope with external changes or even conforming to westernized culture.

The 40% and 22% (Somalia and Kenya response respectively) noted indicated 'Not at all' , which could be attributed to the reform-minded Kenyan Somalis and efforts made by the government to ensure the madrasa system needs is modified. Moreover, some claim there is no evidence of the link between religion and radicalization as this has been an effort in counterterrorism policies that focus largely on security and heavy-handed policing to alienate the Muslim community.

From the Somalia response, only 5% said great extent with 35% indicating moderate extent, which indicate that there is considerable variation among Kenyans and Somalis on the link between religion and terrorist radicalization. This was evident during the FGD as one respondent noted the following:

There should never be a space for radicalization view into Muslim religion. Because as I said before this religion is for peace, sharing prosperous and mutuality. Trends of radicalization with faith-based manoeuvre is less probability, Radicalization means with faith-based scheme has no space in the Muslim religion since this doesn't allowed for the real believers to involve any violent business (FGD male member in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The tendency within the Muslim community has often been to down-play the scale of the crisis or denies it exists. Unless it is acknowledged, little will change. I think we need to take steps to reform our religious institutions and improve quality of leadership. We have seen madrasa teaching mislead young people into joining radical terrorist groups and I think we can't deny that there is no link between religion terrorist radicalization (Interview with female civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The varying response above brings into question how these levels and types of causes and catalysts relate to each other and how they, when combined, result in terrorist radicalization. The main premise is that, in general, radicals are 'ordinary' people: they are not insane psychopaths suffering from mental illnesses (Crenshaw, 2000). Although most factors are assumed to contribute to all forms of radicalization, the findings denote the theoretical framework to cases of Islamic radicalism in post 9/11 (Choudhury, 2007). Especially due to one man's terrorist is another's freedom fighter, the varying responses point to the reason as to why there has been a difficult for cooperation in counter-terrorism efforts. As the findings reveal, respondents were particularly more divided on whether religion and the war on terror is a mistake and on how religion has affected the war on terrorism. Indeed,

the negative sentiments shown in can be tied to evaluating Kenya's current situation in response to the global war on terror.

Experts on Islamist terrorism, such as Roy (2004) says that terrorism is not rooted in cultural or religious terms, but that it represents a form of “deterritorialized Islam”, in which individual Muslims find themselves, cut off from authentic local traditions. The implication drawn from the findings is that Islamist terrorists attempt to create a new, universalistic doctrine that can be a source of identity within the context of the modern, globalised, multicultural world. It ideologizes religion and uses it for political purposes. The threat is mostly posed by alienated and angry youth in European cities, who seek jihadist ideology as an identity (Roy, 2004). Indeed, the ‘new’ terrorism has new goals and rather nondescript goals, such as the rejection of Western lifestyle or the creation of a regime with different dominant norms and values. Most visible in this respect is Islamist terrorism.

The dividing line between genuine military, terrorist, proliferation, criminal, and sometimes even humanitarian threats is increasingly blurred. Terrorism has been noted to be increasingly mingled with other criminal activities, such as narcotics, weapons trade, human trafficking, money laundering and forgery, fraud, corruption, and the smuggling of nuclear.

In recent years, a growing number of analysts and policymakers have referred to the doctrines guiding Al-Qaeda and its associates as an ideology. Radicalization stems from “Jihadi-Salafi” ideology, which is defined as “...the driver that motivates young men and women to carry out autonomous jihad via acts of terrorism”

(Silber& Bhatt, 2007). This ideology demands great loyalty and commitment on the part of the individual member. The findings agree with Silber and Bhatts (2007) analysis on acquiring an understanding of radicalization in the West that retrieved four critical phases: pre-radicalization, the point of origin; self-identification, exploration of Salafi Islam and identity issues; indoctrination, beliefs are intensified and Jihadization, self-designation as holy warriors (Silber& Bhatt, 2007).

The evolution of religion is comparable to the rise of globalization, particularly when examining the impact and role of religious ideology in both old and new terrorism. In understanding how religious ideations play a role in acts of terrorism, or religiously inspired terrorism, modernity and globalization are both influencing factors. However, from the response as findings suggest for both Kenya and Somalia, that when the concept of religion comes into play, a conflict of interest occurs comparable to that of the contradictory and opposing views of scientific and religious beliefs. The degree of influence by religious doctrine, however, varies significantly.

From the focus group discussions conducted, it was evident that religious ideology, in terms of religiously inspired Islamic terrorism in particular, is a sensitive issue as many hold differing views about the impact of Islam in acts of terrorism and terrorist radicalization. Through its discourse on revivalism, the Quran permits the use of violence as an act of defense and to preserve the will of God in Islamic communities (Venkatraman, 2007). This statement, in particular, might cause discomfort or even rage among some members of the Muslim community, while other members of the same community might agree to preach the word.

Some members of the Muslim community may argue against this statement, claiming that Islam is a religion that promotes peace and strong faith. Based on the Quranic principle of “Jihad,” Muslims can interpret and determine the extent of their Islamic practices individually (Talev, 2011). It is then plausible to imply that, determined by their extreme interpretations of the Quran, terrorists emphasize the Quran’s doctrine on violence and revivalism in their religious interpretations and present it as a basis for the use of violent acts of terror to preserve the “Shariah” in an Islamic community. As noted by one key informant:

The influence does not only stem from the Quran’s doctrine. The cultural contexts from which these movements arise especially in Somalia are of great importance and must be addressed by both Kenya and Somalia governments; In Kenya, reports of NGOs criticising the government’s policies toward Kenyan Muslims, including Muslims for Human Rights and Haki Africa, were indicted under accusations by government that they had possible links to terrorism (Interview with female NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

From this perspective, radicalization is one way disenfranchised Muslim youth in the have gone about reasserting their religious identity within non-Muslim contexts. This agrees with Roy (2004) who says that individuals find “a way to recast and rationalise their sense of exclusion and uprootedness”, replacing missing interpersonal ties and kinship and re-establishing a sense of belonging. Indeed, that the images Western jihadists and groups like Al-shabaab weave together events from a number of different regional contexts helps explain how and why individuals between Kenya and Somalia could find common ground with their supposed counterparts in Pakistan and Egypt despite profound differences in their experiences.

From these findings, it is possible to link what Rapoport (2004) denotes as the fourth or 'Religious Wave' that began in 1979, and, if it follows the pattern of its predecessors. The aim earlier was to create secular sovereign states, in principle no different from those present in the international world. But religion has a vastly different significance in the fourth wave, supplying justifications and organizing principles for the New World to be established. The 'religious' wave of terrorism has given prominence to suicide terrorism and witnessed an attempt to cause mass casualties by the use of chemical weapons, with emergence of Islam and Christian terrorism (Rapoport, 2004). From the interview response, one noted the following:

Largely, home-grown terrorist radicalization and terrorism as a whole can be viewed as a sociological phenomenon where issues such as belonging, identity, group dynamics, and values are important elements in the transformation process. Religion plays an important role, although here in Somalia that common denominator seems to be that the involved persons are at a crossroad in their life and wanting a cause (Interview with female informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

Our country is being swept by a wave of Islamophobia. At the same time, the Kenya Muslim communities are under pressure from intensive law enforcement scrutiny and we feel as though we are being treated as terrorist suspects by the government (Interview with female NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

From the above response, just as in the case with alienation and integration, neither religious practice nor globalization ferments radicalism in and of itself. There are plenty of converts and newly practicing Muslims that do not radicalize. Instead, they vociferously and unabashedly condemn violence in the name of their religion (Wilner, 2009). Stewart (2006) adds, that "religion plays an important role," in the radicalization process, "but for some it rather serves as a vehicle for fulfilling other goals." While religious adherence and globalization may help create an environment



in which jihadi radicalization can more easily occur, they do not in and of themselves cause radicalization. Another key informant commented the following:

I think we do have a huge generational gap relating to a lack of single religious authority and religious schooling, and as consequence self-teaching and individualization of faith leads our young people to radicalization and extremism. The Government made some arrests in Mombasa and this has helped because the influence of 'imported' radical imams and their hate speeches (Interview with male state officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

What can be deduced from this is that as a driver of terrorism, the true danger that religious doctrine poses is its encouragement of attacks that are more violent in nature than other types of terrorism. By being promised rewards in the afterlife, terrorists are more likely to carry out suicide bombings and other such “all in” tactics that are harder to defend against.

Indeed, conventional literature indicates that Al-Shabaab has been able to get extra-Somalia assistance partly because it fashions itself as part of the global jihad against the kafir West and their African allies. Internationalization of the conflict has also allowed it to come up with an ideology that has enabled it to somehow overcome Somalia’s infamous clannish fractionalization (although elements of this still persist within the organization).


Perhaps the most commonly held belief today is that terrorism is caused by religion. Though it is not the main cause for terrorism, the findings suggest that religion does play a significant role in driving some forms of it. As Hoffman (2011) points out in, from the Thugs of ancient India that killed to terrorize in the name of the god Kali to the Jewish Zealots who cut the throats of Romans in public to combat their occupation of Israel, religion (in conjunction with political/ethno-nationalist drivers) has long been a factor of terrorism. Today religion as a part of terrorism has been

mainly attributed to Islamic fundamentalism. As Sageman (2012) points out “the global Salafi jihad is a worldwide religious revivalist movement with the goal of re-establishing past Muslim glory in a great Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines, eliminating present national boundaries.”

The findings confirms not only al-Shabaab’s strong religious motivations, but links directly to some interviewees’ perception that their religion (Islam) was under threat, which was the belief of a highly significant number of those who participated in the FGD. Overall, the findings provide evidence that effective state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism may require tackling of systemic issues relating to religion between Kenya and Somalia.

### **5.5 Counter-Radicalization Programs**

The study sought to establish the existence of well-identified counter-radicalization programs between Kenya and Somalia designed to manage transnational terrorism. The analysis result is shown in Figure 5.3.



**Figure 5.3 Existence of counter-radicalization programs**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The result shows that more than half of the respondents identified no existence of well-identified counter-radicalization programs (177(64%) and 68(93%) Kenya and Somalia response respectively said No). Those who said Yes, suggesting well-identified counter-radicalization programs do exist were 100(36%) and 5(7%) between Kenya and Somalia respectively.

The results indicate majority believe there are no well defined counter-radicalization programs between Kenya and Somalia. The suggestion of 64% and 93% Kenya and Somalia response respectively who said No implies the ability to craft effective long-term counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation strategies is dependent on the degree to which both countries are able to better understand the phenomenon of radicalization. Counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation are long-term processes needing tact and patience. The recent indication in Kenya's madrasas-teaching

Arabic and the Wahhabi creed, have existed to indicate that not much has been done. The perception has been that the government has not done enough to deal with the problem of terrorist radicalization, heightened by attacks between Kenya and Somalia. However, the counter-strategies that have been witnessed such as the Kasarani Concentration camps in Kenya, have worsened the need to eliminate a sense of perceived discrimination or injustice as a way to prevent young people, especially males from minority communities, from feeling frustrated or excluded.

As indicated from the Focus Group discussion; one respondent commented the following:

I don't think we have any well-define counter-radicalization programs. What the government does is to employ counter-terrorism strategies and carry out swoops; which have make inter-faith relations frayed, and such programs have even opened ill tempered contest that is widening. I am yet to hear a well-round government strategy on programs well-define that involves all stakeholders and the common citizens (Interview with male state official in Nairobi, 24th September, 2015).

Drawing from the above response, that the challenges faced by Kenya and Somalia compounds the effect of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Realistically, madrasa reform can only be part of wider reform with government support and well-define programs. Yet, on the other hand, conservative groups and hardliners dismiss the idea as primarily driven by the West.

From the findings however, 36% and 7% between Kenya and Somalia respectively indicate agreement on existence of well-identified counter-radicalization programs. To some extent, the Kenyan government has made some efforts in strengthening of social and development programmes in areas of need, encouraging job creation and

access to education and credit to prevent situations where disaffected youth are drawn to a life of purpose via radicalisation.

For example, there has been collaboration between the government and UNDP program to strengthen institutional and community capacity to counter radicalization and violent extremism. The program builds the capacity of the National Counter Terrorism Center to implement counter radicalization strategies and effective engagement in counter violent extremism. The strategy is meant to develop Information, Education and Communication material for awareness raising at community levels to counter violent radicalization and extremism, provide training and guidance for trainers who shall interact with the youth and women; to support dialogue between interfaith groups, and to increase tolerance and harmony between and within groups, and support to community awareness of counter violent extremism (UNDP, 2015). Similarly, as observed by Iregi (2014), education stakeholders in Mombasa have launched programs to counter the emerging radicalization of students, based on concerns by the unusual behavior in secondary school students.

The National Youth Service is such one strategy, meant to target the labour pool of possible terrorist recruits. Yet, such strategies are met with challenges as observed by one respondent:

The government may be trying to get some jobs for the young people as part of a strategy to counter radicalization; but the militarisation within Kenya and targeted swoops like what we witnessed in Eastleigh will most likely backfire and radical groups are likely to continue to find a pool of Kenyan recruits, sustaining themselves in Kenya even as al-Shabaab continues to suffer considerable military losses in Somalia. Unless it is acknowledged and a coherent, effective program that is well coordinated is drawn

up, little will change (Interview with male civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

From this response, one clearly understand that initiatives that have been developed and deployed to counter radicalization in Kenya have been hard approaches; which perhaps have widened the relations within the Muslim community. Literature indicates that although programs seeking to achieve similar goals have been implemented in various countries for decades, over the last year's counter-radicalization programs mushroomed throughout the world (Presthold, 2011). Over time, based on direct experience and academic studies, many governments have adopted increasingly nuanced counter-radicalization strategies, partly in response to a more sophisticated understanding of terrorism and radicalization. Response from FGD revealed the following:


The government can't confront radicalization directly. It has to employ different approaches, most perceptions are completely wrong, especially that Somali nationals are responsible for attacks in Kenya. This notion hampers the need for applying different ways to deal with the problem (FGD with female youth group in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

According to Neumann (2009), few governments today believe that the majority of terrorists are deviants, sociopaths or psychopaths who were born terrorists or that "once a terrorist, always a terrorist." On the contrary, it is now widely believed that, in perhaps a majority of cases, the radicalization process that leads people to carry out acts of politically motivated violence can be prevented or even reversed. Working from these revised assumptions, over the last few years several countries have created counter- radicalization programs that differ markedly in their extent and aims.

The counter-radicalization programs implemented in different countries differ greatly from one another, and from non-Western programs, in terms of aims, structure, budget, and underlying philosophy. Each experience is deeply shaped by the political, cultural, and legal elements unique to that country. The programs have often been in place for just a few years, making it therefore difficult to fully assess their impact. Nevertheless, their experience to date points to certain key characteristics and challenges common to all counter-radicalization programs being witnessed between Kenya and Somalia.

### 5.5.1 Existence of Counter-radicalization Programs in Schools

The study further probed respondent's views on the existence of counter-terrorist radicalization programmes in schools. Figure 5.4 shows the results.



**Figure 5.4 Existence of counter-radicalization programs in schools**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings from Kenya response show majority 150(54%) disagreed that counter-radicalization programs exist in schools, 61(22%) said neutral while 66(24%) agreed. On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed 44(60%) disagreed,

23(32%) were neutral while 6(8%) agreed. As the findings suggest, counterradicalization programs in schools is still work in progress. From the findings, response from Kenya shows 24% agreed, while 22% said neutral; which could be attributed to the government's effort through the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), which is the agency responsible for coordinating implementation of the strategy, is currently working with various partners in implementing parts of the strategy.

In particular the government has collaborated with the European Union and the Government of Denmark in programs involving training of law enforcement officers and Prisons and Probation Services Officers to identify radicalization cases and equip them with the proper intervention tools and techniques. There have been calls by leaders in Kenya; in areas like Mombasa on enhancing school-based programs to counter terrorist radicalization. However, the interviews conducted for this study revealed that despite the progress made, the channel programs faces a number of obstacles that have impeded its impact to date. First, there are questions about the level of expertise and knowledge of the front-line staff working, evaluations, and interventions. A mature understanding of the radicalization process and violent extremist ideology is a prerequisite for conducting evaluations (Rosen, 2010).

As seen from the findings, majority (54% and 60%) from Kenya and Somalia respectively disagreed that counterradicalization programs exist in schools. This same view is observed by Anspaha (2008), who points out that there are a few initiatives or programs identified in some of the regions that directly address youth, or are aimed at stemming recruitment attempts in venues frequented by youths. As



findings suggest, it could be that many of those involved with training channels in counterradicalization do not have the background to identify youth most vulnerable to violent extremism. As such, there is a complete lack of operational awareness on issues of counterradicalization, which makes introduction on schools a challenge as well. While efforts have been made to introduce such programs in schools, it appears programs meant to build capacity for youth in schools are still disjointed. According to one member during FGD:

I don't think counterradicalization programs in schools exist, and if they are effective. Unfortunately, in our view, Kenya has largely taken a counterterrorism approach, which basically means that they see this as a security problem, one that can be addressed by either the police or other security services. This is problematic, because counter-radicalization requires new policies. And at the same time, we're also concerned that the extensive use of police and security services risks alienating the Kenyan-Somali population and in fact increasing radicalization amongst them (FGD with male religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

The statement shows that counterradicalization in schools is not overly effective and still other approaches are given more focus. Firstly, the school offers activities that are designed to create distance between the core group and their followers, providing individuals with meaningful activities in their spare time, as participants may come from less privileged backgrounds and have limited access to sports clubs or any other organisations. In addition, programme that puts a particular priority on teaching programmes can help students to focus on their future, and be able to visualise a future in which they can be successful and separate from the group.

In the context of security-based diplomacy and management of transnational terrorism, the finds call for the educational aspect of counterradicalization programs

to focus on motivating the students in question to choose studies adjusted to their particular circumstances. In tandem with these studies, a positive social structure needs to be created with the students, where their ability to relate to others in a tolerant manner can be developed. Yet, such programs have not overly succeeded between Kenya and Somalia as the findings suggest. One university lecturer was of the view that:

The government has not done effective terrorist radicalization programs in schools. This is also coupled by lack of effective monitoring of activities of some students by teachers and parents when their students are in school. I think programs like these should be based on a long-term approach and rely on co-operation from all staff within the school (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The response is in line with Focus groups discussion, respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the governments' efforts to develop effective, long-term counter-radicalization and de-radicalization strategies. One respondent also noted the following:

A link exists between radicalization and terrorism, but counter-terrorism tactics aimed only at stopping Al-Shabaab and other militant groups should not become the only strategy. Programs must be well implemented in our schools and link the same to our communities so that our children can be safe (Interview with male civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

In light of the above, counter-radicalization measures have proved to be ineffective and even counterproductive if they are not based on a clear understanding of what causes individuals to be susceptible to violent extremism. FGD results also identified education and employment as two central components of attempts to find a solution to Somalia's problems, together with peace, stability and reconciliation. The results disagree with a study by Anspaha (2008) indicating that school-based programs have

been implemented in some regions that seek to educate both students and teachers about radicalization and potential signs of extremism.

The unfortunate reality in Somalia is that the formal education system came to a standstill when the Somali state collapsed in 1991, leaving an entire generation uneducated. Education is identified as crucial to preparing young people to obtain employment. Education can also counter later radicalization, because better-educated people tend to participate in conventional politics, for various reasons: They feel that they can influence the political process more than less educated people because they can articulate their opinions better; they are more aware of the impact of government on their lives; they generally have opinions on a wider range of political topics.

The presence of Kenyan nationals in al-Shabaab's activities is a clear indication that al-Shabaab has successfully presented itself as a jihadist organization beyond the borders of Somalia and that it is not exclusively staffed by Somalis. It is therefore essential that the government and security agencies in Kenya move away from the perception that only Somalis and Somali-Kenyans are involved with al-Shabaab. It's time we introduce programs in schools not areas where incidences have been reported, but in all Counties in Kenya (Interview with key informant-NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

It is clear that strategies based on mass arrests, racial profiling are counterproductive; and the need to implement effective counter-radicalization programs in schools can also provide a basis for addressing violent extremism as part of a broader mandate of regional security. Initiatives should be locally tailored and should engage members from across the community who are in a position to address specific underlying factors or identify potential radicalization indicators.

Counter-recruitment and radicalization initiatives must also evolve with the young audiences they are intended to reach, adapt along with the adversaries, incorporate new developments in technologies, and address changes within environments where young persons are susceptible. Given the apparent increase in youth involvement in terrorist organizations, and the changing demographics of those involved or implicated the findings in this study point to the need for more detailed approach to promote awareness that young persons are susceptible to terrorist recruitment and radicalization between Kenya and Somalia.


## **5.6 State-Centric Counter-Radicalization Measures**

With the rising cases of radicalization in the region, the study sought respondents' views on the effectiveness of various state-centric counter- radicalization measures. The analysis on the same was done on various aspects discussed below:

### **5.6.1 Effectiveness of Good Governance as a Counter Radicalization Initiative**

Specifically, the study sought issues regarding to whether Kenya and Somalia governments had done enough to tackle negative socio-economic factors such as corruption and lack of high unemployment especially among the youth as a counter-terrorist radicalization strategy in management of transnational terrorism.

Data on the same was analyzed and results presented as shown in Figure 5.5.



**Figure 5.5 Effectiveness of Good governance as a counter radicalization initiative**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The result from the Figure 5.4 show response from Kenya with 34(12.4%) who agreed, 43(15.6%) were neutral while 199(72%) disagreed. On the other hand, response from Somalia counterparts revealed 7(10%) were neutral while 66(90%) disagreed.

From the findings, response from Kenya 12.4% mentioned agree, 15.6% neutral suggest some progress in enhancing good governance. In the recent past, there has reaffirmation to improve governance by increasing transparency and accountability in Government, and commit to work with other states to combat corruption in Kenya. For example, collaboration between Kenya and USA have seen the two Governments plan to meet quarterly to review progress in implementing commitments and deepen partnership to reduce corruption by focusing on four action areas: entrenching good governance and combating corruption; implementing and reinforcing international anti-corruption initiatives and standards; expanding the

use of technology to reduce opportunities for corruption and ensuring accountability for corruption and mismanagement (UNDP, 2015).

Conventional literature reveals that preventing radicalization begins with promoting “good governance, human rights, democracy, education, and economic prosperity” (Quillen, 2002). Such efforts may also target underlying issues of inequality and discrimination, and therefore, build a sense of trust between Muslim communities and law enforcement officials. Indeed, the Government of Kenya has committed to reinvigorate and expand as well as launch new national civic awareness and education programs for schools across the country by incorporating civic education and ethics in school curricula, and develop national public awareness campaigns. Moreover, introducing compulsory ethics training for all public officials across all levels of government to create synergies among service delivery agencies and professional regulatory bodies to develop professional cadres within the civil service. In addition, there have been efforts by the Government of Kenya to leverage technology to reduce or eradicate opportunities for corruption; such as progressively moving all in-bound government payments onto the Government Digital ePayments Platform, and widening the use of the i-Tax and Single Window platforms. One respondent was quoted saying:

There is some progress, but at a low scale that cannot influence the economic status of the affected. Kenya through youth programs and Somali through reconstruction program (Interview with male state officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The response could be as a result of efforts in Kenya to tackle youth unemployment and rule of law through the new constitution. Yet, taken together, these findings suggest that Kenya and Somalia governments have not done enough to tackle negative socio-economic factors such as corruption and lack of high unemployment

especially among the youth as a counter-terrorist radicalization strategy. The country's responses have ranged from increased security surveillance, security operations, community policing to development of counter-terrorism strategy (UNDP, 2015). However, the attacks in Lamu, Garissa and Nairobi County show the capacity of the terrorist groups, and the requirement of even more effort from the state to counter radicalization to prevent such phenomena at the root.

As the findings suggest, majority (72%) cited disagree. Kenya took a great leap in adapting the new Constitution in August 2010. With the new Constitution comes an expansive Bill of Rights that addresses inequalities encountered by different groups specifically the minorities and those previously marginalized. For citizens to gain the benefits that accrue from the new Constitution, they need extensive civic education on it and the rights inherent therein. For those actors who have been empowering communities to know their rights, it appears not much has been done to create the necessary civic awareness, reorienting the national psyche for the new dispensation and engendering robust public engagement in governance issues.

The implication for this could also be attributed to the burgeoning youth population that is increasingly defining the region's security environment. Population growth over the past several decades has made Kenya one of the youngest regions in the world and is projected to continue. At the same time, violent extremist organizations (VEOs) remain active in the region and have extended their influence in a number of areas. The efforts are still work in progress, and major setbacks remain.

From this response, that despite efforts being made by governments to tackle corruption and unemployment, enhancing cross-sectored trust is a challenge. Rural-to-urban migration, the disintegration of traditional family and community structures, and a lack of formal employment have pushed large numbers of youth into the informal sector, where they interact infrequently or at cross-purposes with state institutions. Youth living in the informal sector are struggling to meet their basic needs and find their place in society. These youth are vulnerable to VEO recruiters, who offer them a strong sense of purpose, community, and even financial compensation.

The response reveals low public participation in governance issues and judicial processes, reforms and inadequate knowledge of the key governance systems in Kenya. This unfortunate situation contributes to abuse of the judicial system and consequently a negative image of the justice system in Kenya. Though public awareness of the reform process is evident, the impact is limited to the national level. Public perception of local governance is still marred by the inefficiencies of the previous judicial system. Respondents continually cited cases where corruption, nepotism and other injustices in public service continue unabated even with the new Constitution. An interview with a key informant noted some concerns:

Not much has been done. To some extent corruption is becoming one of the chronic diseases and if it is not treated well we will fail to fight with terrorist groups. Corruption still thrive well, many youths have not been employed and still their discrimination in governance. The three arms of the government i.e. legislature, judiciary and executive are in conflict to achieve good governance mainly because of corruption and politics (Interview with male government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).



If criminals can easily acquire identification documents such as passports, identity cards, birth certificates, among others from State offices in Kenya provided that they pay some bribe. That is why today, we have many foreigners, especially from Somalia, in Kenya, who claim to be legitimate citizens, yet they can hardly speak English or Kiswahili (Interview with male member of the Media in Nairobi, 25th September, 2015).

The statement above agrees with conventional literature on emerging challenges of terrorist radicalization programs. Corruption affects the youth in a number of ways. The Kenya police, tasked with maintaining law and order, are known for their culture of impunity and appetite for bribes. Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of Kenyans do not trust the police. In a broader view, increased corruption among our security officers and the rising insecurity in Kenya creates a loophole where young people can bribe their way out of crimes.

Though corruption often benefits a select few elite individuals, it more broadly impacts the general public as it “changes the institutions, economies and societies within which it occurs,” making any assessment of corruption overtly subjective and hard to define. By extending corruption beyond the economic market structures to security matters; the phenomenon of violence and terrorism has a social, intellectual and behavioral context that needs to be objectively analyzed. This is because the young men and women involved in this deviant behavior find financial assistance and supportive environment as well as intellectual incubation within the societies in which they live. Corruption takes away resources meant for development, and the consequence of unemployment, especially of youth, is another contributor to the spread of terrorism for it generates a sense of helplessness and despair on the one hand and frustration on the other. This is exacerbated in many affected countries by administrative corruption which in turn is fed by the continuing economic crises; starting from inflation to economic recession, to illegal cases of graft in deals that

are sanctioned by state officials, or even engaging in the trade of illegal goods under the auspices of influential people within government. Such practices generate amongst young people aggressive behavior of violent repression, which soon turns into organized aggression that targets people, institutions or the state.

Several studies pertaining to the challenges faced by the nation's government officials post 9/11 argue that law enforcement officials have been confronted with the task of maintaining a balance between protecting national security interests and preserving the constitutional rights of the citizens. As Oruko (2012) points out, Violent Extremist Organizations (VEO) like Al-Shabaab terror group take advantage of socio-economic factors that render Kenyan youth vulnerable to radicalisation. Most Kenyan youth struggle to access employment, education, housing, health services, and other necessities. Achieving culturally recognized adulthood in Kenya is difficult for poor and non-elite youth, especially the young men among them. The prevalence of conflict, high rates of unemployment, lack of education, and especially the inability to establish a home and marry have all contributed to Kenyans remaining youths much longer than their counterparts elsewhere in the world.

Young people caught in this "in-between" stage may become frustrated with their inability to achieve culturally recognized adulthood and seek validation by joining violent extremist groups, which give them an adult-like status through responsibility, purpose, and often financial compensation. Compounding the problem of delayed adulthood is the common perception among older generations that young people should "wait their turn" for jobs and influence.

The unequal or inconsistent application of the rule of law was also highlighted as a major driver of youth frustration. Impunity among politically connected elites causes

young people to lose confidence in their legal institutions, especially when youth receive harsh punishments for seemingly small offenses, such as operating an unregistered business or living in makeshift homes without formal titles. The findings in this study point to the need for effective structural socio-economic and political strategies to address issues of governance.

Impunity among politically connected elites causes young people to lose confidence in their legal institutions, especially when youth receive harsh punishments for seemingly small offenses (Quillen, 2002). Politicians mobilize youth before elections in order to gain the youth vote. They commonly stoke youth frustrations and promise sweeping reforms aimed at improving their lives. After winning their elections, most of ignore or abandon youth supporters, leaving a semi-organized and politically charged youth cohort idle. Politicians who lose their elections may similarly exploit their youth followers by inciting them to violent protests or armed resistance. In both cases, political manipulation leads young people to feel disillusioned with politicians and electoral politics. This feeling may contribute to the conclusion that solutions to youth problems must be achieved outside of mainstream politics, perhaps through violent extremism.

For Somalia, the findings show 10% was neutral while 90% disagreed, an indication that good governance is not effective. The multiple fault lines have thus opened up, facilitated by (and accelerating) processes of state weakness and the relative empowerment of non-state actors. The result is more political violence and endemic criminality in and off the coast of Somalia and the Horn. This defines the core challenge facing the regional and global security agenda, in addition to attempts at diplomatic mediation and conflict resolution throughout the region. Intensifying illicit networks and rent-seeking criminality are part of a broader pressure on fragile

state structures. They are already struggling to control and adapt to pressures arising from the accelerated flows of information, communication and migration in a rapidly globalizing environment. The coincidence of these processes in Somalia and Kenya in the wake of transnational terrorism puts governments at stake on how to develop effective programs of good governance. According to one respondent;

The government has not done much in terms of good governance. Policies addressing youths are not well defined, and in most cases programs are avenues for corruption. Little has been done since Somalia is not committed in counter terrorism due to religion (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

As the statement suggests, presently, there is no single Somalia. Following the collapse of Said Barre's regime in 1991, a political vacuum emerged in Somalia. All public institutions disintegrated. Virtually all political, economic and social activity underwent a process of extreme decentralization. In several parts of the former Somali Republic, new entities of governance have since appeared, but their emergence has been uneven and the most advanced among them remain relatively weak. Apart from formal administrative structures, a range of entities of the civil society at large elders, Islamic courts, business groups, women associations, local NGOs, etc have emerged to play a variety of roles in defining community priorities and making resource allocation decisions. Armed conflict and to an increasing extent, acts of lawlessness continue to disrupt the relief and development operations, effectiveness of Good governance as a counter radicalization initiative.


Taken together, the results above disagree with a study by Kosseim (2011) indicating that counter-radicalization strategies and programs currently implemented place great emphasis on finding root causes of radicalization in externalities (e.g.,

political and economic conditions). However, a significant gap in the literature entails that less focus is warranted for setting out measures that address causal factors at the social level, and even less attention is paid to causes existing at the individual level. As the findings suggest, it could be that exploring causes of radicalization in connection to good governance as well as other subsets of issues discussed in subsequent sections, may contribute to the long-term success of counter-radicalization strategies in thwarting terrorist acts and preventing formations of new terrorist networks. In the context of governance, effectiveness of a judicial system is paramount for safeguarding economic, social and political rights of individuals within the country. It is anticipated that with the new Constitution, the reform of the judiciary will bestow equal justice to all devoid of any and all discrimination.

### **5.6.2 Effectiveness of Democratic Institutions as a Counter-radicalization**

#### **Initiative**

In order to understand further how counter-radicalization programs have been enhanced, the study sought to establish the effectiveness of democratic institutions and the rule of law, including democratic policing, promoting dialogue between the state and society and ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as strategies in countering terrorist radicalization in Kenya-Somalia governments. Data on the same was analyzed and presented as shown in Figure 5.6.



**Figure 5.6: Effectiveness of democratic institutions**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings indicate for Kenyan response 48(17.2%) said effective, 134(48.4%) cited fairly effective while 95(34.4%) said not effective. Conversely, 5(6.7%) noted programs are fairly effective while majority 68(93.3%) cited not effective for Somalia response.

For Kenya, the 17.2% who agreed the existence of effective rule of law, including democratic policing, promoting dialogue between the state and society relates to the on-going constitutional implementation. There has been a call on clear processes of determining structures and laws that meet the expectations of the public. Particularly, this has often included the design of institutional and organizational structures, monitoring systems, communication networks, and a code of discipline. However, response from Kenya show 34.4% noted not effective, implying promoting dialogue between the state and society and ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms has not been effective. Although enacting

government reforms has been ongoing, governments' role in promoting interagency cooperation when approaching youth radicalization issues is still work in progress. A key informant who was interviewed was quoted saying the following:

The two governments are trying despite there are more challenges beyond Kenya and Somalia. There is need for a regional approach Somalia issues hence the intervention of international community's problem to all Kenyans (Interview with male security expert in Nairobi, 24rd September, 2015).

Little has been done, the challenge not well weighed and things are taken for granted. Very low dialogue is opposed by making political parties which mean no political responsibility or dignity so things are no longer at ease which give good atmosphere for radicals. Not satisfactory only the poor and unfortunate are to follow rule of law and some rich and popular people do not respect to rule of law. It is applied discriminately. Poor cases in violation of human rights exist particularly by the armed forces. We should exercise freedom in religion and media (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The varying responses reflect the challenge of democracy and good governance in promoting the security, stability, harmony, and prosperity of their people in the face of complex challenges from diversity and difference in religion, individual greed and ambition, opinions, and clan rivalries. Somali state failure presents a challenge to implmeneting democratic institutions and peace-building efforts. Kenya's efforts to tackle insecurity have been marred by serious human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, and torture by security forces, Human Rights Watch, 2015). The Kenyan government's failure to ensure accountability for security force abuses and other serious rights violations undermines the rule of law and public confidence. According to a FGD:

Kenyan authorities need to find lawful ways to address the country's growing security problems," we have heard of cases where the police use tactics that have resulted in abuses of thousands of people, yet no measure have been taken by the government (FGD with male religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

The above statement highlights existing gaps and the need for governments to recognize that human rights offer an effective moral guide in turbulent times and that violating rights can spark or aggravate serious security challenges, including terrorist radicalization. The short-term gains of undermining core values of freedom and non-discrimination are rarely worth the long-term price.

The adoption of an operation "*Usalama Watch*" following a series of grenade and gun attacks in Nairobi's Eastleigh neighborhood and in Mombasa is one such case. Kenyan police and military deployed about 5,000 security officers to Eastleigh over several weeks. The forces raided homes, buildings, and shops, extorted massive sums, and harassed and detained an estimated 4,000 people, including journalists and registered refugees. Another key informant was quoted as saying:

The anti-terrorism police unit has been responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and ill-treatment of detainees. The government needs to look into these matters because people and especially the youth are disappearing without trace (Interview with male civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The above response indicates the impact of counter terrorism measures on human rights between Kenya and Somalia. It identifies terrorism as a global problem shows that the human cost of terrorism has been felt in virtually every corner of the world. It demonstrates that legislation intended to strengthen anti terrorism efforts raise serious concerns in relation to international and domestic human rights law. From



the response in Somalia, 6.7% said fairly effective while 93.3% noted not effective.

One respondent who was interviewed noted the following:

We had never witnessed any kind of such strategy you are talking about. I doubt the existence promotion of dialogues, collaborations and cohesion between communities backed by governments in order to engage society in counter these groups. As a civilian man, I have never seen or even heard about any joint strategic events that put emphasis on promotion of dialogues, collaborations and cohesion between communities in order to engage them in strengthening necessary approach, tactics and strategy to paralyze terrorist radicalization agendas (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Clearly, the findings above reveal that programs that enhance democratic institutions and the rule of law, including democratic policing; promoting dialogue between the state and society and ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are not effective. Preventing radicalization must begin at the local level by supporting local capabilities and programs that address radicalization and violent extremism. Counterradicalization efforts vary from counterterrorism initiatives, and therefore, require greater cooperation between a vast range of other government and state departments, as well as other civilian agencies in hopes of developing a citywide counter-radicalization program, which are ineffective. One official from the FGD noted the following:

Within a human rights framework some roles for meeting needs are for governments, and some roles are best left outside governments. But in both cases, governments must be part of a holistic solution, and at a minimum, not fuel the growth of violent extremism. Good governance is critical to help protect communities and individuals from the false promises of violent extremism (FGD female participant with religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

It appears that the governments are not taking a more individualistic approach, and as Bernard (2005) points out, the need for better understanding how radicalization subsets, such as socio-economic factors, demographics, religion/religious ideology, and identity issues, can impact the radicalization process) is a missing link for both Kenya and Somalia. While increasing cooperation between security services does have benefits, the risk of such a move is that it threatens to conflate the external and internal dimensions of radicalisation and terrorism affecting Kenya. This could be the reason for the misguided policy measures that associate the problem of Kenya's marginalised Muslim community with the KDF's militarised approach in Somalia.

As the findings suggest (Figure 5.5) 48.4% said fairly effective while 34.4% cited the programs are not effective (for Kenyan case); meaning they view programs promoting dialogue between the state and society not effective. Similarly, response from Somalia shows 6.7% noted programs are fairly effective while majority (93.3%) cited not effective for Somalia response. A missing link could be limited legal abilities, coordination and leadership that open gaps and challenges within the security institutions. However, considering the heavy-handed practices by these institutions, it is unlikely that such legislative reforms will heal the Muslim community's mistrust of government and unify Kenya against radical Islamism.

From the interview carried out, it was clear that the excessive use of force displayed during *Operation Usalama Watch* conducted in April 2014 in Nairobi's Muslim-majority Eastleigh neighbourhood foreshadowed the type of damage such disproportionate responses can have. The scale and militarised protocol of the operations was met with heavy criticism from the Muslim community and international observers alike. Amnesty International called the operation "a pretext for the blanket punishment of the Somali community in Kenya." The findings for

both Kenya and Somalia point to the need for security institutions to remain in contact with non-defense related agencies, and foster interagency cooperation, which requires political leaders to build political will within their governments to address youth radicalization issues.

I think the public institutions must also be willing to reach out to and work with civil society groups. The governments need to take the first step in promoting cross-sectoral collaboration by convening dialogues between public institutions and NGOs, religious groups, businesses, community associations, recreational clubs, sports teams, and other civil society groups. Government officials are occasionally suspicious of the motives and goals of civil society organizations and vice versa. This needs to change (Interview with NGO member in Nairobi, 25th September, 2015).

Improving state capacity, state legitimacy, and state security are equally important dimensions of better governance and human development. In that sense, Zartman (2005) asserts that human development expands the meaning of development in a similar way that relative deprivation broadens the meaning of poverty. Both concepts are particularly relevant to the debate on the root causes of radicalism. With their emphasis on economic, social, and political aspirations rather than just income per capita, 'relative deprivation', and 'human development' offer analytical tools for a more strategic approach to radicalism and counter-terrorism. These two concepts also shift the debate of root causes from the realm of economic growth to the realm of governance and political economy. Such focus on the state is particularly useful in the context of the Kenya-Somalia security issues, where political power and economic structures are strongly varied.


Political leaders need to stand on the moral high ground when it comes to fighting abuses of power, redress injustices and address popular grievances. Wherever that can be achieved at least in part, extremists and terrorists have, in the long run, no chance of success. However, one should not forget that preventing radicalisation, controlling extremism and fighting terrorism are but some of the concerns of governments. There are other, conflicting priorities and what is good for reducing terrorism will not always be good for the achievement of other policy goals and vice versa (Interview with a male security expert in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The implication of this statement on the effectiveness of democratic institutions as a counter-radicalization initiative thus calls for a change of strategy. This is in agreement with a study by Zartman (2005), indicating that ensuring consistent and effective institutional monitoring regimes should be established at the outset. This structure should be constitutionally empowered to cover all institutional practices, values, and efficacy. These stages are not independent nor necessarily linear. For instance, the constitutional order that forms the basis of the institutional order must be informed by thorough stock taking. This does not suggest that stock taking is a one-time event. It occurs throughout the cycle. Institutional design should not be pursued without a vision, but this does not mean that one stops envisioning once a sense of the institutional architecture has been developed. Links also exist between stock taking and monitoring and accountability, given the need to keep in check institutional excesses and performances.

### **5.6.3 Promoting Co-Existence Across Ethnic/Religious Groups**

Further assessment on counter-radicalization initiatives was done in which the study sought respondents views on the effectiveness of programs implemented to promote co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious and other groups, combating intolerance and discrimination as well as promoting mutual respect as a

way of addressing terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia. The analysis results for this question were presented as shown in Figure 5.7.



**Figure 5.7 Effectiveness of programs implemented to promote harmonious relations**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings shows 25(9%) said effective indicating the existence of effective programs implemented to promote co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious and other groups, combating intolerance and discrimination, 89(32%) said fair while 58% said not effective (Kenya). On the other hand, response from Somalia shows 5(6.7%) said fair while 68(93.3%) cited not effective. Taken together, majority of the respondents feel programs on promoting co-existence across ethnic/religious groups in counter-radicalization are ineffective.

For Kenya, the 9% response agreed the existence of effective programs implemented to promote co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic/religious lines. The implication could be the government is seen to have taken a deliberate effort to encourage cohesion in Kenya. This is mostly seen around areas that had experienced

the Post-Election Violence (PEV) or other conflicts. Institutions such as the Truth and Justice Commission (TJRC), the National Cohesion and Integration Committee (NCIC) and peace committees are seen as an attempt by the government to unite Kenyans at the national level.

However, Focus Group Discussions indicate that government structures put in place are not effective enough and consistency in the search for cohesion has not been maintained on the road to cohesion. One official was categorical and noted the following statement:

Kenya is making good progress in ensuring that there is no religion and ethnic intolerance through the formation of NCIC the commission ought to be seen to be operating independently from the political influence. The government is trying to improve mutual respect and ethnic relation. There has been some effort to enhance cohesion and integration. Yet, despite the existence of laws and institutions created to support the cohesion and integration processes in the country, it seems emphasis has not been on combating intolerance and discrimination, but usually blanket initiatives that have no capacity to address root causes such as terrorist radicalization (Interview with a male security administration officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

As seen above, Inter-Faith and Intra-Faith Dialogues in the recent past, UNDP and NCTC have extended modest support to the civil society organizations to initiate dialogue and discussions on arresting the rising religious tensions and the worrying trend of indoctrination of mostly Muslim youth in violent extremism. However, with the concerns raised, this work needs to be stepped up and aggressively bring onboard the inter-faith groups and their role in combating terrorist radicalization.

Conversely, majority of the respondents 58.6% (Kenya) and 93.3% (Somalia) disagreed, with 32.3% who remained neutral. The Christian and Muslim leadership in the Country have been engaged in inter-faith dialogues towards stemming the rising religious intolerance and tensions. However, the dialogues have not had

sufficient support to cause conversation on cohesion and integration at grassroots level. The government is faulted for not providing adequate civic education to the citizenry that would have otherwise empowered and informed them on their democratic rights. This is noted to have resulted in uninformed citizens who are vulnerable to the exploitation of politicians. FGD revealed that:

The government should be at the forefront of educating citizens of their rights but the government does not walk the talk because they are part of the problem instead of being part of the solution. The spread of negative ethnicity is made worse by our political leaders, which great tensions. Frustration with employment, education, and opportunities for political participation and governance has created ripe conditions for hate preachers to target the youth for radicalization to violent extremism (FGD youth in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

Kenya has constitutionally devolved by central government downplays the system hence existence of intolerance and discrimination of political biasness, yet Somalia disintegrated to regional government which central government is not in far (FGD with male religious-based member in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

As suggested above, promoting mutual respect as a way of addressing terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia have not been overly effective. To some extent, recruitment drives by terrorist sympathizers using monetary inducements and appeals to religious identity to net vulnerable youth who are indoctrinated into violent extremism and enlistment into the fighting units. Radicalization drives exploit Kenya's existing fissures and faultiness including relative deprivation, high unemployment, lack of education, political marginalization. The unresolved issue of killings of Muslim preachers has triggered anger, and built on widespread relative

poverty to intensify the indoctrination and recruitment especially in coastal, North-Eastern and parts of Nairobi regions.

The focus group discussions revealed the need for comprehensive but simplified civic education on the Constitution and the public's willingness in supporting its implementation. The use of various languages and mediums to reach different segments of the Kenyan society was continually echoed across the FGDs. In summary, participants of the FGDs were of the opinion that the citizens as individuals have a responsibility and a role to play in promoting co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious and other groups, combating intolerance and discrimination as well as promoting mutual respect as a way of addressing terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia.

Enhancing cross-sectoral trust is especially important when engaging youth at the margins of society. Rural-to-urban migration, the disintegration of traditional family and community structures, and a lack of formal employment have pushed large numbers of East African youth into the informal sector, where they interact infrequently or at cross-purposes with state institutions. Youth living in the informal sector are struggling to meet their basic needs and find their place in society. These youth are vulnerable to violent extremists (VEO) recruiters, who offer them a strong sense of purpose, community, and even financial compensation.

Beyond promoting mutual respect and co-existence across different groups, the FGD response noted political patronage as one issue that is closely related to resource distribution and regional development in pre- and post-independent Kenya and



Somalia. Respondents noted it determines the economic and political rewards that a county would receive. The situation is further exacerbated by the politico-electoral administrative systems such as the constituencies that are usually dominated by one ethnic community thereby creating a bias within them. According to FGD:

Tribalism in Kenya is and remains a root problem hard to fight. From the political leadership downwards, tribalism creates enmity between the political divides and ethnic groups, which young people can be coerced to engage in violent activities (Interview with a female civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The findings bring to light the fact that the drivers of radicalization are multifaceted. Putnam (2003) states that the interaction between institutions in the institutional environment, both macro and micro authorities, and groups or communities are fundamental to indigenization. According to Putman, this involves two broad strategies: a comprehensive and deliberate approach to rebuilding institutions and a focus on the communicative space where the transformation of mindset and discourses take place. Ethnic discrimination represents one of the problems of inter-group relations in any society. According to him, this is a situation which people of the minority ethnic groups are given unfair or unequal treatment simply because they are from a different ethnic group. It could be referred to as tribalism, which emanates from the ethnocentric feeling of the dominant group. When there is feeling of superiority by one ethnic group, the tendency is to look at the other ethnic groups with contempt.... at the root of ethnicity is fear, fear of the unknown, fear of losing the predictability of one's ways of behaviour ...; fear of having one's established values changed thus cutting one adrift in a wider and more uncharted society.

While authorities have also invested significant resources in the development of initiatives that target at-risk segments of society; seeking to make them resilient to

radical ideas, these initiatives vary significantly in characteristics and underlying philosophies, some focusing on the reinforcement of democratic values, others on moderate Islamic theology or individual self-empowerment. Often blurring the line between counter-radicalization and the promotion of social cohesion and integration, these sets of initiatives have been downsized in most countries due mostly to overall budget cuts, declining threat levels and the difficulty in demonstrating their effectiveness.

From Somalia, information from FGD pinioned the issue of religious intolerance: with such negative attitudes exhibiting themselves in situations whereby leaders or groups blindly refuse to understand and respect contrary religious views and practices except the ones they consider to be true. In the context of security-based diplomayc in counterterrorism, the importance of a variety of factors that could accumulate and break down the barriers of resilience, including economic and political frustrations, enhancing social cohesion, bridging ethnic gaps, and strengthening common identity need to be taken into account. However, research suggests that more specific prevention strategies that emphasize inter-agency coordination may yield more effective outcomes.

Given that the Kenya government has vowed to pursue its military operations in Somalia, despite continuing retaliatory terror attacks, it is worth questioning and unmasking the effectiveness of programs implemented to promote co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious and other groups; as a way of addressing terrorist radicalization. Undeniably, more traction is needed in trying to understand whether this conflict is about resources, and whether the intervention will bring peace and good governance to the Somali people.

#### 5.6.4 Effectiveness of Conflict Resolution and Peace-Building Mechanisms

In view of the prevailing terror attacks and threats between Kenya and Somalia, the study sought respondents' views on the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms; through efforts made by Kenya and Somalia governments in preventing violent conflicts, as well as promoting peaceful settlement of disputes and resolution to counter violent radical groups.

The analysis results for this question were presented as shown in Table 5.4

**Table 5.4 Effectiveness of conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives**

	Kenya (N=277)	Somalia (N=73)
Effective	46 (16.7%)	
Fair	109(39.2%)	9(11.8%)
Not effective	122(44.1%)	64(88.2%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 5.4, the response from Kenyan respondents shows 16.7% said effective, 39.2% mentioned fair while 44.1% cited not effective. On the other hand, respondents from Somalia revealed 11.8% mentioned fair while 88.2% cited not effective. Overall the results revealed majority of the respondents believe programs on promoting conflict resolution mechanisms in count radicalization have not been effective.

For Somalia, building peace in countries emerging from conflict is a huge, complex undertaking, and hence the 88.2% response who noted not effective. For Kenya, 16.7% said effective, 39.2% mentioned fair. There have been efforts by the

government, Governmental organizations and NGOs to promote peace building initiatives. Despite the recent political turmoil, Kenya's robust civil society, strong economy, and stable institutions provide much of the foundation necessary for peace. Many in Kenya continue to work tirelessly toward healing and empowering their communities, and their successes have gone so far as to include peacefully passing a new constitution that contains much-needed reforms. With sufficient effort and investment, the prevention of renewed electoral violence in Kenya is truly possible.

Indeed, a core objective for peace-building is to reach as soon as possible the point when external assistance is no longer required, by ensuring that all initiatives support the development of national peace-building capacities. This is a challenge for Somalia, especially in the early days when peace is fragile and national capacity is often displaced and severely limited. As noted by one key respondent during the interview:

Peace-building is only on paper, yet communities at the local level are not empowered to affect such initiatives. Politics has a role and area of conflict is neglected. The reactive response by the government is an indication that conflict resolution and peace-building initiatives are not given priority in planning (Interview with a male state officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

From the findings, 11.8% mentioned fair, in Somalia case; the UNDP Rule of Law programme has focused on developing competent police and judiciary through training and rehabilitation of failing infrastructure, raising awareness of human and legal rights among communities, establishing legal aid clinics, demobilizing armed forces and groups, and studying and supporting traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. This has allowed war-affected communities to access legal

information, counseling and representation making small steps towards justice in an otherwise lawless environment. However, gaps remain as noted by one key respondent during the interview:

Gaps in the justice and security sector in the ongoing Somalia conflict leave communities exposed to violence and deprived of physical and legal safety. Given the clan factor and varying interests, peace-building is difficult for us here (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Some countries may need peace-building initiatives aimed at their particular conflict drivers, such as drugs and crime, illegal exploitation of natural resources, or land reform. Conflict drivers can also include crosscutting issues such as lack of respect for human rights, bad governance, lack of social integration and cohesion, lack of gender equality. This view is supported by Sawyer (2005) who notes that current approaches to state building, primarily dominated by the liberal peace thesis, tend to gloss over indigenous or organic mechanisms rooted in the sociological, historical, political, and environmental realities of post-conflict contexts.

The attacks on 11 September 2001 renewed the interest in strong and stable states, leading many donors to focus on capacity building and security sector reform. In Kenya, the repressive use of these new powers has created significant resistance and the main external actors have taken the local opposition into account and have adapted their anti-terror agendas. They have complemented hard security assistance with soft interventions aimed at addressing local issues such as conflict prevention and development in communities perceived as being 'at risk' of harbouring terrorists. However, a general shift in security interventions such as military intervention (KDF intervention strategy in Somalia) presents another challenge on

the the effectiveness of existing conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms between Kenya and Somalia.

It appear, from the Kenyan response (44.1% cited not effective) indicates that the design of institutional and organizational structures, monitoring systems, communication networks, and a code of discipline is ineffective. As observed from interview responses, it is evident that structure of ensuring consistent and effective institutional monitoring regimes for peace building is weak. One respondent notes the following:

Peace building efforts in Kenya have been implemented but mechanisms for monitoring and accountability are weak, with many loopholes which makes it difficult to address issues of radicalization (Interview with female NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

In essence, the findings point to the need for institutional design that enhances monitoring and accountability, given the need to keep in check institutional excesses and performances in peace-building. Namasaka (2011) notes that although this is a potentially broad agenda, peace-building in a specific country situation will not involve all these activities. Instead, it should be a selective, prioritized and sequenced strategy, tailored to the specific country circumstances. Indeed, prioritization is essential to effective peace-building. Priorities will vary from country to country, at different moments in time, and between different financing mechanisms.

Peace-building happens in an insecure, politically fragile and therefore challenging environment. Funding needs, the number of actors involved and their (often competing) priorities and objectives, and people's expectations of the benefits of peace building: all these present additional challenges. As one respondent noted:

For Kenya, the challenge of coordination among national actors complicates issue because we live in a politicized society which makes it difficult for national governments to play their part in coordinating support for peace-building. Somehow the religious leaders are being engaged to play a role, but participation traditional institutions are not well coordinated (Interview with a male state officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

Indeed, there have been weaknesses in expanding the role of local institutions, mediated state arrangements such as traditional leaders, religious leaders including the participation of Islamic leadership and peace committees that can help both states fulfill core functions of governance as well as dispensation of justice where both Kenya and Somalia governments cannot extend their authority at the border zone. Arguably, these traditional institutions signify strong local ownership, commitment and knowledge of local conflicts and are more trusted by the communities.

