

**EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN COUNTERING  
TERRORISM IN KENYA WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO NAIROBI COUNTY**

**Alex Cherono Chepsoi**

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Conferment of  
the Degree of Master of Science in Disaster Management and Humanitarian  
Assistance of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology**

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\_\_\_\_\_  
Prof. F.K. Matanga  
Department of Peace and Conflict Studies  
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (MMUST)

\_\_\_\_\_  
DATE

\_\_\_\_\_  
Dr. Silvia K. Vundi  
Ministry of Devolution and ASAL  
State Department for Devolution

\_\_\_\_\_  
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## **DEDICATION**

To my wife, Daisy Kiplagat for her relentless encouragement that made me rises in the education ladder up to the Masters level.

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## ABSTRACT

Terrorism remains a major threat to national, regional and global peace and security. It has become a central and controversial issue of global attention. International consensus is growing on the best way to counter-terrorism. In Kenya, the effectiveness of the National Police Service (NPS) in countering terrorism significantly increased when Al-Qaeda bombed the United States of America (USA) Embassy in August 1998. This led to the formation of the National Intelligence Service (NIS) and Kenya was added to the United States Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (USATAP). The overall objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of the National Police Service in countering terrorism in Kenya with specific reference to Nairobi County. The objectives of the study were to assess the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya; to examine the contribution of the NPS in managing terrorism; and, to establish the challenges the NPS faces in its counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya. The study was guided by three theories; rational theory of choice, which explained why people choose terrorism; the utilitarianism theory that dealt with the ethical issues brought out by rational choice; and, the theory of bureaucratization, which explained the organizational performance of the NPS. The study employed a descriptive survey research design. The study sites were police stations within Nairobi County. The sample size for the study was 311. The sample was selected through three sampling techniques: systematic random probability sampling to identify the police officers' sample; purposive non-probability technique to select key informants and snowballing sampling to identify the terrorism survivors. Data collection tools were: semi-structured questionnaires for police officers; and, interview guides for survivors of terrorism attack, senior state officers in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government and members of CSOs. Data analysis employed descriptive statistics using both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Quantitative data were analyzed using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24.0. Quantitative data were presented in tables and qualitative data discussed thematically in line with the study objectives. The study established that the NPS acts as both a deterrent and reactive force to terrorism by deterring the planning of attacks on the Kenyan soil though they face numerous challenges in discharging their mandates. The study concluded that NPS contribution to counter-terrorism has led to a decline in terrorism by utilizing the law enforcement and intelligence entities that are already in place to mitigate terrorism threats. The study recommends that the government should equip and train adequate NPS for effectiveness in counter-terrorism. The study findings are significant to the NPS because they provide information that could inform the current policy on her role in counter-terrorism.

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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATION AND ACRONYM**

<b>ACSRT:</b>	African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
<b>ATPU:</b>	Anti-Terror Police Unit
<b>AU:</b>	Africa Union
<b>CBP:</b>	Community Based Policing
<b>CCTV:</b>	Closed Circuit Television
<b>CT:</b>	Counter Terrorism
<b>DCI:</b>	Directorate of Criminal Investigations
<b>EU:</b>	European Union
<b>FBI:</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigations
<b>GDP:</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GoK:</b>	Government of Kenya
<b>ICT:</b>	Information and Communications Technology
<b>JKIA:</b>	Jomo Kenyatta International Airport
<b>NACOSTI:</b>	National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
<b>NIS:</b>	National Intelligence Service
<b>NPCEAC:</b>	National Police College Embakasi 'A' Campus

**NPCK:** National Police College, Kiganjo

**NPS:** National Police Service

**NPSC:** National Police Service Commission

**NSE:** Nairobi Securities Exchange

**OCS:** Officer Commanding Police Station

**PATRIOT:** Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism

**UN:** United Nations

**UNEP:** United Nation Environment Programme

**UNHCR:** United Nation High Commission for Refugees

**UNODC:** United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

**UNON:** United Nations Office at Nairobi

**UNSC:** United Nations Security Council

**USA:** United States of America

## **CHAPTER ONE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

This study examined Kenya's efficiency in combating terrorism in the national police service with particular reference to Nairobi County. The chapter addressed the background to the research; statement of the problem; the study's goals; concerns about research; the study's rationale and its scope.

#### **1.1 Background of the Study**

Terrorism poses a significant threat to peace and stability at the national, regional and international levels. Terrorist acts are intended to frighten people and make them afraid of the safety of their society and their loved ones. Incidents affecting defenseless citizens are spontaneous, unpredictable and deliberate. It's natural to be worried about the future when these incidents occur.

In recent years, counter-terrorism approaches through data collection, review, monitoring and assessment have been introduced. While such actions have contributed to a decline in terrorist activity in certain countries, in other areas they have exacerbated the vice. The challenges to security faced by terrorism and the path forward have dominated public debate at the present time. The National Police Service (NPS) has contributed to a wide range of initiatives as well as consolidated actions from various industries and organisations and to the learning of past errors. Nevertheless, some regions continue to be highly affected and vulnerable to terrorism.

There has been an uptick in terrorist activity worldwide. For example, the Global Terrorism Index (2016) has grown to include the Islamic State of Iraq, the Levant (ISIL) and their affiliate

into 15 countries. In Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad, Boko Haram used to be present. Other terrorist countries include Europe, the United States, Turkey, France, Afghanistan, Syria, India, Pakistan, Somalia and Kenya.

Since 11 September 2001, when terrorists targeted Twin Towers in York and Pentagon Building in Washington DC, the federal government in the United States of America adopted a number of anti-terror initiatives. These cover the adoption of the Financial Anti-terror Act; the Bio-terrorism Act; the Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act; Aviation Safety Enhancement Act; the Airlines Security Act; the US Security Act and the US PATRIOT (United and Consolidated United States by Providing Appropriate Tools Needed for Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism) (Department of Homeland Security, 2014). PATRIOT has strengthened the capacity to redefine terrorism, tracking, collect intelligence and identifying crimes and penals by police and other security agencies (Chang, 2003). The establishment of the Home Security Office (HSO) to develop and organize the implementation of a broad national strategy aiming at protecting the United States against terrorist attacks is another important anti-terrorist step adopted in the USA after 11 September 2001. (Kuto, 2004).

Other associated organisations, including the Terrorism Task Force, the Custom Trade Partnership Against Terrorism and the Civil Corps were also created (Shamsul, 2002).

In 2001, the European Commission adopted the Framework Decision on Terrorism, which stipulated definitions of terrorism, the degree of restrictions and sanctions, procedures for extradition and information exchange to be pursued by European Union Member States (EU). The EU set up in 1997 a special preparatory committee to devise European police (Europol) in the run-up to the attack on 11 September (Mathieu, 2006). The Treaty of Amsterdam extended Europol's mandate to include counter-terrorism tasks (Rauchs and Koenig, 2006).

In the conclusions of the extraordinary European Council of 21 September 2001 Europol reaffirmed its significance in the fight against terrorism and the Council's instruction mainly sought to raise Europol to an important information and intelligence media) ( Mathieu, 2006). In 9/11, the counter-terrorism mandate was extended further to obtain powers for the EU police forces to start investigations and exchange information, such as Interpol and other professional police organisations and the police of non-EU countries, with the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) (Ratzel, 2007) and with other third parties ( John, 2007). In India, the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance (2001) enables the law enforcement agencies in India to investigate and prosecute terrorist acts (Kalhan, 2006).

Continental efforts in Africa have a long history of terror prevention and fighting. In 1992, at its 28th ordinary session in Dakar, Senegal, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) (now African Union) (AU), adopted a resolution on improving cooperation and collaboration between African states under which the Union undertook to combat extremism and terrorism (Cilliers and Sturman (eds), 2002). The OAU adopted the Declaration on the Code of Conduct on Inter-African Relations during its 30th Ordinary Session in Tunis in June 1994, rejecting all types of extremism and terrorism, whether they be under a pretext of sectarianism, tribalism, ethnicity or religion. The declaration also denounced and expressed its determination to increase cooperation in combating such activities as illegal, all terrorist acts, methods and practices (AU, 2002).

This initiative resulted in the 1999 OAU Convention on Terrorism Prevention and Fighting, which was adopted in Algiers, Algeria, at the 35th Ordinary Summit of the OAU in July 1999. According to the Convention, State Parties shall criminalize acts of terrorism under the Convention's national laws. It identifies areas of cooperation between states, establishes State competence for terrorist actions and provides a legal basis for extradition, as well as for external

and reciprocal legal assistance and investigations. The Convention entered into force in December 2002 and to date, 40 Member States have ratified it (AU, 2002).

The African Center for Terrorism Studies and Research (ACSRT), which was founded as part of its 2002 Plan of Action in Algiers in 2004, was formed to act as a mechanism to centralize information, studies, evaluate and improve antiterrorist capacity building programmes. in Algiers (Makinda, 2003). The ACSRT is also the forum for Member State-regional system interaction and cooperation. The center plays an important role in directing the actions of the AU against terror and works with many regional and international partners to ensure that counter-terrorism strategies are cohesive and organized across the continent (Cilliers and Sturman, 2004).

When the US Embassy was bombed in August 1998, efficacy of the NPS against terrorism in Kenya increased considerably. The United States Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program (USATAP) included in its National Intelligence Service (NIS) a follow up to the Embassy bombings Kenya (Mogire & Agade, 2011). USATAP was merely a formality and until some years later no substantial support was spilled out (Aronson, 2013). Nevertheless, both America and Kenya made a declaration to affirm their common battle against terrorism (Mogire & Agade, 2011). More than 500 Kenyan security officers in the US and many more in the United States have been trained in East Africa since 2002 by USATAP as designated training establishments (Ploch, 2010a). The Government of Kenya has also established a Joint Terrorist Task Force (Aronson, 2013), an anti-terrorism unit and a National Security Advisory Committee. A joint terrorist group has been formed by the Government of Kenya.

Nairobi is the capital and largest city in Kenya with the vast population, large businesses and the home office for the majority of state, continental and foreign organisations. Nairobi offers a wide range of policing requirements. Although effective policing is a significant precondition for

effective terrorism prevention, ineffectual cooperation, lack of crime prevention and problem solving strategies can be questioned. This underlines the need to conduct this NPS study with particular reference to the Nairobi County in order to combat terrorism in Kenya.

## **1.2 Statement of the Problem**

Since the first notable terrorism attack in Kenya on 7<sup>th</sup> August 1998 when the USA embassy was bombed and 213 lives lost, Kenya's security agencies put in place counter-terrorism strategies in Intelligence-led Policing (ILP), Surveillance and Community Based Policing (CBP) (Weisbard, 2009). In spite of remarkable efforts, terrorist attacks have still been witnessed. These include the Kikambala bomb attack on 28<sup>th</sup> November 2002 in Mombasa County, which resulted in 13 deaths; the Westgate Mall attack in Nairobi on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2013 where 67 lives were lost; the Garissa University attack on 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2015 where over 150 lives were lost; and, the 14 Riverside Drive attack, in Nairobi's upscale Westlands that also hosts the Dusit D2 luxury hotel that resulted in 21 people killed and at least 28 injured (Brayden & Bahra, 2019 and David & McKnight, 201).

The continued attacks prove that terrorism is a challenge in Kenya in spite of law enforcement agencies working hard to counter the attacks. It has been mutating to the extent of forcing law enforcement agencies to keep well-informed developments in terrorism networks (Aronson, 2010). The current study sought to address the evolving nature of terrorism in Kenya as a key strategy for dealing with the challenges facing the NPS in counter-terrorism. The study hoped that the approach would be key to explain the persistence of terrorism notwithstanding the Counter-terrorism measures adopted by NPS and hence draw recommendations that could reverse the trend.

### **1.3 Objectives of the Study**

The general objective of the study was to assess the effectiveness of the NPS in countering terrorism in Kenya. The specific objectives were as follows:

- i. Assess the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya.
- ii. Examine the contribution of the NPS in counter-terrorism in Kenya.
- iii. Establish challenges the NPS face in countering terrorism in Kenya.

### **1.4 Research Questions**

The was guided by the following research questions:

- i. What is the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya?
- ii. How does the NPS contribute to counter-terrorism in Kenya?
- iii. What are the challenges NPS faces in countering terrorism?

### **1.5 Justification of the Study**

There were both policy and academic justifications for undertaking the current study.

#### **1.5.1 Academic justification of the study**

By 2014, the cumulative terrorist attacks began affecting Kenya's tourism industry as Western nations issued travel warnings to their citizens (Mazrui, Dikirr, Ostergad, Toler & Macharia, 2012). They further noted that, although police and other security agencies have made a grand effort to counter-terrorism, there was very little information available on the effectiveness of the NPS in countering terrorism as the lead agency.

Some of the counter-terrorism studies done in Kenya include: Kuto (2004) who studied the *Effects of Terrorism on Kenya's Tourist Industry*; Otenyo (2004) looked at the *Phenomenon of New Terrorism*; Kyama (2006) studied the *Threat of Terrorism in Kenya*; William (2005) addressed the *Al-Qaeda Recruitment Trends in Kenya*; Chumba (2010) reviewed the *Policing Mechanism and their Effect on Terrorism in Kenya* and Muthondeki (2017) looked at *Security Sector Reforms Influencing Transformation of National Police Service in Nairobi and Kiambu Counties, Kenya*. Although the highlighted studies were focusing on terrorism, the aspect of the effectiveness of the NPS on counter-terrorism was not addressed.

Magogo (2012) study on *The Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorism Strategies in Eastleigh, Kenya* is closer to this study. The current study, however, differs from that of Magogo because, while his target population were all the security organs working in Eastleigh namely Kenya Defence Forces (KDF), NIS, NPS, public administration and private security firms, the current study specifically targeted NPS. The researcher considered NPS as the key security organ responding to terrorism in the country because the team, which consists of Kenya Police Service and the Administration Police Service have the highest presence in the Country compared to the other security organs. Second, the study considered NPS a homogeneous group that had been exposed to similar training and equipping for counter-terrorism. Identifying issues in contributing to their effectiveness and challenges would thus be valid because they would have been gathered from a group sharing similar key characteristics.

The study was based on the premise that NPS has a greater impact on counterterrorism than any other security organ in the country. The police can thus have a positive impact in counter-terrorism if they are well equipped with appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes in counter-terrorism. Studying strategies employed by NPS in counter-terrorism was thus crucial towards

the realization of recommendations that can improve their effectiveness to guarantee greater effectiveness in countering terrorism in the Country. Further, the study forms an important information database, relevant for research in counter-terrorism.

### **1.5.2 Policy Justification of the Study**

Terrorism is a complex and ever-changing phenomenon. Its motivation, financing and support mechanism, methods of attack and choice of targets are constantly evolving thus adding to the complexity of coming up with effective counter-terrorism strategies. The finding from this research could either validate the current practice by NPS or suggest ways to refine current policy and explore alternative ways and means to combat terrorism.

An examination into nature and extend of terrorism activities in Kenya would help the NPS to understand the changing dynamics of terrorism in the country and thus develop appropriate counter-terrorism strategies to forestall the escalation. Further, the findings would provide the NPS and the government with information to use to develop an effective policy to combat the terrorist threat in the country. Lastly, evaluation of the challenges facing NPS would assist the national government to identify areas of requiring strengthening in the existing policies for effective mitigation of the challenges.

### **1.6 Scope of the Study**

The study specifically analyses the effectiveness of NPS in countering terrorism in Kenya with specific reference to Nairobi County. The county is the most populous in Kenya. It has a cosmopolitan set up with both formal and informal settlement. These provide a population representative of the wider Kenya and is an easy target for terrorism. The county has the highest

concentration of police stations and counter-terrorism training activities in Kenya. It thus provides the richest information source for the study.

The time scope for the study was between 2001 and 2019. The year 2001 is significant to the study because this the year when issues of counter-terrorism became prominent in Kenya after the country was added to USA TAP and several strategies for counter-terrorism put in place. The year 2019 was the end date of the study. This is when data was collected to assess achievements in counter-terrorism. The study on three aspects namely: the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya; the contribution of NPS in counter-terrorism; and, challenges the NPS face in countering-terrorism. The study considered the three objectives adequate to realize the overall objective of the study which was to establish the effectiveness of the NPS in countering terrorism in Kenya.

## **CHAPTER TWO**

### **LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter discussed relevant literature on the effectiveness of the NPS in countering terrorism in Kenya under the following sub-topics: the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya; contribution of NPS in counter-terrorism and the challenges NPS face in countering terrorism. The chapter also discusses the conceptual framework for the study, presents the relevant conceptual model and concludes with an analysis of the literature gaps.

