

**THE NEXUS BETWEEN SOCIO-CULTURAL FACTORS AND CONFLICT
DYNAMISM WITHIN KERIO VALLEY DELTA, KENYA**

Michael Kiplagat Aiyabei

**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment for the Conferment of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance of
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology**

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DECLARATION AND CERTIFICATION

DECLARATION

This Thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources support, and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or any other award.

Signature.....

Date:

Michael Kiplagat Aiyabei

CDM/H/01-57617/2016

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certify that they have read and hereby recommend for acceptance of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology a thesis entitled: *“The nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamisms within Kerio Valley Delta, Kenya”*.

Signature:

Date:

Dr. Ferdinand Nabiswa Makhanu, Ph.D.

Department of Emergency Management Studies

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

Signature:

Date:

Dr. Elijah Onyango Standslause Odhiambo, Ph.D.

Department of Emergency Management Studies

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

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DEDICATION

This Thesis is dedicated to my wife, Emily Aiyabei and our children Rhine Kiplimo., Gift Kimutai and Tiffany Chebet for their understanding, patience and sacrifice during my studies.

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ABSTRACT

The demographic consequences of conflict and violence in the developing world are receiving increased attention and so is conflict in Kenya. The Northern part of Kenya in particular inhabited by pastoral communities such as the Turkana, Pokot, Marakwet, and Samburu in the Kerio valley Delta, have had years of unresolved conflict. In as much as cattle raids practiced by these communities are considered a culture, emerging socio-cultural factors have increased conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta Kenya and thus the need for conflict management that resonate with new socialization in unending violence. This study aimed at understanding the relationship between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism. The general objective of this study is to investigate the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism in Kerio valley delta while the specific objectives were; To assess the relationship between maintaining status as a socio-cultural element and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta; To examine influence of ethnic identity as a socio-cultural attribute to conflict dynamism within Kerio valley Delta; To analyse the influence of cultural beliefs system as a socio-cultural attribute on conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta and To evaluate the effectiveness of livelihood options as a deterrence of conflict within Kerio Valley Delta. This study was guided by conflict transformational theory and culture theory. The study was conducted in Kerio Valley Delta which links Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and Baringo Counties. Through cross cultural and correlation research designs were used and data collected by use of purposive, simple random, snowballing and census methods. The study population of this research comprised of community elders; morans households in six counties-192,575; government officers461-. The total study population was 193,060. Questionnaires and interviews were used with 196 community elders, 179 community morans; interviews were used with 54 government officers while FGDs were used with 125 government officers. Total sample size was 384. The study adopted a cross-cultural research design and correlational study research design. The quantitative data received from the questionnaires categorized per objective was analysed using descriptive and inferential statistical tools while qualitative data was analysed using thematic/narrative analysis. Computer software was used for coding and further analysis. The study results show that; maintaining status, ethnic identity, cultural belief system and livelihood options have a strong and positive relationship with conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta. The study thus recommends that conflict management strategies should focus on current socio-cultural factors. Sustainable livelihood options such as sedentary pastoralism should be structured with full government support with aim of developing an otherwise marginalised region.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ASTU	Anti Stock Theft Unit
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
DFID	Department for International Development
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
FASO	Families Achieving Sustainable Outcomes
FGD	Focused Group Discussion
GHA	Greater Horn of Africa
GoK	Government of Kenya
GSU	General Service Unit
ICC	International Criminal Court
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IIF	Innovation Investment Fund
IOM	International Organization for Migration
KII	Key Informant Interview
KNHCR	Kenya National Human Rights Commission
KPR	Kenya Police Reservist
KRCS	Kenya Red Cross Society
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PRIME	Pastoralist Area Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion
SIDA	Swedish Development Agency
SL	Sustainable Livelihood
SLA	Sustainable Livelihood Approach
SLF	Sustainable Livelihood Framework
SPSS	Statistical package for Social Sciences
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNISDR	United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Conflict dynamism:	Refers to disagreements or collisions in interest or opinions between two or more actors (Marakwet vs Pokot) and how the conflict exhibit changes over time.
Conflict resolution:	Refers to the resolution of the underlying incompatibilities in a conflict and mutual acceptance of each party's existence as applied in Kerio valley Delta.
Conflict:	This is the status where there are opposing ideas, opinions, feelings or wishes that are incompatible, can either be non-violent or violent. In this study it refers to disagreement involving the communities living along the Kerio valley delta resulting from resource disagreements, raids or un-intended death that is construed as intended and thus need for retaliation
Ethnic based conflict:	It occurs between different ethnic groups in the community such as the Pokot, Turkana among others
Ethnicity:	A consciousness among people with shared ancestry, cultural roots and territory justifying their unity in Kerio Valley Delta.

Kerio Valley Delta:	refers to the Kerio River valley and the intersections with tributaries to Kerio River where watering of pastoralist animals commonly occur.
Migration:	The movement from one area to another in search of pasture, water or safety. In this study means the relocation of a pastoralist group or ethnic community from an area of abode in search of safer ground to live or in search of better pasture and water for the livestock. It may be permanent or temporary in Kerio Valley Delta.
Raid:	Refers to planned forceful or violent large scale theft of livestock from another ethnic community done by more than three persons among communities in Kerio Valley Delta.
Social cultural factors:	Refers to the differences between groups of people relating to beliefs, customs, practices, social class, education and culture in which they live and that affect the thoughts, feelings and behaviours of its people.
Status:	refers to perception of individual or community as to the influence they command in society because of their leadership position, opinion setting and determination, performing of religious practices, or wealth owned including family size among pastoral communities in Kerio Valley Delta.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter opens by giving a background and rationale of this study. It then proceeds to shade light on the problem statement and subsequently the overall and specific objectives of the study and includes research questions that guided the study. This Chapter also give the scope and justification of the study both in academic and policy perspective. The chapter ends with a summary.

1.1 Background to the Study

Conflict is a situation in which two identifiable groups are in conscious opposition to each other as they pursue incompatible goals brought about mainly by structural violence (Bloomfield *et al.*, 2003). Conflicts are common phenomena in many regions of the world, especially in dry lands which suffer from scarce natural resources (Sterzel *et al.*, 2014). Conflict has been one of the devastating phenomena in Africa in the last three decades, with Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) being the most vulnerable (Hussein, 2014). Conflict in these areas manifest with aggression that is often based on ethnicity; indeed, ethnic connotations of conflicts have been touted as a major cause of conflict since resource-based conflict narrative. White (2012), for example, states that ethnic conflicts can distinctly be picked from other types of conflicts globally. Conflicts in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel versus Palestine, Kosovo, the genocide of Rwanda, the civil war of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC); all of them have ethnic roots.

The African situation and the conflicts that lie at the heart of its existence mostly has got to do with control, access to land and attainment of land-based resources like water, pasture and farming. For instance, the Toder massacre of 1991 in Nigeria where the Hausa farmers killed 102 members of a settled Fulani-herding community presents a living memory (Hussein, 2014). The drivers of conflict and motivation for the same have

been changing consistently albeit being inter-related. Also, climate change in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) has been evidenced by increasing frequency of droughts from one in every six years to one in every three years. In Ethiopia, drought frequency has increased from 6-8 years to the current 1-2 years. A study by Hussein postulates that tribal conflicts are as a result of scarce resources such as land. His study is relevant to the current one since it points to causes of conflicts that are ethnic in nature; however, this study fails to point out ingrained socio-cultural factors as drivers of ethnic violence in Africa.

On the other hand, Matthew *et al* (2009), is of the opinion that manipulation of natural inputs coupled with environmental degradation is important stages in conflicts as far as its perpetuation and deflation of peace are concerned. The study observed that approximately 40% of the conflicts occurring intra-state over the last sixty years are linked to natural resources. In Sudan for example, conflicts have deepened because of declining natural resources instigated by severe droughts (Verhoeven, 2011). In Africa, the culture of conflict and violence stems from tribal or ethnic, religious, regional, racial differences and class divide. These reflect the diversity of cultures, and increased economic inequalities between the haves and have not. Oftentimes, cultural and economic factors intertwine as causes of conflict, highlighting the complexity of conflicts in Africa (Osei-Hwedie *et al.*, 2012). Thus, Osei-Hwedie *et al* (2012), brings in other perspectives of conflicts that emanate from environmental degradation which are responsible for climate change. In as much as climate change can be an element that causes dynamism in conflict, it does not explain aspects of socio-cultural that contribute to dynamism of conflicts among ethnic communities in Africa per se.

As elsewhere in Africa, Kenya has borne the brunt of inter-community conflicts of varied grades throughout the years. These conflicts are ingrained in some communities' psyche and are instigated for various reasons. For example, the Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet and Samburu have witnessed massive conflicts and some of the justification has been attributed to government and policy inattentiveness. There are also other conflicts between primary populations of the Rift Valley and the late settler's particularly post-independence settlers and local ethnic groups that have continuously occurred with no permanent solution found. The said conflicts are normally observed between the Maasai and Kalenjin in one hand and between Luhya, Kisii, and Kalenjin on the other (Greiner, 2013). The patterns of conflict in the North Rift and North Eastern regions are complex. Greiner (2013), study brings to the fore peaceful interventions by various regimes to get solutions to conflicts that bedevil these communities in the rift valley. This study does not mention any socio-cultural aspects that need to be the focus of intervention in finding lasting peace in this valley.

Among the pastoral communities, conflicts are largely caused by competition over control of and access to natural resources particularly water and pasture. Other causes of conflicts include historical rivalry, deep-seated cultural values, land issues, political incitements, idleness amongst the youth and more recently proliferation of illicit arms (Cheserek *et al.*, 2012). While communities have continued to protect their grazing and water points with fairly minimal 'new conflicts', routine cultural raids aimed at restocking after droughts and for the purpose of dowry payments, continue to occur. Cheserek *et al* (2012), study indicates that rivalry over scarce resources is a cause of

these conflicts, but fails to point out how this relates to dynamism of the very conflicts that have plagued this valley for years.

However, his study points out that traditionally, raids especially by the Nilotic group - Turkana, Pokot, Samburu and Marakwet did not raid from their own community, but interestingly, raids among the three Kalenjin dialect groups Pokot, Tugen and Marakwet, points to a concern as to the changing spheres of conflict. Raiders were ordinarily not allowed to kill women and children during the raids, but over the last decade this has been observed to occur with serious displacement becoming a common feature. Conflicts in the Kerio Valley region of Kenya are thought to be part and parcel of a pastoral culture and livelihood of resident communities. However, in recent years, due to the proliferation of modern small arms, commercialization of livestock raiding, dispute over land tenure rights, banditry and predation, the cattle raiding practice has become a widespread, sophisticated, more violent and destructive activity among pastoral communities in Northern Kenya. Thus, this study introduces a new twist to protracted conflicts in the Kerio Valley that emerging factors that are socio-cultural in nature have brought to the fore dynamism in the conflicts; however, the study does not mention effective intervention measures that need to capture the new dynamism in the mentioned conflict.

Calam (2017), Ikejiaku et al (2011) and Schilling et al (2012), concur that displacement of families is a major consequence of conflict and that the explosion of contemporary automatic weapons is well recognized as having had an undesirable influence on the nature and influence of armed conflicts in pastoral communities (Mkutu, 2008). Some conflicts amongst pastoralist communities, like raiding leading to cattle rustling have a

long past and have to some degree become a feature of traditional pastoralist culture (Kaimba *et al.*, 2011). These studies do no mention how the mix of cultures have complicated conflict in the Kerio Valley which is the concern of the current study.

In addition, Njiru (2012), study argues that causes to conflicts in Kerio Valley include political pressure and incitement, climate change and socio-economic pressure as major determinants of the conflict dynamism. In other words, communities in this valley have now been socialized along political lines that add new twist to conflicts that this study is focused on. Although, humanitarian challenges that consistently result from the conflict occurrence, the displacement, disturbance on household economies and serious compromise on development makes a study in this area important, and interventions on socio-cultural factors have narrowly been studied in this academic area which situates the current study on this line of thought.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In Kenya unprecedented wave of internal and cross-border conflicts due to peoples' strong attachment to their communities, espousing fundamentally different values, and in competition with each other for access to, or control over resources has been a permanent feature with pastoral communities. In the Kerio valley delta, for instance, increased number of large scale raids has been historical and government's responses are geared towards limiting to multiple retaliatory attacks. Such pattern are replicated across the valley delta since 1997, 2002, (Commission, 2001., Kimenju *et al* 2003), and these repeated in the elections of 2007, 2013 and 2017.

Kerio Valley Delta experience pastoralist and ethnic conflicts that have led to increased numbers of humanitarian aid by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and government knee jerk responses such as disarmament programs. Therefore, emergent socio-cultural factors have greatly led to conflict dynamism. This study would fill this gap such that conflict management strategies are in tandem with the emergent socio-cultural factors underpinning current conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of this study was to investigate the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta.

Specific objectives were to:

- i. Assess the maintenance of status with regard to conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta.
- ii. Examine ethnic identity in relation to conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta
- iii. Analyse cultural belief systems in context of conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta.
- iv. Evaluate livelihood as a deterrence of conflict within Kerio Valley Delta.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. How does status maintenance contribute to conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta?
- ii. How does ethnic identity influence conflict dynamism within Kerio valley Delta?
- iii. To what extent do cultural belief systems influence conflict dynamism within Kerio valley Delta?

- iv. To what extent does livelihood dynamism act as deterrence of conflict within Kerio Valley Delta?

1.5 Justification of the study

This part is delineated in three important parts, namely; the academic justification, policy justification and philosophical justification for the present study that touches on the extent socio-cultural factors such as livelihood, status maintenance, ethnic identity and cultural belief systems underpin conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta.

1.5.1 Academic Justification

This study aims at investigating the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta, Kenya. Cheserek *et al* (2012), study highlights causes of conflicts such as historical rivalry, deep-seated cultural values, land issues, political incitements, and idleness amongst the youth and more recently proliferation of illicit arms. His study is focused on socio-cultural aspects that have existed in history of these ethnic groups. On the other hand, Ruto *et al* (2003), singles out that the proliferation of illicit arms in the Kerio Valley region has made cattle raids deadly, severe and commercial. Further, they point out that, other causes of conflicts include ethnocentrism, heroism, land disputes and boundary problems. In this academic field, focus in previous studies concentrate on how pre-existing socio-cultural aspects are a major contributors to dynamics of conflicts. The current study endeavoured to explore how small arms, climate change, politicization and commercialization of raids have introduced emergent socio-cultural factors that have altered the nature of conflict in the area. Thus, aspects of dynamics in conflict are yet to be the focus in this academic field of which the current study explored exhaustively. Moreover, previous studies are focused on resource scarcity or rivalry as major causes of conflict while the current ones'

underpins issues of socialization of emerging issues as responsible to dynamism in conflicts that bedevil this region.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

On policy justification, previous studies focus has been on efforts by state and non-state actors attempt to resolve the conflicts. However, Calam (2017), argues that despite the presence of many security personnel and NGOs within Kerio Valley Delta peace is still elusive; which necessitates sound policy recommendations that the current study would explore. On the other hand, Ruto *et al.*, (2003), study suggested that all communities in the Kerio Valley, especially the Pokot, should be disarmed. They argue that disarmament programs, peace meetings and workshops in the north rift region of Kenya are ways of restoring peace in this delta. Additionally, they point out that customary institutions and mechanisms of conflict management need to be strengthened. Thus, with the emerging socio-cultural factors in relation to conflict dynamism in the area; need for new policy recommendations cannot be understated here. These study policy recommendations would be beneficial to NGOs, national and county governments, and to Kerio-valley Delta communities.

1.5.3 Philosophical Justification

There are mainly three main philosophical approaches in research, namely; positivist, interpretivist (constructivist) and pragmatic (critical). The positivist approach underscores the objective nature of the study in a manner that argues that the researcher looks at the study in an objective fashion that places the researcher out of the research occurrences and happenings (Žukauskas *et al.*, 2018). In other words, the researcher does not have any manipulative or influencing power over the issues under study and the researcher's work is to thus examine the issues under investigation as a bystander with an objective eye. However, in the event the researcher wants to shape the social

landscape of the research and thus become subjective, the researcher here is guided by the interpretivist (constructivist) philosophy (Mohajan, 2018). The interpretivist approach is thus the opposite of the positivist philosophical approach as far as it is subjective against the objective approach employed by the positivist. The pragmatic (critical) approach is undergirded by facts and the research problem. Consequently, the focus of the pragmatic approach is the research results. The research is 'free' in the sense that the researcher has free reign to choose the methodology, procedures and techniques that would be used in a critical manner (Punch, 2013, Mohajan, 2018).

The present study is underpinned under the positivist philosophical approach for some salient reasons. One, the present study is an objective investigation of the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta; here the researcher does not have any manipulative or influencing power of the occurrences but is simply an assessor of the situation. Two, the study mainly uses quantitative method to collect data with support from qualitative method which is in line with the positivist approach. Three, the present study is to a significant extent correlational and this aligns with the positivist approach since positivist approach correlates the findings to what is happening in the real world.

1.6 Scope of the study

This study covers five counties in the North Rift Region of Kenya. It was limited to the inhabitants living in the wards of the sub counties bordering each other in the five counties under study; Baringo, Samburu, Turkana, West Pokot and Marakwet. Kerio valley sharing water and pasture resources. It also serves coincidentally as a common border among the pastoral communities from the ethnic groups living along it namely, the Tugen, Marakwet, Pokot, Ilchamus and Turkana. The focus in this study was on four spots; the Suguta valley, Kapedo, Tiati, Kainuk and Kaptalmwa. It took approximately

six months to complete the study inclusive of the pilot study. This study was conducted between the months of April and to September 2019. On thematic areas, the study focused on the extent to which socio-cultural factors like, maintaining status, ethnic identity, cultural belief systems, and livelihood options influence the nature of dynamics of conflict in the Kerio Valley Delta.

Further, the study focused on a twenty-year period between the years 1997 to 2017. Within this time chosen for study, unprecedented level of conflict was reached in the valley with huge level of fatalities being experience. Indeed, the chosen period has had a significant number of conflicts in the Kerio delta affecting the same communities with medium and high scale impact that often attracted government attention from the fatalities that resulted as aforementioned.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter presents reviews of previous studies. It covers literature on the relationship between the socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism within Kerio valley Delta as per specific objectives indicated. A conceptual framework and model of the study is also discussed

2.1 The Concept of Conflict Dynamism

Collier *et al.*, (2005), argue that there is a momentous and substantial relationship linking a country's dependence on principal resources, livelihood and armed conflict; and compounded by culture and ethnicity. This created a conclusion that is twofold. One, resource predation is now viewed as a mechanism and not a correlation. Two, the relationship that exists between natural resource presence and conflict dynamism is well-matched with numerous substitute mechanisms (Tarrow, 2007). They found that ethnicity ushered in conflicts. Ethnicity has been categorized as ethnic fractionation and ethnic dominance, fractionation contributing to peace by deepening the costs of organising rebellion across ethnic factors, whereas dominance can increase the risk of conflict dynamism.

On the flip side, sources of conflict in contemporary world map identify that need examining multifaceted conflict systems. For example, Ramsbotham (2011), observed that this examination is integral in the conflict resolution sphere from the start. Nevertheless, this does not imply that there is an all-embracing strategy or method agreed upon by all the scholars in the conflict resolution field. Contrariwise, there are more than a few equivalent and conflicting approaches, stressing diverse perspectives, factors and degrees of analysis.

Conflict is a situation in which two identifiable groups are in conscious opposition to each other as they pursue incompatible goals brought about mainly by structural violence (Bloomfield *et al.*, 2003). Wallensteen (2007), noted on his part that, the dissimilar styles of conflict analysis could be characterised under three titles, based on what kind of strategy they underscore: 1) conflict dynamics, 2) conflict origins that are needs based, and 3) rational-strategic controls. A definitive understanding of conflict construes conflict as a dynamic spectacle: one player is responding to what another actor or player is doing, which creates further undesirable action (Wallensteen, 2007). Further, the dynamic worldview on conflict examination has been accepted by two popular analytical tools, both advanced in the 1960s: They are; the Galtung's (1996), conflict triangle and the game theory. The game theory is espoused as the means actors play or relate within the context of the game; if the actors are within the rules the results are predictable and vice-versa.

Galtung's model, on the other hand, notes that a conflict is seen as moving within the triangle's three corners, corner A is about conflict attitudes, corner B about conflict behaviour and lastly corner C is about the actual conflict or contradiction (the incompatibility) (Wallensteen, 2007). He further notes that understanding conflict dynamics is one of the key components towards underscoring the transformational landscape of conflict. Nevertheless, this dynamic viewpoint is limited.

On the contrary, Wallensteen (2007), notes that actors are rational to some point and they can through their own judgement make choices and forge strategies which would lead to a chain of events that would cause war. This means that the actors start wars to win them

in some way. They also make their own calculations or better, cost benefit analysis to check whether going to war or engaging in conflicts would help in the end. When nobody is winning, they are willing to go back to the drawing board and re-strategize (Wallensteen, 2007).

On their part, Ramsbothan *et al* (2011), suggested a five-level model concentrating on the diverse stages of the conflict phenomena. These five stages include two 'international' stages, namely; world-wide and regional, and contextual determinants, one 'state' stage alienated into functional subdivisions (structural factors), and two 'social' stages (conflict actors and select/individual, and interpersonal determinants). World-wide and regional stages characterise contextual foundations of conflict. The world-wide stage shows the global factors as a possible source of a conflict, like the geopolitical changes, global economic dissection, environmental pressures, weapon explosion and ideological conflicts (Ramsbothan *et al.*, 2011).

The regional stage has been recognised, since numerous groups of conflict data show vibrant regional altercations in modern conflicts. Consequently, regional factors, viewed as either outward through spill-over effects, or inwards, through intervention, must be prudently taken into account. Further, internal conflicts portend external effects. Contrariwise, regional uncertainty can affect the internal politics of countries or counties via, for instance, patterns of clientelism or segregation (Ramsbothan *et al.*, 2011).

Conflicts are common phenomena in many regions of the world, especially in dry lands which are endowed with scarce natural resources (Sterzel *et al.*, 2014). Conflict has been one of the devastating phenomena in Africa in the last three decades, with Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL) being the most vulnerable (Hussein, 2014).

Conflict in these areas manifest with violence that is often based on ethnicity; indeed, ethnic connotations to conflicts have been touted as a major cause of conflict after resource-based conflict narrative. Wolff (2012), for example, notes that ethnic conflicts can distinctly be picked from other forms of conflicts globally. Conflicts witnessed in Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel versus Palestine, Kosovo, the Rwanda genocide, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) civil war; all have ethnic foundations.

The African situation and the conflicts that lie at the heart of its existence mostly has got to do with control and access to land and attainment of land-based resources like water, pasture and farming. The Toder massacre of 1991 in Nigeria where the Hausa farmers killed 102 members of a settled Fulani-herding community presents a living memory (Hussein, 2014). The drivers of conflict and motivation for the same have been changing consistently albeit being inter-related. Also, climate change in the Greater Horn of Africa (GHA) has been evidenced by increasing frequency of droughts from one in every six years to one in every three years. In Ethiopia, drought frequency has increased from 6-8 years to the current 1-2 years.

Matthew *et al* (2009), asserted that manipulation of natural inputs coupled with environmental degradation are important stages in conflicts as far as its perpetuation and deflation of peace are concerned. The study observed that approximately 40% of the conflicts occurring intra-state over the last sixty years are linked to natural resources. In Sudan for example, conflicts have deepened because of declining natural resources instigated by severe droughts (Verhoeven, 2011). In Africa, the culture of conflict and violence stems from tribal or ethnic, religious, regional, racial differences and class divide. These reflect the diversity of cultures, and increased economic inequalities between the haves and have not. Oftentimes, cultural and economic factors intertwine as

causes of conflict, highlighting the complexity of conflicts in Africa (Osei-Hwedie *et al.*, 2012).

Kenya has borne the brunt of inter-community conflicts of varied grades throughout the years. These conflicts are ingrained in some communities' psyche and are instigated for various reasons. The Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet and Samburu have witnessed massive conflicts and some of the justification has been attributed to government and policy inattentiveness. There are also other conflicts between primary populations of the Rift Valley and the late settler's particularly post-independence settlers and local ethnic groups that have continuously occurred with no permanent solution found. The said conflicts are normally observed between the Maasai and Kalenjin in one hand and between Luhya, Kisii, and Kalenjin on the other (Greiner, 2013). The patterns of conflict in the North Rift and North Eastern regions are complex. As seen here, the parties to conflict and course for which the fight is initiated vary same as the technique and weapon. It is more of the interest at the time and tools available as may be concluded from the analysis that follows.

Among the pastoral communities, conflicts are largely caused by competition over control of and access to natural resources particularly water and pasture. Other causes of conflicts include historical rivalry, deep-seated cultural values, land issues, political incitements, idleness amongst the youth and more recently proliferation of illicit arms (Cheserek *et al.*, 2012). While communities have continued to protect their grazing and water points with fairly minimal 'new conflicts', routine cultural raids aimed at restocking after droughts and for the purpose of dowry payments, continue to occur. Traditionally, raids especially by the Nilotic group -Turkana, Pokot, Samburu and Marakwet did not raid from their own community, but interestingly, raids among the three Kalenjin dialect groups Pokot, Tugen and Marakwet, points to a concern as to the

changing spheres of conflict. Raiders were ordinarily not allowed to kill women and children during the raids, but over the last decade this has been observed to occur with serious displacement becoming a common feature.

Conflicts in the Kerio Valley region of Kenya are thought to be part and parcel of a pastoral culture and livelihood of resident communities. However, in recent years, due to the proliferation of modern small arms, commercialization of livestock raiding, dispute over land tenure rights, banditry and predation, the cattle raiding practice has become a widespread, sophisticated, more violent and destructive activity among pastoral communities in Northern Kenya. Calam (2017). Ikejiaku *et al* (2011) and Schilling *et al* (2012), postulated that displacement of families is a major consequence of conflict. The explosion of contemporary automatic weapons is well recognized as having had an undesirable influence on the nature and influence of armed conflicts in pastoral communities (Mkutu, 2008). Some conflicts amongst pastoralist communities, like raiding leading to cattle rustling have a long past and have to some degree become a feature of traditional pastoralist culture (Kaimba *et al.*, 2011).

The causes to conflicts in Kerio Valley focused on political pressure and incitement, climate change and socio-economic pressure as major determinants of the conflict dynamism (Kumssa *et al.*, 2009., Leff, 2009., Mahmoud, 2011., Mkutu, 2008., Njiru, 2012). Despite the humanitarian challenges that consistently result from the conflict occurrence, the displacement, disturbance on household economies and serious compromise on development makes a study in this area important, and therefore need to investigate the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism.

From this review, it is clear that dynamism in conflict can be as a result of global, regional and local factors. Majority of previous studies focus on ethnicity, small arms and pastoralist culture as primary causes of conflict. The gap is that none of the studies explore dynamism aspect in conflict as a result of emergence of new socio-cultural aspects that socialize communities differently to fit in the new environment. In the Kerio Valley Delta, conflict dynamism has been caused by global aspects such as climate change; regional aspects such as cross border population movements brought about by resource scarcity and proliferation of small arms in the region. This means that communities have been socialized to fit in this new environment.

2.2 Status Maintenance and Conflict Dynamism

Keller (2009), argues that status maintenance is about the drive for obtaining status and power has been thought of as a fundamental motivator of human behaviour and which then become a precipitate to conflicts when the power shifts. He states that to maintain status and have power is to have control over resources, to have the ability to influence others' behaviour, and to be able to act on your own volition. The extent to which the said status can be attributable to conflicts in Kerio Valley Delta therefore needs investigation.

The idea of conflicts over power or power struggles is not new, with many examples of power conflict within other disciplines, such as sociology and political science. For example, in his development of a general theory of conflict processes, the sociologist, Blalock (1989), incorporates the concepts of power and dependency as key components of explaining real world conflicts including warfare, international conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and even interpersonal interactions. Blalock (1989), argues that with its basis

around dependency created by a need or desire for certain resources, the notion of power is a key part of conflict processes and influences both the initiation of conflict as well as the outcomes of conflict episodes. Similarly, other sociologists include struggles for power and status as key components in their definitions of social conflict. With this conceptualization, it would be helpful to investigate the extent to which maintaining status has impacted on conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta.

Socio-cultural factors extends to concepts of race, ethnicity, socio-economic class, sexual orientations, political and religious association and conflict would arise from struggles over values, community status, power and resources. Geller *et al* (2010), in a study done in Europe argues that socio-cultural factors are important in creating and understanding conflict in general, socio-cultural factors feed into the systems dynamics processes. He further states in conflict-torn Afghanistan ‘traditional’ socio-cultural mechanisms, political culture and power structures are important factors in understanding the conflict. Geller *et al.*, (2010), study focus on how socio-cultural factors influence status maintenance even among pastoral communities. Their study ties resources, ethnic identity to conflict dynamism; however, aspects of cultural change because of humans being socialized differently is not mentioned which is the core of the current study.

Culture is not something groups belong to but rather a tool that guides action, culture plays a role in our increasingly interconnected lives where we must interact with people from vastly different cultural backgrounds and are exposed to ideologies and events from the other end of the world and peace and conflict are cultural influenced processes (Wagoner, 2014). In the 20th century, anthropologists began theorizing about culture as

an object of scientific analysis. Some understood culture as being definitive of human nature and used it to distinguish human adaptive strategies from the largely instinctive adaptive strategies of animals, whereas others used it to refer to symbolic representations and expressions of human experience, with no direct adaptive value (Laland *et al.*, 2011). Maintaining status has contributed to the growing tension and persistent internal conflicts in Cameroon which are potential ingredients for conflict (Sama, 2007). As seen in South Africa the causes of conflict between the San community and other communities is associated with unemployment and unfair treatment which are socio-economic factors (Beyene, 2014). In Sudan, the conflict in Darfur and even South Sudan before her independence was highly manifested with cultural status characteristics that can best be seen as being driven by cultural supremacy that included race, ethnicity, and socio-economic class, political and religious association.

Indeed, the supremacy and obvious division of Sudanese Arabs and the Sudanese Africans was so distinct that it suggested one class/category had more rights and privileges than the other and for these, violence was offered in order to maintain status. During the Sudan conflict in Darfur, at least 300,000 people were killed and over 3,000,000 displaced in the 2003-2005 intensive conflict that represent a situation where people and communities in general would like to maintain status and get recognition and by extension sense of identity (ACCORD, 2016). However, Hagg (2006), states that Cultural diversity can be a tool for conflict resolution and peace-making processes.

Identity plays a crucial role in the management of social systems and maintaining social order, individuals behaviour is guided by and equally defines the community identity and knowledge of community provides a critical source of socio-political hierarchy (Masolo,

2002). Social groups rapidly self-organize into hierarchies, where members vary in their level of power, influence, skill, or dominance (Koski *et al.*, 2015). In pastoral practicing communities of Northern Kenya, owning of large number of animals and controlling grazing zones has been part of culture that communities still hold to despite the changes in terms of land tenure and climate change that has severely affected their practices. Subsequently and in order to keep the culture, communities struggle to expand grazing territories in order to sustain large herds of stock. At the same time, traditional practices of cattle rustling have also been maintained albeit the fact that in many cases its taking a commercial angle. On the flip side, climate change may socialize communities differently in order to maintain their status; this is an aspect that the current study would focus on.

In Kenya, cattle's rustling has reached unprecedented proportions in the past decade. It has changed in nature, scale and dimension due to a number of factors, including the proliferation of small arms in the region, the commercialization of raiding, high unemployment rate in pastoral areas, frequent droughts and reduced respect for traditional conflict-solving mechanisms (Bond *et al.*, 2005). Some conflicts within and between pastoralist communities, such as raiding and cattle rustling have a long history and have to some extent become an aspect of traditional pastoralist culture (Kaimba *et al.*, 2011). It is clear that researchers have mostly focused on the economic aspects of cattle rustling creating a gap on the social aspects of it which is the concern of this study.

Thus, the reference to cattle rustling in the study as a culture and a way of maintaining community status cannot be overlooked. On one hand, raiding leads to distrust between communities which are prerequisite of conflict (Schilling *et al.*, 2014) Though cattle

rustling is physical in nature; an aspect like distrust is a psychosocial outcome of the same. Communities use raiding to articulate their hostility toward enemy communities (Schilling *et al.*, 2012). Traditionally, livestock raiding often involved small-scale manageable violence. It also involved theft of the best livestock or replacement of animals lost during periods of droughts or diseases. Loss of human lives was rare, and when this occurred, compensation in the form of livestock was paid by the raiders to the victims or their families in case of death (Mkutu, 2008). Cattle rustling has had diverse effects, inclusive of Injuries related to abuse of small arms, loss of lives and property, displacement of people, rape and defilement, child labour, famine and disease, and increased levels of illiteracy (Kaimba *et al.*, 2011). In as much as this study captures issues of maintenance of status, it does not focus on how use of small arms is a new culture in raids and its devastating outcomes that was not traditionally normal.

Dietz (1993) argues that in the Balkans, particularly the three way conflict between Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims (Serb and Slovene conflict receives a brief mention, but due to the extremely short and sharp nature of that conflict it is not explored further), and tension between Ukraine and Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union are his focal points. Dietz (1993) “problem” is that the commonly cited catalysts for ethnic conflict (renewed historical grievances) do not provide ample explanation for the huge variance in violence between the observed groups.

Dietz (1993:28), approach is to view the ethnic conflicts through a “security dilemma”, a core and fundamental element of the realist theory of international relations. Put simply, the security dilemma is where a group (state, ethnic, cultural, political, religious and so on) pursue security guarantees that, ultimately, make the group less secure. From this,

the factors that lead to violent conflict are examined in the context of a wider collapse of stability (in this case, the collapse of Yugoslavia and the breakup of the USSR).