Recent efforts and interventions to address underlying drivers of conflict have only managed and mediated conflicts in the region to a minimal extent. But as Sawyer (2005) points out, a more reasonable and comprehensive peace building strategy demands policies which will seek to address the most dangerous underlying drivers of the conflict. Introducing external aid and other interventions may seem to meaningfully help reshape the sources of conflict into factors that promote peace and security in the region. For Somalia, this has been seen through strengthening politics, good governance of institutions and liberal democracy in the region.

The focus of international and national strategies for countering terrorism in the past decade has shifted from using hard security measures alone to combat terrorism, to a more multi-sectoral, comprehensive approach, which also includes more preventive strategies known as countering violent extremism (CVE). For example, multilateral

organizations such as the United Nations are focusing on CVE through Pillar 1 of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which addresses “conditions conducive” to the spread of terrorism. This relatively new approach is also apparent through the formation of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) as a multilateral platform for addressing counter-terrorism issues. However, findings suggest such approaches have not been successful. From the findings, it is clear that programs of promoting conflict resolution mechanisms in counter radicalization have been ineffective. This calls for a framework supporting the development and implementation of targeted interventions, specifically to minimize youth recruitment and radicalization into violent extremism through formal educational institutions and building community resilience through families and communities (Bachmann & Honke, 2014).

#### **5.6.5 Effectiveness of Community-Focused Initiatives in Counterradicalization**

The study further sought to establish whether Kenya and Somalia states had developed effective community-focused initiatives with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that Lead to terrorism (VERLT). Analyzed data on this aspect was presented as shown in Table 5.5.

**Table 5.5 Effectiveness of community-focused initiatives in counterradicalization**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Effective	104(37.6%)	
Neutral	60(21.5%)	5(6.7%)
Not effective	111(40.1%)	68(93.3%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**



From Table 5.5, the response from Kenyan respondents, 37.6% mentioned effective, 21.5% cited neutral while 40.1% said not effective. On the other hand, respondent from Somalia revealed 6.7% mentioned neutral while 93.3% said not effective. Overall the results revealed majority respondents believe disagree is majorly strategy used to push establishment of community -focused initiatives in count radicalization. Given the 37.6% mentioned effective, for Kenyan case only, could be attributed to the broad range of tools and capabilities that are essential to prevent violent extremism. Recently, the realization of the strength of communities as central approach to in counter radicalization. One key informant revealed the following:

Kenya has developed some community focused institution however there is need for more inclusivity of the public for such institutes to succeed (Interview with a male civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

From the foregoing suggestions it is evident that there are efforts in promoting community-focused initiatives with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism but greater focus is needed in targeting their children, families, and neighbors. Rather than blame particular communities, it is essential that effective ways be employed that are sustainable. The Kenyan government has initiated measures to combat the imminent threat in a bid to preempt, foil and counter any would be attacks on her citizenry. Kenya's public has been urged to emulate the collective security policy locally referred to as 'Nyumba Kumi initiative' that enables them to know their neighbor and report any suspicious neighbors and or activities.

As the results suggest, majority of the respondents (Kenya-21.5% cited neutral while 40.1% said not effective) and from Somalia (93.3%) felt community-focused initiatives in counter radicalization are not effective. Indeed, past experience have

revealed that community-based problem solving, local partnerships, and community-oriented policing have not been given emphasis and a basis for addressing violent extremism as part of a broader mandate of community safety. As earlier observed, major focus has been given to hard-line strategies that have not been overly effective. The implication for these findings could be that avenues for creating capacity to fill gaps as the government implement programs and initiatives are weak.

The findings disagree with a study by Rosen (2010) indicating that government and community-based counter-radicalization approaches are having an impact on directly addressing the crisis radicalization among the youth. Interview subjects said targeted intervention programs were vital to increasing the effectiveness of counter-radicalization efforts, but the strategy adopted have been discriminative. This sentiment was particularly strong among the key informants from the security sector supporting this argument:

The government has been relying on hard-line measures-the use of force with security agencies carrying out arrests and the outcome has been that communities lose trust in engaging with government to deal with the problem. The challenge of communities feeling harassed and left out may trigger an individual to engage in violent activities and so why some people get radicalized (Interview with male peace and security expert in Nairobi, 25th September, 2015).

As the above response indicates, achieving community-based initiatives requires that we all work together; government, communities, the private sector, the general public, and others to develop effective programs and initiatives. To support a community-based approach, the Government needs to work to strengthen partnerships and networks among local stakeholders. There is no single issue or

grievance that pushes individuals toward supporting or committing violence, and the path to violent extremism can vary considerably.

From the FGD, respondents' views the *Nyumba Kumi* initiative though touted as a citizens' neighbourhood watch, as a government ploy to exert political control over citizens. *Operation Usalama Watch* was largely perceived as a discriminatory operation characterized by an undertone of religious profiling; and the security surveillance project remains entangled in deep political debate. These initiatives therefore appear to be underpinned by an overriding political theme: that of consolidating the national psyche behind the government in the face of terrorism. They also seem largely motivated by political expediency rather than well-thought-out policy and strategy that can sustain durable solutions which makes community participation a challenge.

As for Somalia, the threat posed by Al-Shabaab is, unlikely to disappear in the near future, and this has made community-based initiatives ineffective. Interviews carried out the country's focus on security sweeps alienates the very population that the government needs to win over. One respondent cited the following:

The government doesn't make more of an effort to address the legitimate grievances of the citizens and to undermine the ideology of Al-Shabaab. The fear factor and lack of trust makes it even impossible for community-based approaches to thrive here (FGD male participant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

The statement above clearly demonstrates challenges facing effective implementation of counterradicalization programs. As posited by Rosen (2010), community engagement initiatives and community-oriented policing efforts tend to work best when multiple sectors within a community are involved in the initiative. It is important to incorporate community influencers who are not formal leaders into

any engagement plan. This will ensure that engagement has the best chance of reaching a broad cross-section of individuals within the community and it also has the potential to aid in developing trust with different levels in the community. However, that for Kenya and Somalia, providing local-level engagement officials with a broad range of potential partners, such as private sector businesses, national and local government agencies, NGOs, academia and the media is still a work in progress; community lacks tools to respond to community needs.

Conventional literature indicates that community engagement and community-oriented policing initiatives should be tactfully and carefully tailored to the local conditions and cultures, as well as every State's legal system, while also respecting international law (Lord, Nagl, & Rosen, 2009). However, findings from FGD members identified mistrust as a key issue in ensuring effectiveness of community-focused initiatives in counterradicalization.

The findings point to the need for community-focused initiatives in counterradicalization that focus on building trust with local communities and engaging with them as partners to develop information-driven community-based solutions to local issues. Such engagement is meant to raise community awareness about the threat of violent extremism, to provide them with the necessary tools, and to empower them to intervene and prevent radicalization and violence. Fishman and Lebovich (2011) also point out that facilitating local partnerships and building robust training programs to expand the standards of today's community-oriented policing efforts and enhancing government engagement with and support to local communities has been seen as effectively implementing positive community-based approaches to counter radicalization. Yet, as findings indicate, this type of commitment has not been effectively accomplished by reaching out to communities

directly or by convening information and educational-based approaches to keep community members well informed. In particular, multifaceted engagement is emphasized in building new relationships to address issues of security, as noted by one key informant during an interview, who noted the following:

The more aware communities are of potential threats to their security, the more empowered they are to be resilient against it and the better prepared they can be to counter the threats themselves. The vast majority of engagement work relates to issues outside the national security arena, such as jobs, education, health, and civil rights. We must ensure that in our efforts to support community-based partnerships to counter violent extremism, we remain engaged in the full range of community concerns and interests, and do not narrowly build relationships around national security issues alone (Interview with a male member of the Somalia National Army in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The findings above provide evidence that the government needs to build new relationships to address security issues, but these must be predicated upon multifaceted engagement. Indeed, engagement is essential for supporting community-based efforts to prevent violent extremism because it allows government and communities to share information, concerns, and potential solutions.

The results agree to some extent with Bradley (2011) indicating creating and maintaining positive, working relationships with community residents, remains a challenge for the government. This challenge was also evident during the FGD, where respondents noted that although the majority of members of the Muslim community have expressed a desire for engagement with law enforcement, some remain skeptical about the real objective behind such programs; that related outreach programs portray distrust between communities and law enforcement and are implemented as a way to “spy” on Muslims, further labelling or categorizing all

Muslims as prone to radicalization. The case of Operation Linda Nchi witnessed in Eastleigh-Nairobi, was one such case cited as a major obstacle. According to FGD:

The problem we have is that the security people have created this distrust themselves; the complication of followed by lack of cultural awareness among officers and other law enforcement officials, language barriers, and concerns about immigration status are likely to undermine trust (Interview with key informant-female NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

The above statement is understandable why some researchers have questioned the appropriateness of law enforcement/community policing roles in comparison with homeland security responsibilities. The roles may not have been clear in the past; however, the contemporary community-oriented initiative/ policing holds up to the homeland security standards: cite intelligence gathering, covert investigations, information sharing, and immigration enforcement.

A key finding for this study is that although conventional literature reports a shift towards community-base initiatives in countering terrorist radicalization, the findings suggest, Kenya and Somalia scores low; and reveal ineffective community-focused initiatives in counterradicalization. Borrowing from the developed economies, The recent publication of the National Security Strategy for Counterterrorism (2015) in the USA highlights current community-based approaches, priority goals, and guiding principles for combating radicalization and violent extremism (Rosen, 2011). Building resilience against violent extremism is the main goal, and taking defense against radicalized ideologies is shaped by the objective of community-based outreach programs that seek to educate and equip families, local communities, and local organizations with the intelligence and information necessary to prevent radicalization (Rosen, 2011). These findings point to the need for a change of strategy; and in the context of security-based diplomacy

approach, programs and initiatives therefore need to be implemented to meet the needs of members of the community, while partnerships and connections need to be fostered with all levels of government to support these communities.

### **5.7 State-Centric Counterradicalization Measures in Engaging with Specific Groups**

The study sought information on Kenya and Somalia governments' efforts in adopting strategic approach to engaging with specific groups to enhance collaboration as a strategy to counter terrorist radicalization. Various aspects on the same were assessed and results were discussed accordingly as presented in Table 5.6a and 5.6b.

**Table 5.6a Strategic approach to engaging with specific groups (Kenya)  
N=277**

	<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Not satisfactory</b>
Youth	55(20%)	116(42%)	105(38%)
Community policing	44(16%)	161(58%)	72(26%)
Women	22(8%)	116(42%)	138(50%)
Civil society	55(20%)	144(52%)	78(28%)
NGOs	33(12%)	133(48%)	111(40%)
Media	61(22%)	161(58%)	55(20%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Table 5.6b Strategic approach to engaging with specific groups (Somalia) (N=73)

	<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Not satisfactory</b>
Youth	13(18%)	37(50%)	23(32%)
Community policing	21(30%)	20(28%)	32(44%)
Women	4(6%)	18(24%)	51(70%)
Civil society	10(14%)	29(40%)	34(46%)
NGOs	7(10%)	44(60%)	22(30%)
Media	5(7%)	40(55%)	28(38%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

### **5.7.1 Strategic Approach to Engaging With Youth**

From the findings, 20% said satisfactory, 42% noted fair while 38% noted not satisfactory. The findings show 20% said satisfactory. Youth programmes have received substantive attention by governments. In Kenya, the government, especially youth ministries, have created programs to promote youth entrepreneurship and business development. The awarding of start-up business capital to young entrepreneurs is one such example. From interview responses, it was clear that gaps relating strategic approaches to engaging with youths to enhance collaboration as a strategy to counter terrorist radicalization exist. According to FGD, one member was quoted as follows:

The government is trying to engage youth, but the process is selective and leaves out many youth across the country. A clear framework supporting the development and implementation of targeted interventions, specifically to minimize youth recruitment and radicalization into violent groups like Al-Shabaab should be implemented (FGD with religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).



Enhancing cross-sectoral trust is especially important when engaging youth at the margins of society. Rural-to-urban migration, the disintegration of traditional family and community structures, and a lack of formal employment have pushed large numbers of youth into the informal sector, where they interact infrequently or at cross-purposes with state institutions. Youth living in the informal sector are struggling to meet their basic needs and find their place in society. These youth are vulnerable to VEO recruiters, who offer them a strong sense of purpose, community, and even financial compensation.

Despite the efforts made, results reveal 38 % noted not satisfactory, indicating strategic approach to engaging with youth is still work in progress. According to Dandurand (2013), even though many youth live at the margins of society, they are nevertheless inundated with information made available by new technologies. Cell phones and, to a lesser extent, Internet access, even in rural areas, have revolutionized the ways in which East African youth communicate and stay informed. Information and communication technology is shaping youth culture and the methods used by young people to consume music, film, and art.

the pathways through which some individuals move from confusion, frustration or anger to an acceptance of violence as a mode of political struggle are far from being well understood. It is certainly not clear that the process in question is very different for a would-be terrorist than for a would-be gang member. In reality, it may be that social inclusion programmes for youth and the prevention of violent extremism have not been effective in both Kenya and Somalia. Nevertheless, interviewed respondents expressed mixed views about the role of government in monitoring and

potentially engaging with youth groups. Some expressed skepticism about the programs implemented which are short-term and not sustainable.

### **5.7.2 Strategic Approach to Engaging Community Policing in Counterradicalization**

From the findings, response from Kenya reveal 16% said satisfactory, 58% noted fair while 26% said not satisfactory. On the other hand, response from Somalia indicates 30% said satisfactory, 28% noted fair while 44% said not satisfactory.

The findings indicate 15% said satisfactory, 58% noted fair fro Kenya; an indication that a major step towards engaging community policing in counteradicalization. The government of Kenya has attempted to build capacity of community policing for many years. The recent commitment to the nationwide implementation of community-based policing as a core strategy for proactive improvements in public safety and security is one example. One key achievement is the production of a Community Policing Training Curriculum, which has provided an important foundation in the training of security officers and includes civic virtues, people's involvement and security consciousness. The curriculum focuses mainly on: community engagement; partnership policing; crime prevention and reduction; legal framework and human rights; and strategic management (Kenya Institute of Administration, 2004). Nevertheless, the concept of community policing in Somalia (44% noted not satisfactory) is weak, which may be due to the unrest that has continued in the country; Al-Shabaab's swift rise to relative dominance in southern Somalia since early 2009 has added to concerns about enhancing such programs as effective community policicng.

For Kenya, 26% said not satisfactory; it appears these strategies have served to politicize and stigmatize communities, alienating them from the state and law enforcement apparatus (Fielding, 2004). The marginalization, alienation and sometimes victimization of communities, and the resulting perception of discrimination and injustice, can help justify the response of those respondents who cited reservations on effective community policing. Indeed, the broader counter-terrorism measures favoured by the State; in light of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism, rarely extend to offering effective protection to these communities against the radical elements hiding within them. As such, effective strategies, including broad inclusion of community-based policing programmes, can protect and support vulnerable groups who are at risk of exclusion and marginalization. This view was expressed by one key informant who noted the following:

Community-based policing is not effective; in paper, that a lot is being done, yet on the ground, the implementers have no clear framework to ensure the program is well implemented (Interview with key female NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

The findings agree with Chin (2014) who says that community engagement and community-oriented policing initiatives should be tactfully and carefully tailored to the local conditions and cultures, as well as every State's legal system, while also respecting international law.

Community members can build trust, only if the police and the government can be honest and transparent in their efforts to engage the community, respect the community's traditions and culture, listen to their grievances and make efforts to address the issues of radicalization and terrorism (Interview with key male informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

It is evident that trust is an integral part of community engagement and community-oriented policing, but one that does not occur naturally and without concerted and sustained efforts. In view of the above, that building trust can offer a significant progress of police-community working relations, and towards ensuring security and safety of the public interest. Chumba (2013) points out that trust between police and the community is essential; and police community partnership requires not only effective communication between local residents and police officers but, perhaps more importantly, both working towards a common goal to enhance public security and safety. According to Chumba (2013), this can also be facilitated by engaging private and public agencies in community awareness campaigns. Indeed, the wider context to mistrust and fear are considered as critical challenge to police-community partnership to counterterrorism, and hence a challenge to implementing effective state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. This view was expressed during an interview with one key informant in Kenya, who noted the following:

Community-based approaches have not been effective because quite often the government has relied on traditional methods of engagement. Some avenues like through TV, radio, and the Internet can be employed. However, trust has faded because information given may be used against an individual by the police, which make it difficult for this partnership between the police and community to prevail (Interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The comments suggest that community engagement initiatives, community engagement and community-oriented policing efforts tend to work best when multiple sectors within a community are involved in the initiative. It is important to incorporate community influencers who are not formal leaders into any engagement plan. This will ensure that engagement has the best chance of reaching a broad

cross-section of individuals within the community and it also has the potential to aid in developing trust with different levels in the community.

The importance of this engagement has been supported by Briggs (2010), who asserts that the community may act as an early warning system for the police and intelligence services; it can also work upstream to prevent young people from radicalization, by diverting them from extremist propaganda, helping to deal with personal crisis and social exclusion; it can tackle the grievances; and the communication with police should be consensual, to maintain the trust in the relationship. The major problem between Kenya and Somalia, as expressed from the FGD, for example is that Muslim communities still feel alienated because they don't feel that their views are valued by local authorities or that their involvement will make any difference. The construction of these dynamics, in addition to the sense of transnational terrorism have created an environment that call for a postmodernist approach; which advocates a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military fixation on threats. As such, community-based approaches could offer effective counterradicalization measures.

### **5.7.3 Strategic Approach to Engaging Women in Counteradicalization**

From the findings response from Kenya reveal 8% noted satisfactory, 42% said fair while 50% said not satisfactory; as the findings indicates, majority (42%) feel women are fairly involved in counteradicalization programs. On the other hand, response from Somalia shows 6% noted satisfactory, 24% said fair while 70% said not satisfactory. Given the effects of terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia, the question of how to reach and effectively work with women is especially pertinent for governments and NGOs.

As results show, 50% and 70% said not satisfactory from Kenya and Somalia respectively, which could be attributed to the fact that even in times of peace, mediated by men, the participation of women in peace-building and negotiation processes becomes a challenge of extremely complex proportions. As put forward by one interview respondents:

For us women, accountability and role of women in such programs is limited, except in moments of political expediency, the question of “where are the women?” is relegated to an afterthought (FGD with a female religious group member in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

In view of the above, it appears that integrating women into peace-building processes offers new degrees of democratic inclusiveness, more durable economic growth, and human and social capital recovery. Conventional literature has uncovered an alarming trend described as the soft radicalization of women. In regions throughout South and Southeast Asia, the US and some parts of Europe, women are being indoctrinated into a very austere and intolerant interpretation of religion, which encourages a bifurcated world view hostile to non-believers and discourages women from working outside the home. It is perpetuated through a small cell structure similar to other extremist recruiters and is often undetected by intelligence services because it does not actively promote violence.

As such, transition should provide a window of opportunity for promoting gender-sensitive policies, including through affirmative action in social and economic spheres. For example, it is important to reform property and inheritance law to protect the rights of women, and to ensure appropriate provision is made for groups

left particularly vulnerable in the wake of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. In particular, with the shift toward security-based diplomacy tools in countering transnational terrorism, addressing the particular impact of conflict on women's recovery, especially sexual and gender based violence is critical. Such a strategy is important in supporting women's full and equal participation in and ownership of counterradicalization programs.

Several reasons are cited for women's radicalization and involvement in terrorist acts, including both individual and social factors. Although motivations are complex, such factors include: avenging the death of relatives, the promise of a better life for their children, unmet needs and unresolved grievances, the need for companionship, and even feminism. One of the most notorious cases of a female terrorist, possibly radicalized by a spouse, is Samantha Lewthwaite, also known as the "White Widow." She is believed to be one of the masterminds behind the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi, Kenya.

The susceptibility of women to radical religious indoctrination demonstrates the importance of mainstream religious training of women as an often overlooked preventative strategy in countering violent extremist narratives. In Morocco, the Mursheeda program does just this by empowering women to counsel others in family and religious matters after participating in a rigorous 45-week training which includes courses in psychology, law, history, communication and religion (Noor and Hussein, 2010). As one of the longest instances of state collapse in recent years, Somalia faces many of the major challenges that affect conflict-torn countries, making it difficult for such programs to be effective. According to FGD respondent:

There has been efforts towards expanding access for women and girls to basic secular education and mainstream religious education, but some elements with extremist minds who perpetuate a culture of hatred and misconceptions make it hard to engage women here. The religion factor and clan politics play a role and women seem sidelined (FGD with female member in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

What these findings mean is that many respondents view ideology or religion as a form of pull factor, and certainly recognize these dimensions of engaging women. Religion can be one among numerous factors that play into or otherwise inform a person's higher-order needs such as identity or purpose. Many practitioners have internalized what research has shown; women, especially mothers, carry authority within their families and communities which can translate into positive influence against violent extremism. These practitioners repeatedly observe that women are the gate-keepers to their communities and, as such, should be involved in creating and maintaining CVE initiatives (Hamidi, 2013).

Despite their demonstrated potential, the results suggest the capacity of women in the peace-building and counterradicalization field remains underdeveloped. Unfortunately, women face a number of obstacles in attaining access to quality education. It can be inadequate facilities for women, a shortage of female teachers, conservative social or cultural norms, or targeted violence from radical Islamists that prevents girls from going to school. Not surprisingly, literacy rates in countries that are contending with violent extremism are also low.

#### **5.7.4 Strategic Approach to Engaging Civil Society in Counterradicalization**

From results, response from Kenya revealed 20% cited satisfactory, 52% said fair while 28% felt engaging civil society in counterradicalization was not satisfactory. On the other hand, response from Somalia indicates 14% cited satisfactory, 40% said



fair while 46% felt engaging civil society in counterradicalization was not satisfactory.

As the results show, 20% and 14% cited satisfactory from Kenya and Somalia respectively, which indicates there exist several initiatives aimed at directly or indirectly countering radicalization that are carried out by civil society organizations. However, the response from Somalia highlights the challenge of civil society in a state like Somalia that has been without a functional central government since January 1991; and this unique context of state collapse of weak and failed states present important policy challenges to both state and non-state actors role in management of transnational terrorism. Nevertheless, the enormous potential of civil society efforts is evident: they frequently partner with a wide array of organizations to counter radicalization and acknowledge that the grassroots reach and legitimacy of local communities constitute invaluable assets.

These civil society actors can counter radicalism at the grassroots level by inoculating their communities with a mainstream religious education that protects them against the indoctrination of the terrorists. They also advance the cause of youth and women in secular education, but the issue is that government always has a suspicious eye towards them and the level of engagement is still weak in Kenya.

While scholarly literature fully recognizes the importance of civil society efforts, the findings nevertheless reveal the relevance of strategies and programs conceived by governments in partnership with civil society is still work in progress. The findings disagree with a study by Meines (2014) indicating that local government agencies

with members of civil society are playing a crucial role in its successful implementation of counter-radicalization processes. One key informant was quoted:

The government does not engage us fully. In many cases partnership with the government is unbalanced and one-sided as civil society organizations are not regarded and treated as equal partners competent of addressing security issues of common concern. Political pressure by the government to provide “quick fix” solutions to security threats and issues contribute to the difficulties we face as civil society in providing valuable advice and assistance on key issues like counterradicalization programs (Interview with a female member of the civil society Mombasa, 27th September, 2015).

As indicated above, civil society institutions are catalysts for opinions and ideas which was vital for building strong and vibrant communities. By creating safe spaces for dissent and by providing a forum where experiences can be shared on a personal level, civil society institutions may contribute to healing community rifts and tensions. Civil society may engage in outreach activities and take proactive steps to address root-causes of terrorism. Activities that strengthen human rights and the rule of law in particular, promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law contribute to building strong democratic societies in which citizens are free to participate in the political process and exercise their rights.

The Government of Kenya took some steps to increase engagement with civil society on issues of countering violent extremism, including participation by government officials along with religious and civil society leaders in the First National Conference on Security and Countering Violent Extremism in 2015, at which a Violent Extremism Advocacy and Accountability Charter was developed and adopted. “Usalama Watch” and other heavy-handed security operations risked further alienating communities at risk of violent extremism. Some Kenyan civil

society organizations actively worked to address the drivers of radicalization and violent extremism in Kenya, often with assistance from the United States and other international partners, without significant government involvement. One respondent was quoted as follows:

Civil society can help to prevent radicalization by tackling the underlying economic, social and political drivers of radicalization. Governments play an important role in this regard in setting the policy framework, providing funding, and addressing structural issues. However, communities have not been well integrated to engage in issues of security and their voice in civil society; so there is need to play their part for the overall approach to matters of counterradicalization

From the foregoing, the need to develop programmes and frameworks to engage local communities in efforts to counter radicalisation processes is critical; and within security-based diplomacy in counterterrorism, cooperation between the state and society is needed to give local communities a leading role in countering ideological support for violent extremism. In view of the above, Horgan (2009) says that Government can sometimes struggle to conduct community-level intervention work at the local level, so there needs to be a partnership approach. Civil society has a role to play in terms of narratives and messages. It can challenge the narratives of radicalizers and extremists and put forward positive alternatives. These counter-messages are often more effective when they come from communities themselves, rather than governments. This often goes hand in hand with work to strengthen citizenship, integration and a sense of belonging, and also that which seeks to create safe spaces for dialogue and discussion of contentious issues, especially among young people, to provide opportunities to explore the concerns that radicalizers seek to exploit.

In addition, civil society can spot the signs of vulnerability and work up stream to protect individuals from radicalization, through improved parenting, neighbourhood support, and community resilience. Civil society response in this regard will often occur in the normal pattern of everyday life and interactions, rather than specific projects or interventions, but it requires communities to be equipped to play this role and have established intergenerational relationships.

Conventional literature reveals that civil society can play a role in the de-radicalization process. Some community organizations will play a leading role in the process themselves, because of their specialist expertise, sometimes provided by staff and volunteers who have been radicalized themselves. Other community organizations and members can also play a facilitative role, in providing practical help and emotional support to the individuals concerned and their families in the difficult days and months around the de-radicalization or disengagement process

One key informant noted the following:

No, I can boldly say civil society is not fully engaged in those programs. Here in Mogadishu the security situation threatens the possibilities for genuine partnerships between civil society and government, often dependent on different circumstances and political realities. The role of civil society in preventing terrorism and counterradicalization is very limited. Generally there is a lack of political pluralism, a lack of channels to convey messages and a lack of independent media. So you can see that it becomes difficult for civil society to play a positive and meaningful role in preventing terrorism when circumstances require them to put major resources into defending and protecting their own rights and existence (Interview with a female civil society group member in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

Indeed, the suggestions show that the views of civil society and states are not always in line with one another (for example, the question of including certain armed groups

in peace processes remains controversial in almost every civil war context, and human rights issues often create tension between NGOs and governments). At the interface between prevention and interdiction or pursuit, civil society has a role to play in the prevention of a planned attack by providing information or intelligence that could help the authorities.

### **5.7.5 Strategic Approach to Engaging NGOs in Counterradicalization**

From the findings, response from Kenya reveal 12% said satisfactory, 48% said fair while 40% said not satisfactory. Conversely, response from Somalia shows 10% said satisfactory, 60% said fair while 30% said not satisfactory.

As the findings indicate, 40% and 30% response from Kenya and Somalia respectively felt the strategic approach to engaging NGOs in counterradicalization is not satisfactory. In most cases, its effectiveness is hampered by the fact that many view some NGOs role with resentment and suspicion. It is seen as embodying their government's unequal approach to violence emanating from their communities compared to others. NGOs acknowledge an urgent need to develop a counter-radicalization policy to prevent young people from turning to violent groups, but government must do more than promote economic empowerment among marginalized communities; it must also foster a sense of belonging.

In many cases, these measures have built on existing initiatives and policies (e.g. community engagement, development, conflict prevention, etc.) and are delivered by agencies that have not had a significant role in counterterrorism in the past or are unlikely to add the "counterterrorism" label to their current work. For this reason,

some respondents view this engagement within the range of activities that serve the aims of counterradicalization is potentially limited.

It follows that terrorism prevention initiatives, whether they are specifically labeled as such or not, are now underway in a variety of places, including prisons and detention centers, youth and sporting clubs, schools and universities, and churches, mosques, and other houses of worship. This brings counterterrorism officials into contact with a range of actors that were perhaps beyond the scope of their immediate work until relatively recently. In a policy domain that has been circumscribed and highly specialized in the past, the potential breadth of terrorism prevention underscores their novelty.

In sum, terrorism prevention is a significant departure from the counterradicalization approaches of the pre-9/11 period. It mobilizes new implementing agencies from across government, engages a new range of nontraditional interlocutors outside of government, and extends counterterrorism to a series of policy domains (and physical spaces) that were not previously impacted by considerations of national security. There is much variation across states in their use of prevention measures and in their aims, budgets, and attempts to integrate prevention with other counterterrorism tools, but emerging policies and practices suggest that more states now view terrorism as requiring a whole-of government level response.

As the findings suggest, the increased focus on prevention has brought with it greater recognition of the view that counterterrorism itself is a form of communication to vulnerable populations and the broader public. Writing about

evaluating counterterrorism performance, de Graaf (2011) has argued that the processes by which the threat of and response to terrorism are communicated to the public and the messaging these processes imply their “performativity” are closely linked to the levels of violence and radicalization. As such, NGO role is critical in filling this gap. Consequently, NGO roles and public perceptions of government performance in addressing the threat and securing citizens can provide one measure of effectiveness of counterterrorism and terrorism prevention efforts. A final definitional point concerns the distinction between terrorism prevention and the related concepts of deradicalization and disengagement. These terms pertain to individuals that have already become radicalized.

#### **5.7.6 Strategic Approach to Engaging the Media in Counterradicalization**

From the results, Kenya response show 22% said satisfactory, 58% were of the opinion it was fair while 20% noted it was not satisfactory. On the other hand, response from Somalia indicates 7% said satisfactory, 58% mentioned fair while 38% said not satisfactory.

In the case of Kenya, the 7% response of satisfactory could be eluded to the emerging role of media in Kenya, as a platform that disseminates information about terrorism trends, most recently and markedly about the ‘War on Terror.’ The channels that the media operates through not only make the media an information sharer, but a developing key player that can shape and alter the actual lived realities of war on terror (Archetti, 2013). The use of the social media and its ability to give voice to the struggle of a range of actors not previously heard, as well as the ability of this form of soft power to counteract terrorism and reach out to a public that in

some circumstances can support and supply terrorism, is covered in a few interesting case studies. One key informant in Nairobi was quoted saying the following:

Media are being used for radicalization and promoting violent extremism in many regions of the world. Media can and needs to be part of the solution. I think professionals can use media to help communities understand all of their choices, and the consequences of those choices. Despite the propaganda, the government should consider such an approach (Interview with a key female informant member of the Media fraternity in Nairobi, 25th September, 2015).

In view of the above, Archetti (2013) argues that while “strategic communication” and “narratives” are advocated by many analysts as essential weapons in countering extremism, few seem to truly understand the reality of the digital-age information environment where such tools need to be deployed. Since 9/11 much has been said about the role of technologies like the Internet and global communication networks in sustaining transnational terrorism, the spread of its ideology, and its recruiting activities. Many claims have also been made about the role of the media, particularly new communication technologies, in fostering the process of radicalization the embracing of extremist views, which might manifest themselves in the form of terrorist violence.

There is a widespread realization that communication is crucial to terrorism, to the point that “strategic communication” has become a buzzword in official circles, think tanks and academia. The notion of “narrative,” in particular, has increasingly been drawn into the analysis of the roots of terrorism and is now advocated as an essential part of counter-radicalization responses. Another key informant in Mogadishu commented that:



Terrorism's recruitment network is a grave and growing problem that will not be fixed by military action or poorly executed governmental initiatives. We have to consider engaging the media and also social-media marketing efforts that can target the grassroots of terrorism and its expansions in nations everywhere, so that the message of counterterrorism can reach all (Interview with a female university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

From the foregoing, it's clear that the media plays an important role, and would be so in the case of Somalia where state stability is fragile and external powers are at play. The main shortcoming of strategic communication approaches to countering terrorism lies in assuming that the information space in the digital age is far simpler and more linear than it actually is. From reports on how to counter "online radicalization" to governments' calls for taking 'extremist material off the Internet', there is a strong focus on "messaging." Whether this means fighting the terrorists with the "right" counter-message or removing "their" extremist message, this approach reflects a woefully outdated model of public-media interactions (Corman, 2011).

The media and communication with the general public is becoming more important for terrorist organizations and networks. Terrorist actions ("breaking news") are important for media. But the extensive media attention for terrorist attacks is a way for terrorist to further broadcast their message (Interview with a key female informant member of the Media fraternity in Nairobi, 25th September, 2015).

The response above may shed light on why the war on terror has not been seen as positive by these groups. Surprising too is how different media forms seem constrained in this new context and unable to provide more openings to counter official discourses or even shows greater media reflection with the increased proximity from terrorism events (Schlesinger *et al.*, 2003) suggest is the case.

Media measures are a separate category. Media and terrorism hold each other in a strange balance: the media needs terrorism, and terrorism needs the media. An important part of the citizen's trust in a government's counter-terrorism policy will be construed by media exposure of this policy. Government and media need to make agreements about the use of confidential information in the public sphere. Certain information cannot be made public in light of the importance of counter-terrorism policy. However, increased competition in the media causes problems in making (and keeping) agreements between media outlets and the government. Indeed, this has been the case following terrorist attacks between Kenya and Somalia, where the media has been blamed in some instance for wrong reporting; which may be the reason for a 20% response from Kenya and 38% from Somalia who said not satisfactory. With regard to messages conveyed by terrorists themselves analyses and definitions of terrorism often emphasize that they rely on publicity to spread their message. Consequently, the media can increase their capacity for causing terror. Lia (2005) notes a causal relationship in that 'paradigmatic shifts in modern mass media appear to influence patterns of terrorism, by enhancing its agenda-setting function, increasing its lethality and expanding its transnational character.' has turned terrorists and their leaders into celebrities worthy of sympathy.


These findings point to what Corman (2011) asserts as the alarmed attitudes towards the "dangers" of internet and social media; emerging platforms whose effects some appear not to fully comprehend is thus not new when we look at the reactions by those who witnessed advances in communications in the past. It is frequently argued that multimedia material available online is more "radicalizing" than text.

Al-Qaeda’s move into using the Internet as their primary vehicle of propaganda has evolved the ways in which persons become potential recruits (Earnhardt, 2014). Individuals viewing al-Qaeda’s material on the Internet are interacting with the information in ways that could never have imagined at the creation of the organization. Not only are people able to view and listen to the propaganda, individuals from across the world are able to connect with each other and discuss topics relating to al-Qaeda while millions miles apart from one another. The decentralization of the organization has allowed for more covert operations to take place, making it difficult for authorities to track these underground militants.

### 5.8 Challenges of Developing Effective Counter-Terrorist Radicalization

#### Programs

The study sought to establish key challenges that may hinder the effort to implementing effective ways to counter transnational terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia. Data was analyzed and results presented in Figure 5.8 below.



**Figure 5.8 Challenges of developing effective counter-terrorist radicalization programs**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings show a number of challenges of developing effective counter-terrorist radicalization programs. Ineffective security/ inter agency coordination and planning 98(28%), Limited resources 147(42%), Lack of institutional framework 7(2%), corruption 189(54%), lack of support by top leadership 112(32%) and lack of community consultation and involvement 98(28%).

A clear challenge across all countries is to integrate counterradicalization work, and even relatively complex intervention work, into the ordinary day-to-day responsibilities of police officers and other groups. Yet, as the findings suggest, corruption (54%) still hampers the success of such initiatives. The implication could be the lack of institutional framework. As earlier observed, while well-conceived policy interventions by the state and by civil society can achieve positive results in bringing radicalised young people back from the brink of extremism and terrorism, lack of clear institutional framework results in policies and activities taken by governments that are based on wishful-thinking, lessons from the past that are no longer applicable in present circumstances, which open loopholes for corruption.

From the FGD, respondents expressed the great mistrust between the security agencies and the communities as one major challenge that hinder the effort to implementing effective ways to counter transnational terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia.

To help minimize these types of unintended consequences, it should be considered normal practice that, while counterterrorism organizations have a key role to play counter-radicalization, the responsibility for anti-radicalization programs should not be theirs alone. Social organizations, schools, and the police must together take the lead in anti-radicalization programs, acting in an overt and transparent way.

However, experience with *Prevent* activities in the United Kingdom also shows that in order for these community leaders and authority figures to be able to make informed decisions, there must be a flow of relevant information and intelligence from police and security agencies. This effective sharing of information is in itself a difficult process to manage. Recent years have shown an increasing use of the Internet by violent extremists as a means of spreading propaganda, raising funds, recruiting new members, and communicating with their activists. As one respondent put it as follows:

Violent extremists have also used the Internet as a virtual training camp by establishing various forms of online, private, person-to-person or group communication to exchange experience and knowledge. Yet, the challenge for the government is that there is no monitoring done to easily track the culprits (Interview with a female civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

As indicated above, the internet is a key tool that enhances fast communication and flow of information, into a means to achieve radical groups goals and attract recruits. Yet, implementing effective internet policies seems a challenge. Generating and sharing information among all officials involved in counterradicalisation and between them and the public without assisting violent extremists is probably the most effective yet difficult aspect of counter radicalization. Responses from FGD conducted in Mombasa and Mogadishu suggest that they differ widely in how they gather and disseminate information; and there is no unified and well articulated view on how best to approach this task. In addition, another challenge is limited training. Respondents expressed reservations that while training is considered necessary to improve the cultural competence of counterradicalisation agencies, this has not been effectively implemented between Kenya and Somalia; which in essence should involve sensitizing neighbourhoods and training security agencies on the same.

The development of prevention policies has given rise to a number of programmatic challenges for policymakers and practitioners. These include, for example, identifying community-level partners and framing interventions in such a way as to avoid the stigmatization of target audiences, which may include minority and faith-based groups. Similarly, policymakers have had to consider whether and how counter-radicalization policies address sensitive topics, such as religion, faith, and familial or civic duties. Target audiences are likely to be wary of the assertion of state authority in religious and family matters, particularly in states and societies where this is not the norm.


More broadly, those elaborating counterradicalization policies must understand the evolving nature of radicalization and the factors that lead to extremism. In turn, they must define the aims of the intervention, i.e., whether to target both cognitive and behavioral radicalization. Some of these general programmatic challenges overlap with the specific challenges that arise in evaluating terrorism prevention policies. The latter has become an emerging concern for states in recent years.

Romaniuk and Chowdhury (2012) suggest that evaluation can yield information about the costs, efficiency, and impact of such measures and is crucial in determining whether initiatives are proportionate to the threat and sustainable in the current financial and political climate. Put simply, having begun to invest in prevention programming, it is important for policymakers to ask whether these measures work and how experience can inform future practice. Yet, despite the many challenges and potential pitfalls, the benefits that appropriate, well designed and implemented programs generate warrant their inclusion within any

comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, albeit an inclusion that should be carefully considered, professionally managed, and robustly overseen.

### 5.9 Suggestions for Strategies to Deal with Terrorist Radicalization

The study further sought views from respondents on ways that could be employed to deal with youth terrorist radicalization in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. A number of strategies were recommended; and analysis of the same was done and results presented in Figure 5.9 as shown below.



**Figure 5.9 Possible ways to deal with terrorist radicalization**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings show a number of suggestions to deal with terrorist radicalization, including effective criminal justice 30(8.6%), school-based programs 74(21%), job opportunities 203(58%), tackling discrimination 31(9%), rehabilitation programs 7(2%), social cohesion 116(33%). In addition, respondents said improving socio-economic tools 140(40%), the need to promote inter-ethnic/religious relations 147(42%) and community-based initiatives 161(46%).

Given the fact that local circumstances frequently contribute to radicalisation, solutions have to be found in the first instance on the local community level. Conventional literature indicates that there are many external, social factors that can push an individual towards radicalisation and there are also many internal factors that can pull him toward a terrorist group. However, just as there are many push and pull factors on the path of radicalisation, various strategies can be employed to counter radicalization.

Each country possesses peculiarities that could potentially make the implementation of certain counter-radicalization aspects or measures particularly successful or, conversely, significantly challenging if not outright impossible. No counter-radicalization initiative, let alone comprehensive strategy, can be imported to another country (or, for that matter, another city) if it is not adapted to the local reality.

Notwithstanding these fundamental caveats, it is possible to identify common trends, as the findings suggest, between Kenya and Somalia. There are indeed some evolving lines of thinking that, to some degree, can be observed among counter-radicalization practitioners and policymakers in both Kenya and Somalia.

The young generation lacks proper leadership and guidance. The rise in the number of young men and women who now prefer to join radicalized groups is quite alarming. This comes at a time when most of the Islamic radical groups are either comprised of teenagers or young men and women who are devoted to kill and spread propaganda. The relevant ministries and organizations should introduce anti-radicalization programs in learning institutions in a bid to counter young Kenyans who are being recruited through radicalization groups (Interview with a male government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).



The implication for such views is that plans to defeat or neutralize an ideology require different strategies, aims, and tactics than are used in a traditional war. He asserts that prevention is as important as eradication; and long-term strategic planning to counter radicalization must account for, if not emphasize, terrorist radicalization and recruitment. In the context of security-based diplomacy as a strategy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia, a clearer understanding must therefore emerge of militant jihadism's appeal to young people and the tactics radicals use to mobilize them to take violent action.

From the findings, the need to promote inter-ethnic/religious relations (42%) was reiterated during interviews with respondents. One respondent was quoted saying the following:

We need to establish a more humane social order. To mobilize Kenyans and Somalis who are divided along ethnic, cultural, economic and religious diversities in the task of national development. In addition, our leaders must address the problem of educational imbalance between the haves and have-nots; this will help reduce the different rates of development between the two countries and between regions in Kenya that have been marginalized (Interview with a female civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

At a broader perspective, the suggestion above calls for government to ensure that the economy of the country is nationally integrated. Besides, emphasis from now must be on actual production, not mainly on the distribution of national wealth. State of origin, religious sentiments and ethnicity must be de-emphasized in all issues of national interest. This momentous effort must begin with conceptual clarity and a good faith attempt to gather facts and to analyze them with the goal of understanding the problem before leaping into large-scale and potentially deleterious solutions. This will require better thinking and better research. Similar sentiments were echoed

during FGD, with respondents suggesting that a concerted effort to bring about cross-cultural awareness among the citizenry be advocated.

There is need for dialogue among different ethno-religious groups in the country. We posit that ethnic and religious groups in the country should not only talk about the need for dialogue among themselves, they should also act by organising a forum for dialogue. Dialogue will help to create ethnic accommodation, religious tolerance, understanding and peaceful co-existence among the different groups in the country. The government should implement a stringent law against official discrimination and intolerance (Interview with a male university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

From the foregoing it is evident that government reforms is challenging, addressing the politically rooted drivers of radicalization may actually be more straightforward than tackling radicalization's individually based and socioeconomic causes. Enhancing the role of youth in political decision-making is an important step in addressing the political drivers of radicalization. Kenya and Somalia both experience some cultural inertia when attempting to include young people in government, but that challenging traditional views about youth serving in positions of authority is necessary to address pressing challenges facing the both countries.

Results also show school-based programs (21%) as a solution to counter radicalization. Given the preeminent role of schools and other educational establishments in the development of a resilient community that upholds values of nonviolence, peaceful coexistence and tolerance, education also features strongly in the counter-radicalization programmes developed by States. In the United Kingdom, for example, authorities work closely with providers of education at all levels to make schools and universities, better equipped to resist the influence and ideology of violent extremism. This has resulted in the teaching in schools of subjects that

promote intercultural understanding and citizenship. It has also been reflected in other actions, such as the recently introduced “Children’s Plan”, through which state officials engage directly with head-teachers in order to ensure their access to all forms of support needed, as well as ensuring support for young, vulnerable people who may be exposed to violent extremist influences. In Austria, compulsory school curricula and religious education classes teach anti bias and tolerance as part of civic education. In the Netherlands, education is viewed as a prerequisite not only to counter violent extremism, but also to facilitate the integration of minorities (Meines, 2007).

From the interview conducted, one respondent noted:

Governments should promote interagency cooperation when approaching youth radicalization issues. Public institutions must also be willing to reach out to and work with civil society groups. The government needs to take the first step in promoting cross-sectoral collaboration by convening dialogues between public institutions and NGOs, religious groups, businesses, community associations, recreational clubs, sports teams, and other civil society groups (Interview with a female university lecturer in Nairobi, 20th September, 2015).

The interest in exchanging information and good practices suggested the need for greater training, and an investment in providing capacities and guidance for evaluating counterterrorism and counter-radicalization efforts was highlighted by a number of respondents. These would eliminate the need to develop new methods each time an evaluation was needed and contribute to some uniformity across evaluation practices, thereby facilitating comparative analysis, and, when including local partners, can contribute to capacity-building and institutional strengthening efforts. According to FGD:

There is need for a series of workshops could help deepen and broaden discussions among governments, experts, and members of relevant international organizations, such as religious institutions, youth groups and the general public, to share lessons learned, and good practices regarding terrorism and radicalization (FGD female respondent in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Socio-economic tools (40.2%) and employment opportunities (58.1%) were cited as key suggestions as well. Radicalisation is a multifaceted and complex challenge. The need to make strategic investments in youth-oriented services, foremost among them education, can provide young people with the skills needed to enter an increasingly modern and globally connected marketplace. In a similar vein, vocational training is important to providing the youth with employable skills, and it should be extended equally to young men and women.

Indeed, the degree to which inequality and deprivation can explain violent extremism and terrorism continues to be debated in academia. However, there seemed to be an implicit recognition among respondents during FGD that economic and social inequalities (real or perceived) fuel discontent and encourage grievances that create conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism. Terrorism is a global challenge. In an age in which individuals, money and ideas can move internationally with increasing ease, environments in which conditions may be conducive to the emergence or spread of radicalization and violent extremism are of potential concern to other States, regardless of distance. In fact, response from ne interview revealed that the threat of violent extremism coming primarily from “global” violent extremists moving between countries and regions, rather than from homegrown terrorists, which poses a challenge to the state and security agencies. According to FGD:

There is need to integrate youth perspectives into government by hiring young civil servants and creating recurring youth forums to listen to young people's concerns (FGD female religious group member in Nairobi, 22th September, 2015).

From the foregoing it is evident that the prevailing socioeconomic and political situations within a society; whether it is predominantly stable and subject to the rule of law or whether it is suffering from widespread or intense civil conflict or insurgency; can also have an impact on which counter-radicalization measures. Arguably, the more a country deviates from a predominantly peaceful state and into violent civil conflict, insurgency, or terrorism, the less effective anti-radicalization and counter radicalization programs are likely to be.

In addition, effective criminal justice (8.6%) and rehabilitation programs (2.7%) can offer a good ground to which local issues can be well solved. Undoubtedly, all programs and initiatives are created with the intention of achieving positive outcomes. However, even when the desired outcomes are achieved, the programs may also have unforeseen and undesired consequences. The case of Kenya's overarching counterterrorism strategy, and counter-radicalization, have been met by criticism owing to the strategy employed, which have raised issues of human rights violations and discrimination.

Community-based initiative (46%) was cited a strategy to deal with terrorist radicalisation. Indeed, the State alone does not have all the resources necessary to counter-radicalisation and deal with violent extremism. As earlier observed, involving civil society and local communities can bring to bear a range of tools and resources not available to governments. Working with communities and civil society

enhances trust and transparency and strengthens social cohesion. Civil society organizations can reach segments of society that governments may have difficulty to engage. They can help counter extremist ideologies and promote peaceful dialogue. Investing in contacts with local communities not only facilitates and accelerates the process of information gathering, but can also act as an early observation or recognition system of any violent extremist tendencies, hence permitting an early and effective counterstrategy. Sedgwick (2010) adds that without taking these into full consideration, any attempt to evaluate the performance of a specific program will be incomplete. As such, counterradicalization programs can differ from each other not only in the aims, objectives and the methods they employ but also in the wider societal context under which they operate. This context includes the local conditions prevailing in the country where they are located, the type of behavior being targeted, and the degree of control that those responsible for delivering the program are able to exert over the targeted individuals.

### **5.10 Summary**

The purpose of this Chapter was to establish the effect of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. In presenting the findings of the study, various key streams of observations are evident. Firstly, socio-political alienation and failure of integration is a major cause of terrorist radicalization in both Kenya and Somalia. Religiosity and globalization, unemployment and social exclusion, discrimination within ethnic and or religious lines were also listed among the factors. Internet was cited as a common strategy being used for recruiting members into terrorist radicalization; although financing and affiliation of terror networks were also highlighted. In addition, unemployment and religious issues among the youths between Kenya and

Somalia have created a considerable reservoir of discontent and scored high as a reason why the youth are prone to radicalization. Fear of victimization, unemployment, revenge from a combination of push factors account for extremist's network between Kenya and Somalia.

Secondly, although empirical studies indicate that radicalisation is fundamentally an individual process, the study findings suggest that the unequal or inconsistent application of the rule of law is a major driver of youth frustration. The reputation to defend religion and mental manipulation (to fight enemy of Islam) were majorly viewed as the pull factors influencing terrorist radicalization. Religion plays a powerful and central role in human security, particularly in helping individuals to achieve a positive and distinct identity because it is essential to human needs. The varying response above brings into question how these levels and types of causes and catalysts relate to each other and how they, when combined, result in terrorist radicalization. The threat of terrorism in Kenya and KDF intervention is considered one of the drivers of radicalisation, especially among the youth. The results indicate majority believe there are no well defined counter-radicalization programs between Kenya and Somalia.

Thirdly, although progress in enhancing good governance and democratic institutions as a counter-radicalization initiative was seen as work in progress, promoting co-existence across ethnic/religious groups has not been effective and conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms scored low. On the other hand, there have been efforts by Kenya and Somalia governments to adopt a strategic approach to engaging with specific groups to enhance collaboration as a strategy to

counter terrorist radicalization. However, although progress is seen in engaging the youth, community policing and the media, the role of civil society involvement is below average. Lastly, challenges of developing effective counter-terrorist radicalization programs include ineffective security/ inter agency coordination and planning, limited resources, lack of institutional framework, corruption, lack of support by top leadership and lack of community consultation and involvement. Mistrust between the security agencies and the communities impacts the extent of generating and sharing information among all officials involved in counterradicalisation and between them and the public. The findings of this study have implications.

Given the transnational threat of terrorism and terrorist radicalization is a growing threat, a more robust understanding of the effectiveness of particular tools, such as intelligence sharing is essential in delivering a counterradicalization policy that is balanced and effective. The next chapter deals with the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.




**CHAPTER SIX**  
**ASSESSING THE STRUCTURAL CAPACITY OF INTELLIGENCE**  
**SHARING IN THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM**  
**BETWEEN KENYA AND SOMALIA**

This chapter provides the findings and discussion on the third objective of the study which sought to assess the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The chapter contains sub-sections derived from its title. It ends with a summary.

**6.1 Contribution of Intelligence Sharing in Counter-Terrorism**

The threat of transnational terrorism has significantly altered international intelligence sharing. The study sought respondents' views on the extent to which intelligence-sharing has contributed to countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Analyzed data on this question are presented in Figure 6.1.



**Figure 6.1: Contribution of intelligence sharing in counter-terrorism**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings (Kenya response) show 110(40%) cited great extent, 100(36%) said moderate extent while 66(24%) said less extent. On the other hand, (Somalia response) findings indicate 34(46%) said great extent, 10(14%) noted moderate extent while 29(40%) said less extent.

As the findings show, 40% reported great extent in Kenya and 46% said great extent, 14% noted moderate in Somalia. Taken together, intelligence sharing between the security agencies and governments is key, and seems to be taking root, especially after the terrorist attacks in Garissa, Mandera and Lamu (Kenya) and Mogadishu (Somalia). The invasion of Somalia by KDF may also be factor that has facilitated and significantly altered international intelligence sharing. The results of this study seem fairly grim, although one respondent said the following:

Yes there is international intelligence sharing, it was only recently established that USA warned Kenya and Somalia but it was not taken seriously. Kenya provides a basis for strategic operations. Intelligence sharing has made the government alert, hence organizes the security agencies to counter terrorism attacks. It creates preparedness for security and even citizens. Intelligence sharing has been keen in addressing their challenge; however there is need for increased cooperation between all the agencies involved including the police judiciary. I think there is progress in intelligence but acting on them timely among them is a challenge (Interview with male state official in Nairobi, 24th September, 2015).

What the comments above suggest is that intelligence-led law enforcement introduces some important terms and understandings, which are crucial for law enforcement agencies to keep up with the changes in the security environment. As evidenced, law enforcement agencies need to be effective consumers of intelligence products, meaning they must be able to put received information to maximum use in

the minimum amount of time. Furthermore, they need to develop a culture of collection, where personnel of all levels engage in gathering relevant information from all sources available, including many non-traditional. However, this seems to be work in progress (Flynn, 2002)

As the findings reveal, 36% said moderate extent, 24% said less extent (Kenya) while 40% said less extent (Somalia). The reason here could be that a solid majority of Kenyans and Somalia believe that the terrorists will always find a way to launch major attacks regardless of what the government does; citing weaknesses in intelligence sharing. Despite the progress, the findings reveal the level of cooperation seems to vary greatly. Too often, the various security agencies involved in security have been blamed for a lack of cooperation. Indeed, after the terrorist attack at Westgate in Nairobi, the public and opinion leaders expressed deep doubts about Kenya's decision to go to war in Somalia, and most of them believe the war has destabilized the struggle against terrorism. But majorly, what came out was a weakness of intelligence sharing that could have prevented the attacks. The FGD indicate that:

If they could have provided intelligence reports and assessments to the intelligence community to other agencies, the Westgate attack could have been avoided. I think there is mistrust; the police want to do their thing; the military the same, and this gap is what is making the innocent suffer in the hands of Al-Shabaab (FGD with religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

Indeed, the response above shed light on how widely circulated information and declassified intelligence to the state and local law enforcement community can offer a prevent strategy to terrorism. Effective decision-making in counter-terrorism lies in having access to the right information at the right time. A simple increase of

information flow is not the goal of counter-terrorism policy: the fundamental goal is to use that information to improve the actions that are being taken.