#### **2.1 The Nature and Extent of Terrorism in Kenya**

Terrorism is a difficult term to describe because it continuously evolves and can be viewed subjectively in part because of its meaning (Cronin, 2004). Terrorism, as Wilkinson (2006) argued, has a political component that includes acts of violence directed toward governments, communities, or groups to bring about political change. He also sees terrorism as a global phenomenon, relentless in its existence and necessarily involving crimes. This definition of terrorism must be the basis for every national or international counter-terrorism process. Wilkinson (2006) differentiates terrorism from other crime components, on the basis that she plans to spread within her audience an atmosphere of intense fear. The act of terror goes beyond the victims immediately.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) identifies terror as crime in general or specific persons, intimidating the population of individual citizens or forcing a government or an international organisation, or preventing them or forcing them to do something, even against civil persons, with the intention of causing death, serious physical injury, or the taking of hostages (UNSC, 2014). Hunsicker (2006) regards terror as premeditated, politically motivated

violence by sub-national organizations or covert agents against non-combatants, which is typically planned to influence the public. The study will adopt the UNSC definition of terrorism in examining the effectiveness of the NPS in Countering Terrorism.

Kushner (2003) found the use of human beings and services to prevent terrorism and its aid networks as counter-terrorism. Wilkinson (2006) describes counter terrorism to be activities, tactics, techniques and methods embraced in the battle against terrorism by government, armed forces, police and others. The United States Army Field Manual describes counterterrorism as operations that include offensive measures to discourage, deter, prevent and react to terrorism (US Army Field Manual, 2006). The current study examined how NPS use its anti-terrorism tools.

The existence of the terrorist threat would alter counter-terrorism (Bremer, 2002). While terrorism is a not fully eradicable strategy, measures can be taken to disrupt, decommission and eventually defeat terrorist organisations. In the study of NPS' efficacy in the fight against terrorism, this analysis will follow the Wilkinson concept of counter-terrorism since its definition encompasses the three goals of the study.

In the wake of 11 September 2001, Kenya became a leading participant in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Historically an ally of the United States, the importance of the nation was only emphasized after several major incidents.

On 1 March 1975, three bombs exploded on the OTC bus stop in Nairobi in chronological order, as postulated by Atallah (2018). 27 people were been killed and another 100 wounded (Samael, 2011).

The Fairmont Norfolk Hotel was bombed on 31 December 1980. After the attack, twenty people were killed and eighty wounded. The hotel suffered substantial damage and immediate

renovation began. Police and Interpol later described the terrorist as Quddura Mohammad Abdel-Hamid. (Krause & Otenyo, 2005).

The US embassy in Kenya was bombed on August 7, 1998, killing 212 people and injuring over 4,500 others. The bombings were claimed by the terrorist organization al Qaeda (Bodrero & Douglas, 1999). An Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa was bombed on November 22, 2002, just as two missiles were fired at an Israeli holiday plane taking off from the city's airport. Although the missiles narrowly missed the Arkia airline aircraft, a Boeing 757 carrying 261 passengers, the Paradise Hotel was reduced to rubble and the rest was a smouldering shell. 15 people were killed (Mutinga, 2004).

The Ugandan army bombed 5,000 pastoral workers in Koten respectively in August 2007 and 2008, in order to remove them from the area. In August 2008, in Nakwanye (Nakwanga) and Morutorong, Turkan pastors were accused of bombing UPDF (Mkutu, 2005).

Kenya sent troops to Somalia in October 2011 following the threat to Kenya's national security posed by Somalia's Islamist militant group Al Shababab (Olsen, 2018). In the months preceding the attack, the terrorist group actually carried out many cross-border raids. One was killed and another 20 injured following the detonation of the grenade in a bar in Nairobi (Olsen, 2018). Al Shabaab killed 6 people and injured 60 more on 10 March 2012 after four grenades were detonated at Nairobi's Machakos bus station (Aronson, 2011). On 18 November, after an explosion on a city matatus, seven passengers were killed and 33 wounded (Aronson, 2011). Al Shabaab targeted Westgate Shopping Mall on September 21, 2013. Over the four days of siege 68 victims were killed and more than 150 wounded (Bruton, 2013). Al-Shabaab allegedly killed 28 men on a bus in Arabiya, Mandera County, on 23 November 2013 (Bruton, 2013). The targets were considered non-Muslim.

More than 60 people were killed in attacks in and around Mpeketoni, Kenya, between June 15 and June 17, 2014. (Halakhe, 2014). Al-Shabaab, a militant group based in Somalia, claimed responsibility (Halakhe, 2014). In Lamu County's Hindi village, 21 people were killed in July 2014. Al Shabaab took responsibility for the attack (Halakhe, 2014). On November 21, 2014, suspected Al-Shabaab militants targeted a Nairobi-bound bus in Omar Jilo, Mandera County, killing 28 people (Muteti, Gioto & Rono, 2018). Through a pro-Al Shabaab website, Al Shabaab assumed responsibility for the killing of 36 non-local Kenyans at a quarry in the Koromei region near Mandera on the night of December 1, 2014. (Muteti, Gioto & Rono, 2018). Al Shabaab gunmen assaulted Garissa University on April 2, 2015, killing 148 students. There were 142 students among the dead (Odula, Muhumuza, & Senosi, 2015).

Al-Shabaab targeted Mandera on 7 July 2015, tossing grenades into quarry workers' houses. Fourteen people were confirmed dead. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility, stating that they were targeting Christians explicitly in the Kenyan security forces attacks to revenge Muslim murders in Somalia and Kenya (Odhiambo, Onkware, & Leshan, 2015).

The Boshari Guesthouse was stormed early morning by Al-Shabaab gunmen on 25 October 2016. Twelve people were murdered. Their target was Christians, al-Shabaab assumed responsibility (Suna, 2019). In an assault in Daba, Mandera county, on 6 November 2017, militants in al-Shabaab ambushed and bruised two police land cruise ships. When they were struck by rocket-propelled grenades, the two vehicles carrying police officers escorted a bus to Mandera. 12 people were killed, and several others were injured (Suna, 2019).

On August 13, 2017, Al-Shabaab used an improvised explosive device to kill a Kenyan police vehicle that was driving through the towns of Yadi, Damase, and El Wak in Mandera (Suna, 2019). Al-Shabaab militants reported to have overrun a Kenyan military base in the Taksile

region north of Pandaguo, Lamu County, on September 25, 2018. They assassinated ten Kenyan soldiers (Suna, 2019).

Al Shabaab targeted Nairobi's DusitD2 hotel on January 15, 2019. A total of 21 people were killed, with a number of others wounded. Approximately 700 people were saved (West, 2019).

The latest research looked at the gaps in NPS's counter-terrorism activities.

Kenya has faced several small-scale attacks as a result of its involvement in the Global War on Terror and the 2011 military invasion of Somalia, exemplifying the regional security challenges.

It has become apparent that the instability caused by terrorism in Kenya is not confined within the country's borders. As a result, the consequences of increased instability have an impact on global security, necessitating the implementation of effective anti-terrorism strategies that advance the Global War on Terror. Nonetheless, Kenya's new anti-terrorism policy ignores the country's past and geopolitics and is fundamentally flawed.

Terrorists do not choose Kenya at random; there are many factors that contribute to Kenya's attractiveness as a destination. As a result, Kenya becomes a top priority in the Global War on Terror. Geographical causes, poverty and unemployment, insecure neighbors, Islamism, and insufficient law enforcement and counter-terrorism policies are among them (Adan, 2005).

The geographical position and location of Kenya lead to the attractive terrorist targeting in Kenya. Its strategic position makes Kenya a significant gateway to East Africa and the Horn of Africa from the Middle East and South Asia. Kenya has established a major seaport on Mombasa, Mombasa and Nairobi international airports, and extensive train, road and communication infrastructures across the region, as a result of being a geographic gateway. Kenya's porous boundaries with its five neighbors, and it is the long and mostly unmonitored coastline, are also relatively easy to reach and fly in the undetected. Kenya is an ideal target for

and an easy route for terrorist attacks and transit points, because of the mix of infrastructure and porous borders (Barkan and Cooke, 2001).

Arabs who have close historical and cultural relations with the Arabs in the Middle East have widely populated the Kenya coastal area. The common faith and language make it possible for terrorists to melt seamlessly into the coastal culture. In the district of Lamu, on the Kenyan coast Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed was, for instance, operating from Siyu Island without being detected by authorities (Mutinga, 2004). For this reason, the study focused on geographic location as a counter-terrorism influence.

Poverty and widespread unemployment have made Kenyan youth vulnerable to terrorist indoctrination and recruitment. Kenya has a young population and an unemployment rate of 40% (40,6% is below the age of 15). (CIA 2004). Terrorists can also carry money to Kenya, and they can persuade many unemployed people and poor people, wisely or unwisely, to help their cause, to foster knowledge of situation and to collect local information for terrorist activity. The new research has highlighted the effects of terrorism in Kenya on poverty and unemployment.

In 1991, Somalia's government collapsed to create a lawless society in which violence and radical ideologies thrived. Unrestricted movement of people and goods to and from Somalia has been the result of state failure since that time. Many of them were refugees and some jihadists seeking a better life in Kenya. Somalia poses a challenge to Kenya and the rest of the world by a porous border and a confirmation of the existence of Islamic fundamentalists. President Bush announced that the stabilization of Somalia is vital to sustain the fight against terrorism at the Kenya-US joint press conference in 2003. (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

The absence of a proper government in Somalia, which can take control of the region, remains a direct factor in Kenya's security defects. The geographical position of Somalia gives Somalia the

longest shoreline in Africa and is placing its closest Middle East African nation. Somalia can serve as a transit hub to carry illegal goods into Kenya by being a neighbor of Kenya. Most particularly, the perpetrators of the 2002 attacks by Mombasa passed through the shared border from Somalia and smuggled arms into Kenya (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

With the invasion of Somalia by the KDF, Muslims in the Horn of Africa reinforced an already tenuous connection with the Kenyan government. Since the attack began in October 2011, almost all of the transnational violence against Kenya has taken hold on the offensive against southern Somalia known as *Operation Linda Nchi* (Swahili for "Protecting the Country"). In Kenya, Al-Shabaab and her sympathizers conceived of as reprisal for Operation Linda Nchi and, more generally, Kenya's foreign policy, have launched many assaults. In so far as one such attack resulted in civic death, its potential to trigger small-scale terrorist activity in both urban and rural areas of Kenya is more reflective of fear mongering. The current study examined the contribution of insecurity to Kenya's terrorist attacks in neighboring countries.

Islamism is described as a Muslim movement that revisits earlier times and aims at the fundamental principles of religion (Mathieu, 2012). In addition, the Prophet and his followers behaved in the same way as Muhammad. Islamic fundamentalist adherents are in favor of 'a literal and originalist view' of the key sources of Islam (DeLong-Bas and Natana); (2004). They try to remove from every aspect of their lives (which they consider to be) "corrupt" non-Muslim factors (Roy and Olivier, 1994).

Islamic forces have infiltrated Kenya from the east to Somalia and along the coast of Kenya. This prevention has led to an increasing disagreement among the Muslim people, making terrorist activity recruits simple. Individual imams in the Kenyan mosques preach alleged injustice of the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the continuing war in Iraq to their

Muslim brothers in Afghanistan. Muslims in Kenya are becoming more educated, thanks to the technology available in the form of the internet, satellite TV, and Kenya's increased travel and jobs around the world. This increased global awareness is used by individual imams to promote Kenyan empathy in the more severe world views of their core religions' needs, challenges and philosophies (Mogire & Agade, 2011). That is why it was important to find out in this study whether Islamism helps Kenya to fight terrorism.

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The failed terrorism legislation in Kenya has caused serious problems and, even with enhanced legislation, progress has been limited over the past few years. Firstly, the concept of terrorism is ambiguous and can therefore be questioned by many critics. The Kenyan government describes terrorism as "violent non-state activities that are motivated by religious objectives" (Mogire & Agade, 2011). This term ignores terrorism based on policy, ideology and crime, and thus puts the minority religion in Kenya under unfair targets.

Second, it was very difficult to adopt and implement actual regulations, so the government operated without official anti-terrorism legislation and standards. After public outcries regarding unconstitutionality, international abuse of human rights and open prejudice against Muslims, the 2003 Repression of Terrorism Bill did not come into effect. The 2006 Anti-Terrorism Bill was again placed before Parliament two years later. Two years later. This legislation included many of the same problems as its precursor and has not been enacted. Some terrorist offences (say

murder) can be tried in Kenyan courts. However, as long as one exists in other Western democracies, a robust counter-terrorism law also exists.

Without this comprehensive rule, Kenya law enforcement officials are in places where they are carrying out dubious measures and violate the human rights of those in the Muslim community. Intelligence officials repeatedly accuse alleged terrorists of being illegally detained for long periods of time and tortured suspects for the purpose of trying to extract confession (Prestholdt, 2011). Since there is a lack of adequate prosecution facilities, the Kenyan authorities also dismiss terrorist suspects in neighboring countries or the USA. In one case, the Kenyan government moved 13 Kenyans accused of being involved in the attacks to Uganda, following a bombing in Kampala in 2010. This study looked at the contribution made by Kenya to terrorism by insufficient law enforcement and counter-terrorism policies.

## **2.2 Contribution of NPS in Counter-Terrorism**

Bruce (2006) argues that the measure of success in the war on terrorism is described as the capacity to prevent, prevent and disrupt attacks of intelligence agencies and law enforcement agencies. Two police mechanisms (including intellectual police collection, review and surveillance) have been established in Weisbard (2009) and in the Community-based police. Intelligence-led police (ILP) (CBP). Radcliffe (2003) described ILP as a criminal intelligence analysis application and an impartial decision-making method for reducing crime and preventing crime. Cope (2004) adds that the focus of this method is the collection of information by extensively using confidential informants, offender interviews, review of reported crime and call for service, suspect monitoring and community information sources. The 2003 NCISP describes the intelligence process as five phases: preparation and direction, selection, processing, review and dissemination.

An intelligence collection is a mechanism in which more than one interrelating source is gathered information about a certain person for the benefit of another (Stephan, 2010). He found that an important instrument in fighting terrorism is thorough study, analyses and understanding of intelligent goods. Intelligence starts with raw data or facts. When information is organized, processed and interpreted, it becomes knowledge. If a possible attacker is detected, identified and apprehended in the community, current ties between the police and the community may be the key to intelligence development that can reveal anyone planting a future attack or radicalisation seeds (Stanley, 2006).

Police have several communications lines to collect information from the community anonymously and openly. They find a terrorist suspect even more probable simply because of the rule of probability. Stanley (2006) states that collaboration, combined with strong communications and enhanced confidence, enables the police to produce in-community sources of knowledge that can provide critical intelligence about possible terrorist activities. The intelligence collection and subsequent sharing in the police spectrum are crucial elements for mitigating a local attack. The police can use established relationships to make informal contacts with the community useful to help deter terrorist attacks as intelligence collectors (Chappell and Gibson, 2006). The ability of the Police to monitor, obtain, or produce information is a significant factor in combining its current task with a counter-terrorist function. This is why the study concentrated on the contribution of intelligent collection to counter-terrorism.

According to Gottlieb (2007), intelligent research is a series of systematic, analytical processes aimed at providing timely and relevant information. Analyzes of intelligence collected and patterns of crime may expose terrorist activities such as explosive smuggling, biological cultures

or protection clothing, the fraudulent use of personal identification, drug and human trafficking and money laundering (Hanlon, 2005). Potential safety hazard for activities, individuals or places can be improved by analyzing these crimes or groups (Peterson and Marilyn, 2007).

The intelligence collection is designed to anticipate any possible terrorist activity and to provide relevant authority or police with the potential or likelihood of developing a terrorist threat (Field, 2009). For example, police in Israel sometimes investigate theft of military equipment with the military police partly because of potential ties to terrorism (Lyon, 2007). Monitoring is the monitoring of people's behavior, behaviors or other knowledge that changes (Lyon, 2007). This may include distance surveillance by electronic devices, such as CCTV camera, or the interception of information transmitted electronically (e.g. by Internet or by telephone) and may include basic, relatively new, or low-tech methods such as human intelligence agencies and postal interception.

Police use intelligence monitoring, criminal detection, procedure, person, group, or object defense, as well as criminal investigations. The vast majority of machine monitoring includes data surveillance and Internet traffic (Whitfield and Susan, 2008). In the United States, for example, all calls and broadbands (emails, web traffic, instant messages) must be accessible under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act to provide Federal law enforcement authorities with unimpeded real-time surveillance (Lyon, 2007).

Monitoring cameras are surveillance cameras used to observe an area often linked to a capture and viewed by a security guard or police officer. One common means of monitoring is the development of social networking maps based on data from social networking websites such as Facebook, Myspace and Twitter, and on information from phone call records for traffic analysis.

These "maps" of the social network are then used to collect information, such as personal preferences, friendships and affiliations, convictions, ideas and activities (Fuchs, 2009).

Another way of surveillance is biometrics monitoring, the technology used for the authentication, recognition or screening of human physical and/or behavioral characteristics; (Woodward, et al., 2003). Fingerprints, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and facial patterns are examples of the physical characteristics. For example, gait (walking a person's ways) or voice are more behavioral. This is why the study looked at the role of NPS monitoring in the fight against terrorism.

USDJ (2005) defines the CBP as a philosophy focused on crime and social disorder by providing policing services that incorporate conventional law enforcement elements as well as preventing, resolving problems, engaging with the communities and collaborations. Three main elements of the community police philosophy are provided by the USDJ (2005). These involve establishing and relying on strong community partnership and other public/private tools, implementing strategy or approaches for resolving problems and changing the organization and culture of the policing community to help with this paradigm change.