This is a useful approach. The Balkan Wars dominated popular discourse and a great deal of western foreign policy of the 1990s, and in recent years a conflict has developed in the Ukraine with multiple complex issues. Dietz (1993), explanation of the security dilemma gives the reader a useful starting point into understanding the two issues, in particular by: Providing context into the “competition” between Croat and Serb leaders and their pursuit of conventional military assets to defend their own ethnic groups from perceived, or actual, aggression. This relentless pursuit of defensive security is then transformed into a capability that is viewed by the other as solely offensive in nature. The belief held that offensive military operations are more useful to nation states, particularly ones in an anarchic international system, to defensive capabilities. This assessment was made by the Croats during the 1995 Operation Storm. Security is viewed as the sole aim for states, thus increasing military spending and procurement. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine are, primarily, increased by nuclear weapons and only avoided by neither state wishing to appear as the aggressor in the eyes of western nations (who they have no real relationship, historical or otherwise, with).

The security dilemma is, according to Dietz (1993), further exacerbated in ethnic conflict by: firstly, emerging groups quickly trying to evaluate the threat held not just by armed enemy combatants, but all groups in close proximity. Whilst not mentioned in Dietz (1993)’s article, in my view the most severe example of this were the HOS (Croatian Party of Rights) operations in Bosnia.

Secondly, if the threat presented by the opposing group cannot be ascertained (due to a lack of intelligence capability, or a sudden change in forces) or categorised into military/security terms (armoured troops, nuclear weapons, light infantry, heavy artillery, anti-aircraft assets etc.) then each group will assess the other's capability by looking at historical events and the cohesion of said group. Thirdly, such, an assessment of military capability and intent may be based on something such as a hotly contested historical event (Croat alliances with Nazi Germany and the historical implications that come with this are used by Dietz (1993), as opposed to the more reliable methods of reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence gathering.

The World War II era Croat alliance with Nazi Germany is used well by Dietz (1993), and in my view, convincing in understanding the perception side of the argument. The Croat belief, particularly among those on the far right, was that the modern day German state would support the newly founded Croatian state and the Croatian people across a collapsing Yugoslavia. Whilst Germany did support Croatia, this support was not in the form of military intervention. Regardless, the diplomatic support offered by Germany toward Croatia was perceived by the Serbs to prove the intention of the Croats (and, subsequently, the German state) in regard to Serbian communities isolated from Serbia itself. Therefore, despite not offering military assistance the ramifications in terms of ethnic conflict were much the same.

Ultimately, this leads to the "in distinguishability between offense and defence". This is a fair assessment. The collapse of central government is it in Belgrade or Moscow requires the emerging groups (particularly irregular forces) to calculate risk. The ideal

time for them to strike, therefore, is shortly after the collapse of centralised power but before the international community chooses to intervene (Dietz, 1993: 34). The threat of international intervention is particularly relevant in the years after the Cold War, with humanitarian intervention becoming more popular among western heads of state and institutions such as the International Criminal Court gaining prominence.

Dietz (1993), alludes to a number of variables that lead to the variance in ethnic conflict across regions. In the Balkans there are numerous instances across the previous centuries, most recently in WW2 and the 1990 Croat decision to classify Serbs as minorities in Croatia. Between Russia and Ukraine there is the issue of the Holmodor and the control of Ukraine by Moscow throughout the previous centuries – along with the belief held by many Russian traditionalists that Kiev is inseparable from modern Russia due to its role in establishing Russia. Secondly, the issue of ethnic minorities and enclaves is raised (Dietz, 1993). Throughout the history of the Balkans there has been a spread of ethnic groups across the states, with the exception of Slovenia. Small, isolated groups of minorities dotted around in separatist territory led to increased tensions and distrust between the ethnic minority and the emerging state – along with the inevitable competition for security guarantees.

Crucially, whilst there was a similar situation in Ukraine (with large amounts of ethnic Russians living in the east of the country) at the time of Dietz (1993), article these people had not suffered systematic persecution in the successor state unlike minorities across the Balkans in the 1990s. Dietz (1993), discusses comparatively minor factors (conscription in the previous state, criminal organisations and the proliferation of arms), but the more

pressing factors constitute the bedrock of his argument. Interestingly, Dietz (1993), identifies a factor that is less obvious than the others – the issue of foreign legitimacy. In the Yugoslav wars this manifested itself as elements of the Croat right wing considering German diplomatic support as leading toward inevitable western military support. Serbs viewed this diplomatic support as reminiscent of Nazi agreements with Croatian fascists.

Conversely, the conflict between Ukraine and Russia was almost absent of foreign intervention (and the subsequent effect of this intervention, perceived or otherwise) due to a lack of external involvement or political baggage in the region. However, this can lead on to a minor factor – the issue of nuclear weapons. The argument is made by Dietz, (1993), that nationalist or aggressive manoeuvres by Russians in Ukraine may have been limited due to Ukraine retaining some of the nuclear weapons from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Outside intervention in the affairs concerning at least one nuclear power is, therefore, even more unlikely. Whilst nuclear weapons were not present in Yugoslavia, this absence may be seen as a motivating factor not only for outside intervention but the aggressive tactics carried out by communities across the collapsed state.

Technological and geographical variables are analysed by Dietz (1993), in the article. In particular, Dietz (1993), claims that in the case of Russia and Ukraine the geographical variable is most relevant, particularly in regard to the considerable ethnic Russian presence in “pockets” of Ukraine. The geographical proximity of the two states to Western Europe also contributes to the reluctance of both to act in an aggressive manner. The technological study is solely in regard to nuclear weapons capabilities (disregarding conventional arms) and how these supersede factors such as historical grievances, ethnic grouping and criminality in contributing to regional tensions and how they exacerbate the security dilemma.

Dietz (1993), aims to ascertain the differences in ethnic conflict across regions. The article is, as one would expect from an MIT academic, extremely clear and expertly written. It is concise, to the point and provides a fascinating insight into the more pressing security issues across Southern and Eastern Europe of the 1990s. Dietz (1993), provides a strong, reasoned argument (not without limitations, however) and is certainly far more persuasive in this than the popular opinions held at the time, most of which rely on the “primordial” explanation – the collapse of the state led to violence committed almost for the sake of violence itself. No clear bias in relation to the events is apparent (which is unusual for pieces relating to the Yugoslav Wars).

Dietz (1993), reliance on the realist paradigm would be a valid criticism; it was used on explaining the instances outlined. This approach would, however, not be sufficient in explaining the Yugoslav Wars as a whole, or the relationship between Russia and Ukraine after the collapse of the Soviet Union (mainly due to the role of liberal international organisations) but it is more than reliable for these two examples. The evidence and sourcing is of a high standard, avoiding sensationalist news reports and alarmist discourse. For an article first written in 1993 it is reliable, useful and interesting. The insight into the relationship between Ukraine and Russia during the early 1990s is free of the biases or exaggerations that, unfortunately, plague much of the scholarly debate of 21st century Moscow/Kiev relations.

Indeed, the subsequent Ukrainian abandonment of its nuclear weapons lends much credence to the realist approach to international security (it is questionable as to whether Russia would have engaged in conflict with Ukraine if the latter had retained nuclear weapons, regardless of their condition or state of delivery methods) and reading an

account of relations at the time is fascinating. Ultimately, Dietz (1993), is convincing in providing definitive answers to the original aim of his work; explaining the variance in ethnic conflict through the security dilemma and the individual factors within.

The study, however, doesn't mention the role played by diaspora, particularly in the Croat communities across the world, in aiding the "struggle" in their ancestral homeland. Whilst this omission can be attributed to Dietz (1993), focusing on the actual ethnic violence and how it manifested in a region, as opposed to a global war between Serb, Croat and Bosniak, an insight into the diaspora communities would be useful particularly in regard to the historical grievances argument.

Dietz (1993), whilst identifying Yugoslavia as a nation exercising universal conscription, provides no insight into the dominance of Serbs holding senior positions within the JNA and the perception held by the Croat community that the JNA was a Serb Army. Additionally, each ethnicities perception of their respective paramilitary groups and the role they were expected to fill could be examined in greater detail. The security dilemma comes somewhat short of explaining these attitudes and perceptions toward "protectors" and frontier mentality.

Finally, the role of weapons (from the collapsed state, either through to successor governments or secessionist movements) is one that I feel does not go into enough depth. Whilst Ukraine did inherit nuclear weapons after the collapse of the USSR, it is a matter of some debate as to how much of a capability they inherited and how useful these would have been in a confrontation with Russia.

Russia, despite losing vast amounts of power, had a great deal more nuclear infrastructure and inherited the vast majority of delivery methods thus making Ukrainian nuclear ability somewhat hollow. This would have made an interesting contrast to the

situation in Yugoslavia, where the inherited weapons were nearly all serviceable and useful to the forces receiving them, but Dietz (1993), does not make this argument. Dietz (1993), is correct in treating the nuclear arsenals of Ukraine and Russia as more important in contributing to the security dilemma than the other factors, but neglects to mention the considerable amount of immediately useful conventional weapons in the region.

There exists a link between the availability of natural resources and ethnic conflicts. This hypothesis assumes that when a state is dependent primarily on primary commodities including agricultural and natural resources, it is prone to internal violence. Conflict is explained by greed or grievances where there are feelings of ethnic or political marginalization as one group is disadvantaged by another in terms of access to natural resources (Hussein, 1998). Conflict stems from the presence of inequality, in this case economic inequality. In the event of a gap of intolerance between what people feel they deserve and what they get in terms of goods and economic power, dissatisfied people will join together and revolt (Malombe, 1997).

Most studies have laid emphasis on effects of social, cultural and political factors on ethnic violence. There however, exists a relationship between economic conditions and occurrence of ethnic violence. Holding other factors constant, it is argued that just 1% increase in economic growth rate decreases the expected number of cases of violence by over 5%. Sufficient agricultural production in a region where market for the produce exists enables people to lead a decent life. The poverty-stricken usually view their richer counterparts as being exploitative of them (the poor) (Dietz, 1993). Any slightest provocation would make the “oppressed” turn against the “oppressor” in an attempt to

revert the situation .This would result in revolutions that will have people of different classes and possibly ethnic groups turn against each other (Turton, 1993).

High level of youth unemployment renders a section of the population idle and unable to meet its daily needs. The higher the poverty level a group has, the more likely it can indulge in violent situation; and vice versa; since in the first place –they don't have much to lose in the event of a conflict (Nyukiri, 1997). Youth comprise the largest percentage of the world population. In terms of numbers, out of 6.8 billion world population, young people aged between 15-24 years account for 11.2 million (UN,2009). The youth are considered core to the societal development. Skewed employment opportunities for the youth have compelled them into child soldiers, idlers, militias, rebels and vigilante groups (Duffield, 1997). In any conflict situation, the dominance of youth cannot be overemphasized. Many of the youth have high level of experience in violence, in that they are not employed, their projects are under –funded and stressed. Being primary actors in peace building, scholars have not fully explored the contribution of youth in frontline peace keeping (Kaptejns, 1993).

During the early years in Africa, uneducated, unemployed and idle youth posed no threat to the society. This perception has however changed since the youth currently engage in violent activities in search of solutions (Turton, 1993). As a reactionary group; the youth have turned into a social group that responds to poor government policies. In Africa, the youth are viewed both as vulnerable and innocent group involved in armed conflicts. This has been occasioned by the fact that they lack both in protection and resources (Mkangi, 2003).

The youth have in many occasions been used as child soldiers and portrayed as an unruly social group. The youth, who constitute the largest percentage of any society, have been imaged as both makers and breakers of society; in that, while they are simultaneously being made and broken by the society Politically, the youth act as a political force; a source of resilience and resistance . Those youth who lack training, formal education and skill end up involving themselves in acts of conflict and violence as an easy way of making their ends meet.

Majority of the youth are poverty- stricken and therefore are easily lured into warring groups. That is why Chigunta (2002), puts it that the youth mainly have no personal properties or dependable employment thus they have the lowest opportunity cost in war. The idea of the youth being misused as tools for achieving goals is more eminent in politics; where social, political and economic goodies depend on politics of manipulation and patronage. In conflict and violent situations, the youth have been active participants. Although conflicts are common in every society, the exponential rise in adverse effects of conflicts with the youth as active participants is exasperating (Mkangi, 1997). The use of drugs among the youth in ethnic conflicts erodes their “self-control and enhances free-will behaviour and encourages bravery” (Chigunta, 2002).

UNDP (2007), report argues that social, unstable governments, economic marginalization, insecurity, poverty and development challenges have helped drive the youth into armed conflicts and violent situations. Since the youth militant groups have dominated Kenya’s political history, such groups as *Taliban*, *Jeshi la Mzee*, *Baghdad Boys*, *Angola Msumbiji*, *Chinkororo*, *Alshabab* and *Mungiki* are a new face of youth (Nyukiri, 1997). Apart from the involvement of the youth in conflict situations, such

other actors as the state and its mercenaries, militias, rebels, vigilantes, criminal bands, ethnic and religious armed wings, private companies and others have played a role in influencing inter-ethnic conflicts in most African countries.

Land is a factor of production which has played a pivotal role in influencing most inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya. Since 1991, inter-ethnic violence has erupted with high intensity and worrying regularity, not seen before in the country's decades of relatively peaceful independence. The causes of the conflicts have in most cases been attributed to land-based issues (White, 1990).

Land and related resources such as water and biodiversity play a vital role in the livelihoods of communities. Given its significance, access to and availability of land-based resources are critical in ensuring real and long lasting improvement in social, economic and political well-being; especially in vulnerable societies that are prone to turmoil and conflict. The question of the use, ownership and access to increasingly scarce land and related resources has been at the centre of unending conflicts between ethnic communities in Kenya. Heavy reliance on land is very high in Nakuru County, as the region is arable and highly productive.

Different ethnic communities flock to many counties in Kenya to purchase land, since it's considerably cheaper than in other areas. In times of conflicts, those who purchased land in the recent past are considered "foreigners" and hence get threatened of eviction. The Kipsigis are considered the original inhabitants; who practice both crop and animal husbandry. In the event of impending conflicts, the other ethnic groups mainly the

Abagusii and the Agikuyu view themselves as being in a foreign land; hence they in most cases opt to move to other regions till peace prevails.

The Kipsigis own considerably larger tracts of land in comparison to the other ethnic groups. In fact the occupants of the Mau complex settlement scheme within some sub-counties in Kenya comprises mainly of the Kipsigis community .The other ethnic groups feel that they were sidelined during the allocation and settlement in the scheme. The Mau region is considerably more fertile than most other regions within some sub-counties in Nakuru and Narok Counties in Kenya.

The land problem in some sub-counties in Kenya is further compounded by the rising population density in the region .As stated earlier; an influx of people from other regions to the sub- County has increased in the recent past; owing to such increased agricultural activities as growing of Irish potatoes and tea plant bushes in some sub-counties in Kenya.

Other causes of inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya include: Historical causes, competition over scarce resources, and ethnicity among others. Nyakuri (1997), argues that one of the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya is the historical indirect rule administered by the British colonialists that later turned out to be the ‘divide and rule’ strategy which polarized the various ethnic groups in Kenya. This in turn contributed to the subsequent incompatibility of these ethnic groups. The situation was made worse by the emergence of political parties affiliated to ethnic groups (Nyakuri, 1997). For example, the Kikuyu ethnic group formed the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the Kamba ethnic group formed the Ukambani Members Association (UMA), the Luhya ethnic group formed the

Luhya Union (LU), the Luo ethnic group formed the Young Kavirondo Association (YKA), the Kalenjin ethnic group formed the Kalenjin Political Alliance (KPA), the Coastal ethnic groups formed the Mwambao Union Front (MUF) and Taita ethnic group formed the Taita Hills Association (THA). This made it impossible for people to identify as a group.

Norwegian Refugee Council (2004), report found that land is one of the major reasons of inter-ethnic conflicts in Rift valley Province. The value attached to land in the region has perpetuated the recurrent conflicts within the communities. Other land related conflicts in the region have been attributed to poor policies on land demarcation and ownership as well as allocation of public land to non-residents as prevalent in Nakuru County. Also, there is evidence of rampant crop theft and crop destructions instigated and executed by rival communities.

Turton (2003), argues that the history of inter-ethnic conflicts in the Rift Valley is attributed to land ownership. He sees land ownership in Kenya's fertile Rift Valley as a divisive factor that fuels the tensions between ethnic groups living in the area. Turton observes that prior to colonialism in Kenya; the pastoral Kalenjin and Maasai ethnic groups inhabited the Rift Valley. However, in 1915 British colonialists forced pastoral groups off the land, so that they could develop the area agriculturally by planting cash crops like tea and coffee. The colonialists coerced thousands of Kikuyu, Kisii, Luhya, and Luo ethnic groups (all experienced farmers) to move to the Rift Valley to work on the farms. Over the first 20 years of the 20th century the traditional inhabitants of the Rift Valley, the Kalenjin and Maasai, were forcefully displaced from their homelands by the colonial administration. Soon, thousands of non-native Rift Valley dwellers with

agricultural experience, like Kikuyu, settled in the Rift Valley. This shift in ownership of Kenya's most fertile land is a key element of the ethnic tension between these groups.

Turton (2003), looks at the land issue as a problem along county boundaries in other parts of the country as well. It became more prevalent with creation of new constituencies and counties because they were viewed as describing tribal boundaries. In multi-ethnic areas like Nakuru, the creation of a new county has led to the victimization and expulsion of the ethnic minority. Cattle raids and conflicts over water and pasture are the major causes of violence among the warring communities in Nakuru County. Norwegian Refugee Council (2004), report found that tensions between the communities intensify whenever there is famine in the area.

From this review, it is clear that aspects of small arms, politicization of land ownership in ethnically conscious communities that are postural in nature and traditional cultures are at the epicentre of conflicts. However, socio-cultural factors have undergone changes and therefore conflict dynamism has been witnessed as rival communities struggle to maintain status. The gap here is that reviewed studies in this section did not focus on the aforementioned aspects which are the concern of the current one.

2.3 Ethnic Identity and conflict dynamism

In many countries ethnic groups have been visiting violence on each other, sometimes on a horrific scale (the word genocide, by definition, refers to a type of ethnic conflict). Fearon *et al* (2003), identify no less than 58 ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 1999, constituting 51% of the total number of civil wars. They defined ethnic identity as referring to a person's social identity within a larger context based on membership in a

cultural or social group. Cognitive components of ethnic identity refer to an individual's knowledge about his or her ethnic group, such as cultural traditions and history. This allows for a conceptualization of ethnic identity but does not in any way show how ethnic identity is linked to conflict dynamism especially within the context of the Kerio Valley Delta that has shown diverse and dynamic conflicts.

The dual processes of market liberalization and democratization in the 1990s substantially weakened the post-colonial state, ushering in new forms of violence and disorder as the hallmark of the post-Cold War Africa (Gerard *et al.*, 2007). These new patterns of conflicts have been described as 'internal' or 'civil wars' largely because they involved a clash of identities such as ethnicity within the state – although they often overflowed across national borders and affected the neighbouring countries: the 'bad neighbourhood' syndrome (Hughes *et al.*, 2014). It is true, as the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, argues, that the 'sources of conflict in Africa reflect... diversity and complexity' (UN, 2014). Gerard *et al* (2007), study unearths how globalization has brought about ethnic identity crisis in Africa and in particular among pastoral communities due to reduced resource support systems. Therefore, ethnic identity even in Kerio Vally Delta has been socialized in new globalization context which has distorted resource support systems.

On the other hand, Mozingo (2015), argues that factors that influence ethnic conflict and minority violence in the Western Balkans noted that ethnic conflict has always been a large problem in South-eastern European countries. The Balkans, in particular, have been largely susceptible to ethnic conflict due to the peculiar mixture of age-old ethnic rivalries and newly formed governments. In these cases, there are certain factors that

seem to contribute to the growing tension between minorities and governments in these countries. The study also noted that ethnic identity is propagated mostly by politicians for political expediency and ethnic leaders and communities are simply roped in irrationally and this then leads to conflicts. It would be interesting to ascertain this for the case of Kerio Valley Delta.

On the contrary, Humphreys *et al* (2002), argues that models of ethnic enlistment and conflict tend to adopt an opinion that political players are effortlessly able to place other players into their “correct” ethnic classes. Whereas this may be the situation for some people and some classes, it is not always the case. This implies that for Humphreys, political ethnic identity does not occur as often as empirically argued and that people generate for themselves ethnic identity problems which then leads to conflicts that exacerbate proportionate to the deepening of the said ethnic identity.

Sambanis (2001), agrees that ethnic characteristics are extensively seen as enabling and occasionally encouraging violent conflict. Essentially, conflicts over “identity” are attributed to over 70% of the civil conflicts initiated between 1960 and 1999. The study observes also that, ethnic conflicts are considered to be predominantly favourable to large-scale violence like ethnic purging and genocide. The question, why is ethnicity so frequently a foundation of political violence? A host of important theories submit that the answer is in the capacity of ethnicity to enable collective action.

Elbadawi *et al* (2000), asserted that students of conflict in Africa have shown substantial attention to the place of ethnicity in the expansion of political administrations. In Africa, the culture of conflict and violence stems from tribal or ethnic, religious, regional, racial differences and class divide (Osei-Hwedie *et al.*, 2012). These reflect the diversity of

cultures, and increased economic inequalities between the haves and have not. Oftentimes, cultural and economic factors intertwine as causes of conflict, highlighting the complexity of conflicts in Africa (Osei-Hwedie *et al.*, 2012). Africa's ethnic diversity has been blamed for the escalation of violent conflict and the implosion of the state. In the post-Cold War era, such identities as Tutsi, Croats or Hindu have appeared armoured in deadly combats that have mirrored Samuel Huntington's clash of civilisations on a global scale (Sandole, 2013). Although ethnic identity on its own does not necessarily cause or perpetuate violent conflict, it has become 'a sort of universal shorthand that marks a host of much more complex issues of identity and difference' (Broch-Due, 2004 and Khazanov, 2014).

Conflicts are mainly manifested as political, economic, environmental, exploitation of natural resources, land clashes, religious differences and lately terrorism and Kenya has continued to be divided on the basis of ethnic, socio-cultural, regional, political and economic lines. As a result, there have been sporadic conflicts among different communities in Kenya (Lenairoshi, 2014). Community divisions along political and ideological lines gave rise to protracted and institutionalized waves of ethnic and land clashes. Ethnic and political conflicts in Kenya have become more evident during elections, as reflected during the 1992 and 1997 general elections. The intensity of these conflicts following the 2007 General Election resulted in a shattered national fabric culminating in the loss of about 1,300 lives with over 350,000 people internally displaced (Smyth *et al.*, 2013). In addition, clan violence continued throughout 2008, causing at least 200 deaths in the Mt. Elgon district, according to Peace Net committee. Additional estimates by independent media place the death toll in the Mt. Elgon sub-

county in excess of 500 people (Stavenhagen, 2016). This study attempted to explain the influence ethnic identity as a socio-cultural attribute on conflict dynamism in this area.

For the Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana, these communities experience high levels of inter-communal violence; much higher than elsewhere in Africa (Dowd *et al.*, 2013). This violence is perpetrated by identity based communal militias and often involves cycles of attacks and counter attacks (Dowd *et al.*, 2013). Competition over land ownership and land use drive local conflicts, which is sometimes triggered by the migration of herders in search of water and pasture. This is not helped by a minimal presence of security personnel and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Ethnicity is a factor that constrains participation of women in livelihood activities wherever there are different ethnic groups within a community. Bleahu *et al* (2002), in towns, where categorical relationships are most necessary, ethnicity is often used because this makes it possible to divide up the population into a manageable number of categories and to know what sort of behaviour is expected between “us” and “them”. Thus, we can expect friendly behaviour from some people, or aggression and suspicion from others. Turton *et al* (1998), argues that ethnicity has become a focus of conflict because it enhances symbolic and behavioural differences which can be used to promote and or defend the political, economic or social interests of the communities concerned. He observes that in most African countries ethnicity is a more important factor in communal differentiation than race or class, and the use of ethnicity in politics is considered a serious problem. Further, cultural differences can aggravate conflict which is basically economic or political. Conflicts arise when resources are limited. As population increases, disputes pit one village against another, sometimes over national or states boundaries and sometimes within them.

The inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya have taken different forms since they first erupted in early 1990's. Turton (2003), the inter-ethnic conflicts were described by numerous attacks to communities. He argues that in post-colonial Kenya, attacks were on kikuyu ethnic group by Kalenjin ethnic group. Hundreds of Kalenjin "community morans," as they became known would attack farms, targeting non-Kalenjin houses. He observed the attackers were often dressed in a uniform of shorts and t-shirts (sometimes red, sometimes black) and always armed with traditional bows and arrows as well as pangas (machetes). Sometimes, the community morans would have their faces marked in the traditional manner with clay. The community morans would loot, kill, and burn houses.

According to Malombe (2000), the type of weapons used in Kenyan ethnic clashes has been machetes, bows and arrows. These are traditional Kikuyu and Kalenjin weapons. Crisp observes that the increased flow of refugees from war torn countries like Somalia and Sudan has resulted in a proliferation of small arms, like Alexander Kalashnikov 47 rifle famously known as AK-47s in Kenya. These weapons, left over from Cold War politics between the Soviet Union and the United States are becoming increasingly available in Kenya. Crisp pointed out the possibility of increased amount of bloodshed in future conflicts in the country with these kinds of weapons being owned by the members of the warring communities.

According to Turton (2003), the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya is normally organized and sponsored by the government. He observes that the conflicts are politically motivated. Turton further observed that the conflicts took place immediately after elections. For example after 1992 and 1997 elections, Rift Valley province experienced

inter-ethnic conflicts. The conflict in this case is not traditional since communities are now socialized along ethnic lines from a political angle which is the concern of the current study.

Kenya has experienced inter-ethnic conflicts for a long period of time. The conflicts have had different impacts in the lives of Kenyans. According to Nyukuri (1997), the victims of inter-ethnic conflicts were left homeless, landless, injured, and dead and abused. The real impact of inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya was felt most at personal and family level. There was loss of security in the conflicts-prone areas as the civilians took the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there was indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people sustained physical injuries and others were traumatized. The state of insecurity interfered with the day-to-day socio-economic and political undertakings within the areas. There was loss of life among the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Iteso, Kisii and other ethnic groups. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that although the loss was felt on either side of the conflict, the non-Kalenjin ethnic groups suffered most.

According to Nyukuri (1997), the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriages, family and social life. Nyukuri observed that there were cases of breakdown of marriages and family life. The inter-ethnic conflicts also created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy among the various ethnic groups affected in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades. As a result of the clashes, thousands of school going children were displaced. Some dropped

out due to the financial and socio-economic constraints attributed to the menace. For instance, the NCKK estimated that by 1994, over 10,000 people in Trans-Nzoia County had been displaced as a result of the clashes. A similar number were out of school in Bungoma and Narok counties. This disruption of education activities was widespread in all the conflicts-prone regions in Western Kenya, Rift Valley and Coast provinces. Many schools were burned down or looted in parts of Nyanza Province bordering the Rift Valley Province.

The same was witnessed in Cheptais, Kibuk, Kamneru, Kaptama in Western province and Sabaoti Division in Trans-Nzoia County. Teachers and students were also attacked and forced to transfer to other schools while others abandoned schooling and teaching respectively. In Molo, over 55 primary schools catering for over 16,500 pupils were affected and did not re-open for the new term because of insecurity. The Standard Eight pupils due to sit for their Kenya Certificate of Primary Education (KCPE) fled their homes in 1993 because of insecurity caused by the violence (Nyakuri, 1997).

Turton (2003), concurs that the inter-ethnic conflicts brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered more during the period of conflicts. They were abused and violated and some raped. In most internal displaced camps, there was inadequate room to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. Both men and women, together with children, were forced to share congested sleeping places with little or no privacy.

The inter-ethnic conflicts affected the economic stability of the affected areas and the country at large. According to Turton (2003), one of the long term economic

consequences of the conflicts was change of land ownership patterns. He observes that decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence. The insecurity disrupted agricultural activities. In most cases, maize, coffee, pyrethrum, tea, sugarcane and other crops were either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by the conflicts. In some areas of Trans Nzoia, Kericho, Nandi, Nakuru and Uasin Gishu counties, work on agricultural land stopped for a long time as farm workers stayed away for fear of being attacked.

From this review, ethnic identity has traditionally instigated conflicts among communities in the Rift Valley of Kenya. In as much as these conflicts have been about rivalry over resources such as water or land; a new twist was added in post-colonial Kenya where ethnic identity was used as a political weapon. This is a gap that previous studies are yet to identify as communities have been politically been socialized which is a new dimension to conflict even in the Kerio Vally Delta.

2.4 Cultural Belief Systems and Conflict Dynamism

The concept of culture refers to ‘ways of living, values, customs, religion, mother-tongue use, ethnicity and heritage, however socio-cultural diversity appears to play a complex role in conflicts often embedding struggles over resources through ethnic violence and social marginalisation (Hagg, 2006). Also, according to Pache (2010), culture is defined as the tastes in art, values, knowledge and manners that were favoured by a social group. These are attitudes and behaviours that were characteristic of a particular social group or organization.

Ideally, these are the aspects which this study was set to investigate. LeFebvre *et al* (2013), argues that it is important to have some understanding of the cultures of different communities because such knowledge can always help the mediators to recognize not only that he or she has her own culture which appears different from others but that this difference will end up influencing how problems are handled so as to reach an agreement. Admonitions to pay heed to culture as a factor to consider in conflict management seems so self-evident in the current world today and it is surprising how long it takes some people to recognize the cultures' key roles (Ramsbotham, *et al.*, 2011).

Krueger (2012), argues that most of the cultural matters that at any time were associated with a human population were not constrained by the boundary. But these cultural matters varied from one community to the other, people learnt from each other, and exchanged ideas without any critical relation to the boundary maintenance of the ethnic group. So, when one traces the history of an ethnic group through time, one also, traces the history of 'a culture': the elements of the present culture whereas the group had a continual organizational existence with boundaries that despite modifications, had marked off a continuing unit.

Bernauer *et al* (2014), argued that when you link renewable and non-renewable natural resources to the onset intensity and the duration of the intrastate as well as interstate armed conflicts, the renewable resources are usually connected to it through scarcity and the non-renewable resources are hypothesized to lead to conflict through resource abundance and the empirical support for resource scarcity is not strong and therefore resource abundance is likely to be associated with conflict. In plural and multi-ethnic societies, it had caused polarization along religious, linguistic and ethnic lines. Regional

and international factors contributed to the complexity of the situation. The level of internecine struggles had sometimes become so intense that they posed not only a threat to the unity and integrity of the state and society, but also threatened regional and even global peace and security. It was significant to understand the root causes and dynamics of these conflicts to envisage viable ways of solving them (Yang *et al.*, 2013).

Several reasons have been fronted to explain the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya but culture has been given minimal or no attention at all. Kumssa *et al* (2009), state that ethnic conflicts in Kenya are caused by cultural beliefs, boundary or land disputes, political issues, leadership disputes, cattle rustling, ethnic differences, personal attitudes and behaviour, jealousy, problems over water, crime, and corruption, problems over personal property, inheritance, poor communication and misunderstanding.

Nganga (2012), argues that among the Pokots in Kenya, raiding parties were organized in terms of age-sets. Once they joined an age-set, they only legitimized their new membership in this role through participation in raids on neighbouring peoples. Raids were organized very well and successful raids were rewarded while poor raids ended up in punishment to the community morans concerned. However, he did not identify cultural practices and believes as a major cause of conflicts between the Pokot and other ethnic communities surrounding them.

In the traditional African society, rituals and sacrifices played a big role in the day to day running of activities. Among the Pokot for instance, before planning a raid, the war counsellors went to the diviners the ‘Talai’s’, the diviner advised them about the time and any misfortunes that needed anticipation. Before leaving for the raid or war, if the

diviner forecasted misfortune, the raiding party performed a ritual to purify their weapons (Nganga, 2012). These were practices that were purely cultural in nature. How far they impact on conflicts needs investigation hence the presence of this study.

Each society is structured in such a manner that roles and responsibilities are assigned by either gender or on dimension of age. The elders usually advocate for peace and good relations among their neighbours in order to widen their access to limited resources and opportunities. However, to some extent they may turn to conquering their neighbours in order to achieve their unmet goals. In certain cases the youth, more so among the Kipsigis (a sub-tribe of the Kalenjin) participate in cattle rustling from other ethnic groups; with the blessing from their elders (Bollig,1990).

There are numerous causes and reasons, Richardson (1996)., Krueger (1995,1987, 1983,1978, 1975), for ethnic conflict as expressed in verbal and or physical forms in multi-ethnic states. As in the case of Guyana for instance, the chief reason for ethnic conflict is the desire of the leader of an ethnic group or members of groups to capture the state or acquire more resources for its members and to correct what it perceives were historic wrongs committed against the group. As gleaned from the literature, generally speaking, ethnic conflict comes about when ethnicity (identifying with and displaying loyalty to one's group) is used to organize and mobilize ethnic groups of people to compete against one another for resources and or for the attention of the state and or even to capture the state.

Members from an ethnic group rally around each other to give each other support on an issue impacting on their group or for (more) resources for the group or for political or

economic power. The groups are usually organized with the goal of influencing or capturing state power and or making demands on the state to address a perceived (real or imagined) grievance (typically discrimination based on uneven distribution of resources or obtaining greater state recognition of their culture or equitable participation in the government). Ethnic conflict (verbal or physical clashes and the like) inevitably develops when expressed grievances of the group are not satisfactorily addressed in multi-ethnic societies or where the state ignores the groups (Richardson, 1996., Krueger, 1983, 1975., Nagel, 1985).

Theorists have identified some of the proximate causes of ethnic conflict including allegations of discrimination against and neglect and or marginalization of the group by the (leaders of the) ruling (dominant) group and or a demand for equitable distribution of resources and or proportional representation in the composition of the government of the state. Also, conflict ensues when ethnically divisive strategies are invoked by political actors to mobilize political support to capture power and or to make demands on the state and or to gain control of the state, Krueger (2000)., Horowitz (1985), as happened in Guyana after 1957 and in so many other ethnically divided countries (Krueger, 1978).