On the same note, de Vries (2005) says that intelligence is so central to counter-terrorism policy because good and timely intelligence gives governments the capacity to prevent terrorist attacks from taking place. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, revealed severe deficiencies in the FBI's intelligence analysis and information-sharing capabilities and processes. Kenya and Somalia face a number of impediments in their efforts to transform into a law enforcement agency with a robust intelligence capability to help prevent future terrorist attacks. An inherent part of this reinvention is the ability to securely share intelligence and other information as observed by one interviewee:

Some progress is there yes, the historical lack of trust is still an issue. For example, many police chiefs complain of calls they get from their friends in other departments alerting them to a potential threat, but when they ask for the detailed information needed to launch an investigation, they are told: "We can't tell you" or "You don't need to know" (Interview with female government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

Indeed, as the findings above suggest some organizational challenges that limit on improving information-sharing processes. It could be that states have not yet established policies and procedures that delineate the appropriate processes to be used to share information and intelligence, either internally or externally.

Similar to findings by Flynn (2002), separate information held by the state agencies responsible for prevention of terror attacks such as immigration and security institution affects counter-terrorism abilities. Many of the attacks in Kenya could have been potentially prevented if the separate information available was shared

between cooperating agencies. Such information is fundamental in monitoring, tracking and intercepting criminals including terrorist's trends and mitigation measures taken. Streamlining the process to allow shared information and equal access to important details is crucial in gaining a clearer understanding of the threats a state faces for effective planning and response strategies (Flynn, 2002). Without access and sharing of such vital information among key and cooperating agencies/departments, the country is bound to waste time and money, miss potential key clues on escalating terrorist risks more than in the past.

What the findings bring to light is that without formal policies on information sharing, security agencies and staff lack criteria and guidance by which to ensure that appropriate information is disseminated to the appropriate parties. The implication for this is that a framework for improving key aspects of its intelligence program, including information sharing, should at least develop policies and procedures required to implement the plan. A consequence in this scenario of restricted information sharing from the local police level was also highlighted by one key informant:


Intelligence sharing has not been effective hence little if anything has been achieved. Somalia is led by clan government so that to trust. Poor lack of trust and interests clans and politics involved in government administration. Intelligence sharing appears to be poor hence creating the loop holes which are being used by terrorist in launching attacks in the two countries (Interview with a male member of National Intelligence Agency-Somalia officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

One identifiable factor in the above comment is that a state's likelihood of experiencing terrorist attacks involves a state's own prevention tactics or lack thereof which hangs on the level and reliability of available and shared intelligence.

Within this context of security-based diplomacy in managing transnational terrorism, it follows that states like Kenya are bound to employ the neorealist approach, which argues that the organizing principle of the international system is anarchy, and that the unit of importance to that system is the state. The neorealist approach offers a window for co-operation if the national interests of the participating members are considered, especially if they are 'weak' states (Booth, 2004). In essence, the challenge of Somalia instability shows how bureaucratic a state's information-gathering system affects the likelihood of materialized terror attacks. Flynn (2002) argues that if a state is highly bureaucratic and has many levels of information existing separately within various organizations; it becomes increasingly difficult to ensure that each entity is operating in a capacity that would allow it to effectively curb terrorism. The findings call for the law enforcement agencies to provide better information to the public, in order to prevent crime. The public provides better information to the law enforcement agencies, which are then more capable to put this information to effective use.

## **6.2 Possible Deficiencies in Intelligence Sharing**

In this research question, the researcher sought respondents' views in the attacks at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Lamu and Mandera and whether these incidences demonstrate clear deficiencies within the structural capacity and organization of Kenya-Somalia counter-terrorism intelligence community. Analyzed data was presented as shown in Figure 6.2 below.



N=277 (Kenya)  
N=73 (Somalia)

**Figure 6.2 Possible deficiencies in intelligence sharing**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings (Kenya response) show 205(74%) cited great extent, 33(12%) said moderate extent, 17(6%) said less extent while 22(8%) felt there was no association at all. On the other hand, response from Somalia indicate 28(38%) cited great extent, 18(24%) said moderate extent, 23(32%) said less extent while 4(6%) felt there was no association at all.

A solid majority of respondents (74% cited great extent) (Kenya) believe that terrorist incidences demonstrate clear deficiencies within the structural capacity and organization of Kenya-Somalia counter-terrorism intelligence community. These could be attributed to the trends on the attacks which were blamed to lapses that security agencies were indeed not in tune as far as sharing information was concerned. Similarly, responses from Kenya and Somalia show 26% and 32% said less extent which could be argued on the basis that intelligence sharing is done but lapses are seemingly evident within the security agencies themselves.

The sentiments shown in the findings can be tied to evaluating America's current situation in response to the global war on terror by the nation's intelligence agencies' National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report in 2007. Conventional literature indicates that the failure of the U.S. Intelligence Community to provide better warning of the September 11, 2001, attacks has been widely attributed to the existence of "walls" between intelligence and law enforcement agencies (Best, 2007). The walls arguably kept analysts from talking to each other and from sharing pieces of information that, if they had been viewed in close relationship, might have yielded a coherent picture of the emerging plot.

Best (2007:6) states that: 'within the Intelligence Community, agencies did not adequately share relevant counterterrorism information, prior to September 11.' This breakdown in communications was the result of a number of factors, including differences in the agencies' missions, legal authorities and cultures. Information was not sufficiently shared, not only between different Intelligence Community agencies, but also within individual agencies, and between the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. One key informant stated the following:

Intelligence may be available but corruption is the key factor. With all the manpower, facilities and intelligence, the state has failed even to capture to culprit mainly due to disorganization to face cries e.g. there was confrontation between police and KDF which the terrorist took advantage of (Interview with a male member of National Intelligence Agency-Somalia officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).



The results of this study seem fairly grim and could have had different outcomes if the intelligence sharing mechanisms were planned for and met in advance. Another respondent was quoted as follows:

It is defiance after receiving the intelligence information one should plan of action on how to secure the situation effectively. This is an indication of the weakness in the organization as a whole but of elements with the security sector that may be vulnerable to being exploited by terrorists (Interview with a female university lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Indeed, in view of the above, the attacks in Kenya demonstrated that there were some clear deficiencies with the organization of the counter-terrorism intelligence community. In the aftermath of the attacks, there have been moves to develop a more robust counter-terrorism network in Kenya and the region at large. The results may shed light on why the war on terror and the shift to the security-based diplomacy approach and its effectiveness on transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia. Rational choice theory can be used to explain the behavior of intelligence officers when exchanging intelligence. They act in self-interest when they decide about whether or not to share intelligence and with whom. These interests could be varied and go both in favor or against intelligence sharing (Davis, 2007). In light of the findings, it is clear that intelligence has changed alongside terrorism. Some developments can be distinguished that today are forcing national intelligence and security services to change their *modi operandus*.

Another important development from these findings lies in the distinction between collection and analysis. Often, national intelligence reform stipulates the augmentation of collection capabilities for national intelligence services. However, that the problem with the developments in intelligence lies not in collection capabilities, but in analysis capabilities.

The exploding amount of information needs to be selected and processed to form high quality intelligence products. For the EU intelligence function, better selection and analysis has priority over the acquisition of collection capabilities. As put forward by one respondent:

Intelligence may be shared, but the people responsible to act on that information somehow are ignorant: we heard that before the Westgate attack, police issued information before: now why can't the police take responsibility. Terrorist threats in today's world move at a fast pace due to technology and communication advancements. Because of this, the police cannot sit on information and win. Quick response is needed (Interview with female state officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

What the above findings reveal is that more sources, more information and more intelligence are not always the solution: more often, better analysis and selection of available sources is needed more urgently than more information. Furthermore, intelligence needs to increase its focus on sharing to achieve better results from cooperation. The possibility to share a piece of intelligence will greatly increase its value in today's intelligence world. Intelligence is a key factor in countering terrorism as it can provide the means to anticipate, pre-empt, and respond to this threat. Generating actionable intelligence for effective, efficient, and timely responses is a cycle which involves several processes, including collection and analysis of raw information. However, the cycle is incomplete if intelligence is not properly shared. From this perspective, it can be argued that the failure of the intelligence community to respond to terrorist attacks can be attributed to failures in any of these three processes; collection, analysis, or sharing (Thoma et al., 2007).

Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response.

While the intelligence community is not entirely without its legacy “stovepipes,” the challenge more than a decade after 9/11 is largely one of information overload, not information sharing. Analysts now face the task of connecting disparate, minute data points buried within large volumes of intelligence traffic shared between different intelligence agencies. A conducive environment is therefore of paramount importance in creating an intelligence sharing network.

### 6.3 Training of Intelligence Community on Intelligence Sharing

The study further sought to establish the nature of training and capacity building of administrators on intelligence sharing as a strategy to better manage the threat of transnational terrorism. Analysis results are given in Table 6.1.

**Table 6.1 Training and capacity building of administrators on intelligence sharing**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Great extent	78(28%)	7(10%)
Moderate extent	83(30%)	29(40%)
Less extent	116(42%)	37(50%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 6.1, Kenya responses show 28% mentioned great extent, 30% said moderate extent while 42% cited less extent. On the other hand, Somalia response show 10% said great extent, 40% moderate while 50% cited less extent. From the findings (28% and 10%) response from Kenya and Somalia respectively said great extent, which could be attributed to the recent efforts to combat terrorism in the

region; with AMISOM role in Somalia, there have been efforts towards training and capacity building of administrators on intelligence sharing as a strategy to better manage the threat of transnational terrorism.

Although efforts are being made, , as some view (42% response from Kenya and 50% response from Somalia) cited less extent for Kenya and Somalia respectively) indicate that systemic challenges to governance and crises of political legitimacy and authority in Somalia highlight the interlocking and transnational challenges to regional and global security. Lack of resources and training could be a contributing factor for such a response.

When the government of Somalia collapsed in 1991, it created a lawless society where crime and radical ideologies flourished. Lacking state capacity since that time has allowed unrestricted movement of people and goods into and out of Somalia. While many of these people were refugees seeking a better life in Kenya, the number of terrorists should not be underestimated. With a porous border and a confirmed presence of Islamic fundamentalists, Somalia poses a threat to Kenya and the rest of the world. In a joint press conference with Kenya and the United States in 2003, President Bush declared that “stabilizing Somalia is essential in sustaining the war against terrorism” (Mogire & Agade, 2011). It is clear that crime prevention techniques such as watch programmes, provision of hotlines and patrols have been intensified to some extent. With Kenya as a potential target to terror attacks, counterterrorism has to be woven into the everyday workings of every police department. Hence training and capacity building on intelligence sharing should be included on the agenda of every meeting, and this new role must be imparted to

officers on the street so that terrorism prevention becomes part of their everyday thinking.

Police have an important role in preventing terrorism. They are in a good position to learn about and investigate local terrorist threats, and they can work to ensure that vulnerable targets in their jurisdictions are protected. Filling the first of these functions, investigation of terrorists, will require police to extend their normal community policing activities and improve their handling of information. Filling the second function, protecting vulnerable targets, will require greater adjustments through capacity building and continued intelligence sharing. They will need to become more expert in crime prevention and security matters, and they will have to develop partnerships with businesses and a wide range of public and private agencies. However, these changes are consistent with current best practices in policing.

Moreover, Ulrichsen (2008) points out that the multiple causes of human insecurity in each region act as threat multipliers that feed off each other at the domestic level and have significant spillover effects that add to destabilizing flows within neighboring polities. Although originating domestically in response to local factors, Somali-based networks of militants have demonstrated a capability to organize and undertake attacks beyond their boundaries. It holds important implications for the stability of both Kenya and Somalia and the reason as to why training and capacity building of administrators on intelligence sharing is key. One respondent was categorical and said this:

The training is sub-standard and should be rewarded and rationalize to meet the contemporary security threats and challenges. Administrators are not accessible to training and capacity building on intelligence since it is so confidential to forces only. There are no visible structures for this activity (Interview with male government official in Nairobi, 21th September, 2015).

In view of the above, that policies don't prioritize holistic approaches to conflict-affected regions that address the totality of governance and development issues, rather than focusing merely on countering the symptoms of malaise caused by acts of terrorism or militant attacks. Another key informant noted the following:

Training is fairly done-given that the city has previously been affected. But the security agency has not embraced sharing of intelligence information (Interview with female state security official in Nairobi, 24th September, 2015).

Similar sentiments are given by Wagner (2007) who says that although the concept of capacity-building has gained some funding and momentum, information sharing across agencies has not coalesced as planned. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been instrumental in not only setting up the Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) in 2011, but continues to provide core institutional funding, diplomatic access, and training in Mogadishu (Mohamoud, 2015). However, challenges atill face such efforts as opined by one key informant:

Part of the problem, I believe, lies in historical cultural differences between the intelligence community and law enforcement. There is often a mistrust of state, local, tribal entities is a concern (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

What this means that another roadblock to training in intelligence sharing is a lack of trust between the government and the other public-private sector. This is an important component because as when information is transferred across the

public/private spectrum, people are scared of compromising sensitive knowledge.

One key informant was of the following opinion:

The trust factor is huge. Even with training, there is fear of engagement based on trust to share information, even across the different departments of police; so even for the public, this is hard. Also the political issues make it difficult (Interview with female civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

Clearly, trust is important in enhancing technical capacity-building, especially for Kenya-Somalia. Cline (2011) argues that differences in agencies' levels of sophistication, especially in technical matters, can act as a barrier to effective coordination. In a number of countries, information sharing cannot be effected because of basic problems like incompatible computer operating systems or absence of common databases, issues that sometimes occur when agencies do not yet see technology as an important asset. Technical incompatibilities can be explained by the lack of common procedures for the acquisition of equipment, lack of resources, or simply some organizations' resistance to change (Cline, 2011).

In 2013, Kenya participated in a range of U.S. government-sponsored programs. The U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program focused on building law enforcement capacities in the areas of border security, investigations, and crisis response, and on the institutionalization of counterterrorism prevention and response capabilities. The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement assistance was largely dedicated to building the capacity of Kenya's new Independent Police Accountability Office. DHS Customs and Border Patrol assistance provided multinational training including Kenya for rural border patrol units such as those in the Kenya Police Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service (Gettleman, 2015).

Despite the challenges, Kenyan police, intelligence, and military agencies regularly detected and disrupted terrorist threats large and small. While the Westgate attack showed glaring gaps in Kenyan command and control and the unsuitability of conventional military forces to respond to a civilian incident such as Westgate, the initial response by the Crisis Response Team of the elite General Service Unit Recce Company was more competent. Kenya's primary contribution to supporting counterterrorism capacity building in other nations was its significant troop contribution to AMISOM. In addition, Kenya hosted numerous trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighboring nations to build counterterrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation.

For the case of Somalia, the ability of federal, local, and regional authorities to prevent and pre-empt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remain limited (Gettleman, 2015).

According to one key informant:

So far little has been done since the gravity of the matter is not well measured. Knowledge is lacking among administrators and our security agencies. Training on how to strengthen their skills, competencies and ability on how to manage transnational terrorism is key but often hampered by internal factors such as clanism and political instability (Interview with senior male government officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

What comes out clear from this is that Somali law enforcement's basic capacity needs improvement, including basic investigation skills, cordon and search operations, and coordination with the judicial branch. Somalia also lacks capacity, transparency, and institutions to operate an effective judicial and law enforcement system, which, in turn, hinders the federal government's ability to develop and enforce the rule of law, prosecute criminals, and serve justice to the Somali population. In 2013, with assistance from the U.S. Department of State's




Antiterrorism Assistance program, Somali Federal Police received a modest amount of training on crisis response, border security, and leadership and management capacity building. Following the Al-Shabaab terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenya, from September 21 to 24, Somalia expressed greater interest in increasing intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations with its Horn of Africa neighbors against Al-Shabaab (Gettleman, 2013).

#### **6.4 Structural Capacity of Intelligence Sharing Strategies**

The study sought to establish the structural capacity of intelligence agencies with regards to various strategies adopted to effectively manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Various aspects were considered and the analysis of the same are discussed as follows:

##### **6.4.1 Effective Use of Surveillance as a Vital Component of Intelligence**

Surveillance is a vital component of intelligence operations geared to securing sensitive facilities or combating terrorism or insurgency. The study sought to establish the extent to which security agencies had developed effective special investigation techniques, surveillance and use of information technology -in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Analysis was done and results displayed in Figure 6.3.



**Figure 6.3 Effective use of surveillance as a vital component of intelligence**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From the findings in Figure 6.3, response from Kenyan respondents show 24% noted agree, 34% remained neutral while 42% disagreed. From Somalia response, 4% agreed, 10% said neutral while 86% disagreed. The findings strongly indicate a solid majority of respondents in Somalia feel security agencies have not developed effective special investigation techniques, surveillance and use of information technology in the management of transnational terrorism.

For Somalia, the invasion of Somalia by the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) re-amplified an already tenuous relationship between Muslims in the Horn of Africa and the Kenyan government. This offensive into southern Somalia, known as *Operation Linda Nchi* (Swahili for “Protect the Country”), has been used as the basis for nearly all of the transnational violence directed at Kenya since the offensive began in October 2011. Another part of the explanation is that the situation is new and evolving. Local police have little experience at counterterrorism or domestic/homeland security intelligence. The notion of transnational terrorism is

complicated and it could be that structural challenges in the information sharing environment still exist.

With regard to Kenya, the findings show 24% noted agree. Indeed, Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) intervention strategy has implemented several information sharing initiatives and others are underway; and thus surveillance seems to be on rather high alert. However, collectively, while such initiatives can provide an integrated system to quickly deliver information to the law enforcement and intelligence Community partners, that collecting and sharing vast amounts of information without any thought being given to the usefulness of the information collected is counterproductive and wastes precious collection resources. It is in this view that one respondent stated the following:

There is availability of information but corruption is the weakest link. Pictures of known terrorists would not have been obtained without involvement of information. I agree many attacks have been foiled by Kenya intelligence. Security agencies intelligence and investigation techniques are still traditional and a lot has to be done. If these factors exist then terror could be a myth. Information techniques are corrupted e.g. Westgate (Interview with male government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

As noted above, surveillance may be working but overly not effective in terms of managing the threat of terrorism. Surveillance is a vital component of intelligence operations geared to securing sensitive facilities or combating terrorism or insurgency. It is primarily intended to protect and secure the individual, his property or commercial entity and the nation-state. Surveillance can be defined as intended “to detect, identify, track and intercept hostile action.” In the modern day, especially with the ever-present danger transnational terrorism, (Ranade, 2011), new innovative methods have been progressively introduced.

The findings agree with a study by Narayan (2014) indicating that in many countries, surveillance aspect of the intelligence craft unfortunately continues to be neglected, possibly because by its very nature it is low profile and secretive. These views were also expressed by one key informant as follows:

I don't think the government has properly embraced surveillance of intelligence and that is why always terrorist are ahead of the government in their intelligence planning and execution of the operation. -The investigation techniques are poor due to old and outdated equipment and security against have more often been reactive than proactive, also the failure by Kenyan courts to admit electronic evidence in hampering the war against terrorism (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

In view of the above, that the terrorist attacks perpetrated between Kenya and Somalia constitute a significant strategic shift to surveillance. Although some viewed the failure to improve operations management, resource allocation by government, Narayan (2014) notes that rapid advances in science today ensure that technology contributes considerably to more effective surveillance and additionally plays a predictive role.

What these findings demonstrate is that the emergence of trans-national terrorism has accentuated the need for 'passive', 'archival' and real-time active surveillance. In 'passive' surveillance is included all forms of surveillance intended to routinely monitor normal human activity in sensitive or protected areas. Archival surveillance comprises in-built recognition features in surveillance technology that identify particular individuals as well as their being in a specific place at a specific time and stores this data. 'Real-time' or 'active' surveillance is the monitoring of an event or activity as it occurs or unfolds. Perhaps, the weaknesses in systems, including biometrics, ID cards, visitor identification systems and a passenger database and the

electronic system of travel authorization impede the success of such a strategy; and for Kenya is still work in progress. Surveillance technology platforms provide an ever expanding database facilitating instant facial and biometric recognition of visitors and suspects (Loch, 2007).

#### 6.4.2 Effective Evidence-Based Intelligence-Led Strategies

The study sought to establish the extent to which Kenya and Somalia have adopted effective evidence-based intelligence-led strategies in the management of transnational terrorism. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 6.2 below.

**Table 6. 2 Effective evidence-based intelligence-led strategies**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Great extent	77(28%)	9(12%)
Moderate extent	83(30%)	26(36%)
Less extent	111(40%)	22(30%)
Not at all	6(2%)	16(22%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 6.2, Kenya response show 28% mentioned great extent, 30% cited moderate extent, 40% said less extent while 2% mentioned not at all. The results from Somalia show 12% said great extent, 36% moderate extent, 30% less extent while 22% mentioned not at all. The findings point (22% who said not at all-Somalia) point to gaps in evidence-based intelligence-led strategies. As seen, majority felt effective evidence-based intelligence-led strategies are weak. Part of the challenge could stem from Somalia statelessness and weak governance. One respondent was quoted as follows:

Somalia does not have a strong government and thus engaging with them as such transnational issues is a challenge. Since there is no stable Somali government and poor infrastructure in management of transnational terrorism is not effective both countries should be in affair level play ground. Most of the intelligence provided is either insufficient or not actionable intelligence (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Besides complexity and newness, though, there seems to be a great deal of residual resentment and tension clogging counterterrorism information-sharing channels, affecting what would happen in various scenarios. The “need to know” mentality still seems to outweigh the “need to share” mentality. Studies identify evidence-based intelligence process, when properly executed ensures that the information shared is useful and meets the needs of the customer. The collection and timely dissemination of the right information to the right people as part of an enterprise-wide business process is so critically important. As such, evidence-based information means that an operation for dissemination focuses on both the form and substance of raw intelligence reports. Yet, the varying political differences still challenge the success of these initiatives as observed during interviews:

Partly, because Kenya has the capacity but due to prolonged instability in Somalia no effective strategy appears to be in place in the war torn country. Also the culture of traditional strategies and the fear of change mentality may be a culture that undermines new ways of doing things (Interview with a male state official in Nairobi, 24th September, 2015).

The point of these observations is that the structure of Kenya policing, the nature of police work, some historical stumbles, and common features of police culture all seem to conspire against an evidence-based intelligence-led approach to policing and the free flow of information. Along with industry structure, it is important to note a thing or two about police work and police culture. Particularly at the local and state

levels, police officers in the field frequently act alone and without immediate supervision. Much of their work involves making “low visibility decisions” especially when an officer’s decision does not result in a report or an arrest (and most police actions and decisions do not), it is rarely subject to review.

If an officer’s decision does not result in a report or arrest, it probably will not produce any official information for later analysis. As Manning (2010) notes, “information in police departments can best be characterized as systematically decentralized. Often, primary data known to one officer are not available to other officers” because they are stored in the officer’s head or personal notes. Moreover, “all essential police knowledge is thought to be contextual, substantive, detailed, concrete, temporally bounded, and particularistic” while information in official reports and files is often viewed by officers and investigators as trivial, having been created and manipulated mainly for bureaucratic purposes.

Additionally, police agencies and police culture tend to celebrate and reward good arrests. Information and intelligence, by themselves, are not traditional units of police work, they are not measured, and producing them is not rewarded. Also, information that is not directly connected to an incident, crime, or case does not have a natural home in the typical police records system there is no file to put it in. Interview responses by key informants revealed that incidents, crimes, and cases are traditionally assigned to individual officers (or detectives) who are evaluated on how well they handle and dispose of these events. Consequently, the tendency is for officers and detectives to hold information closely in order to use it later to enhance their own productivity.

Specifically on the issue of information sharing, a common complaint is that it is a one-way street; local police provide information to their other “partners” but get little or nothing in return. The following anecdote from one of the respondents who participated in this study illustrates the common local police experience and perspective:

We give information but usually intelligence sharing across the different security sectors is not taken seriously. This is a challenge that limits the effective evidence-based intelligence-led strategies (Interview with a female government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

As the above observation denotes; that agencies seem absolutely consider information sharing environment as single entities rather than state police entities. While they stand a chance of being perceived as serving all agencies in the state, and if they in fact disseminate useful information and products to all agencies, they should become critical assets for both intra-state and national information sharing. The same observation has been made by Cordner and Scarborough (2010), that if security agencies come to be seen as glorified state police units serving state police interests first and foremost, then they will provide little added value and will not substantially improve information sharing. Local agencies will tend not to participate, they will create their own fusion centers when possible, and they will continue to create their own individual relationships with federal agencies.

### **6.5 Structural Capacity of Intelligence Agencies in Intelligence Sharing**

The study sought respondents’ views on the effectiveness of various characteristics of intelligence agencies in the management of transnational terrorism. The structural capacity aspects included: adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, and relationship with the intelligence community and accountability in



the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Analysis results are as discussed below.

### **6.5.1 Adaptability of Intelligence Agencies in Countering Transnational Terrorism**

The study sought respondents' views on the adaptability of intelligence community in the management of transnational terrorism. Analysis results are as shown in Table 6.3 below.

**Table 6.3 Adaptability of intelligence agencies in countering transnational terrorism**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Effective	33(12%)	15(20%)
Fair	50(18%)	16(22%)
Not effective	127(46%)	37(50%)
Poor	66(24%)	6(8%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 6.3, 12% said effective, 18% cited fairly effective, 46% mentioned not effective while 24% poor. For Somalia, 20% said effective, 22% cited fair, 50% mentioned not effective while 24% said poor. As results indicate, 12% and 20% Kenya-Somalia response respectively said effective, and this positive strive might be that a sound organizational culture be fostered within the police, and the ongoing quest for police reforms affirms such a response.

On the other hand, results indicate response from Kenya and Somalia (46% and 50% respectively), and further 24% response from Kenya and 8% from Somalia stated

poor. This could be attributed to the fact that over the years, police departments have struggled with trying to implement the philosophy of effective performance with the same organization structures without success. Indeed, the terrorist attacks between Kenya and Somalia have shown that both countries can no longer address the new challenges without adopting a unified, cooperative and supportive approach. One of the fundamental pillars in countering terrorism and governing security involves information and intelligence sharing as this is the first step in enhancing such cooperation in the security area. The sharing of intelligence seems like a simple task at first glance, but under the surface working together is not always as easy as . Decision makers and agencies face legal, technical, political, cultural, organizational and even personal obstacles when sharing information. An interview with key informants revealed that challenges inherent in organizational structure and command can be either internal or external within the police agencies. One key informant was categorical as follows:

Organizational structure is more centralized and not devolved to ground level which makes it a hindrance. However, adaptability is very poor and biased due to political involvement. No mechanism to ensure accountability since there is no performance monitoring and audit (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Indeed, it was clear that internal opposition to change, issues of trust, power struggles, and informal communications are all factors that can either impede or facilitate the successful adoption of intelligence sharing.

It needs open policy intelligence relating with communities to get information. Organization structure, adaptability and command are manipulated, corrupted and politically managed, lacks devolvement. Its negative, their relationship is not good, their action and their approach in dealing with community is seen as an enemy. Organization command is a long process that is politically managed (Interview with male civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

In view of the above, although intelligence sharing is seen as the most promising tool in the fight against terrorism, operational personnel, policy makers and academics alike are skeptical. An analysis of intelligence agencies reveals that they share some common characteristics: adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, and relationship with the intelligence community, and a mechanism to ensure accountability (Bruneau and Boraz, 2007). Given the very small window of opportunity for effective response to the transnational threat of terrorism, intelligence agencies need a command structure that allows rapid decision making. The leadership of intelligence agencies needs access to the highest level government decision makers with the shortest possible delay and without having to go through the normal bureaucratic channels. An FGD respondent was quoted as follows:

There is a disconnect between intelligence and security agencies and intelligence community-overall security management is not strategic. The organizational structure and command should be all inclusive (Interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

What comes out clear from this view is that careful attention needs to be given to the types of structural changes that will assist in institutionalizing community policing to combat terrorism. Whilst acknowledging that there are on-going initiatives to turnaround the community policing organization after years of institutional neglect, the results point out that gaps still exist and the organization must accept the

existence of gaps in order for meaningful solutions to be found. Oliver (2008) emphasizes that structural changes must be made in both organization and management to successfully implement effective policies that enhance service delivery. To measure effectiveness, evaluations should look at the organizational support and the structures in place for as well as police attitudes and job satisfaction at the very least as supported by Cordner and Perkins (2005).

Intelligence agencies rely a lot on people in order to fulfill their mission, and people are among their most important sources of information. Consequently, it is absolutely necessary that these agencies project legitimacy and trust to ensure effective cooperation with the population. This requires proper oversight of intelligence agencies and guarantees that they will operate legally and in accordance with the rule of law (Loch, 2007).


Conventional literature highlights barriers within the police organizational structure and the organizational climate, where the absence of strong leadership and encouragement in policing strategies can negatively impact on security operations and intelligence sharing. Police may also be reluctant to make information sharing a priority due to the perception that intelligence is distinct from other police work thus reinforcing the notion that it is not 'real' police work (Robinson 2003). The results agree to some extent with a study by Segrave and Radcliffe (2004) indicating that the current police leadership developed in an extremely centralized hierarchical and still largely insular organizational culture are ill equipped to deliver policing issues which requires the decentralized, informed, innovative and pro-active response.

The intelligence community is composed of a multitude of agencies that often do not fall under the same department or chain of command (Miller, 2013). It is not uncommon to find that by virtue of their roles and responsibilities, these agencies occupy equal status in the hierarchy. Thus, finding out who is in charge is problematic. Under these circumstances, agencies are not bound to cooperate or share information unless there is a central body with the relevant legal provisions to act as the coordinating mechanism.

Erwin (2013) argues that this is a prerequisite for putting together the various pieces and strands gathered by individual agencies. Even more importantly, because the window of opportunity to respond to an imminent threat is very small, a coordinating mechanism is necessary for fast and effective decision making.

### **6.5.2 Effectiveness of Organizational Structure in Enhancing Intelligence Sharing**

The study sought respondents' views on the effectiveness of organizational structure in enhancing intelligence sharing. Results of the analysis are presented in Figure 6.4.



**Figure 6.4 Effectiveness of organizational structure in enhancing intelligence sharing**

The results show from Kenya response respondents felt the organizational structure for intelligence agency was not effective 78(28%), while 83(30%) said fair, 66(24%) noted effective while 50(18%) said poor. On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed 7(10%) said the organizational structure is effective, 10(14%) said fair, 29(40%) said not effective while 13(36%) noted poor.

For Kenya, results reveal 30% said fair while 24% noted effective, an implication that the ongoing police reforms and counterterrorism efforts in Kenya have seen the Government heighten security measures including more elaborate police structure for effective service delivery. The State is currently developing a Community Policing Initiative and a community security system dubbed ‘*Nyumba Kumi*’ based on a ten-household’s interactive security model premised on the idea that a small community as a unit can be accountable to each other, keep watch over the activities that happen within their neighborhood. However, the attacks in Nairobi WestGate Mall, in Lamu County (Mpeketoni), Garisa University attacks and the Mandera

attacks have shown the capacity of the terrorist groups, and the requirement of even more effort from the state to re-organizing security agencies including the structure; and these gaps could be the reason 28% said not effective while 18% noted poor.

Organizational structure involves giving more authority to line officers, embracing line officers' input in departmental management, and modifying promotional standards regarding community-policing activities which might facilitate the process of cultural change in the organization (Glensor, Correia, & Peak, 2000). It emphasizes on the styles of leadership, management, and supervision that give more emphasis to organizational culture and values (Vito, Walsh, & Kunselman, 2005). An intelligence capability enables an agency to gather, share, and receive criminal intelligence and information. This capability may include the reporting of suspicious activity by a frontline officer or the distribution of a bulletin produced by a fusion center to all agency personnel. If every agency has an intelligence capability, greater information sharing can occur locally, regionally, and nationally, which will improve the intelligence development process for the nation as a whole, thereby improving prevention, mitigation, and investigative efforts.

Organizational structure is important because it facilitates interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism; which is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. A conducive environment is therefore of paramount importance in creating an intelligence sharing network. Results reveal 28% and 40% said not effective from Kenya and Somalia respectively; an indicator that the current structure does not offer guidelines to enable the intelligence community i Kenya and Somalia to collaborate closely. According to one key informant:

Intelligence community in Kenya is composed of the National Intelligence Service which is similar to the Central Intelligence Agency, while Kenya Defence Forces KDF has got its own wing of intelligence called the Directorate of Military Intelligence DMI, the National Police Service has got what they called the Criminal Intelligence Unit CIU, now all these agencies have no umbrella body they all work independently (Interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

From a structural perspective, the above insight indicates that the Security Service should have a number of regional offices at the regional level to facilitate the information gathering and intelligence sharing process; but more importantly, a central coordinating body. On the other hand, the organizational structure could allow for private sector information which represents a crucial element in both understanding the current threat environment and protecting state critical infrastructure from targeted attacks. In the words of one key informant:

Some private sector entities have cultivated effective information sharing partnerships with the State and local authorities that regulate their activities in the localities in which they operate (Interview with security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

From the foregoing, it is evident that important elements of the private sector have made significant investments to develop mechanisms and methodologies to evaluate, assess, and exchange information across regional, market, and security-related communities of interest; however still more can be done to improve those mechanisms and communication.



All agencies are guided by the principle of need to know, meaning that they find it hard to share information given that they ask whether the other party needs to know they exhibit suspect relationships. Just look at what happened recently when there was a terror attack at Westgate: it opened a blame game between NIS and the police. NIS said that they provided information to the police, while the police said that the information was too general. Imagine this country cannot afford to entertain this blame game; someone needs to be held responsible (Interview with security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

Ideally, the events of the past years (Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi and recent attacks in Garissa, Mandera and Mogadishu) have reaffirmed that risks and threats often emerge and take shape without regard to geographic borders. As such, organizational structure would play a key role on how Kenya and Somalia intelligence communities are taking steps to evaluate and improve upon sharing of information.

It is important to note that while it is common practice in some countries for intelligence agencies to recruit the individual to head the organization from within their own agencies, in some places there is a complete departure from this practice. For example, in Australia, the tendency is to recruit the Director General of the ASIO from outside the agency, to avoid the impression that it is a family business—old-boy inside trading—and to prevent it from becoming a self-replicating bureaucratic structure (Jackson, 2012).

### 6.5.3 Organizational Command Structure

The study further sought respondents' views on the effectiveness of command structure in enhancing intelligence sharing. Results of the analysis are presented in Table 6.4.

**Table 6.4 Effectiveness of command structure in intelligence sharing**

	Kenya (N=277)	Somalia (N=73)
Effective	42(15%)	9(12%)
Fair	83(30%)	13(18%)
Not effective	83(30%)	35(48%)
Poor	69(25%)	16(22%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The results from Kenya response show organizational command for intelligence agency was fair 83(30%), another 83(30%) felt it was not effective, 69(25%) said poor while 42(15%) noted effective. On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed majority 35(48%) said the organizational command was not effective, 9(12%) said effective, 13(18%) noted fair while 16(22%) felt it was poor.

As the findings demonstrate, response from Kenya, 15% said effective while 30% said fair, which could be linked to recent security measures within the counterterrorism agenda that has seen intelligence awareness training for the intelligence community. The security dilemma owing to the challenge of transnational terrorism emanating from Somalia requires new responsibilities for intelligence community, and thus organizational flexibility is key to permit officers to explore new dimensions of crimes and counterterrorism efforts.

From the results, response from Kenya shows 30% said not effective while 25% noted poor ; similar views from Somalia shows 48% noted not effective while 22% said poor. The explanation for this could be that the flow of intelligence information is generally poor between agency units with overlapping mandates and this could explain the challenge of command structure; where even knowing where to find information is tough and time-consuming. One key informant was quoted as follows:


The command structure needs to be relooked into. It is frustrating how often analysts who have been working on a particular region or target for long periods of time will come across new information that they did not know existed because there is minimal interaction between two different organizations. Even when information does make it across boundaries, we have seen regulatory and bureaucratic barriers cause delays of weeks to get an internal intelligence report to the people who need it (Interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

From the above scenario, these challenges create a far different working environment for the intelligence organization. Similarly, the “intelligence challenge” is only part and parcel of the larger challenge for military professionals of having to adapt to the demands of involvement in the civil-military operations that seem to dominate the current international military environment. Given the very small window of opportunity for effective response to imminent threats, intelligence agencies need a command structure that allows rapid decision making. The leadership of intelligence agencies needs access to the highest level government decision makers with the shortest possible delay and without having to go through the normal bureaucratic channels.

Organizational command in interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. This can be achieved in a number of ways. There is a need at organizational level for mechanism to coordinate with liaison officers from other intelligence agencies for effective information sharing. The implementation of a standard operating procedure across agencies can create a platform for local agency participation and encourage operational best practices. The use of a common operating system for intelligence management can facilitate access to all available databases from the various intelligence agencies (Botha, 2009). A memorandum of understanding to regulate the exchange of law enforcement and intelligence information between the different agencies provides a necessary safeguard so the dissemination of intelligence does not infringe on privacy and civil liberties. Also, there is a need for standardization of classification designations and dissemination guidelines to avoid over-classification of intelligence, an obstacle to information sharing. Lastly, a feedback mechanism on the information provided is a prerequisite to make future cooperation more effective.

#### **6.5.4 Organizational Culture of Intelligence Agencies**

The study further sought respondents' views on the organizational culture of intelligence agencies. Results of the analysis are presented in Figure 6.5. The results from Kenya response show majority (42%) felt relationship within intelligence community was fair, (20%) said effective, 26% noted not effective while 12% said poor.



N=277 (Kenya)  
N=73 (Somalia)

**Figure 6.5 Organizational Culture of Intelligence Agencies**

On the other hand, response from Somalia revealed majority (64%) said the relationship within intelligence community was not effective, 10% noted effective, 22% said fair while 4% said poor.

The 42% Kenya response showing relationship within intelligence community was fair could be attributed to the emerging threats and attacks by terrorist that have seen government call on partnership and collaboration among agencies in the fight against terror. Intelligence plays a fundamental role in the development of an effective counterterrorism strategy. Among other advantages, it can help identify individuals and groups engaged in terrorism as well as their locations and sources of recruitment. It enables security agencies to track down the suspects and their logistic and financial supports. In addition, intelligence provides advance warning of potential terrorist threats. It can provide tactical information for counterterrorism operations to disrupt terrorist activities and terrorist command and control structures.

Lastly, it can aid management of an actual or potential crisis by providing decision makers with actionable intelligence.

Organizational culture distinguishes the type of activities in which officers engage (Smith, 2001). The management style in community policing involves maintaining discipline by stressing departmental rules and regulations (Walker & Katz, 2005). According to Kappeler and Gaines (2005), police managers in community policing should assist line officers in developing community contacts and in finding resources to solve community problems. Vertical staff meetings might achieve this task where line officers can discuss issues that emerged in the communities they serve with their supervisors (Kappeler & Gaines, 2005).

Accordingly, the collection and analysis of information have always been considered extremely valuable to states. The emergence of agencies to address national, regional, or international security issues is a common feature of many countries around the world, especially in the last century. Commonly referred to as intelligence agencies, these special organizations play an important role in providing states with the necessary intelligence to make sense of their environment, assess present and potential adversaries, avoid strategic surprises, provide long-term expertise, support the policy process, and maintain the secrecy of information, needs and methods. However, it is important to note that the process of collecting raw information and converting it into actionable intelligence is part of larger cycle. In a democratic framework, intelligence gathering must be conducted in compliance with the rule of law to ensure that the civil rights of individuals are not violated. Indeed, there is a need for a democratic control so the roles and responsibilities of the

intelligence community are directed by the civilian authority, the parameters within which it operates are defined in law, and there are established procedures for reviewing issues such as use of resources and personnel management (Botha, 2009).

Mutual trust is fundamental in international relations and critical in intelligence sharing. From the findings, 26% noted not effective while 12% said poor (Kenya) while (64%) said not effective while 4% said poor from Somalia response. Sharing sensitive information also exposes nations to a certain degree of vulnerability, whether it is an ousted source, a blown operation, or a threat to national interests. Furthermore, the receiver of intelligence must be able to trust the validity of the intelligence it is given or else it is useless unless corroborated by a third party. According to Walsh (2009), trust exists when the interests of a first actor are ‘encapsulated’ in or congruent with the interests of a second actor.”

While this trust is more readily found amongst traditional allies who share many political and cultural values, and through their democratic institutions or common histories, it is far more scarce and thinly developed amongst new allies. During FGD, one respondent noted the following:

The local Muslim and Somalia Muslims collide, conspire to hide the attackers and provide trainings of their youths. Abuse by security officers, leakage of intelligence and high level corruption. Muslim are discriminated and not trusted, hence assumed to be culprits. Information from Muslims are treated none and void. Muslim communities are branded to be culprit therefore not trusted at the time any information which they may contribute will be ferried to terrorist hence fall victims (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

From the above statement, it is evident that mistrust exists especially after the attacks in Garissa, Lamu and some parts of Mogadishu. There was some

disagreement over details, such as whether the KDF should pull out of Somalia; some variation in responses might have resulted because the scenario on trust and intelligence failure has had security implications in both Kenya and Somalia. One respondent indicated that the proper response should involve both information sharing and collaboration to build trust.

Conversely, a sending state is more likely to share intelligence with a receiving state if it trusts the latter to treat the intelligence securely and to use it to act in a manner consistent with its interests. Of course, concerns about trust are not the only barrier to intelligence-sharing. Governments also might worry about becoming dependent for intelligence on a state that uses the relationship to extract concessions on other issues, or reject regular sharing with states that have little valuable intelligence to send them in return. But as the findings in this study indicate, concerns about trust are paramount in the decision to share, since one or both of the partners to a sharing arrangement hopes to rely on intelligence provided by the other that will permit it to make better-informed policy decisions.

Trust is important for both senders and receivers of intelligence. For receivers, trust is crucial because policy-makers are unable to verify independently the accuracy and reliability of shared intelligence. This creates the possibility that the sending state could deliberately alter shared intelligence to influence the receiving state's subsequent policy choices in a direction that serves the interests of the sender but not the receiver. A great deal of research has shown that international institutions and agreements can help states overcome mistrust and engage in mutually beneficial co-operation (Koremenos et al., 2001). Institutions can encourage co-operation even when the degree of trust between the states involved is not very high. They do so



through two types of mechanisms. First, institutions can increase the costs of renegeing on an agreement. For example, institutions often carefully define what actions constitute compliance and defection and lay out actions that states harmed by renegeing can take in retaliation.

When effective, these mechanisms increase the cost of defection by clearly and publicly tagging the violating state. This both removes the immediate benefits that the states might hope to secure by renegeing and harms its reputation for honest dealing, making it unlikely that other states will sign potentially beneficial agreements with it in the future. Second, institutions can also foster trust by creating specific allowances for states to monitor each other's compliance with agreements. One state cannot effectively and accurately punish another that reneges unless it has accurate information about whether such renegeing has actually occurred.

Applied to the issue of intelligence-sharing, Aldrich (2004) proposes that institutions should encourage freer sharing by allowing receiving states to closely and directly analyze the intelligence they receive from senders. For example, agreements to share might require that the sender convey not only their analysis of intelligence on a particular issue, but also some details about how the underlying raw intelligence was obtained, insights into the reliability of these sources and so on. This allows the receiver to monitor more effectively the degree to which shared intelligence is based on accurate and reliable sources and has not been tainted in the analysis process by the interests of the sending government. Successful sharing agreements might also allow the sender to monitor closely how the receiver uses and disseminates shared intelligence.

## 6.6 Interstate Cooperation in Intelligence Sharing

Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. In this regard, the study sought to establish the extent to which interstate Cooperation (Kenya and Somalia) has helped identify individuals and groups engaged in terrorism. The results of the analysis were presented in Table 6.7.

**Table 6.5 Inter-agency Cooperation in Intelligence Sharing**

	<b>Kenya (N=277)</b>	<b>Somalia (N=73)</b>
Great extent	72(26%)	22(30%)
Moderate extent	150(54%)	15(20%)
Less extent	55(20%)	37(50%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 6.5, findings from Kenya show 26% mentioned great extent, 54% cited moderate extent while 20% said less extent. On the other hand, Somalia response shows 30% said great extent, 20% moderate while 50% less extent.

As the results indicate, response from Kenya shows 26% said great extent. This positive trend could be as a result of the development of strong counterterrorism strategies that have recently been of particular priority in Kenya. The key factors contributing to this prioritization include Kenya's general international counterterrorism obligations pursuant to the relevant UN Security Council resolutions; its geographical proximity to Somalia and previous terrorist attacks on US and Israeli interests in Kenya; and the identification of Kenya as a key strategic

partner in the implementation of the US-led 'war on terror.' In this respect, Kenya has established a number of agencies and institutions as well as inter-agency cooperation in intelligence sharing.

On the other hand, response from Kenya shows 54% cited moderate extent while 20% said less extent. Despite the encouraging efforts by governments to calibrate its response to transnational terrorism, its threat appears to increase coupled with diverse challenges including terrorist radicalization. Furthermore, persistent reports of extremist activity across the country especially in Nairobi and Mombasa and in Somalia have deepened concern over the government's machinery to combat terrorism. This could be the reason for majority indicating government not doing enough to steer inter-agency cooperation in intelligence sharing.

From Somalia, 50% said less extent, which could be attributed to the clan conflicts and dynamics that challenge such cooperation. Moreover, Somalia has been without an effective national government since the fall of the Said Barre regime in 1991. Coordination within such environment may be difficult. In perspective, the findings reveal that intelligence failures happen for a number of reasons: the difficulty of predicting terrorist attacks, the lack of interagency cooperation, insufficient emphasis on the analytical processing of information, and/or the reluctance of the intelligence community to focus more on human intelligence (Hoffman, 2006). However, response from Somalia shows 30% who said great extent, an indicator that recent developments by AMISOM and external actors are providing support and encouraging inter-agency cooperation. In developing response to the threat of terrorism, public safety leaders from all disciplines have recognized the need to

improve the sharing of information and intelligence across agency borders. One key informant noted the following:

The need to develop and share information and intelligence across all levels has significantly changed over the last few years. The long-standing barriers that built roadblocks among law enforcement agencies, public safety, and the private sector are slowly crumbling. Yet, the need to identify, prevent, monitor, and respond to terrorist and criminal activities remains a significant battle for the law enforcement, intelligence, and public safety communities. Leaders must move forward with a new paradigm on the exchange of information and intelligence (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Furthermore, Erwin (2013) asserts that the lack of communication between intelligence agencies due to organizational structure, technical incompatibilities or competing interests, along with the absence of a central mechanism for coordinating among agencies, can all increase the propensity for intelligence failures. Indeed, these observations motivate a systematic examination of an integrated model involving a judicious mix of the defense, diplomatic, intelligence and law-enforcement capabilities of the state. Pooling all available resources and drawing together multiple strands of expertise can remove the barriers to effective interagency cooperation so the dots can be connected more accurately (Erwin, 2013). This argument resonates with response from interview. One key informant was quoted as follows:

The current terrorist threat level and the continued harbouring of terrorist by Somalia should have come to an end. Collective responsibility is the only way to have effective and timely response in going against terrorism. But lack of trust, interest, political camps resulting from religious and racism existence limits cooperation (Interview with male security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

These views suggest that interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. A conducive environment is therefore of paramount importance in creating an intelligence sharing network. According to one key informant:

Yes the gains made in identifying source of the terrorist attacks and operations have been through interstate cooperation. But much is needed to ensure identification of interstate criminals (Interview with a male member of National Intelligence Agency-Somalia officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

While not all agencies might want to share the proverbial podium, it is in their best interests to help one another on overlapping and complementary issues. Various interviewees stressed the importance of personal contacts when relationships of intelligence sharing are being maintained. “If you know each other, everything is just that much simpler. There is, however, the possibility that the current consensus may unravel. The political controversy surrounding electronic surveillance efforts and other data mining programs may come to focus on the sharing of information that some argue was not lawfully obtained, and this concern could lead to efforts to restrict information sharing across the boards. There is also a possibility that the use of information obtained by surveillance might ultimately not be allowed. Despite the widespread acceptance of the need for information sharing, concerns that sharing information could lead to governmental abuses persists across the political spectrum. These concerns are tenaciously held, and have in the past made legislating very controversial (Best 2007).


Macro policy shifts in counterterrorism have had significant implications for leadership and command and control. The first and most apparent shift is assertive, often aggressive, geographic reach with the intention of interdicting terrorist capacity and capability at its bases. The second is the shift from traditional restrictive circulation of intelligence to a greater emphasis on delivering intelligence, even to new or unlikely partners, who can take useful actions to prevent harm. The third is the changed emphasis from a long-term pursuit-oriented strategy with a view to optimizing evidence-gathering to the firm priority of prevention, even if that results in lost evidence-gathering opportunities (Schmid & Hindle, 2009). This latter aspect is more than an issue of policy and timing: it has major consequences for resource allocation. Collectively, these changes have necessitated more coherent, inclusive and integrated leadership approaches. In addition, the revised leadership model dictates unified command and control mechanisms that address the complete span of counter-terrorism from prevention through incident management to long-term recovery.

The development of strategy which has successfully enhanced international co-operation and driven national cohesion is more apparent at the national level than the regional and global tiers. This includes policy and institutional progress around the notion of homeland security. However, national cohesion appears to have more benefits than disadvantages and the overall direction of international co-operation, albeit slow and imperfect, seems to be correct. On the other hand, strategic development has not produced optimum results and there is scope for strategic cohesion and stronger international leadership. In addition to specific intelligence, the analysis of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures permits proactive

intervention to make the business of terrorism more difficult. Terrorist attacks rely on a number of identifiable elements that must be combined to achieve the intended results.

### 6.7 Coordination of Local Security Agencies with Foreign Intelligence Services

In light of the terrorist attacks/threats between Kenya and Somalia, the researcher further probed the question on whether local security agencies coordinate closely with foreign intelligence services to inform a common assessment of threats and options in response. Data on the same were collected and analyzed, and results presented in Figure 6.6.



N=277 (Kenya)  
N=73 (Somalia)

**Figure 6.6. Local and foreign cooperation intelligence sharing**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Results in Figure 6.6, Kenya response show 55(20%) said effective, 133(48%) said fair, 61(22%) felt it was not effective while 25(9%) said poor. On the other hand,

Somalia response reveal 9(12%) said effective, 13(18%) said fair, 16(22%) felt it was not effective while 23 (32%) said poor.

The findings show response from Kenya at 20% while 12% response from Somalia said effective; an indication of some developments of local security agencies with foreign intelligence services with coordinated policies designed to build relationships in counterterrorism. The objective has been to foster a sense that rather than counterterrorism policing being targeted against a particular community. Kenya and the US have fostered such links with a focus on the counter-terrorist programmes. However, response from Kenya reveals 22% felt it was not effective, with 5% stating poor. For Somalia, 22% felt it was not effective while 32% said poor. The reason could be that while mutual trust is fundamental in international relations and critical in intelligence sharing.

Sharing sensitive information also exposes nations to a certain degree of vulnerability, whether it is an outed source, a blown operation, or a threat to national interests. Furthermore, the receiver of intelligence must be able to trust the validity of the intelligence it is given or else it is useless unless corroborated by a third party (Rees & Aldrich, 2005). According to Walsh (2006), "trust exists when the interests of a first actor are 'encapsulated' in or congruent with the interests of a second actor" (Walsh, 2006:628). While this trust is more readily found amongst traditional allies who have supported and defended the US and share many political and cultural values, and through their democratic institutions or common histories, it is far more scarce and thinly developed amongst new allies.



A study by Wasserman (2001) notes that national intelligence agencies, by themselves, however strong and capable, may not be able to deal with this new threat of a trans-national nature. The new terrorism calls for a revamped intelligence apparatus at the national level and a reinforced co-operation mechanism that involves the international partners. An intelligence capability offers an agency or an organization the opportunity to be proactive in its mission, be it through crime prevention efforts or the thwarting of a potential terrorism event. An important aspect of an intelligence capability is information sharing, both internally and externally. The sharing of criminal information and intelligence has far-reaching benefits for the communities that law enforcement and homeland security organizations serve, and an intelligence capability can be used as the agency's focal point in this sharing priority.

In an early and still useful expression of this view, Wasserman (2001) criticized the intelligence community for an unwise emphasis on current intelligence and the accumulation of data. Instead, he argued, intelligence should focus on longer-term and analytic efforts, shaped by a closer understanding of what policy makers believe and care about. According to an FGD:

There is still mistrust between the Muslims of Kenya and Somalia and the other Kenyan communities whose majority are Christians. Security alerts are misinterpreted by Kenya as affecting on economy e.g. terrorist. Coordination and collaboration is not effective, because some of alerts from foreign countries cannot be acted upon by the countries security agency (FGD with religious groups in Nairobi, 22th September, 2015).

From the foregoing, there are numerous signs of inter-religious hostility and hatred. The Muslim-Christian relationship has a mixed historical background, which

highlights the aspect of tolerance and tension in the war against terrorism within the context of religion. The dynamics of religious violence in Kenya have evolved significantly in the last few years, in part because of changes in the security environment that have followed the Kenyan army's incursion into Somalia in 2011, but also due to the catalysis of tensions that have existed for decades. An older dispute about the treatment of ethnic Somalis and Kenyan Muslims thus play a critical role in the context of transnational terrorism management and so far as intelligence sharing cooperation is concerned.