In general, CBP has been a conciliatory approach to police action instead of a punitive one, according to Nijhar (2005). Methods used to combat violence, including strategic police and community collaborations. The CBP process requires the participation of ordinary people in policy-making processes, so both neighborhood and political interests are made aware of organizational strategies and techniques. The implementation of community-based programs is a significant path toward crime prevention strategy. This is a community-based program intended to improve the crime prevention efforts in the neighborhood, while at the same time restoring

positive elements in the community as stated by Kania (2004). In Kenya, safer Africa has been driving community policing at the slums of Kibera and Isiolo District (Kania, 2004).

Focus on developing strong relationships between the police-community and the idea that the community should serve the interest of the different communities and that the CBP initiatives are focused on Findlay (2004) findings; Lemle (2007) stresses that the central component of CBP is thus building trust and cooperation among the two parties in resolving the problems between police and the community. Scheider and Chapman (2002) suggested that CBP could play an integral role in the security of home countries. They contend CBP will help the police plan for and defend against terrorist attacks by incorporating the concepts of organizational reform, problem solving, and external collaborations (Chapman and Scheider, 2002). CBP contributes to building trust between the community and law enforcement, enabling officials to cultivate community and residents' awareness and to provide critical information on possible terrorist activities.

Local law enforcement can encourage the collection of information between ethnic or religious groups that are related by the police. In general, people who notice and report such findings to the local police are the odd groups that are staying in apartments or motels or unusual behavior in flight schools in their neighborhood. Agencies can perform vulnerability assessments with the use of existing data sources and develop risk management and crisis plans (Chapman and Scheider, 2002)

CBP is based on the principle of inspiring people to stop crime or the issues leading to crime (Dennis Stevens, 2001). Setting up and retaining mutual trust thus represents the core objective of community policing, as it offers broad access to useful community knowledge that could potentially contribute to crime prevention and resolution (Lyons, 2002). Partnerships to help

deter crime at community level will also provide a framework to engage the public in helping police detect potential threats to terrorists and vulnerability to infrastructure. In addition to forming relationships with the law enforcement authorities and residents, there is also effective neighborhood police action, as well as intergovernmental and interagency partnerships with the state. These relationships are important for intelligence gathering and exchange, threat and vulnerability identifying them and resource sharing in case of an attack (Flynn, 2004). The aim of this study was to determine the efficacy of community collaborations with police in counter-terrorism.

### **2.3 Challenges of the NPS in Countering Terrorism**

In Kenya, despite the government incorporating the anti-terrorism activities in the annual budget and Vision 2030, the counter-terrorism is yet to be fully effective ( Ndombi and Auya, 2016). This was brought to light by the Garissa University and DusitD2 hotel terrorist attack. This raises concerns about the NPS's overall preparedness to combat terrorism. Furthermore, police officers were found to be under-trained in dealing with such circumstances and the use of modernized equipment. As a result, the country faces a significant challenge, as it continues to expand and evolve in almost every sector of the economy.

The NPS has several defects which hinder its efficacy in the execution of its terrorist and police mandate in various ways. Transportation deficiencies, youth radicalisation, absence of funding from the public, human resource capacity deficits, poor terms and conditions of service, budget deficits, military action against refugees, the Kenya Criminal Justice System, police corruption and laxity (Sandler, 2015). These factors were studied and how they affect NPS counterterrorism performance.

With respect to transport services, NPS is urgently challenged. The police needs are much greater than the available transport services. Although there are very few cars, aircraft and vessels to perform their tasks, the few resources available are poorly serviced and hardly driven. Therefore, the lack of trustworthy transport means that police response to illegal activities is slow. Likewise, police presence in certain important localities is kept to a minimum, enabling offenders to have a day on the ground. The police recognize that their simple presence in different localities is itself a dissuasion of crime. The lowly serviced cars often prevent the police from matching the pace and efficiency of criminals escaping from scenes of crime (Kimani, 2012). In counter-terrorism we need to examine how transport deficiencies impact NPS.

NPS is understaffed and the country is also under police jurisdiction. The total population of the NPS is estimated to be about 80,000. (NPS, 2017). The ratio of public police to the 2009 national population census estimates of approximately 40 million people can therefore be deducted from approximately 1: 500. This is below the 1:450 ratio recommended by the UN (Kimani, 2012). However, the above-mentioned Kenyan government ration is technically only.

At least one fifth of the NPS officers are in office, protecting the political elite or leading government officials (Kimani, 2012). Accordingly, there are around 60,000 committed police officers who serve in crime prevention and the actual public service. The police-public ratio is further broadened. In contrast to citizen safety, the NPS remains too much concerned with regime protection (Kimani, 2012). Other factors still influence the police's capability. The diminished capability of police is also contributed by natural attrition, physical injury, resignation of greener pastures and dismissal for reasons of discipline. The last population census figures suggest rapid growth and changes in the country's demographic structure.

For junior officers, housing is a burden since they are obliged to share living units of two or three bedrooms with other families. The police officers are not properly offset for their services. In view of the life-threatening hazards they face in the implementation of law and war against crime, the police still lack sufficient health insurance. In their organizational and logistical systems, the poor service levels are also evident. They have minimal IT infrastructure and have to do with manual recordings and data collection in certain cases. All these factors lead to their poor morals in the workplace and predispose many officers to a professional lifestyle of misconduct, due to their insufficient pay.

Police corruption further compounds the state of insecurity in the country through tendencies including officials taking bribes to free prisoners or to avoid such crimes as drug trafficking (NPS, 2012).

Davis (2010) pretends that technological modernisation has significantly intensified the curbing of terrorist activities. Technology has been found in particular to ease the way in which the terrorist operates such as media propaganda, money transmission, communication and general terrorist operations and to the fact that Nairobi has made major advances in technology, and it is highly susceptible to terrorist attacks (Davis, 2010). The lack of new and adequate counter-terrorism equipment continues to hamper its position in compliance.

In addition to restricting the police's effectiveness, the absence of infrastructure often puts life at risk when terror happens (Onyeozi, 2005). The police are lacking in many respects in terms of communication. Firstly, their communications devices may be taped and criminal groups have used this kind of subversion in the past in order to gain access to confidences in the police. In comparison with the communication needs of officers, the communication devices are also

highly restricted. In certain cases, they have used their cell phones to perform their official functions on their own (NPS, 2012).

The annual budget allotment of the NPS would hardly be adequate to make sure that they successfully fulfill their duties and that the top commanders further impede their service delivery (Mwenda, 2005). This is why many of the NPS project implementation and police modernisation schemes are still underfunded (NPS, 2012). This has hindered the modernisation efforts and the challenge of matching the advanced character of crime and criminal activity. For example, there is no forensic laboratory in the Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) to address sophisticated crime.

Vehicle patrols and interventions are hindered by a shortage of functioning patrol vehicles. This has contributed to weaker reactions and coordination in crime and disaster incidents requiring police intervention. Furthermore, the police force lacks staff in ICT to combat crime by means of up to date technologies, such as cybercrime (Kivoi, 2013).

The radicalization of the youth is the the number of terrorist operations in the area (Cooker, 2015) as more than one third of the 40 million Kenyans (18-35 years of age) are young people, with many unemployed and out of high school, rendering them especially vulnerable to extremist recruitment. The goal of radicalisation is to take advantage of current faults and fissures, which include relative poverty, high unemployment, education shortages, and political marginalisation (Cooker, 2015).

Local young people radicalized and trained by Al-Shabaab have carried out the majority of terrorist attacks in the region. Following radicalisation, young people are brought to Somalia

with experience, knowledge and training in violence. They are therefore deadly and potentially damaging for the resident. They are being hired to terrorize (Franzensburg, 2015) The Terrorist groups tend to recruit young people from local communities to escape local security suspect, according to Ploch (2010b) used to terrorist attackers by foreign nationals in their early years.

Murunga (2005) reports that police officials view as the main drivers of the country's insecurity because of weapons trafficking refugees, in particular from Somalia. The police have therefore "securised" the refugees as main risks to safety. The arms are said to be traveling to the suburb of Eastleigh, a major hub of Somali economic activity in Nairobi's capital. He also claims that Somali refugees are responsible for increased instability in the capital and argues in favor of recognizing the proliferation of small-scale weapons in the country in a range of contexts. He argues that key factors such as the involvement of the Kenyan law enforcement authorities, collaboration with Kenyan entrepreneurs and insufficient Kenya-Somalia border controls covering over 1,000 km in the complex arms trade industry. He also argues that part of the reason why unlawful arms find their way to Eastleigh is because the suburb is largely messy and disregarded in terms of social services and public infrastructures (particularly roads, drainage and refugees), which inhibit accessibility and support crimes of any kind that are equally complicit of Kenyans. He also faults the government for failing to address the internal security conditions and the demand for the flow of small arms in the country.

The NPS is an integral part of the broader criminal justice system, which also includes the courts, which regulate the legal process, and correctional facilities like prisons. In the criminal justice system, the job of the police is to investigate and present offenders to the court with supporting evidence for prosecution (NPS, 2012). The criminal justice system is confronted with many difficulties. One of the difficulties stems from provisions of the new constitution, which was

ratified in 2010, especially Article 49 subsection f I of the Bill of Rights portion. This provision enumerates and protects an accused person's rights. A police officer is allowed by the constitution to take a criminal to court within 24 hours of being arrested. Officers contend that 24 hours is not enough time to plan and collect evidence for a court case. The implication is that, in some cases, defendants who have been rushed to court will be set free due to a lack of proof.

Corruption and inefficiency among police officers and officials in judicial and correctional institutions. Bad forensic capabilities and services within the police force contribute to the criminal justice system's inefficiency (Gimode, 2001). He goes on to say that the police and courts' apparent inability to ensure justice has resulted in a citizenry system of vigilante justice.

Kenya's police force is widely regarded as the country's most corrupt agency. According to the East Africa Bribery Index - EABI (2012), the National Police Service remains the most corrupt public sector, with a 60 percent chance of bribery. The alleged police collusion with criminals is another type of corruption in the police force. According to a crime victimization study conducted in Nairobi in 2002, respondents claimed that offenders were gradually cooperating with law enforcement agencies, leading police facilities to deteriorate (Aki, 2002). Similarly, the police are said to be part of the trader's chain and other officials of the government to facilitate illegal arms across porous frontiers in Kenya (Murunga, 2005).

Police bribery and take-up of bribes are not exclusive to Kenya. A phenomenon in the developing world is considered to be normal. For example, in Nigeria, police often install illegal roadside tollgates to extortion drivers. Threats of terror, torture and actual arrest are the extortion methods employed. The solution is to use Junior Officers, who often have to contribute to their income for their elderly, a similar approach to what is stated in Kenya. The police and government also largely ignore and uninvestigate the few cases of officers arrested for build up

illegal roadblocks in Nigeria (Oarhe and Iro, 2010). Therefore, it was necessary to investigate whether police officers' misconduct and laxity affect their counter-terrorism efforts.

The lack of complete cooperation between the members of the society has been demonstrated to be a problem. Most communities believed that the job of the police officers was to fight terrorism. They are also making minimal attempts to keep a close eye on terrorism in particular. Despite the launch of the initiative '*Nyumba Kumi*,' which seeks to encourage involvement of community members? Most appointees are not aware of their positions and have no motivational benefits. Public members do not recognize their policing function and their role in cooperating with the police to make sure protection prevails has not been fully recognized. Therefore, they do not cooperate with the police in providing vital information, which will help combat terrorism.

## **2.4 Conceptual Framework**

A conceptual framework is a logically developed description and elaborated network of interrelationships among variables deemed an integral part of the dynamic of the situation being investigated (Saleemi, 2008). Development of the conceptual framework was first informed by analysis of relevant theories. This was followed by the development of a conceptual model.

### **2.4.1 Theories**

The study was guided by three theories namely: the rational choice theory, utilitarianism theory and the theory of bureaucratization.

### **2.4.1.1 The rational choice**

The rational choice theory assumes that a person has preferences among the available options, allowing them to choose which one they prefer (Easley Flowers 2008). Sen Sen (2008) adds that the preferences are supposed to be full and transitive (the individual may always state which of the alternatives it considers preferable or which is not preferable) (if option A is preferred over option B and option B is preferred over option C, then A is preferred over C). In deciding preferences, the rational agent is presumed to take into account available knowledge, event probabilities, and possible costs and benefits, and to behave consistently in selecting the self-determined best course of action (Browning, Halcli, and Webster) (2000). In layman's terms, this principle states that everybody, even while performing the most tedious of activities, should conduct a cost-benefit analysis to decide if the action is worthwhile in terms of achieving the best possible result. To make a reasonable decision, the desire to benefit must outweigh any potential penalty or loss (Nyatepe-Coo, 2004).

The theory of rational choice explains that offenders assume that their decisions will benefit themselves, their communities and societies, and that the crime pays or, at least, is a risk-free way to improve their circumstances. Cohen and Felson (1979) further reiterated this concept and set out three criteria for a crime: (1) appropriate targets or victims who place themselves in danger; (2) the absence of competent guardians or police present; and (3) the absence of driven or unemployed and alienated criminals.

The first objective of the study, nature and scale of terrorism in Kenya are technically relevant. Theory claims that terrorism is no pathological epidemic and certain groups may have recourse to terror because they have attempted other alternatives from the existing rebellious pattern. Second, because they have learned from the contagion effect, other groups could want terrorism

to be their early option and suggest that it has a distinctive pattern that looks similar to copycat effects as in other theories of aggression (Gurr, 1970).

Critics of the theory of rational choice contend that the theory of rational choices does not appear to tolerate pronounced consequences of impulsive behaviours, feelings or faulty cognition. The leader's deep sentiments of vengeance, ambition and confidence can distort actions from the forces of rational processes, says Victoroff (2005). Nevertheless, some of terrorists' behaviours tend to dispute that such activities constitute the best way of achieving social and political objectives (Crenshaw, 2000). Their actions cannot achieve their objectives and thus cannot be considered a rational effort to follow them (Azam, 2005; Brooks, 2002). The researcher agrees with these criticisms to some degree as a result of Kenya's Al-Shabaab attacks against the innocent people and inspired some by the vengeance agenda.

In describing the economic justifications behind terrorists engaging in terrorist attacks, the rational choice principle was essential to the analysis. In addition, the theory shows that the balance between profit and impact is weighed by terrorist activity. When an anticipated terrorist recognizes that the advantages are greater than the impact, it is still a major challenge for law enforcement authorities and the need to investigate the efficacy of NPS in counter-terrorism to prepare and participate in terrorism threats and experiences.

The rational theory of choice was not adequate to explain the other two objectives in the study namely: contribution of NPS to countering terrorism and the effectiveness of the NPS in countering terrorism in Kenya hence the need for the study to bring in other theories.

### **2.4.1.2 Utilitarianism theory**

Hersh (2015) argues that utilitarianism is normative ethics which, as proponents Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John Stuart Mill say, asks if a particular behavior is good or evil, moral or immoral (1806-1872). In their fundamental states, they add, utilitarianism is moral or good when something creates the greater good for the greatest number of people (Driver, 2014). Utilitarianism is an ethical philosophy that decides the correct by concentrating on the results (Hersh, 2015). It is a type of consequentialism in which one that produces the best value for the greater number is the ethical option (Driver, 2014). Bauhn (2005) points out that war can be seen as the only moral framework to justify military power. However, it is impossible to know with certainty whether our decisions are going to have a positive or poor impact as we can't predict the future.

Counter-terrorism can entail a range of dubious ethnic practices, including murder / murder, deadly pharmacy, torture, data screening, high tech surveillance and legislative imposition, sometimes discriminatory, which limits civil liberties and human rights (Hoffman, 2006). Both the ethics of rights and international law demand that persons have a variety of fundamental rights, some inalienable and unconditional, while others are considered conditional. There is some question whether the right to life is inviolable and inalienable or can in some cases be lost (Amnesty International, 2002). The purpose of adopting utilitarianism and human rights to the exclusion of natural law underlies in that the study is formulated under the contribution of NPS in CT.

NPS's second goal, the commitment to counterterrorism in Kenya, is addressed in utilitarian theory. The theory explains NPS' participation in various counterterrorism operations, including surveillance, aimed at making Kenyans happy because they enjoy security.

Thus, NPS carries out the mandate to combat terrorist activities which violate others' rights and hamper their full enjoyment. The study argues that it is preferable to protect the majority over rights of minorities, since the rights of the minority as terrorists in this case endanger the security of the overwhelming majority of the population. Looking critically at utilitarianism theory, the state has a right to trample upon and violates the rights of terror suspects, with an aim as to maintain its peace and security, since it is a sovereign state.