In multi-ethnic conflict ridden societies, often, the state is dominated by an ethnic group and other ethnic groups become subordinated feeling left out of decision making and or left behind believing they are not getting a fair (or “their”) share of resources leading to all kinds of complaints based on ethnic discrimination (persecution) accompanied by demands for restitution. These complaints can be (and often are) used as a basis for open conflict or political mobilization based on ethnicity. Long-standing beliefs and attitudes held by members of the ethnic group are used to support the claim of discrimination

against the group and the accompanied militant response (protests, boycotts, demands, and even violence, etc.) against the state.

Violent conflicts between rival ethnic groups sometimes break out spontaneously or at times are planned and pre-meditated (Richardson, 1996., Krueger, 1983). Also, members across ethnic groups are known to form alliances in conflict against other groups (as the Africans, Portuguese, Amerindians, Mixed, etc. did in Guiana during the 1960s against the People's Progressive Party {PPP} and Indians). When peace is restored, conflict between former alliance members can take place as happened in Guyana between Africans and Amerindians and Africans and Portuguese once the Indian threat was removed (Krueger, 1978., Duffield, 1970).

Different communities have a tendency of negative perceptions against each other. Ethnic stereotypes in Kenya are a major cause of ethnic tension that has led to bloodshed and displacement for many years in the county (TJRC, 2008). The Somalis are seen as being warlike, the Agikuyu perceived as thieves, the Luhya and the Akamba referred to as liars, the Kalenjin considered as cattle rustlers, the coastal people are deemed lazy and Dholuo are said to be proud. In cosmopolitan areas of Kenya, continued use of ethnic stereotypes creates tension among the communities. Some ethnic stereotypes that are used by various ethnic communities in many counties in Kenya may create anger and animosity among other ethnic groups.

For instance the Agikuyu refer to the Kipsigis as “Rumbwa” a terminology literally taken to mean “Dog”, However the history of the terminology roots back to the colonial period when the Kipsigis split half a dog in Kipkelion (Lumbwa), in order to bring about truce with the British. A confrontation existed between the Kipsigis and the British when the

former resisted against to the construction of Kenya Uganda Railway by the latter from passing through Kipkelion (Lumbwa) (Duffield, 1997).

The Kipsigis on the other hand refer to the Agikuyu as “Kibirir Kelda” Meaning “People with brown teeth” owing to the predominant brown teeth that characterized them. The use of the above two terminologies namely “Lumbwa” and “Kibirir Kelda “ is entrenched in the linguistics of the two communities and are only used in derogative reference to people of either ethnic group. During the initiation of young boys to manhood among the Kalenjin, they are taught various ways of defending their community. The use of locally assembled weapons such as spears, bows, shields, arrows and boomerangs are taught. As the youth grow up, they tend to misuse the training that was imparted into them through such vices as cattle rustling and raids (Kapteijns, 1993).

Due to limited grazing land; there are cases where livestock belonging to one community strolls into another’s farmland thereby destroying crops, thus being a breeding ground for conflicts. The elders determine whether the raids are successful; and where they deem unsuccessful, the young people are doomed and their graduation into next age sets may be held at suspense. Owing to such a requirement, the young raiders have no other option but to perfect “successful” ethnic raids (Baxter, 1979). The Kalenjin herdsmen have historically been associated with cattle rustling. The young people are culturally required to pay dowry in form of livestock, obtained through their own initiatives (cattle rustling) (Hussein, 1998).

Culturally among most herdsmen and pastoralists, there are a fixed number of animals required to pay dowry. This requirement acts as a push factor for the young people into acquiring the required number of animals for the tradition (Black, 1975). Since marriages

are lifelong activities, raids on other communities will ever persist; hence paving way for unending ethnic conflicts. In most cultures the young are considered generally poor unless they either acquire or inherit herd and family responsibilities and authority in order to be considered an elder regardless of their age (Baxter, 1979).

The monopoly and ownership of property is vested in the elders; leaving perpetual poverty among the youth (Farah, 1993). This scenario of poverty among the youth gives them an impetus to use all means available to them to acquire resources from other ethnic communities, in disregard of the possible consequences. Cattle raids are common phenomena among the herdsman; against other communities. Such repeated raids will eventually breed hostilities among the concerned ethnic groups. Cattle raiding bring distrust between communities a prerequisite for conflicts (Little, 1996).

The young are looked upon as the providers of security and future people to be depended upon by the community. Traditionally, all raids should first be approved by the elders. However, early ethnographers stress that often young men decided in secrete and took action quickly without the knowledge of the elders of their intention (Gulliver, 1951). In other cases, where the young community morans claim lives of their opponents; it's the duty of the elders to cleanse them, in order to wade off spirits of bad omen (Goldsmith, 1997).

Education level in the region is predominantly low; hence the youth are less empowered on the need for inter-ethnic coexistence; since majority of them don't get the opportunity to mingle in order to appreciate other cultures and peoples as is done in a school setting. Politicians may stoke inter-ethnic conflicts by either failing to intervene or by spreading

propaganda that undermines the relationships between different ethnic groups (Fratkin, 1994). It is suggested that ethnicity per se, in the absence of politicization does not cause conflicts. In most cases when politicians intervene, there is a strong allegation and mistrust put against them for being partisan (Dida, 2012).

In the current democratic global space, leaders of all cadres of society are elected. Leaders or aspirants usually influence the behaviour of their followers; before, during or after an electioneering exercise. In the case where politicians feel that their greatest threat comes from an opponent who enjoys support of a particular ethnic group, incitement among the ethnic groups may result so that the opponent's supporters may be displaced during the elections; in order to cause a disadvantage on the side of the opponent. The first multiparty general elections in Kenya in 1992 saw forceful evictions of ethnic groups with different political views from those of their counterparts (Baxter, 1994).

Most political leaders are associated with incitement and ethnic stereotypes that hamper the relationships between different ethnic groups living in the same region. Such incitements create animosity between different ethnic groups. Such a gruesome experience was not only evidenced in many counties in Kenya, but also at national level in Kenya, during the general elections of 2007/2008; when different ethnic groups turned against one another. A strong allegation too stands in that politicians incite their ethnic groups to raid and steal livestock from other ethnic groups. This livestock theft stokes animosity between the ethnic groups. In most cases the politicians have been reported to hire goons to cause turbulence (Baxter, 1997).

Majority of the youth, who are idle and unemployed get lured into such uncouth behaviour, a living case example is the allegation against some politicians in the ICC for having funded and used the outlawed Mungiki sect to cause mayhem and havoc during the 2007/2008 post-election violence in some parts of Kenya (TJRC, 2008). All the above scenarios show that the main aim of politicians is to gain control, remain in power and gain access to resources.

Kenyans have typically in the past voted along ethnic lines since the advent of multiparty era in the country in 1992. Presidential candidates and their political parties have always got huge following and support from geographical zones dominated by groups whose ethnicity is the same as that for the presidential candidates. Ethnic groups whose presidential candidates win in elections are viewed by the rest of the ethnic groups as being favoured by the ruling government in terms of public appointments. This tendency draws a wedge in the nature of relations and coexistence among the various ethnic groups in the country.

Some studies on ethnic violence are guided by the theory of instrumentalism. The theory, having been propounded by Karl Popper in 1965, is pegged on the premise that ethnic conflicts are a function of political entrepreneurs; who mostly stoke historical grievances in order to perpetuate their personal ambitions, gains and interests. The theory is a complete inverse of the primordialists' theory, which argues that conflicts are attributed to the peoples' historical hatreds and differences. The instrumentalists' view reiterated that in the event of institutions' failure to award identity to the society, individuals will have a high propensity to recoil back to their ethnic cocoons; in search for societal protection and security.

From the review, cultural belief systems contribute to conflicts that have bedevilled Rift Valley region for years. Building on existing negative cultural believes, emergent cultures have been as a result of changes on livelihood support systems. With existing negative cultures or attitudes towards other cultures, there has been sporadic spread of hatred that is politically instigated. The gap in previous studies is that focus has been on pre-existing cultures and not acquired cultures brought about by environmental changes which are the concerns of this study.

2.5 Livelihood Options as a Deterrence of Conflict

Shackleton and Shackleton (2012), found that livelihood is considered sustainable when it can cope with and recover from the stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future without undermining the natural resources and a livelihood comprises of the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. He further states that in sustainable livelihood, there are factors which shed light on why the sustainable livelihood approach was developed and applied to poverty reduction.

Some of this approaches includes the realization that while economic growth may be essential for poverty reduction there is no automatic relationship between the two since it all depends on the capabilities of the poor to take advantage of expanding economic opportunities so it is significant to find out what precisely it is that prevents or constraints the poor from improving their lot in such situation so that support activities could be designed accordingly.

In the African context, livelihood assets are a key component of livelihoods analysis because they are about the base of resources needed for communities and especially households to run. The nature of the asset pentagon; being, amount and comparative importance of each kind of capital is diverse from one community and from one wealthy to another poor household found in similar social structure (DFID, 1999). For instance, as soon as conflicts ended in Tindouf refugee camps, entrepreneurship flourished to the extent that money was made and greater freedom was attained. Further, the conflicts in Algeria has forged a constricted and dire situation for refugee aid in the country (Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011).

A wide range of academic research and literature has been published on livelihood diversification benefits, challenges, lessons, and knowledge gaps, at macro and micro levels, addressing both less and non-climate-dependent contexts. It is well-recognized that households in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) seek to diversify their income and livelihood strategies both to manage or reduce their risks and to expand or take advantage of synergies across different income generation activities (Barrett *et al.*, 2001). While livelihood strategies of the poorest often still depend primarily on agricultural activities, several studies show non-farm income activities to correlate with greater overall household wealth.

Thus, engendering more non-farm opportunities i.e., non-climate-dependent has been a focus for poverty alleviation and many broad development efforts, although some work also suggests caution in assuming causality in this relationship (Reardon *et al.*, 2001). On the whole, arguments for growing the non-farm economy in SSA have also highlighted the role it may play in providing employment for the continent's

burgeoning population of poor, typically rural, and working age men and women; providing an alternative to urban migration; and contributing to overall economic growth and income equality but also helping to reduce inter-ethnic conflicts (Duffield and Duffield, 2001). There is general agreement in the academic literature that more livelihood diversification and non-farm employment is typically good for individuals and overall economic growth in SSA.

It is therefore not surprising that many development strategies and programs seek to design development interventions to better promote livelihood diversification. These typically seek to provide farmer populations with access to new or expanded non-farm opportunities, such as involvement in micro or small business enterprises, and/or promote engagement in agricultural transformation, encouraging farmer populations to become actors in higher levels of crop value chains. Development strategies for livelihood diversification therefore tend to focus on eliciting increased access to and use of modern inputs and technologies, improving markets and agribusiness opportunities, and developing skills and support for individuals and groups to engage in non-agricultural self-employment or wage employment.

But while the potential opportunities afforded by diversification efforts are well-recognized, the challenges involved in engendering access and promoting effective uptake of less or non-climate-dependent livelihood opportunities for more disadvantaged segments of populations have long been recognized as a key problem for development programming, as such populations typically lack the education, skills, financial capital, and/or social networks that are needed for such opportunities to be successful (Winters *et al.*, 2010). A related challenge is how to effectively engender

agricultural transformation, for which the literature also identifies more knowledge gaps than clear answers. Lastly, given the inter-linkages between agricultural and non-farm activities in many rural economies in SSA, including Burkina Faso and Niger, an additional and unresolved key programming challenge centres on how to more effectively grow common elements of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors together (Davis *et al.*, 2010).

Thus while the issue of livelihood diversification in SSA has been a core focus of development efforts and academic research for many decades, and much of the poverty alleviation discourse seeks to better understand how to effectively facilitate or promote livelihood diversification towards non-farm/non-agricultural activities (Alobo, 2015), as well as towards more formalized wage employment, there remain several key and substantive knowledge gaps. Among these, it is first important to note that there is not yet universal consensus that greater livelihoods diversification in rural areas of SSA will necessarily lead to broad-based improvements in conflict resolution (Alobo, 2015). And while there are many calls for development efforts to expand non-farm livelihoods and economies in SSA, the academic literature actually still remains unsure of whether and the extent to which growing non-farm activities may lead to increased conflict resolution (Duffield *et al.*, 2016).

One noted contributor to this uncertainty is that much of the existing research on this has taken a broad brush approach to what constitutes “non-agricultural,” lumping many activities together rather than engaging in sector-specific or more finely disaggregated analyses of different non-agricultural activities (Duffield *et al.*, 2016). He found that manufacturing (under which the authors include agro-processing), trade, and transport

services can be on par with or higher than agriculture in terms of their conflict resolution effectiveness, while construction and government services tend to be lower. Their work highlights that non-agricultural sectors of economies are indeed important for potential conflict resolution. While their analysis points to the importance of manufacturing in the study countries, they are also careful to note that this sector's potential is importantly related to or dependent on strong linkages between farmer-producers and agro-processing, so agricultural sectors should not be neglected either.

Overall, their analysis reinforces the existing literature which tends to find that in SSA, agriculture-led growth tends to be more strongly associated with conflict resolution than growth in non-agricultural sectors. However, there is substantial variation across countries, and such differences tend to relate to differences in the structural characteristics of countries. For example, in the case of agro-processing as a component of manufacturing, they find that in countries where the required workers and inputs can be supplied by poorer and less educated households, such as for agro-processing activities in Zambia, Malawi, and Tanzania, this sector is similarly effective as agriculture at reducing poverty. But for countries where the agro-processing activities focus on higher-value inputs that are more often provided by wealthier households, such as meat and dairy industries in Uganda, or where the required inputs and worker skills rely on a higher capital and education, such as in Uganda and Mozambique, the poverty-reducing potential of the agro-processing sector is much lower (Duffield *et al.*, 2016).

At the micro level, much existing research points to a wide range of context and structural factors, and individual endowments, that shape the kinds of places likely to be

more amenable to diversification efforts, and who within a community may be better placed to successfully benefit from livelihood programming. Thus, locational and individual targeting are important elements for successful programming. The key structural factors that the literature notes as essential for facilitating effective promotion of non-farm livelihood activities and non-farm economic growth include; good infrastructure and transport; communication and information infrastructure; market access, noting that this also encompasses physical infrastructure and (at times) communication and information access, electricity availability, and institutional processes to facilitate markets; and an overarching policy environment that facilitates small-scale, less formal, and more rural enterprises and small businesses, rather than providing disincentives (Barrett *et al.*, 2001., Duffield and Duffield, 2001., Brixiova, 2010., Davis, *et al.*, 2010 and Alobo, 2015).

There is also ample evidence that several characteristics of individuals, in addition to the constellation of place-based context factors, ease the ability for some households and individuals to diversify their livelihoods out of subsistence farming and livestock more so than others. Key among these is literacy, numeracy, education level, skills, financial capital, and social or professional networks (Barrett, *et al.*, 2001., Davis, *et al.*, 2010 and Alobo, 2015). For instance, much existing work suggests that being able to take advantage of higher earnings and non-climate-dependent livelihood opportunities is conditional on already being better off to begin with.

In Gambia, a recent study of small non-farm enterprises showed that wealthier households were more likely to undertake non-farm entrepreneurial activities and invest

more in such activities (Spencer, 2013). In Ghana, a study of more than 8,500 households found the level of education to be a significant determinant of the number non-farm livelihood activities and their share of household income. Households with greater access to credit, electricity, and markets also had more non-farm income sources and a higher share of income from non-farm activities (Spencer, 2012).

Overall, a range of empirical studies from SSA points to household, locational/geographic, and broader structural factors as playing key roles in determining the likelihood, sustainability, and level of productivity/success of micro and small business enterprises and other less and non-climate-dependent livelihood activities. Household factors may include, for example, age, gender, level of education, and existing farm and non-farm assets. Locational/geographic factors include road conditions, market access, and availability of water and electricity. Broader structural factors may include credit access, regulatory environments, and general business conditions.

At the same time, a wealth of studies also demonstrates that complex interactions among place, policies, markets, institutions, and social and cultural factors contribute to divergent or unanticipated development outcomes. For this reason, it is necessary to be cautious about blanket assumptions that uniform programming prescriptions will work similarly in different areas, as subtle differences in constellations of factors and their interactions could lead to unintended differences in outcomes.

Several studies highlight a number of key considerations for efforts to innovate on livelihood diversification away from primarily agricultural sources. These studies

commonly highlight structural limitations as key underlying contributors to high unemployment in SSA, particularly among youth (Reardon, *et al.*, 2000., Duffield and Duffield 2001., Oya, 2013 and Fox *et al.*, 2016). Thus while the potential opportunities afforded by diversification efforts are well recognized, the challenges of how to engender access and effective uptake of less or non-climate-dependent livelihood opportunities for more disadvantaged segments of populations have long been recognized as a key problem for development programming, as such populations typically lack the education, skills, financial capital, and/or social networks that are needed for such opportunities to be successful (Davis, *et al.*, 2010).

This is one of the reasons why more effective entrepreneurship training for self-employed individuals or micro and small business enterprises receives strong attention. Academic research emphasizes a need for both higher productivity entrepreneurship (as opposed to low productivity entrepreneurial activities that are common in SSA), and more diversity of the kinds of entrepreneurial activities that are done, Brixiová *et al* (2015), particularly where wage and salaried employment opportunities are low (Cho *et al.*, 2014).

An equally salient consideration is that the heterogeneity of context and individual factors and interactions in rural areas of SSA calls for great caution in applying uniform program interventions. This consideration shifts the emphasis to more localized designs that draw on community inputs and site-specific fit: “The great heterogeneity of the non-farm sector in rural areas implies that there is little scope for general, broad, policy prescriptions

The literature widely recognizes several constraining factors to productive entrepreneurship in developing countries, including the overarching regulatory and business environment in a country, lack of capital, poor access to credit, and lack of entrepreneurial skills (Spencer *et al.*, 2012 and Cho *et al.*, 2014). These studies also show that much of the existing entrepreneurial activity in SSA tends to be in sectors with little value-added potential, and are “driven by necessity rather than opportunity”

However, more productive and opportunity-driven entrepreneurship can be supported and expanded through effective skills training for nascent entrepreneurs. Such training can help bridge two of the three key primary constraints commonly faced by young entrepreneurs: insufficient business skills and professional networks (Brixiová *et al.*, 2015). When coupled with facilitated access to credit, such programs address all three of the major constraints to productive entrepreneurship at the micro level: business skills, effective networks, and sufficient capital to start and expand enterprises.

Cho *et al* (2016), highlight four key sets of considerations for the design of strong entrepreneurship development programs, each of which has bearing on the likelihood of program effectiveness: (1) determining beneficiary targeting, eligibility criteria, and profiling potential applicants or participants, particularly given that many studies suggest that relatively low uptake may be common; (2) determining the set and sectors of business/enterprise activities that will be allowable under the program, noting that this can function via either a demand-driven or project-determined approach; (3) choosing the training and additional elements that will comprise the program interventions; and (4) selecting the form and institutional partnerships by which program delivery will occur.

Business and entrepreneurship training aims to improve business income, profitability, and growth through improved knowledge, financial literacy, and use of good business skills (for example, use of record keeping and formal accounting). It is also anticipated to lead to higher employment, either through expanded employment opportunities for additional workers in successful small or medium-sized business enterprises, or simply through self-employment for successful entrepreneurs. Such training programs are often offered at no expense to participants (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014). Different interventions target a range of beneficiaries, including youth, women, clients of microcredit institutions, or those with some level of existing business skills or an existing small business. There is also a strong focus on potential entrepreneurs in target groups, such as the unemployed, school drop-outs, or recent school graduates (Cho *et al.*, 2014).

In general, much of the current rigorous evaluation literature finds differential impacts by different beneficiary groups, suggesting that it is important to target programs well. However, there is also currently no strong understanding of whether certain kinds of training programs universally benefit certain types of target beneficiaries in a consistent way. Similarly, there is no strong evidence that the same kind of program will produce the same type or level of effect when applied in different country contexts (Cho *et al.*, 2014). This uncertainty stems in part from the relatively small existing evidence base. Moreover, much of the current knowledge base is drawn from studies with relatively small sample sizes, without sufficient statistical power to detect small effects if such effects are present.

In the development literature, entrepreneurship training has also been viewed as a potential vehicle to help address youth unemployment, while strong entrepreneurial activity in poor countries is widely viewed as important for stimulating stronger economic development, not only through providing direct employment but also for its

role in spurring innovations, new technology adoption, or expanded dissemination. Some programs couple entrepreneurship training packages with competitive funds to provide start-up capital to successful participants, thus aiming to address not only the skills deficit but also capital constraints that are another commonly cited barrier for new entrepreneurs. Going a step further, other programs also aim to link participants more strongly into professional networks. Training programs often emphasize a mix of business, entrepreneurship, and financial literacy skills, and programs may draw on partnerships across NGO, private sector, education, and government institutions (or some subset of these) to design and provide the training. Typical content of such training efforts includes topics on accounting, financial planning, and marketing, pricing and costing, and separating household and business finances. More comprehensive efforts can also address topics related to customer service, business growth strategies, and employee management, and issues related to savings, debt, and using banks (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014).

There is generally a positive outlook on the potential for such programs to foster stronger employment opportunities, growth, and livelihoods diversification in countries, but there are also several knowledge gaps, including with respect to effective targeting. The academic literature consistently highlights that the current evidence base for entrepreneurship and vocational training program effectiveness draws on relatively few rigorous impact studies, conducted over too short time periods, and often with too small sample sizes to enable rigorous analysis and power to detect nuanced differences in impacts across different types of participants. In turn, this limits the overall knowledge base on how to design and implement future development programs that are appropriately tailored for given contexts, and are more likely to achieve their intended effectiveness.

There are also several reasons that contribute to the current lack of strong evidence on business training impacts, including measurement difficulties for impacts like profits or revenues. This is made even more difficult by the fact that many small business enterprises or entrepreneurs do not maintain written records. Moreover, many evaluations of program impacts are done after only a relatively short time period has passed (for example, one year), which may be too short for impacts to be realized (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014).

In terms of business survivorship, there is some evidence that business skills training programs that focus on skills for starting a new business can increase income and the likelihood of business survival. However, the effects are nuanced. For example, in one study women with higher social status had positive effects, but those with lower social status did not (Jayachandran *et al.*, 2010). In other studies, it appears that individuals who successfully start new businesses are essentially trading this for wage employment that they could do elsewhere. In such cases, although the training program is successful for entrepreneurs, it does not necessarily increase net employment in the program area (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014).

However, recent meta-analyses or systematic reviews do provide a useful evidence base for the impact of training programs (or training programs coupled with finance interventions) on intended development programming outcomes. Cho *et al* (2014), draw on 37 rigorous impact evaluations of entrepreneurship programs, and find wide variation in the effectiveness of such programs, which also vary depending on country and type of participants. They find evidence for the impact of training on business skills knowledge and adoption of practices, but not on income. In their efforts to identify which types of

training programs tend to work better for certain types of target beneficiaries, they find that such programs can have stronger impacts for younger participants, while training programs that are also combined with finance activities have stronger impacts than those that focus only on business training or financial training alone. They also find that financial activities focused on cash or in-kind grants lead to stronger impacts than microcredit activities, but caution that the even thinner evidence base here leaves much room for additional work. Lastly, their analysis also suggests that women participants appear to benefit most from finance activities that provide access to credit, rather than skills training.

Positive impacts of entrepreneurship training programs on the use or adoption of improved business skills, such as record keeping and formal accounting, although few studies have shown corresponding increases in revenue or profits. However, existing evaluations of business training effects frequently lack sufficient statistical power to detect small impacts if they are present, while differences in outcomes measured or the nature of training components included in different interventions also limits the extent to which strong syntheses of trends can be made (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014 and Spencer *et al.*, 2015).

A recent systematic review, which also looked at effects of financial access, business development services, and efforts to improve the broader business environment, in addition to entrepreneurship training, found similar overarching patterns across the urban and rural non-farm micro, small, and medium enterprises in its sample. Drawing on a sample of 53 studies that used rigorous experimental (randomized controlled trial) or quasi-experimental methods to detect impacts and attribute effects to development program interventions, the authors found that entrepreneurship training led to small improvements in management skills and self-employment. Relative to entrepreneurship

training, financial access activities on their own had smaller impacts (Spencer *et al.*, 2015). Finance interventions included microcredit schemes as well as conditional and unconditional cash grants ranging from \$100 to \$2,000 per participant. However, and similar to many of the complaints raised by the Local Data Access (LDA) study participants, the authors note that for many credit interventions, loan sizes tended to be too small, and required repayment over too short a time period (Spencer *et al.*, 2015).

Appropriate targeting is also important, with some studies pointing to stronger impacts for training participants who already had higher skills at the start of their programs, while other studies suggest that longer, more intensive, and more tailored training programs that are specific to the knowledge gaps of participants are more effective. In general, the body of evidence of rigorous impact studies of business enterprise and entrepreneurship training programs also highlights several important gaps in knowledge. These include a strong understanding of how training should be tailored to different types of beneficiaries (for example, women verses men, poorer verses wealthier participants, and subsistence verses transformative entrepreneurs), what kinds of participants tend to benefit most from such training, and what are the characteristics of small enterprises that tend to be able to use such training more effectively (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014 and Cho *et al.*, 2016).

Since most of the current work is conducted within a relatively short time after the program (12-24 months post-intervention), there is also little understanding of the longer-term effects of such programs for example whether any positive short-term effects are maintained, grow stronger, or fade out over longer time periods. Training interventions tend to target either micro-enterprises (≤ 5 employees), or demographic groups that are more likely to have high existing unemployment, such as youth. As with earlier meta-studies, Spencer *et al* (2015), also find evidence that participants gain

improved business skills as a result of such training programs, but there is little evidence for an effect on sales, revenues, or profits.

Lastly, it should be noted for this and the other systematic reviews and meta-analyses discussed here, the bulk of the studies are drawn not from SSA but from Latin America, where a greater number of randomized controlled trials and experimental studies on these issues have been conducted. In general, there are few rigorous studies of the impacts of entrepreneurship training, financial access, and broader business environmental interventions from SSA, despite the clear relevance of employment issues in SSA and the fact that such efforts comprise a major focus of development programming on the continent (Spencer *et al.*, 2015).

Unsurprisingly, current syntheses of these types of training programs have called for larger studies, with sample sizes that are sufficiently powered to detect small impacts; greater consistency in which and how different outcomes are measured across studies; a stronger focus on understanding heterogeneous outcomes across participant and enterprise characteristics; longer timelines for conducting research; and a stronger focus on determining which particular components of training programs appear to contribute most to positive effects (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014 and Spencer *et al.*, 2015).

Furthermore, there is currently little work to understand the cost-effectiveness of different types of training or coupled training and finance interventions, Spencer *et al* (2015), which is crucial to help those who design development programs to better understand how they might use scarce development resources most efficiently. In terms of empirical evidence from individual studies, a recent rigorous impact evaluation study from Ghana found that training focused on entry-level management skills led to improved business practices (Spencer *et al.*, 2012). In Swaziland, Brixiova *et al* (2015),

found better performance, measured by sales, in young entrepreneurs who had received business training, although men did better than women. Their study also found that young entrepreneurs with stronger professional networks performed better, underscoring the important role that networks play in successful business enterprises, in addition to skills.

In terms of overall effects on employment, there also appear to be fewer studies that have looked at this, and those that have generally found small effects on overall employment as a result of a small business's having received business training. Relatedly, such work has found that only a small proportion of micro-enterprises that receive business training go on to hire additional employees (that is, generate new employment) (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014).

On the other hand, there is some evidence that business training can increase the amount of loans obtained by entrepreneur participants. Some studies have demonstrated significant increases in the likelihood of women's seeking loans (Jayachandran *et al.*, 2010). Others have found an increase in the amount of loans taken, although in some cases this was higher for men only, and not for women participants (Mansuri *et al.*, 2011).

Blattman *et al* (2014), studied the impacts of an innovative Youth Opportunities Program implemented in areas of northern Uganda affected by insecurity, armed banditry, and violent extremist groups. The program provided one-off cash grants of generally \$7,500 – \$10,000 to selected groups, which averaged out to roughly \$382 received per group member. Applicants went through a structured application and screening process conducted by the Government of Uganda, which included preparing and submitting a written proposal to describe how grant funds would be used for non-

agricultural skills training and costs to start a small business enterprise. Since most potential applicants were illiterate with few years of formal education, the program provided facilitators to help with proposal preparation.

Applicants had leeway to choose where and through which institution they would like to be trained, including apprenticeship programs and formal training offered by institutions. The program established a set of technical criteria for selection, and a screening process was implemented that involved village and district government. The program provided a one-off payment of the amount requested to successful applicants, and conducted no additional monitoring of funds after the payment was made (Blattman *et al.*, 2014).

The rigorous evaluation of program impacts was conducted via an experimental design, in which equally qualified groups of applicants were randomized into program (treatment) or comparison (unselected) groups. Four years on, half of program participants were engaged in a skilled trade (most commonly tailoring, hairstyling, carpentry, or welding), and the program had increased business assets by 57 percent and earnings by 38 percent over those of the control group (Blattman *et al.*, 2014). There was also evidence that the program had led participants to move towards stronger business formalization, including a greater likelihood of keeping formal accounting records, registering their businesses, paying business taxes, and hiring labor (that is, employment expansion).

Women and men participants had similar impacts; however, women saw larger increases, primarily because they start small businesses with fewer resources than their male counterparts, and, absent such a program, women appeared unable to successfully start

and maintain profitable small business enterprises, while treatment group women were able to do so. Blattman *et al* (2014), noted substantial social barriers to women's starting and maintaining businesses in their study context, which may serve to effectively shut women out of successful entrepreneurship. Barriers can include social stigma or disapproval of women's starting businesses, lower approval rates for credit/loans, and difficulties women may face protecting business earnings from husbands or male family members (who may siphon resources from the nascent business and make it harder to invest or grow its profitability).

The study also found that women required a longer time period to realize positive impacts, but the magnitude of their earning increase over control group women was substantially greater than for men (women in the treatment group had a 73 percent increase in earning over women in the control group, relative to treatment group men earning 29 percent more than control group men) (Blattman, *et al.*, 2014).

The Blattman *et al* (2014), study is something of an outlier, and one of the strongest current examples of a successful unconditional cash transfer program in SSA. It provides compelling evidence of the possibility for well-designed and targeted development programming to elicit positive changes and opportunities for poor unemployed citizens to move from low-earning agricultural work into skilled artisanal and non-farm small business enterprises or entrepreneurial activities. The study also provides strong evidence for credit constraints as a substantial barrier to successful diversification into non-agricultural livelihood activities, and illustrates how, in this program context, unconditional cash transfers to groups of would-be entrepreneurs can be an effective way to overcome this barrier (Blattman *et al.*, 2014).

Another key element for stronger economic growth towards less and non-climate-dependent livelihoods is the ability for households and individuals to have access to functional financial systems that provide them with the ability to save, access risk-management products, and obtain financing for business activities (Demirgüç-Kunt *et al.*, 2009). In the absence of such systems, entrepreneurial-minded individuals must rely on their personal networks for financial support to pursue opportunities. Such sources are often only available to already better-off populations, thus poor access to sufficient credit also tends, in poor countries, to reinforce existing economic inequalities across populations (Demirgüç-Kunt *et al.*, 2009).

Poor credit access is therefore recognized as a key barrier to wider economic growth; however, several recent studies suggest that, while important, it may not always be the most important barrier to livelihoods diversification and household economic growth (Karlan *et al.*, 2009). Instead, studies suggest that individuals generally must first have some base level of financial literacy in order to be able to take advantage of expanded credit access and credit opportunities (Sayinzoga *et al.*, 2016). Moreover, existing evidence on credit expansion activities through increased microfinance has found a range of mixed results, and has led some authors to highlight that the ability for program recipients to benefit from microfinance interventions often hinges on individuals' existing human capital, including their financial literacy (Sayinzoga *et al.*, 2016).

Financial literacy is defined as “consumers’ awareness, skills, and knowledge enabling them to make informed, effective decisions about financial resources” (Sayinzoga *et al.*, 2016). Although there are relatively few rigorous experimental studies which measure the impact of financial literacy programs on development objectives, there is some

evidence from existing studies to suggest that a focus on improving financial literacy can be an important way (and in some cases perhaps a necessary precondition) to improve the ability of individuals to effectively make use of improved access to credit. Such studies highlight several important points.

First, they provide evidence that it is possible to improve the financial literacy of the rural poor through targeted training programs; second, that such improved financial literacy can lead to positive changes in household behaviour around saving more, and being able to borrow effectively; and third, that such changes in household saving and borrowing can translate into improvements in or starting new income-generating activities by households.

In one example from Rwanda, Sayinzoga *et al* (2016), found that financial literacy training had a significant positive impact on household saving and borrowing, as well as on new business start-up rates. However, the training was not found to have a significant impact on household income. Importantly, the study also found that increased financial knowledge among financial literacy trainees did not appear to get passed on (or spill over) to fellow farmers in the same villages, suggesting that an assumption that training some villagers in financial literacy could effectively help spread financial literacy across a village may be misguided (Sayinzoga *et al.*, 2016).

On the other hand, it should be cautioned that not all financial literacy studies have found a positive effect. Some studies have also found low interest in financial literacy training among intended beneficiaries, but this could relate to where and how the training was offered. For example, the Rwandan example above, in which there was high interest among beneficiaries, provided a week-long training course and paid

transport costs for participants, while some other programs are much shorter and may be perceived to offer less added value to potential beneficiaries (Sayinzoga *et al.*, 2016).

Systematic reviews focused on understanding the impact of increased use of microcredit services have also found mixed evidence of success. A 2012 systematic review of 17 rigorous studies of microcredit and micro-savings program impacts, which examined interventions aimed to improve the uptake and use of microcredit (typically small cash grants, as opposed to larger credit sources) and micro-savings (i.e., improved availability of deposit services for small amounts of cash), found little evidence that such programs have a positive impact on income diversification for program beneficiaries (Stewart *et al.*, 2012).