Another important element of the security environment in Kenya is the declining capacity of religious leaders to address extremism and violence effectively. In the last two years, moderate Kenyan Muslim leaders have been losing influence in key mosques especially in Mombasa due to their diminishing credibility among certain factions of their congregations who are increasingly susceptible to extremist recruitment. According to one respondent;

Many imams have been seen as failing to defend Muslim communities adequately against longstanding economic and political marginalisation, as well as against the KDF intervention in Somalia. Such criticism of security operations with sympathy for extremists, place us between a rock and a hard place and makes it difficult for us to win the war as a united front (Interview with male security expert in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

The statement above points to the need for enhancing moderate religious and community leaders into tangible policies and programmes to help re-legitimise their authority and to address some of the root causes of radicalisation in the country. However, a change here must be accompanied by changes in policy if Kenya seeks to genuinely reduce the scale of religious violence and insecurity that forms a vital

component in intelligence sharing and cooperation to combat terrorism. It means then that terrorism can only be efficiently combated if states work together, especially in the field of intelligence. Roberts (2007) adds that bilateral intelligence sharing arrangements can also be established without personal contacts. Usually, in this form of cooperation, two national intelligence services agree on a MoU or other formalized cooperation agreement. However, this type of cooperation is unlikely to substantially improve the information position of either of the partners of the agreement.

The emergence of agencies to address national, regional, or international security issues is a common feature of many countries around the world, especially in the last century. Commonly referred to as intelligence agencies, these special organizations play an important role in providing states with the necessary intelligence to make sense of their environment, assess present and potential adversaries, avoid strategic surprises, provide long-term expertise, support the policy process, and maintain the secrecy of information, needs and methods (Botha, 2009). However, it is important to note that the process of collecting raw information and converting it into actionable intelligence is part of larger cycle.

In a democratic framework, intelligence gathering must be conducted in compliance with the rule of law to ensure that the civil rights of individuals are not violated. Indeed, there is a need for a democratic control so the roles and responsibilities of the intelligence community are directed by the civilian authority, the parameters within which it operates are defined in law, and there are established procedures for reviewing issues such as use of resources and personnel management. These sentiments were also highlighted in interviews, and respondents expressed concerns

on the nature of foreign partnership n intelligence cooperation. While a legal framework regulates the work of intelligence agencies and various control mechanisms ensure that they operate within a democratic framework. An interview revealed the following:

The cooperation with foreign agencies is marred with political issues, which makes Somalia to ignore and the consequences have been seen here in Mogadishu (Interview with a male member of National Intelligence Agency-Somalia officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Somalia Federal Government have got the intelligence working within us the Somalia National Army, this is the main intelligence agency almost similar to NIS of Kenya, CIA of America and Amniyat of the alshaabab, do you know that al shaabab has got intelligence? in fact the alshaabab one is strong like the one in Kenya, Each Federal government has got its own police for example Jubaland has got its own police with its own intelligence, the is no central body of intelligence where all this intelligence send its own information to in facit it is not easy for us in the Somalia National Army to get information from Police , it is easy for us to get even information from the Kenyan military forces (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

The above statement underscores the role intelligence plays as a fundamental role in the development of an effective counterterrorism strategy. Among other advantages, it can help identify individuals and groups engaged in terrorism as well as their locations and sources of recruitment. It enables security agencies to track down the suspects and their logistic and financial supports (Jenkins, 2003). In addition, Clein (2011) points out that intelligence provide advance warning of potential terrorist threats. It can provide tactical information for counterterrorism operations to disrupt terrorist activities and terrorist command and control structures; and it can aid management of an actual or potential crisis by providing decision makers with actionable intelligence (Clein, 2011).

Thus, the preferred method of international intelligence cooperation for most intelligence officers consists of a combination between formal and informal arrangements. The formal arrangements are used to initiate contacts, which usually occurs on director or vice-director level. The formal arrangements also provide the necessary hard- and soft-ware, such as secured connections which are used to exchange intelligence products. However, the real successes of the cooperation depend on informal arrangement. A friendly and personal relationship with the cooperation partner ensures the results: receiving of good and valuable intelligence products.

What comes out from this statement is that cooperation in multilateral diplomacy and facilitates equal gains for all and long term actions for the benefit of the collective. However, within the security-based diplomacy approach and transnational terrorism threats, has at times been an instrument of manipulation by the traditionally politically and economically dominant states. One key informant expressed the following views:

Cooperation with foreign agencies is not a problem, but sometimes the West uses it as strategy to impose measures that may not work in our context. Although the developed economies are well equipped and can share intelligence, this should not jeopardize local efforts to foster peace across the political divide, especially Kenya and Somalia (Interview with a male peace and security expert in Nairobi, 20th September, 2015).

In view of the above, it has been seen throughout history that there is a direct connection between power and the ability to influence processes which have hampered the reputation of this mode of diplomacy. It has been a fact that the imbalances of power in the world have brought as a consequence the formation of blocs to counter the imbalance (Armstrong, Lloyd & Redmond, 2004).

The findings thus point out clearly that multilateral diplomacy has proven to be an instrument vulnerable to the conflicts and the political environment to which it is exposed. While states are strategically drawn to look for the support of likeminded nations, (in terms of coordination of local security agencies and foreign intelligence services to inform a common assessment of threats); multilateral diplomacy was influenced and susceptible to the negative effects of the bipolar world of super power states (Kahler, 2009).

The tensions of these years have been a constant reminder of the vulnerabilities that multilateral diplomacy is subject to in diplomatic relations therefore representing a weak point for the practice of multilateral diplomacy (Kahler, 2009). The ‘Global War on Terror,’ led by the United States, emphasizes the role of international alliances in tackling terrorist threats. By their very nature, international counterterrorism efforts challenge state sovereignty by requiring changes to both foreign and domestic policies. This, in turn, creates complex sovereignty issues and raises some interesting questions for closer examination. As such, this may be the reason as results indicate why intelligence sharing between local and foreign agencies remains still faces such challenges.

This is important in the sense that Kenya-Somalia relations and the war on terror has led to cooperation in counterterrorism, which has altered the perceptions and behavior of allies of the United States. By their very nature, international cooperation’s confront state sovereignty by requiring changes in both foreign and domestic policies. In many cases, such operations necessitate coordination of overarching federal security issues with local functions such as law enforcement, which createssore relations.

Overall, these finds raise important issues on intelligence sharing at local and global level, and concur with Betts (2011) argument that challenges of terrorism have not been met by a comprehensive and sustained universal effort (Betts, 2011). Indeed, the United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda's bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs have sought to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies (Maclean, 2010).

Nonetheless, Kenya-Somalia case represents bilateral security relations with its own challenges. Practically, the findings reveal that working in a way that is more supportive of security sector transformation between Kenya and Somalia may require external actors to adapt their approaches; to confront more directly the profound structural problems plaguing governance of the continent's security sectors. This means acknowledging that current security deficits stem not simply from capacity problems and intelligence sharing failure, but in many cases, a lack of public legitimacy that has deep roots in the colonial era (Hendrickson, 2008).

Findings indicate Kenya response 22% felt intelligence sharing with foreign agencies was not effective while 10% said poor. The national intelligence agencies' unwillingness to share intelligence is to a certain extent understandable. Opposed to a logic of openness which promotes exchange and trust, it should be taken into account that "possession of intelligence reinforces the image of the possessor as elite, knowledgeable, and advantaged. revelation of intelligence must be tightly

policed” (Bean 2011). Nevertheless, a tight cooperation between the national intelligence agencies is vital as terrorism has long become an internal problem for many states.

Explaining the multiple dimensions of national security intelligence, Johnson noted that intelligence can be equally understood as secret information, set of missions, process, and organization, adding that: “since intelligence activities are carried out by people in secretive government agencies, a closer look at intelligence as an organization is in order” (Johnson, 2012). This often overlooked view in the literature can provide a relevant explanation for the reluctance to cooperate in the field of counter terrorism intelligence.

Though domestic information sharing is an important undertaking and represents a better understanding of how to combat terrorism, this approach overlooks two important points. First, states increasingly rely on other states either for their security or the necessary training and equipment to perform security functions. Second, to combat transnational threats effectively, states must share intelligence at the international level. The level of trust, value of intelligence, and type of diplomatic relationships with other countries determine the extent to which intelligence is shared. But penetrating another country’s intelligence service remains a threat.

The new emphasis on intelligence-sharing creates new challenges, including how to widely disseminate classified information, overcome sensitivities regarding intelligence sources and methods, and maintain counterintelligence vigilance. Even with regard to combating transnational terrorism, national interests still govern



states' behaviors. And when expanding beyond traditional allies, a variety of practical and counterintelligence concerns arise.

As a major threat to security and order in the 21st century, terrorism demands a more deliberative and effective response. Extremists will use religion and any other means to attract the disaffected. Countering extremism requires people and nations to buy into a rule-based order with law enforcement structures and intelligence capacity to protect societal interests. The challenge, as findings demonstrate, is to harness a vision for international cooperation on counter-terrorism and construct a roadmap for its strategic implementation.

The struggle against terrorism rests on four facets of responsible sovereignty: effective strategies to combat terrorism require states to fulfill universal responsibilities not to sponsor, aid or abet transnational terrorism; to take responsibility for the external impacts of conditions within their borders; to take responsibility for the well-being of their citizens and therefore diminish the risk of terrorism; and to build adequate capacity to implement their responsibilities. This last point, on state capacity, underscores that powerful states have an incentive based on self-interest, as well as a positive responsibility, to assist weak states. If states want to create an international system that helps them protect the territory within each of their borders, they need the cooperation of all states. That creates an imperative to build the capabilities of even the weakest links in the chain.


An effective response against both the Al-Shabaab threat and terrorism more generally will require extensive international cooperation and infrastructure. Stronger capabilities are needed to authorize and support offensive efforts against

Al-Shabaab; to build national capacity and support local strategies against terrorism; to implement a robust legal and normative framework; to further articulate state responsibilities; and to support tactical cooperation on intelligence and financing.

### 6.8 Effectiveness of Structural Capacity in Intelligence Sharing

The study further sought respondents' views on the effectiveness of structural capacity initiatives

of Kenya and Somalia intelligence agencies and whether those initiatives enhance intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism. Results of the data analyzed are given in Figure 6.7.



**Figure 6.7. Effectiveness of Intelligence-Sharing Initiatives**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Findings in Figure 6.7 show Kenya response; 6(2.2%) said very effective, 30(10.8%) said effective, 100(36%) felt it was fair, 76(27.4%) noted not effective while 66(23.7%) said poor. Responses from Somalia show 1.2% said very effective, 3(3.6%) said effective, 10(13.3%) noted it was fair, 16(22.2%) felt it was not

effective while 44(59.7%) said poor. The indication of 2.2% who said very effective, 10.8% said effective, 36% felt it was fair could be attributed to Kenya's efforts to implement a range of overt, covert, and clandestine programs to counter the transnational terrorist threat in this region. It appear, following a series of attacks on Kenyan soil, that government shift from a primarily law enforcement response to one guided by a broad strategy in intelligence sharing is work in progress.

On the other hand, 27.4% noted not effective while 23.7% said poor (Kenya) while responses from Somalia show 22.2% felt it was not effective while 59.7% said poor. Several factors may account for the apparent low level of state police involvement in the new information sharing environment. One possibility is that the scenarios simply did not incorporate elements that would have made state police participation more relevant.

A second view is that state police are a relatively small slice of the law enforcement pie. Also, state fusion centers may have superseded state police agencies as the principal state-level cogs in the system if so, this probably just reflects how the new system is supposed to operate.

Additionally, though, it is probably the case that many local agencies have their own direct connections, or other agencies, so that no state-level involvement is initiated in many situations. From an efficiency standpoint this may seem desirable; however, it might limit information sharing and intelligence development if pertinent information does not also find its way to broader networks such as the state fusion centers or the national counterterrorism centers in each country. A potential value of following the “need to share” philosophy in this scenario has challenges and was outlined by a different respondent.

Very poor. Somalia has no adoptable intelligence system and clans supersede state security. Kenya has initiated its own intelligence surveillance deep into Somalia. No effective sharing of intelligence due to lack of interest and political clan base. Poor, there is mistrust between the two countries when it comes to intelligence sharing (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency (NISA) officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

As responses to these scenarios illustrate, there remains a good bit of skepticism about the free flow of information from both ends. Traditional obstacles and barriers certainly remain even though progress has been made. The results agree with conventional scholarly excerpts on intelligence analysts pointing out that police intelligence gathering cycle as having a problem. Intelligence failure happens when there are inadequacies within the 6-intelligence cycles, with intelligence analysis stage being the most critical stage of the cycle (Shulsky & Schmitt, 2002). The failure in intelligence could be attributed to what Lowenthal (1985) described as the inability of one or more parts of the intelligence process including collection, evaluation and analysis, production and dissemination, to produce timely, accurate intelligence on an issue or event of importance to national interests.

Shulsky and Schmitt (2002) point out that the lack of links between intelligence and policy, and indicate that an intelligence failure arise when recipients misuse the intelligence they are given. It could be that while the intelligence gathering by police does the best it could in the wake of new terrorism attacks and threats to collect and pass on a multitude of threat warnings, policy makers and other security agencies have failed to take the necessary precautions to combat terrorism. An interview with key informants revealed that intelligence sharing has not been effective with a lack of intelligence sharing on terrorism issues.

A failed state, Somalia continues to be governed as a series of fiefdoms supported largely by the business class and the militias they finance. The situation in Somalia raises serious concerns and challenge effectiveness of intelligence sharing.

The potential for terrorist activity emanating from Somalia is real and requires close monitoring; intelligence-sharing initiatives are weak because communities are neglected in security arrangements. The military strategy, though effective, is not all effective and challenges the extent to which intelligence is shared because some have vested interest (Interview with male state officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

In view of the above, the role of military is critical in matters of terrorism in the region. Within the context of security-based diplomacy, the AU peacekeeping mission to Somalia in 2007 revealed the organization's limitations. The AMISOM groups have been involved in armed confrontation with local groups, which highlighted the inadequacy of the mission's actions regarding the complexity of the situation. While the "war on terrorism" usually relates to internationally linked terrorists, Kenya and Somalia could face other security threats of equal or greater significance, posing a question of focus on the new security-based approach in counterterrorism efforts.

As results suggest, response from Somalia (22.2% felt it was not effective while 59.7% said poor) is a solid revelation on the lack of accurate intelligence that is an effect of the operational difficulties of running human sources in such complicated operating environments especially in Central and Southern Somalia which are held by Al-Shabaab.

According Rotberg (2005), many government officials blame the terrorist problems on the outsiders, especially Somali: the absence of any central authority, the

presence of organized warlords, the growth of politicized Islamic organizations like Al Itihad Al Islamiya, and the proliferation of thousands of small arms, combined with Kenya's long porous northern border, were enough to indict Somalia and its people. As a result, Kenyan officials were extremely reluctant to acknowledge that any Kenyan citizens were directly and actively involved in carrying out terrorist activities in their own country.

International assistance for terrorism prevention operations, however, is scattershot. Instead of a comprehensive approach to bolstering capacity across a range of countries, efforts tend to pick and choose current hotspots, potentially neglecting future areas of concern (Carson, 2005). Moreover, many analysts find bilateral capacity-building arrangements too security-minded, with military and law enforcement concerns trumping those of good governance and relevant development programming. Critics also point out that there is little oversight and monitoring of how funds are actually used by recipient governments, restricting the overall impact of the effectiveness of intelligence sharing.

Information sharing is perhaps the most important factor in the protection and resilience of critical infrastructure. Information on threats to infrastructure and their likely impact underlies nearly every security decision made by owners and operators, including which assets to protect, how to make operations more resilient, how to plan for potential disasters, when to ramp up to higher levels of security, and how to respond in the immediate aftermath of a disaster .

Effective critical infrastructure protection and resilience relies on access to timely, accurate, and actionable information. Reliable information on suspected threats, known vulnerabilities, and their potential consequences enables infrastructure

owners and operators to assess risks and take action, such as prioritizing assets, implementing effective security measures, and improving emergency plans. Such information underlies nearly every security decision, and the most valuable threat information that the private sector receives originates in the government. From the ground up, information on threats or suspicious activity observed by owners and operators at the asset level can give insight into potential national-level threats.

Since 2002 Kenya has taken following legislative and executive measures to ensure compliance with Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001; enactment on Act no 9 of 2009 Proceed of Crime and Money Laundering Act, the most Contentious was an attempt of specific counter terrorism legislation. Pursuant to Kenya's introduction of the Suppression of Terrorism Bill in 2003, certain provisions, including those that sought to make it an offence for one to wear or use items associated with terrorists, was perceived as an attack on the Muslim community and their mode of dressing.

One respondent was quoted as follows:

The terrorism bill was well intended, but many felt that the counter-terrorism agenda of the country sought to promote religious and ethnic prejudices or, at best, was based on religious and ethnic prejudices. This led to stiff opposition from certain elements in Kenya, among which was the Muslim community (Interview with female key informant-NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

Other arguments in opposition to the Counter terrorism legislation as observed by Nzamba included; The bill was seen as a threat to personal liberties and human rights; As arbitrary and therefore prone to abuse by agents of the state even when there is no threat of terrorism; As religiously and racially discriminatory; As an imposition by The United States of America and Western Nations; The definitions of

terrorism, terrorist organizations, terrorist property in the bill are so wide that being drunk and disorderly or in possession of a pen knife can fit the definition (Nzamba,2010).

Despite the failure by Kenya to enact specific counter-terrorism legislation, it has sought to fight terrorism in several other ways,<sup>12</sup> including the establishment of the National Security Intelligence Service with support from the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Program; creation of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) in 1998, a Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) in 2003; and the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC) in 2004 which has since been scrapped. Additional measures include participation in the U.S. Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP), which provides technology to screen travelers arriving at airports and border crossings. Interview response noted gaps within intelligence as follows:

Intelligence operatives in counter terrorism has been concentrated on predominantly Muslim areas in North Eastern province on the border with Somalia and the Coastal strip that is inhabited with predominant Muslim Arab-Swahili communities bringing to the fore allegations of discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity and religion in the operations (FGD with religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).


It appears that the absence of a legislative framework to regulate the counter terrorism action coupled with impunity by the well endowed state officials engaged in the action has resulted in outright violations of rights leaving victims of such violations without any judicial remedies of redress. The continued implementation of counter terrorism measures in Kenya that is catalysed by, a considerable supply of resources for the Kenyan government. Because aid appears to have been pegged to



the perceived terrorism risk rather than to the level of counterterrorism effort, Kenyan officials have incentives to tolerate a low level of terrorism. Moreover, close cooperation with the U.S. entails significant costs for the Kenyan government.<sup>28</sup> With the poor human rights record and lack of good governance these measures are domestically seen in the context of fueling abuse and massive human rights violations.

### 6.9 Community Intelligence in Counterterrorism

The study further sought to establish the effectiveness of community intelligence and whether it is utilized as a strategy to manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The results of this analysis were presented in Figure 6.8.



N=277 (Kenya)  
N=73 (Somalia)

**Figure 6.8 Community intelligence in counterterrorism**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Figure 6.8, 50(18%) said great extent, 83(30%) said moderate extent while 144(52%) cited less extent from Kenya. For Somalia, 9(12%) said great extent, 20(28%) moderate while 44(60%) noted less extent.

For Somalia, majority (60%) said less extent highlighting major gaps in community intelligence, which could be related to the trend toward clan and proportional clan-based representation in Somalia's nascent federal government that has often led to a "hardening" of ethnic identities. In such an environment, penetrating communities and enhancing peace building efforts, coupled with outside actors that have influenced and exacerbated the situation in Somalia

As indicated, 18% who cited great extent in Kenya may be an indication relating to ongoing efforts by government to acknowledge and address the risks to communities as well as state agencies in highlighting the fundamental connection between state and community security. However, response from Kenya reveal 52% cited less extent may be due to the exclusion tactic employed by police officers that in some cases may result to highly successful prevention interventions without leaking intelligence to the public. With this background in mind, it is important to develop a range of community-based initiatives designed to foster social cohesion and inter-cultural dialogues that make it easier to isolate terrorists from their potential communities through shared intelligence.

Indeed, there has been an effort in institutionalization of community policing in Kenya which has helped promote the advantages of a community approach in the minds of police and public alike. The diversified process requires that citizens must trust the police, while the police must have trust in the people in order for a sense of community to successfully take form. However, lack of full realization of the benefits of community intelligence and policing remain formidable, with increasing grenade attacks and threats pausing fear among police and the public at large. It may

seem that police regard community intelligence primarily as a means of instructing local populations, rather than of listening to them.

Information gained from citizens helps define the parameters of community problems. In Intelligent-Led- Policing, information input is the essential ingredient for intelligence analysis. Therefore, communications from the public can provide valuable information for the intelligence cycle. When threats are defined with specific information, communicating critical information to citizens may help prevent a terrorist attack and, like community policing, will reduce fear.

Community intelligence and community-led-policing is seen by some as an ideal local police strategy because it helps officers get to know their communities and builds trust, making it more likely that residents will share important information with the police. It has become common to refer to local police as “first preventers” who are most likely to be in a position to prevent a terrorist act, both by gathering information and by taking action, when appropriate.

The response above demonstrates what Wasserman (2001) notes that national intelligence agencies, by themselves, however strong and capable, may not be able to deal with this new threat of a trans-national nature. The new terrorism calls for a revamped intelligence apparatus at the national level and a reinforced co-operation mechanism that involves the local community. Kenya has experienced recent grenade attacks and terror threats, and thus intelligence is a key feature of policing, for this is the basis upon which crimes are both prevented as well as solved.

In modern intelligence, gathering and sharing frameworks, the fact that intelligence-sharing failures hamper war on terrorism underscores the need to increase incentives and sharing programmes to increase threat preemption. This scenario draws out failure in intelligence sharing between allies in war against terror. In an early and still useful expression of this view, Wasserman (2001) criticized the intelligence community for an unwise emphasis on current intelligence and the accumulation of data. Instead, he argued, intelligence should focus on longer-term and analytic efforts, shaped by a closer understanding of what policy makers believe and care about. An interview with key informants revealed that intelligence sharing has not been effective with a lack of intelligence sharing on terrorism issues.

To some larger extent community policing and local administrative leaders has been involved in the war against terrorism. Not much. The Nyumba Kumi implementation is shaky and unpromising. Also poorly community intelligence is neglected and not trusted by the concerned forces. Anyone who volunteers to give intelligence information will be grilled rather than to be appreciated (Interview with female key informant-NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

In view of the above, it indicates that a breakdown of police-community relations can have serious consequences for policing, and in the context of counterterrorism can halt the flow of vital information from communities. As the findings suggest, a lack of community intelligence may then lead to further intrusive, hair-based policing strategies to be employed because suspicion tends to be of the community as a whole rather than being limited to specific groups or individuals and so generating and/or reinforcing community anger, frustration and paranoia. One respondent was categorical and noted the following during a FGD:

It is a very important tool, but Somali community fear in giving out intelligence information for being victimized. Poor neglected and entrusted community intelligence by the concerned organs. In most cases, information volunteered will be grilled not appreciated. It's not properly utilized due lack of trust especially by the Kenyan Muslims community. They have issues with the government due marginalization which they claim due to historical injustices (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Intelligence Security Agency officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

In view of the above, the community regards intelligence sharing as a strategy that demands confidential informants and surveillance. Some viewed it as an intrusive and sensitive tactic which the researcher identified to stem from a misunderstanding of the difference between the tactics used to gather information, and intelligence-led policing. As terrorists move to new methods of attack, law enforcement and first responders must use comprehensive and timely information and intelligence to both anticipate potential threats and to ensure a high measure of adaptability in responses. Perhaps the critical aspect revealed during the interview was the fact that the community is willing to give information on crime trends but the police don't follow up to use that information to prevent crime. FGD responses revealed this:

At least we have had some terrorist threats have been thwarted. But I don't know what happens as police don't take the information we give them seriously. Sometimes they take too long to act on reports and in this way, terrorist manage to launch attacks killing innocent citizens. Mutual trust is essential if this community-intelligence has to be effective (FGD -male religious-based member in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

The statement highlights the need for police to effectively utilize any information given to prevent crime and terrorist attacks. Of particular importance, however, given the nature and scope of intelligence and crime analysis units, is the issue of why they do not work more closely together to provide a more holistic approach to

crime problems and to better inform decision makers about the problems affecting the communities they serve. In many cases, however, this increase in data has not necessarily translated to an increase in knowledge. Then, that the structure of information handling processes within community policing is not effectively set up to facilitate intelligence management and dissemination. Therefore, it is important for police to use crime analysis because it can provide them with an understanding of crime patterns and trends. Without this understanding of both crime patterns and criminal behavior, people who have to make decisions that affect the safety and security of communities will not have access to the vital, synthesized information essential to good planning and strategy.

The shift to security-based diplomacy therefore demands new strategy. The emphasis and role of community policing in intelligence sharing is more proactive than traditional policing models when community do appreciate and value its role in countering terrorism. One respondent during FGD said the following:

The religion factor and clanism issues in Somalia make trust with local and foreign relation a challenge: marginalization and exclusion is also a factor, and to some extent communities that feel neglected by the government cannot open up and often look at such involvement with suspicion. We have seen cases where police target some communities like Eastleigh in Nairobi (FGD with male religious groups in Nairobi, 22th September, 2015).

The reason for such may be that community intelligence may provide increased contacts between police and communities, exposing police to more public scrutiny, which in turn, affects how citizens rate police performance and decide to participate in addressing terror problems. This agrees with a recent report by Ndungu (2011), indicating that public confidence in Kenya's police force has been eroded due to

accusations of impunity, excessive use of force and brutality, disregard for human rights, abuse of due process and malignant corruption. Public outcry for transformation in the Kenya Police sector in particular has been driven by the ills in the police force whose nefarious reputation has eroded public trust. Those feelings continue to persist but the on-going reforms have brought some hope that the 'force' will transform into a 'service' that is accountable, professional, transparent and possessing a human rights sensitive approach, as well as the operational capacity to deliver on its obligations to the Kenyan public.


Although it has generally been seen that the coverage of strategic intelligence by the security agencies has been satisfactory, their collection of tactical or prevention intelligence has left much to be desired. It poses ethical problems, which are not appreciated by public opinion. Research by intelligence and counterterrorism experts, one of the most obvious significant deficiencies exposed by The Nation Newspaper, 1st July, 2012 terror attack in Garissa besides previous numerous terror attacks in Kenya, revealed "the weakness within our intelligence agencies. These weaknesses enabled the terrorists to plan, develop, and execute their attack without detection."

The intelligence community has its own deeply embedded culture and value systems. In contrast to law enforcement, the intelligence community focuses beyond the borders of the States and on the future, assessing foreign trends and actions (Biswas, 2009). The intelligence community is the first line of defense. A sharper focus on offensive preventive measures and deeper analysis will be necessary. These findings make it necessary to maintain aggressive community intelligence and law

enforcement operations especially in the context of the security-based diplomacy approach in transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

**6.10 Challenges Contributing to Intelligence Failure**

The new emphasis on intelligence-sharing creates new challenges with regard to combating transnational terrorism. The study sought to establish possible challenges contributing to intelligence failure in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The analysis results are presented in Figure 6.10.



N=277 (Kenya)  
N=73 (Somalia)

**Figure 6.9. Challenges contributing to Intelligence Failure**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From the findings in Figure 6.10, various challenges contributing to intelligence failure in the management of transnational terrorism were suggested. Political controversy and national biases was majorly by 90(25.8%) cited as a key challenge. Other challenges include mistrust on the part of countries involved 55(15.6%), inadequate technology 85(24.2%), ineffective command structure 45(12.9%),



limited inter-agency cooperation 56(16.1%), ineffective analytical framework within intelligence networks 9(2.7%), competing interests 44(12.5%).

Throughout this study, the idea that intelligence cooperation and trust is in essence beneficial for both parties is supported. It has been argued that no effective counter-terrorism policy can exist without intense and substantial intelligence cooperation at the national and international level. Most interviewees agreed with this statement and support it in practice. However, some interviewees and key informants pointed out that sometimes intelligence cooperation may be “forced” upon them by politicians, and that these contacts prove of little or no value to national intelligence services in their perception.

Thus, national intelligence services are hesitant to commit time and resources to international cooperation that is ‘forced’ upon them, rather than initiated by themselves to improve their information position. They argue that intelligence cooperation is not always necessary, and that sometimes intelligence cooperation in general gives them poor results. One key informant was categorical and noted the following:

There are many statutes that require agencies to report to the state but none to require them to share information back to anyone. To state the problem simply: the police have an inherent distrust for local community and all the local communities do is mirror that distrust right back at them (Interview with civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

From this view, the culture of some national intelligence services can be characterized as ‘skeptical’. The expectations on results of intelligence cooperation are low. Furthermore, rivalry might exist between agencies within the same country about who is tasked with international cooperation. Other problems include: logistics, communication, the incompatibility of timescales. This term refers to the behavior of intelligence officers when they agree to a certain amount of cooperation, but refuse to commit time or other resources from their own organization.

The language barrier also plays a role here: best results are achieved mostly in bilateral in which the partners speak the same language. Sharing is possible also without such a personal relationship; however, respondents viewed the chances of results of such sharing as substantially lower where language may be a barrier. Another challenge relates to the failed state, Somalia continues to be governed as a series of fiefdoms supported largely by the business class and the militias they finance. Clan ties are more important than religious ones. There are few places to hide and non-Somalis are highly conspicuous in Somali society. Somalis are pragmatic and quick to shift loyalties. They would not hesitate to expose an outsider if they found it in their interest (Clife, 2009).

McGregor (2014) argues that the manifest shortcomings of this mixed record do not indicate that security-based diplomacy should not be a major component of counterterrorism strategy. They do, however, show that security-force assistance is not a counterterrorism panacea (McGregor, 2014). One particular key informant was quoted as follows:

The intelligence community is slow to change. The concept of intelligence-led law enforcement is not yet engrained in the intelligence community and this creates loopholes which have made the country prone to attacks that would often have been prevented (Interview with a University Lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

On the same note, response from FGD raised concerns, with an argument that:

Kenyan internal security policies are subject to politicization which challenges effective intelligence sharing. Respondents wondered why Ethiopia, which is also in Somalia and has a large Somali population, has remained relatively safe (FGD with a female religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

What is it that Ethiopia has done better in because Al-Shabaab attacks have not been reported there, yet Kenya is the target. We need to learn from this and change tactic towards intelligence sharing. Corruption and lack of effective sharing of intelligence and joint cooperation among agencies from both countries. Some terrorist are a creation of intelligence agencies of some states, therefore no trusts exists due to level of corruption states become reluctant to share intelligence. The budget especially availability of resources to assist obtain information is relevant (FGD male response from religious group in Nairobi, 22th September, 2015).

What comes out is that many view Kenya strategies as having gaps, and should not emulate Ethiopia's strategy, focus should be on an honest assessment of how internal security policies indeed, as the above response indicates, corruption still challenges effective intelligence in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

The failure to cooperate in the area of counterterrorism can be explained in many ways. For instance, disparities in the political, administrative and judicial frameworks between Kenya and Somalia are likely to obstruct effective information sharing and coordination. Secondly, in some cases, police agencies deal with

terrorism, while in others intelligence agencies are responsible for this area. Cooperation between intelligence and police agencies is difficult as they often have mismatched interests in information. While police agencies might be particularly interested in specific information with prosecutorial purposes, intelligence agencies might seek more general information (Deflem 2006).

To a great extent, conventional literature on international intelligence cooperation assumes states are sole, unitary actors rationally deciding on cooperation. Nevertheless, this state-centric perspective does not seem to fit the case of intelligence cooperation on counter terrorism within Kenya-Somalia case. Grey (2009) observes that the study of intelligence has been overlooked by organizational literature and argues that agencies relating to intelligence, counter terrorism, warfare, defence procurement or policing can be understood as organizational apparatuses and thus, studied in a similar way (Grey 2009, 311). Consistent with this view is Fägersten's opinion (2010). The author interestingly points out that intelligence cooperation within is hindered by bureaucratic barriers under two forms: bureaucratic interests and bureaucratic culture.

The bureaucratic interests are related to the so-called "asset specificity." Fägersten (2010) briefly, social, material or knowledge-based investments in an institution cannot effectively be reallocated. This theoretical framework could better explain, for instance, why intelligence remains a challenge. In this context, the national character of the professional culture is likely to hamper effective communication across similar bodies in different states as opposed to other professional cultures which are transnational in their nature (Herman, 2009). Yet, as transnational threats such as terrorism cannot be effectively addressed singularly, intelligence sharing can

prove vital for the national interest. From the above findings, it is evident that confidence is thus needed before any communication of intelligence cooperation can take place. When a step (e.g. from communication to coordination) is taken successfully and the confidence basis is intact, the relationship can take a step to the next level.

### **6.11 Strategies to Enhance Effective intelligence Sharing**

The study further sought respondents' views on strategic ways that Kenya and Somalia could employ to enhance intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism. A number of suggestions were made. Of importance was the need to foster training to local law enforcement in this area of intelligence sharing. Local law enforcement needs to recognize when this type of information should be forwarded to the appropriate intelligence agencies. More importantly, critical information on these types of crimes comes not only through reports or information analysis, but also through human sources. One respondents from FGD was quoted as follows:

Effective and focused training can improve the confidence of community members and the public's perception that information is being handled appropriately. The right training, coupled with intelligence policies, will better enable sharing and ultimately will help change the cultures (FGD respondent in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

In view of the above, human source development training should be enhanced to help local police officers develop homeland security sources at the local level. The private sector should also be better trained and utilized for recognition and timely reporting of suspicious criminal activity related to our homeland security. While

training is essential, people have a natural tendency to resist change. For this reason, respondents suggested the need for leaders throughout the intelligence and law enforcement communities to consistently and repeatedly deliver the message of change and ensure that everyone understands the importance of sharing information. Analysts who have been told for years that releasing certain types of information violates the law must now be strongly encouraged to exchange the information with others. One key informant who was interviewed also noted the following:

Kenya and Somalia should learn a lesson from the system of USA and Israel. Security should be locally owned. Security should be brought down, then strengthen community policing and *Nyumba Kumi*. Create a sense of cohesion and confidence amongst the security agencies for both countries. Financial support to intelligence agency in Somalia is key. Devolve intelligence to localized levels, and bring on board borderline communities for intelligence information (Interview with government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

Indeed, abuses of the past have made the public skeptical about the government's role in intelligence sharing. Yet, the public wants and deserves a collaborative intelligence and law enforcement community effectively working together to prevent another terrorist attack. Building trust requires strong leadership, clear laws and guidelines, and advanced technologies to ensure that information sharing serves important purposes in the management of transnational terrorism. According to FGD, one respondent was quoted as follows:

Unless Kenya and Somalia can overcome their historical distrust, there can be no progress in eliminating terrorism and insurgency that cross national borders (FGD response from a female religious group in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

From the foregoing, it is clear that the impediments to protecting sources and methods while enabling effective information sharing need to be enhanced. Respondents suggested that technology should be embraced as a key in easing the administrative burdens of sharing information. Counterterrorism efforts put into place require the application of instruments of power so as to assist in ending the terrorist groups. Postmodernism provides a reflective and descriptive approach in security studies although limited in its prescriptive and normative character. Firstly, postmodernism highlighted the importance of discourses societies in the developing world facing security challenges. Discourses can cause exclusion or inclusion based on the perception of other groups, individual or states can create to the listener. Discourses would need to be taking into account to overcome security challenges in the developing world. Secondly, postmodernism provides an inclusive approach that advocates for the acceptance of different narratives of the reality. In this case, postmodernism highlights the importance of having an open attitude to listen to different narratives in order to improve the understanding of the security challenges facing Kenya and Somalia within the context of transnational terrorism. It is true that the ending of any terrorist attacks requires use of intelligent policy instruments, which involve political affiliations as well as military intervention, in addition to humanitarian assistance. Before any instruments of power can be put into place, it is necessary to understand the goals of the terrorist group and their depth

## **6.12 Summary**

The chapter has provided analytical cases of the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The findings reveal that the need for greater collaboration among states and intelligence agencies on issues related to transnational terrorism is key. The findings reveal the level of cooperation seems to vary greatly. Too often, the various security agencies involved in security have been blamed for a lack of cooperation. The majority of respondents believe that terrorist incidences demonstrate clear deficiencies within the structural capacity and organization of Kenya-Somalia counter-terrorism intelligence community. As the findings show, the link between intelligence failure and clanism between Kenya and Somalia highlights sharing sensitive information inevitably raises the danger that intelligence sources and methods can be compromised either accidentally or purposefully. Kenya and Somalia have been plagued by attacks from Al-Shabaab militants, and Somalia's state collapse and the security threats pose a great challenge to intelligence sharing. The findings strongly indicate that majority of respondents in Somalia feel security agencies have not developed effective special investigation techniques, surveillance and use of information technology in the management of transnational terrorism. Training is fairly done-given that the city has previously been affected. But the security agencies have not embraced sharing of intelligence information down to the communities. The findings in this study indicate serious concerns about trust between Kenya and Somalia agencies.

Community-based initiatives in intelligence sharing are still weak. The findings show majority feel adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, relationship with the intelligence community and enhancing a mechanism to ensure



accountability in the management are weak. Interstate cooperation is relatively positive, but cooperation of local security agencies with foreign intelligence services is still work in progress, often linked to gaps in policies designed to build such relationships in counterterrorism.

A number of challenges contributing to intelligence failure in the management of transnational terrorism were suggested. Political controversy and national biases was majorly (25.8%) cited as a key challenge. Other challenges include mistrust on the part of countries involved, inadequate technology, ineffective command structure, limited inter-agency cooperation, ineffective analytical framework within intelligence networks and competing interests. The idea that intelligence cooperation and trust is in essence beneficial for both parties is supported. The bureaucratic and political interference were also cited as hindrances to effective intelligence sharing.

This chapter has found out that today, Kenya and Somalia intelligence functions in a dramatically different security environment; especially the rise of transnational terrorism is a credible and realistic threat for the security of the citizens and intelligence community. There is progress in surveillance, but from the Kenyan side, and the approach looks promising and holds much potential for stimulating counterterrorism intelligence cooperation in the region. Various factors play important roles in regulating the behavior of intelligence officers when sharing intelligence through international formal channels. Restraints of resources, language problems, the absence of trust, time constraints, and cultural differences contribute to making international intelligence cooperation more difficult.

With that in mind, it is important to recognize that terrorism still poses a threat despite greater cooperation on intelligence sharing fronts. In responding to the terror threat, states are enhancing other tools of engagement such as increased border checks. It is prudent to interrogate the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in managing transnational terrorism. This is the subject of the next chapter.

**CHAPTER SEVEN**  
**THE EFFECTIVENESS OF BORDER SURVEILLANCE STRATEGIES IN**  
**THE MANAGEMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM BETWEEN**  
**KENYA AND SOMALIA**

This chapter examined the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The chapter provides findings and discussions as well as a summary of key findings.

**7.1 The importance of Kenya-Somalia Border Controls in Countering Transnational Terrorism**

Border surveillance plays a critical role in the management of transnational terrorism. With respect to threats and trends, that terrorism remains one of the most enduring challenges to Kenya and Somalia and therefore an overall success on border control is key to the management of transnational terrorism. This strong endorsement for effective border controls was highly expressed as follows:

Border controls between Kenya and Somalia represent one challenge that our security forces have failed to fill this loophole because the security barriers are poor. There is need to enhance measures that can effectively limit cross-border terrorist movements and enable the country to prevent attacks which have killed many innocent lives here in Kenya as well as in Somalia (Interview with male government security officer in Garisa, 22nd September, 2015).

From the above statement, it is evident that addressing border security appears to be a plausible approach for states that suffer from terrorism. Kenya's border wall is to keep terrorists out of Kenya. In Kenya's case, recent measures like building a wall represent just how important Kenya-Somalia border controls mean in countering transnational terrorism. Another respondent was quoted as follows:

There are many ‘panya (rat) routes’ and they are the paths used by Al-Shabaab-even at the official border checkpoints, no patrols, no security searches sometimes-so you can bring whoever and whatever you want in and out. We hear Kenya wants to build a wall along the border, but the problem should start fist from both countries and citizens working together to combat terrorism especially monitoring illegal groups at border areas (FGD response from a female religious group in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).


The above statement clearly demomnstartes that while a great deal of progress is evident, significant challenges and obstacles remain in improving border management and security between Kenya and Somalia. Simila views have been cited by Lamptey (2010), indicating that despite the challenges and threats posed by border insecurity, there is a lack of a common approach in terms of policy formulation, at the national and sub-regional levels in border control ans counterterrorism. The importance of Kenya-Somalia border controls in countering transnational terrorism thus should give priority to preventing terrorists and terrorists weapons, and facilitating the flow of legal immigration and goods while preventing the illegal trafficking of people and contraband. According to one respondent:

Kenya-Somalia border controls are not effective since surveillance, following up leads, and strict traffic checkpoints along highways leading from border areas are weak. Often, the border is a barely discernible line in uninhabited areas, and this requires that our security men and women utilize a variety of equipment and methods to ensure these terrorists don’t take advantage. But this is not happening because corruption is also in all these- We need to up out game (Interview with male government security officer in Garisa, 22nd September, 2015).

This observation demonstrates the challenge of putting in place consistent and long-term support to assist under- resourced countries to address security issues related to border management. Indeed, for Kenya and Somalia, there are many further aspects that make the issue of border management complex. The arbitrarily demarcated

borders of the colonial era mean that people from the same ethnic group are often divided by political boundaries. This has affected mobility and encouraged the use of unapproved border crossings for familial and economic activities. Moreover, the work of border security officials is hampered by logistics and poor government remuneration, creating avenues for corruption. The results indicate the need for a comprehensive analysis of the major elements of border management systems including procedures, identity management, interagency and international cooperation, monitoring and reporting in order to identify gaps and anticipate efficient capacity building measures needed to bolster preparedness.

The study further sought to establish the extent to which Kenya-Somalia border controls have been effective in countering transnational terrorism. Results of the analysis are as given in Figure 7.1



**Figure 7.1 The importance of Kenya-Somalia border controls in counterterrorism**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 7.1, Response from Kenya show 44(16%) said satisfactory, 94(34%) cited fair, 139(50%) said not satisfactory. Response from Somalia reveals 45(62%) said not satisfactory, 22(30%) cited fair while 6(8%) mentioned satisfactory.

As findings show, the 16% response from Kenya and 8% from Somalia who cited satisfactory points to the recent years that have witnessed calls for the intensification of surveillance and monitoring of the movement of people across the Kenya Somalia borders. An indication relating to the Kenyan government's dramatic new steps to secure its border with Somalia by erecting a wall designed to keep out militants after a series of cross-border raids by Al-Shabaab militants.

This intensification of surveillance of movement, however, appears to be at odds with the minimization of checks and porosity of the borders, which have been blamed for the Al-Shabaab strategic attacks in Kenya. This explains why 50% and 62% said not satisfactory from Kenya and Somalia response respectively. Borders serve many vital functions. All legitimate cargo trade passes over these borders, generating customs and other revenues and duties. In this sense, the borders facilitate the flow of trade, which is increasingly important to national economy. Borders are also a "check point" for monitoring the arrival and departure of people (Carafano, 2004).

For Kenya and Somalia, the devastating effects of transnational terrorism have put pressure on Kenya particularly, to urgently focus greater attention on improving their border counter-terrorism strategies. Although military defense and economic regulations have traditionally been central border concerns, in many places, states are re-tooling and reconfiguring their border regulatory apparatus to prioritize

policing with the objective to deny territorial access to both local and transnational terrorists who attempt to evade law enforcement efforts. Due to exponential increase in international travel, border management systems have to contend with additional risks associated with these movements including mass-casualty terrorist attacks, rising illegal immigration, and human trafficking which have exposed weaknesses in states' ability to manage their borders effectively. As one respondent noted:

The government needs to invest more heavily in border management frameworks with an aim of facilitating legitimate travel and trade, preventing terrorism and transnational criminal activity as well as reducing illegal migration flows (Interview with male government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

In view of the foregoing, border management ensures that all the resources available are employed to regulate the movement of people and goods across the borders. Its effectiveness depends to a large degree on the rules and procedures established to enforce the conditions under which entry is permitted including commitment to locating and removing those who breach the conditions of their stay. Within the security-based diplomacy approach, there is the need for balancing security imperatives that are facilitating the movement of legal persons and goods to enable the country to benefit from the open relationship with the rest of the world and at the same time preventing the situations that threaten the security of the state. Indeed, the security-based approach raises fundamental questions and concerns. According to one respondent:

One key concern at the Kenya-Somalia border is the activities of Al-Shabaab which is becoming stronger and its activities and attacks have continued to multiply, despite

a strong state security response. This should be clear to both Kenya and Somalia that border security alone cannot solve the root problem, because the problem of border dates back to historical colonial issues, and therefore to some extent not much has been done to deal with transnational terrorism (Interview with key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

What the foregoing statement above depicts is that the concept of human security and various cross-border flows depicted pose a challenge to security. They not only challenge the state by circumventing its control and threatening its institutions, but this also puts individuals at risk: they are the ones who face increasing insecurity when crossing the border. The everyday experiences of travelers and traders crossing the Kenya-Somalia border are highly contradictory to the legal stipulations. The behavior of security officials, who in some cases systematically violate these provisions, is crucial in this respect. According to a member of an FGD:

Border surveillance need to review the laws and rules and also intelligence curriculum and get to borrow with best practice from developed nations and allocate more funds. Monitoring and guarding of the border is very essential however it is too huge and porous that cannot be sealed all ago. Good and necessary but corruption is incompatible disease and the border is too long and air defense is centralized in command, there is no air patrol of the border (Interview with key informant in Mogadishu, 12th August, 2015).

From this statement, it is evident that it is the lack of implementation of an existing legal framework, which theoretically provides for human security in the border region t is the main challenge and creates such difficulties for citizens at the border. The enforcement of free mobility is the responsibility of the member states that are usually more willing to sign treaties and agreements than willing to (and/or being



capable of) implement their contents. Indeed, these problems have become aggravated in recent times by Kenya's policy of cross-border terrorism, along with its intensely hostile al Shabaab propaganda designed to mislead and sway the loyalties of the border population.

Both Kenya and Somalia governments recognize the importance of securing the open border and attempt to do so through a variety of measures, including surveillance, patrols, physical barriers, joint control operations and patrols, information exchange, intelligence assessments, and engagement with border communities on control and policing issues. However, the findings show that concerted control efforts by the relevant authorities are required in order to effectively address the risks presented by the open border.

In line with the security sector reorganization outlined in the 2010 Kenyan Constitution, the Government of Kenya divided counterterrorism functions among the three branches of the National Police Service the Kenya Police (including the investigative Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and the paramilitary General Services Unit), the Directorate of Criminal Investigation, and the Administration Police as well as non-police agencies such as the National Intelligence Service and elements of the Kenya Defense Forces. Operational effectiveness was impeded by poor interagency coordination among and within police, intelligence, and military forces; limited resources; insufficient training; endemic corruption; and an unclear command and control of, and politicization of, some terrorist incidents. In an effort to reverse this trend and improve operational effectiveness, the government made significant leadership changes.

Border security remains a challenge for Kenya due to the country's vast, sparsely populated border regions and porous borders, as well as corruption. According to one member of FGD:

This border region is particularly challenged when it comes to security and access: On the one hand, the Kenyan population suffers from a long standing marginalisation, failing to establish appropriate infrastructure and a meaningful administration to secure the region. So saying we can manage terrorism with these problems is a big lie. Something needs to be done (Interview with key informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

The foregoing response emphasizes the importance and challenges of border and the lack of capacity on border security and inadequate systems of national identification hampered law enforcement's ability to identify and detain potential terrorists. Terrorist screening watch lists, biographic and biometric screening, and other measures have been largely in place at major Kenyan ports of entry. Kenya continues its partnership with the United States to strengthen Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System border controls at major ports of entry, adding new ports of entry and upgrading systems nationwide. The Kenyan government focused increased attention on preventing the flow of foreign fighters, including Kenyan nationals attempting to join al-Shabaab in Somalia, as well as Kenyan national foreign fighters returning from abroad (Rosand, *et al.*, 2009).

### **Key Changes in the Kenya-Somalia Border Area since 1990**

By far the most important and dramatic change on the Somali side of the border occurred in January 1991, with the fall of the Barre regime and the subsequent collapse of the Somali state. The impact on the Kenya-Somalia border area was immediate and disastrous, especially in the first two years of civil war and famine

(Menkhaus, 1996). Upon the fall of the government, southern Somalia fell into heavily-armed chaos. Swarms of uncontrolled gunmen and residents looted everything of value in government buildings and in Mogadishu's residential neighbourhoods. Inter-clan violence led to massacres, ethnic cleansing, and a massive exodus of displaced persons in all directions. Armed battles pitting factions of the Darood and Hawiye clan-families swept across the countryside. In several instances, fighting border became a "shatter zone" within which residents were exposed to repeated rounds of looting until they began to starve. The massive famine which occurred from late 1991 through 1992, and which ultimately claimed an estimated 240,000 Somali lives, was thus almost entirely due to armed conflict and wartime plundering (Mahmoud, 2008).

One of the hallmark features of the crisis of 1991-1992, as Little (2003) points out, was the rise of an economy of plunder, in which a wide range of social groups from illiterate gunmen who fought to loot, to merchants of war who made millions of dollars exporting scrap metal from dismantled factories came to have a vested economic interest in continued lawlessness and armed conflict. International relief supplies became part of this economy, as warlords fought to control key ports of entry and transit of the valuable food shipments brought into the country (Little, 2003). On the other hand, Mahmoud (2008) points out that militias charged exorbitant fees to "guard" the food aid, and were complicit in diversion of relief supplies. By 1992, the food aid had become the principal commodity over which warlords fought. Emergency relief became part of the problem rather than part of the solution. In the Jubba regions, several sites Kismayo port, the Kismayo-Jilib

highway, Bardhere, Buale, and Beled Hawa were the principal food relief distribution hubs and attracted the most militia attention (Mahmoud, 2008).

Another important aspect of the civil war of 1991-1992 was the almost complete breakdown of authority at all levels. Militias were under only the loosest control of militia commanders, and fought mainly in order to loot (McPeak & Little, 2006). According to McPeak and Little (2006), clan elders lost control of young teen-age gunmen. Both clan customary law (*xeer*) and Islamic law were rendered largely irrelevant as constraints on lawless behavior. The result was an epidemic of massacres, rape, and other previously taboo brutalities. The Somali civil war produced a major weapons flow in the Kenya-Somalia border area (McPeak & Little, 2006).


According to Besteman and Cassanelli (1996), both government troops and liberation fronts looted the enormous Cold War armories of the army, producing a free flow of weapons and ammunition on the street. At the same time, the fall of the Mengistu government in Ethiopia and the disbanding of the Ethiopian army in 1991 flooded the regional market with cheap weaponry. Still more arms found their way into Somalia via the rapidly growing global arms trafficking in the immediate post-Cold War era (Brown, 2002). Some of these weapons found their way into Kenya, where they helped to produce destabilization in the border area and gave criminal elements in Nairobi greater access to cheap semi-automatic weapons. By 1991, the Kenyan police and military in northern Kenya were outgunned by clan militias and criminal gangs (Brown, 2002). One key informant noted the following:

Fears that the unpoliced border provides foreign or Somali terrorists with easy entrance into Kenya and an easy escape route remain strong and have been a major preoccupation of Western counter-terrorism partnership with the Kenyan government. Even more difficult has been differentiating between legitimate Islamist movements in the region and those with links to terrorism (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

From the foregoing, the Kenya-Somalia border challenge is historical, and understanding these dynamics is critical in the management of transnational terrorism. Goldsmith (1999) points out that the repeal of emergency rule in 1992 ushered in a new period of government retrenchment from the border area. While liberation from the harsh emergency laws was welcomed by local populations, the timing of the retrenchment was disastrous, coinciding as it did with the collapse of the Somali state and the spillover of arms, violence, and criminality across the border. In truth, even had the Kenyan government attempted to maintain the control it exercised via emergency rule it would have been overwhelmed by the tidal wave of refugees, militia, and guns from Somalia in 1991 and 1992. By late 1991, the Kenyan government had essentially lost control of hundreds of kilometers of territory in Northeast Province (Goldsmith, 1999). Even in major towns like Mandera, (Brown (2002) asserts that Kenyan police and military could not enter certain parts of the town after dark. The first half of the 1990s was a period when, at times and in some locations, northern Kenya was widely viewed by both locals and international aid workers as less safe than southern Somalia. Heavily armed clan-based militias and gangs, sometimes organized by business and political elites, engaged in looting of livestock and vehicles, terrorizing both Somali and non-Somali communities beyond the Tana River (Brown, 2002).

## 7.2 Strategies Currently Being Employed in Open Border Control

The researcher was interested in ascertaining strategies currently being employed in open border control. The results of the analysis are as given in Figure 7.2.



**Figure 7.2 Strategies currently being employed in open border control**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 7.3, response from Kenyan respondents, 15(5.4%) mentioned surveillance, 60(22%) said patrols, 40(14%) cited physical barriers, 118(42%) said joint control operations, 19(7%) mentioned information exchange, 11(4%) said intelligence assessment while 15(5%) cited border communities. On the other hand, Somalia response revealed 15(20%) said surveillance, 24(33%) mentioned patrols, 10(13%) cited information exchange, 5(6%) said intelligence assessment while 10(13%) mentioned border communities.