#### **2.4.1.3 Theory of bureaucratization**

The theory suggests that human society is an entity and consists of mechanisms called social intuitions which are designed primarily to fulfill various roles in the name of society. Conceptually informed by the work of Max Weber (1864 - 1920), the bureaucratization theory holds that an ideal-typical bureaucracy, whether public or private, is characterized by the hierarchical organization; formal lines of authority (chain of command); a fixed area of activity; rigid division of labour; regular and continuous execution of assigned tasks; all decisions and powers specified and restricted by regulations; officials with expert training in their fields; career advancement dependent on technical qualifications; and, qualifications evaluated by organizational rules, not individuals (Swedberg & Agevall, 2005)


The theory is adequate to address the third objective of the study, challenges faced by the NPS in countering terrorism. The modern police organizations are bureaucracies, hierarchically ordered with a vertical structure of a rigid chain of command and preparedness. Police agencies handle terrorism based on general rules of evidence collecting and processing without regard to the person and insole view of the stated objectives of counter-terrorism. Police work is routinely


based on standardized methods of investigation, often strongly influenced by scientific principles of police technique, such as training, technically advanced methods of terrorist identification and computerized databases.

When challenges manifest themselves in the working of NPS, the organization is not able to realize its objective of countering terrorism in the country. The challenges stall various processes and procedures that are crucial in countering terrorism. A challenge like corruption takes away resources set aside for training of police officers and equipping them with relevant skills and tools for counter-terrorism. The result is the failure of the NPS to perform her role in counter-terrorism. The challenges must be overcome for the envisioned goal in countering terrorism to be realized.

#### 2.4.2 Conceptual framework model

The conceptual framework in Figure 2.1 shows the relationship between the dependent and independent variables of the study. The study sought to establish the effectiveness of the NPS in countering terrorism in Kenya with reference to Nairobi.





**Figure: 2. 1: Conceptual framework model showing the interaction of variables: Source: Author (2019)**

From Fig. 2.1, the independent variables namely: nature and extent of terrorism; the contribution of NPS; and, challenges faced by NPS, represent the variables which, if effectively addressed would equip the NPS for effectiveness in countering terrorism in the country. The independent variable presents the expected outcomes that will be evidence of effectiveness in counter-terrorism. Reduction in terrorist activities, which will be shown by improved competence of the NPS to plan, detect and halt terrorist activities, is the expected outcome of effective counter-terrorism. This would result in enhanced peace and security in the country. For the envisioned outcome to be realized, intervening variables namely: policing mechanism and use of technology

in counter-terrorism; legislation; police integrity; and, nature of training must be addressed.

Failure to address will hamper the NPS efforts in countering terrorism in the country.

## CHAPTER THREE

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the procedure and methodology of the study. It describes the study site and population, research design, sampling strategy, data collection instruments, and validity and reliability, ethical consideration, limitations and assumptions of the study.

#### 3.1 Study Area


The study area was Nairobi County, in Kenya (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Nairobi is the Capital city of Kenya with a current estimated population of about 4,397,073 million according to the 2019 census (KNBS, 2019). It is one of the most prominent cities in Africa politically and financially. It is home to thousands of Kenya's business and over 100 international companies including the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the main coordinating and headquarters for the UN in Africa and Middle East. The United Nations Office in Nairobi (UNON) is an established hub for business and culture. The city is located at latitude  $11^{\circ} 16^{\circ} \text{ S}$ , Longitude  $36^{\circ} 48^{\circ} \text{ E}$ , and occupies 696 square kilometres. Nairobi is situated between the cities of Kampala and Mombasa.

The County is adjacent to the eastern edge of the Rift Valley and Ngong Hills to West Kenya. Mount Kenya is situated north of Nairobi and Mount Kilimanjaro towards the southeast. On its north, Nairobi is surrounded by Karura Forest (FEWS NET/Kenya, 2018). The City was considered for this study because of the diversity of policing strategies employed; the vulnerability of the area to crime more particularly terrorist attacks; and the high concentration of police stations within the County. The area has 18 police stations distributed among various administrative units. Nairobi being the capital and the largest city in Kenya presents a wide

variety of policing needs necessitated by the high population; high concentration of businesses; and headquarters for most government and non-governmental organizations. According to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) (2018), Nairobi County leads in GDP by 21.7 per cent (\$3.4 billion).

The study area warrants this study because it has experienced a series of terror attacks. The most notable was the 7<sup>th</sup> August 1998 bombing of the USA embassy. Other attacks include: grenade attack at a bar at the Centre of Nairobi followed by a similar attack at Nairobi's OTC bus station on 24<sup>th</sup> and 27<sup>th</sup> October 2011 respectively, Westgate attack on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2013 (Aronson, 2013) and On January 15, 2019, Al Shabaab attacked Nairobi, the DusitD2 hotel. 21 people were killed and several others injured.

COUNTIES OF KENYA



**KEY**

- |              |                     |              |              |
|--------------|---------------------|--------------|--------------|
| 1. NAIROBI   | 8. KERICHO          | 15. KAKAMEGA | 22. HOMA BAY |
| 2. KIAMBU    | 9. TRANS NZOIA      | 16. VIHIGA   |              |
| 3. MURANG'A  | 10. UASIN GISHU     | 17. SIAYA    |              |
| 4. KIRINYAGA | 11. ELGEYO-MARAKWET | 18. MIGORI   |              |
| 5. NYERI     | 12. NANDI           | 19. KISII    |              |
| 6. NYANDARUA | 13. BUNGOMA         | 20. KISUMU   |              |
| 7. BOMET     | 14. BUSIA           | 21. NYAMIRA  |              |

**Figure 3. 1: Map of Kenya showing Nairobi County**

Source: FEWS NET/Kenya, 2018



**Figure: 3. 2: Map of Nairobi County:**

**Source: FEWS NET/Kenya, 2018**

### **3.2 Research Design**

The research design is the structure, overall strategy, or plan for a study that is chosen to combine the various components of the study in a rational and consistent manner, ensuring that the research issue is effectively addressed (Vaus, 2006). It sets out the structure for data collection, calculation, and analysis (Kothari, 2007). The research design, according to Ngau and Kumassa (2004), is the way a study is designed and carried out, as well as the procedures and techniques used to address the research questions.

This research was based on a descriptive survey design. Descriptive studies, according to Kombo and Tromp (2007), entail data calculation, description, examination, contrast, and interpretation. According to Kothari (2007), the primary goal of descriptive research is to explore and describe the current state of affairs. Information is gathered using questionnaires and interviews with a group of people rather than the whole population in this process (Orodho, 2003). The descriptive research design was perfect because the study's aim was to learn what was already known about the study's objectives.

### **3.3 Target Population**

The target population comprised police officers, senior state officers in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, survivors of the terrorist attacks and members of civil society. The target population of police officers was drawn from the 18 police stations in Nairobi County. Table 3.1 gives the police population in Nairobi County.

**Table: 3. 1: Study Population of Police officers in Nairobi County**

<b>Police Station</b>	<b>The Population of Police Officers</b>
Kayole	200
Industrial Area	150
Embakasi	215
Central	352
Kamukunji	150
Shauri Moyo	142
Langata	241
Karen	121
Ngong	214
Buruburu	158
Kasarani	230
Pangani	125
Ngomogo	112
Kilimani	116
Wilson Airport	131
JKIA	142
Huruma	181
Muthaiga	130
<b>Total</b>	<b>3110</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 3.1 shows that Nairobi County had 3,110 police officers. These formed the target police population for the study.

### **3.4 Sampling**

Both probability and non-probability methods were used in the study. Probability sampling is when any unit in the population has an equal probability of being chosen for the survey (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000). Any sampling process in which certain members of the sample have a chance of being selected or in which the likelihood of selection cannot be reliably calculated is known as non-probability sampling (Kombo & Tromp, 2007). While probability sampling makes sure that, all units of the population have an equal chance of being selected, non-probability sampling ensures selection and inclusion of the population of interest in a study (Kombo & Tromp, 2007).

#### **3.4.1 Sampling of police stations**

The selection of police stations was done using probability-sampling techniques. Systematic random sampling was used to sample 30% in each of the 18 police stations. This sample size according to Kothari (2004) recommendation is adequate for sampling a small population.

Sampling size 30% of 18 police station = 6 police stations

Sample selection: sampling interval= $K = N/n$

Where n is the sample size and N is the population size=  $18/6=3$

The sampling interval determined stations to participate in the study.

The first police station was identified using simple random sampling. The researcher began by numbering all of the police stations. On separate pieces of paper, the names of the police stations were written. The papers were placed in a jar and shaken. The researcher selected a piece of paper at random from the container to represent the first police station in the study sample. This

met the statistical regularity theorem, which states that if a sample is selected at random, it would have the same characteristics and composition as the population on average (Kothari, 2003). After identifying the starting point for sample selection in a randomized list of the police stations, every third station was picked until the desired sample size of six (6) police stations had been obtained.

### **3.4.2 Sampling of police officers**

In the six police stations identified in 3.4.1, police officers were selected from each police station to participate in the study using a stratified random sampling technique. According to Kombo and Tromp (2007), stratified random sampling involves dividing the population into homogenous subgroups and then taking a simple random sample in each subgroup. In the study, police officers were placed in their respective departments. These included; department of criminal justice, police patrol, community policing, intelligence-led and general duty office (report office).

The departments were included in the study because they are involved in counterterrorism and provide information on the effectiveness of the NPS in Countering Terrorism. Ten per cent (10%) of the number of police officers representing each department was selected randomly to identify the police officers to form a sample size of three hundred and eleven (311) to participate in the study. According to Kothari (2004), 10% of the sample size is enough for a large population. Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) recommend 10% of the accessible population as sufficient sample in descriptive studies.

### **3.4.3 Sampling of senior state officers in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government**

Purposive sampling was used to select the officer's in-charge of police stations. According to Wooldridge (2003), purposive sampling is a sample selected in a deliberate and non-random fashion to achieve a certain goal. The strategy was also used to identify the Senior State officer in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government involved in the formulation and implementation of policies about countering terrorism.

### **3.4.4 Sampling of survivors of terrorism**

Snowballing was used to get the survivors of terrorism attack. Snowball sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where existing study subjects recruit future subjects from among their acquaintances (Kombo and Tromp, 2007). In the study, the first subject was identified from records of the Kenya Red Cross and St John's Ambulance who were the first responders during a previous terrorist attack. The target population was 10 respondents.

### **3.4.5 Sampling of members of Civil Society who offer humanitarian assistance during a terrorist attack**

Purposive sampling was used to sample the civil societies who are responsible for offering humanitarian assistance to victims of terrorist attacks. These Non-Government Organizations are the Kenya Red Cross and St John's Ambulance. The two organizations were sampled because of the significant role they played in offering humanitarian assistance to victims of terrorism.

## **3.5 Data Collection Procedures**

Questionnaires and interview schedules were used to collect data from police officers, senior state officers in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, survivors of terrorist attacks and members of civil society. The researcher was given a letter of introduction

from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology - MMUST (Appendix 6) to enable acquisition of a research permit. This supported the online completion and submission of the National Council of Science and Technology (NACOSTI) research permit request form. The Permits (Appendices 7 and 8) were given after two weeks. Obtaining of the NACOSTI permit legally allowed the researcher to undertake data collection in Nairobi County. Permission was also sought from the NPS (Appendix 5) and a consent letter was given to collect data. This is in line with Manion, Cohen and Morrison (2001) who aver that the first step in any research involves the gaining of official permission.

The questionnaires were administered to 311 police officers. Questionnaires had both closed and open-ended questions. Closed-ended questions had choices from which the respondents were to select one among several options. Open-ended questions allowed for an in-depth response. As the questionnaires were being filled in, the researcher proceeded to conduct the interview.

Interviews were administered to senior state officers in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, 10 survivors of a terrorist attack and 2 members of civil society. The interview had both structured and open-ended questions. The structured questions were used to get specific answers from the respondents. Open-ended questions were to enable the respondents to express their views on the topic of the study freely and openly. In the interview, the researcher was able to probe the respondents further to get an in-depth response and clarify unclear items in the interview guide. The researcher was able to read the body language of the respondents.

### **3.5.1 Questionnaires**

Questionnaires were used to collect data from the police officers. They enable the study to collect quantitative data from the closed-ended questions, and qualitative data from the open-ended questions. The questionnaires for police officers were divided into five sections. Section A

solicited general information of the police officers; section B comprised questions on the effectiveness of National Police Service in Counterterrorism namely; Nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya, The contribution of National Police Service in counterterrorism and Challenges National Police Service Face in counter-terrorism. The questionnaires are appended as Appendix 1.

### **3.5.2 Interview guide**

The interview method of collecting data involves the presentation of oral-verbal stimuli and reply in terms of oral-verbal responses (Kothari, 2007). According to Kombo and Tromp (2006), structured interviews have advantages such as the reliability of the information being high, giving in-depth information about particular cases and, are systematic and timesaving.

In the study, the researcher used there (3) interview guides to interview senior state officers in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (Appendix 2), survivors of terrorist attacks (Appendix 3), and members of civil society (Appendix 4). The interview guides sought the respondents' demographic data as well as responses in line with the three study objectives namely: the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya; the contribution of police in counterterrorism and the challenges faced by NPS in counterterrorism in Kenya.

## **3.6 Validity and Reliability of the Research Instruments**

### **3.6.1 Validity**

Validity refers to the quality of a data-gathering instrument or the procedure that enables it to measure what it is supposed to measure (Best and Kahn, 2001). It is concerned with the extent to which a measuring instrument measures what is supposed to measure (Kombo and Tromp, 2000). This study's instruments were tested for validity through consultation and discussion with

the supervisors and experts in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies and Emergency management Studies (EMS) of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology for validation. They scrutinized the instruments and gave their objective comments. Their valuable comments, corrections, suggestions, assisted in the validation of the instruments. The paramount aim of this test was to determine whether the items provided adequate coverage of the subject under the study (Aderson, 1988) and were logically arranged to measure accurately the research characteristics that were intended to be measured (Gall, Borg & Gall, 1996). The corrections identified, noted and used in amending and fine-tuning the instruments.

### **3.6.2 Reliability of Research Instruments**

Reliability is described by Chava, David, and Jack (2014) as the degree to which research instruments produce consistent results or data after repeated trials. The test-retest approach was used to determine the testing instruments' reliability for this analysis. As a result, the questionnaires were sent out twice in two weeks to a group of police officers. The responses to these items were computed for reliability using the Pearson Product Moment Correlation Coefficient analysis.

From the responses, the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient was calculated yielding a coefficient value of 0.785 and significant ( $P < 0.05$ ). This index was considered reliable in collecting the data required for the study in agreement with Sekaran (2003) who avers that, the minimum acceptable Cronbach Alpha coefficient is 0.70.

Before the questionnaire schedules were used to collect data for the study, a pilot study was conducted in Kamukunji police stations. This station was not part of the study. The purpose of this was to identify any challenge the respondents would encounter in filling the questionnaires.

The instruments were also piloted to enable the researcher to identify any ambiguity in them and establish the level of language used to review the general phraseology if need be (Mulusa, 1990).

### **3.7 Data Analysis and Presentation**

The research can be defined according to Bryman & Bell (2003) as a process of data ordering, organizing in categories of patterns, descriptive units and searching for relationships between them. In addition, Matthew and Huberman (1984) claim data analysis requires three sub-processes; data reduction displays (data selectivity units from the whole universe), and a conclusion drawing (interpretation of findings). In this analysis, numbers have been allocated from the closed questions, for example 1 for strong consensus and 2 for consensus. The responses were numbered by themes in the open-ended questions. Then a code was assigned to each subject. Frequency tally was employed to determine the theme closest matched for every expected answer in the results. New theme categories have been developed for unexpected data. To process the data, numerical values were entered into the computer program Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) version 24.0.0. Quantitative and qualitative methods were used to analyze data. The study consisted of numerical measurements to assess the impact on counter-terrorism of one component of the effectiveness of the National Police Service. The research was carried out on the basis of statistics descriptive. In order to explain the data sets and effects, the researchers used frequencies and percentages in tables.

The present results were based on qualitative data gathered from open-ended questions in questionnaires and interviews. This entailed a thorough review of each answer and a thematic inter presentation of the study's key goals, which were then presented in narrative excerpts throughout the research. To represent the situation on the ground, narrative and interpretive reports, as well as citations, were written down. The findings of this analysis were derived from a

summary of the data collected. Finally, the research results were interpreted in a systematic manner and scientifically discussed. All data was interpreted about research questions hence conclusions were drawn from the findings. Finally, yet important, recommendations were made and areas of further research suggested.

### **3.8 Study Limitations**

The researcher encountered some reluctance among the respondents in answering the research questions due to the intrusive nature of the study, especially during interviews with a senior state official, survivors of terrorism attack and members of civil societies. This was overcome by assuring the respondents of confidentiality and anonymous participation in the study where they were reminded not to provide their names or names of police stations on the questionnaires. The researcher further showed the respondents permits and consent to carry out the study within the relevant jurisdiction of the police station as a way to assure them of the legality of the process.

In some cases, it was difficult to find the sampled groups, especially the line officers who were on duty. To ensure that the study got responses from the targeted respondents, the researcher sought the support of Officer in Charge Station (OCS) and through arranged appointments with the officers, was able to get information from the appropriate respondents.

### **3.9 Ethical Consideration**

Fraenkel and Wallen (2003) point out that the term ‘ethics’ in research refers to the question of what is right and what is wrong about conducting a particular study or carrying out certain procedures so that a researcher is clear on whether there is some kind of studies that should not be conducted. According to Leedy and Ormrod (2001), most ethical issues in research fall into one of the four categories namely: protection from harm, informed consent, right to privacy, and

honesty with professional colleagues. The study carefully safeguarded these ethical issues by putting several relevant measures in place.