In addition, the review found that while greater use of microcredit can lead to an increase in economic opportunities for some, often this is more likely to be successful for people with already higher levels of education or vocational training (Stewart *et al.*, 2012). Overall, such studies point to fairly mixed evidence to date, and many remaining knowledge gaps on the effectiveness of microcredit interventions for individual or household economic growth. Results also highlight the importance of appropriate targeting for microcredit programming, noting that there is evidence that for some of the ultra-poor, obtaining microcredit services can actually make them poorer, due to the riskiness associated with meeting loan repayments according to the required schedule, and the often difficult loan interest conditions (Stewart *et al.*, 2012).

A 2012 meta-evaluation of agribusiness support programs conducted by the International Finance Corporation (IFC) provides complementary information to the above, with a focus on summarizing the evidence for the impact of access to finance and farmer/business training on agribusiness indicators (Nankhuni *et al.*, 2013). The focus on these two particular types of agribusiness support stems from causal logic that the key barriers to farmers' ability to benefit from agribusiness expansion activities stem from: (1) a lack of sufficient agricultural inputs and financial capital, together with (2) insufficient knowledge, to make a productive switch to marketable crops, achieve the level of agricultural productivity and quality required for markets, and engage effectively in market processes for a given value chain. The 2012 meta-evaluation summarizes the results of 22 previous meta-analyses, together drawing on evidence from 135 reports and 66 evaluations that met selection criteria for inclusion in the analyses.

The analyses found that access to finance interventions tended to produce positive impacts on short and medium-term outcomes, such as adoption of new agricultural technologies (like improved seeds or fertilizers), higher production, and increased agricultural income. However, results were also fairly varied across different value chains and types of beneficiaries. For farmer business training results, the meta-evaluation similarly found some positive impacts on increased technology adoption, yields, and income, but this was generally only for certain types of beneficiaries, and also only for some value chains. This suggests that there is scope for such interventions to be better targeted to appropriate beneficiaries and for better selection of viable value chains for a given context. In addition, for access to finance interventions, the analyses tended to find some evidence of positive impacts on overall household livelihoods, but in terms

of poverty reduction, there was little evidence for this longer-term effect from farmer business training interventions alone.

As with the evidence highlighted in previous sections of this literature review, the IFC study highlighted that the most successful interventions provided training programs together with in-kind (in the form of inputs or equipment) or cash grants. In terms of specific guidance for more and less successful approaches, the review also cautions against one-size-fits-all training models, and emphasizes the need for approaches that are tailored to the needs of specific farmer groups.

The authors also noted that more successful projects tend to focus on resolving limitations across an entire value chain, including a focus on good farming practices and management skills, post-harvest techniques, marketing support, and facilitating organized groups of farmers to have access to sufficient information on prices and linkages to suppliers, and to ensure that they understand and are trained in required quality standards for product marketability. It is highlighted that improvements and dissemination of relevant information and communications technology can be an especially useful way to improve farmer access and effective use of market information for wide entry and engagement in agribusiness activities (IFC, 2012).

USAID's Pastoralist Area Resilience Improvement through Market Expansion (PRIME) program was a five-year initiative aiming to impact 250,000 households in three regions of Ethiopia, launched in 2012. Its overarching objective was to "increase household incomes and enhance resilience to climate change through market linkages," toward the goal of reducing poverty and hunger. The program described its methodology as a

combination of “push” and “pull,” with the emphasis on production and productivity to be the push force and the linkage to markets to be the pull force. PRIME investments were all in agricultural value chains, particularly livestock. The project had five complementary “intermediate results” or thematic areas productivity of livestock, adaptation, alternative livelihoods, innovation, and nutrition.

To strengthen alternative livelihoods for households transitioning out of pastoralism, the PRIME project focused on achieving (1) increased employability through life skills, financial literacy, and entrepreneurship training and mentoring; (2) increased income opportunities for households transitioning out of pastoralism, including through increased access to and availability of appropriate financial services, technologies, and private sector market information; and (3) expanding market access to increase employment opportunities, through support to businesses expansion or start-ups, and a focus on public and private sector opportunities (USAID, 2015).

The two main mechanisms used to improve market linkages are the Innovation Investment Fund (IIF) and the small grants fund. The IIF was aimed at supporting livestock value chains by encouraging new private sector investment through grants of up to 50 percent of the investment cost. This was designed to support activities across the entire project through targeted investments in the form of technical assistance, matching grants, and service contracts with private sector, government and non-government stakeholders. In sum, the grants were intended to reduce the risk for investors in high-risk areas and leverage new investment.

A PRIME mid-term evaluation found that the strategy had the potential to have a strong positive impact on livestock and livestock product value chains (USAID, 2015). The number of applicants for grants was initially small, but the entire grant budget of \$5 million was soon fully committed. Illustrative ventures included enterprises focused on improving access to and availability of quality livestock inputs, including feed and fodder; improving animal health services; improving meat and live animal trade; strengthening the dairy value chain; essential skills transfer for youth and entrepreneurs; strengthening the poultry value chain; and efficient and renewable energy technology. Small and medium enterprises were not the only beneficiaries: financial institutions, private equity and business advisory firms, research institutes, and other not-for-profit entities could all apply for IIF support under the same conditions as the small businesses, for projects that had similar market development objectives.

The small grants are obtainable for up to \$25,000 and are provided for up to 30 percent of the investment cost, with the balance provided by the investor (similar to IIF grants). The grants are allocated on a competitive basis following vetting according to selection criteria (also similar to IIF), usually targeting existing businesses where investors already have a track record. The range of grant recipients has included dairy processing and distribution businesses, private veterinary pharmacies, women's traders' associations, agricultural cooperatives, agricultural input suppliers, solar energy distributors, and livestock holding grounds. The original project results framework provided for engaging households on commercial livestock production and small scale dairy and fattening models, but the evaluation did not find progress yet in this area.

Evaluators described the project as most successful in its efforts to improve market linkages, but noted that it had a harder time increasing livestock production activities. Market linkages were considered a success because of the small investment funds. The evaluators found the value chain investments worked best when technical advisory accompanied the value chain investment subsidies and when the investments did not crowd out other non-subsidized market players. Technical advisory to accompany the investments was seen as very useful, especially in cases where livestock investors and business operators were relatively uninformed about the best practices of production.

It was also emphasized that value chain interventions need to be systematically mapped to cover all points of the value chain, in order to proportionately emphasize each link in the chain, without which the others cannot work. In this sense, value chain mapping may be a useful exercise. For example, in agriculture, addressing the supply chain for high-yielding seeds is worth little if the market for fertilizer does not work for the same customers. And investments in expanding small-scale dairy production are suboptimal without 24-hour electricity and a cold-storage chain among wholesale buyers.

Trainings worked best in the cases where they were directly connected to opportunities. While the project also sponsored a job-seeking agency, it was unclear what type of relationships or incentives the project had for actual job placement with employers for graduating trainees and other job seekers. Without that kind of linkage, livelihood trainings for job and entrepreneurship skills may not help many people find jobs or start their own business.

As is often the case for potential beneficiaries within the RISE zone of influence, the PRIME evaluation noted that prospective entrepreneurs did not have start-up capital. The PRIME project had a microfinance platform and connections with some banks. Facilitating this interaction between the loan providers and would-be entrepreneurs may also help to connect training and technical advisory to financial services for new business opportunities. For example, by virtue of contact with banks, the project was apparently able to encourage the rollout of a regional mobile money platform from the national bank (USAID, 2015).

USAID's Office of Food for Peace partners jointly with the World Food Program to provide emergency food assistance in Burkina Faso. USAID's most recent Food for Peace projects in Burkina Faso are Families Achieving Sustainable Outcomes (FASO) and Victory Against Malnutrition (ViM) (USAID 2015a). FASO spent roughly \$40 million over five years, from 2010 to 2015, in the districts of Boulsa-North, Manni, and Gayéri (north-central and eastern Burkina Faso). ViM was valued at roughly \$34 million over five years, from 2011 to 2016, in Sanmatenga Province. Both projects aimed to reduce food insecurity affecting vulnerable populations by improving farmers' incomes and household health and nutrition, especially among pregnant and lactating women and children under 5 years old.

Examples of resilience programming included support for irrigated vegetable gardens, improved and adapted seeds, and improvement of soil fertility, post-harvest products, and emphasis on high-value crops. Beyond these successes were counted a community savings and credit program and the expansion of warrantage practices. It is not clear that the programs were doing much beyond assistance in agricultural domains or to

achieve a transformative change, as the nods to governance were vague, and those to infrastructure were small-scale. While the evaluation found excellent examples of project assistance to resilience, there was little indication that interventions would serve the goal of livelihood diversification that is closer to the core of the RISE initiative.

Evaluators were positive about the success of the program in overcoming some of the barriers to livelihoods diversification. In particular, they highlighted microfinance, business training, youth participation, and the market information system. After business training and literacy training as well in some cases many beneficiaries were able to take advantage of start-up grants and village-level loans, with apparent success. Preparation in business and vocational skills made them ready to take advantage of the opportunity that came with the next part of the program, which was technical training followed by and coupled with loans. Many of the grantees and loan recipients went into petty trading. Despite the program's theory of change and hypothesis of an impact in agriculture, the evaluation found that non-agricultural production appeared to be among its greatest benefits (USAID, 2007).

Although the training was deemed to be effective, beneficiaries indicated that it did not go far enough. They indicated that their micro-enterprises did not advance beyond their "current ceiling," so that even if they could find employment, these did not become "sources of employment in their own right." However, a successful aspect of the training was that the choice of topics was highly participatory; the training topics were selected by trainee groups themselves. Among the interventions implemented, the evaluators also highlighted the success of a market information system, which broadcasted prices on the

radio and became an important source of information for farmers to know what prices were available at different market points throughout the country.

Microfinance was also seen as one of the greatest successes of the LINKS project. Loans were very popular with those who took them because of their low interest rates (2.5 percent) and easy access, and the repayment rate was apparently very high (cited as 99.9 percent). There were easily navigable group lending processes, gradual increases in loan size, and simple collateral requirements. The beneficiaries reported that loans allowed them to expand their businesses (USAID, 2007).

Based on the USAID (2007) study, the village savings and loan groups were often comprised entirely of women, and they benefited from skills training. However, the sustainability of this model was called into question, particularly for (peri) urban youth. In the LINKS program, young men went into business in cassava processing to produce *gari* (flour), but they soon learned that the cash flow cycle of this business did not meet their everyday cash needs. In other words, even if this was a profitable business model, it was not profitable fast enough. The men needed cash instantly, and the agro-processing only promised revenue later on. For this reason, if not others as well, the young men were evidently “disenfranchised” from LINKS start-up benefits. The evaluation also found that young men refrained from taking microloans to the same extent as elders and particularly women (USAID, 2007).

Integration was a notable aspect of the program, which did a lot with only \$8 million—that is, integration between different aspects of the program targeted to the same farmers’ groups: field schools, savings and loans, trainings in skills and business management, and even literacy. The interventions were overlaid onto existing

community structures and initiatives, which maintained and built upon community ownership of the activities (USAID, 2007).

Little *et al* (2016), in a report commissioned by USAID on East Africa resilience programming, highlighted the main types of livelihoods that have evolved among pastoralists from three case studies in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Main questions included how the livelihoods are changing and why, what factors determine whether alternative livelihoods are good or bad options, and what the economic and political implications of this diversification are. The authors also examined the social and environmental costs of diversification, including women's experiences. Finally, they made recommendations on policy improvements for rural livelihood diversification programming.

The authors used a framework that examines short-versus long-term reward, and compares risks to benefits, to draw conclusions about which livelihoods offer the best opportunities with the fewest private and social costs. Their foremost examples of livelihoods with short-term private gain but long-term social (environmental) cost were in the cultivation of grazing land and the production of charcoal. In fact, the marginalization of pastoralist communities (at least in East Africa) has accelerated as a result of recent changes in land use and this hits women and minorities particularly hard because of their disenfranchisement facing the laws and land rights in general.

The authors argue that there is no single technology for enhancing resilience in dry-lands. Rather, there are multiple, incremental options, including livelihood diversification, that, when adapted to local contexts and circumstances, can increase probabilities for improved livelihoods and resilience. Factors that impact diversification

and migration include employment and business prospects, education, security, and health.

At least in East Africa, the fact that towns are growing in size also means that they are growing in importance, and the nature of a town's economy dictates the employment opportunities available there. Some towns, now growing in what were until recently strictly rangelands, offer great diversity of businesses and job opportunities. Increased urbanization and associated business developments in the larger towns attract wealthier herders who seek investments in business and occasionally in real estate. Depending upon trade and migration patterns, towns can be connected to local or national labour markets and to national or international markets for food and consumer goods (if not yet services).

Program opportunities for building resilience in the dry lands include land tenure and land use policies; education and skills training; support for women-owned enterprises and employment programs for youth; value-added activities around livestock production and trade (e.g., fodder production, meat processing, and local fattening enterprises for trade); support to local communities for natural product extraction, processing, and marketing (e.g., wild plant products); nutritional extension and support for settled/ex-pastoralist communities; (peri-)urban infrastructure planning, especially sanitation and water; governance and empowerment; and research and support on all of the above.

With regard to land use changes, government policy can have a defining impact on the livelihood options and benefits available to residents especially in industries related to extracting or processing natural resources. Wild plant products may also help local people more than is currently the case, if local groups can be organized for the collection, processing, storage, and marketing of the goods. Such products and local cooperative groups to do the processing and improve techniques and technologies may be a good opportunity to target benefits particularly for women.

Livestock production and processing offer a unique opportunity to expand and innovate upon current operations, where new techniques and supply chain improvements can deliver greater benefits and multiplier effects in the local economy. Urbanization, income increases, and population growth all entail an increased demand for meat, milk, and other animal products, which local producers and traders could potentially meet. Low-hanging fruit for basic infrastructure investments in ex-pastoralist communities would include sanitation and hygiene, more consistent electrification, animal health services, and various supports to small-scale enterprises.

Kamket (2019), who is a Member of National Assembly representing Tiati constituency that forms part of the study area strongly proposes education and skills training for the community that has been practising pastoralism. He suggests too that education should and must be emphasized as a means to change culture as well as tame the engagement of children in pastoral activities. Indeed, the bigger labour force in pastoralism is children who take care of livestock, both cattle and shoats while the elders engage in other chores, often non income generating.

“As MP for Tiaty, if I were asked to choose between rustling powered by the gun and the hoe and modern education and economy, I would choose the latter. And this is what I want to vouch for here.

...Nomadic pastoralism and formal education are strange bedfellows. They are incompatible. They are mutually exclusive. One must die for the other to survive. I want to vouch strongly for our government and our people to help nomadic pastoralism and cattle rustling die and be replaced by modern economy through modern education.

...The gun is not the panacea to the problems of the North Rift region. The solution to the problems lies in Development and opening up of the place. The frequent gun and arrow fights over water, pastures and livestock that has gone on for generations while fortunes of the community morans continue to dwindle is proof that the people urgently need to be provided with alternative economic livelihoods (Kamket, Standard, 6th June 2019).

Few would likely question the notion that understanding the determinants of violent conflicts is prudent in designing strategies, setting policy, allocating resources, and implementing effective initiatives to counter the threat by VEOs and their adherents. As noted above, however, the current literature, though expanding, does not yet provide a comprehensive understanding. Moreover, while the core ideologies of Salafi Jihadi organizations have consistent elements, those who join these VEOs, which are most prominent in the Sahel, have varied and multi-layered motivations. Designing and targeting development responses to enhance resilience to these VEOs, and hinder community support or participant recruitment to them, should be similarly varied.

A substantial portion of the peer-reviewed literature on drivers of violent conflicts has focused on macro-level analysis of countries of origin and places of terrorist attacks as a means of understanding the conditions under which violent conflicts emerges and is sustained (Abadie, 2006., Krueger *et al.*, 2008., Piazza, 2006 and Li *et al.*, 2004). From these cross-country analyses, which examine data on unemployment rates, economic growth, gross domestic product per capita, and similar macro-level indicators, no

consensus has emerged on whether negative economic factors are directly related to participation in VEOs or positive economic factors correlate with resilience to violent conflicts. While some studies indicate that there is a relationship between low per capita income and terrorist attacks others find no discernable relationship (Krueger *et al.*, 2008., Abadie, 2006 and Piazza, 2006).

However, consistent with findings on civil war, there is some emerging agreement that precipitous changes in some of these conditions may have a relationship to participation in attacks, particularly among better educated populations (Graff, 2010 and Collier, 2003). This finding is consistent with research that states that change, whether economic, political, or social, can create conditions for instability. In this view, therefore, absolute poverty would not show a direct connection to violent conflicts, but rather the relative change in conditions or relative deprivation (Gurr, 2005 and Collier, 2003). Gurr (2005) in particular posits that one of these precipitous changes that pose a risk factor for developing countries is a “youth bulge” characterized by a substantial increase in population facing insufficient employment prospects (Gurr, 2005).

The literature highlighting weak governance in developing countries as the critical element of allowing VEOs to develop and grow through attraction of recruits and supporters largely suggests that perceived inequalities, including possibly wealth distribution and availability of employment, are points of galvanization (Chenoweth, 2005 and Gurr, 2005). As income inequality increases, whether regionally or between ethnicities or other discernable identity groups, there is evidence that insurgent violence increases (Fearon, 2008). Using data on 227 communal groups throughout the world, Gurr (2005), found that “identities, equality, and historical loss of autonomy” are major

factors in group grievance. Further, Piazza's global quantitative cross-national time-series study shows that countries with minority group economic discrimination are significantly more likely to experience domestic terrorist attacks than countries either without minority groups or without economic discrimination towards minority groups (Piazza, 2011).

Abadie (2006), found that there is no relationship between income inequality and violent conflicts, but shows that there is a relationship between political freedom and violent conflicts. "Countries with intermediate levels of political freedom are shown to be more prone to violent conflicts than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with highly authoritarian regimes."

In Khalil and Zeuthen's case study of the Office of Transition Initiatives' Kenya Transition Initiative, the authors stress the relatively limited number of people who have been recruited into VEOs, as well as a need to better understand the subpopulations that are vulnerable and their material and non-material motivations for involvement (Khalil *et al.*, 2014). This raises the question of whether livelihoods and income levels are principal factors, or whether relative deprivation and inequity felt by particular marginalized groups are more prominent considerations.

Pastoralists get half of their food and income wholly from livestock (Swift, 1988). During colonial times or even today, pastoralists faced major challenges from drought, causing shortage of pasture and water. This leads to competition for grazing, and stock theft (cattle rustling). However, they possessed organized drought coping mechanisms including: mobility, leaving land fallow; splitting families to better manage family herds;

pooling resources; trade ties; diversification of domestic herds; raids that distributed the cattle from within the communities! Such mechanisms were organized through the customary institution of the elders, regulating conflicts and administering justice.

The nomads' strategies to manage calamities are well known especially in the 1880s and 1890s during rinderpest and pleuropneumonia outbreaks. These strategies were based on the premise that control of a variety of resources was needed to provide access to pasture and water at different times of the year and particularly during droughts. Pastoralists had a highly diversified economy. Firstly, the land was vast and ranged from good agricultural soils to desert, with large herds of wild game. Secondly, they had the wide and peaceful contacts they established, which facilitated long distance trade (Spencer, 1973). The current borders did not exist in the pre-colonial era. The pastoralists were never organized on the basis of centralized state system structures, no tradition of administrative or political loyalty to central governing figures, and in the immediate pre-colonial period operated a decentralized self-government based on territorial units. Colonialism and post-independence added two significant variables important to understanding of pastoral conflicts; boundaries and military repression. The native practices though allowed pastoralists to hold back their animals from wetter areas keeping grass in reserve for the dry season.

During the dry season in prolonged droughts, pastoralists are forced to search for water across international boundaries. 1939 was a terrible year for Kenya - Uganda pastoralists. Rainfall was very inadequate and locusts finished whatever pasture remained. The result was a widespread migration by pastoral Suk (Pokot). Droughts resulted in scarcity of pasture and water, leading to mass loss of livestock in Laikipia. This led to the Mukogodo Masai' migrating from their familiar plains. In response to the 1999-2001 droughts, the Mukogodo Masai migrated from their familiar plains into private ranches.

This was aggravated by the fact that it was not just the Laikipia Masai pastoralists who invaded European owned ranches,' but also pastoralists from Samburu. The scarcity, mobility and competition aggravated by the climatic conditions lead to conflict within and across borders. It further leads to migration of pastoralists, risking conflict with settled peoples, and also diseases such as trypanosomiasis, tsetse fly and rinderpest (Nkutu, 2005).

Therefore, raiding is done for three purposes among the Pokot. Firstly, to secure basic needs of life and to regenerate the number of animals in the herd as a response to drought. Secondly, raided cows allow payment of bride wealth for many wives, which is a sign of wealth of a Pokot man. Lastly, it was for religious sacrifice and gained prestige for having killed an enemy.

Policy makers have always preferred agriculture as an economic activity to pastoralism. Most of the pastoral areas were 'closed districts' and the maintenance of order remained the major goal of colonial government officials. The best hope was to transform pastoralists into agriculturists, who would be simple to manage. From the 1950s, the colonial governments in Kenya and Uganda sought to introduce private land tenure.

In Kenya the Marakwet neighbours the Pokot who are major inhabitants of West Pokot counties respectively and both speak the Kalenjin language. The Marakwet population is fairly settled producing maize, beans, tea, Irish potatoes and vegetables; rearing cattle and goats for meat and milk. Sheep is reared for wool and meat. Insecurity is high since the 1990s when raids from Pokot increased. The immediate cause of the conflict is competition for the scarce natural resources of water and pasture. Pokot is characterized by a very arid and semi-arid environment and are subsequently compelled to venture to

Marakwet in search of water and pasture. The Marakwet see such actions as aggressive and respond by violence (Nkutu, 2005).

Several peace meetings between the Marakwet and the Pokot have not improved the situation. The clans who have fallen victim to the Pokot cattle rustlers especially from Baringo East have started to move away from the common borders displacing the clans already settled.

People's means of livelihood in North Rift is quite different from those in the south where modernization has been attempted. Access roads to the cities and major towns are rudimentary, and there are no railways. Other amenities like water, electricity and health care are extremely limited or absent. This condition hampers access to basic services such as health care, formal education, security and markets. It hinders efficiency and options, both for input resources and output products. Therefore, trade ability and income generation capacity in all the areas under study are severely restricted (Nkutu, 2005).

From this review, a significant gap in studies to do with livelihoods options and how significantly it has been advanced with conflict, dislocation and relocation in mind is evident (Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011). In Kerio Valley Delta, there is no such scheme available intended to either discovering the livelihood abilities accessible in conflicts situation. However, little is known of livelihood options available to conflicting communities in the Kerio Valley Delta region and how it is connected to conflict dynamism. Successive regimes have turned a blind eye to existing lack of alternative livelihood among the communities in this Valley which is a concern of the current study. Further, reviewed study works have not explored livelihood options as best solution to and from protracted dynamic conflicts.

2.6 Literature Review Approaches

The approaches used in the literature reviewed appear to be quantitative methods with descriptive and explanatory designs forming the bulk of the studies (Spencer *et al.*, 2015., Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt *et al.*, 2009 and Sayinzoga *et al.*, 2016). These studies have thus sought to examine the events and happenings that underlie the occurrences of conflicts, especially ethnic conflicts, and the determinants adduced to cause the said conflicts. Others, as already noted, in an explanatory sense, have been done to show a causal link between determinants like socio-economic and socio-cultural factors and conflict occurrences.

Some notable studies have also been qualitative in nature (Gurr, 2005., Collier, 2003 and Thorsten *et al.*, 2015). These studies have been done via content analysis where systematic review of literature as regards conflicts within ethnic realms have been researched on plus the factors that have been found to lead to the escalation of the ethnic based conflicts. The reviews have been helpful in building and tracking information both empirical and theoretical that helps in a better and deeper understanding of the issues under investigation; for the purposes of the present thesis, they were socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta, in Kenya.

The sampling procedures for the quantitative studies have mainly been stratified random sampling used to delineate populations that are heterogeneous and later coupled with simple random sampling to offer equal chances of participation for the respondents and reduce bias. Purposive sampling has however been sparsely used in many of the studies reviewed. Also, many of the studies have used questionnaires to collect data; an instrument that is an outlier for quantitative studies. As far as data analysis is concerned, descriptive statistics in the form of means, standard deviations, percentages and counts form the bulk of analysis with others infusing inferential statistics in the form of

correlations and multiple regression analysis. For the qualitative studies, the systematic review was done by sampling using publication searching methods that allowed for searching of keywords that reflect the variables under review.

There are notable gaps in the methodological approaches used by the reviewed literature that the present study has attempted to fill. One, the overreliance on one methodology leaves a lot of interpretational gaps which the current study hoped to fill by using quantitative and qualitative elements in a somewhat mixed methodology that employed the use of questionnaires, interview schedules and focus group discussions. This has allocated the study a higher standard of reliability. Second, the study has infused inferential elements via a correlational analysis in a bid to check for statistically significant relationship between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism. This has helped to offer the much-needed analysis that lends itself to better conclusions and recommendations within a complex context that is the Kerio Valley Delta region in Kenya.

2.7 Conceptual Framework

A conceptual framework is a pattern of conceptual and theoretical underpinnings coalesced or discussed side by side in a bid to underscore the anchorage of a research work. For the purposes of the present study, the conceptual framework is a discussion of two theories that apply to the present study, namely; social conflict theory and the cultural theory. However, the two while relevant do not solely apply to studies on ethnic conflicts. Consequently, it is important to consider the three major schools of thought that form the conceptual and theoretical underpinning of ethnic conflicts before cascading to the two relevant theories for the present study. The three theoretical schools that underpin ethnic conflicts are the primordialist theory of ethnic conflict, the instrumentalist theory and the constructivist theory of ethnic conflicts. The primordialist

theory consists of what has been adduced as there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location” (Grosby, 1994).

What this means is that people develop kinship based on their biological connection and look at each other as relatives and anyone who is not a member of the blood line becomes an enemy. This system falls short however because it makes conflicts unavoidable and yet we know that that is not often the case.

The instrumentalist theory is understood as conflicts being spearheaded by community conscious leaders who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes” (Smith, 2001).

This means that conflicts are run and led by leaders who mobilize their people in a bid to enact conflicts characterized by violence clothed in a feeling of discrimination, disenfranchisement politically and resource immobilization. This appears to be the picture in many conflicts in Kenya where leaders lead out in incitement and conflict operations. This theory also means that the said leaders have a major share not only in the blame but also importantly in the responsibility to stop the conflicts.

Finally, there is the constructivist school of thought who argues that conflict is bred by the perception, knowledge and experience of the actors involved in the said conflict. When one ethnic group feels left out of jobs and resources at the expense of another ethnic group, the perception, experience of being left out and the knowledge that discrimination is happening creates a constructivist view that leads to conflicts. This is better explained by the case between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda where the major

ethnic Hutu felt that the Tutsis had gotten all the jobs and resources and used violence to try and bring the situation to rights.

That said, the two main theories, the social conflict theory and the cultural theory better explain the issues in the present study. However, a keen eye will see that the two theories lend themselves to the three schools of thoughts already highlighted.

2.7.1 Social Conflict Theory

This study was guided by two theories, the social conflict theory and the culture theory. The social conflict theory was suggested by Karl Marx in 1867 and it claims that the society is in a state of perpetual conflict because of competition for limited resources, it holds that social order is maintained by domination and power rather than consensus and conformity. According to the social conflict theory, those with wealth and power try to hold on to it by any means possible chiefly by suppressing the poor and the powerless (Coombs *et al.*, 2013). A basic premise of conflict theory is that individuals and groups within a society work to maximise their own benefits. It focuses on competition between groups within the society, it views social and economic institutions as tools of struggle between groups or classes used to maintain inequality and the dominance of the ruling class (Cragun and Cragun, 2006).

Social conflict theories assume that competition is the default rather than cooperation, given conflict theorists assumption that conflict occurs between social classes, one outcome of this conflict is revolution, the idea is that change in a power dynamic between groups does not happen as the result of adaptation position control (Chen, 2008).

Oftentimes, cultural and economic factors intertwine as causes of conflict, highlighting the complexity of conflicts in Africa. Violent conflicts in Kerio valley between inhabitants of Turkana, Baringo, Elgeyo Marakwet and West Pokot with occasional spill over to Samburu counties. Elfversson (2016), argues that this left more than 30 people dead and many others displaced from their homes and farms. Competition over access to pasture and water and control of dwindling resources along River Kerio, ethnic intolerance and political differences have been blamed for the conflict in the valley. As much as the national government has been blamed for being a bystander, political rivalry is also to blame for the escalating Pokot-Marakwet conflicts. Dating back to pre-colonial times, the conflicts among communities in Kerio valley Delta have been in recent times become more violent and complex.

This theory while explaining part of the main issues of conflict dynamism does have certain gaps that warrant a new theory. One, it deals only with conflicts in a general sense devoid of the cultural nuances that help describe conflicts in certain regions of Africa. Secondly, the theory does not describe the recommendations that would help solve conflicts while cultural theory does.

2.7.2 Cultural Theory

Cultural theory as espoused by Ogburn (1966), is a sub-branch to semiotics and comparative anthropology that is intended to explain the heuristic concepts attendant to culture in practical and scientific terms and format. The 19th century saw scholars define culture as the vast portfolio of human activities but others substituted culture with 'civilization.' It was until the 20th century that culture was viewed using scientific lenses. Consequently, culture was considered as strategies used by human as opposed to the instinctive animal dynamics. Others still looked at culture as symbolic expressions and

representations of human action but all looked at culture as distinctive to human nature (Fridgal, 2013).

Culture theory sought to elucidate the integral relationship between human nature and human actions (Ogburn, 1966). Consequently, culture becomes such an essential element of human existence within the human environment and the human adaptation to historical events that comes from it. Furthermore, now that culture is considered as a principal adaptive instrument of humans and occurs much quicker than human biological evolution, significant cultural modification can be looked at as culture adapting to itself (Ogburn, 1966).

Consequently, anthropologists often argue on if human behaviour is dissimilar to animal behaviour in grade more than in kind; they must surely get ways to differentiate cultural norms from sociological behaviour and psychological norms and behaviour. This infers that in the event culture is utilized as a cause to conflicts, it is just a response to distinctive human behaviour. It is in this last argument that this theory becomes relevant to the present study. This relevance is in the sense that the people in conflict and living in Kerio Valley Delta have experiences, norms and ways of life which underpin their relationship. The relationship has become the basis for conflict and as a result, this theory offers a perfect espousal of the issues under study especially the ethnic identity and cultural belief system aspects.

2.8 Conceptual Framework Model




Figure 2. 1: Conceptual Framework

Source: Researcher, 2019

2.9 Chapter summary

The chapter covered literature on Nexus between the socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism within Kerio valley Delta as per the objectives of the study with the main aim of identifying the theoretical framework that formed its basis. Contemporary literature was reviewed around the concepts of conflicts resulting from cattle rustling and raids, culturally fuelled conflicts including sustaining of status and the conflict dynamics among the pastoral communities. Resources reviewed included books, academic literature, journals, electronic libraries, newspapers, and online searches. The following chapter outlines and described research methodology that the study adopted in its inquiry.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this chapter was to outline and describe research design and methodology that the study adopted in its inquiry. This section comprises of the study design, study area, target population, sample size, sampling procedure, and data collection instruments. It entails the methods adopted in gathering and analysing the data for the study. This section also highlights the ethical consideration made and chapter summary.

3.1 Research Design

The study adopted a blend of cross cultural survey design, content analysis and correlational research design. According to Okoth (2012), a research design is the strategy, assembly and approach of investigation considered so as to gain answers to research questions and to control variables. The cross-cultural survey research design was used to describe the existing research concern by asking individuals about their perceptions, attitudes and values which enabled researcher to understand communities' in the Kerio Valley Delta understanding of the phenomenon under study (Cummings, 2003., Survey Research Centre, 2010).

Correlational research design was used to determine the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism in this study (Baur, 2014). Correlational research is a category of non-experimental research where the researcher scores two sets of measurement variables and evaluates the statistical relationship (the correlation) found in between the variables with almost no effort to regulate extraneous variables (Kothari, 2014).

The usage of more than one research design as applied in this research has also been called mixed research design which is an acceptable methodology as posited by (Creswell, 2004). This study investigated socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta. Since the research problem under investigation was descriptive in nature, a survey research design was considered appropriate for collecting, analysing and presenting the data. Further, descriptive survey allowed for a combination of both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. The descriptive element was useful to describe the livelihood options, the status maintained, the ethnic attitudes, the cultural inclinations and the conflict dynamics. The following Table 3.1 is a summary of research design and variables of the study.

Table 3. 1: Summary of Research Designs based on Specific Objectives

Specific Objective	Variables/measurable indicators	Research design
Ethnic Status Asses the relationship between maintaining status as a socio-cultural element and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta.	Maintaining status Position in society Value on power	Descriptive research design Correlation and inter-correlation Content analysis
Ethnic identity Examine the influence ethnic identity as a socio-cultural attribute on conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta	Maintaining ethnic identity Moral based ethnic identity Political based ethnic identity	Descriptive survey design Correlational survey Content analysis
Cultural belief Analyze the connection between cultural belief system and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta	Cultural belief system Rituals Cultural understanding Levels of cultural position	Cross-cultural research design Correlational survey Content analysis
Sustainable livelihood Evaluate the effectiveness of livelihood options as a deterrence of conflict within Kerio Valley Delta	Sustainable Livelihood Livelihood options	Descriptive Survey design Content analysis

Source; Researcher, 2019

3.2 Study Area


Kerio Valley lies between the Tugen Hills and the Elgeyo Escarpment in Kenya. Kerio valley stretches about 80Km long and 10 Km wide with the deepest point being Cherangani hills and the Tugen Hills. The valley also serves as natural border line in most sections between the counties of Elgeyo Marakwet, Baringo, West Pokot, Turkana and Samburu. The communities living along the valley are predominantly pastoral with Tugen and Marakwets practicing little of crop farming. The Tugen, Pokot and Marakwet are linguistically related groups from the larger Kalenjin ethnic group (Pkalya *et al.*, 2004). Kerio valley has highly variable and erratic rainfall; the temperatures are high with a mean of between 26°C and 38°C, (Schilling *et al.*, 2012). At Kimwarer in the southern part of the valley, fluoride is mined by the Kenya Fluorspar Company. The southern parts of the valley are settled by the Elgeyo people and the northern part by the Marakwet people. Tugen people live on the slopes of the Tugen Hills. The Valley extends into West Pokot and Marakwet border and ends at border to Turkana County. The valley narrows as it nears Samburu-Turkana border before ending at Lake Turkana.