From the findings, joint control operations (42%) and patrols (33%) were cited as common strategies. The problem of long, uncontrolled and porous borders pose significant challenge to Kenya and Somalia. The joint control operations can be attributed to the efforts by the KDF in collaboration with Somalia National Army

(SNA) to counter terrorism. Because of its territorial proximity to Somalia, as well as the current lack of border security and resources to carry out a concerted counterterrorism offensive, Kenya is perhaps most susceptible to further terrorist attacks (Menkhaus and Boucek, 2010). At present, as noted by Harnisch (2010), because of resource constraints, as well as the practical challenges in monitoring the 400-mile border between the two countries, terror groups operating in Somalia “can essentially enter and leave Kenya freely, opening the door to hit the country’s soft targets more or less at will.” Other countries are also at risk, for example Ethiopia, whose border with Somalia is practically void of security.

According to Kaunert (2010), developing a framework for coordinated border management that focuses on the activities of border-control agencies during the pre-arrival, arrival and post-clearance phases of a border crossing is still a challenge for many states. As such, these findings point to the need for exploring States’ efforts to develop a coordinated approach by border control agencies to better enable them to share the information needed for effective transnational terrorism management.

According to one respondent:

Joint border control is key, because some attacks such as that on Garissa University could have been prevented if patrols are collaborative between Kenya and Somalia police. They need to build trust and work with communities around these borders; this can offer a long-term solution to both countries (Interview with male border patrol unit officer; Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

The response denotes that the growing list of cross-border issues cannot be resolved by isolated policy action at the national or sub-national levels. It is essential to forge strategic alliances at the regional level which support the development of consolidated approaches through regional platforms for dialogue and action (Rozemarijn, 2013). According to Cheema (2011), regional governance mechanisms

and institutional arrangements to respond to emerging cross-border issues and trends are critical; such as the movement of people including refugees and illegal migrants, regional trade integration for human development, effective and efficient water management, human trafficking, and health focusing on infectious disease surveillance and response (Cheema, 2011). One respondent was categorical when he noted the following:

The challenge is that information sharing across the two countries is not effective. Even in our country, the clan factor and Al-Shabaab sympathizers makes information sharing difficult (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).


Taken together, the findings show that developing a framework for coordinated border management is still a challenge for both Kenya and Somalia. As such, this study is important in exploring States' efforts to develop a coordinated approach by border control agencies to better enable them to share the information needed for effective transnational terrorism management; decision making on potential risk situations and also better enable them to integrate the necessary human and technological capacities to improve the legal, institutional and practical mechanisms to protect their borders.

### **7.2.1 Strategies Considered Effective in Managing Transnational Terrorism**

The researcher further sought respondents' views on strategies they considered to be effective in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

The results of the analysis are given in Figure 7.3.





**Figure 7.3 Strategies considered effective in managing transnational terrorism**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

The findings from Kenya response reveal surveillance 152(55%), patrols 199(72%), physical barriers (24%), joint control operations 66(70%), information exchange 177(64%), intelligence assessment 166(60%) and border communities 160(58%). On the other hand, response from Somalia reveal surveillance 41(56%), patrols 37(50%), physical barriers 9(12%), joint control operations 40(54%), information exchange 31(42%), intelligence assessment 33(45%) and border communities 26(36%)

As the findings demonstrate, patrols (72%) and joint operations (70%) scored high from Kenya responses. For Somalia, surveillance (56%) and patrols scored high. The steps to gaining operational control proceed sequentially: detection, identification, classification, and finally, response to emerging threats. However, owing to the security gaps that have been witnessed between Kenya and Somalia, developing a broad border security management plan is key. From the findings, it

thus clear that one strategy alone cannot be effective. State border surveillance includes measures, actions and powers taken along the state border and between border crossings for the purpose of combating cross-border crime, preventing illegal crossing of the state border and protecting its sanctity, on land, sea and inland waters. On the other hand, border check includes measures and actions to be carried out at a border crossing in the intended or immediately after completion of crossing the state border, in order to control the lawful entry of persons. Owing to the long stretch of Kenya-Somalia border area, a combination of strategies is needed for effective management of border security and managing transnational terrorism. As one key informant noted:

To some extent, the advances in surveillance can help, but modern surveillance assets have not been effectively utilized. Similarly, enhancing the quality of aerial surveillance and the ability to move troops to quickly occupy defensive positions is a challenge. The government should invest more and utilize other strategies because in some cases attacks have happened despite the presence of KDF in the border regions (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

In view of the foregoing suggestion, border security strategy needs to be shaped in light of an understanding of the most important threats. For instance, Boswell (2007) points out that the security of the maritime domain is an issue of global importance. The aims of maritime security are to detect and deter security threats; to take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities; and to safeguard passengers, crews, ships and their cargoes, port facilities and the people who work and live in port areas, while still allowing for the safe and efficient movement of maritime trade (Boswell, 2007). Terrorists trying to enter the country via ship require a different approach than counterfeiters trying to avoid customs by driving trucks of illegal goods through border checkpoints. Although this study is

specifically focused on land borders between points of entry, the findings point to the need for a country's border security strategy review to begin by examining the most likely potential threats and their most likely points of attempted entry given the terrain on the border of the given country.

Given the threat of transnational terrorism, (White, 2010) says that in addition to looking at the existing border security process and infrastructure, the border management should consider the strengths and weaknesses of various resources in the country and seek to make the best possible use of them. No two countries are likely to need the same border security solutions. A country that has an abundant workforce can rely more heavily on manpower, whereas a wealthier country with less available labor can opt for a more technologically intensive approach to border security. Indeed, based on the considerably varying responses between Kenyan and Somalia responses, border security strategy needs to identify specific capabilities that a country should develop. For example, such strategy could identify the specific combination of personnel, training, technology, and infrastructure to develop and implement those capabilities on and around the border.

The physical barriers (10.2%) were cited among Kenyan respondents, but not among respondents from Somalia. Moreover, the role of communities is key, an implication that control duties at state borders include tasks connected with various aspects of border security breaches, such as: prevention of smuggling of goods, narcotics, arms, and persons across borders, danger of spreading diseases infectious to people, animals and plants, strengthened control due to threats of transnational terrorism, protection of the unlawful interference in the operation of the equipment, and others.

As such, Amoore (2012) suggests that suppression of those requires a wide spectrum of strict control mechanisms. On the other hand, increase of scope in international trade, tourism, cultural and educational exchanges require more open borders. Therefore, border services have to create a balance between strict controls and completely open borders, and close co-operation of various services can contribute to creation of such a balance. Accordingly, one respondent noted:

Most of this activity is blamed by the authorities on the infiltration of Al-Shabaab terrorists across the poorly defended border. Intelligence sharing and information exchange is important; but only to the extent to which there is political will, which seems to be lacking, even among the local leaders who treat each party with suspicion (FGD with female religious groups in Mombasa, 28th August, 2015).

From this statement is that Kenya-Somalia borders have a variety of problems and issues and need a comprehensive focus for durable settlement. At many places, the social contours of the two countries' borders are mercilessly cut across and divided into various ethnic groups. In some cases, strategies employed such as patrol and surveillance have become a source of acute tension. The inter-ethnic relations are characterized by existence of number of bilateral disputes some of them rooted in historical past, others in current dynamics of bilateral issues. Similarly, the varying degrees based upon political will and local capacities challenge the effectiveness of such border management strategies.

### **7.2.2 Border Management Mandate**

Border surveillance and protection is intended to enable security measures to be taken in the event of terrorist threats. The study sought to establish respondents' views which group should be given the mandate to manage the borders. Data on the same were collected, analyzed and results presented as shown in Table 7.1.

**Table 7.1 Border management mandate**

	<b>Kenya</b>	<b>Somalia</b>
Military personnel	195(70.4%)	44(60%)
Regular police	33(11.8%)	15(20%)
Community policing units	27(9.7%)	3(4%)
Immigration personnel	12(4.3%)	7(10%)
Other	11(3.8%)	4(6%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 7.1, response from Kenya show majority 195(70%) felt military personnel were better placed to manager border security, 33(12%) mentioned regular police, 27(9.7%) cited community policing units, 12(4%) said immigration personnel while 11(3%) cited other. Regarding Somalia response, 44(60%) said military, 15(20%) felt regular police were better placed, 3(4%) suggested community policing units, 7(10%) cited immigration personnel while 4(6%) said other.

Majority from Kenya (70%) view military personnel better place to manage the borders. This could be attributed to the KDF role in Somalia, and their capacity to engage various strategies in defending the country. In most cases, some view the cross border crimes in the border regions as connivance and close nexus of the criminals and the police. The image shaped is that the police service is a corrupt force and this may be the reason only 11.8% mentioned regular police.

Indeed, the diversity of border threats and the complexity of border security and border management mission create challenges for border policing and security

policymaking and planning (Narayan, 2014). These challenges are amplified by the uncertainty and fear surrounding many border threats. Rather than attempting specific predictions about where, when, and how border threats will be realized, analysts often rely on risk management as an approach to border security, and on probabilistic risk models as a framework for analyzing and describing different types of potential threats (Narayan, 2014). In Kenya, within the broader context of national security, there are many institutions that are involved in border security management. Some are directly authorized to use force; which implies the power to arrest, detain and prosecute offenders. According to one respondent:

The Kenya Defense Forces form one part of the three national security organs in the country under the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The other two are the National Intelligence Service NIS, and the National Police Service. The Kenya Defence Forces is one of the three organs of national security subordinate to civilian authority under the National Defence Council. The KDFs premier role is to defend the country against external aggression and threats to the security of the people of Kenya (Key informant interview with a male security expert in Nairobi, 17th September, 2015).

The Kenya Police Service is the main agency directly involve in border security together with the immigration department. The department of immigration involvement in border security is by virtue of the fact that it authorizes the issue of visas to foreigners who enter the country. According to FGD:

The Kenya army, navy and air force; since they are better disciplined, less corrupt and better equipped and swifter in action. KDF have the necessary training, resources and are all well equipped (FGD with male religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

In view of the above, the concept of security-based diplomacy approach comes into play; and given that Kenya and Somalia are increasingly facing daunting tasks of managing their borders in ways that secures their territorial sovereignty/integrity. It

is recognized that the use of military measures in countering terrorism can be counterproductive. The role of military is critical in matters of terrorism in the region. In 2007, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was set up with the purpose to stabilize the situation in the country and to promote dialogue, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance and create conditions for a long-term stabilization and development in Somalia. The AU peacekeeping mission to Somalia in 2007 revealed the organization's limitations. The AMISOM groups have been involved in armed confrontation with local groups, which highlighted the inadequacy of the mission's actions regarding the complexity of the situation.

Beyond land borders, Kenya-Somalia maritime border security is of importance.

According to one key informant:

Somalia took its maritime border dispute with Kenya to the United Nations' top court because the dispute has been simmering for years. Kenya however wants the sea border to go in a straight line east, giving it more sea territory (Interview with male border patrol unit officer; Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

Perhaps one of the most important issues arising from the inability of the two countries to come to an agreement on their maritime boundary, is that their legal claims to sell exploration blocks and collect revenue from any subsequent discoveries, are at risk. The ongoing dispute over the boundary has the potential to deter interest in the offshore blocks. It is evident that the maritime border dispute will not be easily resolved and no resolution is expected in the short-to-medium term. One respondent was quoted as follows:

A military approach may not work at its best, but rather a border control unit should be formed comprising of both officers from immigration, police, intelligence and military will enhance efficiency instead of having officers from one department alone to patrol the areas. This combined security agencies would enhance accountability, as well as communities-clans to their understanding of the local interest (Interview with a male member of Somalia National Army in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

What comes out from this comment is that border management requires an integrated approach. The challenges facing African states to manage their borders are compounded by globalization that is tearing down traditional borders through advancement in technology and transformation of international relations. At the moment crimes are committed without crossing borders and huge amounts of goods are sold through cyberspace. The internet has not only made it more difficult to manage borders and to combat cross-border crimes, but has also effectively dismantled borders by allowing imports without going through customs.

On the other hand, the three main types of borders, (land, sea and air) have their unique characteristics and therefore require different modes of control and the presence of some specialized security agencies. For example the Navy is needed to protect the maritime borders and the Air force the air borders. The air and the sea borders have bodies that supervise all activities within their domain; the Civil Aviation at the Airport and at the sea ports. However, for the land borders, gaps still emerge on their effectiveness; with the challenge of corruption.

Prestholdt (2011) notes that the presence of endemic corruption is important here because it can impact a country's ability to combat terrorism. Kenya has regrettably become a paradigm for what can happen when corruption becomes so ingrained in a nation that its security forces are unable to effectively protect its people. On the hand, there is a conceptual relationship between 'terrorism' and 'political offence'



since most often political motives govern terrorist activities. Hence, given that many bilateral and multilateral international conventions exclude political offences from the list of crimes that justify extradition, several terrorist activities could become unpunishable if certain states decided to characterize them as political offences and terrorists as political offenders.

In the recent past, terrorist attacks have occurred and attacks along the borders have been marred by slow response from the police. Despite legislation passed in 2011 to overhaul the police, intelligence and defense forces in Kenya, not much progress has been made. Since many of our borders are man-made artificial boundaries and not based on natural features such as rivers and watersheds, they are extremely porous and easy to cross. Multiplicity of forces on the same borders has inevitably led to the lack of accountability as well as problems of command and control (Kenya). Even with the efforts recently made to enhance security in Kenya, the context in which intervention operations take place within the context of security-based diplomacy has important operational significance

### **7.3 Border Management Training in Border Security Control**

Kenya-Somalia relations in countering terrorism have necessitated capacity building strategies to deal with transnational terrorism. The researcher sought to find out the degree of awareness regarding capacity building of administrators between Kenya and Somalia on countering terrorism matters. Data on the same were analyzed and presented in Figure 7.4 below.



**Figure 7.4 Capacity building of administrators in border management**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Capacity building appears to have progress in Kenya than in Somalia. Response from Kenya shows 72(26%) satisfactory while 94(34%) said fair while 110(40%) noted not satisfactory. On the other hand, Somalia response revealed 12(16%) said satisfactory, 18(24%) fair with majority 44(60%) noting not satisfactory.

For Kenya, 26% who said satisfactory could be attributed to the recent efforts by the Kenyan government in engaging stakeholders to enhance border security following the al shabaab attacks in Mandera and Lamu. Despite the efforts, 40% response noted not satisfactory, an indication that border management strategies may be disjointed and involvement of all agencies is still work in progress.

On the other hand, Somalia response shows 16% said satisfactory, which may be attributed to the role of secondary actors in the Somali conflict including neighboring countries and international actors who support humanitarian and peace building efforts in Somalia. AMISOM has been supporting transitional

governmental structures in implementing a national security plan and training the Somali security forces (Mohammed, 2014). Nevertheless, 60% said not satisfactory, which could be attributed to weaknesses in international interventions, which have failed to alleviate and have even exacerbated the conflict in Somalia, which ultimately allowed Islamist extremists to gain control.

Capacity building has been seen in providing positive alternatives to those most at-risk of radicalization and recruitment into violent extremism and increasing international partner capacity (civil society and government) to address the drivers of radicalization in Kenya. Bademosi (2012) says that through small grants to U.S. embassies and consulates, the Department of State implements projects that focus on activities that link at-risk youth with responsible influencers and leaders in their communities. These activities include youth sports leagues, leadership development, and problem-solving and conflict-resolution skills. Grants also support the establishment of youth support groups for youth in prisons, and amplifying narratives from victims of terrorism and former terrorists that portray the negative effects of violent extremism.

The international community has been united in fighting against transnational terrorism since the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The threat of terrorism still, however, remains serious as has been seen in a series of terrorist incidents including in Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Yemen over the past year. From the interview, a key informant noted:

There is progress especially after the attacks in Lamu and Garissa. Administrative structure of the seven IGAD countries under UN guideline exists. Kenya empowered Somalia National Army through trainings and ammunition. More of Kenyan security officers are being well equipped and facilitate to strategically deal with terror (Interview with a University Lecturer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

In this view, the recent attacks have necessitated capacity building of administrators in counterterrorism. Bossong (2008) says developing a successful capacity to tackle terrorism requires a focus on three main areas of counter-terrorism activity: first, to deny terrorists the means to commit terrorist acts (for example, to prevent the financing of terrorism, and denial of false documents and weapons); second, to deny terrorists a safe haven and ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and/or extradited (for example to accelerate the conclusion of counter-terrorism conventions and protocols, to deny terrorists entry into a country and to reinforce law-enforcement agencies); and third, to overcome vulnerability to terrorism for example, to enhance domestic security measures and capability for crisis management and consequence management).

For the peace and security of the world, it is essential for all countries, including developing countries, to enhance such capability. Such activity should be seen as complementary to initiatives to strengthen good governance, the rule of law, human rights and judicial reform, and to the analysis of factors which contribute to the emergence of terrorism (Bewasi, 2012). Counterterrorism cooperation across the region picked up following the Westgate attack and nations began to examine their procedures for responding to attacks on soft targets. U.S.-funded and implemented multi-year, multi-faceted program designed to build the capacity and cooperation of military, law enforcement, and civilian actors across East Africa to counter terrorism. It uses law enforcement, military, and development resources to achieve

its strategic objectives, including reducing the operational capacity of terrorist networks, developing a rule of law framework for countering terrorism in partner nations, enhancing border security, countering the financing of terrorism, and reducing the appeal of radicalization and recruitment to violent extremism. PRACT member countries include Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda (Bademosi, 2012).

In 2013, the U.S. government, through PRACT, continued to build the capacity and resilience of East African governments to contain the spread of, and counter the threat posed by, al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, and other violent extremist organizations. PRACT complements the U.S. government's efforts to promote stability and governance in Somalia, including support for AMISOM. For example, training and equipment for light infantry, technical intelligence, and crisis response units have supported Kenya's, Tanzania's, and Uganda's efforts to protect their borders and respond to terrorist incidents.

In 2013, Kenya participated in a range of U.S. government-sponsored programs. The U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program focused on building law enforcement capacities in the areas of border security, investigations, and crisis response, and on the institutionalization of counterterrorism prevention and response capabilities. The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement assistance was largely dedicated to building the capacity of Kenya's new Independent Police Accountability Office. DHS Customs and Border Patrol assistance provided multinational training including Kenya for rural border patrol units such as those in the Kenya Police Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service (Gettleman, 2015).

Despite the challenges, Kenyan police, intelligence, and military agencies regularly detected and disrupted terrorist threats large and small. While the Westgate attack showed glaring gaps in Kenyan command and control and the unsuitability of conventional military forces to respond to a civilian incident such as Westgate, the initial response by the Crisis Response Team of the elite General Service Unit Recce Company was more competent. Kenya's primary contribution to supporting counterterrorism capacity building in other nations was its significant troop contribution to AMISOM. In addition, Kenya hosted numerous trainings involving law enforcement professionals from neighboring nations to build counterterrorism capacities and increase regional cooperation.

While AMISOM and Somali forces continued to control major population strongholds, Al-Shabaab continued to control large sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia, including areas in the Juba, Shebelle, Bay, and Bakol regions. Al-Shabaab also continued to operate in northern Somalia along the Golis Mountains and within the federal state of Puntland's larger urban areas. Areas controlled by Al-Shabaab provided a permissive environment for the group to train operatives and plot attacks. The ability of federal, local, and regional authorities to prevent and preempt Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited (Gettleman, 2015).

Somalia remained a safe haven for Al-Shabaab. The group continued to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries, particularly in Kenya. However, despite its successes, Al-Shabaab continued to face internal pressure and experience internal leadership disputes. One respondent was quoted as follows:

So far little has been done since the gravity of the matter is not well measured knowledge is lacking among administrators and our security agencies. Training on how to strengthen their skills, competencies and ability on how to manage transnational terrorism is key but often hampered by internal factors such as clanism and political instability (Interview senior government officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

What comes out clear from this is that Somali law enforcement's basic capacity needs improvement, including basic investigation skills, cordon and search operations, and coordination with the judicial branch. Somalia also lacks capacity, transparency, and institutions to operate an effective judicial and law enforcement system, which, in turn, hinders the federal government's ability to develop and enforce the rule of law, prosecute criminals, and serve justice to the Somali population. In 2013, with assistance from the U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program, Somali Federal Police received a modest amount of training on crisis response, border security, and leadership and management capacity building. Following the al-Shabaab terrorist attack in Nairobi, Kenya, from September 21 to 24, Somalia expressed greater interest in increasing intelligence sharing and conducting joint operations with its Horn of Africa neighbors against al-Shabaab (Gettleman, 2013).

### **7.3.1 Border Committee Representations**

The study further sought to establish the composition of border security committee.

The response from analysis results is given in Table 7.2.

**Table 7.2a Border committee representations (Kenya; N=277)**

	<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Not satisfactory</b>
Security agencies	44(16 %)	172(62%)	61(22%)
Local administration	61(22%)	166(60%)	50(18%)
Religious leaders	33(12%)	102(37%)	144(52%)
NGOs	30(11%)	133(48%)	111(40%)
Community policing officers	61(22%)	78(28%)	139(50%)

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**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 7.3, response from Kenya reveal on border committee representation varied considerably. On security agencies, 16% said satisfactory, 62% said fair while 22% said not satisfactory. For local administration, 22% said satisfactory, 60% said fair while 18% said not satisfactory. On composition of religious leaders, 12% said satisfactory, 37% said fair while 52% said not satisfactory. On NGOs, 11% said satisfactory, 48 % said fair while 40% said not satisfactory. For community policing officers, 22% said satisfactory, 28% said fair while 50% said not satisfactory.

**Table 7.2b Border committee representations (Somalia; N=73)**

	<b>Satisfactory</b>	<b>Fair</b>	<b>Not satisfactory</b>
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Currently, the issue of border security has evoked concerns and debates. In line with modern notions of security, advocates have argued that security is meaningless unless it is linked with development where the focus of security extends beyond military and political capabilities to protect and include issues such as satisfaction of basic needs, sustainable environment and protection of cultural and religious identity and human rights which gives the individual the confidence from the fear of violence. All these are geared towards the improvement of life. In line with that, border security is entirely about border development where there is improvement in the issues and activities that enhance security at the borders.

As the findings show, the composition of security agencies and local administration seem fair. Some of those duties can be clearly attributed to certain services, but a considerable zone of overlapping of authorities is also notable, particularly in customs service and border police. In those situations, clearly defined competences and professional cooperation are preconditions for a successful overcoming of challenges. Although the border security is mostly under authority of the border police, all bodies have an important role in achieving real security at borders.

The composition of NGOs, religious leaders and community policing was viewed as not satisfactory. This means that the concept of integrated border management (IBM), which is not a new one, has not overly been affected in border management. Efficient border management and real border security are of exceptional importance for Kenya and Somalia and the region as a whole, but also important factors in the process of stabilization and association which lead the countries in the region towards the goal of integration. A member of FGD noted the following:

In most cases, the communities are only given audience after an incidence occurs, and yet they are not fully involved in planning and rolling out of some border management strategies. This mistrust makes it difficult for the police to work effectively. Because religious leaders and NGOs work on the ground, they are better place to identify some underlying issues of security, but they are not fully engaged (FGD male member in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).


In view of the above, it is clear that the increasing and dramatic effect of non-state actors on international peace and security energized the response and emergence of new international legal regimes to deal not only with the relations between States in dealing with terrorism generally, but with the relationships and responsibilities of States vis-à-vis non-state actors (Collier 2008). Because of the cross-border nature of transnational terrorism, national counter-terrorism efforts rely heavily on international cooperation the exchange of information; the sharing of intelligence and cooperation between intelligence agencies; and on mutual assistance in investigation, prevention, and prosecution of terrorists. Yet, drawing from the findings of this study, Kenya and Somalia lack the requisite legal and operational mechanisms for counter-terrorism cooperation. While building cooperative relations with various institutions such as religious, NGOs and integrating community policing has been a challenging process. By their very nature, border security operations confront state sovereignty by requiring changes in both foreign and domestic policies.

Border security is a dynamic and evolving process. Because the illegal cross-border movement of people adversely affects not only the security, but also the political, economic and social welfare of States (Cheema, 2011). According to Baldaccini and Guild (2007), Governments now focus on cooperative security efforts, in the understanding that unilateral actions are no longer effective. However, Bossong

(2008) emphasizes that comprehensive early-warning and alert systems are key components of effective border management systems: they strengthen the collective capacity of States to detect, prevent and combat terrorism, by facilitating inter-agency cooperation and the timely sharing and exchange of pertinent, reliable information, thereby enabling critical decisions to be taken in a responsible manner (Bossong, 2008). In view of the security-based diplomacy approach that Kenya has undertaken, the results indicate that security agencies need to widen their surveillance capability by collaborating with public and private enterprises to obtain personal data or to eavesdrop on the public.

#### 7.4 Effectiveness of Kenya-Somalia Migration Controls

Migration controls have become an increasingly important component of counter-terrorism. The study sought to establish the effectiveness of Kenya-Somalia migration controls in managing transnational terrorism. Data on the same was collected, analyzed and results presented in Figure 7.5.



**Figure 7.5 Effectiveness of Kenya-Somalia Migration Controls**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Figure 7.5, response from Kenya revealed 50(18%) felt migration controls were fair, 150(54%) said not satisfactory, 44(16%) noted satisfactory while 33(12%) said poor. On the other hand, Somalia response show majority 26(36%) felt migration controls were poor, 23(32%) said not satisfactory, 16(22%) said fair while 7(10%) said satisfactory.

Following the Al-Shabaab attacks, Kenyan government has made tremendous efforts to tighten migration controls as a border security strategy; which could explain the response of 16% who mentioned satisfactory. However, 18% cited fair, 54% said not satisfactory, while 125% mentioned poor; (with similar trend in Somalia 36% poor, 32% not satisfactory) which has a linkage to the integrity and security of document issuing process that has always been blamed for the corruption cases that jeopardize the country's safety and security of its citizens.

Travel-document security and identity management are important tools in preventing terrorist mobility and in combating trans-border crime. In the hands of terrorists, a fraudulent travel document can be as dangerous as a weapon. As modern passports have become more secure and more difficult to forge, criminals and terrorists have increasingly attempted to falsify supporting documents (birth certificates, national ID cards, etc.) or to apply for “officially issued” passports. In particular, one respondent was concerned and noted the following:

The challenge facing both Kenya and Somalia is that securing identity cards and travel-document like a visa is easy if money changes hands. Corruption has made it easy and terrorist can use such opportunities to access anywhere. Migration controls are extremely poor-due to corruption of immigration departments, person's registration and the security. Migration control of Kenya-Somalia is not good and new strategies should be employed to improve the control. The terrorist don't pass through official points, so other areas which not manned are used by terrorist hence making official entry not important (Interview with female civil society member in Mombasa, 29th August, 2015).

What come out clearly from the above response is that rigorous compliance with security laws to manage our borders has not effectively been applied to improve border control effectiveness. From the viewpoint of counterterrorism, counterespionage, and law enforcement authorities, the borders of states have historically presented rare opportunities to detect and intercept adversaries, who are forced to surface at this point and engage with governmental authorities (Ford, 2005).

When terrorist adversaries transit official access points they must take measures to conceal themselves that provide governments and their security partners with opportunities to detect and disrupt them. Ginsburg (2006) argues that legal entry channels visa offices and official ports of entry at land, air, and sea access points located before and at national frontiers are therefore newly critical infrastructure for counterterrorism. They are also critical for responding to pandemics and other security threats and for the safe and efficient management of trade and travel (Ginsberg, 2006).

Conventional literature indicates that migration controls have become an increasingly important component of counter-terrorism policy over the last few years (Lugna, 2006). However, the findings of this study demonstrate clear gaps

regarding migration control measures; which seemingly reveal that initiatives to secure our borders have not been justified by any systematic analysis of the success of migration controls as a counter-terrorism instrument, especially in the developing nations like Kenya and Somalia.

Most scholars have argued that security concerns have led to the strengthening of border controls and the tightening up of asylum and migration policies, at both the national and interstate levels; as a international protection and for would-be migrants to legally move to another country (Bigo and Tsoukala, 2008). Thus, while the impact of security concerns, including terrorism, and migration controls and policy has been effected, the findings show weak surveillance mechanisms in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. During the interview with one key informant, he comments that:


Migration controls should go hand in hand with technology application across our borders. But beyond technology is the need for information exchange between Kenyan and Somalia security agencies to ensure any ill-motive behaviour is reported and action undertaken (Interview with female NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

Indeed, these views compound the challenge that institutions have not provided any analysis of the impact and success of using migration controls in the fight against terrorism, an observation supported by (Trauner and Kruse, 2008). Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that it is particularly challenging to assess the effectiveness of migration controls to combat terrorism. This is because the best indicator of their success is the absence of terrorist attacks. However, it is impossible to conclusively prove that a terrorist attack did not take place because of one specific counter-terrorism instrument, rather than another, as information on non-existent

terrorist attacks is by definition scarce. Whilst it is unclear to which extent reinforced migration controls contribute to combating terrorism, it has become increasingly evident that they have negative externalities, notably as far as the right to privacy and data protection are concerned (Bullock, 2006); the findings of this study the effectiveness of using such instruments for fighting transnational terrorism is significant.

### 7.5 Effectiveness of Control and Surveillance of the Land Open Border

In view of terror attacks between Kenya and Somalia, the study further assessed the effectiveness of control and surveillance of the land open border between Kenya and Somalia. Results of the analysis are given in Figure 7.6.



**Figure 7.6 Effectiveness of control and surveillance of the land open border**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 7.5, response from Kenya reveal majority 127(46%) felt control and surveillance of the land open border is not effective, though 55(20%) said effective, 44(16%) cited moderate, 17(6%) said moderate while 27(10%) said poor. For

Somalia, 9(12%) felt land open border surveillance was effective, 4(6%) said fair, majority 53(72%) noted it was not effective while 7(10%) said poor.

In the context of counter-terrorism, effective border management plays an important role in combating the transnational terrorist threat. Viewed as a whole, both Kenya and Somalia responses show control and surveillance of the land open border ineffective (46% and 72% cited not effective for Kenya and Somalia respectively). Indeed, agencies involved in border security and trade facilitation are confronted with the common challenge of facilitating the movement of legitimate people and goods while maintaining controlled and secure borders (Kaunert, 2010). Bures (2006) points out that the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy reflects a clear affirmation, on the part of Member States, that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting, but rather complimentary and mutually reinforcing goals, and that human rights and the rule of law constitute the fundamental basis of the global counter-terrorism effort.

In recent times, Kenyan police forces have achieved some success in capturing all types of criminals from these borders. In adopting the Global Strategy and its Plan of Action, Member States resolved “to recognize that international cooperation and any measures that we undertake to prevent and combat terrorism must comply with our obligations under international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and relevant international conventions and protocols, in particular human rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law” (Bures, 2006).

Surveillance seems to be a challenge for Kenya and Somalia; and the challenge could be the lack of capacity to utilize or promote early-warning and alert systems.



In addition, Establishing or strengthening border systems, including the data systems used at checkpoints and at central management sites, improving the business process at the border, and, emphasis of integrated border management approaches is still work in progress. While surveillance can be well-driven, previous findings demonstrate gaps in improvement of travel documents and their issuance systems, primarily passports. The challenge is also related to limited training and human resource development systems that support all features of migration management, including those most directly linked with migration and security.

Hobolth (2010) notes that the open border (the frontier between official land-border and seaport check points) continues to facilitate the illegal cross-border movement of people, including terrorists and criminals, and of goods (including small arms, light weapons, ammunition and explosives, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear material). The Kenyan Governments recognize the importance of securing the open border and attempt to do so through a variety of measures, including surveillance, patrols, physical barriers (the on-going construction of a border wall) and joint control operations and patrols. However, as revealed during FGD, surveillance is still weak owing to the attacks that have caught Kenyan security agencies unaware. One respondent was quoted saying:

Surveillance has not been effectively implemented. In most cases the emphasis is targeted zones and yet terrorist are always changing their strategies now and then. Police need to train in current technology and surveillance systems that can be well monitored (Interview with male state officer in Nairobi, 22nd September, 2015).

In view of the above, it is evident that changes in technology have contributed to the ability of the police to engage in electronic surveillance of citizens. Personal electronic communications (i.e., internet, voice-over-internet- protocol, cellular

telephone, wireless transmission, etc.) are able to be intercepted with greater ease, and to some extent, with less physical intrusion. However, part of the motivation for the police to increasingly adopt the use of electronic technology is to make them more effective at pursuing elusive criminals on a global scale. In perspective, one respondent had this to say during an interview:

Open border has been a great facilitator of strong and unique bilateral relations. At the same time, it has given rise to many irritants and problems that raise serious concerns especially here in Somalia. Surveillance is poor and along the disputed border also surface from time to time (Interview with security expert in Mogadishu, 22nd September, 2015).

The views above resonates with Argomaniz (2009) argument, that the impact of border surveillance should be seen in a broader perspective, especially by comparing the relative importance of the different aims of border surveillance i.e. protecting the border and protecting the lives of the concerned countries. However, Bigo and Tsoukala (2008) point out that the discussion on the legitimacy of border surveillance revolved around three main issues: the procedure by which (the change in) the measure is instigated; the timing and arguments used in that procedure; and the relative importance of the aims of border surveillance.

Indeed, some issues pertaining the effectiveness of border surveillance can depend on the definition of the original aim, and whether this aim might have been political: on whether these policies are not effective; whether these border control systems stop people from coming in. Boswell (2007) views effectiveness to be a measure of the degree to which the measure is able to reach it stated aims. In the particular context of border surveillance, effectiveness would be felt to be of little relevance as the goal of protecting borders is, in principle, a worthy cause and therefore the

effectiveness of the measure seem to be less relevant, particularly in relation to the discussion of the social acceptability of the measure (Boswell, 2007).

From the findings, 20% and 12% noted effective from Kenya and Somalia respectively, which could be attributed to significant progress in its counterterrorism efforts. The terrorist group al-Shabaab lost control of large sections of rural areas in south-central Somalia, including the key port city of Barawe and other key towns along the main supply route in the Juba, Shebelle, Bay, and Bakol regions as a result of the successful AMISOM-led Operation Indian Ocean (Aronson, 2013). In October, the Punt land Security Forces led an offensive against the al-Shabaab stronghold in northern Somalia's Golis Mountains, which further degraded al-Shabaab's operational capability. Separate U.S. military strikes that killed then-leader Mokhtar Abu Zubeyr. The ability of the federal, local, and regional authorities to prevent and preempt al-Shabaab terrorist attacks remained limited. Somalia remained a safe haven for a number of international terrorists, who continued to plan and mount operations within Somalia and in neighboring countries, particularly in Kenya (Aronson, 2013).

Somalia has porous borders. Most countries do not recognize Somali identity documents, leaving Somalia with little to no travel document security. Somalia currently does not have a central or shared terrorist screening watch list, nor does it have biographic and biometric screening capabilities at ports of entry. Minimal cooperation occurred between the federal and regional governments to investigate suspected terrorists, kidnappings, and other incidents of terrorism committed inside and outside of Somalia (Aronson, 2013).

## 7.6 The Effectiveness of Various Aspects With Regard to Border Surveillance

The study sought to establish the effectiveness of various aspects with regard to border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Data on the same was collected, analyzed and results presented in Table 7.5 below.

**Table 7.3a Effectiveness of various aspects with regard to border surveillance (Kenya) (N=277)**

	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Moderat</b>	<b>Not effective</b>
Mobility of people	33(12%)	152(55%)	89(32%)
Integrity of document issuing	64(23%)	125(45%)	83(30%)
Maritime security	50(18%)	108(39%)	114(41%)
Early warning systems	64(23%)	125(45%)	83(30%)
Aviation security	83(30%)	105(38%)	83(30%)

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**Source: Field Data, 2015**

**Table 7.3b Effectiveness of various aspects with regard to border surveillance (Somalia) (N=73)**

	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Not effective</b>
Mobility of people	4(6%)	22(30%)	46(64%)
Integrity of document issuing	13(18%)	16(22%)	44(60%)
Maritime security	31(42%)	20(28%)	23(32%)
Early warning systems	12(16%)	22(30%)	39(54%)
Aviation security	15(20%)	15(20%)	44(60%)

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**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Table 7.5a, response from Kenya on various aspects with regard to border surveillance aspects varied considerably. On mobility of people, 12% said effective, 55% said moderate while 31% said not effective. For integrity of document issuing, 23% said effective, 45% said moderate while 30% said not effective. On maritime security, 18% said effective, 39% said moderate while 42% said effective. Regarding early warning security, 23% said effective, 45% said moderate while 30% said not effective. For aviation security, 30% said effective, 38% said moderate while 30% said not effective.

Kenya's rate of growth has far outpaced that of most of its neighbours and this has generated problems like mass migrations into and out of Kenya. Other threats and challenges have also emerged. The border security scenario is marked by; increased cross- border terrorism; infiltration and ex- filtration of armed militants; emergence of non- State actors; nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers; illegal migration; radical extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and the establishment of madrasas (training schools), some of which are potential security hazards.

Regarding integrity of document issuing, 23% said effective, 45% said moderate while 30% said not effective. While efforts have been made to ensure scrutiny of document issuing, the cross border crimes in the border regions flourish due to the connivance and close nexus of the criminals, police administration officers, which may explain 45.7% said moderate while 30% said not effective.

For Somalia, response shows on mobility of people, 6% said effective, 30% said moderate while 64% said not effective. The porous border present a challenge to controlling movements across the Kenya-Somalia borders. It has been found in certain cases that before the illegal migrants enter a country, certain important documents like ration cards, are all prepared and handed over to them to allow them escape detection on the border. These illegal migrants are then helped to reach any part of this country, including crossing over the fences also.

Response from Somalia also shows varying views on integrity of document issuing, with 18% who said effective, 22% said moderate while 60% said not effective. travel-document security and identity management are important tools in preventing terrorist mobility and in combating trans-border crime. In the hands of terrorists, a fraudulent travel document can be as dangerous as a weapon. As modern passports have become more secure and more difficult to forge, criminals and terrorists have increasingly attempted to falsify supporting documents (birth certificates, national ID cards, etc.) or to apply for “officially issued” passports. It is therefore essential that States develop and implement universal specifications for identity management and travel-document security (including in the issuance process) in order to address these vulnerabilities

State police force has been found inadequately trained to deal with situation as such border guarding forces are frequently withdrawn to combat insurgency. They have also been withdrawn many a time to deal with law and order problems. Withdrawal of forces limits their capabilities to guard the borders efficiently. Even the military officers are alleged to have ordered weapons on the basis of how large the kickback will be. There are instances where soldiers and policemen have extorted rather than defended the public.

On maritime security, response from Kenya shows 18% said effective, 39% said moderate while 41% said effective. The 18.8% who said effective may be attributed to recent efforts: in 2013, Kenya participated in a range of U.S. government-sponsored programs. The U.S. Department of State's Antiterrorism Assistance program focused on building law enforcement capacities in the areas of border security, investigations, and crisis response, and on the institutionalization of counterterrorism prevention and response capabilities. The U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement assistance was largely dedicated to building the capacity of Kenya's new Independent Police Accountability Office. DHS Customs and Border Patrol assistance provided multinational training including Kenya for rural border patrol units such as those in the Kenya Police Service and the Kenya Wildlife Service.

Recognizing the serious threat posed by SALW, the government of Kenya launched an array of efforts designed to shore up that country's ability to prevent trafficking. For example, the Kenya Ports Authority has made remarkable strides in implementing the International Maritime Organization's ship and port facility security measures. In April 2008, the Kenyan government set up a new monitoring unit to control trafficking along its coastline. Kenyan authorities are also strengthening border security through the acquisition of sophisticated detection and inspection equipment for border points and providing training to relevant personnel (Smith, 2010).

In conjunction with heightened port and security measures, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission together with the Kenya Revenue Authority have stepped up efforts to investigate and prosecute customs control and border-security violations involving the diversion of transit goods. A recent investigation uncovered

a tax-evasion syndicate operating at major Kenyan border posts, including Busia, Malaba, Isebania, Lokichoggio, Taveta, Namanga, and Lunga-Lunga on the Kenya-Uganda border, which led to the arrest of three people, including one customs official (Finlay *et al.*, 2012).

The Kenyan government is also providing incentives to traders that comply with stricter regulations. For example, the Kenya Revenue Authority has started a new initiative designed to integrate modern risk-management measures into the regulation of transit trade. The Authorized Economic Operator status will reward responsible traders and freight-forwarding companies by enabling trustworthy traders those with a satisfactory system of financial and customs record-keeping to gain access to expedited shipment processing, lower storage costs, and minimal intervention at border crossings. In aggregate, these initiatives are meant to prevent the transshipment of small arms and light weapons as well as other crime and terrorist activities across the borders of Kenya (Nzumbi, 2010).

Regarding early warning security, 23% said effective, 45% said moderate while 30% said not effective. Early warning systems within border surveillance and protection are intended to enable security measures to be taken in the event of threats of risks aimed at individual people, objects or services. The point of departure is safe and unhindered functioning (Haggerty and Ericson, (2010). However, the findings suggest work in progress.

The results further indicate aviation security scored low. Response from Somalia on aviation security shows 20% noted effective, 20% moderate while 60% said not effective. One of the important problems in managing the borders is their delimitation and demarcation on the ground. Kenya has an undemarcated border



with Somalia. Comparing with Kenya, on aviation security, 30% said effective, 38% said moderate while 30% said not effective.

The fact is that the boundaries are a mix of well recognized demarcations; as argued, Al-Shabaab has been using covert action in the guise of terrorism as an instrument of State policy against Kenya. It has recruited, trained, financed, armed and infiltrated terrorists in the region. When a border is not demarcated on the ground and when there is no common understanding between two sides such intrusions are bound to take place from both sides. Such intrusions used to be a recurring feature across the Kenya-Somalia border in the Northern region. Undemarcated areas continue to remain a source of tension and pose a hindrance towards normalization of relations between two nations. India had to defend its territory by going to war over these issues. Terrain and ethnic affinities of population on both sides of the borders. Illegal migration, infiltration of anti-national elements, smuggling of arms/explosives and drug trafficking are some of the serious problem. The terrain and the demographic composition of the border area make it conducive for terrorist groups to sneak into Kenya and also to get easily assimilated into the local populace. Interview sessions revealed:

Sometimes managing the whole border area is difficult, because the stretch is long and security officers do not always apply air patrol. The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of the people have also made it easy for insurgent groups to cross over into Kenya. Migration from Somalia to Kenya, especially in Mandera and Wajir, is worrying (Interview with male government security officer in Garissa, 22nd September, 2015).

In view of the above, the magnitude of this illegal migration had reached such an astounding proportion that it had begun to alter the demographic profile and threaten the socio- political fabric of the both Kenya and Somalia. The increasing influence

of Islamic fundamentalism has resulted in the large-scale push, of not only economic migrants, but also the foot- soldiers of jihad terrorism and pan- Islamic fundamentalism, all of which have the potential to destabilize the country and threaten national security

Somali population bordering Kenya and Somalia look alike, speak the same language, wear the same dresses and have similar set of culture and traditions, thus making it difficult to identify a foreign national in the absence of identity cards in the border areas. Connivance of the locals with intruders—for a payment makes the task of detection more difficult. Their similar face, attire, posture and behaviour resemble. In one sense, the porous border has helped to initiates rebellion activity in both nations to some extent. At many places, the social contours of our borders are mercilessly cut across and divided into various ethnic groups. In time of conflict in neighbouring countries this becomes a source of acute tension.

The impact of the situation in Somalia on neighboring states is significant. For example, northeastern Kenya has been severely affected by the near absence of state control in Somalia, where inter-clan rivalry and banditry have further weakened border security and created additional space and income (through the illegal sale and transit of commodities, mainly livestock and grain) for criminal and terrorist elements to operate. It is argued that a more holistic approach is necessary when looking at border issues, taking into account the nexus between peace, security and development. Adetunji (2014) posits that more efficient border management as well as bilateral infrastructure development should be at the heart of the efforts to make the border regions between an economically viable and safer environment. The various cross-border flows depicted pose a challenge to security. They not only challenge the state by circumventing its control and threatening its institutions, but

this also puts individuals at risk: they are the ones who face increasing insecurity when crossing the border.


Kenya-Somalia borders have a variety of problems and issues and need a comprehensive focus for durable settlement. At many places, the social contours of our border are mercilessly cut across and divided into various ethnic groups. In time of conflict in neighbouring countries this has become a source of acute tension. The inter-ethnic relations are characterized by existence of number of bilateral disputes some of them rooted in historical past, others in current dynamics of bilateral issues. For instance, the long stretch poorly policed Kenya-Somalia border provides an easy entry way for foreigners, some of whom are hostile to both Kenya and the neighbouring states. This has led to increased number of illegal immigrants who have continued to create terror risks within the Kenyan territory. There is limited capacity of the relevant institutions to cope with high human traffic at the border points which has created gaps/ lapses which the illegal immigrants have used to access Kenyan territories. This is worsened by the vast distance from one border control to another resulting in infrequent or no patrols/ security checks. The result is that borderlines have remained highly vulnerable for extremist groups to enter Kenya especially from surrounding and unstable countries like Somalia and South Sudan.

There has however been some progress made in fighting illegal cross-border activities. Regional coordination has improved in many areas. For example, regarding small arms (Convention on small arms and light weapons, their ammunition and related materials, June 2006), human trafficking (Plan of action and declaration) (Onuoha & Ezirim, 2013). However, it results from the absence of significant improvement of these problems that "...the underlying factors

contributing to the outbreak of these crimes as well as the complex linkages between them” have not yet been sufficiently addressed. In totality, the findings provide evidence that it is necessary to achieve significant improvement of these problems; and the transnational criminal activities between Kenya and Somalia are rather one of the symptoms of larger underlying structural problems than the cause of insecurity.

### 7.7 Technology in Border Surveillance

Controls of cross-border activities on borders require some of the important and strategic heights important for the security of the nation. The study sought respondents' views on the extent to which adoption of technology at the Kenya-Somalia border points. Figure 7.7 presents the findings.



**Figure 7.7 Technology in border surveillance**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

From Figure 7.7, response from Kenya reveal 66(24%) felt technology adoption in border management was sufficient, 94(34%) cited fair while 116(42%) said not sufficient. In the case of Somalia, respondents cited sufficient 12(16%), with

16(22%) saying fair but majority 45(62%) said not sufficient. Taken as a whole, majority felt that the adoption of technology at the Kenya-Somalia border points is still weak. As the findings indicated, the 24% who said sufficient from Kenya could be the new transnational terrorism threats that have seen Kenya undertake technological advancements in the realms of surveillance, identity management and border control, which emerged as the key areas of counterterrorism after 9/11.

As Figure 7.7 findings show 42% and 62% mentioned insufficient (Kenya and Somalia response respectively). Broadly, there have been gaps relating to new approaches of managing populations and their transnational movements through identity and border management spawned by the trend toward risk management. Moreover, the effectiveness of counterterrorism technologies and their ethical implications imply some weaknesses in the extent to which technology is being adopted in border management. As commented by one key informant:

Due to porous border, no technologies in place, we only have immigration structures and efforts. Technology will eliminate some of the vices such as corruption at border points as well as evaluating security agencies to keep watch on the borders throughout. The plan might work for the government to weeds out corruption officials if the will is contracted all through the border, however the challenge of home grown terrorists will still be an issue. Application of technology at the border is poor hence it needs to be enhanced (Interview with male key informant- -security officer in Mogadishu, 4th September, 2015).

This line of argument indeed point to the changing nature of borders and the challenges of managing them due to technological advancement. The findings agree with a study by Sosuh (2013) indicating that most African countries are yet to adopt modern and integrated approaches to border management. Conventional literature indicates that technology allows for detection, the simply identifying that someone is attempting to cross the border, followed by classifying the threat. Interdiction is

responding to and apprehending them during the act of crossing or attempting to cross the border. Deterrence is placing barriers along the border that make entry difficult or funneling attempted transgressors toward areas with higher detection and interdiction capabilities. All three functions need to be considered in relation to urban, rural, and remote areas. Urban areas provide the advantages of infrastructure to both threats and border patrol agents, often leaving responders only minutes for interdiction, a distinct disadvantage in the time/distance challenge.

Given the nature of transnational terrorism, across national borders, security agencies face new challenges in promoting public safety, investigating crimes, and apprehending offenders (Kegley, 2003). Terrorists and criminal offenders have become increasingly adept in the use of technology to perpetrate transnational illegal acts (i.e., terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking, organized crime, etc.) (Grabosky & Smith, 1998). Perceived threats, posed by global terrorists and criminals, have provided the impetus for many of the legal changes that have contributed to the enhanced technological adoption; yet, as the findings suggest, this application, and emerging border challenges highlight gaps in dealing with transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. One respondent noted the following:

Technology seems to be majorly focused in cities, yet, terrorist activities and planners can counter such measures if security agencies don't employ various approaches to monitor borders (Interview with female NGO officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

Indeed, rural areas have much less infrastructure and generally fewer places to hide, leaving much more time to respond, but they are generally more scarcely patrolled. Remote areas have natural defenses such as mountains or deserts. A sound border security strategy should attempt to use barriers and other deterrence factors to funnel

threats toward rural and remote attempts to cross the border, where sensors and scanners can better detect entry and agents can optimize the time/distance challenge by allowing increased time and space to respond appropriately. Detection can be as simple as border security agents watching the border, either from patrols or fixed locations, or as complex as integrated electronic sensors and scanners of various kinds and manned or unmanned aerial patrols along the border. Technology can be extremely important in helping increase the efficiency of border patrol agents, but it can also be prone to failure or interference and does not always stand up to the harsh conditions along many borders. As always, the exact mixture of technology and labor depends on the needs and strengths of the given country.

Surveillance technologies include cameras, satellite, facial recognition systems, motion sensors, and border surveillance robots. Today, third generation CCTVs capture the image of an average urban dweller approximately every five minutes. Drones equipped with surveillance cameras and weapons to carry out reconnaissance and/or targeted killings of suspected terrorists exemplify how surveillance technology can be used in counterterrorism intelligence. For example, in September 2011 a drone targeted and killed Anwar al Awlaki (who inspired the Fort Hood shooter and the Detroit “underwear bomber”) in Yemen. Though highly controversial, this method is increasingly commonplace in the context of the “War on Terror,” blurring the line between surveillance and acts of war. Drones are also used in law enforcement and border management (Krasner, 2009).

In practice, border control policies should be designed so that operational requirements drive technical requirements. Sometimes, though, this process is

reversed, and available technology drives procurements, which in turn forces operational border agencies to adopt tools and solutions before they possess a clear concept of operations. At best, this scenario leads to wasteful spending. At worst, it leaves states with shortfalls in capabilities and opens up crucial gaps in national defense. Therefore, states should be careful to ensure that large acquisitions have a clear, strategic underpinning. Simply put, technological innovations, if implemented appropriately, can help speed global trade and the legal movement of people. So, while states should be wary of flashy new technologies and be sure to acquire such assets based on strategic need, senior policymakers and officials must avoid instinctively rejecting these tools.

### **7.8 Involvement of Border Communities in Border Security Management**

The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of the people have made it easy for insurgents groups to cross between Kenya and Somalia. The study sought respondents' views on the degree of involvement of border communities and their role in border security management. Results of the analysis are given in Table 7.4.

**Table 7.4 Involvement of border communities in border security management**

	<b>Kenya</b>	<b>Somalia</b>
Satisfactory	72(26%)	9(12%)
Fair	39(14%)	13(18%)
Not satisfactory	166( 60%)	51(70%)

**Source: Field Data, 2015**



From Table 7.4, response from Kenyan respondent's show 26% said satisfactory, 14% cited fair while 60% said not satisfactory. On the other hand, Somalia response revealed that, 12% said satisfactory, 18% mentioned fair while 70% cited not satisfactory.

As the findings suggest, the 26% and 12% who said very satisfactory, from Kenya and Somalia respectively reveal some progress in involvement of border communities and their role in border security management. Recent incidences like attacks in Garissa and Lamu has raise as well as in Mogadishu have raised concerns of community engagement in border matters, and there appear some progress in this involvement.

Conversely, majority (60% and 70%) said not satisfactory from responses in Kenya and Somalia respectively. The implication is that a major problem in combating cross border terrorism is that all border crime takes place in an organized manner. The population residing in the border areas is either dependent on the kingpins or are scared to speak against such criminals. This sometimes happens due to indifferent attitude of the administration where some of them are also a part of the nexus. One of the main reasons for surviving and thriving of terrorists and subversive groups is that the people no longer willing to tolerate the inequity, poverty, and corruption in which Sates in these areas have been mired. Disgusted with the governments and despairing of the prospect for peaceful and incremental change within the existing order, the people are looking for an explanation of their personal suffering and societal degradation. The denial of basic human needs like genuine decent livelihood, civil liberties; some have taken to terrorism due to various grievances

and instigation by the religious, fundamentalist and jihad organizations. One respondent was categorical:

It is a myth, but could be most suitable to solve issue. The government has not enhanced community ownership role to thwart any illegal radicals. Communities along the border are peace loving and patriotic to their country, they help by providing information to local administration. However, some are involved and they offer sanctuary and logistical support to insurgents groups (FGD male respondent in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

In view of the above, that most border management efforts do not take advantage of border communities. The local community usually has intimate knowledge of the terrain, the criminal syndicates, meeting places and other security issues. Nevertheless, they are not always involved in managing the borders. Their inclusion and incorporation of local perspectives is useful in informing state actors of the threats in the border areas. The gaps created by these omissions are filled by transnational criminal networks. Some of their members even marry local women in order to enjoy the social protection associated with being part of a community.<sup>10</sup> Thus, border agencies must actively involve the local community thereby earning their trust and gradually reducing their reliance on other non-state groups.

Carafan (2004) notes that it is prudent to consider what the future of border security might hold as well trends and what issues of policy each country is likely to confront. However, Rosenblum (2013) observe that understanding border risks begins with identifying key threats. At their roots, border-related threats are closely linked to the flow of people (travelers) and goods (cargo) from one country to another, and the communities within which such activities occur around border points (Rosenblum *et al.*, 2013).