To protect from harm, the researcher included a statement in the introductory letter to inform the participants of the benefits of the study and seek their voluntary participation. The participants were not coerced, threatened or given false promises of material reward for their participation. The respondents were informed that participation was voluntary and they were free to withdraw from the study at any point and were under no obligation to respond to what they did not feel comfortable responding to.

To safeguard the rights to privacy and anonymity of the participants, the researcher included the disclaimer on the questioners instructing participants not to include their names and contacts (phone numbers, e-mails). This ensured anonymous participation in the study. The filled questionnaires were safeguarded to avoid access by unauthorized users. Privacy was guaranteed by ensuring that the interviews were conducted in secluded places away from those who might pry on the conversations. Names and photos of respondents were not included in the report.

The researcher ensured that the study participants had informed consent. Through a letter of introduction (Appendix 5), they were given adequate information on the purpose of the study, the risk involved, the benefit and implication of participating and, an extended opportunity to ask questions concerning research. They were requested to participate voluntarily.

To ensure honesty, the researcher avoided plagiarism by acknowledging all the sources of information towards the study. The researcher also acquires a research permit.

### **3.10 Summary of Research Methodology**

This chapter discussed the study methodology in line with several sub-headings as expected in the chapter. The study identified the Nairobi as the study site. It was considered for this study because of the diversity of policing strategies employed; the vulnerability of the area to crime more particularly terrorist attacks; and the high concentration of police stations within the County.

The study employed a descriptive research design, with mixed methods under qualitative and quantitative methods being utilized. Descriptive design was, therefore, found to be most suitable in this study since it involved measuring variables about policing about terrorism as occur naturally. The target population comprised police officers, senior state officers in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, survivors of a terrorist attack and members of civil society.

Police stations were sample using systemic random sampling, stratified random sampling was used to sample police officers, purposive sampling was used to sample senior state officer, snowball sampling was used to sample survivors of terrorism and purposive sampling was used to sample members of civil society. Data collection was done by the use of questionnaires and interview schedules. The research findings were presented systematically and discussed scientifically. Content validity was applied to ensure that the study sought the information in line with its set objectives. Triangulation technique was employed to ensure the reliability of qualitative research instruments. Some limitations included the challenges of meeting the police officers on duty in time. The researcher made sure that the purpose of this study was fully explained in advance to the respondents, Confidentiality at all times was maintained to ensure all ethical standards were adhered to.

The next chapter presents the findings of the study discussed under each objective.

## **CHAPTER FOUR**

### **THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF TERRORISM IN KENYA**

The study sought to assess the nature and extent of terrorism, which was the first objective of the study. The general perspectives about these aspects were assessed based on several issues including the instrument response rate, profile of the respondents (gender, age, education level, number of the years in service and departmental distribution); geographical location of Kenya, poverty and unemployment, instability in the neighbouring countries, Islamism, inadequate enforcement of counterterrorism laws and policies and respondent opinion on nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya

#### **4.1 Response Rate and Reporting Protocol**

The study administered 311 questionnaires to police officers in line with the study's sample size. Out of this number, 306 were returned. This accounts for 98.39%. This was a good response rate as it is above the 70% threshold recommended by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003). According to them, a 50% response rate is adequate, 60% good and above 70% is rated very well.

In certain items, the reported results are based on fewer cases because some respondents did not answer all the questions. In other words, the results indicate the percentage of actual respondents to a particular item rather than the percentage of the total sample. Concerning the descriptive results, in situations where both or one of the tools were used, the results from the questionnaire are reported first followed by those from the interviews.

## 4.2 Demographic Information of the Respondents

The study sought to establish the gender, age, experience, department and education qualification of the respondents.

### 4.2.1 Gender of Respondents

The study sought to establish the gender of the respondent. Respondents were thus asked to indicate their gender. The researcher considered the gender aspect important to the study because it would indicate the existing gender representation in the NPS. Kenya has made many strides in gender mainstreaming in the police service. Gender distribution in this study was considered a good indicator of the gains given that police service has majorly been a male-dominated area. The findings of the study are summarized in Table 4.1

**Table: 4. 1: Distribution of Police Officers by Gender**

<b>Gender</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Male	216	70.6
Female	90	29.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

In table 4.1, the findings show that majority 216 (70.6%) of the respondents were male while 90 (29.4%) were female. This study established that most police stations have more male representation as compared to females. Although the findings indicate gender disparity in favour of men, the female officers were 90 representing 29.4%, which the study considers a good representation in line with the affirmative action that demands a minimum of 30% representation

of the other gender, especially where one gender has been dominant. The study considers the NPS to have made great strides towards affirmative action. It, however, feels that the Service can improve on this. The current recruitment drives into the NPS in Kenya have been allocating more slots to men. Although this appears acceptable at many policy levels in Kenya, the study argues that there is a need to recruit more women because each gender brings a unique dynamic to policing a whole. If Kenya is to make strides in counterterrorism, more women need to be brought on board. There is a possibility that the continued terrorism activities have continued because of the dominance of males in counterterrorism.

#### **4.2.2 Distribution of respondents by age**

The respondents were requested to indicate their age category. The aspect of age in policing is important in that it sometimes involves many physical duties in the field where the officers are expected to be fit and energetic. Table 4.2 presents the findings.

**Table: 4. 2: Age of Respondents**

<b>Age (years)</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
20-29	87	28.4
30-39	180	58.8
40-49	27	8.8
50-59	12	3.9
Total	306	100.0

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 4.1.2 shows that majority of the respondents 180 (58.8%) were between the age of 30-39 while 12 (3.9%) were between the age of 50-59 respectively. This shows that majority of the respondents were majorly youth. The study considered having many youths as respondents an indicator of having reached the right sample given that the responses sought required people who had directly participated in counterterrorism activities in the NPS. The study thus hoped to get reliable responses from the respondents.

#### **4.2.3 Distribution of police officers by the duration of service**

The study sought to establish the length of service in the police service by the respondents. Determining the number of years a police officer had served in the service was considered by the study a reflection of the experience an officer had acquired over the years in the service. Table 4.3 gives the findings.

**Table: 4. 3: Respondents’ length in police service**

<b>Duration in service</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
1-5 years	81	26.5
6-10 years	111	36.2
11-15 years	84	27.5
16 and above	30	9.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 4.3 shows that the majority of police officers 111(36.2%) had worked between 6-10 years in service while 30 (9.8%) had stayed for 16 and above years. Cumulative results show that 195 (63.7%) had between 6 – 15 years’ experience. The study considered this number to have relevant knowledge and experience to give insightful responses to the items under study. The researcher thus hoped that the high number of respondents with adequate experience would give valid responses to the NPS role in countering terrorism.

The researcher’s assertions are in line with those of Lewis (1999) who established that an individual’s length of service greatly determined the extent and nature of officers’ understanding of the various sub-components of policing. Although training is critical, experience gained based on the number of years in service may correlate with a deeper understanding of terrorism and how to counter it.

#### 4.2.4 Distribution of police officers by department

The study sought to find out the department each of the respondents belonged to. This was important to the study because each department of police service presents a unique aspect of police work; some departments are more involved in counter-terrorism as compared to others and the study was keen to establish their representation. The analyzed data are presented in Table 4.4.

**Table: 4. 4: Distribution of Police Officers by Department**

<b>Department</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Department of criminal justice	21	6.9
Police patrol	65	21.2
Community policing	67	21.9
Intelligence-led	27	8.8
General duty office (report office)	126	41.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Results in Table 4.4 show that majority 126 (41.2%) of the respondents were in the department of general duty office while the least number 21 (6.9%), came from the department of criminal justice. Given that sampling of respondents was random, it is notable to observe that criminal justice and intelligence-led policing departments have lower numbers compared to the other departments. The findings imply, to the study that, the study was not likely to realize adequate

responses for analysis from these two departments. Although the study considered officers in the General duty office (report office) valid respondents to all the items in the study, it felt that there was a possibility to have the under-representation from the intelligence-led and criminal justice departments leading to biased results. To cover the possible gaps from this bias, the study sought further information from through key informant interviews to comprehensively handle issues from the two departments. Given this situation, the study argues that there is a need for NPS to train more officers from the general duties department to acquire specializations in intelligence-led and criminal justice issues in policing. The two departments have a lot of stake in improving counterterrorism. The NPS could also improve on the training content to include several courses to cover these two aspects so that all officers are better equipped for effective performance in the departments.

#### **4.2.5 Distribution of police officers by education qualifications**

The study sought to determine the education qualification of the respondents. Education qualification is associated with police professionalism and adherence to the fundamental principles and global standard of practice. Summary of the findings is given in Table 4.5.

**Table: 4. 5: Distribution of Police Officers by Education Qualification**

<b>Education qualification</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Primary	9	2.9
Secondary	186	60.8
Certificate	15	4.9
Diploma	54	17.6
Bachelors	39	12.7
Masters	3	1.0
Doctorate	0	0.0
Total	306	100.0

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 4.5 shows that the majority of the police officers 186 (60.8%) had secondary certificates while 3 (1.0%) had masters; none was at the doctorate level. This showed that the majority did not pursue an education at higher levels after recruitment. This could be attributed to fact that the majority of police officers are recruited with lower mean grade (D+) and the nature of their deployment hinders them from pursuing higher education. Having a paltry number of officers with post-graduate qualifications could also be because those who acquire higher education exit the service for greener pastures. This could have serious implication in counter-terrorism because crime is evolving and police need continuous training to be a step ahead of the terrorist. Given that rising the academic ladder might not be easy to realize by many police officers, the study

feels that there is a need for NPS to invest in professional training programmes to improve on efficiency and productivity of the police officers.

### **4.3 Nature and Extent of Terrorism in Kenya**

The first research question of the study was: What is the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya? In answering the question, the following pre-dispositional factors to terrorism were addressed; the geographical location of Kenya, poverty and unemployment, unstable neighbours, Islamism, insufficient law enforcement and counter-terrorism policies. Respondents were required to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with statements on the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya using the 5-point Likert scale were: 1- Strongly Agree, 2 -

The study sought to find out if the Agree, 3 - Neutral, 4- Disagree and 5 - Strongly Disagree

#### **4.3.1 Geographical location of Kenya**

The geographical location of Kenya predisposes the country to terrorism activities. The fact that Kenya shares boundaries with five countries that have experienced civil unrest for a long time with spillover to Kenya were a concern to the study. The results are shown in Table 4.6.

**Table: 4. 6: Geographical location of Kenya**

<b>Geographical location</b>	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly agree	126	41.2
Agree	87	28.4
Neutral	30	9.8
Disagree	24	7.8
Strongly disagree	39	12.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 4.6 shows that majority 126 (41.2%) strongly agreed and 87 (28.4%) agreed to give a cumulative total of 213 (69.6%) who agree that the geographical location of Kenya predisposes her to terrorist attacks. A paltry 24 (7.8%) disagreed. These findings conform to the study by Barkan and Cooke (2001) who argued that the combination of poor infrastructure and porous borders makes Kenya an attractive target and an easy conduit for terrorist-related material, activities, and transit points. Mutinga (2004) pointed out that the Kenyan coastal region and the North-Eastern border with Somalia are widely inhabited by Arabs and Muslims who have strong historical and cultural ties with the Arabs in the Middle East. Because of the common religion and language, terrorists can easily blend into the coastal community. For example, Fazul Abdullahi Mohammed operated from Siyu Island in the Lamu district on the Kenyan coast for a long time without the authorities detecting him. The study concludes that, for Kenya to deal with terrorism, it needs better surveillance of its borders and especially the largely unmonitored coastline, which has been an easy entry point for terrorists.

### 4.3.2 Poverty and unemployment

The study sought to find out if poverty and unemployment contributed to terrorism in Kenya. This was because poverty and widespread unemployment had been cited many times as the reason why many Kenyan youths were vulnerable to indoctrination and recruitment to terrorist activities. The findings are shown in Table 4.7.

**Table 4. 7: Poverty and Unemployment**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly agree	153	50.0
Agree	105	34.3
Neutral	15	4.9
Disagree	21	6.9
Strongly disagree	12	3.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 4.7 shows, majority of the respondents either strongly agreed, 153 (50%) or agreed 105 (34. %) that poverty and unemployment contribute greatly to terrorism in Kenya. Only a negligible 12 (3.9%) strongly disagree. These indicate that youth are susceptible to indoctrination and recruitment for terrorist activities. Kenya has a young population (40 per cent are under the age of 15) and she has an unemployment rate of 40 per cent (CIA, 2004). Terrorists bring money into Kenya and can entice many from the unemployed and poverty-stricken backgrounds to

support their cause, wittingly or unwittingly, and to enlist recruits to the cause to enhance situational awareness and gather local intelligence for terrorist activities.

Several studies also concur with the findings by mentioning in their discussions that poverty forms a major contributor to terrorism (Yaqoob, 2007).

The situation is not a preserve for Kenya alone. In their study, Shaykhutdinov and Achilov (2013) established that, many of the radicalized Muslims that come from European countries exist in lower socio-economic areas and status of the society and that it might play a part in radicalization. Malik, Halstead, Bunglawala and Spalek (2004) posit that the economic situation of a country has a positive correlation with the rise of terrorism and radicalization. The authors assert that where there is economic deprivation whether permanently or seasonal, there is a higher likelihood for radical activities and terrorism to increase in the society. The decision by individuals and groups to engage in such activities depends on both constraints and available opportunities. They further aver that terrorism or radical behaviours can become one of the most attractive and rational behavioural alternatives for social groups that see themselves as economically marginalized.

Carson (2005) refutes such hypothetical claims that economic deprivation presents an opportunity for engaging in terrorist activities. The author goes ahead to analyze the Gaza strip and West Bank public opinion polls to define the category of social groups that seemed to support the need for government to use armed Israeli civilians. Their analytical findings reveal that the majority of the people that supported violence against the Israelis were those with higher educational status. Additionally, when compared to people that were of similar age category, the findings indicate that indeed, Hezbollah participants have a slightly above average educational status.

### 4.3.3 Instability in neighbouring countries

The study sought to find out whether instability in neighbouring countries contributes to terrorism activities in Kenya. Some of these countries had experienced political and civil unrest for a long period. The study sought to establish whether the instability contributed to the predisposition of Kenya to terrorism. Table 4.8 presents the data.

**Table: 4. 8: Instability in Neighboring Countries**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly agree	135	44.1
Agree	84	27.5
Neutral	45	14.7
Disagree	27	8.8
Strongly disagree	15	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 4.8 shows that the respondents considered instability in Kenya's neighbourhood to be responsible for terrorism in the County with 135 (44.1%) strongly agreeing and 84 (27.5%) agreeing. These findings suggest that in these nations, anarchy has resulted in a lawless culture where violence and radical ideologies thrive. Due to a lack of state ability in those countries, people and goods have been able to freely move in and out of the region. Given that many of these people are refugees seeking a better life in Kenya, as well as a few terrorists, Kenya faces a

challenge, particularly given the porous border and the reported presence of Islamic fundamentalists.

For instance, Somalia remains directly responsible for Kenya's safety shortcomings. First, Somalia's geographical position offers Africa's longest shoreline and is the African nation nearest to the Middle East. Somalia can therefore serve as a transit hub for illicit products to Kenya (Mogire & Agade, 2011). The study indicates that methods for improving the strategy in Kenyan borders must be considered.

#### 4.3.4 Islamism and terrorism

The study sought to establish whether Islamism was contributing to terrorism in Kenya. The study saw fundamentalism as having the potential to lead to growing dissent among the Muslim population, making them easy recruits for terrorist activities. The findings are given in Table 4.9.

**Table: 4. 9: Islamism and Terrorism**

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	85	27.8
Agree	90	29.4
Neutral	68	22.2
Disagree	33	10.8
Strongly disagree	30	9.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

From the findings in Table 4.9, majority of the respondents, 90 (29.4%) agreed and 85(27.8%) strongly agreed. The findings suggest that the respondents felt that Kenyans were being exposed

to Islamism. From key informant interviews, it emerged that the respondents considered the encroachment of Islamism to have resulted in making them easy recruits for terrorist activities. Individual Imams preach about alleged injustice to their Muslim brothers in Kenyan mosques, according to the interviewees. Muslims in Kenya are becoming more internationally conscious, assisted by technologies such as the Internet, Satellite TV, and the growing travel of Kenyans throughout the world. They will spread this philosophy across the different forms of communication.

These findings corroborate the findings of Mogire and Agade (2011), who reported that in Kenyan mosques, individual Imams preach about perceived injustice to their Muslim brothers in Afghanistan, the unresolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the ongoing war in Iraq. The study argues that imams use the increasing global knowledge to inspire Kenyan empathy with more radical ideas of their core religious needs, difficulties and philosophies around the world. This could enhance terrorism and efforts to combat terrorism should be implemented.

#### **4.3.5 Inadequate enforcement of counterterrorism laws and policies**

The study sought to find out from the respondents whether insufficient laws enforcement and counterterrorism policies contribute to terrorism in Kenya. The study considered flawed terrorism laws in Kenya and pretentious police mandates possible contributors to terrorism. Table 4.10 shows the results.