The choice of Kerio valley for this study is informed by the inter-relations of the groups; being pastoral and secondly being Nilotic have a common practice in raids, and code of conduct relating to the practice, yet for many years, this communities have constantly fought along the valley and no solution has ever been reached as to the ownership or resource use pattern. The following Table 3.2 indicates counties and sub-counties in the study area.

Table 3. 2: Sub-Counties and Wards in the Study

County	Sub-County	Wards
Turkana	Turkana South	Kaputir, Katilu, Lobokat, Kalapata, Lokichar
	Turkana East	Kapedo, Napeitom, Katilia
Baringo	Tiati	Tirioko, Kolowa, Ribkwo, Silale, Loiyamorock, Tangelbei, Korossi, Churo, Amaya
	Baringo north	Barwessa, Kabartonjo, Saimo, Kipsara Man, Saimo, Soi, Bartabwa
Elgeyo Marakwet	Marakwet East	Kapyego, Sambirir, Endo, Embobut, Embulot
West Pokot	Sigor	Sekerr, Masool, Lomut, Weiwei
	Kacheliba	Suam, Kodich, Kasei, Kapchok, Kiwawa, Alale
Samburu	Samburu West	Lodokejek, Suguta-Marmar, Maralal, Loosuk, Poro

Source: Researcher, 2019



The following map covers conflict prone areas in Kerio valley Delta

Figure 3.1: Map of study area

Source: Researcher (2019) as modified from Wencelaus Simiyu, ESRI (2019)

3.3 Study Population

Population is a set of persons, objects or events having at least one common attribute to which the researcher wishes to generalize on the basis of representative sample of observation. It is that population that the researcher wants to generalize the results of the study (Fisher, 1958). It sought to get data from the chiefs-84, assistant chiefs-124, sub-county directors-28, deputy county directors-14, regional commissioner-1, county commissioners-7, directors of NGOs-54, security personnel-150, Director of ministry of

Interior-1, County directors on special programmes)-5, members of parliament-4, households of community elders and community morans from the Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Ilchamus and the Samburu-.192,575. The target population was 193,046. The households that live along the Kerio Valley along the 5 bordering counties were targeted specifically in the respective sub counties as tabulated in Table 3.3 below.

Table 3.3: Population Data of Target Sub Counties

County	Sub county	Population	Number of HH	HH size
Turkana	County	922,210		
	Turkana East	138,265	17,981	7.7
	Turkana South	153,350	24,552	6.2
West Pokot		618,867		
	Pokot South	80,590	13,817	5.8
	Pokot Central	118,721	21,850	5.0
Baringo		662,760		
	East Pokot	79,770	14,498	5.5
	Tiaty	73,146	12,153	6.0
	Baringo North	104,654	23,555	4.1
Elgeyo Marakwet		453,403		
	Marakwet East	96,897	21,362	4.5
Samburu	Marakwet West	137,180	29,523	4.6
		307,957		
	Samburu North	66,879	13,284	5.0
	Households (elders/morans)		(192,575)	

Source: KNBS, 2019

3.4 Sample Size Determination

In determination of sample size, the researcher used the formula provided by (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). While in determination of sample size of sub-groups Borg and Gall formula was used (Gall *et al.*, 1996). The formula is presented hereunder.

$$N = Z^2 pq / d^2$$

Where: N= desired minimum sample size

Z= the standard normal deviate at confidence interval of 99% (1.96),

p= proportion in the target population estimated to have the characteristic of security personnel, elders, community raiders under Study (0.8)

q =1-p (0.2) and

d= level of statistical significance of estimates (0.05) for desired precision thus derivation of multi-stage random sample size was

$$N=1.96^2 \times 0.8 \times 0.2 / (0.05)^2 = 384$$

However in this study, a 95% response rate of 365 shall be acceptable as our sample size, considering that the place was volatile at the time of the study. Kothari (2011), argues that a response rate that exceeds 60% is still acceptable as it will answer the questions that are asked. This position is supported by other scholars like Krejcie and Morgan (1970) who further proposed a table for sample size determination on the context that good representation of population exceeding 75,000 people can be achieved. According to these authors, as population increases the proportion of population required in sample diminishes and indeed remains constant at around 384 cases.

For community elders, community morans and government officers' probability and non-probability sampling methods were used to obtain a proportion of items from the selected people as representative would be used. The selection of a representative sample was made with respect to the inferences the researcher intended to make (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003).

The sample size was determined by the following formula recommended by (Nassiuma, 2000)

$$n = \frac{nC^2}{C^2 + (n - 1)e^2}$$

Where:

n the sample size was the population

C was the Coefficient of variation (0.5)

e was the level of precision (0.05)

Substituting this value for strata obtained:

For

$$n = (0.5 * 0.5) * 5601 / 0.25 + (5601 - 1) * (0.05 * 0.05)$$

$n = 98$ community morans

$$n = (0.5 * 0.5) * 4922 / (0.25 + (4922 - 1) * (0.05 * 0.05))$$

$n = 98$ community morans

Therefore, for households of community morans:

Whole Sample size

$$N = 1.96^2 * 0.8 * 0.2 / (0.05)^2 = 384 \text{ minus}$$

For

$$n = (0.5 * 0.5) * 5601 / 0.25 + (5601 - 1) * (0.05 * 0.05)$$

$n = 98$ community morans obtained:

$$n = (0.5 * 0.5) * 4922 / (0.25 + (4922 - 1) * (0.05 * 0.05))$$

$n = 98$ community morans

$$384 - 196 = 188$$

Therefore, community morans were allocated 188 informants. After the sample size was obtained, the researcher used simple random sampling method; lottery method. In this method the researcher numbered all the items on separate sheet of paper of same size, shape and colour. They were folded and mixed up in a box. A blindfold selection was made. This was done until the 188 households of community morans were obtained which was the desired sample. After obtaining 196 from households of community elders the researcher randomly distributed them in Kerio Valley Delta. Simple random sampling technique was an appropriate technique because it ensured that all community elders and community morans had an equal chance of being included in the samples that yielded the data that were generalized within margin of error that could be determined statistically (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2003). Purposive sampling was used to identify the resource persons from the in the study area. Purposive sampling a non-probabilistic sampling that is selected based on factors of a population and the objectives of the study (Tongco, 2007). County Commissioners, director of ministry of internal security and director of county government on special programmes were targeted for in-depth interview on the issues under study. The following table 3.4 is sample size of the study.

Table 3. 4: Sample Size

Type of Respondents	Target Pop	Sample	Sub Total	Sampling Technique
Key Informants				
Director, Ministry of Internal Security	1	1	1	Purposive and census
Directors, County Governments Special Programmes	5	2	2	Purposive
Members of Parliament	4	4	4	Purposive
Managers, local NGOs	54	21	21	Purposive, simple random census
Regional Commissioner	1	1	1	census
County commissioner	5	5	5	Purposive
Deputy County Commissioners	14	8	8	Purposive
Sub-county Commissioners	28	12	12	Purposive
Sub Total			54	
FGDs				
Chiefs	84	34	43	Purposive, simple random
Assistant Chiefs	124	46	46	Purposive,
Security personnel	150	36	36	Purposive, simple random
Sub Total	358		125	
Principle Questionnaire respondents				
Community elders (196)	Male	153	153	Snowballing, purposive and simple random
	Female	43	43	snowballing
Community morans (179)	Male	140	140	Snowballing, purposive and simple random
	Female	39	39	Snowballing, purposive and simple random
Sub Total		375	375	

Source: Researcher, 2019

3.5 Data Types and Collection Methods

This section highlights the data types analysed used and the data collection methods used.

3.5.1 Data Types

The researcher collected both quantitative and qualitative data. The relevant data for this study was collected through primary and secondary data. Primary data referred to data collected for a specific research problem at hand, using procedures that fit the research problem best. Secondary data on the other hand refers to data that has been collected before and included journals, GOK documents, NGO's/CBOs documents, recorded videos on you tube among others and available to the researcher (Neuman, 2006).

3.5.2 Data Collection Methods

In this study, the instruments used in primary data collection were questionnaires, structured interviews, document analysis and direct observation. The questionnaires were used as principal primary data collection instrument. Individuals who had lived in the villages along the Kerio valley Delta and who were knowledgeable about the culture and conflict patterns in the study area were targeted. To get as many varied views as possible and understanding of the situation, a reasonable number of respondents were targeted. The questionnaires comprised of both closed and open-ended so as to offer the respondent the option to reply to an issue which may not have been clearly written down in the questionnaire. The reasons of choosing questionnaire are: -they are easily administered, easy to compute and analyse, the researcher being physically present or his proxy allowed for better explanations on ambiguous questions and the questionnaire got the needed responses. The principle respondents on whom the questionnaires were administered were; Heads of house-holds both male and female and secondly the community morans who were all males thus distributed as 153 questionnaires for Male elders, 43 questionnaires for Female elders totalling to 196 and 179 questionnaires for the community elders and morans respectively from the Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Ilchamus and the Samburu. Total set of questionnaires were 375 (Appendix II)

The questions were developed based on the information required to reveal how various socio-cultural factors affect conflict. The questionnaires were pre-coded in order to facilitate the process of data entry into computer software. Self-administered questionnaires can be widely distributed to a large number of employees, so organizational problems may be assessed quickly and inexpensively. The researcher can establish rapport with the respondents, stayed there for any clarifications, and may also be for any debriefing. Self-administered questionnaires can be filled out whenever the respondent has time. Thus there is a better chance that respondents took time to think about their response. The cover letter that accompanies the questionnaire or is printed on the first page of the questionnaire is an important means of inducing a reader to complete and return the questionnaire. In the letter tell why the study is important, who is sponsoring the study, how was the respondent selected, assuring the anonymity of the respondent could help in establishing rapport and motivating the respondent to respond (Kothari, 2004).

Structured questionnaires are those questionnaires in which there are definite, concrete and pre-determined questions. The questions are presented with exactly the same wording and in the same order to all respondents. Resort is taken to this sort of standardization to ensure that all respondents reply to the same set of questions. The form of the question may be either closed (i.e., of the type 'yes' or 'no') or open (i.e., inviting free response) but should be stated in advance and not constructed during questioning. Structured questionnaires may also have fixed alternative questions in which responses of the informants are limited to the stated alternatives. Thus a highly structured questionnaire is one in which all questions and answers are specified and

comments in the respondent's own words are held to the minimum. Structured questionnaires are simple to administer and relatively inexpensive to analyse. The provision of alternative replies, at times, helps to understand the meaning of the question clearly. But such questionnaires have limitations too. For instance, wide range of data and that too in respondent's own words cannot be obtained with structured questionnaires.

Secondly, the researcher used Key Informant Interview (KII) guides with regional commissioner, county commissioners, deputy county commissioners, sub-county commissioner, directors of county special programme, director in Ministry of Interior and managers of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and members of parliament. Patton (2010) defines interview schedule as a qualitative research technique that involves piloting intensive individual interviews with a small number of respondents to explore their perspectives on a particular idea, program, or situation. Interviews with the key informants allowed the researcher to collect in-depth information on how socio-cultural factors affect have contributed to new twists of conflicts in the Kerio Valley Delta. The researcher adopted semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions which were employed as one of the methods for data collection to provide qualitative data and were complemented by the quantitative data.

Personal interview method requires a person known as the interviewer asking questions generally in a face-to-face contact to the other person or persons. (At times the interviewee may also ask certain questions and the interviewer responds to these, but usually the interviewer initiates the interview and collects the information.) This sort of interview may be in the form of direct personal investigation or it may be indirect oral

investigation. In the case of direct personal investigation the interviewer has to collect the information personally from the sources concerned. He has to be on the spot and has to meet people from whom data have to be collected.

This method is particularly suitable for intensive investigations. But in certain cases it may not be possible or worthwhile to contact directly the persons concerned or on account of the extensive scope of enquiry, the direct personal investigation technique may not be used. In such cases an indirect oral examination can be conducted under which the interviewer has to cross-examine other persons who are supposed to have knowledge about the problem under investigation and the information, obtained is recorded. Most of the commissions and committees appointed by government to carry on investigations make use of this method. The method of collecting information through personal interviews is usually carried out in a structured way. As such we call the interviews as structured interviews. Such interviews involve the use of a set of predetermined questions and of highly standardised techniques of recording. Thus, the interviewer in a structured interview follows a rigid procedure laid down, asking questions in a form and order prescribed. The researcher used interviews with directors of County government in special programme departments-2, managers of NGOs, Deputy County Commissioners, director of Ministry of Interior-1 and County commissioners-6 and members of parliament (Appendix IV).

Thirdly, the researcher used focus group discussion with security personnel, chiefs and assistant chiefs. There were specific topics to be discussed by the groups. In total, there were 10 Focused Group Discussion groups comprising of 8 to 12 members in each group. The members were brought together to engage in a guided discussion of the

outlined topics The Focus Group Discussion (FGD) is a group interview, Morgan (1997), and involves small groups of individuals numbering 6-12 people who meet to express their views on a common topic. During the FGD, the researcher introduced the topic and between the community and her neighbours and what they think would be the solution, thereafter withdrew from active participation allowing the group to freely give their opinions as proposed by Kueger (2000) and Morgan (1997), this would yield data that can be said to be free of researcher's influence and certainly validate medium level model of moderation.

The FDGs helped produce qualitative information to compliment quantitative data. As Bryman (2008) argues that the focus group discussions is a form of a rapid assessment, semi structured data gathering method in which a purposively selected set of participants gather to discuss issues and concerns based on a list of key themes drawn up by the researcher or facilitator. The researcher gathered the key informants in a room with a moderator to discuss socio-cultural aspects and how they contribute to dynamics in conflict situations. The focus groups lasted about 90 minutes for each group. The FGD schedule was useful in getting views and consensus by government officers on their position matters relating to Kerio Valley Delta. It also served as an instrument to triangulate and clarify some data given by individuals during the KII as and thus validation (Appendix IV). The focus group discussions and key informant interviews were recorded and later transcribed. This also helped the study to collect supplementary information about the respondent personal factors and environment that are very vital in interpreting the data.

Fourth, the researcher used observation check lists as a method for data generation. Sommer and Sommer (2001) argue that observations help researchers answer questions such as: how do environments create opportunities or obstacles for people such as a place to informally talk, view entertainment together, or prohibit communication. The observation method is the most commonly used method especially in studies relating to behavioral sciences (Kothari, 2004). Under the observation method, the information is sought by way of researcher's own direct observation without asking from the respondent. For instance, in a study relating to socio-cultural factors, the researcher instead of asking how these factors influence conflict dynamism, he observed aspects of culture, ethnicity and livelihood of communities in Kerio Valley Delta.

Lastly, the researcher collected secondary data from a variety of sources. This included library books, information from journals and other government documents on socio-cultural factors with regard to conflict dynamism. These documents include the journals, GOK documents, NGO's documents, recorded videos on you tube among others.

3.6 Piloting of instruments

Ahead of rolling out the study, these instruments were tested in a pilot study that was conducted at a selected site in the border of Nakuru and Narok counties. In the second phase which was the actual study, the instrument (questionnaires) was used in data collection after some corrections and improvement based on the outcome of the pilot study. Two additional questions and the wording on the general questionnaire were introduced in the questionnaire before being administered. An attempt was made to get historical information on the ethnic and land boundaries from the five counties under

study in Kerio Valley Delta during the literature review although most of the data seem not to have been documented, particularly the land mapping and cultural boundaries.

Feedback from the pilot study was used to revise the instruments for final data collection. The respondents in the pilot phase were excluded during the final administration of the instruments. The questionnaires used were open and closed questions intended to capture a detailed level of content. This tool was chosen due to its ability to reach distant respondents hence minimized researchers influence on the respondents. It also allowed time for respondents to give well thought answers and time to respond to the items. Use of questionnaires was appropriate especially to guarantee unanimity (Prewitt, 1975). The researcher administered structured questionnaires personally or e-mailed to the respective respondents listed

3.6.1 Reliability and Validity Tests

To test reliability and validity, the researcher undertook a factor analysis for collection of observed variables there are a set of underlying variables called factors that can explain the interrelationships among those variables. The basic assumption is that underlying dimension such as payment of bride price as a form of culture can be used to explain complex trends like conflict dynamism. The goal is to identify some aspects of socio-cultural aspects that are not directly observable factors on the basis of observable variables. There were four steps followed to accomplish this task. First a correlation matrix was done for all variables such as conflict dynamism versus socio-cultural factors. Secondly, a number of factors were determined so as to represent the data and method of calculating (factor extraction). This was followed by forming factors to make them interpretable and lastly, scores for each factor was done.

Reliability of an instrument being the consistency of an instrument in measuring what it is intended to measure was established by first ensuring internal consistency approach followed by carrying out a pilot study. A questionnaire is considered reliable if the Cronbach's Alpha coefficient is greater than 0.70 (Mutai, 2000). The independent variables and the dependent variable were subjected to reliability test using SPSS and the results obtained are shown in Table 3.5. The results indicated that all the variables obtained had Cronbach's Alpha greater than 0.7 thereby achieving the recommended 0.7 for internal consistence of data (Mugenda and Mugenda, 2008). Table 3.5 indicates summary of reliability in pilot study findings.

Table 3. 5: Reliability Test Results

Variable	Cronbach alpha
Conflict Dynamics	.923
Maintaining of Status	.986
Ethnic Identity	.883
Cultural Belief Systems	.817

Source: (Researcher, 2019)

Data validity is the degree to which a test measures that which it is supposed to measure (Porter, 2010). Mugenda and Mugenda (2008) define validity as the degree to which the research results obtained from the analysis of the data represent the phenomenon under study.

According to Table 3.5 Kaiser –Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequately indicated KMO value of greater than 0.5 meaning thereby that the sample size was good enough to treat the sampling data as normally distributed. KMO value above 0.5 is

considered to be high enough to consider the data as normally distributed. Bartlett’s test sphericity which tested the null hypothesis “item to item correlation matrix based on the responses received from respondents for all the effective variables was an identity matrix”. The Bartlett’s test was evaluated through chi-square test as shown in Table 3.6 for the entire variables and was all significant at 0.000 level of significance, indicating that null hypothesis is rejected. The following table 3.6 indicates summary of test for validity results in the pilot study.

Table 3. 6: Test for Validity

Factors	KMO test	Barlett’s test of sphericity		
		Chi-Square	df	Sig.
Conflict dynamics	0.871	221.45	4	0.000
Maintaining of status	0.958	176.65	4	0.000
Ethnic identity	0.932	167.34	4	0.000
Cultural belief systems	0.929	188.72	4	0.000

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Source: (Researcher, 2019)



Plate 3. 1: Researcher (standing) in an FGD during piloting in Nakuru-Narok Border

Source: Researcher, 2019

3.7 Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments

This sub-section will discuss Validity and Reliability of Research Instruments used in the study

3.7.1 Validity

According to Creswell (2014), validity is the accuracy and meaningfulness of inference, which are based on the study results. This study measured content validity because content validity measure the items of the questionnaires and offer feedback on what needs to be revised. The usual procedures in accessing the content validity are to use professionals or experts in the particular field. The researcher gave the instruments to the supervisors to scrutinize if the instruments were valid. In order to determine the

content validity a pilot study conducted where the research question and objective formulated earlier against the expected responses which the item elicited from the field.

To ensure content validity, the tools for the study covered as many aspects on socio-cultural and conflict dynamism. They were subjected to specialists in the conflict area of study and agencies that are mandated by such tasks since the number of instruments were applied to different groups to establish the same. The scores obtained were correlated to establish the construct related validity during the pilot study at a selected site in the border of Nakuru and Narok counties. The objective was to ascertain the validity and reliability of instruments. The researcher requested the respondents to indicate if any statements are not clear to them. The instruments were adjusted for accuracy before the actual field study. The participants in the pilot study were not included in actual field study. Structured questionnaires were used during the pilot study. A high correlation above 0.60 would mean the instruments measured what was intended (Kasomo, 2007).

3.7.2 Reliability

Two aspects of reliability viz., stability and equivalence deserve special mention. The stability aspect is concerned with securing consistent results with repeated measurements of the same person and with the same instrument. We usually determine the degree of stability by comparing the results of repeated measurements. The equivalence aspect considers how much error may get introduced by different investigators or different samples of the items being studied. A good way to test for the equivalence of measurements by two investigators is to compare their observations of the same events. Reliability can be improved in the following two ways: (i) Standardizing the conditions under which the measurement takes place i.e., we must ensure that external sources of variation such as boredom, fatigue, etc., are minimized to the extent possible. This improved the stability aspect (ii) carefully designed directions for measurement with no

variation from group to group, by using trained and motivated persons who conduct the research and also by broadening the sample of items used. This indeed helped improve equivalence aspect.

To test reliability of the instrument the researcher administered questionnaires in selected site in the border of Nakuru and Narok counties. Data was analyzed and the results correlated to determine their reliability coefficient. Best and Kahn (1989) suggest that Pearson product moment correlation (r) is most often used because of its precision with a value of around 0.5. The results obtained from the two exercises were be coded, secured using Pearson moment coefficient (r) formula and the correlated. Therefore, the instruments were adopted for study.

3.8 Data Analysis

The study used both descriptive and inferential analysis techniques to analyse the quantitative elements of the data received from the questionnaires categorized per objective. The descriptive statistics used frequency percentages, mean, which indicates the average performance of a group or a measure of some variable, and the standard deviation which indicates how to spread out a set of scores is around the mean. The inferential statistics used was the Pearson's' correlations test to get the significant and statistical relationship between the variables. All data was analysed at a level of significance of 95% and the degree of freedom depending on the particular case was determined. Analysis was further done using SPSS version 24 which is a computerized statistical package by encoding responses from questionnaires and interview guides. Data from the interview guides was analysed using narrative analysis where people's quoted words are categorized according to themes and presented in prose based on their

relevance to the study objectives. Presentation of this information has been done using tables and charts.

3.9 Data Collection Procedures

Informed consent was sought from participants before participating in both in-depth interviews and focus group discussions. The researcher utilized the help of research assistants and community guides to facilitate the interviews and discussions, the researcher further made an effort to translate the questionnaires into Turkana, Pokot and Marakwet in order to assist the research assistants to accurately administer the questionnaires. Data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. Primary data, was obtained directly from In-depth interviews from Key Informants, and FGDs with the respondents. Secondary data collection continued through the study period.

3.10 Limitation of the study

This study anticipated and indeed experienced some challenges. However, measures were put in place to overcome them; first was the language barrier; on this research assistants were picked from each of the ethnic groups that participated in the study. Where the researcher of the ethnic group targeted was not found, or was not very conversant with English, a translated version of questionnaire was provided and a translator with understanding of Swahili and/or English was mostly sought and engaged. Secondly is the reluctance of getting details appertaining to culture and for Government institutions; there were occasions of laxity in giving out critical classified information by key informants particularly the administrators. These categories were re-assured by the researchers who made efforts to engage knowledgeable senior members of the community as appropriate. The other limitation was on the distances and security of the team given volatility of the area and dynamism of conflict. In each of the sections that was travelled, local research assistants, informers and translators were engaged and this

in a way provided assurance of safety for the research team. Further, the researcher had contacts with security officials and local youth leaders who were continuously engaged informally in order to get the security situation assessments from time to time. This access to information was very useful throughout the study in scheduling meetings for FGD and KIIs in the field. Also this limitation was overcome by targeting 95% of the sample size rather than a hundred percent as derived in the formula.

Since the study focused on the hotspots of Kerio valley delta and the researcher was able to penetrate deep to groups of youth involved in active conflict, the level of honesty might have been skewed because of unexplained expectations or fear of being exposed and subsequently tracked. This limitation was overcome by triangulating their feedback with that from Focused Group Discussions and key informants.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

The researcher started by first seeking permission from Directorate of Post graduate Studies (DPS) of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology and a permit from the National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation. The permit obtained was used to obtain permission from the relevant County offices. The research sought oral consent from the study participants who are given study details for their understanding. Confidentiality of the data was observed whereby the participant's privacy is assured. They were notified that involvement is voluntary and the benefits of the study would help inform stakeholders' knowledge on the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism and thus contribute to peace processes.

Strict confidence was subjected to all information given during the interviews, documents' analysis and observation. The identity of Key Informants once concealed

once the information was coded in the SPSS and synthesized for analysis, this being an accepted practice considered ethical in Social Sciences research (Saunders *et al.*, 2007).

3.12 Chapter summary

The chapter focused on the methodological aspects of the research. It looked into the design, study area and target population, sampling strategy and sample size determination, the reliability and validity of research instruments, the pilot results, limitations and delimitations, the ethical considerations for the study and it ended with chapter summary. The chapter was crucial in explaining the techniques and the processes that was adopted in undertaking the study. By adopting both quantitative and qualitative techniques, the researcher used mixed methods as its main methodology. The choice and suitability of the study area has also been discussed. The next chapters focused on the findings

CHAPTER FOUR
MAINTAINING STATUS AS A SOCIAL-CULTURAL ELEMENT AND
CONFLICT DYNAMISM WITHIN KERIO VALLEY DELTA

In chapter four, the data has been analysed quantitatively and qualitatively. Analysis of data is a process of inspecting, transforming, and modelling data with the goal of highlighting useful information, suggestive observations and supporting decision making. The chapter highlights the research findings touching on the first objective which is to examine maintaining status as a sociocultural element and conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta. However, first, it looks at the response rate, the demographic findings and the findings touching on conflict dynamism as the dependent variable.

4.1 Response Rate and demographic Information

This section highlights the response rate and the demographic data from the findings.

4.1.1 Response Rate

There were 384 questionnaires issued 375 of which were returned and fully responded to. This shows a 97.7 % response rate, which is an acceptable percentage, based on scholars like Kothari (2011), who have argued variously that a response rate that exceeds 60% is still acceptable and would still answer the questions that are asked.

4.1.2 Gender of the Respondents

The response was about the gender categories of those who participated in the study as shown on table 4.1 and figure 4.1.

Table 4. 1: Gender of Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage
Male	290	77.3%
Female	85	22.7%
Total	375	100.0

Source: Researcher, 2019




Figure 4. 1: Ratio of Male-Female

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 4.1 shows that a majority of respondents a 77.3% of the total respondents who participated in the study were male while only 22.7% were female respondents. The

results led to the interpretation that while this study had the ability to act fairly on gender basis considering that both genders were somewhat equally represented; it is clear that the delta has maintained its patriarchal status. This result agrees with Braathen *et al* (2010), who in his study noted that the patriarchal culture was more poignant and remarkably high in conflict areas and situations where both genders were not significantly viewed as important. This result highlights an important element about the Kerio Valley Delta, indicating that the area is fairly gender biased based on the patriarchal nature of the area but would not interfere with the credibility of the variables under investigation.

4.1.3 Age of Respondents

Age is an important demographic element in any study and as a result, the inhabitants of the Kerio Valley Delta in Kerio Valley Delta were asked about their ages results of which are presented in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2

Table 4. 2: Age Distribution of Respondents

Category	Count	Percentage
18-25 Years	45	12.0%
26-30 Years	120	32.0%
31-35 Years	130	34.7%
36-40 Years	45	12.0%
Over 40 Years	35	9.3%
Total	375	100.0%

Source: Researcher, 2019




Figure 4. 2: Age of Respondents

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 4.2 indicates that majority at 34.7% were aged between 31 and 35 years, then closely followed by 32.0% who were aged between 26-30 years. The others were older, 36 years and above and between 18-25 years old. This gives the suggestion that the inhabitants in Kerio Valley Delta were mature and thus able to thus comprehend and consequently canvass on issues to do with the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism. The study also supports the assertions of Wagoner (2014), that most players of conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa were male and youthful within the 30's age bracket. This also adds credence to the reliability of the results generated.

4.1.4 Highest Level of Education Attained

The presentation on table 4.3 addresses the highest level of education of respondents.

Table 4. 3: Level of Education

Category	Frequency	Percentage
No Schooling	15	3.1%
KCPE	135	37.3%
KCSE	155	40.2%
Degree and Post Graduate	70	19.4%
Total	375	100.0

Source: Researcher, 2019.

Table 4.3 indicates that majority of respondents at 40.2% were KCSE certificate holders then 37.3% had KCPE followed by 19.4% with degree and any other Post graduate degree and only 3.1% had no formal schooling. It can thus be established that this study comprised of adequately educated individual going by the majority of the respondents with KCPE education and postgraduate. This is ably supported by Tan (2014), who mentioned that in the event of the presence of educated respondents in a study, the question under study can be better understood and clearly elaborated with minimal ambiguity. The result here shows that issues of culture were better understood and clearly elaborated with minimal ambiguity by the Kerio Valley Delta inhabitants by way of their acceptable academic credentials which if put to better use would undoubtedly offer deep responses that are guided by reasoned action. It should be noted that scholars have argued that a primary certificate and above warrants a person acceptable literacy level (Smith, 2013).

4.1.5 Years Lived in the Delta

The years lived in the Kerio Valley Delta of respondents in this study is presented on table 4.4 and Figure 4.3 as shown.

Table 4. 4: Residence Period of Respondents

Category	Frequency	Percentage
< 5 years	27	7.2%
6-10 years	53	14.1%
11-15 years	83	22.1%
Above 15 years	285	56.5%
Total	375	100.0%

Source: Researcher, 2019




Figure 4. 3: Number of Residence Years

Source: Researcher, 2019

The study as shown on table 4.4 establishes that majority at 56.5% of respondents had lived in the delta for over 15 years, 22.1% of them had lived there for 11 to 15 years; the rest below 10 years. This shows that the majority of inhabitants in the delta had sufficient witness experience, therefore, expected to have details about their experience and knowledge on conflict dynamism in the area. Shackleton and Shackleton (2012), had mentioned that the dependability, verifiability and credibility of the issues of research are better explicated by respondents with long-standing experience and this result thus attests to the dependability, verifiability and credibility of the issues of socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamics.

4.2 Conflict Dynamism

The first part of the study sought to examine the dependent variable that was conflict dynamisms. The results are as presented in the Table 4.5

Table 4. 5: Conflict Dynamism

	Mean	\sum Rank	StD	Rank
	\sum			StD
Conflicts has become our way of life	2.70	2	0.74	2
We have been unable to resolve conflicts	2.19	5	0.95	5
The conflict has become too much	2.16	7	0.84	4
Many people have died as a result of conflict	2.67	3	0.83	3
We would wish to resolve the conflict	2.23	4	0.72	1
Conflicts have affected education attainment in our region	2.17	6	1.09	7

Conflicts have created diminishing economic returns in our region	2.06	8	1.11	8
Conflicts have affected our social lives in our region	3.09	1	0.99	6

N=375

Source: Researcher, 2019

The results above show the extent to which conflict dynamism is noticeable in Kerio Valley Delta. Looking at the Mean and standard deviation results it is clear that all the aspects were notably true for the area. Thus, conflicts had become a way of life for the Kerio Valley Delta inhabitants (M=2.70 SD=0.74), they had been unable to resolve conflicts (M=2.19 SD=0.95); the conflict had become too much (M=2.16 SD=0.84); Many people had died as a result of conflict (M=2.67 SD=0.83); They wished to resolve the conflict (M=2.23 SD=0.72); conflicts had affected education attainment in the region (M=2.17 SD=1.09); conflicts had created diminishing economic returns in the region (M=2.06 SD=1.11); and conflicts had affected the social lives in the region (M=3.09 SD=0.99).

Based on the means presented, social lives of communities in the Kerio Valley delta have been disrupted most compared to even economic and education. The mean bases also indicate that although there is desire to resolve these conflicts; communities have found it difficult on how to go about it. This means that even government interventions capsuled by humanitarian organizations are yet to achieve the desired results. However, the standard deviation indicates that desire to resolve the conflicts is the highest while possibility of restoration of normal social lives is most difficult. Therefore, conflict dynamism has greatly affected social well-being, education and economy of

communities in Kerio Valley Delta but in as much as there is desire to end it current methods are not sufficient in managing the very conflicts.

This result indicate that basically, conflicts are mainly manifested as political, economic, environmental, exploitation of natural resources, land clashes and religious differences. Kenya has continued to be divided on the basis of ethnic, socio-cultural, regional, political and economic lines. This result concurs with Lenairoshi (2014), study which found that sporadic conflicts among different communities in Kenya are common. In the recent past, ethnic community divisions along political and ideological lines gave rise to protracted and institutionalized waves of ethnic and land clashes even among pastoral communities. Thus, conflict dynamics in Kerio Valley Delta has been brought about by communities being socialized along political lines which add a new twist to conflicts.

This result concurs with Dowd *et al* (2013), postulation that for the Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana, these communities experience high levels of inter-communal violence; much higher than elsewhere in Africa. This violence is perpetrated by identity based communal militias and often involves cycles of attacks and counter attacks. Competition over land ownership and land use drive local conflicts, which is sometimes triggered by the migration of herders in search of water and pasture. This is worsened by a minimal presence of security personnel and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (Dowd *et al.*, 2013). In an FGD, a security personnel argued:

Conflict is when enemies attacks them as a community and with an objective of stealing their stock or displace them from their land. He noted that conflict is common in the settlements, most of the time it is not reported but occurs almost every 2 months

with their neighbours, for the Pokots, it is mostly the Turkana and occasionally the Marakwet (INT 5-5/06/2019, Samburu).