By giving community involvement the status of a pillar, this strategy can offer an important role of local communities as key stakeholders in the management of borders between Kenya and Somalia; a view supported by one respondent:

The border communities should be engaged more in identifying foreigners and provision of intelligence however the intelligence to cooperate with recently agencies i.e. posing a great challenge achieving it. In some cases, border communities are related to Al-Shabaab either by blood or religion -they support criminal elements. Community involvement could best suit to solve this issue; given this opportunities they could develop ownership role and engagement to thwart illegal armed groups which they easily identify (Interview with one female university lecturer in Nairobi, 20th September, 2015).

The statement above underscores the need to employ various strategies and accompanying mechanisms recommended for ensuring the involvement of local communities in border management decision-making and implementation as a means to enhance security at national borders between Kenya and Somalia. In perspective, local communities include the people who live on both sides of a border, border traders, border civil society organizations, local government administrative authorities, and other locals who in one way or another could play a role in the way borders are managed. Decisions and subsequent actions taken with regard to border security will be doomed to fail if they are not backed by these key stakeholders at the borders. Another key informant was quoted as follows:

Border communities are not empowered to handle border related security issues. This leaves intruders to go about with their business. The border communities lack patriotism hence they work with external enemies e.g. think because of common characteristics they share across the border. Mostly border location is not aware of the activities of these terrorists since the border is big. If communities for any case come across such situations they share the information with the local administration (Interview with state officer in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

This view presupposes border management agencies as a legal authority establishing a useful relationship with the border communities, developing a genuine and thorough understanding of how the communities contribute to the security of the borders. The success of this cooperation lies in the commitment of border management agencies to working with local communities and recognizing their strategic placement at the borders. Indeed, the essence of such involvement stems from the fact that borders are in the remote parts of the countries, where communities compete aggressively for scantily available resources such as pasture and water.

During the FGD, the issue of pastoralists occupying some of the driest areas that provide nothing much for the people as a means of sustenance was raised; and due to these and other circumstances like frequent drought and famine, the pastoralists have sometimes used desperate means to survive. Underdevelopments along the border areas are generally marginalized, neglected, and underdeveloped than those areas which are closer to capital cities and hubs of economic activities such as mining. Their livelihoods are usually threatened by poor or lack infrastructure and facilities necessary for promotion of human security. Violence that starts on either side of the border normally invites kinsmen at the other side to join and escalate the problem.

As noted by one FGD respondent:


Distance from national capitals normally means in the being alienated from crucial public services such as policing and legal coverage, and falling prey to all kinds of opportunism including cross border crimes. By force or by consent, some members of border communities involve themselves, as accessories or as active players, in cross-border criminal activities and remain potential recruits to terrorist radicalization (FGD with male religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

In light of the above comment, that the levels of performance of border control agencies should extend beyond the norm: compounding the challenge of lack of coordination, absence of uniform institutional and legal frameworks, lack of commitment and oversight, insufficient resources including infrastructure and manpower, poor working environment, lack of expertise; to address underlying issues of marginalization and underdevelopment, which threaten community involvement. Therefore, border management agencies require legal and regulatory instruments; procedures; institutional structures; and capabilities in order to tackle their inefficiencies, enhance cooperation and coordination vertically and horizontally among themselves, and provide improved services to the communities around the borders. Cooperation and coordination of authorities and agencies with communities on border management activities is thus critical.

The findings agree with Kaunert (2010) indicating that at the local level, most border management efforts do not take advantage of border communities (Kaunert, 2010). In addition, Lamptey (2010) posits that the local community usually has intimate knowledge of the terrain, the criminal syndicates, meeting places and other security issues. Nevertheless, they are not always involved in managing the borders. Their inclusion and incorporation of local perspectives is useful in informing state actors of the threats in the border areas. The gaps created by these omissions are filled by transnational criminal networks. Thus, border agencies must actively involve the local community thereby earning their trust and gradually reducing their reliance on other non-state groups (Lamptey, 2010).

## 7.9 The effectiveness of border wall by Kenyan government in border management

Border-security cooperation is important to combat organized crime and terrorism insurgencies. From this perspective, the study sought respondents' views on whether Kenya's strategy to construct a wall on its border with Somalia offers a long-term solution to the management of transnational terrorism. Data on the same was collected, analyzed and results presented in Figure 7.8.



**Figure 7.8 Effectiveness of border wall in border management**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Figure 7.8 shows response from Kenya indicating 66(24%) said great extent, 94(34%) noted moderate extent while 122(44%) said less extent. From Somalia response, 14(20%) said great extent, 22(30%) cited moderate extent whereas 37(50%) said less extent. Overall, response from Kenya indicates majority of respondents felt that Kenya's strategy to construct a wall on its border with Somalia has not offered offers a long-term solution to the management of transnational

terrorism. An interesting view of the findings is that a considerable number of Kenyans feel Kenya's strategy to construct a wall on its border with Somalia has benefits; but majority of Somalia respondents feel the strategy cannot offer a long-term solution to the management of transnational terrorism.

The Kenyan government is taking dramatic new steps to secure its border with Somalia by erecting a wall designed to keep out militants after a series of cross-border raids by Al-Shabaab militants. According to an FGD:

Yes it will limit free flow of the people across the border. A security wall can prevent porous nature of one border. A wall with surveillance gadgets with several legitimate entrances backed by swift responds offers better solution in long term. The plan might work if the government weeds out corruption officials and if the wall is constructed all through the border, however the challenge of home grown terrorists will still be an issue (FGD with female religious-based members in Nairobi, 22nd September, 2015).

In view of the above, it is imperative that when faced with mounting instability, violence, or other threats next door, several countries have sought to bolster their borders with long, elaborate security barriers, but maintaining and patrolling these walls can be a challenge. This view can be well understood within the theoretical underpinning of neorealism. Since terrorism is a threat to sovereignty and the nation state, which according to neo-realism is the most important issue for states (Chandler, & Gunaratna, 2007); it follows that states like Kenya have to act foremost for their own gains, and balance or ally with other states dependant on the expected gains. While most states needs are the same, capabilities to obtain these needs differ between states.

The relative differences in capabilities among states to meet their needs therefore results in distrust and fear within the international system. It is the fear that other

states, with the capabilities, will become more powerful which result in the uneven globalization process and an uneven distribution of power in the international system. In addition, and supporting Waltz's (1979) theory, neo-realists view globalization as a challenge but still see politics as international, and states as the principal actors in the international political arena. Their main concern, in regards to Globalization is uneven distribution of power, which results in inequality and therefore conflict.

Neorealists believe that since the basic motive driving states is gaining, maintaining, and maximizing power in order to obtain security and stability, states are in constant struggle for power and potentially dangerous to each other (Lamy, 2009). Furthermore, Neorealists believe that the only path to international order and security is the international system to be dominated and led by a single state, which impose its will, but creates peace. To maintain and maximize its dominance, the dominant state uses its supremacy to restore order and stability. In addition, it utilizes various strategies including covert and overt intervention in other states' politics and imposing state policy of regime change (one single model of national success), deterrence (displaying power), preemption (preventive war), and powerful political socialization through which norms and expected behavior is transmitted (Kaufmann, *et al.*, 2004).

Kenya's decision to construct a barrier along the border with Somalia in order to prevent further spillover of terrorist attacks demonstrate the shift in counterterrorism measures that nation states are faced with. Indeed, Gilkes and Segewa (2014) point out that while the plan made international headlines, it is far from the first instance in which barriers have been proposed or constructed in the name of bolstering national security and well-being, with concerns ranging from militants to migrants to



infected livestock. In addition to the well-publicized and much-criticized barriers along the Israeli-Palestinian and U.S.-Mexican frontiers, various regions have a long history of major border security projects.

Kenya's decision to build a wall along its border with Somali is not a new phenomenon in the world. Most countries have had to construct perimeter walls to deter a belligerent neighbour or to try and protect it from cross border attacks. Israel has the most infamous wall that separates its territory with Palestine. Spain has built fences to deter African illegal immigrants, United States of America has a wall to deter Mexican illegal immigrants, and Saudi Arabia too has a wall separating it from Yemen. Kenya's sole reason according to the Interior Cabinet Secretary is to reduce border entries especially for the Al Shabaab militant group who have continuously waged a war in the towns bordering Somali. While many have cited the huge financial capital that come with such construction, it was clear that this question received mixed reactions. One key informant was quoted as follows:

What is the significance of building the wall right now? Are they going to minimize Al-Shabaab who is now crossing into Kenya so nobody knows? Kenya must gain the hearts and the minds of the northern people so that, together, they can defeat Al-Shabaab, otherwise building a wall doesn't help the matter (Interview with male key informant-NGO officer -in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

The statement above underscores the debate on the effectiveness and long-term strategy to which such measures, especially looking at the history of walls around the world. Walls serve as a deterrent measure against burglars and provide the much needed comfort. In a crime ridden city like Nairobi, the upper middle class and elites have managed to confine themselves within these walls. One important feature though is that these walls alone are not enough to keep away the bad guys.

On top of the high perimeter wall, there is need to hire private security companies to be continuously patrolling the community every day. Furthermore, electric razor fences have been added on top of the wall, CCTV cameras installed to monitor the same wall, and for those who can afford, motion sensors have been installed too. The amount for money invested in it runs into millions of shillings. Most of Kenya's security problems seem to begin and end with Somalia. This explains the current plan to build a wall. The porous border of Kenya and Somalia is responsible for the illicit small arms trade, smuggling of goods and the illegal entry of immigrants who might be Al Shabaab or not. Inadequate state presence in the area has made it easy for terrorists to launch attacks and go back to Somalia at will without resistance. To some, it is believed building a wall with controlled movement of the people across the border will be a solution.

Kenya's immigration policy challenges were to be solved through a comprehensive immigration system that was part of the infamous Anglo Leasing Contract. Corruption made sure the contract never saw the light of day and hence the mess in the immigration department. Endemic corruption among the immigration officials and the police is a major impediment when trying to capture terrorists. Poorly remunerated by the government, they are easy targets to be bought. The sentiments were cited by one interview respondent who categorically noted:

No way, a wall failed to help Israel situation... people are tied to each other more than security so other alternative could be better. Even with the construction of the wall, so long as these corrupt officials are in office, the terrorists will still access the country. Al-Shabaab has proven that they cannot be contained through blocking their cross border access and this has been shown by their recent attacks. The perpetrators of the Westgate attack did not come through the Somali border but our main airport (FGD with male religious groups in Nairobi, 22th September, 2015).

The implication of this statement is that building a wall is stop gap measure of a larger problem on our porous borders and the entire security structure. As argued by Wekesa (2015), Kenya's great wall is a costly and ineffective way to solve Kenya's security challenges along the Somali border. Wekesa points out that the wall will most likely cut off the Somali people of Kenya from their relatives in Somalia and this will have a negative impact on how these groups interact and in turn be counterproductive to the future peace of the region. One respondent noted the following during FGD:

A border wall will not, since some Al-Shabaab operatives live and in our midst. There is a huge presence of the Somali population in Kenya and by forcefully cutting those off from their neighbours will further reinforce the notion that they are not wanted in Kenya and alienate them further to the hands of extremist groups. We need to cultivate closer ties among these groups which will help in neutralizing the threat of Al-Shabaab (Somalia) (FGD with male religious groups in Mogadishu, 3rd September, 2015).

In view of the above, and based on history, the wall does a good job at stopping incursions. Since Israel constructed their wall, the number of people killed by suicide bombers has significantly gone down compared to when there was no wall. But this is not the whole story behind the drop of suicide bombers. The Palestinians have simply realized violence alone is no longer the only means to further their cause. In fact Israelis argue that if they really wanted to go through the wall, it will be very easy. The wall therefore will not solve our problems as it is believed as pointed out by one key informant: Al Shabaab has the ability to recruit among the local populace especially the disenfranchised youth is a big worry. It is difficult to pin point an Al Shabaab operative in a crowd and this has been one of the reasons Kenya has struggled to get the masterminds.

The findings above point the need to enhance close relationship that information will be shared about the bad elements. Majority of the people who cross the Somalia border are genuine immigrants in such off food, peace and economic livelihood. A blanket physical barrier will cut out the genuine immigrants who have lived along the border peacefully despite the presence of Al Shabaab. As one key informant argued during the interview, 'separation barriers like the one envisaged by the Kenyan government might look like the solution, but they can't be the whole solution. At the best, they are just one brick in the wall.'

One significant consequence of the terrorist attacks carried out across the world over recent years is the increased linkage between the movement of people across borders and measures taken to safeguard national security. Because the very processes that facilitate travel and economic and cultural exchanges are also exploited by terrorists, measures aimed at preventing terrorism have become explicitly linked to the management and regulation of cross-border movements. These measures include implementing passenger integrated border-management systems, issuing secure travel documents, promoting exchange of information among stakeholders, training, and capacity-building.

Improvements in these areas can help enhance security and immigration systems while also facilitating the cross-border movement of people. Some of these measures are technologically complex and highly innovative, but a number of simpler measures can be implemented in traditional areas of migration-management with a view to enhancing overall capacity. Such measures should always be justified by the level of threat faced, particularly as increased security can lead to increased obstruction and to potential intrusion into privacy and civil rights.

Going forward, more barriers appear to be in the works. While the Malay government initially assigned a committee to study the options for a new fence along just Kelantan's border, its remit was later expanded to the Sabah and Sarawak provinces bordering Indonesia. The entire proposed fence would stretch over 1,600 miles. As of March this year, the study was still ongoing. In contrast to the Kenyan and Saudi barriers, proposed primarily as counterterrorism measures, Bulgarian officials approved the construction and expansion of a 100-mile fence along the border with Turkey to combat the swelling number of asylum seekers streaming in from the south. A combination of economic pressure, fears of militant infiltration, and a desire to be included in Europe's Schengen Area pushed officials to bolster the country's defenses. Similar trends have been reported in barriers between Malaysia and Thailand, first built as early as the 1970s, purportedly to combat smuggling. They were chiefly constructed of concrete, steel, and barbed wire, with iron fencing in some parts. Both countries built their own 340-mile walls, up to eight feet high, with a thirty-foot no man's land between them.

In Africa, following an outbreak of hoof-and-mouth disease around the border with Zimbabwe in 2003, Botswana began building an electrified fence ostensibly to control the epidemic. Yet Zimbabwean officials and many other observers believed the fence was at least partially aimed at keeping out refugees and illegal immigrants (Finlay, 2012). In fact, Zimbabweans have torn down parts of the barrier, and fence cutting is common. Although Kenya was no stranger to terrorism in the past, the frequency and lethality of Al-Shabaab's recent attacks are unprecedented. Given the reported failure of other measures -including new counterterrorism legislation, increased police presence, and significant Western security assistance, Kenyan officials felt compelled to pursue an extreme solution: constructing a border wall

that will extend from Mandera County at the country's northeastern tip to the Indian Ocean. According to news accounts, the government believes such a wall is the best way to insulate Kenya from Al-Shabaab's hit-and-run attacks in the short term. However, the findings of this study point to more long-term strategic approaches (Menkhaus, 2014).


The above findings reveal the diversity of challenges that a country like Kenya, and Somalia face in developing border security strategies. Kenya's case is challenging because the government continue to be consumed by a daunting challenge: how to ensure physical security (such as the border wall crisis); and by extension, continued economic growth in a region troubled by transnational terrorism and instability. Within this context, Kenya has undertaken a significant reorganization of its bureaucratic processes for internal and border security following the recent attacks in Garisa and Lamu.

### **7.10 Challenges Hindering the Effectiveness of Border Surveillance**

The September 11, 2001, attacks transformed American and international conceptions of border control. The U.S. government, for instance, had traditionally viewed border control as a mostly customs and immigration-based challenge. But after 9/11, policymakers and officials increasingly viewed borders as potential points of entry for would-be terrorists. Internationally, other countries also took steps to rethink approaches to border security in the post-9/11 environment. Some states echoed the U.S. approach and moved to emphasize border control as part of a larger, and emerging, “homeland security enterprise” that dealt with how internal, external, and trans-boundary threats affect domestic security (Conley & Schaffer, 2010).

But even as governments broadly heighten their focus on border control, important differences remain in how individual states approach organizational- and policy-based reforms. EU member states, for instance, have embraced a regional approach to border security by adopting common standards and moving toward a single, external border. Other countries, meanwhile, have turned inward to examine how national capabilities address or, in some cases, fail to address a growing litany of border security threats. For Kenya, the security-based approach witnessed by employing the hard-line measures has been met with challenges.

The study sought to establish the challenges that hinder the effectiveness of border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Data on the same were analyzed and results presented as given in Figure 7.9.



**Figure 7.9 Challenges hindering the effectiveness of border surveillance**

**Source: Field Data, 2015**

Findings in Figure 7.9, show response from Kenya various challenges hindering the effectiveness of border surveillance in counterterrorism, including corruption 194(70%), limited inter-agency cooperation 122(44%), limited interstate cooperation 100(36%), limited inclusion of border communities 144(52%), weak immigration and border policies 166(60%) and poor technological capacity 116(42%).

Response from Somalia reveals various challenges hindering the effectiveness of border surveillance in counterterrorism, including corruption 40(54%), limited inter-agency cooperation 45(62%), limited interstate cooperation 47(64%), limited inclusion of border communities 29(40%), weak immigration and border policies 57(78%) and poor technological capacity 54(74%).

Kenya-Somalia border porosity and undemarcated borders presents a major challenge hindering the effectiveness of border surveillance. Different portions of extensive border have a variety of problems specific to them which have to be appropriately addressed. These problems have become aggravated in recent times with Kenya's policy of cross- border terrorism along with its intensely hostile Al-Shabaab propaganda designed to mislead and sway the loyalties of the border population is a growing trend. The intensification of cross-border terrorism targeted to destabilize Kenya and Somalia has thrown up new challenges for border management policy.

One of the important problems in managing the borders is their delimitation and demarcation on the ground. Kenya has an undemarcated border with Somalia. The fact is that the boundaries are a mix of well recognized demarcations; as argued, Al-



Shabaab has been using covert action in the guise of terrorism as an instrument of State policy against Kenya. It has recruited, trained, financed, armed and infiltrated terrorists in the region. When a border is not demarcated on the ground and when there is no common understanding between two sides such intrusions are bound to take place from both sides. Such intrusions used to be a recurring feature across the Kenya-Somalia border in the Northern region. Undemarcated areas continue to remain a source of tension and pose a hindrance towards normalization of relations between two nations. India had to defend its territory by going to war over these issues. Terrain and ethnic affinities of population on both sides of the borders. Illegal migration, infiltration of anti-national elements, smuggling of arms/explosives and drug trafficking are some of the serious problem. The terrain and the demographic composition of the border area make it conducive for terrorist groups to sneak into Kenya and also to get easily assimilated into the local populace.

Migration from Somalia to Kenya, especially in Mandera and Wajir, has primarily been driven by the quest for better economic opportunities. Many Somalis have also crossed over into Kenya to escape political and religious persecution. Over the years, the magnitude of this illegal migration had reached such an astounding proportion that it had begun to alter the demographic profile and threaten the socio- political fabric of the Border States. The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of the people have also made it easy for Insurgents Groups to cross over into Kenya. The increasing influence of Islamic fundamentalism has resulted in the large- scale push, of not only economic migrants, but also the foot- soldiers of jihad terrorism and pan- Islamic fundamentalism, all of which have the potential to destabilize the country and threaten national security.

Inadequate security cooperation with other states. It appears that although border-security cooperation, designed to combat organized crime and terrorism insurgencies, is ongoing, it has not overly been effective in ensuring effective border surveillance. One respondent noted the following:

Centralized surveillance responsibilities by the state (state owned) make it difficult for agencies to collaborate effectively. The blame game after an attack has happened just shows that collaboration is not effective in Kenya; coupled with poor security planning and strategy. In most cases, lack of coordination and proactiveness when information is received is a big problem (Interview with female NGO representative in Garissa, 9th September, 2015).

The most difficult problem is coordination between state and central agencies, and it operates both at the political level, between the national government and the elected chiefs at the local level, and especially in the area of policing (Interview with a male member of National Intelligence Agency-Somalia officer in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

What the above statements mean is that lack of collaboration and cooperation between the border agencies and their counterparts in neighboring countries impedes their ability to provide fast and efficient services. The necessity of collaboration boils down to the fact that similar issues confront border security and a state will be limited in its capacity to deal with it single handedly. This is what informs the adoption of an integrated approach to border management. This however requires huge investments in border infrastructure such as technology and other equipment to integrate the communication system of the border agencies for effective collaboration.

The above view disagrees with Harns (2005) analysis indicating a move towards inter-governmental cooperation and dialogue on border management has been

effective; including migration management matters, including migration and security. In addition, a major set-back has been corruption. One respondent also noted this:

Corruption is key and limited and lack off appropriate infrastructure such as scanner and detection equipment makes surveillance difficult. There is political influence by some of those benefiting from the porous border through illegal trace (FGD with male religious-based members in Mombasa 29th August, 2015).

In view of the above, it clearly demonstrate that number of terrorism activities in Kenya and within the region have been blamed on corruption involving the government officials, extremist groups and cartels organized to facilitate the extremist activities. Corruption and terrorism have been cited to go together. Corruption acts have facilitated influx of terrorism groups/individuals and thriving of terrorism in Kenya as supported by Orttung (2009) who observed that poor governance creates a favorable environment for thriving of terrorism and terrorist activities by facilitating their ability to attack or organize. Terrorists corrupt government officials to gain entry into Kenya so as to execute their operations fueled by their individual interests emanating from their affiliate groups/organizations with vested interests such as revenge and or as an act of national, regional or international recognition. Thus, the high corruption incidences have a direct relationship to terrorism acts perpetrated across and along the border points.

The weak efforts by the Kenyan Government on implementation of the existing laws, ethical and anti-corruption measures have also enabled corruption to thrive and water down efforts geared towards counter-terrorism efforts especially along Kenya

border points. This has demoralized efforts of other committed personnel to scale up their fight against insurgency and related extremist activities especially those resulting from illegal immigrants and suspected terrorists. In addition, lack of integrity among border management institutions has created a formidable challenge in the fight against terrorism perpetrated along the Kenyan borders. This has put into question the commitment of the government in enhancing security in Kenya to an extent of drawing both local and international criticism.

In line with results of a past study by Orttung (2013), the high incidence of porosity resulting from corruption practices among security agents and other staff operating in these border control station has been linked to greed for money and or feeling of vulnerability to criminal group threats. In addition, use of repressive methods in fighting terrorism and illegal immigrants has prompted immigrants and individuals feeling discriminated against and oppressed to seek out criminal and shadow structures instead of appealing to government agencies and law-enforcement for support. Such individuals provide the support the criminal groups require to succeed through corruption and unethical practices outside the knowledge of the security agents and institution as a way of sympathizing and revenging. As such, terrorism is facilitated through well formulated and executed architecture of colluding cartels within the same institutions mandated to prevent such deals and activities.

This conflict of interest has made it difficult for the counter-terrorism strategies to be adequately successful in ensuring security of the country. This finding is also supported by similar study by Robinson (1999) who found out that the enormous amount of money that terrorists are able to launder, to re-invest in criminal activity,

to hand out as bribes to the border control and law enforcement security officials and to accumulate profits can replace the government with a body politic designed in their own image. Therefore, without collusion of terrorist groups with prominent leaders and officials in key institutions such as banks, security and immigration institutions, terrorist groups cannot function on a national and global basis as successfully as they do. This violates the constitution of Kenya (2010) requirements of integrity among the state officers in the execution of their duties.

Border areas are particularly ideal places for the spread of corrupt practices because of the prevailing difficult social and economic circumstances which encourage border control agents to compromise security in exchange for illegal benefits. The problem of corruption requires a broader understanding and a more appropriate response by all stakeholders, for any degree of control achieved in this area will have corresponding positive implications against the other border related problems. This is due to the direct linkages between corruption and crime, whereby the former routinely facilitates an environment conducive to the sustainment of criminals and their activities, including those related to national borders.

Wherever there are border management agents and officials who are willing enough to trade their responsibilities for personal benefits, it is only natural to encounter the proliferation of smugglers, traffickers and terrorists who know no qualms to extend their trades once they have overcome this immediate barrier. Therefore, unless efforts are taken at all levels to prevent and combat corruption, there will be little progress in mitigating the impact of these criminals on national, regional or global security. One respondent quoted during FGD said the following:

It is saddening because the security people receive bribes for private profit, at a time when Kenya faces its most determined and focused enemy called Al-Shabaab (FGD with male religious groups in Nairobi, 22th September, 2015).

In contexts like Kenya's where corruption is so systemic that entire public institutions are essentially privatized there's great need for more robust international mechanisms to deal with corruption. To deal with situations where the system isn't corrupt but corruption *is* literally the system. Yet, another major dissatisfaction to all the security personnel is their low remuneration and lack of incentives to boost their morale. This explains why a lot of them act unprofessionally.

Bribery and corruption has become part and parcel of the work culture of these institutions to a large degree and increases in salaries and incentives will not erase this negative attitude unless other measures are instituted to deal with it. Officers who refuse to follow the norm do not get the needed support from either their colleagues or supervisors. They are rather victimized and they face the threat of losing their jobs.

Piracy is not a new phenomenon in Africa but has now gained attention in the news particularly off the Somali coast and in the Red Sea. Due to lack of maritime security along the African coastal waters, and acquisition of advanced technology ranging from fast boats to global positioning system (GPS), pirates have been able to negatively affect maritime transport. In addition, piracy has blossomed due to weak state governance and lack of state capacities to patrol coastal waters. From the findings, 5.4% cited limited surveillance technological capacity.

Telecommunications infrastructure in border areas does not satisfy the real needs for efficient work of the border services, both in terms of accessions nets, and in transfer capacities. The existing radio-telephone systems are outdated and they cannot support border security duties. Bad telecommunications infrastructure is a bottleneck and hindrance for any serious information modernization of border crossings.

One of the conditions for a successful communication and information exchange is the application of modern information and telecommunications equipment. Introduction of mutually connected and compatible information systems would facilitate more efficient performance of duties of border services. Beside information and communication equipment, in the domain of information technological component of the integrated border management system, there also lacks the software support for gathering, local and central processing and presenting data which can be useful for border services' work. There is no connection between information systems of border services. One respondent noted the following:

Infrastructure at all border crossings is not satisfactory, evinced in a small number of lanes, bad access roads, and complicated technology of traffic flow (Interview with a key male NGO official in Mogadishu, 4th September, 2015).

Lack of adequate infrastructure at border crossings impedes the work of border services. However, despite this defect, there are no clearly defined common infrastructure requirements, ways of maintaining them, or the solution for the matters concerning property relations. In addition, the institutions charged with the responsibility to enforce security at the borders are woefully under resourced hence nullifying their efforts directed at improving security. Their constraints involve a lot of factors that are intertwined and include inadequate legislative and judicial support

to enforce the rules, insufficient, outmoded and dilapidated border facilities and equipment, and the deficiency in their capacity to act according to modern standards. In addition, lack of motivation in terms of low remuneration for the security personnel is the reason for the 'institutionalized' corruption. The issues are exacerbated by the uncompromising attitude of the border residents who perpetuate smuggling at the borders and the inability of the institutions concerned to use the right platform to sensitize civil society on relevant concerns that pertain to the use of the borders.

The Strategy for Enhancing Border Management in Africa is based on a general understanding that despite continuous efforts at both national and regional levels, border management in Africa is far from satisfactory in accomplishing the purposes of enhancing regional and continental peace, security, and integration. One of the purposes of border management is the prevention and elimination of cross-border crimes such as illegal trafficking of weapons, drugs, goods and people; illegal migration; piracy, insurgency and terrorism; illegal exploitation and destruction of natural resources; auto theft; and cattle rustling. Most of these criminal acts are aggressively pursued in highly organized and complex ways that spread out regionally and globally. However, the prevalence of insecurity along territorial borders stifles legitimate commercial activities and replaces them with illegitimate ones, which denies local communities and governments economic benefits. Despite the realized co-operation, there are no detailed regulated ways and procedures for co-operation, which in some cases creates a possibility for delaying and overlapping of competencies.

While Kenya's border problem with Somalia is related to this colonial history, its porosity has been exacerbated by the failure of succeeding governments to properly



administer these borders. As Okumu notes, “the high level of insecurity on African borders is largely due to the way they are administered and managed, and less to do with how colonialists drew them.” In this respect, these borders are known for the limited presence of security and law enforcement officials. The few that are deployed are poorly trained, work with inadequate and obsolete equipment, and sometimes poorly remunerated. In addition, most border communities have for long been neglected by the government, making it difficult for government to leverage on their position to curtail illicit cross- border activities.

The presence of large ethnic Somalis in Kenya’s chronically underdeveloped northeast region can no longer be ignored; the task of countering terrorism has been made all the more difficult by the fact that the planners and financiers of this brutality are deeply embedded in our communities. Indeed, from one FGD respondent:

Kenya’s efforts are likely to be in vain so long as Kenya’s security forces fail to learn from or even acknowledge past mistakes in order to protect their reputation. The border issues cannot be solved if corruption is still tolerated by both governments. Terrorists use this loophole to recruit and move across the borders (Interview with key female in Mogadishu, 4th September, 2015).

In view of the above, it is clear that border management strategies and require a broad-based approach. Supporting the quest for human security is the striking fact that border regions often exhibit a low level of development compared to the core centers of the country. Asal and Pate (2005) point out that built upon fragile power after independence and weakened through continuing border conflicts, the postcolonial states has rarely been able to exercise control over its entire territory. Even if a state power is strong enough to penetrate its entire territory, governments

tend to disregard development of border communities, since these are often the target for destruction during the time of war.

It is also the historically grown uncertainty in relation to border regions that make states hesitant to invest in them: one respondent noted during an interview that “For security reasons, no government or individual is willing to invest in the border communities because of war.” It is hence not surprising that the border communities along the Kenya-Somalia line suffer from poor infrastructure, a lack of access to educational facilities and low development in general. As stated by one respondent:

Kenya and Somalia have always conducted governance as if the people outside the cities have no need for peace, security and development. This results in very limited possibilities and choices for the border population in terms of their survival and livelihood, and pushes them into informality and illegality (Interview with male key informant-security expert officer in Nairobi, 22nd September, 2015).

What these findings indicate is that varying political instability and border management are critical components that may eventually hinder development and create border management challenges. Somalia has been without a functional central government since January 1991, making it the longest-running instance of complete state collapse in post-colonial history. This unique context of state collapse has been an important factor in the evolution of both nonviolent and jihadi Islamic movements in the country. The challenge of weak and failed states present important policy challenges to border management policies.. Failed states offer two potential advantages to terrorist groups. First, they may provide a safe haven for hierarchical systems that ease terrorists’ core organizational problems. Second, the

economic conditions that accompany state failure may create a favorable labor market for recruiting militants (Amed & Herbold, 2009).

Borderlands are both melting pots and security hot spots. Often neglected in the development strategies of postcolonial states, they are an arena for cross-border crime and represent a dynamic place of historically fostered cultural and socio-economic exchange at the same time. Worries of border porosity and fears of criminal activity spilling-over from Somalia to Kenya are increasing. This is due to the potential spread of threats related to transnational terrorism and cross-border crime; especially linked to the growing power of Al-Shabaab. Small arms and light weapons combined qualities of destructiveness; adaptability and portability have made them weapons of choice for organized criminal groups. Their unchecked availability has played a part in causing massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and in the emergence of a culture of violence and the use of children in armed conflicts, events which have devastated many socio-economic systems in Africa (Musa, 2013).

The implosion of Somalia, and the instability that followed, have greatly contributed to the challenge of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) trafficking in East Africa. When the Somali government fell in 1991, many soldiers who fought in the border regions of Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya traded the only goods they had; weapons for food, shelter and safe passage home. Because of its nonexistent central authority and porous borders, Somalia became a gateway country for illicit arms flows into East Africa; although the relative ease with which these weapons travel across national borders everywhere means that all countries in the region are victims

and culprits alike (Bergenas & Finlay, 2011). Arms trafficking facilitate and exacerbate violent crimes, car-jacking, highway robberies, abductions, extortions, terrorism and piracy. With the porosity of the border points, the proliferation of illegal firearms into Kenya has reached crisis proportions. A recent study of Kenya by South Africa's Institute for Security Studies (ISS, 2014) indicates that 'black' marketers sell some 11,000 guns annually, most of which enter Kenya from Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, and Uganda.

Kenya launched an array of efforts designed to bolster its ability to prevent small-arms trafficking. The Kenya Ports Authority has made remarkable strides in implementing the International Maritime Organization's security measures for ships and port facilities. In April 2008, Kenya set up a new monitoring unit to control trafficking along its coastline. Kenyan authorities are also strengthening border security through the acquisition of sophisticated detection and inspection equipment for border points and by providing training to relevant personnel. In conjunction with heightened port and security measures, the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, together with the Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA), stepped up efforts to investigate and prosecute customs-control and border-security violations involving the diversion of goods in transit. Kenya is also providing incentives to traders to comply with strict regulations. The KRA launched an initiative designed to integrate modern risk-management measures into the regulation of transit trade (Bergenas & Finlay, 2011).

As trends that have particularly worrisome security implications continue to evolve, it is conceivable that the conflated pressures of insurgent conflict, terrorism, political insecurity, illicit trafficking of all kinds, and piracy and vessel hijacking will outstrip the international and regional community's ability to effectively respond to those

issues in a sustained fashion (Rupert, 2012). Rupert further asserts that amidst the existential pressures of geopolitical fragility, internal political upheaval, insurgency, famine, and inter-state tensions, there is now a growing danger that the specific threats from terrorism, trafficking, and piracy will not get the resources and policy attention they require, and could, therefore, increase further in the near term and beyond.

These findings relate to recent evidence from Nigeria, for example, which reveal that there are over 1,499 irregular (illegal) and 84 regular (legal) officially identified entry routes into Nigeria. This confirms the very porous state of these borders which permits illicit transnational arms trafficking. For Kenya and Somalia, terrorists and smugglers take advantage of this leakage to smuggle small arms and light weapons (SALWs) (Omuoha, 2012). Criminals and rebel groups have taken advantage of the widespread availability of SALWs to engage in acts that undermine human security and state sovereignty. There are currently several internal and external sources of SALWs. Nevertheless, regardless of their origin, these SALWs do cross national borders to reach various destinations where they are lucratively sold or, in some cases, donated.

Travel and various forms of migration constitute a growing challenge with regard to the monitoring of interstate state and external borders. From the point of view of counterterrorism, these borders must be guarded effectively so that terrorists wanting to execute their plans do not have an opportunity to pass these borders without being detected (Ginsburg, 2006). At the same time, Ford (2005) points out that states have an economic interest in the rapid processing of passenger flows. It goes without

saying that border surveillance is a field of work that requires close cooperation with other states and international partners. One respondent was quoted as follows:

Issuance of national identity cards is a big security threat as anybody can end up being issued with KenyanID. In fact, it's easy for a Somalia citizen to get a Kenya ID than a real Kenyan citizen (Interview with key female informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

These comments indicate the prevailing gaps in illegal migration, often may be varied in conformity with prevalent environmental, social, political and economic circumstances. It is only logical to expect that the same process will be a major human preoccupation as long as these circumstances remain to be the governing factors in the long term, as well. Two categories of reasons are generally identified as factors contributing to the movement or migration of people across national borders: the push and pull factors. The push factors include human-made and/or natural catastrophes such as drought, famine, flooding, wars and conflict, and other sources of insecurity such as unemployment. These factors induce people to leave their home countries for neighbouring or distant ones where, they believe, they can secure relative safety for themselves and, often, their families (Omuoha, 2012).

On the other hand, the pull factors generally refer to conditions in destination countries that, as a matter of reality or of perception maintained by the migratory, are more attractive or conducive than those in their home countries. These attractions manifest in the form of an opportunity for a better life, high income, greater security, better quality of education and health care. No matter how people are influenced to cross other countries' borders, their crossing itself will be regarded either legal or illegal (Okumu, 2012). Countries demand the legal movement of

people as this form has beneficial outcomes to both the migrant and the destination country in terms of almost all aspects, if not to the home country which may consider the event a loss of potential productive capability. Conversely, illegal migration is something countries have always defended themselves against, as it is associated with border insecurity (Stanojoska, 2012).

These findings suggest that border management initiatives between Kenya and Somalia, therefore, have to take into account all these pros and cons, more specifically with respect to illegal migration, without which are doomed to fail. The increasing frequency of armed conflicts initiated by politically disenfranchised groups, the rising sense of insecurity, environmental degradation and subsequent famine, and the cruel vicious cycle of poverty have driven millions to the brink of despair. The customary reaction of people has always been to flee their homes and take refuge elsewhere within their own country or in neighbouring countries. Tension can escalate to armed conflict between refugees and local people, ultimately sucking in the concerned countries into it, as well. Moreover, criminals and insurgents can take advantage of the situation to carry out attacks on host governments or even against other sovereign nations across borders, as has been the case with Kenya and Somalia terrorist attacks and hijackings. Similarly, refugees are doubly victimized when they are forcefully recruited by rebel groups and criminal syndicates that operate usually along national borders (Bergenas & Finlay, 2011).

Adetunji (2014) notes that transnational criminal activities across the many African borders are manifold. They include the trafficking of small arms and light weapons, narcotics and human beings as well as cross-border armed attacks after which

criminals often easily retreat to the other side of the border to evade prosecution. For example, the porosity of the border between Kenya and Somalia; and weak governance on Somalia sides facilitate, like in other border regions, transnational crime. Less common, but still important is transnational organized crime (TOC), which has been growing in the region over the past few years. Despite increasing sub-regional and international cooperation, criminal cross-border activities remain a key variable of instability in the sub-region. In the words of one respondent:

Like other cross-border crimes, corruption is what oils the easy flow of these illegal drugs across our borders. It is now widely acknowledged that drug trafficking has become a major threat to human security, national sovereignty and regional stability (Interview with a female civil society official in Mombasa, 29th August, 2015).

In view of the foregoing, it is evident that informal cross-border trade can be seen as a positive or negative phenomenon, depending on the viewpoint taken. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of an ancient solidarity between people who were separated by colonial borders. It can be seen as an expression of entrepreneurship and economic dynamism that is healthy for any economy and which secures the livelihood of many families. On the other hand, custom evasion deprives the state of important revenues which contributes to the weakening of public institutions and the state's legitimacy (Flynn, 2007).

External threats to security are not the only border management issue dealt with at present by the national security apparatus. Kenya and Somalia rate of growth has generated problems like mass migrations. Other threats and challenges have also emerged. The border security scenario is marked by: increased cross-border terrorism; infiltration and ex-filtration of armed militants; emergence of non-state



actors; nexus between narcotics traffickers and arms smugglers; illegal migration; left-wing extremism; separatist movements aided and abetted by external powers; and, the establishment of madrasas, some of which are potential security hazards.

Kenya's national security and stability as well as economy have been destabilized by waves of terror attacks which targeted some important sources in the country by Al-Shabaab. Tourists and aid workers were also kidnapped from Kenya into Somalia by the group (Eriksson, 2013: 66). In response to the security threats, Kenya decided to intervene in Somalia's conflict militarily, in order to protect its national security. The KDF entered Somalia in 2011 and fought with Al-Shabaab, capturing many territories inside Somalia from the group. The Kenyan troops initially entered Somalia without the consent of Somalia's government, but were later on allowed to join AMISOM peace keeping mission under the mandate of AU and UNC (AMISOM, 2012).

In view of the fact that refugees are victims of multiple circumstances, these findings show that Kenya and Somalia have to enhance the safety of refugees as well as ensure their own security by designing and implementing prudent refugee policies and programmes. As regards to illegal recruitment of refugees by criminal gangs, states must act proactively, their actions being, for example, by providing adequate security around their camps to prevent armed groups infiltrating them. One respondent noted the following:

Kenya must practice innovative ways of assigning or locating camps on sites that are not too close to the boundary. Locating or relocating refugee camps must involve a thorough planning. There is a big border area which is porous which allows illegal immigrants and army's movement to Kenya. This makes it hard to differentiate the terrorist and refugees and whom you can really trust (Interview with civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

In view of the foregoing, such a situation exacerbates the challenges of border management, making it more complex for the border guarding agencies. The findings agree to some extent with a study by Moller (2009) indicating that displaced persons seeking asylum across borders also pose a threat to border security. The displacement of people could occur anywhere in the world for natural or human-made reasons. In Africa, armed conflict, civil strife and political instability are the chief causes of social dislocation.

From the FGD responses, refugees put strain on the economy, environment and social infrastructure, and can be predisposed to crime especially those coming from civil war situation. They could bring their weapons and use them for criminal activities. As one respondent notes:

....also, a lot of the refugees, after getting integrated into the system, refuse to go home even when the situation is improved in their country. The prolonged stay of too great influx could alter the ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of a country. Also, it could create a political constituency for immigration control. With the Kenyan experience, there were occasions where the government decided to repatriate refugees and this however received protest (Interview with key male informant-NGO officer in Garisa, 9th September, 2015).

The response above paints Kenya's long-standing Somali refugee crisis. According to Flood (2011), Kenya is now officially home to over 500,000 refugees from Somalia. The Dadaab refugee camps in the north east are severely overcrowded.

This influx has imposed tremendous strains. In addition, emerging challenges of terrorism trends between Kenya and Somalia underline the need to shift initiative on the counterterrorism approaches being utilized. Interestingly, response from Somalia reveals that not many see refugee camps as a border and terrorism problem. A respondent was categorical and said the following:

Refugees are innocent but unfortunately are blamed for all bad things. Kenya has been planning to repatriate them but that won't solve terrorism because Al-Shabaab and its affiliates are now penetrated into some towns and not in refugee camps (Female FGD member in Mogadishu, 2nd September, 2015).

Contrary to these findings above, Mativo's study found out that there is a linkage between camp refugees and threats to state and human security. Mativo (2014) points out that the complexity of refugee camps like Dadaab and Kakuma in Kenya pose border security challenges in general. He adds that both in migration and security policy the spectre of the sovereign state loom at large. This information explains how border surveillance and combating terrorism is extremely difficult since it is so amorphous, extremely complex, constantly changing in form and tactic as well as very unpredictable; to counter it, effectively, governments must tackle the entire range of causes leading to terrorism.

### **7.11 Suggested Strategies for Effective Border Management**

The researcher in this research question sought suggestions from respondents on possible strategies that could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying problems relating to border surveillance to effectively counter terrorism.

A number of suggestions were made on possible strategies that could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying problems relating to border surveillance to effectively counter terrorism. Firstly, the need for security and community intelligence partnership is important. Sensitizing border communities on key partnership areas such as the kind of information they should be giving to facilitate counterterrorism efforts at the local level is also a vital element in the fight against terrorism and extremists. This is important based on the fact that many terrorists, who attack the country, enter and live with the community, planning their attack for a long time before the right time comes for them to strike.

Therefore, there is need for cooperation between the community and security agencies which can be boosted through community involvement in border counterterrorism planning especially by effective and efficient communication and exchange of relevant information with the communities. This will help to monitor and report illegal activities to the authorities on the extensive porous frontiers that are not effectively policed by government officials. Perhaps this is what the government of Kenya is aiming to initiate in the “*NyumbaKumi*” or ten household concepts that was planned as response to the 21st September 2013 Westgate Mall terrorist attack in Nairobi. One key informant was categorical and noted the following:

The first step should be to make the border with Somalia real by fixing customs and border patrol agencies; and by reining in sections of Somali elites who continue to engage in costly fights at the expense of ordinary wananchi. The government should adopt a strict policy of not taking sides in these fights, and strictly enforce this policy at the County level (Interview with female state officer in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

Response from FGD noted that constant surveillance, data collection, processing and sharing of information is fundamental in monitoring and weeding out criminals posing threats to national security. Similar to findings by Adamson (2006), lack of effective and efficient intelligence gathering and sharing among the relevant cooperating agencies has compromised counter-terrorism efforts aimed at denying terrorist access to Kenya. One respondent quoted the following:

The government needs to invest heavily in border intelligent security and surveillance technology. Sensitize border communities with culture of patriotism and defense of their motherland, improve infrastructure and empower border communities to be self sustaining people (Interview with civil society member in Nairobi, 23rd September, 2015).

In view of the above, intelligence gathered provides a cornerstone in fighting terrorist attacks in any state without which terrorism and related criminal activities cannot be contained. This concurs with the Kenyan situation where many attacks have been blamed on the immigrants who penetrate Kenyan borders and live in Kenya illegally without the knowledge of government officials. These terrorist groups radicalize and recruit the young people to join illegal militia groups who later carry out attacks within the country with the help of networks across the border with the terrorists. An FGD member noted:

Harmonize neighboring communities, reduce the arming of locals and check on illegal arms. Also sufficient surveillance technology necessary. Discourage corruption and diversify the skills of community policy team and local administrators. The need to synergize the intelligence network of the two countries (Interview with a female NGO official in Kismayu, 5th September, 2015).

Introduction of electronic registration of persons that will help in tracking individuals from birth. Roll out security programs on security sensitization and involve all security agencies. Formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of strategic security agencies (Interview with a male state official in Nairobi, 24th September, 2015).

It is evident from the foregoing views that controls of cross border activities on borders require some of the important and strategic heights important for the security of the nation. Both external and internal situations of the country are changing at an incredibly fast pace with the developments in nuclear weapons and missiles, increasing cross border terrorism, the emergence of non-state actors, the growth of Islamic fundamentalists, the narcotics arms nexus, illegal migration and left wing extremism, gravely impacting upon the security of the country and thus posing challenge to management of borders.

In what Cole (2003:13) refers to as “preventive law enforcement,” the legal and operational response has been to use greater surveillance to reduce threats and prosecute transnational offenders. Since the police often lack the manpower and technical expertise to keep pace with global terrorists and criminals, O'Harrow (2005) notes that security agencies need to widen their surveillance capability by collaborating with private commercial enterprises to obtain personal data or to eavesdrop on the public.

Given that globalization, media revolution and technological development in various fields have immensely impacted the border management framework. Now more comprehensive planning is needed to achieve peace and progress on borders. Geocentrality of Kenya and the fear of the unstable neighbouring States of Somalia, economic resources and military strength has impacted on mutual relations. Moreover, regional cooperation (including effective information-sharing) was key to the effective monitoring of borders against the movements of terrorists and weapons, and should be strengthened. This cooperation might begin at an informal level and subsequently be moved to a more formal setting. Confidence-building could be achieved through joint activities or training.

Effective regional cooperation required effective domestic inter-agency coordination and cooperation, which would be facilitated through the development of national counter-terrorism strategies. In particular, one key respondent was quoted as follows:

Bring on board the communities on border lines, empowered and established legitimately in the structural frameworks, devolve the centralized command demand. In addition, performance monitoring of the forces commands and radical disciplinary measures; erasure of political involvement in security matters of nation and radical disciplinary of corrupted force (Interview with male state official in Nairobi, 24th September, 2015).

What the above statement means is that a review should be wider and involve communities as key partners in border surveillance. Overall, coordination of activities in the development of regulations in the field of integrated border management and mutual cooperation between border services; coordination and organization of joint actions of the civil administration in border management; cooperation with relevant international organizations and state bodies and bodies of

local self-government with respect to the integrated border management; participation in the implementation of the agreements reached on the construction of common facilities and proposing priorities for the modernization of border crossings and establishing a single IP video surveillance of border crossings; harmonization of transport procedures and border controls with border services of neighbouring countries are critical. Multilateral co-operation, aimed at matters concerning border management, is one of the ways of an easier information exchange, and it can be enlarged to encompass mutual operational co-operation and establishment of joint security teams, which contributes to a more efficient prevention of trans-border crime.

As indicated earlier, the role of some key players such as the government, the border agencies and civil society is very critical to good border management. Though the institutions involved are already playing their role, the impact is still minimal. There is the need for them to beef up their efforts regarding the present state of our borders which leaves much to be desired. The efforts at the political level should be seen in practical terms where appropriate laws and policies that geared towards boosting the security needs at the borders are formulated. A review of the policies should be possible to address the existing trends of border issues. The policy formulators can be well acquainted with current border issues if they fund and encourage research in issues that are oriented to border security. As mere policies do not solve problems unless they are put into action, resources should be made available or the necessary conditions created for successful implementation. Resources should also be allotted to improve border infrastructure and facilities.



A major transformation within the judicial sector is necessary for timely persecution of offenders. There is the need for them to devise a pragmatic means to trace, freeze or confiscate the assets of border criminals if found guilty. This will serve as a great disincentive to them and deterrent to those intending to be recruited into the dirty game. The capacities of the institutions that gather, analyze and exchange intelligent information should be enhanced to complement the judicial efforts. Much attention should be given to maritime security especially, with the discovery of off-shore oil. There should be a speed up in the intended re-demarcation of the maritime boundary shared with Somalia.

The key actors in the business of ensuring security at the borders should not be relegated to the background. For the security personnel, their competencies must be improved through continuous training to enable them meet the modern requirements or the standards set by the global world. Some amount of intelligent training should be incorporated into their induction process. They should also be encouraged to strengthen the existing collaboration among them and be given some form of incentives to boost their morale. For those residing around the border, alternatives should be created such as the establishment of free educational institutions together with the continuous campaign for them to see its worth to encourage their younger ones to build their capacities for other forms of economic activities. The establishment of industries can also help in absorbing the energies of the idle youth thus breaking the generational tandem of engaging in the smuggling business.

Co-operating with neighboring states is very essential to good border management. This is because aside the fact that organized crimes thrive where conditions

prevailing within neighbouring countries are conducive, a country also bears the repercussions of the push factors for irregular migration such as natural disasters, war, poverty and unemployment. Thus improving security at the borders will amount to nothing if it is not done in collaboration with close countries. As indicated already, it is the bedrock for an integrated approach to border management. This however can be achieved if border facilities are upgraded to the required standards that will ensure a fast and efficient means of sharing information.

In collaboration with the media and other avenues of information dissemination, the general public or civil society can be made to keep abreast of pertinent issues that relate to border security. Some security personnel at the land borders have expressed the need for a big pictorial billboard sited within a radius close to the border with the message written in both French and English language to alert the users of the border about simple requirements. In addition they are advocating for an organized and identifiable group to serve as porters at the land borders to guarantee some form of monitoring and regulation of their activities. Finally, programmes organized to come out with best ideas, strategies or skills to address specific problems to enhance border security must be emphasized, and should go a step beyond where a concerted and dedicated efforts is made to make them deliverable within institutional capability.

The Strategy for Enhancing Border Management in Africa is a *de rigueur* instrument developed to improve the security of borders and to facilitate easy movement of people and goods among AU Member States; which in turn, enhances regional and continental cooperation and integration in Africa. The Strategy is built on the

understanding that African countries have not sufficiently secured their borders to prevent crime and encourage beneficial cross-border trading. The AU, therefore, has found it necessary to support its Member States to enhance the management of their borders in a manner that promotes peace, security, and development

The second pillar places emphasis on capacity building through institutional reforms, acquisition and proper use of modern technology, and continuous training of personnel based on the needs and changing nature of African borders. The third pillar anchors the strategy on the inclusion and active involvement of local communities in the management of border. The philosophy behind the three pillars underpinning this Strategy is that by cultivating a culture of cooperation and coordination, by developing dynamic and self-transforming institutions, by strengthening performance through enhanced capabilities, and by embracing the positive contribution of local stakeholders, it is possible for border management actors to increase their efficiency and effectiveness (Amoore, Marmura & Salter, 2012).

## **7.12 Summary**

The Chapter has given analytical perspective of the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Border surveillance plays a critical role in the management of transnational terrorism. This intensification of surveillance of movement, however, at odds with the minimization of checks and porosity of the borders, which have been blamed for the al Shabaab strategic attacks in Kenya. Gaps common in border points majorly include small arms and light weapons, combined qualities of

destructiveness, adaptability and portability have made them weapons of choice for organized criminal groups, as well as illegal migration of populations.

Travel and various forms of migration constitute a growing challenge with regard to the monitoring interstate state external borders. Surveillance, patrols, physical barriers, are common strategies being used, although the involvement of border communities scored low. Patrols, information exchange and joint control operations were viewed as effective strategies from the Somalia responses. The findings reveal a link between refugees and terrorism, although a solid majority was from Kenya. Varying political instability in both Kenya and Somalia has an influence on the effectiveness of border surveillance.

Technological advancements in border surveillance were rated to be weak. An important finding is that the inclusion of border communities in the management of the borders is not effective. At the local level, most border management efforts do not take advantage of border communities. Majority view Kenya's strategy on building a wall along parts of the border as a short-term strategy that cannot solve underlying problems of terrorism. Majority view military personnel as better-places to manage border, although integrated teams were suggested. Inadequate border security cooperation coupled with high levels of porosity/undemarcated borders, as well as lack of inclusion of border communities in the management of the border security represents major challenges

Kenya and Somalia face substantial immigration border control human resource challenges in its efforts to address terrorism and terror threats along and within their border lines. This requires concerted efforts to address the root cause of terrorism other than its symptoms. Inadequate staffing levels, poor working environment,

corruption and bureaucratic intelligence surveillance and sharing among security agencies and institutions increases porosity of Kenyan border line to increasing terror attacks and extremist activities. The study findings reaffirm and refine the need to address threats and challenges to effective border control between Kenya and Somalia in the wake of transnational terrorism.

Finally, despite the fact that there are a multitude of agencies responsible for the physical patrolling of borders, there are fewer coordination issues between those agencies. This is partly because there are no conflicting or competing jurisdictions and partly because most of the internal security enforcement agencies have a centralized reporting system. The internal security apparatus faces additional challenges with a poorly trained and understaffed police force, an outdated and overburdened legal system, and insufficient modern equipment. This chapter summary leads to the next chapter that constitutes the summary, conclusion and recommendations.