**Table: 4. 10: Inadequate Enforcement of Counterterrorism Laws and Policies**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly agree	80	26.1
Agree	124	40.5
Neutral	45	14.7
Disagree	36	11.8
Strongly disagree	21	6.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

In table 4.10, majority 124 (40.5 %) of the respondents agree that inadequate enforcement of counterterrorism laws and policies are a major barrier to counter-terrorism efforts in Kenya. While 80 (26.1%) strongly agree. There were 21(6.9%) respondents who strongly disagreed. From interviews, respondents argued that the lack of comprehensive legislation puts Kenyan law enforcers in positions where they use questionable strategies and violate the human rights of many in the Muslim community.

The results agree with the study carried out by Mogire & Agade (2011), which showed that Kenyan law enforcers do not have robust regulations under which they employ dubious means and abuse the rights of many of the Muslims. Pretholdt (2011) also notes that intelligence agents have repeatedly been accused of illegal arrest and torturing suspects for long periods of time for alleged terrorists in order to force faiths and intelligence on the ground. Since there is little adequate prosecution infrastructure, Kenya authorities also hand over terror suspects to

neighboring countries or the USA. In one instance after 2010, bombing in Kampala, Uganda, the Government of Kenya transferred 13 Kenyan citizens suspected of taking part in the attacks to Uganda (Mogire & Agade, 2011).

Academics and policy specialists are clearly aware that Kenya is still heavily dependent on Western security services in the aftermath of the Westgate attack in Nairobi. An inability to work together rapidly overwhelmed the counter-terrorism units which have been enlarged and supported primarily to deal with terrorist attacks. The military enabled Kenya's President Uhuru Kenyatta in direct contrast to his usual position, causing substantially greater uncertainty. This led to claims that their success was directly the product of inadequate law enforcement and counter-terrorism policies, and in the end the robust training and support of recent years were in doubt. The study therefore considers a dire need for the NPS to establish legislation to implement laws and policies on counter-terrorism.

#### **4.3.6 Respondents' opinion on the nature and extent of terrorism**

The study further sought from the respondents' opinion on the nature and extent of terrorism. This was an open-ended item where the respondents were expected to give their view. The study considered it necessary to capture unstructured views on the research question. Many responses were given. The most cited views included youth radicalization, political dissatisfaction, lack of accountability, high poverty levels, corruption and weak judicial system.

An interview with a member of civil society revealed that there was a decline in terrorist attacks in major towns in Kenya, though there was an increase in such attacks in North Eastern and Coastal regions. Other interviewees pointed out to the nature of terrorism as today as involving radicalized foreigners mostly from Somalia and Kenya. The lack of socio-economic

opportunities, marginalization discrimination, weak governance which encourages deteriorating relations between state and citizens, human rights violations and the selective application of the rule of law contribute, as the respondents pointed out, to the collective criticism of the coastal and northeastern communities. As Badurdeen suggested, the same things drive recruits to include violent extremism (2012). Recruiters from Al-Shabaab leverage these mutual grievances by radicalizing and recruiting tactics by developing politically based narratives focused on the Kenyan state and its Western government allies as well as emphasizing the plight of communities and individual casualties (Badurdeen, 2012). Recruiters follow up with materialistic and/or moral help responses to their needs.

An interview with senior state officials in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government revealed that there has been a general trend of terrorism declined in the past years though the threat is still high in Northeastern and Coastal region especially along the Kenyan borders with Somalia. These regions still suffer from poor social-economic infrastructure. He pointed out that the Al-Shabaab followers and sympathizers were motivated primarily by economic hardship could be deterred by increased developmental inputs for poverty-ridden localities.

When asked how the terrorism trend could be reversed, an interviewee suggested that the government and civil society actors should focus on providing more resources to address the root causes associated with socio-economic drivers of violent radicalization. An interview with a member of civil society revealed that:

Increased investment in public education, poverty reduction, and unemployment are pivotal to counter Al-Shabaab radicalization in the coast and North Eastern. Such initiatives will help the youth find purpose within their communities, preventing them from seeking new identities

through a radical Al-Shabaab ideology. (Source: Field data, 2019)

Another interviewee added that:

Most attacks target security personnel, civil servants and vital installation because most projects lack public participation creating the perception that most of the jobs created will benefit outsiders, this can be addressed through educational and vocational training, career guidance programs, credit schemes and networking opportunities can be harnessed to improve local youth's employment prospects. (Source: Field data, 2019)

On the nature of the attack and how the attack was carried, one terrorism survivor said:

I am lucky to survive, the bullets were flying all over the place, and I had to hide under furniture before the police rescued me. Although I did not suffer a physical scar, to date, I still experience episodic nightmares and fear of crowded places. (Source: Field data, 2019)

Another survivor, sharing his experience said:

I heard a loud bang; I do not know what happened after that. When I woke up, I was in a hospital bed. I lost a limb and I have several scars on my body from the ordeal. (Source: Field data, 2019)

These comments are evidence that the terrorist attacks in Kenya have been characterized by the use of guns and explosive. They also point out to the fact that, although the attacks occurred several years ago, the victims still suffer physical and psychological trauma to date. The study thus considers it necessary to ensure proper screening of persons accessing buildings and other public places and post-attack rehabilitation of the victims.

From an interview with another survivor of terrorism, it was revealed that the police were able to rescue many people during an attack:

Police were able to repulse the terrorist at initial stages of the attack thus enabling the majority of us to run out the building. (Source: Field data, 2019)

#### **4.4 Summary of the Chapter**

The chapter discussed the response rate of the questionnaires, which accounted for 97.4%. This was a good response rate as it is above the 70% threshold recommended by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003). The chapter discussed the background of the respondents. The importance of such a factor is also noted in other similar studies that adopted these factors moderators as supported by Pervan (2007). It is therefore important to examine briefly the context of the respondent in order to determine whether such respondents were suited for such studies. The respondents' context gives the researcher confidence in the reliability of answers as knowledgeable respondents are required to provide accurate answers under the circumstances.

The study revealed that the geographical location of the country predisposes her to terrorist attacks especially that it shares porous borders with countries that had experienced political instability. This makes Kenya an attractive target and easy conduit for terrorist-related materials, activities and transit point. The study found that poverty and unemployment predisposed the youth to indoctrination and recruitment for terrorist activities Terrorists to bring money into Kenya and can entice many from the unemployed and poverty-stricken backgrounds to support their cause, wittingly or unwittingly. Islamism contributes in recruiting terrorist in the country by encouraging Kenyans empathy with extreme views on the needs, hardships and philosophies towards terrorism and majority of the respondents agreed that youth radicalization is on the rise in the country.

The findings further revealed that Kenya lacks comprehensive laws that govern terrorism in the country. This put law enforcers in a position where they did not perform their duties effectively.

An interview with members of civil societies and senior state officers revealed that there is a decline in terrorist attacks in major towns in Kenya, though there was an increase in such attacks in North Eastern and coastal region. They point out that radicalized foreigners mostly from Somalia and Kenya from all parts of the country. The lack of socio-economic opportunities, marginalization discrimination, weak governance which encourages deteriorating relations between state and citizens, human rights violations and the selective application of the rule of law contribute, as the respondents pointed out, to the collective criticism of the coastal and northeastern communities.

The next chapter presents and discusses the findings of the second objective of the study.

## **CHAPTER FIVE**

### **CONTRIBUTION OF NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN COUNTER TERRORISM**

This chapter discusses the findings on the contribution of national police service in counterterrorism. The main themes discussed in this chapter are; intelligence gathering, analysis, surveillance and the respondents' opinions on ways the national police service can contribute to counterterrorism.

#### **5.1 Contribution of Intelligence Gathering in Counter-Terrorism**

The study sought to find out whether intelligence gathering contributes to the NPS efforts in countering terrorism in Kenya. An intelligence gathering is a system through which information about a particular entity is collected for the benefit of another using more than one, inter-related source. Detailed gathering of intelligent, evaluation and interpretation of intelligent is an effective tool in counterterrorism. The study considered the item important because the information gathered through intelligence is considered crucial in aiding detection, identification and apprehension of potential terrorists hiding in a community. Summary of findings is given in Table 5.1.

**Table 5. 1: Contribution of Intelligence Gathering to Counter-Terrorism**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly Agree	189	61.8
Agree	63	20.6
Neutral	12	3.9
Disagree	27	8.8
Strongly disagree	15	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 5.1 shows that majority 189 (61.8%) of the respondents strongly agree that intelligence gathering helps to counter terrorism while 27(8.8) disagree. While supporting this position, one key informant intimated that:

The ease of gathering intelligence comes from the nature of existing relationships between police and the community. The good relationship ensures that information, which may uncover someone plotting a future attack or someone planting the seeds of radicalization is nabbed early enough. Intelligence has played an important role in diplomacy and warfare throughout history. (Source: Field data, 2019)

The study findings agree with Pashley and Cools (2017) who stated that intelligence gathering provides the guiding principles on how investigations are undertaken in operations and measures of its effectiveness. The study avers that intelligence gathering in the country plays a big role in giving the NPS information on possible terrorist activities hence employ counterterrorism

mechanisms early to avert attacks. From key informant interviews, it, however, emerged that, compared to the developed countries; Kenya still lacks utilities and resources to undertake proper intelligence gathering due to the high cost involved. The study thus concludes that given that majority of the respondents consider intelligence gathering a contributor to counterterrorism, it is important to improve on the existing standards by equipping the police officers with both the necessary equipment and skills to effectively undertake the role.

## **5.2. Contribution of Gathered Intelligence to Counter-Terrorism**

The study sought to find out whether gathered intelligence assists NPS in counter-terrorism. For gathered information to be useful, it has to be analyzed to identify ordinary crime patterns with potential for terrorism. The study sought to gather from the respondents whether the gathered intelligence information had contributed to counterterrorism. Table 5.2 presents the data.

**Table 5. 2: Contribution of Gathered Intelligence to Counter-Terrorism**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly agree	129	42.2
Agree	99	32.4
Neutral	36	11.8
Disagree	24	7.8
Strongly disagree	18	5.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 5.2 indicates that majority 129 (42.2%) of the respondents strongly agree that analysis of gathered intelligence contributes to counter-terrorism while a paltry 24(7.8%) disagree. From key informant interviews, the position was supported with one respondent adding that analysis of gathered intelligence and ordinary crime patterns had helped them reveal activities associated with terrorism and develop relevant counterterrorism activities averting attack.

The study findings corroborate Field (2009) who argues that the analysis of intelligence aims at the prediction of future terrorist attack, supplying the relevant authority or police of developing terrorist threat possibility or probability of such threat happening. Stephan (2010) also noted that detailed analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of intelligent is an effective tool in counterterrorism. The study supports the need for intelligence information to be analyzed and

proper mechanisms put in place to avert possible terrorist attacks where the information heeds on such possibilities.

### 5.3. Contribution of Surveillance in Counter-Terrorism

The study sought to establish whether surveillance contributes to countering terrorism. This was important to establish because of police use surveillance for intelligence gathering, prevention of crime, protection of a process, person, group or object, or for the investigation of crime. It was thus necessary to establish whether the use contributed to counterterrorism. The summary of the findings is presented in Table 5.3.

**Table 5. 3: Contribution of Surveillance in Counter-Terrorism**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly agree	134	43.8
Agree	73	23.9
Neutral	57	18.6
Disagree	33	10.8
Strongly disagree	9	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 5.3 shows that majority 134(43.8%) strongly agree and 73(23.9%) agree to give a cumulative 207 (67.6%) who agree that surveillance contributes in counter-terrorism. From key informant interviews, respondents explained that surveillance includes observations from

distance using electronic equipment, interception of electronically transmitted information (such as Internet traffic or phone calls); and other times includes simple, relatively low-technology methods such as human intelligence agents and postal interception. Another key informant summed up the contribution of surveillance to counterterrorism by saying that:

Adoption of technology to enhance surveillance in Nairobi has increased the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. Employing technology advancement like the use of CCTV cameras surveillance and metal detectors has significantly acted to minimize the risk of terrorist attacks in public places and buildings. (Source: Field data, 2019)

The research results are consistent with the Hoffman and Morrison-Taw (2000) study, which shows that technology can be a means of enforcing legislation and a critical component in complying with national counter-terrorism policies. Police must be able to interact and have a way to store the research data which they obtain. Moreover, technology enables knowledge gathering, in particular in the context of monitoring techniques. The study argues that police technologies, especially in communication and information sharing, have a direct effect on how information is transformed into action. It is therefore important for strategies to be enhanced so that security threats can be identified early and adequate counterterrorism mechanisms put in place.

#### **5.4 Respondents' Opinions on Ways the NPS Can Contribute to Counter-Terrorism**

The respondents were asked to give their opinions on ways the NPS can contribute to counterterrorism in Kenya. This was an open-ended item to solicit for unstructured responses without the researcher's guidance. The most cited responses were community policing, border patrol, prosecution of terrorists, prompt surveillance and modern technology. Based on these sentiments, the study avers that a common interest approach allows the community and the police to consult

in determining operational policing priorities as well as collaborating with them in search of a solution to insecurity. According to Gordner (2008), police officers working with the community towards a common goal can help facilitate positive interactions and where possible, may have several other benefits such as building familiarity, officers being more knowledgeable about people's security concerns and conditions and can provide specific information to combat terrorism. In his study on Security Sector Reforms Influencing Transformation of National Police Service, Nairobi and Kiambu Counties, Kenya, Muthondeki (2017) recommended that the government needed to put more effort to make community policing and *Nyumba Kumi* (ten houses) initiative effective to fully discharge its mandate of protecting citizens and their property.

From the interview, the opinion on the contribution of NPS to counterterrorism by a member of the civil society was that:

We collaborate with the police during the evacuation of injured victims and offering pre-hospital care; participating in search and rescue of victims of terrorism; tracing of missing persons during an attack and offering counselling and psychosocial support to victims of terrorism(Source: Field data, 2019).

An interview with the survivors of terrorism about their opinion on police contribution in counter-terrorism revealed that police contribute greatly to counter-terrorism. One respondent said:

Yes, police contribute to reducing terrorist attacks in Kenya by performing their police duties. They, however, need to involve the public in their effort against terrorism through community policing. (Source: Field data, 2019).

The findings are supported by a study by Fridell and Wycoff (2004) which showed that police-community partnerships could develop responses aimed at disseminating information to the community on terror activities that affect their quality of life. This means that the public is keen on the development of counter-terrorism strategies put in place by the government and they would like to be part of it.

An interview with a senior state official in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government revealed that the government had invested heavily in security by modernizing police service in terms of acquiring modern technology, tools and equipment. This is in line with the Revised Police Reforms Program Document 2015-2018 NPSC (2015) that was launched by President Kenyatta on August 2015 as part of A Strategy Framework for Implementation of Reforms in the National Police Service on the converse, the interviewee said that the police were yet to fully embrace community-based policing model in counter-terrorism. For community policing to be effective, public seminars and rallies should be conducted to educate the citizens concerning the roles of the police and how community involvement will help strengthen the security.

Kenya's public involvement as counter-terrorism by Community Police was launched in 2003, in accordance with the Kenya Police Annual Report, and includes a combination of government agencies and community members' efforts and resources. The aim was to bridge the gap between the police and the community. The '*Nyumba Kumi*' project was launched to include the society in the prevention and elimination of terrorism. Given that, in the opinion of the respondents, employing multiple tactics in policing will contribute to counterterrorism, the study argues that, if NPS efforts in counterterrorism are to succeed, the police ought to employ various aspect of policing to perform fully its mandate in counter-terrorism.

## **5.5 Summary of the Chapter**

This chapter looked at the policing mechanism used by national police service in contributing to counter-terrorism in Kenya. National police service contributes to counter-terrorism through intelligence gathering which involves detection, identification and apprehending of potential terrorists hiding in the community. Making use of the existing relationships between the police and the community could be the key to developing information that may uncover potential terrorist attacks or someone planting the seeds of radicalization. Intelligence plays an important role in diplomacy and warfare. However, compared to the developed countries, Kenya still lacks resources to undertake proper intelligence gathering due to the high cost involved. The study revealed that analysis of gathered intelligence and ordinary crime patterns had revealed activities associated with terrorism. Analysis of intelligence aims at predicting future terrorist attacks, supplying the relevant authority/police with information on developing terrorist threats or probability of such threat happening.

On surveillance, the findings show that it assists the national police service in countering terrorism in the country. Use of electronic equipment; interception of electronically transmitted information (such as Internet traffic or phone calls) and, the use of low-technology methods such as human intelligence agents and postal interception had helped police to survey on terror-related crimes. It has also enabled police to reduce acts of terrorism in major cities in Kenya due to the use of technology such as CCTV and metal detectors. The study further revealed that the national police service is yet to fully embrace this type of policing in combating terrorism. From the study findings, the study recommends the use of the community-based policing model as the key to combat terrorism.

The next chapter discusses findings based on objective three of the study on challenges the national police service faces in counter-terrorism.