This argument lay bare that conflicts are common among ethnic communities in the delta. Thus, communities involved in conflict along the Kerio valley delta, namely the Pokot, Turkana, Marakwet, Ilchamus and Samburu, it emerged that all of them have a common disaster risk management approach to mitigate against stock theft and losses that may result from diseases and other calamities. The practice relates to distribution of stock among relatives and friends so that when any is lost, then one does not lose everything. This means too that one has to care for livestock held by other families and clans. When dowry is paid, all animals are not taken to the bride's parents and instead are given to other clan members who hold them in trust. Poor families who did not have livestock were given animals from relatives to enable them get milk for their young families as they struggled to build their own wealth.

Findings indicate that the effects of conflict and raiding on livestock numbers can be both direct and indirect. Indirectly, raiding contributes to loss of livestock through the spread of diseases. The direct effect of raiding can be both positive (for the raiding community) and negative (for the raided community). From the raider's perspective, raiding can appear to be an effective and direct tool to increase their own herd, at the cost of those who are raided. If two or a few groups in a confined area reciprocally raid each other without selling livestock to outside actors, the total number of livestock may remain fairly the same.

In recent times, commercialization of raids has generated a twist to the conflicts. Both the Turkana and Pokot experienced a net loss of livestock of more than 90,000 animals due to raids between 2006 and 2009 (CEWARN, 2010). In an FGD, a chief retorted:

These animals would be returned to the owners later after the assisted family settles or when the owners have a pressing matter including payment of dowry for their other sons, they would come and make a request to have the stock back in part or in full. With this situation therefore, one will find that when an enemy attacks to steal the animals, the theft impact will extend to other members of the community and therefore a joint response in pursuit of the enemy including revenge will be approached communally (INT 5-5/06/2019, Samburu).

This assertion indicates factors that underlie conflicts. As it can be noted they are socio-cultural in nature such as bride price payment using stolen cattle. Indeed there is great level of similarity amongst the pastoralist as was confirmed in an interview with the Pokot elders relating to Sapanaa ritual for the young men who want to take up leadership; the practice itself is in a threatening situation for anyone who do not fulfil the rituals condition and it would suffice to say that its violent in itself as was laid in an interview with a county commissioner:

The young man who is blessed in Sapanaa ceremony must get a bull from a friend of the family or clan but not from within and this is to be returned later. Unsuccessful spearing of the bull to death does not only invite ridicule to the candidate and the clan but also attracts curse. Sapanaa is of utmost importance and is ceremony with component actions for women and men albeit at different locations (INT 6/06/2019, West Pokot).

At this juncture, it can be said that some cultures are real reason for raids. Sapanaa cannot be partaken by a person without cattle and other livestock. The common conflict is as a result of cattle thefts but also sometimes, people are killed while grazing or while on transit. The group blamed the attacks on the neighbours who attack them especially

when they have low strengths in an area and the aim is normally to displace or revenge. Further, the cause is mostly competition for grazing land. In an interview, sub-county commissioner laments:

“...the Turkana invaded pokot land. We can never have peace unless the Government moves this people (Turkana)” (INT 4-5/06/2019, Amayan, Baringo East).

This lamentation indicates that the government is not doing much to safeguard lives and provide security in the region. Therefore, proactive government intervention may be a solution to these common conflicts among communities in the region. The following plate 4.1 indicates an interview session with one of the political leaders.



Plate 4. 1: The researcher on the left, Supervisor (seated right) having an Interview Session with a politician

Source: Researcher, 2019

With lack of coordinated approach from the government, traditional raids were under strict control of the elders, community healers and soothsayers. Everyone knew a raid was coming. The aspect of surprise in a raid involved only time and place. Attacks would

only take place at dawn or in the evening (Thomas, 1965). Ichumer, a Karamoja elder, insisted that awareness of impending raids was made known to everyone. A man in traditional war costume would alert the other clan. Former President of Kenya Daniel Arap Moi, who is of pastoralist background, notes, "Traditionally, a cattle rustling does not involve killing people". The practice was considered a social and cultural occupation as opposed to a criminal activity. The aggressors may simply partake in the raids not out of any tangible.

The conflicts are done by the youth, but they have blessings from their elders. Even the Turkana women participate actively in conflict unlike the Pokot community where women are not supposed to fight. The elders bless and finance the youth while women support them with food and even fight back if they see an enemy. For the Pokots, their perception and believe is that the Turkana hate them because they are fighting for their land rights which they claim has been encroached by Turkana who do not want to leave. Secondly is the perception that they have fire power because they were provided with arms by government as KPRs and also accessed them from neighbouring countries. Women do not take part in active conflict in the Pokot and Marakwet community safe for providing food care of the injured. The Pokots further note that the Governments since the colonial time have been favouring the Turkanas and that is why the Pokot feel undervalued. The injustice has always been there but they don't really know why they are hated. The youth say they post security sentries at all times to the border lines to protect them from raiders from the Turkana community (Maito *et al.*, 2013).

The Pokot further state that the other communities have been good safe for a few cases of the Ilchamus and the Samburu. They also actually do not have a problem with the

Tugen, few of them attempt to steal animals and when they defend themselves, they complain. Also, when a young man has reached an age of being circumcised, he is ready to have a home shortly after and must be able to get dowry; at least some even if they he was supported by his father. Secondly is that one has to be ready to defend the clan and community at large. The group did not agree directly that this was a cause to conflict. They agreed in principle that a person with more than one wife was seen as being powerful and yet this needed more resources for dowry something that was contributing to raids in order to raise the dowry for the second and third wife. The Pokot culture encourages young people to raid and as this is evidence of a hardworking and protective generation. This could be the undoing on the part of relations with other communities in the neighbourhood (Maito and Odhiambo, 2013).

Yet, the number points to the dimension of losses that some communities experience. During this research, 75% of the pastoralists and raiders reported to have lost livestock, partly due to raids and drought-related incidences. A reduction in livestock population, even by small numbers, is critical especially for the pastoralists who depend on livestock for income and food security. Similarly, it was reported that losing livestock also goes hand-in-hand with the loss of societal recognition. Without livestock, young men cannot marry as they are unable to pay dowry. Elders, functioning as communal judges, are suffering from loss of livestock, too. During focus group discussions in Turkana, elders complained that the youth does not respect them anymore. In an FGD, a an assistant chief noted:

Our community (Pokot) are pastoralists but we have a few who participate in livestock trade and other market commodities”. Further, there are people who have started practicing crop farming although the output is almost insignificant. If people had other options, the conflicts would reduce substantially. The government should send back the Turkana who are living in Kapedo and settle them elsewhere in Turkana County (8/07/2019, Turkana).

The sentiments indicate that coping mechanism can limit conflicts and the government needs to resettle ethnic communities that have illegally occupied some areas in the region. In an interview with an elder, similar situations were noted, for instance the Pokots but now blame the Pokots for all the conflicts so far engaged in. Similar conflicts dynamics also appear to affect the Samburu although there is fairly less conflicts there and the Marakwet who have had run-ins with the Pokot. He noted that conflict was a normal occurrence since he was born and involves the Turkana and Pokot with few incidences occurring between Turkana and the Samburu. In an interview, a director of NGO said:

The reasons can be split into three. One is the business people and there are people who benefit from the stocks stolen. Second is the issue of Land. The claim by Pokot that Kapedo is their land is not true. From even the name itself, **‘Kapedo’ in Turkana language means a drilled stone**. There is a stone at the border line after Kapedo as you enter Baringo from Turkana County that has a hole in it, like it was drilled and marks the natural boundary. Going by this border point, Silale area thus falls in Turkana. More interests have been generated because of the geothermal exploration (INT 1-5/06/2019, Turkana).

The sentiments here point to commercialization of raids, border issues in kapedo and traders who add a twist to the existing conflicts. It is interesting that government mega projects such as geothermal exploration fuels the conflicts further in the region. The

following plate 4.2 indicates researcher in Red T-shirt, the supervisor in the middle and the research assistant in Kapedo area.



Plate 4. 2: Researcher holding stick, the Supervisor (middle) and the Research Assistant in Kapedo shortly after conducting FGD

Source: Researcher, 2019

It was noted that the boundary issue between Baringo and Turkana is historical. This result concurs with Mutsotso (2018), study which indicates that in 1920 and 1927 where the boundary remained undetermined until it was confirmed in 1935 by a government district's boundaries map and reference made to the Kenya gazette Notice number 352 of May 25th, 1933 recognising Kapedo as a trading centre. In an FGD, a security personnel retorted:

The Pokots are expansionists on land issues and you can see the way they moved from West Pokot through Tugen and now to Turkana. They feel superior and keep attacking the Turkana because they are very disrespectful” (INT 2-5/06/2019, Turkana).

This assertion shows that Pokot mobility for pastoral reasons have entered several conflicts with almost all other ethnic communities in the region. Their movement causes pressure on already scarce resources in the region which explains conflicts that are rampant in the region.

It was noted that in terms of roles of groups in conflict, there is the part played by youth who go for raid in order to get animals, but there is also a role increasingly being played by politics and politicians. The politicians make promises that make them popular during campaigns but some of them can only be achieved through violence or cannot be achieved at all. Politicians finance some of the raids in order that they may be seen as having delivered their political promises (Maito and Odhiambo, 2013). For instance, a politician in Turkana East promises that once he gets to power he will ensure that Turkana are able to freely move in Kapedo and stop cattle rustling from the Pokot while an MP in Baringo East would promise the constituents that once he ascends to power he will ensure that Kapedo is reverted back to the Pokots in Baringo county, both of which are in reality not tenable.

As indicated already, politicians and powerful traders’ interests in the oil and gas sector with an aim of maintaining control over the operations and business opportunities complicate conflicts in the area. The MP mentioned that a senior politician influenced the Geothermal Development Company (GDC) to start the exploration and sinking of

wells even without authorization in a Turkana county area but being controlled by people from Baringo by insinuation that it was in Baringo and therefore no need to involve Turkana County. He also observed that the communities involved in the conflict are Turkana against the Pokot, Samburu and Ilchamus. Cases of raid by Marakwet and Pokots are also there. In an FGD, a chief retorted:

The Pokots are expansionists on land issues and you can see the way they moved from West Pokot through Tugen and now to Turkana. They feel superior and keep attacking the Turkana because they are very disrespectful” (INT 3-5/06/2019, Turkana).

This sentiment indicate that the Turkana culture traditionally allowed for raids but it was limited to specific periods of time when there are occasions and weather conditions. He mentioned that with the ‘land-locked’ condition of the Turkana, the cattle rustling practices have been reducing. He said that the community has resulted to just acting in defence and do not attack their neighbours. In general, he summarised the political perspective; that for a Pokot politician to be popular, Turkana have to be an agenda and for the Turkana politician, the Pokot must be an agenda if one was to win an elective position. The following plate 4.3 show the researcher and youths of different ages among the Pokot with their commander second from left who protect and defend their community from attacks from other communities during an FGD session in Amayan.



Plate 4. 3 FGD in Amayan-Baringo and Turkana Border by researcher (Right side in red T-shirt)

Source: Researcher, 2019

It was noted that conflict has levels where at times there are threats to violence, other are cattle thefts that turn violent during execution or revenge missions. In some occasions it is violent competition for land. And that it's a common situation to experience conflict. The actors are normally youth and the elders who guide the youths, they have the power to allow or disallow for a raid to take place.

The causes are mostly cattle thefts, political influence and recently mineral resources, gas and oil. He also added that the conflicts are normally between the neighbours, that is the Ilchamus and Turkana. He enumerated that the causes of conflict are several starting from traditional raids because the youth practice it as a hobby, also the fight over land and natural resources in the area is a common cause. According to him, the Turkana community came and settled in Kapedo and thereafter made it their home yet they know

this is not their land, and the Government has not done enough in resolving the conflict, instead, they have posted administrators from the Turkana side to administer the Kapedo area. So as we speak, kapedo has an overlap of leadership from Pokot and Turkana. In an interview, a member of parliament:

Well the reason for these points back to the livelihood, the community practices, nomadic pastoralism, and the children provide 70% of the labour as heard boy. So, the youth grow knowing that the animals can be raided by Turkana and therefore view Turkana as an enemy by default. They also learn that the elders bless those taking care of the animals and those who go for revenge missions. Another is the new entrants from the political sides who make promises that sometimes cannot be delivered” (INT 2-8/08/2019, Nairobi).

The communities involved in the conflict are the Pokot and Turkana. The MP said that the Pokot only act in defence when they are challenged or get attacked by the Turkana. He also observes that the Turkana were the first to acquire guns and NPR formerly known as KPR and they have always had them. Pokot has never had them. This has made them feel superior. Raids are acknowledged by the leader as a common cultural practice. This was also supported by the weak political support and structure of the pokot by previous governments.

In an interview, the area member of parliament recommends that alternatives for livelihoods could be approached from two angles. One is to promote education. He said that nomadic pastoralism is not compatible with education; they are mutually exclusive and one must die. The current economy (economy is dependent on children who take care of the animals) hence the children must be taken to school to learn other skills and diversify livelihoods.

Secondly, he mentions is establishment of industries so that idle youth who unfortunately never went to school can provide unskilled labour or learn on job in order to work in some of the industries that will come. He also observes that there is need for a review and re-instatement of original boundaries. He also recommends the end of dependence of pastoralism which benefits from 70% of the workforce from children and creation of alternative livelihood sources by establishing industries and increased engagement with communities to change their demands on dowry in order to lower the same to affordable amounts.



Plate 4.4: An Interview with a former Member of Parliament (seated middle, researcher on the right side)

Source: Researcher, 2019

This results echoes what Kamket (2019), wrote an article in the Kenya's daily The Standard newspaper 6th June 2019 "*Disarm, then find other ways to keep peace*", (The Standard, 2018). He said his purpose of writing was that he wanted to demystify the issue of guns in Baringo East and the pastoral communities. In the paper, Kamket has proposed uniform disarmament exercise and promotion of education and those alternative livelihoods be provided to the pastoral community.

The gun is not the panacea to the problems of the North Rift region. The solution to the problems lies in Development and opening up of the place. The frequent gun and arrow fights over water, pastures and livestock that has gone on for generations while fortunes of the community morans continue to dwindle is proof that the people urgently need to be provided with alternative economic livelihoods (Kamket, 2019).

The argument here is that marginalization of this pastoral region is the panacea of conflicts. The pastoral livelihood is no longer sustainable and opening up the areas to other economic activities is long overdue. In an interview with a director in Ministry of interior, it was noted that conflicts are active often leading to deaths, injuries and loss of property between two or more communities. The area has had a number of conflicts the major one being 2016-2017 that involved Pokot, Ilchamus and the Tugen. There also has been an incident with Pokot and the Marakwet in the Western side. The young men and elders are involved in conflict directly but women in-direct role. The causes are mostly land boundary issues where Pokots have often been blamed for encroaching other areas in search of water and pasture. In an interview, director of NGO noted that:

Other causes of conflicts are of course land tenure, border points, ethnicity and animal thefts. The actors involved include Laibons/elders, blessing the youth and assisting in forecasting successful and risky raids, Politicians through funding the supply chain of ammunition and traders who market the stolen animals (INT 3-7/08/2019, Elgeyo Marakwet).

The argumentation here point to poor land tenure systems as responsible for conflicts that have plagued the area for long. The conflict mostly involves the Pokot, Turkana, Ilchamus and Marakwet. Also, the communities do not respect the other and see them as enemies in particular the Pokot-Punyot, Turkana-Emoit.

In addition, moranism has traditionally been part of the pastoralist communities who believe that once the boys have been initiated, they must start looking for their own wealth and protect community at the same time. Participation in raids is one way the youth ‘under community pressure’ plan and execute raids that would earn them respect and legitimacy as moran. Their successful attack and raid on another community is praised. The traditional foreteller, (Aba-Mulele for the Turkana and Orgoiyot in Pokot) play a serious role in conflicts. The communities seem to be continuously at logger heads, -continued hate and no trust at all over the other. Secondly is the right of passage costs and proof of successfully graduating to the next level (sapanaa). The Pokots are aggressive and mostly solve conflicts through ‘action’. In an interview, a director of NGO recommends (Maito and Odhiambo, 2013).

There is need for livelihood options that can be initiated include; Improvement of crop production with resilient crops. Development of irrigation schemes, provision of active extension workers by the Ministry of Agriculture is critical. There is need for the Government should repossess the 18-acre land in Kapedo by buying it back and use it to set up a National Government security institution that will also act as a buffer zone (INT 5-5/06/2019, Samburu).

The assertion indicates that as far as the dynamics of conflicts are concerned with all the main causes across board are land boundary issues, land tenure, border points, ethnicity and cultural traditions and animal thefts.

The results here when critically viewed shows that the African situation and the conflicts that lie at the heart of its existence mostly has got to do with control and access to land and attainment of land-based resources like water, pasture and farming. The drivers of conflict and motivation for the same have been changing consistently albeit being inter-related. This argument offers the other look at the situation by noting that not all is as it seems. Basically, what the respondents in FGD and interviews mentioned assume that conflicts are often linear and yet clearly conflicts are characteristically dynamic.

Further there appears to be, based on the results both quantitatively and qualitatively, that dissimilar styles of conflict analysis are very present. This has been characterized under three titles, based on what kind of strategy they underscore: 1) conflict dynamics, 2) conflict origins that are needs-based, and 3) rational-strategic controls. From the reviews however, a definitive understanding of conflict construes conflict as a dynamic spectacle: one player is responding to what another actor or player is doing, which creates further undesirable action. This supports the study's earlier assertion that conflict is viewed in linear terms other than dynamic and thus the present study has something of value to add.

It can also be gleaned from the results that based on the view that notes that actors are rational to some point and they can through their own judgement make choices and forge strategies which would lead to a chain of events that would cause war; the actors in Kerio Valley start wars to win them in some way. They also make their own calculations or better, cost benefit analysis to check whether going to war or engaging in conflicts

would help in the long run. When nobody is winning, they are willing to go back to the drawing board and re-strategize

4.3 Maintaining Status and Conflict Dynamism

The first specific objective of the study was to assess the relationship between maintaining status and conflict dynamism. The results are seen in Table 4.6 and succeeding focus group and interviews.

Table 4. 6: Maintenance of Status

	Mean Σ	Σ Rank	StD	Rank StD
My community is highly respected	2.80	4	0.75	7
My family is highly respected	2.18	7	0.87	4
We fight to maintain the respect	2.27	4	0.94	3
The other tribe does not respect us and we must teach them a lesson	2.89	2	0.83	5
Generally, We must fight to keep the respect	2.19	6	0.72	8
For one to be recognised they must have large stock	3.11	1	1.02	2
For one to be respected they must have more than one wife	2.07	8	1.04	1
For one to be respected they must participate in raid	2.89	2	0.79	6

N=375

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 4.6 indicates that statements on maintaining status were notably valid and true. Thus, the respondents felt that their community was highly respected (M=2.80 SD=0.75); the family was also highly respected (M=2.18 SD=0.87); they fought to

maintain the respect (M=2.27 SD=0.94); the other tribe did not respect them and they had to teach them a lesson (M=2.89 SD=0.83); Generally, fought to keep the respect (M=2.19 SD=0.72); For one to be recognised they had to have large stock (M=3.11 SD=1.02); For one to be respected they must have more than one wife (M=2.07 SD=1.04); and for one to be respected they must participate in raid (M=2.89 SD=0.79).

From the means bases, violent conflicts among communities in the valet delta is due to recognition of individuals, attracting respect and failure to be respected by other ethnic communities and therefore need to continue fighting for the same. Other socio-cultural factors as a cause of conflicts such as getting more wives or family respect rank lowest as per means presented. This means that violence is community instigated with undercurrents of individual egos as ranked in mean bases.

This result indicate that maintenance of wealth status is in form of number of livestock a man has and thus raiding is a way of restocking among ethnic communities in the Kerio Valley Delta of Rift Valley. A man pride and respect is hinged on a large number of livestock in the society in general. At a higher level, the community is respected and have high standing with rival ethnic groups when livestock levels are high. Therefore, this explains the traditional raiding escapades between ethnic communities in this region since time immemorial. Thus power is measured in terms of wealth as per number of livestock. The extent to which the said status can be attributable to conflicts in Kerio Valley Delta therefore needs investigation.

The idea of conflicts over power or power struggles is not new, with many examples of power conflict within other disciplines, such as sociology and political science. For

example, in his development of a general theory of conflict processes, the sociologist, Blalock (1989), incorporates the concepts of power and dependency as key components of explaining real world conflicts including warfare, international conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and even interpersonal interactions. Blalock (1989), argues that with its basis around dependency created by a need or desire for certain resources, the notion of power is a key part of conflict processes and influences both the initiation of conflict as well as the outcomes of conflict episodes. Similarly, other sociologists include struggles for power and status as key components in their definitions of social conflict. With this conceptualization, it would be helpful to investigate the extent to which maintaining status has impacted on conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta.

Socio-cultural factors extends to concepts of race, ethnicity, socio-economic class, sexual orientations, political and religious association and conflict would arise from struggles over values, community status, power and resources. Geller *et al* (2010), in a study done in Europe argues that socio-cultural factors are important in creating and understanding conflict in general, socio-cultural factors feed into the systems dynamics processes. He further states in conflict-torn Afghanistan ‘traditional’ socio-cultural mechanisms, political culture and power structures are important factors in understanding the conflict. Geller *et al* (2010), study focus on how socio-cultural factors influence status maintenance even among postural communities.

Maintaining status has contributed to the growing tension and persistent internal conflicts in Cameroon which are potential ingredients for conflict (Sama, 2007). As seen in South Africa the causes of conflict between the San community and other communities is

associated with unemployment and unfair treatment which are socio-economic factors (Beyene, 2014). In Sudan, the conflict in Darfur and even South Sudan before her independence was highly manifested with cultural status characteristics that can best be seen as being driven by cultural supremacy that included race, ethnicity, and socio-economic class, political and religious association.

Indeed, the supremacy and obvious division of Sudanese Arabs and the Sudanese Africans was so distinct that it suggested one class/category had more rights and privileges than the other and for these, violence was offered in order to maintain status. During the Sudan conflict in Darfur, at least 300,000 people were killed and over 3,000,000 displaced in the 2003-2005 intensive conflict that represent a situation where people and communities in general would like to maintain status and get recognition and by extension sense of identity (ACCORD, 2016). However, Hagg (2006), states that Cultural diversity can be a tool for conflict resolution and peace-making processes.

Identity plays a crucial role in the management of social systems and maintaining social order, individuals behaviour is guided by and equally defines the community identity and knowledge of community provides a critical source of socio-political hierarchy (Masolo, 2002). Social groups rapidly self-organize into hierarchies, where members vary in their level of power, influence, skill, or dominance (Koski *et al.*, 2015). In pastoral practicing communities of Northern Kenya, owning of large number of animals and controlling grazing zones has been part of culture that communities still hold to despite the changes in terms of land tenure and climate change that has severely affected their practices. Subsequently and in order to keep the culture, communities struggle to expand grazing

territories in order to sustain large herds of stock. At the same time, traditional practices of cattle rustling have also been maintained albeit the fact that in many cases its taking a commercial angle. On the flip side, climate change may socialize communities differently in order to maintain their status; this is an aspect that the current study would focus on.

In Kenya, cattle's rustling has reached unprecedented proportions in the past decade. It has changed in nature, scale and dimension due to a number of factors, including the proliferation of small arms in the region, the commercialization of raiding, high unemployment rate in pastoral areas, frequent droughts and reduced respect for traditional conflict-solving mechanisms (Bond *et al.*, 2005). Some conflicts within and between pastoralist communities, such as raiding and cattle rustling have a long history and have to some extent become an aspect of traditional pastoralist culture (Kaimba *et al.*, 2011). It is clear that researchers have mostly focused on the economic aspects of cattle rustling creating a gap on the social aspects of it which is the concern of this study.

Thus, the reference to cattle rustling in the study as a culture and a way of maintaining community status cannot be overlooked. On one hand, raiding leads to distrust between communities which are prerequisite of conflict (Schilling *et al.*, 2014) Though cattle rustling is physical in nature; an aspect like distrust is a psychosocial outcome of the same. Communities use raiding to articulate their hostility toward enemy communities (Schilling *et al.*, 2012). Traditionally, livestock raiding often involved small-scale manageable violence. It also involved theft of the best livestock or replacement of animals lost during periods of droughts or diseases. Loss of human lives was rare, and

when this occurred, compensation in the form of livestock was paid by the raiders to the victims or their families in case of death (Mkutu, 2008). Cattle rustling has had diverse effects, inclusive of Injuries related to abuse of small arms, loss of lives and property, displacement of people, rape and defilement, child labour, famine and disease, and increased levels of illiteracy (Kaimba *et al.*, 2011). In as much as this study captures issues of maintenance of status, it does not focus on how use of small arms is a new culture in raids and its devastating outcomes that was not traditionally normal. To explain this clearly a chi-square analysis was conducted to ascertain these assertion.

On investigating the relationship between maintenance of status and conflict dynamism, chi-square analysis was done and the summary of the findings is as shown in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Chi-Square Tests on Maintaining Status and Conflict Dynamism

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	197.035 ^a	2	.001
Likelihood Ratio	203.47	2	.032
Linear-by-Linear Association	176.49	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 2 cells (28.43%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 198.43.

Source: Researcher, 2019

From the Chi-square analysis, there is a relationship between Maintaining Status and Conflict Dynamism. The p-value=0.001<0.005 indicates that the variables are dependent of each other and that there is statistically significant relationship between Maintaining Status and Conflict Dynamism. Maintenance of status through the acquisition of wealth

(cattle raids) has led to continuous presence of conflict within the Kerio Valley Delta of Rift Valley. The results on correlation analysis are as shown in Table 4.8.

Table 4.8: Correlation between Maintaining Status and Conflict Dynamism

		Maintaining Status	Conflict Dynamism
Maintaining Status	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)		
Conflict Dynamism	Pearson's Correlation	.025	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.002	
	N	375	375

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Source: Researcher, 2019

The findings indicated that there was a positive and significant relationship between Maintaining Status and conflict dynamism. This is depicted by a Pearson correlation coefficient $r=0.025$, $p\text{-value} = 0.002 < 0.05$ which was significant at 0.05 level of significance. This implies that a positive change in maintaining status results in increase of conflict dynamism within the Kerio Valley Delta of Rift Valley.

The correlation analysis indicates a clear nexus between maintaining of status and conflict among communities in the Kerio Valley Delta. This is true since aspects such as respect of individuals in their communities; respect for other ethnic groups and even family underscores aspect of status. This status is sustained by size of livestock one owns or what the community owns. This also relates to issues of wealth and payment of dowry

This result concurs with Nyakuri (1997), findings that in the Kerio Valley peace process, a number of actors with different formal status and different resources played a part in peace building: central and local state actors, customary leaders, religious actors and NGOs. They argue that cattle raiding have culturally historical connotations among all plain and some highland Nilotic groups. It is not a new phenomenon, but has undergone major transformation in the last four decades. Traditional songs and dances highlight the existence of cattle rustling before the coming of the colonial government to the North Rift. Pastoral communities engaged in cattle rustling as a means of expanding lands, restocking livestock, obtaining cattle for bride wealth, demonstrating the bravery of new community morans, initiating boys into manhood and enlarging the community herds after drought, diseases, famine. Usually the raids were organized by the elders, and diviners were consulted to ensure that the raid would be successful. The victims of raids were normally neighboring ethnic communities. When the community morans returned from successful raids, ululation and songs of praise welcomed them. Among the singers are potential brides for the warrior. Thus, pride among these ethnic groups elevates ones status to certain leadership and qualification to participate in deadly raids. Seemingly, one's ability to marry is tied to paying bride price which is sourced through raids.

This result concurs with Maito and Odhiambo (2013), findings that livestock is a source of survival in pastoral areas. Therefore, a man's position in society is recognised according to the number of cows, goats, sheep, camels and donkeys he possesses. A poor person cannot address a panel of elders or even eat the most valued meat, "meant for men". In the past, raids were a form of cattle distribution among the different communities; raided cattle remained in the neighbourhood or within the new community or they were used for bride wealth.

Lamphear (1976), illustrates that raided cows allow payment of bride wealth for many wives, which is a sign of wealth of a Pokot man. Lastly, it was for sacrifice of the animals for religious purposes and gained prestige for having killed an enemy. Lamphear (1976) agrees much that successful raiders gained much prestige from their prowess, and apart from being the choice. In as much as Lamphear (1976), study points to cultural raids it does not link it to conflict dynamism as the current study. It is clear those successful raids, and to some extent, killing was a source of pride for young Pokot men which encourage this culture of raiding. In a nut shell, one's maintenance of status or as a community is at the centre of dynamics of conflicts.

This result concur with Mkangi (1997), assertion that "cattle complex" is at the centre of "the very high social prestige and prominence attached to the possession of a great number of cattle and the glorification of homicide connected with its acquisition". He found that the aggrieved party may compound the act by non-involvement of official security apparatus. To them, they will have a better forum of settlement by retaliation/vengeance. The gap here is that government intervention fail to net in local or community peace strategies that may unearth underlying issues in the conflict dynamism.

The maintenance of status goes beyond wealth acquisition through raids. For instance, in an interview, a regional commissioner alleged that in the North Rift pastoralists acquire wealth for prestige, retaliation, young girls, trophies and a desire to claim victims in association with the death of favourite oxen, heroism, and sometimes to get back stolen cattle, land and arms. Also, cattle keeping are a way of life, with numbers of cattle

defining wealth and status, such that raiding takes also place for revenge, honour, marriage and prestige. In the recent times, pastoralists have turned raiding into an easy option of resourceful commerce to boost their status within society.

Therefore, maintaining status has contributed to the growing tension and persistent internal conflicts. This means that cultural diversity would be a necessary mechanism towards conflict resolution and peace-making processes in Kerio Valley Delta of Rift Valley. It is important for cultural diversity to play a crucial role in the management of social systems and maintaining social order, individuals behaviour is guided by and equally defines the community identity and knowledge of community provides a critical source of socio-political hierarchy (Masolo, 2002). Social groups rapidly self-organize into hierarchies, where members vary in their level of power, influence, skill, or dominance (Koski *et al.*, 2015).

On the flip side, a chief in an FDG argued that responses among the broader community varied, especially among the youth. He noted the youth find alternative means to achieve status such as through “commercial raiding” and political connections in recent times and thus they are less motivated to bow to the elders’ will. Such an assertion adds a twist to conflicts, politics has been cited as a new driver of conflicts and therefore, peace strategies need to be in tandem with new realities on the ground. In an FGD, a security personnel argued:

Bond-friendship, delayed exchange and entrustment of particular livestock from sedentary or less specialized neighbours are all customary forms of ownership based on reciprocity, which enable the establishment of social ties between different ethnic groups, diminishing the risk of conflict and providing ground for negotiation (INT 5-5/06/2019, Samburu).

This assertion points out that strong ties between ethnic groups with varied sources of livelihood can be a source of peace. Goldsmith (1997), found out that the institution of *maal* camel; *Maal* is a female gift camel whose male offspring belong to the receiver whilst the female offspring belong to the original owner and can be claimed back in case of necessity. As the *maal* camel can later be passed on to other herders, its genealogies create complex sets of cross-cutting linkages which underlines that the ‘variations on exchange linkages regulate the balance of conflict and co-operation’.

In as much as this assertions reflect peaceful strategies under discussion, there is risk of monetization of exchange relations and livestock marketing which make livestock not suitable means for generating social status guarantees. In fact, increased and deadly raids in recent years among communities in the delta have been blamed on commercialization of raiding in the name of status maintaining. This has added a new twist to conflict dynamism. In a FGD, an assistant chief retorted:

The Pokots for instance are status minded and expansionists and that is their nature. They always push off other communities. They made an attempt to push the Turkana and after a month’s fight, Lomelo centre was opened up so that that became a base and the fight was successful. One interviewer mentioned that the two tribes have had inter marriages and some of the prominent politicians in Pokot, their mothers or fathers were from Turkana (INT 5-5/06/2019, Pokot).

This assertion indicates that the Tugen, Marakwet, Samburu and Turkana believe that while conflicts were entered into as a result of land pressures and land use coupled with revenge and cattle rustling, they all soon escalated to preserving respect and pride within the tribe. Thus, the ‘we-cannot-loose-and-we-are-men attitude’ becomes a conduit via

which escalation of conflicts took place. This standpoint reflects the promordialist theory that there are traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological features and especially territorial location (Grosby, 1994). In looking at the Marakwet clans internally, one notices the segregation of specialization for those who herd cattle and community morans, the foretellers and the blacksmiths. During an interview with an elder he stated that one would have serious shortcoming in form of accident or even death if one attempted to practice blacksmith work without being dully authorised an indicator that there a struggle even within the subsets of clans from the communities under study to maintain status hence a blend of effort to maintain culture as well and both have a contribution to conflict while observing this conditions. A director of special programme at county office posed in an interview;

If one attempted to practice blacksmith work without inheriting the skills and/or buying authority to deal with metal works, such person would have a calamity and even death. In our community we have clans that do balck smith work, those that keep animals and are warriors and the foretellers. The skills and power are inherited although you can 'buy the blessings' to practice by paying livestock and this is done at a very tender age (INT 5-8/06/2019, Pokot)

In a nutshell this means that people develop kinship based on their biological connection and look at each other as relatives and anyone who is not a member of the blood line becomes an enemy. This system falls short however because it makes conflicts unavoidable and yet we know that that is not often the case. On the other hand, the instrumentalist theory is understood as conflicts being spearheaded by community conscious leaders who used their cultural groups as sites of mass mobilization and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, because they found them more effective than social classes” (Smith, 2001).

This means that conflicts are run and led by leaders who mobilize their people in a bid to enact conflicts characterized by violence clothed in a feeling of discrimination, disenfranchisement politically and resource immobilization. This appears to be the picture in many conflicts in Kenya where leaders lead out in incitement and conflict operations. This theory also means that the said leaders have a major share not only in the blame but also importantly in the responsibility to stop the conflicts.