## **CHAPTER EIGHT**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter presents a summary of key findings of the study, conclusions, recommendations and suggestions for further research. They are presented on the basis of the specific objectives and the responding research questions which were posed in pursuit of realizing the general objective of examining the role of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

#### **8.1 Summary**

The general objective of this study was to examine the role of security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia. The summary of the study was informed by the objectives below:

- i. Trace the historical evolution of security-based diplomacy and its influence on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.
- ii. Examine the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.
- iii. Assess the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.
- iv. Evaluate the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

With respect to the first specific objective, the results revealed that the historical relations between Kenya and Somalia and prolonged collapse of the Somali state

have had disastrous impact on the security situation of the two countries. In light of this, assessments of the historical relations between Kenya and Somalia point to an array of underlying factors which make the region exceptionally prone to transnational terrorism and armed conflict. While majority viewed a less connection between factors such Shifta War and terrorism between Kenya and Somalia; however, the major element of perceptions revolved around a number of socioeconomic and political grievances emanating from North Frontier District which was curved from the Jubaland Federal State of Somalia in the colonial era and has experienced negligence in terms of development by successive regimes in Kenya.

Among the marginalized communities of North Eastern Kenya, the counterterrorism agenda is perceived to have contributed to what they see as a series of repressive practices by state security forces. Despite ongoing reform initiatives, the study established that majority of respondent in Somalia seemed unconvinced of their impact on current law enforcement practices. Relative economic deprivation has long been the subject of local dissent, dissatisfaction, and opposition to the national government. The general socioeconomic and political marginalization of local youth, a lack of inclusivity and ethnic discrimination against Muslim communities also figured highly in the grievances of local communities. The findings established that Kenya-Somalia relations present a diverse set of regional and country-specific challenges that broadly analyzed extent to long-standing historical issues especially within cross-border communities.

On the other hand, the Kenyan military intervention in Somalia on counterterrorism seems to have mixed reaction across the divide. The study established majority view the strategy as a short-term goal to a long-term problem: arguments on both sides of

the spectrum. It was established that KDF interventionist strategy has not been clear from the onset, and this confusion continues to fuel tension and revenge mission from the Somalia populations, especially clans that feel have been marginalized and left out. The findings revealed that while to some extent, the intervention has weakened the al-shabaab because their source of getting finance have been captured (port Kismayu); it has not been overly effective because it has not been strategically complemented with the other strategies (Interviewee).

The study findings further established a connection between refugee camps and terrorist activities, with majority supporting this view from Kenya, although Somalia response viewed Somali refugee as peace loving people. The study found the dilemma between a humanitarian concern for refugees and a realization those refugees as a source of tension is key in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Moreover, the study established the context of clan politics pose unique difficulties and complicates counterterrorism efforts in Somalia which spills over into Kenya as well. Clan rivalry and split over political rights, issues of representation are collectively underlying factors that have created contentious dangerous environment in which to maintain the peace and manage transnational terrorism.

The second objective sought to examine the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Results established that the pull and push factors to terrorist radicalization range from socio-political alienation and failure of integration; religiosity, unemployment and social exclusion, discrimination within ethnic and or



religious lines. In particular, unemployment and religious issues are the leading trigger factors of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Marginalization and education were cited the least trigger factors of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. Perhaps today religion as a part of terrorism has been mainly attributed to Islamic fundamentalism such as the global Salafi jihad is a world wide religious revivalist movement with the goal of reestablishing past Muslim glory. On the other hand, unemployment as a trigger scored high as well, which could be attributed to globalization and the situation of many young unemployed youths in Kenya and Somalia that may likely lead to frustration, victimization, and humiliation among growing cohorts of urbanized. This allows terrorist organizations to gain attention and entry to societies that have felt wronged by these perceived social injustices.

Results revealed that the link between religion and terrorist radicalization largely highlighted from respondents in Kenya as compared to response from Somalia respondents. The varying response confirmed how the levels and types of causes and catalysts relate to each other and how they, when combined, result in terrorist radicalization. The study further established that counter-radicalization programs have not been effectively implemented between Kenya and Somalia. Moreover, although progress in enhancing good governance and democratic institutions as a counter-radicalization initiative was seen as work in progress in Kenya, promoting co-existence across ethnic/religious groups has not been effective and conflict resolution and peace-building mechanisms are still work in progress, especially in Somalia.

On the other hand, the findings indicate some efforts by Kenya and Somalia governments in adopting strategic approaches in engaging with specific groups to enhance collaboration with the view to countering terrorist radicalization. However, although progress is seen in engaging the youth, Women, community policing, media, NGOs, the role of civil society involvement was below average. Despite their demonstrated potential, the results suggest the capacity of civil society and counterradicalization field remains untapped. The internet was cited as a common strategy being used for recruiting members into terrorist radicalization; although financing and affiliation of terror networks were also highlighted. The findings established that community-focused initiatives in counterradicalization are still weak. Although existing literature indicate that community-based counter-radicalization approaches are having an impact on directly addressing the crisis of radicalization among the youth, the results of this study revealed that this initiative has not been fully utilized. Amongst other challenges, the study established mistrust between the security agencies and the communities as a major factor that impacts the extent of generating and sharing information among all officials involved in counterradicalization and between them and the public.

The third objective sought to assess the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The findings established gaps within the structural capacity of intelligence agencies in intelligence sharing. The findings revealed that the level of cooperation varies greatly. Too often, the various security agencies involved in security have been blamed for a lack of cooperation. Interstate cooperation in intelligence sharing has not been overly effective. On culture, the findings show that although intelligence

community has a clear strategy that establishes core objectives for developing these intelligence relationships, there is lack of coherence to gain the benefits of expanding the network of intelligence agencies, especially with Somalia; often marred by suspicion and traditional statist practices that limit intelligence sharing. The organizational culture of intelligence community was found to be wanting, and training was cited as a strategic aspect that can help Kenya and Somalia intelligence agencies share collection capabilities with foreign intelligence service. Similarly, although interstate cooperation is relatively positive, cooperation of local security agencies with foreign intelligence services is still work in progress, often linked to gaps in policies designed to build such relationships in counterterrorism.

The findings further established that the adaptability of intelligence agencies is limited in relation to accountability and oversight and organizational command structure. Community-based initiatives in intelligence sharing are still weak. The findings show that the majority felt community intelligence mechanisms to ensure accountability in the intelligence sharing are weak. It was further established that various factors play important roles in regulating the behavior of intelligence officers when sharing intelligence through international formal channels. However, it was also established that restraints of resources, mistrust, and cultural differences contribute to making international intelligence cooperation more difficult between Kenya and Somalia. Overall, the study indicates the best practices in intelligence sharing are training, decentralized organizational structure, interstate and inter-agency cooperation in intelligence sharing as well as adoption of modern surveillance as a vital component of intelligence operations geared to combating terrorism or insurgency.

Specific objective four sought to evaluate the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. The findings established that border surveillance plays a critical role in the management of transnational terrorism. This intensification of surveillance of movement, however, is at odds with the minimization of checks and porosity of the borders, which have been blamed for the Al Shabaab strategic attacks in Kenya. The findings established that technological advancements in border surveillance were rated to be weak.

From the findings, majority from both Kenya and Somalia view Kenya's strategy of building a wall along parts of the border as a short-term strategy that cannot solve underlying problems of terrorism. Strategies employed in control and surveillance of the land open border have not been effective. While Kenya has made strides to tighten border security, inadequate border security cooperation with Somalia coupled with high levels of porosity/undemarcated borders, as well as lack of inclusion of comprehensive patrol units in the management of the border security represented major challenges.

The results reveal travel and various forms of migration controls constitute a growing challenge with regard to the monitoring of Kenya-Somalia external borders. The findings point to issues of corruption that necessitate issuing of passports and national identity cards to criminals and terrorists. The findings reveal ineffective migration controls and challenge point to the vulnerabilities of Kenya and Somalia's efforts to counter terrorism. While surveillance, patrols and physical barriers are

common strategies being used, the study established that the involvement of border communities in border security management is low. The inclusion of border communities in the management of the borders was found to be ineffective. At the local level, most border management efforts do not take advantage of border communities.

## **8.2 Conclusions**

Security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism is still nascent in Africa. The shift towards a security-based diplomacy has so far leaned on military force as one element of national power; while other complimentary instruments have not been effectively aligned in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

In theoretical perspective, neorealism can still usefully inform us about the permissive causes of statelessness in Somalia and the counterterrorism challenges Kenya and Somalia face. On the other hand, there has been ongoing momentum of stability operations and the establishment of the post-transition federal government in Somalia. As the findings suggest, the role of state and non-state actors point to the postmodernist approach which advocates for a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military fixation on threats. The study established certain issues including a mix of growing radicalization movement in Kenya, repression and cycles of contention within clan systems especially in Somalia, which have direct bearing on militancy. Ideally, the changing trends of terrorism point to the new social movement theory; which can provide valuable and instructive insights into how groups form and behave and thus enable states to develop strategic

tools to manage the threat of terrorism. While the shift towards a security-based diplomacy in counterterrorism is still a work in progress, an effective counterterrorism strategy requires a combination of appropriate security and law enforcement responses, and broader strategies within the theoretical framework to enhance social cohesion and resilience, and lessen the appeal of the extremist ideologies that fuel terrorism.

The findings point to the ‘security dilemma’ which Kenya and Somalia face in managing transnational terrorism. This dilemma relates to the Neorealism approach, easily found in diplomacy, indicating that forces built to defend against the potential threat of other actors may cause those other actors to feel themselves threatened. Kenya is facing a threat for intervening in Somalia against terrorism. As the threat of violent extremism evolves, a more robust understanding of the effectiveness of particular tools, such as terrorism prevention, is essential in delivering a security-based approach to counterterrorism that is balanced and effective. Kenya and Somalia have to build on strong partnerships and cooperation at the national level, effective engagement at the international level and effective information sharing.

With respect to the first specific objective, it may be concluded that the historical links that Kenya has with Somalia, often related to refugee crisis are still at play. The conceptual ambiguity and lack of programmatic focus of the countering violent extremism and terrorism prevention discourse increases the risk of terrorist radicalization if it is based on assumptions and a limited evidence base. The findings of this study demonstrate that, in the context of marginalized communities between Kenya and Somalia, a “hearts and minds” based approach to countering violent

extremism focused on countering extremist narratives is no substitute for fulfilling local needs and addressing community grievances.

A security-based diplomacy approach, where military intervention is involved require not only an effective strategy but, perhaps more importantly, clear national goals and other diplomatic tools. What was established, however, is that although Kenya supports the military intervention strategy in Somalia, there were some reservations from the Somalia side on whether it relates to fighting Al Shabaab or creating a stable Somalia government. Moreover, the study found that the KDF intervention strategy in Somalia has not been overly effective in managing transnational terrorism, with Somalia response calling for withdrawal of KDF from their land.

Although the Kenyan government has made tremendous efforts on addressing transnational terrorism, findings reveal existing gaps. As it emerged from the findings, mixed reactions on the relation between refugee camps and terrorism still poses a threat to Kenya's efforts to better manage transnational terrorism. The clan dynamics in Somalia offer a major challenge to the security-based approach, coupled with cases of sabotage involving leaking of information across the enemy territories, often blamed on the clan identity and religion factors. The problem of weak states, in the case of Somalia, challenges state capacity in terms of equipping and training security agencies. The weak institutional capacity is a challenge for Federal Government of Somalia to pay the security officers well; which lowers their morale to effectively perform their duties, and offers loopholes for manipulation from terrorist groups like Al shabaab. Overall, the study concluded that the shift towards

a security-based diplomacy approach on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia is ineffective.

When addressing the case of Somalia, it is important to adopt a holistic approach to conflict management in order to attain sustainable peace and development because the identified issues are interdependent. This requires each root cause to be addressed in order to satisfy the needs of all stakeholders and prevent future conflict.

When approaching the issue of transnational terrorism management in Somalia, it is also important to consider each identified context in order to ensure effectiveness. Each stakeholder must be equipped with relevant practices necessary for building and maintaining peace in order to ensure sustainability.

With regard to the second specific objective, it may be concluded that state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia are weak and disjointed. While effective counter-radicalization measures can offer highly successful prevention interventions in the wake of new terror attacks and threats, socio-political alienation and failure of integration drive terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia. The police are the most visible manifestation of the government's counter-terrorism policies so it is critical that their work does not unintentionally alienate Muslim communities. State-centric counter-radicalization measures should go beyond enhancing good governance and democratic institutions. It was established that while there are strategic approaches in engaging with specific groups, the role of women in counterradicalization is still low. Moreover, it is very difficult for civil society to



play any meaningful role in cases where there is little political pluralism and where civil society structures are weak.

The internet has become an invaluable tool for global terrorism recruitment; used for propaganda, gathering intelligence, fundraising, recruiting, planning operations and conducting cyber-criminal activities. While the Kenyan government has authored a number of cybersecurity strategies, they all focus too much on technology and not enough on a comprehensive approach to battling cyber activity as another form of insurgency. The findings revealed that community-focused initiatives in counterradicalization are still weak. Counterradicalization programs can be more effective by realizing the critical role communities play in identifying and addressing security issues in their areas. Understanding differences within the Muslim community is critical to designing the types of interventions and structures that will enable all communities to participate in a community-based counter-terrorism strategy without encountering undue negative outcomes in Somalia.

With respect to the third specific objective, it may be concluded that the effect of the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism highlights the fundamental connection between state security and citizens' expectation of security assurance. From the findings, it is evident that effective intelligence mechanisms should go beyond interagency cooperation, to culture change that integrates training with a goal to enhance intelligence sharing with foreign states.

When determining the success of structural capacity of intelligence sharing measures, it should be viewed in a broader perspective than the current one which only looks at the foiled attacks. The structural capacity of intelligence agencies with regards to their adaptability, organizational command, accountability and oversight underscore the underlying conditions of intelligence failure, and point to the need for more cooperation in enhancing the institutional capacity of the central or national intelligence agencies between Kenya and Somalia.

The study established that community-based initiatives in intelligence sharing are still weak. The effects of mistrust between interstate agencies and within the intelligence community in respective state agencies constitute major aspects in intelligence failure. Since the significance of community intelligence sharing is a factor of frequency of trust and credibility of the information, communities have a role to play in helping security officers identify specific issues of concerns to effectively manage transnational terrorism through information sharing.

Lastly, the fourth specific objective point to the fact that the contribution of border surveillance is critical in the management of transnational terrorism. Progress in the homeland security border management has been inconsistent and the extent to which technology adoption is utilized in border surveillance reflects the state capacity to monitor and address underlying cases of corruption and illegal smuggling of goods. Inter-state and local cooperation under border patrol units is still a challenge. Indicators of illegal border crossing and unlawful presence of foreign nationals indicate gaps in the states' efforts to ensuring effective open border patrol strategies.

Travel and various forms of migration constitute a growing challenge with regard to the monitoring of interstate state external borders. The porosity of Kenya-Somalia border coupled with corruption highlights the challenge of intensifying of stringent migration controls in terms of travel documents which have been blamed for the al Shabaab strategic attacks between Kenya and Somalia. The study established that Kenya's strategy of building a wall along parts of Somalia border cannot offer a long-term strategy in the management of transnational terrorism. A clear border management system that incorporates border communities with a clear and well-communicated border management system is important in building local capacity in the management of transnational terrorism. The study established gaps in border community involvement in border security management. Overall, the study concluded that border surveillance strategies are still a work in progress.

### **8.3 Recommendations**

Based on the study findings and subsequent conclusions, the study recommends key areas of follow-up to effectively manage the transnational terrorism threat. Since addressing the challenge of transnational terrorism over the long term demands multilateral cooperation capacity building and considered efforts to counter violent extremism by all levels of society and government, the recommendations are presented in the order of efficacy with respect to the threats and trends of terrorist attacks in Kenya and Somalia. With the youth population expanding rapidly throughout Kenya and Somalia, and the region at large, the prospect of increasing numbers of "at risk" young people also rises. Moreover, both Kenya and Somalia may also continue to be fertile ground for recruitment for extremists if sizable numbers of refugees and, in particular, second and third generation Muslims

continue to experience socioeconomic and integration problems and feel alienated by governments' domestic and foreign policies.

In the midst of growing interconnectivity of the world, no country can succeed against terrorism in isolation. Kenya and Somalia must strengthen their counterterrorism measures nationally, regionally, and internationally. For the common good and against a common problem like terrorism, both countries should put aside their differences and work together. Consistent with the UN Global Counter Terrorism Strategy, Kenya and Somalia should adopt a counterterrorism strategy that utilizes all elements of national power simultaneously, judicially, and systematically to counterterrorism. In this comprehensive national strategy, use of military and security forces will continue to provide a deterrent and disruptive effect.

Given that the shift towards security-based diplomacy in countering terrorism is still an emerging strategy in the region, Kenya's counterterrorism strategy should therefore, take into account a wide range of issues. It should encompass the use of all instruments of national power, especially economic, diplomatic, information and military as well as other security forces to counter terrorism. The use of military and other security forces for countering terrorism is nothing but the utilization of one element of national power. Its use should be concurrent, supplementary, and complimentary to the utilization of the other instruments of power and should never be used as a solitary method for countering terrorism.

For Somalia, there is need for the government to adopt a specific, concrete and well-coordinated strategy to counterterrorism. Growing political and clan dynamics

threaten the progress and stability of its citizens and those of neighbouring states and state failure greatly challenges any approach to countering terrorism. In this case, investment in conflict resolution programs could reduce the scale and scope of the civil wars on which jihadist groups feed in Somalia. Building up its defense and governance capabilities could help the security apparatus collaborate with other countries in reducing or containing violence in the region.

With respect to the first specific research question, it is recommended that:

**Deal with historical issues:** The relations between Kenya and Somalia have been particularly strained due to the NFD. Kenyan Muslim community has always been brisk as a political unit in a persistent struggle against a perceived marginalization. This perceived political and socio-economic deprivation and their religious inclination only serves to create an environment for nurturing radicalization and pro-terrorism attitudes. Both Kenya and Somalia should engage lobby groups and the international community to take a leading role in ensuring marginalized groups are protected in the new framework. Both governments should engage IGAD to develop a clear plan to strengthen the Federal Republic of Somalia. Political spillover from Somalia into northeastern Kenya was a greatly enhanced and politicized sense of clanism among Kenyan Somalis. Both Kenya and Somalia governments should develop political goodwill to address the heightened religious and political difference.

From the FGDs, the general socioeconomic and political marginalization of local youth, a lack of gender inclusivity, and ethnic discrimination against Muslim communities also figured highly in the grievances of local communities. The Kenyan government should ensure local perspectives are taken into account when

considering approaches to counter violent extremism. Specifically, the strategies need to address the root causes of underdevelopment leading to marginalization of the North Frontier District. One strategy would be to develop a multi-sectoral policy framework that will foster economic development in region and provide a robust monitoring framework that will develop and track the achievement of key indicators and milestones of integrated economic development.

Such a framework should include all sectors such as infrastructure development meant to construct road network, rail network, water dams to increase agricultural and livestock activities, building of polytechnics, technical colleges, universities and other educational facilities. Moreover, a huge investment in human rights and education is critical to increase literacy levels. For Somalia, peace building is recommended to the jubaland Federal government in Somalia which was part of the North Frontier District. The Federal Government of Somalia should also develop necessary facilities in the region such as schools and hospitals. There are resources especially from port of Kismayu which need to be distributed to the entire parts of Jubaland by a concept similar to constituency Development Fund or CDF as is known in Kenya.

Social, economic and political infrastructures must be rebuilt in Somalia, which includes establishing stable and coordinated governance structures, developing public administrations and civil governments, restoring order and rebuilding institutions. Peacebuilding efforts must focus on working towards unity amongst Somaliland, Puntland and South-central Somalia while also combatting terrorism. It is important to resolve cross-clan disputes while aiming to provide restitution and to facilitate reconciliation.

**A clear military strategy:** The effectiveness of a security-based diplomacy in countering terrorism can be achieved through development of a clear mission strategy for KDF in Somalia that includes clear military and political goals. The study established that there were mixed reactions regarding KDF's role in Somalia, from fighting insurgency to creating a stable Somalia government. Somalis view the 'Operation Linda Nchi' with suspicion and having different aims, indicative of differences on strategy within the political and military leadership. This ambiguity could lead to a failed mission in the long-run, a situation in which goals progressively accumulate, requiring ever greater resources, time and commitment. It is therefore imperative for the Kenyan Government to spell out the war aims and accompanying political goals clearly and maintain focus on the key objectives. As the findings suggest, majority from Somalia advocate for withdrawal of KDF from Somalia. Nevertheless, there is need for KDF to develop an exit strategy which needs to be at the peak of their performance. Upon withdrawal, KDF should create a buffer zone that will provide the armed forces with the freedom of movement, and surveillance across the Kenya-Somalia border. Professionalism is required within the military strategy to avoid KDF engagements into the ethnic Somali and wider Muslim community regarding the war against Al Shabaab.

**Rationalize the refugee crisis:** The Kenyan government needs to work closely with Somalia to develop a sustainable strategy that entails repatriation of refugees, while enhancing monitoring and screening technologies across the borders. A proper analysis of refugee security dynamics is needed for Kenya that can lead to the development of policies guaranteeing sustainable peace and security in the refugee camps and in Somalia at large. A tripartite agreement was signed between the governments of Somalia and Kenya, and the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR) (On 10 November 2013); highlighting the framework governing the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees over a three year timeframe. Beyond this initiative, Somalia departments and agencies responsible for the security of the refugee vetting process should employ additional screening measures to make sure refugees do not have ties to terrorism. Given the current high-threat environment, agencies are stretched extremely thin in terms of their ability to monitor suspects and disrupt plots. The Kenyan government should initiate an end-to-end review of the refugee screening and vetting process, with a particular focus on the integrity of the current procedures for conducting national security checks on Somalia refugees. In addition, if Kenya is to accept all refugees from Somalia, it follows that the Kenyan government must attend to the question of the rights of Kenyan Somalis living in Northern Kenya.

**Analyze clan dynamics in counterterrorism:** The study revealed Clan is integral in Somali society and influences all aspects of Somali life. For Somalia, concerns over clan-based conflict demonstrate that clan is a double edged sword and a challenge in counterterrorism. The Somalia government needs to develop measures that ensure are constructively encouraged to serve as facilitators of cooperation and mutual assistance. Jubaland is a new Federal state where alshaabab exhibit heavy presence from Raskamboni to Kismayu port. There are two main sub-clans in Jubaland the marehan and the ogaden. The current jubaland administration is compost of the ogaden while marehan have been completely left out. Most members of alshaabab are from the marehan sub-clan while ogaden control the port of Kismayu where most resources are. There is perception from alshaabab that both



Kenya and Ethiopia governments are aiding the ogaden to control control the port of Kismayu.

The competition for control of power and resources in the Jubaland region may one of the main causes of violent extremism leading to terrorism. There is need to push the Jubaland administration and the Federal Republic of Somalia to encourage power sharing between the ogaden and the marehan clans. In addition, there is need for the Jubaland Federal government to develop a blue print on allocation of seats to parliament by sub-clans and how power and resource sharing can be evenly distributed to all the sub-clans. The control of the port of Kismayu should not be left to the ogaden clan alone the marehan sub-clan should also be included in the power sharing mechanism towards control of port of Kismayu. Jubaland Federal Government need to take advantage of common bonds of language, religion, traditions and inter clan marriage to unite Somalis in Jubaland. Clan elders need to be trained by the Jubaland administration to use customary laws to bring about negotiated settlements and prevent conflicts escalation. There is need to use cross-clan partnerships where civil society organizations and businesses on cross clan lines to work toward development and peace helping to build trust and overcome suspicions among clans. On the other hand, the Kenyan government needs to enhance continued capacity building among its soldiers to deter them from politics of clanism between Somali clans especially the Ogaden and Marahan. Strategic interventions should be adopted to encourage Somali clans and their leaders who currently support Al shabaab to change their allegiance, and support an inclusive local administration of the Federal Republic of Somalia. This reiterates the necessity for adopting a proactive aggressive counterterrorism strategy for Somalia.

With respect to the second specific research question, it is recommended that:

**Formulate a clear state-centric counterradicalization framework:** Among the marginalized communities of Northern Kenya and Somalia, the counterterrorism agenda is perceived to have contributed to what they see as a series of repressive practices by state security forces. Both Kenya and Somalia governments need to formulate and implement counterradicalization programs and outreach initiatives in order to create a diversified counter-radicalization strategy. A first step would be to undertake a baseline assessment of violent extremism and radicalization trends and formulate a clear curriculum for counter radicalization framework. There is need for implementing a more holistic approach to strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law and on promoting democratic accountability, social inclusion as well as efforts in addressing socio-economic factors. For Somalia especially, the government must establish a series of initiatives in peace-building, promoting inter-faith co-existence and strengthening democratic institutions.

**Engaging civil society in public-private partnerships:** The study established that civil society are negatively influenced by counterterrorism measures; and legislative and regulatory measures have made it more difficult for some civil society organizations to operate freely and effectively. Therefore, more attention should be paid to building the capacities of civil society in Kenya and empowering them in the context of efforts to support implementation of state-centric counter-radicalization measures and management of transnational terrorism. For Somalia, there is need for the Federal Government to embrace civil society as a hook for human rights and promote inter-clan relations to join together to develop and promote human rights-compliant counterterrorism policies.

While it is important for civil society to be given a sense of ownership of the problems and processes, both Kenya and Somalia governments should also develop

mechanisms to vet civil society to ensure they are not platforms for terrorist radicalization. Therefore, genuine partnerships between civil society and government should be fostered. In cases where state capacity is weak such as Somalia, there is need to support leadership and political pluralism, provide channels to convey messages and independent media to sensitize members of the public on counterradicalization.

Both Governments should therefore create structures that allow civil society to partner with law enforcement agencies to develop targeted counterradicalization programmes of cooperation focusing, for instance, on increasing awareness and understanding of the diversity of communities; outlining aspects of the role of women in counterradicalization, religious customs and traditions of certain communities, in addition to their historical and geographical origins. One strategy would be to encourage debate within the media profession on the image that they convey of different or minority groups in connection with the fight against terrorism and the responsibility to avoid perpetuating prejudices, stereotypes or inaccurate information. In this way, civil society can act as catalysts for opinions and ideas vital for building strong and vibrant communities, which may contribute to healing community rifts and tensions, promotion and protection of human rights, building strong democratic societies in which citizens are free to participate in the political process and exercises their rights.

Among other findings, the study revealed a conflicting response in the misunderstandings between Muslims and non-Muslims between Kenya and Somalia. Therefore, it is important for Kenya and Somalia governments to support civil society to engage in a public national dialogue to counter the misperception that all Muslims are radicals. Kenya and Somalia government should partner to draw media

attention to the effort and organize public forums where the threat of domestic radicalization can be addressed along with the differences between radical and mainstream religious tenets of Islam.

**Build cyber security capacity:** The study established that the internet is an increasingly significant vehicle for terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia. Kenya and Somalia can anticipate the growth of cyber-terrorist insurgencies as their capabilities develop. Therefore, Kenya and Somalia governments must have a sustained equivalent counterinsurgency strategy for cyberspace. The strategy must be much more expansive than treating cyber threats primarily as a technical challenge. In order for cyber-strategy to work, the right hand has to know what the left is doing or there will be gaps for enemies to exploit or worse, activities may interfere or work at cross-purposes, wreaking more havoc than solving problems.

Security agencies between Kenya and Somalia should work towards integrating government and civilian action, such that coordination between military and civilian government assets. Partnership with social media companies should be fostered to come up with websites and information on counterradicalization and bring down extremist media content online. Strategies should be implemented with a clear framework for local Muslim leaders, imams and scholars to produce moderate, counter-radical websites to educate Muslims on mainstream Islam and to discredit extremist arguments. At the same time, local community centers and religious organizations should hold special radical propaganda awareness programs to discuss the dangers of online indoctrination with extremist terrorist groups.

For a cyber-insurgency strategy to be effective, it is critical that Kenya and Somalia governments develop mechanisms to ensure that “successes” and “best practices” are translated into a suitable doctrine and become part of the professional development of private-sector and public-sector leaders. Among other needs, there will be demands for education, training, and experience that qualify public and private actors to be real cyber leaders. A doctrine that addresses public-private cooperation must be a centerpiece of that strategy.

**Integrate community-based approach in counterradicalization:** The effectiveness of the community-based approach in counterradicalization will require both Kenya and Somali governments consider conducting a crosscutting review of policies designed to tackle terrorism in order to determine which interventions are most effective in reaching most vulnerable communities. In particular, the government must address the poor educational attainment of young Muslims, partly through paying attention to what happens in the classroom. This can be achieved through supporting community level relationships facilitated with thought administrative leaders, religious leaders and the business community based on mutual interests beyond the scope of terrorism and community grievances. The government should work with related Ministries to facilitate community-led interventions to stop radicalization in its initial stages.

One of the most important challenges raised relates to trust and pre-emptive police action. In order to put communities at the heart of counterradicalization, there is need for the Kenya and Somalia security agencies to partner with communities to have relationships that extend far beyond the counterterrorism agenda. One step towards this would be the roll-out of the Muslim Safety Forum’s request for community. This will help build a much more open relationship between the police

and Muslim communities, where information can be shared not on a ‘need to know’ basis, but on the assumption that open channels of communication are in everyone’s best interests.

The study identified gaps in the way Muslim communities are treated. Therefore, Kenyan government should respond to the grievances of the Muslim community. Issues such as poverty and discrimination provide fertile ground for the discontentment on which terrorist recruiters prey. In addition, both Kenya and Somalia government should endeavour to work together to build a more varied and resilient community infrastructure, reinforcing the existing bonds within the community and building new ones between the community and other actors.

For Somalia, school administrators and religious leaders are capable of providing legitimate counseling, counter-radicalization programming and religious retraining in an authentic religious paradigm. In addition to countering radical ideology, both countries should ensure community-led interventions address social alienation. Moreover, counter-radicalization efforts of local Muslim communities should be publically recognized by government and security officials, while monitoring them to ensure they work diligently to discourage terrorist radicalization and violence and promote pluralism. This will be achieved through a clear political leadership that should unite to ensure a community-based approach to counterradicalization and counter-terrorism remains a central agenda in national security.

With respect to the third specific research question, it is recommended that:

**Multi-agency cooperation in intelligence sharing:** The study established gaps within inter-agency cooperation on intelligence sharing, which has been blamed for

failure to deter terrorist attacks between Kenya and Somalia. There is need for Kenya government to implement an interagency policy structure that includes representatives from all security departments and agencies. In addition, a more holistic approach to building trust within the intelligence community is required to encourage partnership among the different security agencies at national and interstate level. Both governments should create avenues that interstate intelligence sharing through engagements within their embassies in combating terrorism. Pooling resources horizontally would build synergy by capitalizing on the strengths of each organization while helping each better manage its respective weaknesses. Accurate and timely information from the front would also help national and regional decision-makers make appropriate and opportune decisions. There is need for establishing forward-based joint special intelligence operations task forces between Kenya and Somalia. This forward-based approach demands diplomacy and respect for political sensitivities. Therefore, such joint teams would focus on working in harmony and close coordination with their host nation counterparts and embassy officials.

Through the support, expertise, and knowledge of law enforcement leaders from all components, Kenya and Somalia governments should implement the fusion center concept to bring all the relevant parties together to maximize the ability to prevent and respond to terrorism and criminal acts. By embracing this concept, these entities will be able to effectively and efficiently safeguard our homeland and maximize anticrime efforts. Moreover, this landmark initiative could enhance coordination efforts, to bring together law enforcement intelligence, public safety and the private sector. This means going beyond establishing an intelligence center or creating a computer network, to support the implementation of risk-based, information-driven

prevention, response, and consequence management programs. At the same time, it supports efforts to address immediate and emerging threat-related circumstances and events.

**Enhance culture change within the intelligence community:** Intelligence communities of both Kenya and Somalia need to develop new strategic plans in the face of the threat of terrorism that would encourage a shifted counterterrorism culture and organization from reactive to proactive and threat based. Their strategic plans need to include specific objectives to implement fundamental changes to organizational culture and requisite administrative processes among such that would counter terrorism efforts would be a creation of knowledge based culture through training of new intelligence officers to acquire necessary skills of trade craft on counter terrorism trade craft culture this may be reinvigorated by bringing back experts into specific intelligence services to instruct and mentor new recruits. Culture serves as the primary driver of systemic failure or success and it is necessary to have new officers inculcated in the culture of continuous improvement through training mentor ship and sponsorship of officers in pursuit of career related academic studies in areas like international relations, diplomacy, security studies, political science, peace and conflict studies and related areas which will enable such officers develop strong analytical skills.

There is need to develop in the intelligence agencies strategic plan a culture of information sharing including a culture that supports and rewards initiative, creativity, diversity professionalism and innovation. Intelligence sharing cannot be realized if intelligence agencies are not encouraged to inculcate a culture of information sharing that would lead to proactive counter-terrorism. Culture of collaboration need to be promoted in respective states among its members of



intelligence community and stake holders this will help the implementation of two critical areas the multi-agency fusion centers necessary for information sharing and the umbrella bodies for intelligence agencies the National Counter Terrorism Centers the two are necessary for improvement of the structural capacities of the intelligence communities in Kenya and Somalia. There is need for intelligence communities in each respective country to develop common strategic plans by creating a culture of leadership of all levels to improve responsibilities and account abilities in the face of increased terror attacks by developing common ethos. Intelligence community personnel in respective states need to view themselves as members of one team rather than as staff members of their individual agencies. There is need to have them reflect a common intelligence community culture in this way they will work together and will manage the threat of terrorism through information sharing and knowledge sharing on trade craft and intelligence capabilities.

**Streamline the adaptability of intelligence agencies:** The adaptability of intelligence agencies can be improved through reforming the command structure of intelligence agencies that allows rapid decision making. Results show that intelligence community lacks a strong central management structure in both Kenyan and Somalia security forces. Both countries need to restructure the intelligence community by creating a National Counter Terrorism Centres similar to the United States of America one whose role will be an umbrella which will be mandated to plan an executive-wide counter terrorism operations. These centres will be expected to force integration among intelligence agencies. In order to give the National Counter-Terrorism Centers the prestige and the muscle necessary to compel departments to carry out its plans voluntarily, it is necessary that the Directors of the

National Counter Terrorism Centers for both states be given a role in the selection and deployment of key counter terrorism officials across the intelligence agencies. The Directors of the National Counter Terrorism Centers for both states needs to be given powers to control the finances and budgets for the respective centers. Secondly there is need for the Security Councils of Kenya and Somalia to formulate policies and necessary protocols on security, information communication technology including personnel issues in order to create networks in the intelligence in which information, people and resources would flow freely. Furthermore, the intelligence agencies capabilities should be harnessed synergistically in order to achieve their missions which can offer a solution to the current intelligence community's loose and confederated organizational structure by giving agility, openness and flexibility suitable to the current threat of al shaabab facing the two countries. For Somalia, there is need for ensuring robust unilateral covert collection capabilities benefiting counterterrorism collection; improving the core training program and global coverage capability for covert human intelligence collection and analysis.

**Community intelligence:** Without community participation, intelligence-sharing is subject to fail. Thus, the community is an important element in a programme's failures or successes. Therefore, Kenya and Somalia intelligence community should come up with a framework for engaging citizens in helping the intelligence community to identify possible terrorist threats and infrastructure vulnerabilities. Strategic intelligence measures that link the community intelligence and policy makers should be enhanced to produce timely and accurate intelligence that will ensure effective counterterrorism measures. One strategy would be for Kenya and Somalia governments to encourage community policing programs that engage communities to take a unified stand against terrorism. For counterterrorism and

broader information sharing to be more effective, each entity and level of government must clearly know its role. The Kenyan government should designate and delineate the responsibilities of the national and County Governments based on their available resources and ensure that information sharing occurs at all levels.

Mutual trust is fundamental in international relations and critical in intelligence sharing. Sharing sensitive information also exposes nations to a certain degree of vulnerability, whether it is an outed source, a blown operation, or a threat to national interests. As such, community intelligence will likely improve for as long as Kenya-Somalia trust is maintained or improved and compromises are made in the greater interest of combating the shared threat of terrorism.

Results revealed Kenya face continuing foreseeable challenges from the ever expanding breadth of unpredictable setbacks to trust with Somalia counterparts. Therefore, there should be more historical awareness of the relative effectiveness of past counter-terrorism measures, and of their consequences, when developing new frameworks to counter-terrorism. Greater awareness of, and sensitivity to possible impacts on individuals and communities should underpin the formulation of counter-terrorism policies. Greater awareness in and by the press and political establishment of the dangers of characterizing communities as harbouring extremists, as responsible for solving the problem of terrorism, or as split between the innocent, law-abiding, moderate majority and the extremist, criminal minority, would help to diminish the negative focus on Muslim communities and enhance community intelligence. Furthermore, Kenya and Somalia states should consider policies that foster the practices of multiculturalism based on less bounded notions of

communities which may be more successful in promoting social cohesion within an increasingly ethnically, religiously and culturally diverse society, than the focus on suspect communities as a source of and responsible for a solution to political violence.

With respect to the fourth specific research question, it is recommended that:

**Enhance border control technological capacity:** Acts of terrorism and massive loss emanating from terror attacks requires more renewed interest in border security translating into rapid demands for advances in technology. It is recommended that security-based technologies commonly used by the developed world to monitor insurgents at the border be procured and deployed by the two states such as cameras and sensors which have the capability to record video images transmit any suspected movements at the border to a command and control center controlled by security agents miles away, from the border. The command and control centers should be deployed by both Kenya and Somalia security agencies so that they have the capability to record feeds from numerous cameras allowing video playback of any camera at any time this would help to keep surveillance on suspicious terrorist and to inform officers on how to conduct an evidenced based proactive arrests of suspected terrorists in either Somalia or Kenya.

There is need to employ superior technological systems with instant access to GPS and GIS information along the borders to allow security agents have a wireless access to location to information. Furthermore, the two states also need to develop a common policy framework on use of the drones or the unmanned aircraft vehicle to avoid unauthorized agents from using the drones on the same vein, the two states need to consider procuring and deploying the unmanned aircraft vehicles often

referred to as drones which are remotely piloted aircrafts designed to conduct aerial surveillance over a wide area. These devices have heralded as ultimate force multipliers allowing few agents to effectively monitor miles of border from a bird's eye with the use of specialized sensors and cameras. This unmanned aircraft can monitor terrorists at the border and at the same time carry out an offensive exercise by striking targeted insurgents seen to be crossing the border. There is need for the two states to also procure radiation detectors to be used by officers on patrol along the borders of Kenya and Somalia these radiation detectors are small gadgets used by security agents and have the capability of sensing any weapon or metal transported by suspected terrorist across the border. Alongside deploying small radiation detectors, Tethered Aerostat radar systems should be utilized along the border of Kenya and Somalia which will help to provide requisite data that will help the security agents monitor from the command and control centers any intrusion of suspected insurgents at the border.

There is need to employ superior technological systems with instant access to GPS and GIS information along the borders to allow security agents have a wireless access to location to information. Possible Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), often referred to as drones, should be employed to enhance surveillance across the Kenya-Somalia. This will require Kenya and Somalia governments to collaborate on providing additional resources and more funding to border security agencies. The best means by which to tackle border infrastructure problems is through investment by the private sector. Not only would this save government resources, it would allow the private sector to use its knowledge and creativity to design border infrastructure that is commerce-friendly without jeopardizing security or sovereignty. The government can encourage the private sector to take these steps in a number of

ways, for example, by expanding the protections of the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies

**Integrated border patrol strategy:** Given the porous nature of Kenya-Somalia borders, a thorough overhaul of the border security strategy is need. The threats to Kenya-Somalia border have evolved and the border patrol's resources and capabilities to meet these threats need reassessment. Therefore, both governments should now move from a resources-based approach toward a risk-based approach, and a strategy that is built on a framework using information, integration and rapid response to better secure the borders. There is need for Somalia border patrol units to collaborate with Kenya counterpart's and focus on intelligence-driven operations in identifying and developing a comprehensive understanding of terrorist and transnational criminal threats to each nation's borders. Furthermore, there is need to allocate more resources and training for the maritime security response to ensure they have advanced counterterrorism skills and tactics.

While the border wall strategy is being undertaken by the Kenyan government, findings established the strategy may not offer a long-term solution. Indeed, the difficulties in making this strategic shift underscore a deep-seated barrier to effective, border patrol strategies. Therefore, an effective border patrol and prevention will require both Kenya and Somalia border patrol units to build trust, both between agencies that must share information, leads, and enforcement action, and more fundamentally among the public in each country that must perceive and accept legitimate and effective actions on both sides of the border. To meet current and future operational and organizational requirements, it is essential for Kenya and Somalia to develop, deploy, and manage institutional capabilities within the border patrol units. This may include areas such as human-capital management, training,

leadership development and organizational integrity. More importantly, there is need for both governments to standardize organizational structures for sector headquarters and stations for border patrol. Such a move will ensure the organizational structure create uniformity in how sectors and stations are organized throughout the border patrol, and in aligning functions throughout sector headquarters.

**Streamline migration controls:** The goal of border and migration control systems is to ensure all the doors legally permitted by the governments to enter the territories of Kenya and Somalia will be able to do so and that they will level the countries when required. Therefore, Kenya and Somalia governments will be required to formulate migration control policies which will play a key role on combating terrorism. The policies to be developed will be required to be security-based; which will include; defending suspected terrorists from entering and remaining in the respective countries, and prosecuting those who commit terrorist acts, or support terrorists. Laws need to be formulated by the two states to give rights to the immigration officers to allow them to refuse entry to any of the two states of suspicious foreigners, deport such foreigners, and the two states need to be encouraged to share detailed information on such suspected foreigners.

The study established gaps in migration controls across the Kenya-Somalia border points. To ensure effective migration controls, Kenya and Somalia governments should empower law enforcement and government authorities to monitor and assess security situations with well-equipped early warning systems. This can be achieved through using biometric travel documents and the new screening concepts of identity to track international travel with the goals of preventing identity fraud to ensure safety and security of citizens. Both countries must implement stringent measures to

rid out corruption in issuing secure travel documents. The move toward identity and border management will require Kenya and Somalia security agencies to enhance norms in regulating travel documents through widespread adoption of biometric identifiers.

A great deal of entry control efficiency is dependent on advance information and trend analysis, often only possible where immigration controls are efficient and national processing facilities are adequate. There is need for the Kenyan government to enhance the integrity of security features in ID and travel documents, and develop new ways of recording and verifying traveler and foreign identities. One strategy would be to replace the national identity cards with special electronically-readable codes that are more resistant to forgery. This can provide greater certainty in the identification of the individual and that he/she is the genuine holder of the card. Findings revealed migration controls were not identified as a priority in Somalia. For Somalia, there is need to develop a border management framework that encourages increased data collection and exchange of immigration control systems with Kenyan counterparts for effective transnational terrorism management.

**Involve border communities in border security plans:** The effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia can be achieved through establishment of a border community liaison program. Such a program could facilitate the inter-state and national expansion of relationships and interactions among government, law enforcement, non-government agencies, border-community partners, and the border patrol. The program may also provide stakeholders with a designated point of contact at their respective border patrol sector and encourages communication between the border patrol and its



border-community partners. The study established that border communities are not fully engaged in border management controls. There is need to identify relevant stakeholders involved in border management and the application of controls. One strategy would be for government and security agencies to partner with border communities in raising awareness and increase sharing of relevant information regarding border management and control as an essential role in countering transnational terrorism. For successful implementation of the integrated border management concept, it is important that Kenya and Somalia security agencies provide coherence among the different communities within and across their borders. Improvements in these areas can help enhance security and immigration systems while also facilitating the cross-border movement of people.

Addressing structural drivers of conflict in the border area: Chronic instability along the Kenya-Somalia border zone is part of a larger pattern of state failure, lawlessness, and communal violence afflicting Somalia. In the context of transnational terrorism, Kenya government should go beyond the conventional conflict prevention and management approaches that have generally been frustrated in the face of these unconventional conflict dynamics. In light of this, a more comprehensive conflict prevention policy must also address key conflict drivers themselves; including the need for clarification of political, economic, and pastoral rights within border communities in both Kenya and Somalia. Programs which provide the Kenyan government and legal aid offices with the capacity to reshape local understanding of the rights of citizenship and to enforce the laws will go a long way towards eliminating the emerging threat of ethnic conflicts and terrorist sympathizers.

Overall, the study's findings point to the need to adopt a postmodernist approach which advocates for a broadened conceptualization of security that goes beyond a military fixation on transnational terrorism. This means that both Kenya and Somalia governments must broaden counterterrorism measures to include a wide range of state and non-state actors. In addition to counterradicalization, intelligence sharing and border surveillance, other instruments of government can contribute to addressing the broader long-term causes of transnational terrorism and violent extremism, and the conditions in which they thrive.

While regional cooperation and international support to disrupt insurgencies such as the al-Shabaab in Somalia is needed, there is need for Kenya and Somalia to work with the community to identify, implement and manage local solutions to local problems and to develop local level resilience. These calls for consolidated research to better understand the factors leading to violent extremism in their countries. This can ensure that their work is evidence-based and appropriate to individual state circumstances.

#### **8.4 Suggestions for Further Research**

The results of this research have shown that security-based diplomacy variables identified in previous literatures can be a barrier to effective management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. This study has stressed the importance of further research into the topic of security-based diplomacy and the management of transnational terrorism.

The historical evolution of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia has less data in Kenya. The findings demonstrate that the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia is a challenge that calls for

tough, comprehensive and coordinated national measures. The study revealed inconclusive evidence that the security-based diplomacy strategy can improve or deter the effective management of transnational terrorism, especially between Kenya and Somalia, where historical security issues are still at play. A comprehensive analysis of security-based diplomacy between the two countries requires an in-depth treatment of comprehensive data from both states which will provide a basis for analysis of the effectiveness of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) intervention strategy in the management of transnational terrorism.

With regards to the second specific objective, the strategic value of state-centric counter-radicalization programs in counter-terrorism was emphasized. Due to recent developments regarding the threat posed by terrorist attacks in Kenya and Somalia, it is safe to say that these programs will be a cornerstone of future counter-terrorism and counter-radicalization strategies, especially within the context of security-based diplomacy. However, an important revelation of the study findings was that an understanding about counter-radicalization is still in their infancy, and the role of non-state actors is not fully integrated. As such, the extent to which these initiatives impact local communities will be essential in formulating assistance strategies to better the livelihoods of local people and to curb the appeal of violent radicalism. Therefore, there is need for a study on the role of civil society in counter-radicalization in transnational terrorism management between Kenya and Somalia.

Relating to the third specific objective, the structural capacity of intelligence sharing extends beyond inter-agency cooperation; to transforming the attitudes and mind-sets of intelligence community based on a set of values. The Kenya-Somalia terrorist

incidences indicate that those involved in the war on terrorism are continuing to work through very real problems, without preventing in any way the full sharing of terrorism threat-related information. As such, the intelligence community must not only collect and share more, but collect and share smarter. Ideally, a study to be carried out on the role of community intelligence sharing as a counterterrorism strategy between Kenya and Somalia.

In view of the fourth specific objective, the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies represents one of the key lines of a Kenya-Somalia defense in the management of transnational terrorism. Achieving a balance between the need to maintain security against the cross-border threats and the freedom of movement for persons and goods remains a challenge to this border management and security strategy, in particular on inter-state risks such as transnational terrorism, migration, transport security and organized crime. Therefore, a study to establish the contribution of technology and surveillance as border management strategies in managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia is needed.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX 1: Introduction Letter

#### RE: REQUEST TO CONDUCT SURVEY FOR A RESEARCH PROJECT

**To Whom It May Concern:**

My name is Christopher Chumba, a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am undertaking a study on “Security-Based Diplomacy Influencing Transnational Terrorism Management between Kenya and Somalia.”

I have identified a list of individuals who play prominent roles in shaping the development of peace and security in the region. For this reason, I would like to ask for permission to administer questionnaires. Your participation will be of help for this study and I will be grateful if you will permit me to do so.

I would like to clarify the responses will be kept private, and I will not include any information that will make it possible to identify your organization or individual in any report I might publish. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, please feel free to contact me.

Hoping for your kind consideration.

Sincerely,  
Chris

## APPENDIX II: Questionnaire For Respondents

My name is Christopher Chumba, a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am undertaking a study on “**Security-Based Diplomacy Influencing Transnational Terrorism Management between Kenya and Somalia.**” Please assist in contribution of information towards this study by filling in the questionnaire below.

*NOTE: Security-based diplomacy is used to mean hard-line preventive measures against terrorist activities undertaken by Kenya and Somalia governments; (which offers no door for negotiation). Security-based diplomacy strategies may include military intervention, counter-radicalization strategies, defensible border security measures, intelligence gathering and sharing and other homeland counterterrorism measures that ensures national security apparatus is ready to address the full range to counter and deter terrorist activities.*

***Terrorist radicalization:** a process whereby an individual comes to accept terrorist violence as a possible, perhaps even legitimate course of action*

**SECTION II: Historical evolution of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement in the Table below. Use a cross(x) or tick in the most appropriate column.

<b>Setting of Realistic Targets</b>	<b>Agree</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Disagree</b>
The challenge of managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia has roots related to the history of the two countries			
Kenya's intervention in Somalia has helped manage terrorist activities and insecurity cases in both countries			
Somalia instability after state collapse has influenced the extent to which management of terrorism in Kenya.			
The refugee situation in Kenya is a major implication for terrorist trends in both Kenya and Somalia			
Collaboration between Kenya and Somalia has improved in the fight against terrorism			

2. Historically, the relations between Kenya and the Kenyan-Somalis have been fraught. Indicate factors that may have influenced this relation?

- a) Somalia's lack of a functioning state since the overthrow of the military government, led by General Siyad Bare, in 1991
- b) Warlords and clan militias
- c) colonial legacy of British in Northern Kenya and Somali community
- d) Economic factors and alienation of northern frontier
- e) Politicized clan system.
- f) North frontier-shifita war and border disputes
- g) Other (specify).....



3. Kenya-Somalia security-based diplomacy has taken a new phase in the emerging transnational terrorist events. Select two **aspects** regarded as factors behind the disintegration of security situation in both Kenya and Somalia?

- a) Somalia's' state collapse
- b) Availability of arms
- c) Clan conflicts
- d) Youth unemployment
- e) Terrorist radicalization
- f) Extensive foreign interferences
- g) The Cold war superpowers paradigm shift in the horn of Africa
- h) Al shabaab factor
- i) Other (specify).....

4. In your opinion, why is Kenya and Somalia vulnerable to terrorism? (PICK TWO ONLY-Focus on your country)

- j) Internal conflicts [ ]
- k) Weak governance [ ]
- l) Collapsed state institutions [ ]
- m) Porous borders [ ]
- n) Increased extremist religious ideology and terrorist radicalization [ ]
- o) Poor socio-economic conditions [ ]
- p) Kenya's long-standing Somali refugee crisis [ ]
- q) Other (specify).....

5. In your opinion, do you think Kenya-Somalia action in the Shifta War has a historical bearing on the current challenges of terrorism and other security challenges between the two countries?

a. To a great extent [ ]

b. To a moderate extent [ ]

c. To a less extent [ ]

d. Not at all [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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6. With Kenya's independence imminent, many Kenyan Somalis agitated for merger of their region into Somalia, a call supported by the Somali government. In your opinion, do you think the **Northern Frontier District** (NFD) still threatens new security arrangements between Kenya and Somalia?

a. To a great extent [ ]

b. To a moderate extent [ ]

c. To a less extent [ ]

d. Not at all [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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7. Kenya is facing challenges from hosting large number of Somali refugee in the country. Due to the changing dimensions of the conflict in Somalia, to what extent do you think Somalia refugee camps are being used as launching camps for terrorist attacks?

- a. To a great extent [ ]
- b. To a moderate extent [ ]
- c. To a less extent [ ]
- d. Not at all [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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b). In your opinion, what should be done to refugees to better manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a. Repatriate-move refugees back to their country [ ]
- b. Shift the camps [ ]
- c. Tighten security in the camps [ ]
- d. Other (specify)..... [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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8. Kenya as well as Somalia national security and stability have been destabilized by waves of terror attacks. In your opinion, to what extent do you think Kenya's military (KDF) intervention in Somalia has offered an effective counterterrorism strategy to assure security and safety of citizens in both countries? (Focus your country).

- a. To a great extent [ ]
- b. To a moderate extent [ ]
- c. To a less extent [ ]
- d. Not at all [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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9. In your opinion, rate your level of agreement on whether strategies listed below have offered a window of opportunity to better manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia? (Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement in the Table below. Use a cross(x) or tick in the most appropriate column.

<b>Groups</b>	<b>Effective</b>	<b>Neutral</b>	<b>Not effective</b>
Training of Somali soldiers in Kenya and Kenyan returnees			
Renditioning of suspects by security agencies			
Seeking international support e.g USA military support			
Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) interventionist action			

10. States are more sensitive to security and military developments in their regions due to increasing terror trends. What challenges do you think hinder the success of such engagements in the context of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia? **(Pick two only)**

- a) Lack of a comprehensive response to transnational terrorism
- b) Limited defence capabilities (man-power)
- c) Inadequate technological advancements
- d) Lack of an efficient regional and organizational structure
- e) Inefficient early warning mechanisms for intelligence
- f) Unclear foreign policy objectives
- g) Poor coordination
- h) Other (specify).....

*Explain your answer above?*

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11. Suggest strategies you consider the government can employ in enhancing effective security-based diplomacy in management of transnational terrorism?  
[Focus on Kenya-Somalia]

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**SECTION III: Examining the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia**

1. In your view, what would you consider as the two **major** causes of terrorist radicalization profiles relating to terrorist activities? (Focus your country).

- a) Socio-political alienation and a failure of integration
- b) Religiosity and Globalization
- c) Reaction to Foreign Policy of both Western and Muslim governments
- d) Political violence
- e) Social changes (breakdown in social bonds of different cultures and generations)
- f) Discrimination on the basis of ethnic or religious origins
- g) Experience of unemployment and social exclusion
- h) Other (please specify).....