## CHAPTER SIX

### CHALLENGES THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE FACE IN COUNTER TERRORISM

This chapter presents the findings of the study on the third objective: to establish the challenges the national police service face in counterterrorism. the findings are discussed under the following sub-section; transport deficiency, deficiency in human resource capacity, poor terms and conditions of service, budgetary deficits, refugee's militarization, the weak criminal justice system, corruption and laxity in the police service.

#### 6.1 Influence of Transport Challenge on Counter-Terrorism

The study sought to find out whether transport deficiency affects the NPS efforts in counterterrorism. The findings are summarized in Table 6.1.

**Table 6. 1: Influence of transport challenge on counter-terrorism**

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	108	35.3
Agree	93	30.4
Neutral	46	15.0
Disagree	44	14.4
Strongly disagree	15	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 6.1 shows that majority 108 (35.3%) strongly agree that transport is a challenge in their efforts to counter-terrorism while 93(30.4%) agree. From interviews, the study established that the NPS had minimal vehicles, aeroplanes and boats to carry out their duties. Further, the few available were poorly serviced and scarcely fueled. The vast majority believe that transport is an obstacle in the efforts of NPS to fight terrorism, and Kimani (2012) has concluded that the pace and effectiveness of malserved vehicles, which criminals often escape crime scenes, cannot be balanced. The police needs weigh well beyond the means of transport available to them.

The lack of unreliable transport means that the police would be slow to deal with crime incidents. Likewise, the involvement of police in some key locations is minimized, allowing drug offenders to get access to them. Given that, the very presence of police in various localities is in itself deterrence to crime, the study argues that there is need to improve transport for them and set aside an adequate budget to cater for their local running.

## **6.2 Challenge of Inadequate Human Resource Capacity in Counter-Terrorism**

The study sought to find out whether a deficiency in human resource capacity leads to ineffective counter-terrorism measures by the NPS. The UN recommends a police-public ratio of 1:450 (Kimani, 2012) for police to perform its mandates effectively. There are estimates that the NPS has a total population of about 80,000 personnel serving a population of 40 million hence public-policing ratios can be deduced to be roughly in the ratio of 1:500 (NPS, 2017). Given the shortfall in Kenya, the study sought to establish how this deficiency influenced the NPS efforts in counterterrorism. Table 6.2 presents the findings.

**Table 6. 2: Challenge of Inadequate Human Resource Capacity in Counter-Terrorism**

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	83	27.1
Agree	103	33.7
Neutral	63	20.6
Disagree	36	11.8
Strongly disagree	21	6.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 6.2 indicates that majority 103(33.7%) of the respondents agree there is a deficiency in human resource capacity in NPS to deal with counterterrorism while 83(27.1%) strongly agree to give a cumulative 186 (60.78%). From key informant interviews, the study established that the Kenyan public–policing ratio of 1:1,500 as per the NPS (2017) report was actually in theory given that police officers are also involved in administrative and escort duties. Kimani (2012) rightly summed up this inadequacy when he asserted that, a quarter of the NPS officers are engaged in office administration duties, guarding the political elites or serving as drivers to top government officials. This lowers to about 60, 000 employees the number of committed police officers involved in crime prevention and actual public service. The police-public ratio is also increased.

In light of the above, the study claims that the NPS has so much to do with the protection of the system and not with the security of citizens, thereby reducing the number of police personnel. The deficiency is also aggravated by other factors affecting the police ability to deal with various

police problems in the nation, such as natural turnover, physical injury, withdrawal from green pasture and removals. There is also a need for NPS to improve the capacity of the officers through training and equipping of the police stations with adequate resources to enable them counter-terrorism. The current situation is difficult because the police officers are mismatched as compared to the terrorism attackers who have modernized equipment.

### 6.3 Challenge of Poor Terms and Conditions of Service

The study sought to find out whether poor terms and conditions of service affect NPS efforts in counter-terrorism. The study considered poor terms and conditions of service as factors that might contribute to low morale at work and predispose many officers to a professional lifestyle of corruption. The summary of the findings is given in table 6.3.

**Table 6. 3: Challenge of Poor Terms and Conditions of Service in the NPS**

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	136	44.4
Agree	96	31.4
Neutral	38	12.4
Disagree	18	5.9
Strongly disagree	18	5.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 6.3 shows that 136 (44.4%) strongly agree that poor terms and conditions are a challenge to counter-terrorism while 96 (31.4%) agree to give a cumulative frequency 232 (78.32%) who agree. The interviews expounded on these challenges by highlighting that poor working

conditions for the police service included insufficient working tools and as well as poor remuneration, housing, medical cover and compensation in case of injury or death. The poor conditions of service are also evident in their operational and logistical facilities. The study findings agree with the study by Muthondeki (2017) that police do not feel motivated at their workplaces and felt they can exit from the service. The IT infrastructure is limited and in many cases it is manual recordings and information submission. All these factors lead to the poor moral standards at work and predispose a number of agents to a professional lifestyle of misconduct because of their insufficient wages. Engaging in corruption when it comes to terrorism activities could include allowing terrorists access to buildings with suspect equipment that can be used to harm members of the public. A police officer could easily do this in exchange for financial gain.

The study findings agree with the study by Oino and Sorre (2014) who observed that lack of adequate funding and lack of well-coordinated efforts is the greatest hindrance on combating terrorist acts in the country. The study thus avers that the NPS needs to work out better modalities to motivate their officers to ensure loyalty and commitment to duty.

#### **6.4 Budgetary Deficits in the National Police Service**

The study sought to find out whether budgetary deficits are a challenge to the efforts by the NPS in counter-terrorism and crime prevention. The study considered budgetary shortfall as hurting the many operations of NPS: it delays the realization of envisioned goals. Table 6.4 presents the findings of the study.

**Table 6. 4: Challenge of Budgetary Deficits in the NPS**

	Frequency	Per cent
Strongly agree	90	29.4
Agree	75	24.5
Neutral	108	35.3
Disagree	18	5.9
Strongly disagree	15	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 6.4 indicates that majority 108 (35.3%) of the respondents are neutral that budgetary deficits are a challenge to counter-terrorism while 90 (29.4%) strongly agree and 75 (24.5%) agree respectively. Although majority 108 (35.3%) of the respondent were not able to make up their minds as to whether the budgetary allocation of the NPS was a challenge in counterterrorism efforts in the country, the reality is that limited resources tend to act as a barrier in training, police operations, police organization and acquisition of modern equipment and technology. From interviews with the key informants, it was however clear that the budgetary deficits had led to the inability of NPS to acquire modern equipment as well as in-service officers on emerging issues in policing. Perhaps the reason for the discrepancy between the responses by the officers who responded to questionnaires and those who were interviewed is that the officers completing the questionnaire did not have a direct role in budget making, unlike their counterparts who were interviewed. Those who make budgets can easily review and see the gaps, unlike the users who might not understand the reason for the shortages.

The finding from the interviews conforms to NPS (2012) assertions, which indicated that many of the NPS development projects and modernization of police service remained under-resourced.

This has delayed their attempts to modernize and respond to the sophisticated nature of crime and crime. For example, a forensic laboratory to deal with sophisticated crime is available to the Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI). Furthermore, Kivoi (2013) argues that there is a shortage of ICT staff inside the Police Services (crimes using state-of-the-art, e.g. cybercrime). Given the foregoing, the study argues that there is need for NPS to enhance the budget for its activities. If the internal sources are inadequate, they could solicit assistance from external sources given that countering terrorism in Kenya would be of benefit to not only Kenya but also the entire world.

### **6.5 Challenge of Refugees' Militarization**

The study sought to find out whether refugee militarization poses a challenge to the National Police service in its counter-terrorism endeavours. Refugees are perceived to be responsible for trafficking arms and involvement in many terrorist attacks in Kenya. The findings are presented in Table 6.5.

**Table 6. 5: Challenge of Refugees' Militarization**

	<b>Frequency</b>	<b>Percentage</b>
Strongly agree	66	21.6
Agree	144	47.1
Neutral	54	17.6
Disagree	36	11.8
Strongly disagree	6	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 6.5 indicates that majority 144(47.1%) agreed that refugee militarization is a challenge to counter-terrorism while 66 (21.6%) strongly agree. The findings concur with Murunga (2005), who notes that police officers see refugees from Somalia, in particular, as key drivers of weapons trafficking insecurity in the region. He also points out that Somali refugees are responsible for increased insecurity in the capital city and argues that there should be a multitude of understandings of small arms in the region. Kenya in collaboration with UNHCR has been voluntarily repatriating refugees to their countries since December 2014 (UNHCR, 2014).

The study thus argues that, if the challenge of refugee militarization is to be overcome, the NPS needs to intensify border patrol to reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons into the country. Further, there is a need for the international community to intensify efforts to repatriate refugees to their countries to curb the potential insecurity from their presence within Kenya.

## 6.6 Challenge of Weak Criminal Justice System

The study sought to find out whether a weak criminal justice system is a challenge to NPS in counter-terrorism. The role of police in the criminal justice system is to investigate and present suspects to the court with supporting evidence for prosecution; they are a key factor in the criminal justice system. Table 6.6 presents the findings.

**Table 6. 6: Weak Criminal Justice Systems**

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	102	33.3
Agree	135	44.1
Neutral	42	13.7
Disagree	12	3.9
Strongly disagree	15	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 6.6 shows that majority 135(44.1%) agree that weak criminal justice systems are a challenge to counter-terrorism while 102 (33.3%) agree. This suggest that the NPS is a central component of the wider justice system, including judicial courts and correctional facilities such as prisons. The results agree with Gimode, (2001), who argued that criminal law inefficiency is attributable in part to inadequate forensic qualifications and facilities within the police. He further claims that a weak system of justice can be seen in the perceived inability of the courts to guarantee justice for victims of terror. The study argues that it is important to improve the

criminal justice system to assist the NPS to discharge its role in counter-terrorism. Having successful prosecutions and convictions will be a deterrent to those planning terrorist attacks.

### **6.7 Challenge of Corruption and Laxity in the National Police Service**

The study sought to find out whether corruption and laxity in National Police service jeopardized its efforts in counter-terrorism. The study considered any activity that hampered terrorism to have the potential to derail realizing the goal of countering terrorism in the country. Table 6.7 gives the findings.

**Table 6. 7: Corruption and Laxity in the National Police Service**

	Frequency	Percentage
Strongly agree	96	31.4
Agree	132	43.1
Neutral	27	8.8
Disagree	27	8.8
Strongly disagree	24	7.8
Total	306	100.0

**Source: Researcher, 2019**

Table 6.7 indicates that majority 132(43.1%) of the respondents agreed that corruption and laxity in the police service was a challenge in counter-terrorism. From interviews, one officer concurred with the findings by declaring that:

Corruption and laxity in the police service have been a challenge in counter-terrorism. This has been evident through acts like; police officers taking bribes, case file disappearing. This has also led to a lack of immediate response in terrorist attack cases leading to failure to account for the loss of life and property. (Source: Field data, 2019)

The assertions are in tandem with the EABI (2012) bribery index report which asserted that the National Police Service still leads as the most corrupt public sector with the likelihood of bribery being at 60%. Similarly, there are claims that the police form part of the chain of traders and other government officials that facilitate the flow of illegal weapons across Kenya's porous borders according to Murunga (2005). Given the foregoing, the study argues that there is a need to deal firmly with corruption in the NPS to send a strong warning to those with an inclination to engage in it in future. The current laxity in the NPS should end.

### **6.8 Respondents' Opinions on Other Challenges to Counter-Terrorism**

The study further sought to establish other challenges the NPS encounters in counter-terrorism in Kenya. The item was open-ended to capture diverse views from the respondents that the structured items could have missed. The most cited opinions were lack of modern technology, poor judicial laws, corruption, poor funding, political interference and lack of skilled personnel.

An interview with a member of civil society organization corroborated the findings that police officers lack skills and knowledge on counter-terrorism. One respondent interjected that:

Most officers are not trained on how to handle victims of terrorism, they lack skills and equipment to manage an incident during and after an attack (Source: Field data, 2019).

However, an interview with a senior state official in the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government gave a contrary view from the one above findings. He pointed out that:

National Police Service has acquired modern technology, tools and equipment to counter-terrorism. This has led to improved surveillance, intelligence gathering, and analysis. (Source: Field data, 2019).

On the converse, the officer, however, added that:

Although there is an improvement in criminal justice in Kenya, police still face challenges in prosecuting terror suspects (Source: Field data, 2019).

The study thus avers that there is a need to deal with the challenges in prosecution of terror suspects to give the NPS confidence that their efforts are not in vain. Speedy prosecution would also serve as a deterrent to those wanting to venture into terrorism.

### **6.9 Summary of the Chapter**

The findings in this chapter looked at various challenges faced by the national police service in countering terrorism. The study revealed that national police service is faced with transport deficiency; this was evident during the Garissa attack response whereby specialized unit delayed in response due to unavailability of the aeroplane to take to the responders to the scene. The study found that the NPS is faced with inadequate human resource capacity. This is shown by the inability to meet minimum UN recommendation of 1:450 (Kimani, 2012). The finding further revealed poor terms and conditions of service of the police officers. They lack sufficient training and necessary resources to counterterrorism. This is complicated further by a lack of adequate funding and lack of well-coordinated efforts to combat terrorist acts in the country.

From interviews, it emerged that police officers lack skills and knowledge on counter-terrorism. On a positive note, one interviewee, however, reported that the government has improved the welfare of police officers and acquires modern tools and technology for counterterrorism.

The study revealed that refugee's militarization is a challenge to the NPS in counter-terrorism because refugees are associated with arms trafficking and some refugees' camps harbour terrorists. Having a weak criminal justice system is a challenge to the NPS in counter-terrorism.

This is partly attributed to poor investigative skills and facilities within the NPS and insufficient laws on terrorism. Corruption within the NPS and judicial system was also found to be another challenge in countering. According to the East Africa Bribery Index (EABI) 2012, the National Police Service still leads as the most corrupt public sector with the likelihood of bribery being at 60%. Similarly, the police are said to form part of a traders' chain and other government officials who make it easier for illicit arms to flow across the pore borders of Kenya (2005).

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presents a summary of the research study, conclusion, recommendations and suggestions for further research. The findings were thematically based on the objectives of the study.

#### 7.1 Summary of the Findings

The general objective of this study was to examine the effectiveness of the National Police Service in countering terrorism in Kenya. The study was guided by the following objectives: to assess the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya; to examine the contribution of the National Police Service in countering terrorism, to establish the challenges the National Police Service face in countering terrorism in Kenya.

Before analyzing data on individual objectives, the study analyzed the demographic data of the respondents. It established that the majority of the respondents were male 216 (70.6%). This needs to be addressed to achieve improved representation of female within the service because each gender brings a unique dynamic to policing as a whole. The study revealed that majority of the respondents 180 (58.8%) were between the age of 30-39 while 12(3.9%) were between the age of 50-59. This shows that majority of the respondents were majorly youths. This could indicate the majority of respondents were at their productive age and did not only have a history of transition to NPS and but were also involved in counter-terrorism activities. They were thus well versed with the study topic to be able to give valid information.

Further, the results indicated that a cumulative 195 (63.7%) had 6 – 15 years' experience in the police force. The study considered this number to have relevant knowledge and experience to

give insightful responses to the items under study. Lastly, also established that the majority of the respondents' academic qualification 186 (60.8%) was secondary certificates. This showed that the majority did not pursue an education at higher levels after recruitment. Professional training programmes could be enhanced to improve the efficiency and productivity of police officers.

### **7.1.1 Nature and Extent of Terrorism in Kenya**

Kenya is, due to its porous boundaries, shared with its five neighbours, and is the long, mostly unmonitored coastline, relatively easy to reach and travel within. Kenya is an enticing destination and easy route to terrorist products, operations and transit points because of the blending of politically instable neighbourhoods and porous borders. Although there is a decline in terrorist attacks in major towns in Kenya, Northeastern and the coastal region has experience increase in such attacks. Actors point out to radicalized foreigners mostly from Somalia and Kenya from all parts of the country. Lack of socio-economic opportunities, marginal discrimination, weak governance that promotes a declining state-citizenship, breach of human rights and selective enforcement of the rule of law lead towards the embrace of violent extremism by the coastal and northeastern communities.

The study agrees with Adan (2005) findings that Poverty and unemployment, unstable neighbours, Islamism, and Insufficient Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism Policies are the main factors that predispose country to terrorism. Terrorist recruiters leverage these community grievances in their tactics for radicalisation and recruitment by developing politically motivated accounts focused on the common enemy, while the Kenyan State and Western government allies emphasize the plight of communities and individual victims (Badurdeen, 2016). Recruiters follow up with materialistic and/or moral help responses to their needs.

### **7.1.2 Contribution of the NPS in Countering Terrorism**

The findings of the study indicate that NPS contribute to counterterrorism through Surveillance, intelligence gathering and analysis of gathered intelligent to counterterrorism. The study revealed that the government of Kenya has invested heavily on security by modernizing police service in terms of acquiring modern technology (example; installation of CCTV in Nairobi and Mombasa Cities), tools and equipment (NPS, 2015). This is in line with the Revised Police Reforms Program Document 2015-2018 that was launched by President Kenyatta on August 2015 as part of A Strategy Framework for Implementation of Reforms in the National Police Service.