The result also underlies the constructivist school of thought who argues that conflict is bred by the perception, knowledge and experience of the actors involved in the said conflict. When one ethnic group feels left out of jobs and resources at the expense of another ethnic group, the perception, experience of being left out and the knowledge that discrimination is happening creates a constructivist view that leads to conflicts. This is seen with the people in the Kerio Valley delta where the fight over land is part of a constructivist element. For example, young men in pastoralist societies usually acquire prestige by being brave and successful in predatory raids and accumulating large herds of animals. The individual livestock owner has a continuous incentive to increase the number of his own livestock even when this increase damages to communal grazing land, because the damage is communally shared. This supposed inherent contradiction between private and public interests and the consequential overgrazing has been termed the tragedy of the commons (Mkangi, 1997). Young men are the community's warriors bestowed with the responsibility to protect and acquire property for the community. This is especially the case among the Maasai of Kenya. This kind of socialization prepares pastoral youths for the harsh tasks ahead of them in the unfriendly environments and this makes them hostile in order to survive in the harsh surroundings (Spencer *et al.*, 2003).

4.4 Factor Analysis for Maintaining Status Variables

Factor analysis was applied on the data to bring inter-correlated variables together under more general, underlying variables. The following table indicates correlation matrix.

Table 4. 7: Correlation Matrix for Maintaining Status Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1	1.000							
2	-.121	1.000						
3	-.223	.184	1.000					
4	.221	.212	-.034	1.000				
5	-.078	.188	.138	.080	1.000			
6	.033	.243	.156	.344	.132	1.000		
7	.099	.174	.146	.263	.183	.220	1.000	.
8	.088	.177	.039	.213	.280	.126	.082	1.000
9	.079	.081	-.047	.153	.139	.161	.186	.128

a. Determinant = .282 and r value=0.644

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 4.7 indicates the correlation matrix or intercorrelations between the studied maintaining status variables. The test results indicate that original correlation matrix is not an identity matrix, $p = .000$, p-value is less than critical value=0.05 hence it is clear that maintaining status has a notable influence on conflict dynamism. This implies that, the correlation between the variables exist and are noticeable. There is no multicollinearity problem as multicollinearity exist if the determinant is less than 0.00001. (reference needed)

Further, sampling adequacy was tested via Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure. It is shown that the KMO value is 0.609. This value is greater than 0.5 showing that the sample size was

adequate for analysis. Moreover, all elements on the diagonal of this matrix are greater than 0.5 showing that the sample is indeed adequate for analysis (Field, 2000).

This result reflect Keller (2009), in a study done in the USA on status and power noted that throughout history, the drive for obtaining status and power has been thought of as a fundamental motivator of human behaviour and which then become a precipitate to conflicts when the power shifts. He states that to maintain status and have power is to have control over resources, to have the ability to influence others' behaviour, and to be able to act of your own volition. The extent to which the said status can be attributable to conflicts in Kerio Valley Delta therefore needs investigation.

The idea of conflicts over power or power struggles is not new, with many examples of power conflict within other disciplines, such as sociology and political science. For example, in his development of a general theory of conflict processes, the sociologist, Blalock (1989), incorporates the concepts of power and dependency as key components of explaining real world conflicts including warfare, international conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and even interpersonal interactions. Blalock (1989), argues that with its basis around dependency created by a need or desire for certain resources, the notion of power is a key part of conflict processes and influences both the initiation of conflict as well as the outcomes of conflict episodes. Similarly, other sociologists include struggles for power and status as key components in their definitions of social conflict. With this conceptualization, it would be helpful to investigate the extent to which maintaining status has impacted on conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta.

4.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter analysed nexus between maintaining of status and conflict dynamism. Status is defined in from of wealth, prestige and pride of a man's standing in ethnic communities in Kerio Valley Delta, ability to carry out successful cattle raids and pay bride price. These aspects have determined scale of conflict in the region. However, in recent years, political issues and commercialization of raids have added new twists and therefore to conflict dynamism in the Delta. It is true that government approaches in resolution of the conflict does not bore much fruit since these dynamics of maintenance of status is not in consideration.

CHAPTER FIVE

ETHNIC IDENTITY AND CONFLICT DYNAMISM

The findings of specific objective two was sub-divided into: Ethnic Identity and Conflict Dynamism, Factor Analysis for Ethnic identity Variables and ended with chapter summary.

5.1 Ethnic Identity and Conflict Dynamism

The second objective was to examine the relationship between ethnic identity and conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta and the results are highlighted in Table 5.1

Table 5. 1Ethnic Identity and Conflict Dynamism

	Mean	Σ	StD	Rank
	Σ	Rank	StD	
Our tribe owns the land we fight for	2.10	5	0.76	3
My tribe is a warrior tribe	2.77	2	0.77	2
My tribe cannot lose the war at all	2.11	4	0.74	4
My tribe is superior to other tribes	2.99	1	0.93	1
My tribe's respect must be won through fighting	2.19	3	0.72	5

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 5.1 provides findings on whether there is a relationship between ethnic identity and conflict dynamism. From the results it is clear that all the statements were indeed valid. Thus, our tribe owns the land we fight for was valid (M=2.10 SD=0.76), the tribe

was a warrior tribe (M=2.77 SD=0.77); the tribe could not lose the war at all (M=2.11 SD=0.74); the tribe was superior to other tribes (M=2.99 SD=0.93); and the tribe's respect must be won through fighting (M=2.19 SD=0.72).

The mean bases indicate that tribal rivalry ranks highest as a cause of violent conflicts among communities in Kerio Valley Delta compared to factors such as tribes that are warrior like, respect and land. The standard deviation reflects the same scenario since where tribal rivalry ranks highest to other factors presented. Thus, the issue of ethnicity as a major cause of conflict cannot be ignored here.

Findings inhere indicates that ethnic identity is propagated mostly by politicians for political expediency; ethnic leaders and communities are simply roped in irrationally and this then leads to conflicts. This result underscores Chelanga *et al* (2006), study findings in the 1990's and especially with the advent of plural politics in Kenya that ethnicity has been used overtly as a tactical and bargaining tool in economic and political competition at the national level. They argue that in this context of politics of ethnicity, politicians use cultural differences in two negative ways. Firstly, they have portrayed "other" communities as the cause of the "underdevelopment" of the predominantly pastoral and former pastoral regions, which creates mistrust and escalates inter-societal conflicts

Sambanis *et al* (2001), noted that ethnic characteristics are extensively seen as enabling and occasionally encouraging violent conflict. Essentially, conflicts over "identity" are attributed to over 70% of the civil conflicts initiated between 1960 and 1999. The study observes also that, ethnic conflicts are considered to be predominantly favourable to

large-scale violence like ethnic purging and genocide. The question, why is ethnicity so frequently a foundation of political violence? A host of important theories submit that the answer is in the capacity of ethnicity to enable collective action. Sambanis *et al* (2001), asserted that students of conflict in Africa have shown substantial attention to the place of ethnicity in the expansion of political administrations. There is quite and amount of scholarly literature on the character of ethnicity in political culture prior to colonization, throughout independence skirmishes, in the political body of African countries and in state failure. In an FGD, an assistant chief retorted:

Some politicians have made us believe that non-pastoral societies have benefited from state resources at the expense and neglect of the pastoral societies such as the Pokot (INT 5-5/06/2019, Samburu).

This statement means that pastoral communities in Kerio Valley Delta have been made to expect that it is now time to correct the relative deprivation by a deliberate targeting of resources to their regions, which has raised the "value expectations" in these societies. Although communities have been made to expect better conditions of life, the economic situation since the late 1980's has made it extremely difficult for that to happen. This has whipped up feelings of deprivation and discontent among pastoral societies leading to aggression against societies perceived as the beneficiaries of state development programs.

Ethnicity in this context is used politically in pastoral areas to highlight and create a wedge between pastoral communities in Kerio Valley Delta and those perceived agro communities. For instance, Pokot attack on Marakwet is due to the perception that the latter have benefited from government than the former. Therefore, for political expediency pastoral and former pastoral societies in the Kerio Valley Delta have adopted

the label of “small” ethnic groups as a strategy of political mobilization to counter what is regarded as political and economic domination in post-colonial Kenya blamed on the predominantly agricultural societies

This finding reflect Humphreys *et al* (2002), models of ethnic enlistment and conflict tend to adopt an opinion that political players are effortlessly able to place other players into their “correct” ethnic classes. Whereas this may be the situation for some people and some classes, it is not always the case. This implies that for Humphreys, political ethnic identity does not occur as often as empirically argued and that people generate for themselves ethnic identity problems which then leads to conflicts that exacerbate proportionate to the deepening of the said ethnic identity. This means that conflict management strategies need to capture the political element that makes ethnicity conscious among communities in the region.

Therefore, the conflict dynamics in pastoral communities have the ‘pastoral’ identity used as a precursor of mobilization and for exclusion with other communities .This leads to a perception of us versus them which explains the mistrust and animosity. In an FGD, security officer argued:

Historically, pastoral societies are identified by common identity as livestock keepers which bring unity among them with other categories such as cultivators (INT 5-5/06/2019, Turkana).

These sentiments mean that non-pastoral populations in the region settled among pastoral communities in the context of politics. The conflict therefore is not just within pastoral

communities but other ethnic societies. This indicates how politics added twist to the conflict in the Kerio Valley Delta. Thus, physical violence and destruction of property have been directed to such groups in protest against this state of affairs. These clashes are common during election times manifested in tribal clashes since 1991 and the post-election violence in 2007/2008 whose epicenter was the rift valley.



Plate 5. 1: FGD session in Pokot border Area (Researcher holding walking stick)

Source: Researcher, 2019

In such circumstances any small differences or misunderstanding between families or even individuals from different ethnic groups quickly escalates into an inter-societal conflict. In case of livestock raids, raiders are not only interested in stealing animals but to inflict maximum damage to the ‘enemy’ to settle economic and political scores. In an interview, a director of NGO said:

In recent years, raids do not entirely benefit the raiders' benefits, but also for their local political elite. In a peace meeting between the Pokot and the Turkana on 27/10/1997, the then member of parliament for Turkana and West Pokot Member of Parliament traded accusations and ended up inciting their respective groups against one another (INT 5-5/06/2019, Pokot).

This sentiment Confirms that at the local level local politicians manipulate and use young men for violence, and that some prominent people with a financial interest in the cattle raiding “industry” were fueling the raids (Kamenju *et al.*, 2003). The use of inflammatory ethnic language is common by politicians during election campaigning.

Elfverson (2016), study found that a peace process in the Kerio Valley in the early 2000s exemplifies this: After steadily escalating violent conflict over local land and cattle raiding but also heavily influenced by local and national politics, leaders from the two groups involved Marakwet and Pokot began dialogue to resolve the conflict. He argues that they turned to the Catholic Justice and Peace Commission (CJPC), a faith-based organization that had long been engaged in providing local services such as education and health care, to facilitate their negotiations. Consequently, church officials acted as mediators, with a focus on convening and facilitating meetings, until the two sides were able to reach a peace agreement known as the Kolowa Declaration. Government representatives were present at the declaration and endorsed the agreement, with local government officials playing a key role in its implementation. The involvement of non-state actors in management of conflicts is critical as explained here. This is an aspect that not been captured in previous studies.

On the flip side, successive government adapted disarmament as a strategy to restore peace and security in the Delta. However, interview with an elder indicated that the exercise always take an ethnic angle. He explained that for the Kenyan pastoralists in the region, particularly the Pokot and Turkana, disarmament campaigns have been carried out severally during the colonial and in the post-colonial period. While the idea is well intentioned, the exercise itself has drawbacks. This is because the exercise is often selective and, therefore, leave some societies armed which makes those disarmed vulnerable to attacks. Politics is also at play when political machinations in attempts by different pastoral societies to compete for control of political and economic power in the region through firearm possession.

In an interview with a director of NGO in the region, it was noted that this explains long-standing conflict between the Pokot and the Marakwet societies. He further lamented that disarming Kenyan pastoralists in the borderlands without a strengthening of security leaves them exposed and defenseless against external raiders even across Kenyan borders. Thus, the disarmament weakens the balance of power between pastoral societies.

The perception by the government that ethnic conflict in the region is that cattle raiding and related conflicts are cultural practices and thus not criminal activity. However, those who practice raiding presently no longer view it as a cultural practice parse, but as a political and economic under taking, while the managers of the problem want to continue to portray it as cultural. When perceived this way, the problem does not attract attention as an impediment to peaceful co-existence of fear, insecurity, polarization and mistrust.

Therefore, ethnicity role in the conflict has transformed to economic and political levels and as such interventions need to reflect these new factors in conflict dynamism.

Other government interventions such as deployment is often hampered by their inadequate numbers relative to the raiders, poor infrastructure in the region which affects the effective pursuit of the raiders, and insufficient facilities including transport and food rations for the security personnel. The result is little success in their activities. The poor results from the security personnel make affected pastoralists suspicious and distrustful of the capability of the government to provide and maintain adequate security. In an FGD, a security officer retorted:

The conflict among the Tugen, Marakwet, Samburu and Turkana is always as a result of land pressures and land use coupled with revenge and cattle rustling, but in recent years these conflicts are escalated to preserve respect and ethnic pride within the tribe (INT 5-5/06/2019, Marakwet).

The sentiments indicate that conflicts are propelled by ethnic pride and identity. However, as illustrated earlier, politics flare up ethnic consciousness for selfish political reasons.

Conflicts are mainly manifested as political, economic, environmental, exploitation of natural resources, land clashes, religious differences and lately terrorism and Kenya has continued to be divided on the basis of ethnic, socio-cultural, regional, political and economic lines. As a result, there have been sporadic conflicts among different communities in Kenya (Lenairoshi, 2014). Community divisions along political and ideological lines gave rise to protracted and institutionalized waves of ethnic and land clashes. Ethnic and political conflicts in Kenya have become more evident during elections, as reflected during the 1992 and 1997 general elections. The intensity of these

conflicts following the 2007 General Election resulted in a shattered national fabric culminating in the loss of about 1,300 lives with over 350,000 people internally displaced (Smyth *et al.*, 2013). In addition, clan violence continued throughout 2008, causing at least 200 deaths in the Mt. Elgon district, according to peace net committee. Additional estimates by independent media place the death toll in the Mt. Elgon sub-county in excess of 500 people (Stavenhagen, 2016). This study will attempt to explain the influence ethnic identity as a socio-cultural attribute on conflict dynamism in this area.

For the Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana, these communities experience high levels of inter-communal violence; much higher than elsewhere in Africa (Dowd *et al.*, 2013). This violence is perpetrated by identity based communal militias and often involves cycles of attacks and counter attacks (Dowd *et al.*, 2013). Competition over land ownership and land use drive local conflicts, which is sometimes triggered by the migration of herders in search of water and pasture. This is not helped by a minimal presence of security and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

Ethnicity is a factor that constrains participation of women in livelihood activities wherever there are different ethnic groups within a community. Bleahu *et al* (2002), in towns, where categorical relationships are most necessary, ethnicity is often used because this makes it possible to divide up the population into a manageable number of categories and to know what sort of behaviour is expected between “us” and “them”. Thus, we can expect friendly behaviour from some people, or aggression and suspicion from others. Turton *et al* (1998), argues that ethnicity has become a focus of conflict

because it enhances symbolic and behavioural differences which can be used to promote and or defend the political, economic or social interests of the communities concerned. He observes that in most African countries ethnicity is a more important factor in communal differentiation than race or class, and the use of ethnicity in politics is considered a serious problem. Further, cultural differences can aggravate conflict which is basically economic or political. Conflicts arise when resources are limited. As population increases, disputes pit one village against another, sometimes over national or states boundaries and sometimes within them.

The inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya have taken different forms since they first erupted in early 1990's. Turton (2003), the inter-ethnic conflicts were described by numerous attacks to communities. He argues that in post-colonial Kenya, attacks were on kikuyu ethnic group by Kalenjin ethnic group. Hundreds of Kalenjin "community morans," as they became known would attack farms, targeting non-Kalenjin houses. He observed the attackers were often dressed in a uniform of shorts and t-shirts (sometimes red, sometimes black) and always armed with traditional bows and arrows as well as pangas (machetes). Sometimes, the community morans would have their faces marked in the traditional manner with clay. The community morans would loot, kill, and burn houses.

According to Malombe (2000), the type of weapons used in Kenyan ethnic clashes has been machetes, bows and arrows. These are traditional Kikuyu and Kalenjin weapons. Crisp observes that the increased flow of refugees from war tom countries like Somalia and Sudan has resulted in a proliferation of small arms, like AK-47s and Kalashnikovs, in Kenya. These weapons, left over from Cold War politics between the Soviet Union

and the United States are becoming increasingly available in Kenya. Crisp pointed out the possibility of increased amount of bloodshed in future conflicts in the country with these kinds of weapons being owned by the members of the warring communities.

According to Turton (2003), the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya is normally organized and sponsored by the government. He observes that the conflicts are politically motivated. Turton further observed that the conflicts took place immediately after elections. For example after 1992 and 1997 elections, Rift Valley province experienced inter-ethnic conflicts. The conflict in this case is not traditional since communities are now socialized along ethnic lines from a political angle which is the concern of the current study.

Kenya has experienced inter-ethnic conflicts for a long period of time. The conflicts have had different impacts in the lives of Kenyans. According to Nyukuri (1997), the victims of inter-ethnic conflicts were left homeless, landless, injured, and dead and abused. The real impact of inter-ethnic conflict in Kenya was felt most at personal and family level. There was loss of security in the conflicts-prone areas as the civilians took the law into their own hands, targeting perceived enemies. As a result of insecurity, there was indiscriminate loss of human life. Many people sustained physical injuries and others were traumatized. The state of insecurity interfered with the day-to-day socio-economic and political undertakings within the areas. There was loss of life among the Kikuyu, Kalenjin, Luhya, Luo, Iteso, Kisii and other ethnic groups. However, there is increasing evidence to suggest that although the loss was felt on either side of the conflict, the non- Kalenjin ethnic groups suffered most.

According to Nyukuri (1997), the inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya exemplified the potential and real consequences of conflict on inter-ethnic marriages, family and social life. Nyukuri observed that there were cases of breakdown of marriages and family life. The inter-ethnic conflicts also created mistrust, prejudice and psychological trauma characterized by mental anguish and general apathy among the various ethnic groups affected in Kenya. This emerging negative tendency contradicts the view that the conflicting ethnic communities have co-existed and inter-married for several decades. As a result of the clashes, thousands of school going children were displaced. Some dropped out due to the financial and socio-economic constraints attributed to the menace. For instance, the NCKK estimated that by 1994, over 10,000 in Trans-Nzoia County had been displaced as a result of the clashes. A similar number were out of school in Bungoma and Narok counties. This disruption of education activities was widespread in all the conflicts-prone regions in Western Kenya, Rift Valley and Coast provinces. Many schools were burned down or looted in parts of Nyanza Province bordering the Rift Valley Province.

5.2 Factor Analysis for Ethnic identity Variables

Factor analysis was applied on the data to bring intercorrelated variables together under more general, underlying variables. Correlation matrix,

Table 5. 2: Correlation Matrix for Ethnic Identity Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1.000					
2	.291	1.000				
3	.2123	.144	1.000			
4	-.234	.281	-.089	1.000		
5	-.213	.183	.142	.172	1.000	
6	.151	.263	.281	.304	.182	1.000
KMO						0.592
r value=0.594						

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 5.2 shows the correlation matrix or intercorrelations between the studied ethnic identity variables. The intercorrelation between the variable is checked by using Bartlett's test of sphericity, which tests the null hypothesis that the original correlation matrix is an identity matrix. The Bartlett's test of sphericity is shown. The test results indicate that original correlation matrix is not an identity matrix, $p = .000$, p value is less than critical value=0.05 hence there is a positive and an amount of influence that ethnic identity has on conflict dynamism. This implies that, the correlation between the variables exist and are notable.

Multicollinearity is then detected via the determinant of the correlation matrix, which is also calculated through SPSS. The determinant for the correlation matrix is 0.278, which shows that multicollinearity does not exist among the variables. According to (Field 2000: 445) multicollinearity exist if the determinant is less than 0.00001 (Table 5.2).

Sampling adequacy was tested via Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure. It is shown that the KMO value is 0.592. This value is greater than 0.5 showing that the sample size was adequate for analysis. Furthermore, all elements on the diagonal of this matrix are greater than 0.5 showing that the sample is indeed adequate for analysis (Field, 2000).

The results here are also somewhat attuned to the reviewed literature. In the USA and according to Humphreys *et al* (2002), models of ethnic enlistment and conflict tend to adopt an opinion that political players are effortlessly able to place other players into their “correct” ethnic classes. Whereas this may be the situation for some people and some classes, it is not always the case. This implies that for Humphreys, political ethnic identity does not occur as often as empirically argued and that people generate for themselves ethnic identity problems which then leads to conflicts that exacerbate proportionate to the deepening of the said ethnic identity. To ascertain this connection between ethnicity and conflict dynamism, a chi-square analysis was conducted.

To determine the relationship between ethnic identity and conflict dynamism, chi-square analysis was done and the summary of the findings is as shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Chi-Square Tests on Ethnic Identity and Conflict Dynamism

	Value	Df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	204.114 ^a	2	.011
Likelihood Ratio	209.451	2	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	123.40	1	.004
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 2 cells (28.43%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 198.43.

Source: Researcher, 2019

From the Chi-square analysis, there is a relationship between Ethnic Identity and Conflict Dynamism. The p-value=0.011<0.005 indicates that the variables are not independent of each other and that there is statistically significant relationship between the study variables. The findings confirm that though Ethnic Identity is unique and it plays a big role in conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta. Therefore, the conflict dynamics in pastoral communities have the ‘ethnic’ identity used as a precursor of mobilization and for exclusion with other communities. The results on correlation analysis are as shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3: Correlation between Ethnic Identity and Conflict Dynamism

		Ethnic Identity	Conflict Dynamism
Ethnic Identity	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)		
Conflict Dynamism	Pearson’s Correlation	.012	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.406	
	N	375	375

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Source: Researcher, 2019

The findings indicated that there was a strong positive and significant relationship between livelihoods and conflict dynamism. This is depicted by a Pearson correlation coefficient $r=0.406$, p-value =0.012 < 0.05 which was significant at 0.05 level of significance. This implies that improved Ethnic Identity results in decrease of conflict dynamism.

The correlation analysis has clearly shown the strong relationship between ethnic identity among the Kerio Valley delta communities and conflict dynamism. This means that ethnic identity is negatively exploited to advance atrocities against other ethnic communities in the valley delta. Therefore, there is need to promote positive ethnicity where aspects such as language, values and customs are appreciated across communities in the Valley delta. This would automatically reduce animosity on the basis of ethnic identity.

This results concur with Sambanis (2001) study that noted that ethnic characteristics are extensively seen as enabling and occasionally encouraging violent conflict. Essentially, conflicts over “identity” are attributed to over 70% of the civil conflicts initiated between 1960 and 1999. The study observes also that, ethnic conflicts are considered to be predominantly favourable to large-scale violence like ethnic purging and genocide. The question, why ethnicity so frequently a foundation of political violence, is here important. A host of important theories submit that the answer is in the capacity of ethnicity to enable collective action.

In Africa again, the culture of conflict and violence stems from tribal or ethnic, religious, regional, racial differences and class divide (Osei-Hwedie *et al.*, 2012). These reflect the diversity of cultures, and increased economic inequalities between the haves and have not. Oftentimes, cultural and economic factors intertwine as causes of conflict, highlighting the complexity of conflicts in Africa (Osei-Hwedie *et al.*, 2012). Again, based on the focus group discussion, the ethnic identity aspect was prominently noted,

that, the Turkana, Tugen and Pokots for instance are ethnic identity minded and in their nature. They always push off against each other.

The results here can be critiqued and given the researchers voice in this way: The findings here must be contrasted to early qualitative studies that showed that ethnic fractionation was quite low in triggering conflicts, later case studies, several of them, give results that show that ethnicity is a major cause of conflicts. Ethnicity has been categorized as ethnic fractionation and ethnic dominance, fractionation contributing to peace by deepening the costs of organising rebellion across ethnic factors, whereas dominance can increase the risk of conflict dynamism. Further, while definitive methods have been fixated on some determinants as sources of conflict, contemporary conflict mapping identifies the need of examining multifaceted conflict systems. Ramsbotham (2011), observed that this examination is integral in the conflict resolution sphere from the start. Nevertheless, this does not imply that there is an all-embracing strategy or method agreed upon by all the scholars in the conflict resolution field. Contrariwise, there are more than a few equivalent and conflicting approaches, stressing diverse perspectives, factors and degrees of analysis.

Also based on the results, the assertion in literature that ethnic conflicts are considered to be predominantly favourable to large-scale violence like ethnic purging and genocide is not necessarily true. But also, for the Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana, these communities experience high levels of inter-communal violence; much higher than elsewhere in Africa. The results show and can thus be asserted that this violence is perpetrated by identity based communal militias and often involve cycles of attacks and counter attacks.

Competition over land ownership and land use drive local conflicts, which is sometimes triggered by the migration of herders in search of water and pasture. This is not helped by a minimal presence of security and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Further, ethnicity is a factor that constrains participation of women in livelihood activities wherever there are different ethnic groups within a community. Also, ethnicity has become a focus of conflict because it enhances symbolic and behavioural differences which can be used to promote and or defend the political, economic or social interests of the communities concerned.

5.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed how ethnicity contributes to conflict dynamism. Ethnicity is identified by language and also way of life of communities in the Kerio Valley Delta. Pastoral communities met violence or tribal clashes on non-pastoral communities for reasons ranging from scarcity of natural resources to perception that their ethnic groups have been marginalized since independence. Politics play a critical role in ethnic consciousness in relation to issues of marginalization and therefore, conflict management need to relook at these new emergent issues in the conflict that is no longer cultural but political.

CHAPTER SIX

CULTURAL BELIEF SYSTEM AND CONFLICT DYNAMISM

This chapter gave the analysis of cultural belief system and Conflict Dynamism, factor analysis for cultural beliefs variables and Chapter Summary

6.1 Cultural Belief System and Conflict Dynamism

The third objective was to analyse the relationship between cultural belief system and conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta and the results are highlighted in Table 6.1.

Table 6. 1: Cultural Belief System and Conflict Dynamism

	Mean	Σ	StD	Rank
	Σ	Rank		StD
The elders are our leaders in war	3.10	1	0.96	1
We have a cultural system arranged to fight	2.76	2	0.73	3
My culture demands that we fight for our position	1.11	5	0.64	5
No other tribe has a better culture than mine	2.09	4	0.73	3
My cultural belief is a major cause of conflict	2.14	3	0.76	2

N=375

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 6.1 indicates that the elders were leaders in war (M=3.10 SD=0.96); They had a cultural system arranged to fight (M=2.76 SD=0.73); The culture demanded that they fight for their position (M=1.11 SD=0.64); No other tribe had a better culture than theirs

(M=2.09 SD=0.73); and the cultural belief was a major cause of conflict (M=2.14 SD=0.76).

The mean bases indicate that the instigators of violent conflicts are the elders and there is a cultural system lay down for purposes of tribal conflicts in the valley delta. Other causes of conflict dynamism are cultural beliefs and a notion that our culture is superior to others. Therefore, violent conflicts are a result of cultural systems guided by elders and that's why resolutions to the same need to take cognizance of this factor. The standard deviation bases reveal the same explanation that elders are the originators of violent conflicts and a systematic historical system exists among all communities in the Kerio Valley Delta. This means that for any peaceful measures elders as actors are key players.

The findings confirm that cattle raids are a tradition that is passed on from one generation to another and therefore conflicts among ethnic communities in the Kerio Valley Delta is historical in nature since pre-colonial times. The raids are well structured that each community is out to undo the other in this raids. Since culture refers to 'ways of living, values, customs, religion, mother-tongue use, ethnicity and heritage, the socio-cultural diversity appears may play an important role in conflicts when embedded in struggles over resources through ethnic violence and social marginalisation (Hagg, 2006).

LeFebvre *et al* (2013), argue that the art of international negotiations agree that cultures really matter. This means that understanding of the cultures of different communities can

be of notable impact in reaching solutions over conflicts. Therefore, having knowledge can always help the mediators to recognize not only that he or she has her own culture which appears different from others but that this difference will end up influencing how problems are handled so as to reach an agreement. Admonitions to pay heed to culture as a factor to consider in conflict management seems so self-evident in the current world today and it is surprising how long it takes some people to recognize the cultures key roles (Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011).

The result reflects Kumssa *et al* (2009), postulation a number of reasons have been fronted to explain the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kerio Valley Delta but culture has been given minimal or no attention at all. Therefore, this study filled this gap by focusing on socio-cultural factors that play out in conflict in this region. The ethnic conflicts in Kerio Valley Delta are caused by boundary or land disputes, political issues, leadership disputes, cattle rustling, ethnic differences, personal attitudes and behaviour, jealousy, problems over water, crime, and corruption, problems over personal property, inheritance, poor communication and misunderstanding.

There are numerous causes and reasons, Richardson (1996), Krueger (1995, 1987, 1983,1978, 1975), for ethnic conflict as expressed in verbal and or physical forms in multi-ethnic states. As in the case of Guyana for instance, the chief reason for ethnic conflict is the desire of the leader of an ethnic group or members of groups to capture the state or acquire more resources for its members and to correct what it perceives were historic wrongs committed against the group. As gleamed from the literature, generally speaking, ethnic conflict comes about when ethnicity (identifying with and displaying loyalty to one's group) is used to organize and mobilize ethnic groups of people to

compete against one another for resources and or for the attention of the state and or even to capture the state.

Members from an ethnic group rally around each other to give each other support on an issue impacting on their group or for (more) resources for the group or for political or economic power. The groups are usually organized with the goal of influencing or capturing state power and or making demands on the state to address a perceived (real or imagined) grievance (typically discrimination based on uneven distribution of resources or obtaining greater state recognition of their culture or equitable participation in the government). Ethnic conflict (verbal or physical clashes and the like) inevitably develops when expressed grievances of the group are not satisfactorily addressed in multi-ethnic societies or where the state ignores the groups (Richardson, 1996., Krueger, 1983, 1975., Nagel, 1985).

Theorists have identified some of the proximate causes of ethnic conflict including allegations of discrimination against and neglect and or marginalization of the group by the (leaders of the) ruling (dominant) group and or a demand for equitable distribution of resources and or proportional representation in the composition of the government of the state. Also, conflict ensues when ethnically divisive strategies are invoked by political actors to mobilize political support to capture power and or to make demands on the state and or to gain control of the state, Krueger (2000)., Horowitz (1985), as happened in Guyana after 1957 and in so many other ethnically divided countries (Krueger, 1978).

In multi-ethnic conflict ridden societies, often, the state is dominated by an ethnic group and other ethnic groups become subordinated feeling left out of decision making and or

left behind believing they are not getting a fair (or “their”) share of resources leading to all kinds of complaints based on ethnic discrimination (persecution) accompanied by demands for restitution. These complaints can be (and often are) used as a basis for open conflict or political mobilization based on ethnicity. Long-standing beliefs and attitudes held by members of the ethnic group are used to support the claim of discrimination against the group and the accompanied militant response (protests, boycotts, demands, and even violence, etc.) against the state.

Violent conflicts between rival ethnic groups sometimes break out spontaneously or at times are planned and pre-meditated (Richardson, 1996., Krueger, 1983). Also, members across ethnic groups are known to form alliances in conflict against other groups (as the Africans, Portuguese, Amerindians, Mixed, etc. did in Guiana during the 1960s against the People's Progressive Party {PPP} and Indians). When peace is restored, conflict between former alliance members can take place as happened in Guyana between Africans and Amerindians and Africans and Portuguese once the Indian threat was removed (Krueger, 1978., Duffield, 1970).

Most political leaders are associated with incitement and ethnic stereotypes that hamper the relationships between different ethnic groups living in the same region. Such incitements create animosity between different ethnic groups .Such a gruesome experience was not only evidenced in many counties in Kenya, but also at national level in Kenya, during the general elections of 2007/2008; when different ethnic groups turned against one another. A strong allegation too stands in that politicians incite their ethnic groups to raid and steal livestock from other ethnic groups. This livestock theft stokes animosity between the ethnic groups. In most cases the politicians have been reported to hire goons to cause turbulence (Baxter, 1997).

Majority of the youth, who are idle and unemployed get lured into such uncouth behaviour. A living case example is the allegation against some politicians in the ICC for having funded and used the outlawed Mungiki sect to cause mayhem and havoc during the 2007/2008 post-election violence in some parts of Kenya (TJRC, 2008). All the above scenarios show that the main aim of politicians is to gain control, remain in power and gain access to resources.

Kenyans have typically in the past voted along ethnic lines since the advent of multiparty era in the country in 1992. Presidential candidates and their political parties have always got huge following and support from geographical zones dominated by groups whose ethnicity is the same as that for the presidential candidates. Ethnic groups whose presidential candidates win in elections are viewed by the rest of the ethnic groups as being favoured by the ruling government in terms of public appointments. This tendency draws a wedge in the nature of relations and coexistence among the various ethnic groups in the country.

Some studies on ethnic violence are guided by the theory of instrumentalism. The theory, having been propounded by Karl Popper in 1965, is pegged on the premise that ethnic conflicts are a function of political entrepreneurs; who mostly stoke historical grievances in order to perpetuate their personal ambitions, gains and interests. The theory is a complete inverse of the primordialists' theory, which argues that conflicts are attributed to the peoples' historical hatreds and differences. The instrumentalists' view reiterated that in the event of institutions' failure to award identity to the society, individuals will

have a high propensity to recoil back to their ethnic cocoons; in search for societal protection and security.