2. From your own opinion, what would you consider as the **two main** recruiting strategies for terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia? (Pick only 2)

- a) Education system to transmit group ideologies in Mosques
- b) The Internet
- c) Dissemination of propaganda
- d) Financing and affiliation of terror networks
- e) Inflammatory rhetoric of extremist clerics and their materials

*Explain your answer above:*

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3. In your opinion, why are youths vulnerable to recruitment in terrorist activities? (Focus your country/ region).

- a) Lack of education [ ]
- b) Unemployment [ ]
- c) Religious issues [ ]
- d) Marginalization [ ]
- e) Others \_\_\_\_\_

4. A number of contributing factors may be singled out as facilitators for the emergence of terrorist radicalization processes leading to terrorism. From your point of view, rate the push/pull factors listed with reference to terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia?

	<b>Push Factors</b>	<b>Greater extent</b>	<b>Lesser extent</b>	<b>Not at all</b>
	Unemployment			
	Fear of Victimization			
	AMISOM Bombardment			
	Revenge			
	Lack of Education			

	<b>Pull Factors</b>	<b>Greater extent</b>	<b>Lesser extent</b>	<b>Not at all</b>
	Reputation (hero for defending country and religion)			
	Mental Manipulation and Fighting Islam's Enemies			
	Obtain Paradise			

5. Given the emerging trends of terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia which continues to evolve in nature and scope, would you say that religion has played a factor in terrorist radicalization in these countries?

a) To a great extent [ ]

b) To a moderate extent [ ]

c) To a less extent [ ]

d) Not at all [ ]

*Explain your answer above:*

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6. The intervention of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia as a counterterrorism strategy has had an effect on both countries. To what extent do you think this has influenced terrorist radicalization?

a. To a great extent [ ]

b. To a moderate extent [ ]

c. To a less extent [ ]

d. Not at all [ ]

*Explain your answer above:*

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7. In your view, has Kenya and Somalia done enough to tackle negative socio-economic factors such as corruption and lack of good governance, high unemployment especially among the youth as counter-terrorist radicalization strategy in management of transnational terrorism?

- a) Agree [ ]
- b) Neutral [ ]
- c) Disagree [ ]
- d) Strongly disagree [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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8. How would you rate the Kenya-Somalia government efforts in strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, including democratic policing, promoting dialogue between the state and society and ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as strategies in countering terrorist radicalization?

- a) Effective [ ]
- b) Fair [ ]
- c) Not effective [ ]
- d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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9. In your opinion, has Kenya and Somalia governments done enough to combat intolerance and discrimination, as well as promoting mutual respect, co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious and other groups a way of addressing terrorist radicalization in the region?

- a) Satisfactory [ ]
- b) Fair [ ]
- c) Not satisfactory [ ]
- d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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10. In view of the prevailing terror attacks and threats in Kenya, how do you rate Kenya and Somalia governments on preventing violent conflicts, as well as promoting peaceful settlement of disputes and resolution of existing conflicts initiatives (counter-terrorist radicalization programs) to counter violent radical groups?

- a) Satisfactory [ ]
- b) Fair [ ]
- c) Not satisfactory [ ]
- d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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11. Do you think there are counter-radicalization programs between Kenya and Somalia designed to manage transnational terrorism? (Focus your country)

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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b) In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia states have developed effective community-focused initiatives with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that Lead to terrorism (VERLT)?

a) Agree [ ]

b) Neutral [ ]

c) Disagree [ ]

d) Strongly disagree [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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12. State your agreement on the existence of counter-terrorist radicalization programmes in schools (focusing your country) as a measure of managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) Satisfactory      [   ]
- b) Fair                [   ]
- c) Not satisfactory   [   ]
- d) Poor                [   ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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13. In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia governments have adopted a strategic approach to engaging with specific groups to enhance collaboration as a strategy to counter terrorist radicalization? Please indicate your level of agreement or disagreement in the Table below. Use a cross(x) or tick in the most appropriate column.

Groups	Level of engagement to counter terrorist radicalization		
	satisfactory	Fair	Not satisfactory
Youth			
Community policing			
Women			
Civil society			
NGOs			
Media			

14. In your opinion, what strategy do you think can be employed to deal with youth terrorist radicalization in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) Effective criminal-justice action
- b) School-based programs
- c) Job opportunities
- d) Tackling discrimination
- e) Rehabilitation programs for young persons
- f) Other (specify).....

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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15. Select two key challenges that you think are evident in an effort to implementing effective ways to counter transnational terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia? (Focus your country).

- a) Ineffective security/ inter agency coordination and planning
- b) Limited resources
- c) Lack of institutional framework
- d) Corruption
- e) Lack of support by senior management
- f) Lack of community consultation and involvement
- g) Other  
(specify).....

16. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying factors or identify potential terrorist radicalization indicators; and thus ensure safety and security of the citizens?

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**SECTION IV: Assessing the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. The threat of transnational terrorism has significantly altered international intelligence sharing. In your opinion, to what extent has intelligence-sharing contributed in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

(Focus your country)?

- a) To a great extent [ ]
- b) To a moderate extent [ ]
- c) To a less extent [ ]
- d) There is no association [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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2. Given the terrorist events between Kenya and Somalia, do you think security-based propaganda in intelligence has been used to deter terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) To a great extent [ ]
- b) To a moderate extent [ ]
- c) To a less extent [ ]
- d) There is no association [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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3. In your own opinion, do you think the attacks at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Lamu and Mandera demonstrate clear deficiencies with the organization of Kenya-Somalia counter-terrorism intelligence community?

- a) To a great extent [ ]
- b) To a moderate extent [ ]
- c) To a less extent [ ]
- d) Not at all [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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4. Do you see any linkages between intelligence failure and clanism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) To a great extent [ ]
- b) To a moderate extent [ ]
- c) To a less extent [ ]
- d) Not at all [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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5. Kenya is a unitary state while Somalia's state collapse and the security threats posed by Somalia's prolonged crisis (lawlessness and lack of a revived central state) In your opinion, to what extent does these variations affect the structural capacity of intelligence sharing to better manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) To a great extent [ ]
- b) To a moderate extent [ ]
- c) To a less extent [ ]
- d) Not at all [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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6. Surveillance is a vital component of intelligence operations geared to securing sensitive facilities or combating terrorism or insurgency. In your opinion, do you think security agencies have developed effective special investigation techniques, surveillance and use of information technology -in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) Agree
- b) Neutral
- c) Disagree
- d) Strongly disagree

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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7. In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia have effective evidence-based intelligence-led strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) To a great extent
- b) To a moderate extent
- c) To a less extent
- d) Not at all

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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8. Training and capacity building of administrators on intelligence sharing is key to better manage the threat of transnational terrorism. How would you rate training on information sharing and terrorism management in your area of jurisdiction?

- a) Satisfactory [ ]
- b) Fair [ ]
- c) Not satisfactory [ ]
- d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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9. a) Would you say that there exists trust in intelligence sharing from the Muslim communities both between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) Agree [ ]
- b) Neutral [ ]
- c) Disagree [ ]
- d) Strongly disagree [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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b) To what extent is community intelligence being utilized as a strategy to manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) To a great extent [ ]
- b) To a moderate extent [ ]
- c) To a less extent [ ]
- d) Not at all [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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10. In your opinion, how would you rate the characteristics of Intelligence Agencies as far as the adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, relationship with the intelligence community and enhancing a mechanism to ensure accountability in the management of transnational terrorism? (Focus your country).

- a) Effective [ ]
- b) Fair [ ]
- c) Not effective [ ]
- d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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11. Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. To what extent do you think interstate Cooperation (Kenya and Somalia) has helped identify individuals and groups engaged in terrorism?

- a. To a great extent [ ]
- b. To a moderate extent [ ]
- c. To a less extent [ ]
- d. There is no association [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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12. In light of the terrorist attacks/threats between Kenya and Somalia, do you think local security agencies coordinate closely with foreign intelligence services to inform a common assessment of threats and options in response?

- a. To a great extent [ ]
- b. To a moderate extent [ ]
- c. To a less extent [ ]
- d. There is no association [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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13. The new emphasis on intelligence-sharing creates new challenges with regard to combating transnational terrorism. Select **two** challenges you think might be contributing to intelligence failure in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

- a) Political controversy and national biases
- b) Mistrust on the part of countries involved
- c) Inadequate technology
- d) Ineffective command structure / slow decision making.
- e) Limited interagency coordination/cooperation within and other law enforcement agencies
- f) Inappropriate analytical framework
- g) Competing Interests
- h) Inadequate structure to engage the public/Community Intelligence
- i) Other (specify).....

14. In your view, how do you rate Kenya and Somalia governments intelligence-sharing initiatives and their effectiveness in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

- a) Satisfactory [ ]
- b) Fair [ ]
- c) Not satisfactory [ ]
- d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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15. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying gaps relating to intelligence failure to better manage transnational terrorism?

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**SECTION V: Evaluating the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. Border surveillance plays a critical role in the management of transnational terrorism. In your opinion, to what extent are Kenya-Somalia border controls important in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

(Focus your country)?

a) To a great extent [ ]

b) To a moderate extent [ ]

c) To a less extent [ ]

d) Not at all [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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2a) In your opinion, what strategies are you aware of that are currently being employed in open border control? Focus your country/ region?

- a) Surveillance
- b) Patrols
- c) Physical barriers
- d) Joint control operations and patrols
- e) Information exchange
- f) Intelligence assessment
- g) Border communities and policing issues

Other strategies:

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b) From the strategies mentioned in question 3 (a) above, which **TWO** strategies would you consider as effective in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia? (Tick where appropriate)

- a) Surveillance
- b) Patrols
- c) Physical barriers
- d) Joint control operations and patrols
- e) Information exchange
- f) Intelligence assessment
- g) Border communities and policing issues

3. Migration controls have become an increasingly important component of counter-terrorism. How would you rate the effectiveness of Kenya-Somalia migration controls in managing transnational terrorism?

a) Satisfactory [ ]

b) Fair [ ]

c) Not satisfactory [ ]

d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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4. In view of terror attacks between Kenya and Somalia, how would you rate the control and surveillance of the land open border between the two countries?

a) Effective [ ]

b) Fair [ ]

c) Not effective [ ]

d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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5. How would you rate the effectiveness of the following aspects with regard to border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

	<b>Very Effective</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>Not Effective</b>
Mobility and processing of people			
Integrity and security of document issuing process			
Maritime security			
Early warning and alert systems			
Aviation security			
Control and surveillance of the land open border			

6. Controls of cross-border activities on borders require some of the important and strategic heights important for the security of the nation. In your own opinion, how would you rate the extent of adoption of technology at the Kenya-Somalia border points?

- a) Sufficient            [   ]
- b) Insufficient        [   ]
- c) Poor                    [   ]

*Give reason for your answer*

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7. The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of the people have made it easy for insurgents groups to cross between Kenya and Somalia. In your opinion, rate the degree of involvement of border communities and the role they play in border security management?

- a) Satisfactory [ ]
- b) Fair [ ]
- c) Not satisfactory [ ]
- d) Poor [ ]

*Give a reason for your answer above:*

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8. Border-security cooperation is important to combat organized crime and terrorism insurgencies. In your opinion, do you think the Kenya's strategy to construct a wall on its border with Somalia offers a long-term solution to the management of transnational terrorism?

- a) To a great extent [ ]
- b) To a moderate extent [ ]
- c) To a less extent [ ]
- d) Not at all [ ]

*Give reason for your answer above:*

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9. What challenges would you say hinder the effectiveness of border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia (**pick two only**).

- a) Inadequate border security cooperation with other states and international partners.
- b) High levels of porosity/undemarcated borders
- c) Inappropriate infrastructure such as detection equipment and scanners
- d) Poor migration and border policies
- e) Lack of inclusion of border communities in the management of the border security
- f) Corruption (nexus between border agents and criminals).
- g) Other (specify).....

16. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying problems relating to border surveillance to effectively counter terrorism?

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***End***

***Thank you for your contribution***

### **APPENDIX III: Interview Schedule For Key Informants**

#### **(State actors and Non-state actors)**

My name is Christopher Chumba, a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am undertaking a study on "The role of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia." Please assist in contribution of information towards this study by filling in the questionnaire below.

*NOTE: Security-based diplomacy is used to mean hard-line security preventive measures against terrorist activities undertaken by Kenya and Somalia governments; (which offers no door for diplomacy and or negotiation). Security-based diplomacy strategies may include military intervention, defensible border walls and homeland counterterrorism measures in intelligence gathering.*

#### **SECTION II: Historical evolution of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. Historically, the relations between Kenya and the Kenyan-Somalis have been fraught. What factors may have influenced this relation?
2. Kenya-Somalia security-based diplomacy has taken a new phase in the emerging transnational terrorist events. What are the factors behind the disintegration of security situation in both Kenya and Somalia?

3. In your opinion, why is Kenya and Somalia vulnerable to terrorism?
  
4. In your opinion, do you think Kenya-Somalia action in the Shifta War has a historical bearing on the current challenges of terrorism and other security challenges between the two countries?
  
5. In your opinion, do you think Kenya-Somalia action in the Shifta War has a historical bearing on the current challenges of terrorism and other security challenges between the two countries?
  
6. With Kenya's independence imminent, many Kenyan Somalis agitated for merger of their region into Somalia, a call supported by the Somali government. In your opinion, do you think the Northern Frontier District still threatens new security arrangements between Kenya and Somalia?
  
7. Kenya is facing challenges from hosting large number of Somali refugee in the country. Due to the changing dimensions of the conflict in Somalia, to what extent do you think Somalia refugee camps are being used as launching camps for terrorist attacks?
  
8. In your opinion, what should be done to refugees to better manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

9. In your opinion, would you say Somalia's conflicts and Kenya's conflicts such as the Wagalla massacres have a linkage/ association to the current terrorist threats and attacks being witnessed in the region?

10. There have been reports of Kenyan returnees from Somalia engaging in terrorist activities. In your opinion, do you think Kenya returnees are responsible for terrorism?

11. Comment on the weather Somalia Al shabaab terrorist groups carry out attacks in collaboration with other Kenya groups such as MRC.

12. Kenya as well as Somalia national security and stability have been destabilized by waves of terror attacks. In your opinion, to what extent do you think Kenya's military (KDF) intervention in Somalia has offered an effective counterterrorism strategy to assure security and safety of citizens in both countries? (Focus your country).

13. The implications of Kenya's (KDF) interventionist action in Somalia have been attributed to retaliatory terrorist attacks in Kenya. In your opinion, has ethnic profiling (e.g. Kasarani concentration camps) affected Kenya-Somalia relations in countering transnational terrorism?

14. Kenya-Somalia relations in countering terrorism has necessitated capacity building strategies to deal with transnational terrorism. How do you rate

capacity building of administrators between Kenya and Somalia in countering terrorism? (Focus your country)

16. In your view, how would you rate the existing trust between Kenya and Somali Muslims in countering transnational terrorism?

17. States are more sensitive to security and military developments in their regions due to increasing terror trends. What challenges do you think hinder the success of such engagements in the context of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia?

18. Suggest strategies you consider the government can employ in enhancing effective security-based diplomacy in management of transnational terrorism?  
[Focus on Kenya-Somalia]

**SECTION III: Examining the effects of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia**

1. In your view, what would you consider as the causes of terrorist radicalization profiles relating to terrorist activities? (Focus your country).

2. From your own opinion, what would you consider as are the recruiting strategies for terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia? (Pick only 2)

3. In your opinion, why are youths vulnerable to recruitment in terrorist activities? (Focus your country/ region).
4. A number of contributing factors may be singled out as facilitators for the emergence of terrorist radicalization processes leading to terrorism. From your point of view, what are the push/pull factors to terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia?
5. Given the emerging trends of terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia which continues to evolve in nature and scope, would you say that religion has played a factor in terrorist radicalization in these countries?
6. The intervention of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia as a counterterrorism strategy has had an effect on both countries. To what extent do you think this has influenced terrorist radicalization?
7. In your view, has Kenya and Somalia done enough to tackle negative socio-economic factors such as corruption and lack of good governance, high unemployment especially among the youth as counter-terrorist radicalization strategy in management of transnational terrorism?
8. How would you rate the Kenya-Somalia government efforts in strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, including democratic policing, promoting dialogue between the state and society and ensuring respect for



human rights and fundamental freedoms as strategies in countering terrorist radicalization?

9. In your opinion, has Kenya and Somalia governments done enough to combat intolerance and discrimination, as well as promoting mutual respect, co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious and other groups a way of addressing terrorist radicalization in the region?

10. In view of the prevailing terror attacks and threats in Kenya, how do you rate Kenya and Somalia governments on preventing violent conflicts, as well as promoting peaceful settlement of disputes and resolution of existing conflicts initiatives (counter-terrorist radicalization programs) to counter violent radical groups?

11. Do you think there are counter-radicalization programs between Kenya and Somalia designed to manage transnational terrorism? (Focus your country)

b) In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia states have developed effective community-focused initiatives with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that Lead to terrorism (VERLT)?

12. State your agreement on the existence of counter-terrorist radicalization programmes in schools (focusing your country) as a measure of managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

13. In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia governments have adopted a strategic approach to engaging with youth, community policing, women, civil society, NGOs, media.

14. In your opinion, what strategy do you think can be employed to deal with youth terrorist radicalization in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

15. What challenges are evident in an effort to implementing effective ways to counter transnational terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia? (Focus your country).

16. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying factors or identify potential terrorist radicalization indicators; and thus ensure safety and security of the citizens?

**SECTION IV: Assessing the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. The threat of transnational terrorism has significantly altered international intelligence sharing. In your opinion, to what extent has intelligence-sharing contributed in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia? (Focus your country)?

2. Given the terrorist events between Kenya and Somalia, do you think security-based propaganda in intelligence has been used to deter terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

3. In your own opinion, do you think the attacks at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Lamu and Mandera demonstrate clear deficiencies with the organization of Kenya-Somalia counter-terrorism intelligence community?

4. Do you see any linkages between intelligence failure and clanism between Kenya and Somalia?

7. Kenya is a unitary state while Somalia's state collapse and the security threats posed by Somalia's prolonged crisis (lawlessness and lack of a revived central state) In your opinion, to what extent does these variations affect the structural capacity of intelligence sharing to better manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

8. Surveillance is a vital component of intelligence operations geared to securing sensitive facilities or combating terrorism or insurgency. In your opinion, do you think security agencies have developed effective special investigation techniques, surveillance and use of information technology -in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

9. In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia have effective evidence-based intelligence-led strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

10. Training and capacity building of administrators on intelligence sharing is key to better manage the threat of transnational terrorism. How would you rate training on information sharing and terrorism management in your area of jurisdiction?

11. a) Would you say that there exists trust in intelligence sharing from the Muslim communities both between Kenya and Somalia?

b) To what extent is community intelligence being utilized as a strategy to manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

12. In your opinion, how would you rate the characteristics of Intelligence Agencies as far as the adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, relationship with the intelligence community and enhancing a mechanism to ensure accountability in the management of transnational terrorism? (Focus your country).

13. Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. To what extent do you think interstate Cooperation (Kenya and Somalia) has helped identify individuals and groups engaged in terrorism?

14. In light of the terrorist attacks/threats between Kenya and Somalia, do you think local security agencies coordinate closely with foreign intelligence services to inform a common assessment of threats and options in response?

15. The new emphasis on intelligence-sharing creates new challenges with regard to combating transnational terrorism. What challenges might be contributing to intelligence failure in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

16. In your view, how do you rate Kenya and Somalia governments intelligence-sharing initiatives and their effectiveness in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

17. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying gaps relating to intelligence failure to better manage transnational terrorism?

**SECTION V: Evaluating the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. Border surveillance plays a critical role in the management of transnational terrorism. In your opinion, to what extent are Kenya-Somalia border controls

important in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?  
(Focus your country)?

2. What security gaps would you consider as common in the Kenya-Somalia Borders. (Focus on your country).

3. a) In your opinion, what strategies are you aware of that are currently being employed in open border control? Focus your country/ region?

b) which strategies would you consider as effective in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia? (Tick where appropriate)

4. Do you see any linkages between border security threats and the problem of refugee camps and terrorist activities (Focus your country)-Kenya and Somalia?

5. what is the composition of border security committee focusing on your region/ country?

6. Migration controls have become an increasingly important component of counter-terrorism. How would you rate the effectiveness of Kenya-Somalia migration controls in managing transnational terrorism?

7. In view of terror attacks between Kenya and Somalia, how would you rate the control and surveillance of the land open border between the two countries?

8. Do you think the varying political instability in both Kenya and Somalia has an influence on the effectiveness of border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

9. How would you rate the effectiveness of the migration controls, document issuing, maritime security and surveillance with regard to border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

10. In your opinion, what would you say is the underlying cause of Kenya-Somalia border problem in the wake of transnational terrorism?

11. Controls of cross-border activities on borders require some of the important and strategic heights important for the security of the nation. In your own opinion, how would you rate the extent of adoption of technology at the Kenya-Somalia border points?

12. The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of the people have made it easy for insurgents groups to cross between Kenya and Somalia. In your opinion, rate the degree of involvement of border communities and the role they play in border security management?

13. What challenges would you say hinder the effectiveness of border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

14. Border-security cooperation is important to combat organized crime and terrorism insurgencies. In your opinion, do you think the Kenya's strategy to construct a wall on its border with Somalia offers a long-term solution to the management of transnational terrorism?

15. Border surveillance and protection is intended to enable security measures to be taken in the event of terrorist threats. In your opinion, which group should be given the mandate to manage the borders? (Focus your country)

16. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying problems relating to border surveillance to effectively counter terrorism?

*End*

*Thank you for your contribution*



## **APPENDIX IV: Focus Group Discussion**

### **Non-state actors (Religious-Based Institutions)**

My name is Christopher Chumba, a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST). I am undertaking a study on "The role of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia." Please assist in contribution of information towards this study by filling in the questionnaire below.

*NOTE: Security-based diplomacy is used to mean hard-line security preventive measures against terrorist activities undertaken by Kenya and Somalia governments; (which offers no door for diplomacy and or negotiation). Security-based diplomacy strategies may include military intervention, defensible border walls and homeland counterterrorism measures in intelligence gathering.*

### **SECTION II: Historical evolution of security-based diplomacy in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. Historically, the relations between Kenya and the Kenyan-Somalis have been fraught. What factors may have influenced this relation?
2. Kenya-Somalia security-based diplomacy has taken a new phase in the emerging transnational terrorist events. What are the factors behind the disintegration of security situation in both Kenya and Somalia?

3. In your opinion, why is Kenya and Somalia vulnerable to terrorism?
  
4. In your opinion, do you think Kenya-Somalia action in the Shifta War has a historical bearing on the current challenges of terrorism and other security challenges between the two countries?
  
5. In your opinion, do you think Kenya-Somalia action in the Shifta War has a historical bearing on the current challenges of terrorism and other security challenges between the two countries?
  
6. With Kenya's independence imminent, many Kenyan Somalis agitated for merger of their region into Somalia, a call supported by the Somali government. In your opinion, do you think the Northern Frontier District still threatens new security arrangements between Kenya and Somalia?
  
7. Kenya is facing challenges from hosting large number of Somali refugee in the country. Due to the changing dimensions of the conflict in Somalia, to what extent do you think Somalia refugee camps are being used as launching camps for terrorist attacks?

8. In your opinion, what should be done to refugees to better manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

9. In your opinion, would you say Somalia's conflicts and Kenya's conflicts such as the Wagalla massacres have a linkage/ association to the current terrorist threats and attacks being witnessed in the region?

10. There have been reports of Kenyan returnees from Somalia engaging in terrorist activities. In your opinion, do you think Kenya returnees are responsible for terrorism?

11. Comment on the weather Somalia Al shabaab terrorist groups carry out attacks in collaboration with other Kenya groups such as MRC.

12. Kenya as well as Somalia national security and stability have been destabilized by waves of terror attacks. In your opinion, to what extent do you think Kenya's military (KDF) intervention in Somalia has offered an effective counterterrorism strategy to assure security and safety of citizens in both countries? (Focus your country).

13. The implications of Kenya's (KDF) interventionist action in Somalia have been attributed to retaliatory terrorist attacks in Kenya. In your opinion, has ethnic profiling (e.g. Kasarani concentration camps) affected Kenya-Somalia relations in countering transnational terrorism?

14. Kenya-Somalia relations in countering terrorism has necessitated capacity building strategies to deal with transnational terrorism. How do you rate capacity building of administrators between Kenya and Somalia in countering terrorism? (Focus your country)

16. In your view, how would you rate the existing trust between Kenya and Somali Muslims in countering transnational terrorism?

17. States are more sensitive to security and military developments in their regions due to increasing terror trends. What challenges do you think hinder the success of such engagements in the context of security-based diplomacy between Kenya and Somalia?

18. Suggest strategies you consider the government can employ in enhancing effective security-based diplomacy in management of transnational terrorism?  
[Focus on Kenya-Somalia]

**SECTION III: Examining the effect of state-centric counter-radicalization measures on the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia**

1. In your view, what would you consider as the causes of terrorist radicalization profiles relating to terrorist activities? (Focus your country).
2. From your own opinion, what would you consider as are the recruiting strategies for terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia? (Pick 2 only).
3. In your opinion, why are youths vulnerable to recruitment in terrorist activities? (Focus your country/ region).
4. A number of contributing factors may be singled out as facilitators for the emergence of terrorist radicalization processes leading to terrorism. From your point of view, what are the push/pull factors to terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia?
5. Given the emerging trends of terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia which continues to evolve in nature and scope, would you say that religion has played a factor in terrorist radicalization in these countries?
6. The intervention of Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) into Somalia as a counterterrorism strategy has had an effect on both countries. To what extent do you think this has influenced terrorist radicalization?

7. In your view, has Kenya and Somalia done enough to tackle negative socio-economic factors such as corruption and lack of good governance, high unemployment especially among the youth as counter-terrorist radicalization strategy in management of transnational terrorism?

8. How would you rate the Kenya-Somalia government efforts in strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, including democratic policing, promoting dialogue between the state and society and ensuring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as strategies in countering terrorist radicalization?

9. In your opinion, has Kenya and Somalia governments done enough to combat intolerance and discrimination, as well as promoting mutual respect, co-existence and harmonious relations between ethnic, religious and other groups a way of addressing terrorist radicalization in the region?

10. In view of the prevailing terror attacks and threats in Kenya, how do you rate Kenya and Somalia governments on preventing violent conflicts, as well as promoting peaceful settlement of disputes and resolution of existing conflicts initiatives (counter-terrorist radicalization programs) to counter violent radical groups?

11. Do you think there are counter-radicalization programs between Kenya and Somalia designed to manage transnational terrorism? (Focus your country)

b) In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia states have developed effective community-focused initiatives with a particular focus on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that Lead to terrorism (VERLT)?

12. State your agreement on the existence of counter-terrorist radicalization programmes in schools (focusing your country) as a measure of managing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

13. In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia governments have adopted a strategic approach to engaging with youth, community policing, women, civil society, NGOs, media.

14. In your opinion, what strategy do you think can be employed to deal with youth terrorist radicalization in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

15. What challenges are evident in an effort to implementing effective ways to counter transnational terrorist radicalization between Kenya and Somalia? (Focus your country).

16. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying factors or identify potential terrorist radicalization indicators; and thus ensure safety and security of the citizens?

**SECTION IV: Assessing the structural capacity of intelligence sharing in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. The threat of transnational terrorism has significantly altered international intelligence sharing. In your opinion, to what extent has intelligence-sharing contributed in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia? (Focus your country)?

2. Given the terrorist events between Kenya and Somalia, do you think security-based propaganda in intelligence has been used to deter terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

3. In your own opinion, do you think the attacks at Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Lamu and Mandera demonstrate clear deficiencies with the organization of Kenya-Somalia counter-terrorism intelligence community?

4. Do you see any linkages between intelligence failure and clanism between Kenya and Somalia?

5. Kenya is a unitary state while Somalia's state collapse and the security threats posed by Somalia's prolonged crisis (lawlessness and lack of a revived central state) In your opinion, to what extent does these variations affect the structural capacity of intelligence sharing to better manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?



6. Surveillance is a vital component of intelligence operations geared to securing sensitive facilities or combating terrorism or insurgency. In your opinion, do you think security agencies have developed effective special investigation techniques, surveillance and use of information technology -in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

7. In your opinion, do you think Kenya and Somalia have effective evidence-based intelligence-led strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

8. Training and capacity building of administrators on intelligence sharing is key to better manage the threat of transnational terrorism. How would you rate training on information sharing and terrorism management in your area of jurisdiction?

9. a) Would you say that there exists trust in intelligence sharing from the Muslim communities both between Kenya and Somalia?

b) To what extent is community intelligence being utilized as a strategy to manage transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

10. In your opinion, how would you rate the characteristics of Intelligence Agencies as far as the adaptability, organizational structure, organizational command, relationship with the intelligence community and enhancing a

mechanism to ensure accountability in the management of transnational terrorism? (Focus your country).

11. Interagency coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community in the fight against terrorism is a prerequisite for effective, efficient, and timely response. To what extent do you think interstate Cooperation (Kenya and Somalia) has helped identify individuals and groups engaged in terrorism?

12. In light of the terrorist attacks/threats between Kenya and Somalia, do you think local security agencies coordinate closely with foreign intelligence services to inform a common assessment of threats and options in response?

13. The new emphasis on intelligence-sharing creates new challenges with regard to combating transnational terrorism. What challenges might be contributing to intelligence failure in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

14. In your view, how do you rate Kenya and Somalia governments intelligence-sharing initiatives and their effectiveness in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

15. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying gaps relating to intelligence failure to better manage transnational terrorism?

**SECTION V: Evaluating the effectiveness of border surveillance strategies in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.**

1. Border surveillance plays a critical role in the management of transnational terrorism. In your opinion, to what extent are Kenya-Somalia border controls important in countering transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia? (Focus your country)?

2. What security gaps would you consider as common in the Kenya-Somalia Borders. (Focus on your country).

3.a) In your opinion, what strategies are you aware of that are currently being employed in open border control? Focus your country/ region?

b) which strategies would you consider as effective in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia? (Tick where appropriate)

4. Do you see any linkages between border security threats and the problem of refugee camps and terrorist activities (Focus your country)-Kenya and Somalia?

5. what is the composition of border security committee focusing on your region/ country?

6. Migration controls have become an increasingly important component of counter-terrorism. How would you rate the effectiveness of Kenya-Somalia migration controls in managing transnational terrorism?

7. In view of terror attacks between Kenya and Somalia, how would you rate the control and surveillance of the land open border between the two countries?

8. Do you think the varying political instability in both Kenya and Somalia has an influence on the effectiveness of border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

9. How would you rate the effectiveness of the migration controls, document issuing, maritime security and surveillance with regard to border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia?

10. In your opinion, what would you say is the underlying cause of Kenya-Somalia border problem in the wake of transnational terrorism?

11. Controls of cross-border activities on borders require some of the important and strategic heights important for the security of the nation. In your own opinion, how would you rate the extent of adoption of technology at the Kenya-Somalia border points?

12. The porous nature of the border and the constant flow of the people have made it easy for insurgents groups to cross between Kenya and Somalia. In your opinion, rate the degree of involvement of border communities and the role they play in border security management?

13. What challenges would you say hinder the effectiveness of border surveillance in the management of transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

14. Border-security cooperation is important to combat organized crime and terrorism insurgencies. In your opinion, do you think the Kenya's strategy to construct a wall on its border with Somalia offers a long-term solution to the management of transnational terrorism?

15. Border surveillance and protection is intended to enable security measures to be taken in the event of terrorist threats. In your opinion, which group should be given the mandate to manage the borders? (Focus your country)

16. Suggest strategies you think could be explored further between Kenya and Somalia to address specific underlying problems relating to border surveillance to effectively counter terrorism?

*End*

*Thank you for your contribution*

## APPENDIX V: Letter of Authority to Collect Data-MMUST



### MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 0202315221  
Fax: 056-30836  
Website: [www.mmust.ac.ke](http://www.mmust.ac.ke)

P.O Box 190  
Kakamega - 50100

NAIROBI CENTRE

Our Ref: CDR/H/207/13

Date: 28<sup>th</sup> January, 2015.

National Council for Science & Technology  
P.O Box 30623-00100  
NAIROBI.


Dear Sir/Madam,

#### RE: INTRODUCTION OF CHRISTOPHER CHUMBA

The above mentioned is a student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, Nairobi Centre, (Adm. No. CDR/H/207/13) pursuing PhD Programme in Diplomacy and International Relations. He has already submitted his proposal to the University titled "Security-based Diplomacy Influencing Transnational Terrorism Management in Kenya and Somalia" which has been approved by the University. He is now ready for field research.

Kindly assist him accordingly.

Yours faithfully,

  
Ms Silvia Yundi  
For: Dean, School of Graduate Studies

SV/ek

## APPENDIX VI: Letter of Approval From University -MMUST



MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870  
Fax: 056-30153  
E-mail: [sgs@mmust.ac.ke](mailto:sgs@mmust.ac.ke)  
Website: [www.mmust.ac.ke](http://www.mmust.ac.ke)

P.O Box 190  
Kakamega – 50100  
Kenya

Office of the Dean (School of Graduate Studies)

Ref: MMU/COR: 509079

Date: 2<sup>nd</sup> June 2015

Christopher Chumba  
CDR/H/207/13  
P.O. Box 190-50100  
KAKAMEGA

Dear Mr. Chumba,

### RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Senate of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology acting on the advice of the Board of the School of Graduate Studies approved your proposal entitled: *'Security-Based Diplomacy Influencing Transnational Terrorism Management in Kenya and Somalia'* and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. P.G Okoth
2. Dr. Edmond Were


You will be required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Dean SGS. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, Centre for Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Committee and Chairman, Peace and Conflict Studies.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of three years from the date of registration to complete your PhD thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

I once more congratulate you for the approval of your proposal and wish you a successful research.

Yours Sincerely,

  
PROF. PETER ODERA  
AG. DEAN, SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES



## APPENDIX VII: Letter of Authority to Collect Data-NACOSTI



### NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,  
2241349, 310571, 2219420  
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249  
Email: secretary@nacosti.go.ke  
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke  
When replying please quote

9<sup>th</sup> Floor, Utalii House  
Uhuru Highway  
P.O. Box 30623-00100  
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No.

Date:  
19<sup>th</sup> March, 2015

**NACOSTI/P/15/2834/5020**

Christopher Chumba  
Masinde Muliro University of  
Science and Technology  
P.O. Box 190-50100  
**KAKAMEGA.**

#### **RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

Following your application for authority to carry out research on "*Security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia*," I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **all Counties** for a period ending **31<sup>st</sup> December, 2016**.

You are advised to report to **the Principal Secretaries of the selected Ministries, the Chief Executive Officers of the selected Government Agencies, the County Commissioners and the County Directors of Education, all Counties** before embarking on the research project.

On completion of the research, you are required to submit **two hard copies and one soft copy in pdf** of the research report/thesis to our office.

  
**DR. M. K. RUGUTT, PhD, HSC.**  
**DIRECTOR GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The Principal Secretaries  
Selected Ministries.

The Chief Executive Officers  
Selected Government Agencies.

*National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation is ISO 9001: 2008 Certified*




**APPENDIX VIII: Resear**

**ch Permit**

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:**  
**MR. CHRISTOPHER CHUMBA**  
**of MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF**  
**SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 30091-100**  
**nairobi, has been permitted to conduct**  
**research in All Counties**  
**on the topic: SECURITY-BASED**  
**DIPLOMACY INFLUENCING**  
**TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM**  
**MANAGEMENT IN KENYA AND SOMALIA**  
**for the period ending:**  
**31st December, 2016**

**Permit No : NACOSTI/P/15/2834/5020**  
**Date Of Issue : 19th March, 2015**  
**Fee Received :Ksh 2,000**



*[Handwritten Signature]*  
**Applicant's Signature**

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
**Director General**  
**National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation**

## APPENDIX IX: Letter of Authority to Collect Data in Somalia



Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia  
Nairobi - Kenya

Re: ESR/1505/15


Nairobi, 17<sup>th</sup> December 2015

### To Whom It May Concern:

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the Republic of Kenya has the honor to introduce Mr. Christopher Chumba holder of Student ID No. CDR/H/207/13 of Maside Muliro University of Science and Technology, Kakamega, Kenya. He is undertaking a research Study for his doctoral thesis on Security-based Diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism management in Kenya and Somalia”.

Any assistance rendered to him in this regard will be highly appreciated.

Regards

  
Mr. Ali Mohamed Sheikh  
Counsellor



## APPENDIX X: Tripartite Agreement on Refugees in Kenya

### TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF SOMALIA AND THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES GOVERNING THE VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION OF SOMALI REFUGEES LIVING IN KENYA, 2013

#### Preamble

The Government of the Republic of Kenya, the Federal Government of Somali (herein referred to as "the Governments") and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (herein referred to as "UNHCR"), all together hereinafter referred to as "The Parties."

a) Recalling the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 1951 (the 1951 Refugee Convention) and its Additional Protocol of January II, 1967 (the 1967 Protocol) and the OAU Convention of September 10, 1969 Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (the 1959 OAU Convention) and the obligations on the Parties to adhere to and respect the provisions of this Agreement;

b) Noting the general principles of international law on the right of all persons to leave and return to their country of origin as enshrined in Article 13 (2) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and Article 12 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),

c) Recalling that the United Nations General Assembly "Resolution 428(V) of 14 December 1950, adopted the Statute of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and mandated it to seek, permanent solution to the problem of refugees inter alia, facilitating the voluntary repatriation and reintegration of refugees in their countries of origin;

d) **Considering** that voluntary repatriation constitutes a durable solution for the problems of refugees, and that the attainment of this solution requires that refugees will voluntarily return to their country of origin in conditions of safety and dignity;

e) Noting that Conclusion 18 (Session XXXI)-1980, Conclusion 40 (Session XXXVI)- 1985 and Conclusion 74 (XLV)-1994 and 101 (LV)-2004 of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Program set out internationally accepted principles and standards governing voluntary repatriation of refugees;

## APPENDIX XI: Historical overview of Kenya-Somalia dispute

The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware  
CSC 1984

SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues

The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware  
Submitted to  
Rudolph V. Wiggins, PhD  
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements  
for Written Communications  
The Marine Corps Command and Staff College  
Quantico, Virginia  
Major Tom L. Wanambisi  
Kenya  
April 6, 1984

The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware

On June 26, 1960, hardly four days after the British Government granted the former British Somaliland her independence to become the Somalia Republic, the new government declared her desires to unite all the Somali speaking people in the Horn of Africa.

As the Somalis see it, writes Mr. John Drysdale:

"Their frontier dispute is not essentially about land alone but the people."<sup>1</sup>

The nomadic Somali speaking people who by colonial boundary "arrangements" found themselves dismembered. About two-thirds of them live under the national flag of the Somalia Republic and the remainder are divided between Djibouti (former French Somaliland), Ethiopia and Kenya. This historical error prompted the first Somalis President, Dr. Abdirashid Ali Sharmarky to say this:

"No! Our misfortune is that our neighboring countries, with whom we seek to promote constructive and harmonious relations are not our neighbors but our Somali kinsmen whose citizenship has been falsified by indiscriminate boundary

"arrangements".

They have to move across artificial frontiers to their pasture lands. They occupy the same terrain and pursue the same pastoral economy as ourselves. We speak the same language. We share the same God, the same culture and the same

traditions.

How can we regard our brothers as foreigners?"<sup>2</sup>

On the other hand, both the Ethiopian and the Kenyan Governments consider their Somali population as just one of the minority communities living within our borders and are, therefore, bonafide citizens. The governments regard any external pressure as infringement in internal matters of a sovereign state. They further consider any desire by the Somali people to break away and possibly unite with Somalia as seditious. The support, material or moral given to the Somalis to enable them to fight by the Somalia Government is viewed as infringement of territorial integrity. And, in the words of President Kenyatta: "Kenya will never surrender any inch of her territory to anyone."<sup>3</sup>

## APPENDIX XII: Historical Evidence of the Shifta War in Kenya

The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware  
CSC 1984  
SUBJECT AREA Strategic Issues

The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware  
Submitted to  
Rudolph V. Wiggins, PhD  
In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements  
for Written Communications  
The Marine Corps Command and Staff College  
Quantico, Virginia  
Major Tom L. Wanambisi  
Kenya  
April 6, 1984

### The Somali Dispute: Kenya Beware **The Shifta War in Kenya**

The British Government on realizing that the would-be Kenya Government would not accept the terms set by some British officials in the 1960's, decided to take a different approach. Series of meetings were organized including one in August 1963 in Rome to resolve the issue. The British Government stand was spelled out by Mr. Peter Thomas as follows:

"Since the British Government would be responsible for Kenya only a few more months (before her independence in December 1963), the British Government considers that it would be wrong to take a unilateral decision about the frontiers of Kenya without reference to the wishes of the government of that country; and that agreement should be sought by the African governments concerned working and negotiating within an African framework."<sup>24</sup>

The Somalia delegation led by then, Prime Minister Dr. Abdirashid Sharmarky were disappointed to learn at their first meeting that the British Government had no intention of making any constructive proposals. He charged:

"The British had only convened the meeting to explore the position of the Somalia Republic, which was in any case well known to them."<sup>25</sup>

In conclusion, the Somalia Government states:

"It was evident that the British Government has not only deliberately misled the Somalia Government during the course of the last eighteen months, but has also deceitfully encouraged the people of North Eastern Province to believe that their right to self-determination could be granted by the British Government through peaceful and legal means. The responsibility for the consequences that may follow this suppression of a fundamental human right lies squarely on the British Government."<sup>26</sup>

Shortly after this, the Somalia Government recalled her Ambassador from Britain and severed diplomatic relations. The Somali people residing in the North Eastern Province boycotted the elections, took arms, and demanded self-autonomy. For us Kenyans, the Somalis demand that we give up approximately 45,000 square miles of our territory (approximately a fifth of the land mass), not only is it unacceptable but also violates our Constitution and the OAU Charter. The Kenyan view was and continues to be similar to that expressed by the majority of the Organization of African Unit member countries:

## APPENDIX XIII: North Frontier District and Kenya-Somalia Relations

Post-Independence Low Intensity Conflict In Kenya  
CSC 1992  
SUBJECT AREA History

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Title: Post-Independence Low Intensity Conflict In Kenya  
Author: Major H. K. Biwott (Robb), Student, United States Marine Corps.

Background: Between 1963 and 1979 Kenya was faced with a serious armed conflict with the people of Somali origin living in the North Eastern province. The focus of the conflict was secession to Somalia. With the support of Somali government, the ideology spread into NFD, a Somali predominant region in Kenya, The Somalis in Ogaden and the Haud in Ethiopia initiated the whole campaign by forming an irredentist movement during the pre-colonial era. The primary purpose for this movement was to fight for a unified Somalia comprising of all the Somali speaking people in the Horn of Africa.

Following Kenya's independence from British colonial rule on 12th December, 1963, the country faced a serious armed conflict with the Somali community in the Northern Frontier District which was getting support from the government of neighboring Somalia. The estimated Somali community of 250,000, who had migrated into the region between 1894 and 1912 was fighting to secede from Kenya to form part of greater Somalia.

Throughout the period between 1963 and 1967 there were serious armed skirmishes which translated into massive loss of life on both sides. The Kenya government suffered serious set backs due to the lack of local support and adequate intelligence network. Another drawback was the encountering of a two-pronged attack by the Somalis in Ogaden, Ethiopia, and those from Somalia who had formed a strong irredentists force to fight for an homogeneous Somali community.

Over the period, the central government of Somalia offered the irredentist moral and material support in both North Eastern Kenya and South Eastern Ethiopia. Further external support was received from some former colonialists and Arab sympathizers.

Following these developments, Kenya government contemplated introducing military forces in the Northern Frontier District to combat the envisioned protracted guerrilla campaign by the Somali irredentist. In June, 1963, military posts were established in the towns of Mandera, Garissa, and Wajir. Outposts were subsequently also organized at Buna, Gurar, Moyale, and Malka-Mari. To date, military detachments and outposts are still in these towns to ensure that peace prevails in the region

## APPENDIX XIV: Somalia Chronology of Events at a Glance

- 1991: On Jan. 26, former President of Somalia “*Siyad Barre*” flees Muqdisho. Northwest (now known as Somaliland, former British Protectorate of Somalia) subsequently declares independence on May 18, 1991.
- Jan 29, 1991: *Ali Mahdi Mohamed*, head of one of the USC (United Somali Congress) factions appointed President by the National Reconciliation Committee appointed by the ousted president Barre.
- Mar. 1991: Forces loyal to ex-president (late *Siyad Barre*) stage an unsuccessful attempt to re-take the capital, Muqdisho.
- April 1991: The United Somali Congress (USC) captures the port-city of *Kismaayo*, south Somalia.
- Former President of Djibouti *Hassan Guled Aptidon* organizes and holds 2 consecutive peace and reconciliation efforts in Djibouti attended by 6 political factions. Both conferences were on May and July in 1991.
- August 1991: UN re-opens its office in Muqdisho.
- July 1991: Late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed* was appointed as the only legitimate chairman of USC and recognized by his arch rival *Ali Mahdi Mohamed*.
- Sept. 1991: Ex-president (late *Siyad Barre*) militia seized *Baidoa* and its environs.  
Fighting continues in the south until April 1992 resulting in large population displacements, looting of grain stocks and serious damage to agricultural systems in Somalia’s main farming areas.

- Oct. 18, 1991: *Ali Mahdi Mohamed* was sworn-in as President of Somalia in Muqdisho following the agreement reached in Djibouti, Djibouti by the six Somali political factions: The United Somali Congress (USC), Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), United Somali Party (USP), Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA)
- Nov 17, 1991: A devastating civil war erupts in Muqdisho between *Ali Mahdi Mohamed* and *Mohamed Farah Aideed* where hundreds of Somalis are killed and many others flee the city seeking refuge in neighboring countries: Kenya and Ethiopia. This is followed by a total state collapse.
- Dec. 19, 1991: United Nations General Assembly appeals to all states and relevant inter-governmental and NGOs to continue to extend emergency assistance to Somalia.
- Feb. 12, 1992: Consultations with the Somali faction leaders, mainly from south-central Somalia, held in the UN headquarter in New York, during which they agree to an immediate cease-fire.
- Mar. 3, 1992: Cease-fire brokered by the Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General, James Jonah in Muqdisho. Mr. Jonah was later replaced by *Amb. Mohamed Sahnoun*.
- Mar. 17, 1992: The Security Council adopts resolution 746 (1992) supporting the Secretary General's decision to send a technical team to Somalia.
- Mar. 28, 1992: The technical team, in Muqdisho, obtains the agreement of late *Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed* and *Mr. Ali Mahdi Mohamed* to a possible deployment of 50 United Nations cease-fire observers in Muqdisho (25 on each side of the then divided city of Muqdisho) and of adequate security personnel for humanitarian relief operations.



- Apr. 21, 1992: The Secretary General of the UN recommends to the Security Council for the establishment of United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), to consist of 50 unarmed military observers to monitor cease-fire in Muqdisho. The Secretary also informs the Council of a Consolidated Inter-Agency 90-days plan of action for emergency humanitarian assistance drawn from the UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs.
- April 1992: Famine hits southern Somalia. This is followed by the intervention of the US led multi-national forces (*Operation Restore Hope*) to alleviate famine.
- Jan. 4, 1993: 15 faction leaders meeting in Addis Ababa, reach agreement to cease hostility, demobilize their militias, hand-over heavy weapons to a cease-fire monitoring group.
- Mar 1993: Somali Reconciliation Conference held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia attended by 15 armed factions, the 3<sup>rd</sup> reconciliation conference for Somalia.
- June 1993: Security Council adopt resolution 837 (1993) authorizing UNOSOM II to take all necessary measures against those responsible for the attack on the UN personnel on June 5, 1993.
- June 17, 1993: Rear Admiral Jonathan T. Howe issues a warrant for the arrest of late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed*. This is followed by fierce fighting between the US-led multinational forces in Muqdisho against the militia loyal to late Gen. *Aideed*.
- July 1993: Col. *Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed*, chairman of SSDF, leaves Mogadishu after failure to attempt to establish a government with late Gen. *Mohamed Farah Aideed*.

- Oct 3, 1993: 18 American Rangers killed and 75 wounded in battle with USC/sna – (SNA: Somali national alliance) militia of late *Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed*.
- 1994: The Americans ignominiously withdraw their forces. A National Reconciliation Conference between the warring factions of Muqdisho held in Nairobi, Kenya – the 4<sup>th</sup> reconciliation conference for Somalia.
- Late 1994: An inter-*Habargidir* armed conflict erupts between forces loyal to late *Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed* and his ex-financier, *Osman Hassan Ali (Atto)*.
- In another development, an inter-clan cease-fire signed in Kismaayo between the then warring factions.
- 1995: UN mission ends and its entire staff evacuated from south-central Somalia.
- Early 1995: Late *Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed*'s USC/sna captures the city of Baidoa, Bay region.
- Mohamed Siyad Barre*, former Somali President dies in Lagos, Nigeria.
- 1996: Aug. 1 *Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed* dies in Muqdisho after sustaining gunshot wounds.
- RRA (*Rahan Weyn* Resistance Army) of the *Digil & Mirifle* clans founded in north *Mogadishu*.
- 1997: RRA captures *Baidoa*, the capital city of *Bay & Bakool* supported by the Ethiopians.

A National Reconciliation Conference was held in Sodare, Ethiopia attended by the armed faction leaders – the 5<sup>th</sup> of its kind.

- 1998: In Cairo, Egypt – a Somali National Reconciliation Conference held. This is the 6<sup>th</sup> NRC to fail.  
Saudi Arabia bans livestock export on Somalia.
- 1999: Eritrea/Ethiopia conflict develops involving some Somali factions in south-central Somalia.
- 2000: The *Arta* peace conference held in Djibouti takes place where the Transitional National Government (TNG) is established.
- 2001: Sept. 11 terror attack on America leads to the freezing of Somalia's largest remittances company *Al-Barakaat*.
- Oct. 2002: Eldoret conference in Kenya invites the Somali faction leaders.
- 2003: Somali Peace Conference moves from Eldoret to Mbagathi
- July 2003: Transitional National Assembly (TNA) sacks Speaker of the House, Mr. *Abdalla Derow Issaq*.
- July 2003: A new Speaker for the House is elected after serious discussion between the MPs. Mr. *Mukhtar Gudow* is elected as the new Speaker of the House.
- August 2003: *Abdikassim Salad Hassan* extends his presidency another 3 years following the end of his tenure. *Abdikassim Salad Hassan* renews his presidency according to the 1960 Constitution.
- Sept. 2003: A number of Somali armed faction leaders leave the Mbagathi peace conference led by *Haji Musse Sudi Yalahow*. The group establishes a coalition of factions under the banner Somali Salvation Council

(SSC) in *Bal'ad* district, Middle *Shabelle* region. They enter an agreement with the TNG led by *Abdikassim Salad Hassan*.

- Dec. 2003: A number of notable traditional leaders, supported by some prominent businessmen and women, leave Muqdisho to mediate warring clans in *Galgudud* region, central Somalia: an armed inter-clan conflict in *Herale* village (*Dir* against *Marehan*) on one hand and, the *Murusade vs. Duduble* in *El-bur* district.
- Jan. 2004: The Somali political faction leaders that left the peace conference (SSC) and the TNG go back to Nairobi to attend a consultative mini-conference organized by IGAD. President Museveni mediates between the armed political faction leaders SRRC, G8, the TNG, SSC and the two-split civil society organizations in Safari park, Nairobi – Kenya.
- Jan. 2004: The armed faction leaders and civil society organizations sign an agreement in the Kenyan government state house witnessed by the Kenyan President and Yaweri Museveni.
- Jan. 2004: A number of the Ethiopian backed SRRC group withdraw from the conference in protest to the agreement signed in the Kenyan government state house.
- Feb. 2004: A number of the Ethiopian backed SRRC leave Nairobi. They establish a new alliance under the banner SNOC.
- April 2004: The Kenyan Foreign Minister, H.E. *David Kalonzo Musyoka*, announces the re-launching of the 3<sup>rd</sup> phase of the Somali peace conference.
- Oct. 2011: The Kenyan government launches Operation Lindi Nchi, an armed intervention in Somalia to counter the growing terrorist threat and impart stability and governance.

**APPENDIX XV: The Constitution of Kenya 2010:**  
**Chapter Fourteen-National Security**

PART 2—THE KENYA DEFENCE FORCES

Establishment of **241.** (1) There are established the Kenya Defence Forces.

Defence Forces and

Defence Council. (2) The Defence Forces consist of—

- (a) the Kenya Army;
  - (b) the Kenya Air Force; and
  - (c) the Kenya Navy.
- (3) The Defence Forces—
- (a) are responsible for the defence and protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic;
  - (b) shall assist and cooperate with other authorities in situations of emergency or disaster, and report to the National Assembly whenever deployed in such circumstances; and
  - (c) may be deployed to restore peace in any part of Kenya affected by unrest or instability only with the approval of the National Assembly.
- (4) The composition of the command of the Defence Forces shall reflect the regional and ethnic diversity of the people of Kenya.
- (5) There is established a Defence Council.
- (6) The Council consist of—
- (a) the Cabinet Secretary responsible for defence, who is the chairperson;
  - (b) the Chief of the Kenya Defence Forces;
  - (c) the three commanders of the defence forces; and
  - (d) the Principal Secretary in the Ministry responsible for defence.
- (7) The Council—
- (a) is responsible for the overall policy, control, and supervision of the Kenya Defence Forces; and
  - (b) performs any other functions prescribed by national legislation.