However, police are yet to embrace community-based policing model in counter-terrorism. A study by Fridell and Wycoff (2004) indicate that police-community partnership can develop response aimed at disseminating information to the community on terror activities that affect their quality of life. Bruce (2006) states that the measure of success in the war on terrorism is defined as the ability of intelligence agencies and law enforcement organizations to prevent, preempt, and deter attacks.

### **7.1.3 Challenges the NPS Face In Counter-Terrorism**

The findings show that NPS is faced by numerous challenges, which include transport deficiency, deficiency in human resource capacity, poor terms and conditions of service, budgetary deficits, refugee's militarization, the weak criminal justice system, corruption and laxity in the police. The study reveals that the government of Kenya is in the process of addressing these challenges through its efforts in police modernization.

According to Kiggundu (1991), availability of adequate funds and resources is very crucial for the development of any particular firm particularly those firms that are well-funded experience

minimal difficulties in adopting and implementing strategies. They can fully expand their operations. The organizations are therefore not able to purchase the required resources and deploy additional personnel. This limits the ability to purchase modernized equipment and gadgets to curb terrorist activities. Hence, police welfare is relatively low which refers to their general conditions, not only in the workplace but also in their personal life. The police and security personnel were found to have poor living and working conditions, which highly affected their efficiency and dedication to fully implement the counter strategies and serve lawfully.

Despite the police being given a salary increment in the recent past, the salaries are still insufficient to cater for their needs. Police remuneration as compared to other security personnel and public servant, it is very low and some officers have used this as justification for their engagement in criminal activities like corruption and facilitation of criminals. This raises the need to ensure that there is a need to come up with a mechanism to ensure proper management of funds.

Davis (2010) postulated that curbing terrorism activities has been hardened greatly by the modernization of technology. Particularly, technology has been found to ease how the terrorist undertakes their transaction such as media propaganda, money transfer, communication and overall terrorist operations activities.

## **7.2 Conclusion**

The overall conclusion of the study is that NPS plays a critical role in counter-terrorism in Kenya. Utilizing the law enforcement and intelligence entities that are already in place is necessary to mitigate terrorist threats. They act as both a deterrent and reactive force to terrorists, deterring the planning of attacks on the Kenyan soil.

### **7.2.1 Nature and Extent of Terrorism**

On the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya today, the study concludes that the geographical location of Kenya, unemployment, unstable neighbours, Islamism, poverty, and Insufficient law enforcement in counter-terrorism policies are among factors that contribute to the rise in terrorism in Kenya. There is a lack of economic and socio-economic opportunities, marginalization discrimination, weak governance which promotes the deteriorating relationship between the state and its citizens, violation of human rights, and selective enforcement are the driving forces behind recruits endorsing violent extremism. In radicalising and recruiting techniques al-Shabaab recruiters leverage these mutual grievances by developing ideological narratives that concentrate on the common enemy as the State of Kenya and its Western partner governments, while emphasizing the plight of communities and individual victims.

If Kenya is to minimize violence and by extension terrorism, the fundamental root causes of conflicts, such as poverty, insecurity, abuses of human rights, injustices, corruption, exclusion and impunity, must be addressed as a top priority. Kenya being a major player in fostering peace and stability in the region should co-operate with her neighbours in promoting socio-economic development in the region.

### **7.2.2 Contribution of NPS in Counter-Terrorism**

NPS contribute to counterterrorism through intelligence gathering, analysis of intelligence and surveillance. Equipping and training of police is core to its efforts in countering terrorism, study suggests that all officers obtain basic training in terrorism-related investigations; these will enable NPS to contribute effectively on its effort of counterterrorism. The poor social and

economic environment provides a haven for the nurturing of crime-terror nexus. The trend could be reversed by the NPS using existing relationships between the police and the community.

The study also finds that it is important for the NPS to use technology to promote the NPS and to comply with domestic counterterror-terror strategies. Police technology, particularly in communications and knowledge exchange, influence, preferably in a co-ordinated manner, how information transforms into action. Adoption of technology will contribute to the enhancement of security and hence increasing the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies and minimizing the risk of a terrorist attack.

### **7.2.3 Challenges of NPS in Counter-Terrorism**

NPS faces several deficiencies that in varied ways hinder their effectiveness in implementing their mandate of countering terrorism and general policing. This includes; Transport Deficiencies, Human Resource Capacity Deficits, Poor Terms and Conditions of Service, Budgetary Deficits, Refugee Militarization, Kenya's Criminal Justice System, Corruption and Laxity in the Police Service. Dealing with the challenges will empower and equip the NPS for effectiveness in counterterrorism.

### **7.3 Recommendations**

Based on the study's findings and conclusion, the study makes several recommendations. First, the study recommends that to prevent terrorism, the government should give priority to addressing the underlying root causes of conflicts such as poverty, unemployment, human rights violations, injustices, corruptions, marginalization and impunity through sustainable development thus improving socio-economic infrastructure. The government should enact laws governing border control and terrorism to enable the police to deal with terrorism effectively.

Secondly, Kenya being a major player in fostering peace and stability in the region should cooperate with her neighbours in promoting socio-economic development in the region. The country should work with stakeholders to come up with national counter violent extremism and terrorism plan, which would reflect a multi-agency approach within the government, NGOs, religious communities and affected communities.

Third, the study recommends that the NPS should put measures to ensure increased public participation in counter-terrorism. This will provide an opportunity for the public and the police to interact and develop good rapport hence learning and gaining more insight about the nature and extent of terrorism in the country. Since all the counter radicalizations and counter extremist are done by the national government, the study recommends that the county governments are involved in addressing radicalization through preventive measures.

Forth, the study recommends that there should be a further effort in increasing manpower and training of the police officers on modern counter-terrorism technologies and tactics. Through this, the available personnel will have the knowledge and expertise on how to respond to the terrorist situation. NPS should acquire modern technology, tools and equipment for surveillance, intelligence collection, intelligence analysis and dissemination of intelligence for action. This will ensure that the NPS contributes effectively in its role of counter-terrorism.

Fifth, the study recommends training needs assessment for the police officers to establish their training needs and plan a relevant programme to build their capacity in counterterrorism. Further, the study recommends a need for lawmakers to strengthen laws against terrorism.

Lastly, the study recommends that the government of Kenya should address the challenges faced by NPS in its war against terrorism; this includes transport deficiency inadequate funding,

refugees militarization, corruption within police service, poor terms and condition in the NPS and budgetary deficits.

#### **7.4 Suggestion for Further Research**

The study makes three suggestions for further research. One, a study on the counter-radicalization for the youths. This would entail understanding factors that make youth vulnerable to radicalization. The goal of the study would be to identify socio-economic factors and ways to mitigate this problem.

Secondly, a study to establish how community policing can be applied in counter-terrorism in the country. This will entail understanding how the community can contribute in intelligence collection, the effectiveness of door-to-door crime prevention strategy within community policing and contributions of various social institutions like family, religion, peers and media to counter terrorism can thus be systematically studied.

Finally, the study recommends a study on the role of public-private policing partnership, focusing on the significance of public awareness in counter-terrorism. This includes the use of technology in monitoring and analysis of crime patterns e.g. mobile banking, communication and money laundering.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix 1: Questionnaires for Police Officers

This questionnaire is on the effectiveness of the National Police Service in Countering Terrorism in Kenya with specific reference to Nairobi County.

#### INSTRUCTIONS

The researcher requests for your voluntary participation to answer each question according to the instructions given. Do not write your name. Your responses are necessary for research purposes only and will be treated with strict confidence by the researcher. Answer as truthfully as you can.

#### SECTION A: BIODATA

Please complete the following by ticking the appropriate box.

1. **Gender:** Male [  ]      Female [  ]
  
2. **Age**      20 – 29 years [  ]      30- 39 years [  ]  
                  40 – 49 years [  ]      50 – 59 years [  ]      60 and above [  ]
  
3. **How long have you been in the service?**  
1-5 years            [  ]            6 – 10 years            [  ]  
11- 15 years        [  ]            Over 16 years            [  ]
  
4. **Which department do you belong to?**  
Department of criminal justice            [  ]  
Police patrol                                    [  ]  
Community policing                            [  ]  
Intelligence-led                                [  ]  
General duty office (report office)        [  ]

**5. What is your highest educational qualification?**

- Primary [ ] Diploma [ ]  
 Secondary [ ] Bachelors [ ]  
 Post - Secondary [ ] Masters [ ]  
 Certificate [ ] Doctorate [ ]  
 Any other .....

**SECTION B: EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KENYA WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO NAIROBI COUNTY**

**PART A: Nature and extent of terrorism**

Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements on the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya using the scale below:

1- Strongly Agree, 2 - Agree, 3 - Neutral, 4- Disagree 5 - Strongly Disagree.

Statements	1	2	3	4	5
The geographical location of Kenya predisposes her to a terrorist attack.					
Poverty and unemployment in Kenya contribute to terrorism					
Unstable neighbours contribute to terrorism in Kenya.					
Islamism contributes to terrorism in Kenya.					
Insufficient Law enforcement and Counterterrorism policies contribute to terrorism Kenya.					

Any other observations on the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya today

.....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

**PART B: The contribution of the National Police Service in Counter-Terrorism**

Do you consider the following activities of the National Police Service to have contributed to countering terrorism in Kenya today?

1- Strongly Agree, 2 - Agree, 3 - Neutral, 4 – Disagree 5- Strongly Disagree.

Statements	1	2	3	4	5
Intelligent gathering					
Analysis of gathered intelligent					
Surveillance.					

In your own opinion, what other ways can the National Police Service contribute to counter-terrorism in Kenya?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

**Part C: Challenges the National Police Service faces in Counter-Terrorism**

Please indicate the challenges the National Police Service faces in Countering Terrorism in Kenya

1- Strongly Agree, 2 - Agree, 3 - Neutral, 4 – Disagree 5 - Strongly Disagree.

Statements	1	2	3	4	5
Transport deficiency.					
Deficiency in Human resource capacity.					
Poor terms and conditions of service					
Budgetary deficits					
Refugees militarization					
The weak criminal justice system in Kenya					
Corruption and Laxity in the Police Service					

In your own opinion, what other challenges does the NPS face in her efforts to counter terrorism in Kenya?

.....

.....

.....

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.....

.....

***END***

*Thank you for your participation.*

**Appendix 2: Interview Guide for Senior State Officers in the Ministry of Interior and  
Coordination of National Government**

This study is on the effectiveness of the National Police Service in Countering Terrorism in Kenya with reference to Nairobi County.

**Demographic Data**

1. Gender Male [ ] Female [ ]

2. Which age bracket do you belong?

18-24 [ ]

25-35 [ ]

36-45 [ ]

46-55 [ ]

55 and above [ ]

3. What is the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya? Prompt for an explanation on how terrorist acts are carried out, who is involved, frequency and patterns.

4. What are the contributions of the National Police Service in Counterterrorism? Prompt on issues of improved surveillance, intelligence gathering and analysis, community policing and criminal justice system.

5. What are the challenges NPS faces in countering terrorism In Kenya? Prompt on training and skills, availability of tools and equipment, terms and condition of service.

6. In your opinion, what could be done to improve police officers' role in counter-terrorism?

**END**

### **Appendix 3: Interview Guide for the Survivors of Terrorism**

This study is on the Effectiveness of the National Police Service in Countering Terrorism in Kenya with reference to Nairobi County.

1. Gender Male [ ] Female [ ]

2. Which age bracket do you belong?

18-24 [ ]

25-35 [ ]

36-45 [ ]

46-55 [ ]

55 and above [ ]

3. What nature of terrorist attack did you survive, what makes you survive the terrorist attack? Probe on police rescue, another agency rescue, personal skills and luck.

4. How did the attack impact your life?. Prompt on the loss of livelihood, body injury, and psychological trauma among others.

5. Did police assist you following the attack? Probe on how.

6. In your opinion, do you think that the police are contributing to reducing terrorism? Probe for why, if yes and, for how police could contribute if no.

7. In your opinion, what could be done to improve police officers' role in counter-terrorism?

**END**

#### **Appendix 4: Interview Guide for Members of Civil Society Organization**

This Study is on the Effectiveness of the national police service in Countering Terrorism in Kenya in Reference to Nairobi County.

1. Gender Male [ ] Female [ ]

2. Which age bracket do you belong?

18-24 [ ]

25-35 [ ]

36-45 [ ]

46-55 [ ]

55 and above [ ]

3. What is the nature and extent of terrorism in Kenya today? Probe for actors, reasons and areas where most prevalent

4. Do you consider the NPS contributing to counter-terrorism? Probe for how?

5. What is your role in response to terrorist attacks?

6. In your interaction with NPS, what are the challenges in Counterterrorism and how they can be the outcome?

In your opinion, what could be done to improve police officers' contribution to counter-terrorism?

***END***

## **Appendix 5: Introduction letter**

Alex Chepsoi  
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology  
P.O Box 1900-50100  
Kakamega  
30<sup>th</sup> August 2018

Inspector-General of Police  
National Police Service Headquarters  
P.O Box 230083  
Nairobi.

### **RE: PERMISSION TO COLLECT DATA FOR ACADEMIC RESEARCH**

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am a Master's Degree student for Emergency Management Studies at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. As a requirement for the award of my degree, I am supposed to carry out a study intended to solve a problem within my area of specialization. I, therefore, intend to carry out a study on "Effectiveness of the National Police Service in Counter-Terrorism in Kenya with Specific reference to Nairobi County". The purpose of this letter is to request your permission to carry out the study in your area of jurisdiction.

The information provided will be confidential and will solely be used to accomplish this academic goal. Descriptive survey design will form the basis for this study and the findings will ultimately provide the Police and the Government with information to use to develop an effective policy to combat the terrorist threat in Kenya. Participation in the study will be anonymous and participants are free to withdraw from the study at any point if you feel uncomfortable.

Yours faithfully,  
Alex Chepsoi

## Appendix 6: Letter of Authority to collect Data



**MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**  
Tel: 0208045353  
Fax: 056-30153  
E-mail: [mmust@mmust.ac.ke](mailto:mmust@mmust.ac.ke)  
Website: <http://www.mmust.ac.ke>

P.O. Box 190  
Kakamega – 50100  
Kenya

### OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR, NAIROBI CAMPUS

REF: CDM/G/200/13/1

Date: 12<sup>th</sup> October 2018

The Commission Secretary  
NACOSTI  
P.O. Box 30623-00100  
NAIROBI

Dear Sir/Madam

**RE: AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT RESEARCH – Mr. ALEX CHERONO CHEPSOI,  
CDM/G/200/13**

This is to confirm that Mr. Alex Chepsoi, is a student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology pursuing a Master of Science in Emergency Management Studies.

He successfully defended his proposal titled, *“Influence of the National Police Service in Countering Terrorism in Kenya with Specific Reference to Nairobi County, Kenya.”* He requires permission to collect data towards development of his thesis.

Any assistance given to him will be highly appreciated by this office.

  
Peter Wawire  
COORDINATOR, NAIROBI CAMPUS

## Appendix 7: Research Permit

**THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT:** **Permit No : NACOSTI/P/19/51568/26265**  
**MR. ALEX CHERONÓ CHEPSOI** **Date Of Issue : 17th January,2019**  
**of MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF** **Fee Received :Ksh 1000**  
**SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, 53258-200**  
**Nairobi, has been permitted to conduct**  
**research in Nairobi County**

**on the topic: INFLUENCE OF THE**  
**NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE IN**  
**COUNTERING TERRORISM IN KENYA**  
**WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO NAIROBI**  
**COUNTY**

**for the period ending:**  
**17th January,2020**

**Applicant's**   
**Signature** **Director General**  
**National Commission for Science,**  
**Technology & Innovation**

## Appendix 8 Research Authorization



### NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION

Telephone: +254-20-2213471,  
2241349, 3310571, 2219420  
Fax: +254-20-318245, 318249  
Email: dg@nacosti.go.ke  
Website: www.nacosti.go.ke  
When replying please quote

NACOSTI, Upper Kabete  
Off Waiyaki Way  
P.O. Box 30623-00100  
NAIROBI-KENYA

Ref. No. **NACOSTI/P/19/51568/26265**

Date: **17<sup>th</sup> January, 2019**

Alex Cherono Chepsoi  
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology  
P. O Box 190-50100  
**KAKAMEGA**

#### **RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION**

Following your application for authority to carry out research on *“Influence of the National Police Service in countering terrorism in Kenya with specific reference to Nairobi County”* I am pleased to inform you that you have been authorized to undertake research in **Nairobi County** for the period ending **17<sup>th</sup> January, 2020**.

You are advised to report to **the County Commissioner and the County Director of Education, Nairobi County** before embarking on the research project.

Kindly note that, as an applicant who has been licensed under the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 to conduct research in Kenya, you shall deposit **a copy** of the final research report to the Commission within **one year** of completion. The soft copy of the same should be submitted through the Online Research Information System.

  
**GODFREY P. KALERWA MSc., MBA, MKIM**  
**FOR: DIRECTOR-GENERAL/CEO**

Copy to:

The County Commissioner  
Nairobi County.

The County Director of Education  
Nairobi County.