Findings (M=3.10 SD=0.96) indicate that community elders dominate traditional pastoral societies in this region. In an interview, a security officer argued that most pastoralists have a distinctive clan-based governance system derived from a progressive age-set system. Based on this system, elders decided pastoral matters, marriage, property distribution, social commitments, and the selection of grazing, leaders, defence matters and disputes. For example, among the Maasai, Nandi, Turkana, Marakwet and Pokot of Kenya, traditional institutions were and are still very important. The role of elders can never be understated here; an elder in an interview explained that traditional raids were under strict control of the elders, community healers and soothsayers. In an FGD, a chief explained:

Everyone knew a raid was coming. The aspect of surprise in a raid involved only time and place. Attacks would only take place at dawn or in the evening. Ichumer elder insisted that awareness of impending raids was made known to everyone. (INT 5-7/06/2019, Baringo).

This assertion explains how raids are organized traditionally. This finding agrees with Thomas (1965), study that a man in traditional war costume would alert the other clan. The organizational culture of raids is clan and age-set based. However, of the ethnic groups in Kerio Valley Delta, the Pokot have adopted a complicated blend of the Kalenjin generation-set and Karomojong age-set system. In this system, there are six generation-sets (pin) which cycle in time. At any time three generation-sets are acting. Chumwo were ritual elders, Koronkoro were political elders and Kaplelach, who were circumcised in 1988 were community morans. Circumcision "ties together the generation-set" and every man who went through his initiation ceremony (sapana) belongs to initiation-set. Three initiation sets integrate into an age-set (Bollig 1990).

Though there is a group of young men set apart who are referred to as warriors – community morans (miron) there is no law which would prohibit older men to participate in raiding (Maito and Odhiambo,2013).

Jacobs (1979) argues that unlike Maasai warriors, Pokot age-sets do not build corporate interest groups since they have a formal internal organization or a shared residential unit. It is interesting that decision-making within an age-set is highly informal and only during the large age set ceremonies is decision-making and leadership more formalized. Within the age-set, there are men who are leaders within their age-sets but their authority may be questioned at any time. But for those who have been accepted in leadership positions, the men of his age-set respect him. The researcher observed the ‘silent power’ the youth leader commanded during an FGD where youths sought are clearance in joining discussions and remarks. In an FGD, a chief said:

We have leaders who emerge and undergo the Sapanaa while there are those that emerge and lead in raids. I plan for the coverage of bridge and sentry to ensure that as a community we are not attacked without knowing. A leader must be very sensitive about things happening and must be extra vigilant (INT 5-7/06/2019, Baringo).

This means that the Pokot culture for instance encourages young people to raid and as this is evidence of a hardworking and protective generation. This could be the undoing on the part of relations with other communities in the neighbourhood. The respondent interviewed observed that the main actors are the youths from both communities but the elders mostly the Laibons in Pokot have a major role. He pointed out that the elders who have power to foresee things are present in both Turkana and the Pokot and do conduct blessing ceremonies before planned attacks.

Their successful attack and raid on another community is praised. The traditional foreteller, (Aba-Mulele for the Turkana and Orgoiyot in Pokot) play a serious role in conflicts. The communities seem to be continuously at logger heads, -continued hate and no trust at all over the other. Secondly is the right of passage costs and proof of successfully graduating to the next level (*sapanaa*). The Pokots are aggressive and mostly solve conflicts through 'action'. Clearly, group perception has been co-opted by the effects of livestock raiding. Each group perceives the other's actions as increasingly hostile and as aimed at cultural and social targets rather than commercial livestock targets alone. What is essentially a financial conflict erupts into full-scale ethnic war. The contention between Turkana and Pokot communities goes beyond a simple conflict spiral.

This concurs with Nganga (2012), study which found that among the Pokots in Kenya, raiding parties were organized in terms of age-sets. Once they joined an age-set, they only legitimized their new membership in this role through participation in raids on neighbouring peoples. Raids were organized very well and successful raids were rewarded while poor raids ended up in punishment to the community morans concerned. This study has filled the socio-cultural factors which his study did not identify as a major cause of conflicts between the Pokot and other ethnic communities surrounding them. In an FGD, an assistant chief retorted:

In the traditional African society, rituals and sacrifices play a significant role in the day to day running of activities. The Pokot, for instance, before planning a raid, the war counsellors went to the diviners the 'Talai's', the diviner advised them about the time and any misfortunes that needed anticipation (INT 6/06/2019, Baringo).

This means that if the diviner forecasted misfortune then the raiding party performed a ritual to purify their weapons. These were practices that were purely cultural in nature.

How far they impact on conflicts needs investigation hence the presence of this study.

These leaders on the account of their rhetoric skills and their deeds give them the status.

In an FGD, a chief argued:

Age and generation-sets are utilized for the mobilization of personnel for raiding. The networks of age-set group are widespread and transmit news about the impending raid. The rhetoric of the age-set system is used to motivate men. The system further provides convenient categories to describe warfare (INT 5/06/2019, Samburu).

This argument puts cattle raids in cultural context. From this assertion, it is clear that age-sets are culturally set for posterity of raids. However, conflict dynamics are determined by modernization and some of the pressures brought by weakening of social organization across pastoral areas and power struggles between the seniors and juniors.

In an Interview, an assistant county commissioner retorted:

The social security that once existed in pastoral areas is declining. The erosion of the traditional governance institutions among pastoralist communities has reduced effective control of conflict. In some places eldership can now be attained by wealth, and armed youth are adding new pressures, which the elders have not confronted before (INT 5-5/06/2019, Turkana).

It is clear that a twist has been added to culturally organized raids in the recent past by factors that have come to socialize ethnic communities in the region differently. Thus, conflict management measures need to reflect these new changes that are a game changer in cattle raiding.

This finding concurs with Maito and Odhiambo (2013), assertion that while governments have exerted control over some aspects of life, they have remained weak in pastoral areas. He argues that in the past the presence of customary traditional governance institutions has compensated for weak state governance by regulating behavior, adjusting

disputes and generally keeping people organized among all pastoral communities and therefore, traditional structures are still vital for understanding pastoralists and such structures can be revitalized and used to resolve pastoral problems.

In an interview with an NGO director, it was revealed that other causes of dynamism in conflict were but not limited to ethnocentrism, poverty, marginalization and proliferation of illicit arms. In the recent past, it was noted that abuse of the traditional culture of cattle rustling to restock livestock after severe droughts or diseases is another cause of conflicts in this vast Kerio Valley Delta. Therefore, raids among these ethnic communities are no longer about replenishing stock but raid to kill, maim and enrich them. The new socialization of commercialization of cattle raids added a new twist to conflicts in the region. With broken traditional peace processes, the raids are now deadlier than ever. Also, there is inadequate policing of pastoralists areas as both the national and county security mechanism is either unable or unwilling to confront cattle rustlers. This has greatly contributed to the spiraling gun culture, self-defence and retaliation missions.

Now that ethnic communities have been socialized into the culture of small arms unlike before when raids were purely conducted with bows and arrows, the disarming of the various communities is critical to management of these conflicts. However, before disarmament could kick off, the government should strive to understand and unravel the myth behind gun culture.

But marginalization by successive governments is also blamed for escalated conflicts in the region; strangely, it has enabled pastoralists to retain their culture, which has existed for centuries to ensure their mode of survival, however, some of the culture has been

eroded such as elder control of raids. Therefore, the existing framework can be exploited to manage the armed and resource conflict bedeviling the Delta. But this can be made possible, if government officials desist from supporting criminal activity, tension and conflict. In an interview, a security officer lamented:

The prejudice against marginalized areas and the attitude governments have is reflected when government sends security forces to these areas. They are already prejudiced and take actions that do not meet the reported insecurity situation (INT 5-5/06/2019, Samburu).

This indicates a government out of touch with the reality in the ethnic conflicts that are prone in Kerio valley Delta region. This means that actions taken by government are knee-jerk and not well thought out strategies on how to manage the historical conflicts in the region. This is further exacerbated by a combination of inequitable policies, lack of access to justice and lack of understanding of pastoral areas. Governments have always viewed pastoralism as a marginal economic way of life. In an interview, a director retorted:

It's a common situation to experience conflict. The actors are normally youth and the elders who guide the youths, they have the power to allow or disallow for a raid to take place. Another cause he mentioned is Moranism. The pastoralist communities believe that once the boys have been initiated, they must start looking for their own wealth and protect community at the same time. Participation in raids is one way the youth 'under community pressure' plan and execute raids that will earn them respect and legitimacy as moran" (INT 2 6/08/2019, Nairobi).

The cattle raids are culturally engrained in ethnic communities that reside in Kerio valley Delta. However, historically, these raids were controlled by elders who relied on socio-cultural foundations to manage the raids. In as much as raids were among these communities, in the recent past communities have been socialized in use of small arms and commercialization of raids which has led to new conflict dynamics. Ironically,

successive government interventions are yet to adapt a holistic approach in managing the conflicts prone in this region.

6.2 Factor Analysis for cultural beliefs Variables

Factor analysis was applied on the data to bring intercorrelated variables together under more general, underlying variables. In total, 322 subjects are included in analysis. The main goal was to reduce the dimensionality of the original space and to give an interpretation to the new space, spanned by a reduced number of new dimensions which are supposed to underlie the old ones or to explain the variance in the observed variables in terms of underlying latent factors.

Table 6. 2: Correlation Matrix for Cultural Belief Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1.000					
2	-.181	1.000				
3	-.273	.134	1.000			
4	.206	.211	-.037	1.000		
5	-.083	.173	.132	.072	1.000	
6	.021	.253	.141	.329	.132	1.000
KMO						0.620
r value=0.623						

Source: Researcher, 2019

A correlation matrix is a square leading diagonal matrix that shows the intercorrelations between the variables measured. Table 6.2 shows the correlation matrix or inter correlations between the studied human capital pool variables. The intercorrelation between the variable is checked by using Bartlett's test of sphericity, which tests the null hypothesis that the original correlation matrix is an identity matrix. The Bartlett's test of sphericity is shown in table 7.2. The test results indicate that original correlation matrix is not an identity matrix, $p = .000$, pvalue is less than critical value=0.05 hence null

hypothesis is rejected. This implies that, the correlation between the variables exist and are notable. Multicollinearity is then detected via the determinant of the correlation matrix, which is also calculated through SPSS. The determinant for the correlation matrix is 0.219, which shows that multicollinearity does not exist among the variables. According to (Field 2000) multicollinearity exist if the determinant is less than 0.00001 (Table 6.2).

Sampling adequacy was tested via Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure. It is shown shows that the KMO value is 0.620. This value is greater than 0.5 showing that the sample size was adequate for analysis (Table 7.2). Furthermore, all elements on the diagonal of this matrix are greater than 0.5 showing that the sample is indeed adequate for analysis (Field, 2000). A chi-square analysis was also conducted to ascertain the relationship between cultural belief systems and conflict dynamism.

On investigating the relationship between cultural belief system and conflict dynamism, chi-square analysis was done and the summary of the findings is as shown in Table 6.2.

Table 6.2 Chi-Square Tests on Cultural Belief System and Conflict Dynamism

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	320.176 ^a	2	.012
Likelihood Ratio	219.962	2	.003
Linear-by-Linear Association	326.42	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	375		

a. 2 cells (23.5%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 212.41.

Source Researcher, 2019

From the Chi-square analysis, there is a relationship between Cultural Belief System and Conflict Dynamism. The $p\text{-value}=0.012 < 0.005$ indicates that the variables are not independent of each other and that there is statistically significant relationship between the study variables. The findings confirm that though cultural belief system is unique, it plays a big role in conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta. The results of correlation analysis are as shown in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3: Correlation between Cultural Belief System and Conflict Dynamism

		Cultural System	Belief	Conflict Dynamism
Cultural System	Pearson Correlation	1		
	Sig. (1-tailed)			
Conflict Dynamism	Pearson's Correlation	.021		1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.002		
	N	375		375

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Source: Researcher, 2019

The findings indicated that there was a positive and non-significant relationship between livelihoods and conflict dynamism. This is depicted by a Pearson correlation coefficient $r=0.021$, $p\text{-value} = 0.002 < 0.05$ which was significant at 0.05 level of significance. This implies that improved cultural beliefs system results in increase of conflict dynamism.

A strong correlation between cultural belief system and conflict as illustrated indicates that aspects such as community morans age-sets, elders organizing raids are historical in nature. Thus, violent conflicts among communities in the Kerio Valley Delta are embeded

in culture and a way of managing the same calls for change of negative cultures as mentioned here.

This result concurs with Ramsbotham (2011) study that observed that this examination is integral in the conflict resolution sphere from the start. Nevertheless, this does not imply that there is an all-embracing strategy or method agreed upon by all the scholars in the conflict resolution field. Contrariwise, there are more than a few equivalent and conflicting approaches, stressing diverse perspectives, factors and degrees of analysis.

Wallensteen (2007), noted on his part that, the dissimilar styles of conflict analysis can be characterised under three titles, based on what kind of strategy they underscore: 1) conflict dynamics, 2) conflict origins that are needs-based, and 3) rational-strategic controls. A definitive understanding of conflict construes conflict as a dynamic spectacle: one player is responding to what another actor or player is doing, which creates further undesirable action (Wallensteen, 2007).

To offer a critique and researcher's voice, the following appears to be quite noticeable: Several reasons have been fronted to explain the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Kenya but culture has been given minimal or no attention at all; this makes the results here both valid and valuable enough to fill a gap in literature. But also, the results now confirm somewhat that truly, ethnic conflicts in Kenya are caused by cultural beliefs, boundary or land disputes, political issues, leadership disputes, cattle rustling, ethnic differences, personal attitudes and behaviour, jealousy, problems over water, crime, and corruption,

problems over personal property, inheritance, poor communication and misunderstanding.

The conflict situation in pastoral Kenya today revolves around the notion of negative reciprocity. Turkana and Pokot societies respond negatively to one another's actions—violence begets violence. Cattle were indeed raided throughout the history of East African pastoral societies. However, these raids were more of a form of wealth redistribution through cattle. There were customary rules in which cattle raids were limited to times of need, were small in number, and generally characterized by little violence. However, as rules began to be increasingly violated during the 20 century, these raids escalated in intensity (Krätli *et al.*, 1999). Victims responded with raids of increased intensity, and the conflict spiral was born (Krätli *et al.*, 1999).

While studies previously did not identify cultural practices and believes as a major cause of conflicts between the Pokot and other ethnic communities surrounding them; the result now does that identity succinctly. In the traditional African society, rituals and sacrifices played a big role in the day to day running of activities. Among the Pokot for instance, before planning a raid, the war counsellors went to the diviners the 'Talai's', the diviner advised them about the time and any misfortunes that needed anticipation. Before leaving for the raid or war, if the diviner forecasted misfortune, the raiding party performed a ritual to purify their weapon. These were practices that were purely cultural in nature. How far they impact on conflicts has gotten substantive investigation hence the presence of this study.

Further, theorists had identified some of the proximate causes of ethnic conflict including allegations of discrimination against and neglect and or marginalization of the group by the (leaders of the) ruling (dominant) group and or a demand for equitable distribution of resources and or proportional representation in the composition of the government of the state. Also, conflict ensues when ethnically divisive strategies are invoked by political actors to mobilize political support to capture power and or to make demands on the state and or to gain control of the state. To add on to the theory, cultural belief system now features prominently.

6.3. Chapter Summary

This chapter indicates that cattle raids were culturally organized and most ethnic communities involved in the conflict adhere to this. Historically, the focus was to restock livestock after droughts, pay bride price and indicate prestige for a rival community. Though traditionally raids were conducted using arrows and bows, modernity introduced small arms, commercialization and polarization of raids. In recent years raids have been deadly and near impossible to manage due to this factors that socialized communities new ways of conflict.

CHAPTER SEVEN

LIVELIHOOD OPTIONS AND CONFLICT DYNAMISM

The chapter has looked into: Livelihood Options and Conflict Dynamism, Factor Analysis for Livelihood Options Variables and chapter summary.

7.1 Livelihood Options and Conflict Dynamism

The fourth objective was to evaluate the relationship between livelihood options as a deterrence of conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta and the results are highlighted in Table 7.1.

Table 7. 1: Livelihood Options and Conflict Dynamism

	Mean	Σ	StD	Rank
	Σ	Rank		StD
I consider myself poor	2.60	3	0.71	5
I have insufficient resources to sustain myself well	2.08	5	0.77	4
I am a pastoralist	2.87	3	1.84	1
I have been forced to fight so as to meet my daily needs	3.01	1	0.99	2
I have protected myself from conflicts by having resources	2.97	2	0.93	3

N=375

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 7.1 shows that there were notably valid and true responses as regards the statements presented. Consequently, the inhabitants considered themselves poor (M=2.60 SD=0.71); they had insufficient sustaining resources (M=2.08 SD=0.77); they were majorly pastoralists (M=2.87 SD=1.84); they had been forced to fight for survival (M=3.01 SD=0.99); and they had protected themselves from conflicts by having resources (M=2.97 SD=0.93).

The mean bases indicate that violent conflicts are a necessity since it is a way of survival for pastoral communities. The correlation between conflicts and survivability is tied to resources such as livestock, water etc. the standard deviation indicates a similar trajectory in that being a pastoralist does not guarantee sustainable livelihoods. It can be concluded that conflict dynamism has been caused by erratic livelihoods such as dependence of pastoralism as a source and therefore this means that measures to improve the same are yet to be fulfilling. This calls for alternative livelihoods as this study proposes.

Findings indicate that ethnic groups in Kerio valley Delta keep large herds of cattle and value cattle as a source of livelihood. It is clear that cattle are wealth to pastoralists which forms the foundation of their economic and social stability. Cattle raiding is vital when drought and diseases deplete their livestock; meaning that raids are used to sustain their livelihoods.

This result occurs with Maito and Odhiambo (2013), study which found that pastoralism is a subsistence pattern in which people make a living through tending livestock. In this

study, he argues that for the livelihood to thrive it requires a regular supply of pasture and water. The animals tended by pastoralists can provide an adequate supply of animal proteins required by humans. With the right support the pastoral economy can thrive and contribute to the national economy. Pastoralists have however suffered from a series of livelihood shocks, some natural and others political.

As results indicate, pastoralists livelihood is always under threats and lack of adequate support make them vulnerable to natural disasters. When they suffer losses, raids are a form of restocking which makes it difficult to completely to eliminate. According to Shackleton and Shackleton (2012) in a study done in the UK, a livelihood is considered sustainable when it can cope with and recover from the stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future without undermining the natural resources and a livelihood comprises of the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. He further states that in sustainable livelihood, there are factors which shed light on why the sustainable livelihood approach was developed and applied to poverty reduction.

Taking cue of Shackleton and Shackleton (2012) argument, ethnic groups in the delta hardly have sustainable livelihood because they suffer from many shocks that wipe out their cattle herds. In an interview, a chief claimed that they suffer huge losses as a result of drought and the only way to restock is through raids which points to how difficult it is to stop conflicts. However, in an FGD, a security officer argued:

The major source of the conflicts in pastoral areas rotate around the cow as it is the source of livelihood, so it has to be "fought

for or kept," though land to access pasture is another source of conflict (INT 5/06/2019, Samburu).

This argument points to dilemma where lack of access to pasture is a threat to pastoralist livelihood and therefore, conflicts revolve around access to pasture and water in Kerio Valley Delta. This finding concurs with Spencer (1975), study that drought triggers livelihood crises, but the underlying causes of vulnerability in the pastoral areas of the horn of Africa are social and political and not natural.

In his study, he argues that droughts are part of the natural cycle in semi-arid areas, and local livelihoods are sensitively adapted to the certainty that can come but can be overcome. Vulnerability to drought can increase, if there is inadequate support to economic, social and political coping mechanisms, rather than increasingly frequent or abnormally severe drought events

On the flip side, Swift (1988) is of contrary opinion that pastoralists get half of their food and income wholly from livestock. He agrees that even during colonial times or even today, pastoralists in this region faced major challenges from drought, causing shortage of pasture and water which led to competition for grazing, and stock theft (cattle rustling). However, they possessed organized drought coping mechanisms including: mobility, leaving land fallow; splitting families to better manage family herds; pooling resources; trade ties; diversification of domestic herds; raids that distributed the cattle from within the communities! In an FGD, an assistant chief argued:

There were traditional coping mechanisms to threats such as droughts. Many ethnic groups in Kerio Valley delta used mobility, leaving land fallow; splitting families to better manage family herds; pooling resources; trade ties to stave off threats. Such mechanisms were organized through the customary institution of the elders, regulating conflicts and administering justice (INT 5-5/06/2019, Baringo).

The assertion points to coping mechanism that were traditional but in post independent era they lost much of this mobility because land has shrunk and drought is more severe due to climate change patterns. It was noted that land tenure systems in Kenya has marginalized pastoral communities further which endangers their livelihood.

This means that pastoral communities engaged in cattle rustling as a means of expanding lands, restocking livestock to enlarge the community herds after drought, diseases, famine. In an FGD, a youth argued that to pastoralists, raiding is never perceived as a crime or socially unacceptable. It was both a cultural tendency and an economic coping strategy that was regulated by elders. The elders controlled and sanctioned all the raids and also made peace if it was necessary which not the case is in the recent times.



Plate 7. 1: Researcher Interview with Government administration Chief at Kaptalamwa, Elgeyo Marakwet.

Source: Researcher, 2019

In an interview, a chief claimed that in Pokot, indicated two kinds of raiding, the *luk* and the *setat*. The traditional form is the *luk*. This is well organised by a large group of community morans for retaliatory reasons or the need to acquire cattle, it *was* often blessed and backed by the elders and seers. The rustlers retained the rustled cattle in the local community as a source of wealth and payment of bride wealth, which was a redistributed amongst families, lineages and affirmed solidarities of cattle owing units. The second type of raiding, *setat*, is considered as stealing/theft or commerce.

There exists, however, a remarkable gap in studies to do with livelihoods options and how importantly it has been advanced with conflict, dislocation and relocation in mind (Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011). Still, there is no such scheme available intended to either discovering the livelihood abilities accessible to conflicts in the Kerio Valley Delta or fixated at regenerating those lost in the course of the undesirable conflict. However, little was known of livelihood options available to conflicting communities in the Kerio Valley Delta region and how it is connected to conflict dynamism. With coping mechanism, a director of NGO argued that the government can buy off pastoralist herds during drought seasons and replenish them in the aftermath. He also argued that development in pastoral areas is critical to sustainable livelihood options. For instance, dug water boreholes, favourable land tenure system for pastoral communities and a mix of pastoral and agro approaches would guarantee sustainable livelihoods in this region.

It was argued that lack of livelihood options in fostering conflicts. All the cadres of groups interviewed observed that the fight for resources to try and improve their lot in life was a force to reckon in motivating conflicts among themselves. The stealing of animals was part of their efforts to live better and the lack of coping strategies or

alternative practices was a major impediment to stopping or deescalating violence among the warring communities.

Therefore, supporting viable livelihoods in pastoral economies requires expanding people's options, supporting the cooperation between pastoralists, agro-pastoralists, farmers, traders, and urban dwellers and maximizing and not restricting their physical, economy national governments, international governments and NGOs have successfully put in place effective mechanisms to deliver food aid to pastoralists in times of drought stress due to the perception that drought is a humanitarian problem. Instead of alleviating the suffering, food aid has had a negative effect on the ability of the pastoralists to naturally adapt to drought. The approach by NGOs and international government agencies is to provide food aid during drought periods which cannot wholly solve the problem.

This result do not concur with Little (1987) study that indicates that agricultural encroachment in pastoral areas and related disputes is more complex than herder/farmer inter-group opposition and involves endogenous conflicts *within* the pastoral community. Sedentarization minimizes the economic differentiation between ethnic groups, towards a uniform combination of agro-pastoralism and wage employment. He argues that the Il Chamus, and some groups of pastoral Pokot in northern Baringo, are developing economies similar to the neighboring Tugen. In an interview with an NGO director, it was noted that pastoralists who did not succeed in the difficult climatic condition or who lost their herds through disease simply left the agro-ecological zone. However food aid has the effect of keeping in place populations who would otherwise move on to initiate a

new subsistence strategy. This means that food aid negatively affect pastoral communities when it comes to coping with natural disasters such as drought and therefore need to be dropped as a strategy.

All in all, the production of livestock remains a crucial element in the economies of African countries with substantial semiarid regions. Where the rainfall is extremely patchy and pasture resources must be exploited opportunistically, the producer with a high level of mobility can maintain a herd in land that is almost unusable for fixed territory or ranch production. Moreover, mobile pastoralists do not have to pay any of the fixed costs associated with fenced pastures and grazing is thus essentially a free resource (Spencer *et al.*, 1998). Mobility was a perfectly rational strategy in regimes of variable rainfall and that the subsequent structural instability of social groups was a regrettable but predictable result of this. In an FGD, a chief posted:

Indeed after the droughts, highly mobile pastoralists preserved their herds far better than their agro-pastoral; pastoralists were making productive use of otherwise extremely marginal land. (INT 5/06/2019, Turkana).

This argument points to the fact that mobility is a coping mechanism and need to be encouraged or allowed. It is interesting that mixing pastoralism and agro do not work in the long run as a coping mechanism. However, in an interview, an NGO director lamented that land has shrunk and mobility may be difficult for pastoral communities with regard to access to water and pasture.

In an FGD, an assistant chief revealed that herders prepare for drought by lending their animals to relatives or friends in exchange for looking after some of their friends or relatives animals in return. This serves as an insurance against drought. When the lending is not done, relatives would always come in handy to help in restocking by lending animals. Also, to restock among pastoralists in the arid and semiarid areas is cattle raiding, though unpopular with government authorities it is used to build depleted stock after a drought.

Cho *et al* (2016), highlight four key sets of considerations for the design of strong entrepreneurship development programs, each of which has bearing on the likelihood of program effectiveness: (1) determining beneficiary targeting, eligibility criteria, and profiling potential applicants or participants, particularly given that many studies suggest that relatively low uptake may be common; (2) determining the set and sectors of business/enterprise activities that will be allowable under the program, noting that this can function via either a demand-driven or project-determined approach; (3) choosing the training and additional elements that will comprise the program interventions; and (4) selecting the form and institutional partnerships by which program delivery will occur.

Business and entrepreneurship training aims to improve business income, profitability, and growth through improved knowledge, financial literacy, and use of good business skills (for example, use of record keeping and formal accounting). It is also anticipated to lead to higher employment, either through expanded employment opportunities for additional workers in successful small or medium-sized business enterprises, or simply through self-employment for successful entrepreneurs. Such training programs are often offered at no expense to participants (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014). Different interventions

target a range of beneficiaries, including youth, women, clients of microcredit institutions, or those with some level of existing business skills or an existing small business. There is also a strong focus on potential entrepreneurs in target groups, such as the unemployed, school drop-outs, or recent school graduates (Cho *et al.*, 2014).

In general, much of the current rigorous evaluation literature finds differential impacts by different beneficiary groups, suggesting that it is important to target programs well. However, there is also currently no strong understanding of whether certain kinds of training programs universally benefit certain types of target beneficiaries in a consistent way. Similarly, there is no strong evidence that the same kind of program will produce the same type or level of effect when applied in different country contexts (Cho *et al.*, 2014). This uncertainty stems in part from the relatively small existing evidence base. Moreover, much of the current knowledge base is drawn from studies with relatively small sample sizes, without sufficient statistical power to detect small effects if such effects are present.

In the development literature, entrepreneurship training has also been viewed as a potential vehicle to help address youth unemployment, while strong entrepreneurial activity in poor countries is widely viewed as important for stimulating stronger economic development, not only through providing direct employment but also for its role in spurring innovations, new technology adoption, or expanded dissemination. Some programs couple entrepreneurship training packages with competitive funds to provide start-up capital to successful participants, thus aiming to address not only the skills deficit but also capital constraints that are another commonly cited barrier for new entrepreneurs. Going a step further, other programs also aim to link participants more strongly into professional networks. Training programs often emphasize a mix of business, entrepreneurship, and financial literacy skills, and programs may draw on

partnerships across NGO, private sector, education, and government institutions (or some subset of these) to design and provide the training. Typical content of such training efforts includes topics on accounting, financial planning, and marketing, pricing and costing, and separating household and business finances. More comprehensive efforts can also address topics related to customer service, business growth strategies, and employee management, and issues related to savings, debt, and using banks (McKenzie *et al.*, 2014).

There is generally a positive outlook on the potential for such programs to foster stronger employment opportunities, growth, and livelihoods diversification in countries, but there are also several knowledge gaps, including with respect to effective targeting. The academic literature consistently highlights that the current evidence base for entrepreneurship and vocational training program effectiveness draws on relatively few rigorous impact studies, conducted over too short time periods, and often with too small sample sizes to enable rigorous analysis and power to detect nuanced differences in impacts across different types of participants. In turn, this limits the overall knowledge base on how to design and implement future development programs that are appropriately tailored for given contexts, and are more likely to achieve their intended effectiveness.

In Kenya Marakwet neighbours West Pokot, and both speak the Kalenjin language. The Marakwet population is fairly settled producing maize, beans, tea, Irish potatoes and vegetables; rearing cattle and goats for meat and milk. Sheep is reared for wool and meat. Insecurity is high since the 1990s when raids from Pokot have increased. The immediate cause of the conflict is competition for the scarce natural resources of water and pasture. Pokot is characterized by a very arid and semi arid environment. They are

compelled to venture to Marakwet in search of water and pasture. The Marakwet see such actions as aggressive and respond by violence (Nkutu, 2005).

Several peace meetings between the Marakwet and the Pokot have not improved the situation. The clans who have fallen victim to the Pokot cattle rustlers especially from Baringo East have started to move away from the common borders displacing the clans already settled.

People's means of livelihood in North Rift is quite different from those in the south where modernization has been attempted. Access roads to the cities and major towns are rudimentary, and there are no railways. Other amenities like water, electricity and health care are extremely limited or absent. This condition hampers access to basic services such as health care, formal education, security and markets. It hinders efficiency and options, both for input resources and output products. Therefore, trade ability and income generation capacity in all the areas under study are severely restricted (Nkutu, 2005).

From this review, a significant gap in studies to do with livelihoods options and how significantly it has been advanced with conflict, dislocation and relocation in mind (Ramsbotham *et al.*, 2011). In Kerio Valley Delta, there is no such scheme available intended to either discovering the livelihood abilities accessible to conflicts. However, little is known of livelihood options available to conflicting communities in the Kerio Valley Delta region and how it is connected to conflict dynamism.

The need for diversification of income as well paid labour is an indirect means of restocking. Money gained in other sectors such as agro can be channeled into pastoralism

after a drought when animal numbers are low and prices high. These coping mechanism need to be well structured with full government support in place.

7.2 Factor Analysis for Livelihood Options Variables

Factor analysis was applied on the data to bring intercorrelated variables together under more general, underlying variables. Correlation matrix.

Table 7. 2: Correlation Matrix for Livelihood Options Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	1.000					
2	.291	1.000				
3	.2123	.144	1.000			
4	-.234	.281	-.089	1.000		
5	-.213	.183	.142	.172	1.000	
6	.151	.263	.281	.304	.182	1.000
KMO						0.592

r value=0.708

Source: Researcher, 2019

Table 7.2 shows the correlation matrix or intercorrelations between the studied ethnic identity variables. The intercorrelation between the variable is checked by using Bartlett’s test of sphericity, which tests the null hypothesis that the original correlation matrix is an identity matrix. The Bartlett’s test of sphericity is shown. The test results indicate that original correlation matrix is not an identity matrix, $p = .000$, pvalue is less than critical value=0.05 hence there is a positive and significant influence that Livelihood Options has on conflict dynamism. This implies that, the correlation between the variables exist and are significant.

Multicollinearity is then detected via the determinant of the correlation matrix, which is also calculated through SPSS. The determinant for the correlation matrix is 0.278, which shows that multicollinearity does not exist among the variables. According to (Field 2000: 445) multicollinearity exist if the determinant is less than 0.00001 (Table 7.2).

Sampling adequacy was tested via Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure. It is shown that the KMO value is 0.592. This value is greater than 0.5 showing that the sample size was adequate for analysis. Furthermore, all elements on the diagonal of this matrix are greater than 0.5 showing that the sample is indeed adequate for analysis (Field, 2000). For further analysis on relationship between livelihoods and conflict dynamism, chi-square test and correlation were done to ascertain the same.

A chi-square test on the relationship between livelihood options and conflict dynamism was done and the summary is as shown in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2: Chi-Square Tests Livelihood Options and Conflict Dynamism

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	114.215 ^a	2	.001
Likelihood Ratio	118.957	2	.002
Linear-by-Linear Association	212.233	1	.001
N of Valid Cases	321		

a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 112.48.

Source: Researcher, 2019

From the Chi-square analysis, there is a linear association between livelihood options and conflict dynamism. The p-value=0.01 indicates that the variables are dependent of each other and that there is statistically significant relationship between the study variables. The results of correlation analysis are as shown in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3: Correlation between Livelihood Options and Conflict Dynamism

		Livelihood Options	Conflict Dynamism
Livelihood Options	Pearson Correlation	1	
	Sig. (1-tailed)		
Conflict Dynamism	Pearson's Correlation	.304	1
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.625	
	N	375	375

*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).

Source: Researcher, 2019

The findings indicated that there was a strong positive and significant relationship between livelihoods and conflict dynamism. This is depicted by a Pearson correlation coefficient $r=0.304$, $p\text{-value} = 0.625 > 0.05$ which was significant at 0.05 level of significance. This implies that improved livelihood options results in decrease of conflict dynamism.

The nexus between level of livelihood sustainability and conflict dynamism cannot be understated here. As presented in the table, pastoralism does not offer sustainable livelihoods to communities that reside in the Kerio Valley Delta and thus survival methods are cattle raids and fight over water points. Given such a scenario, the need to

introduce sustainable livelihoods among these communities is critical to management of the same.

The results here are also somewhat attuned to the reviewed literature; especially the social theory of conflict. The social conflict theory was suggested by Karl Marx in 1867 and it claims that the society is in a state of perpetual conflict because of competition for limited resources, it holds that social order is maintained by domination and power rather than consensus and conformity. According to the social conflict theory, those with wealth and power try to hold on to it by any means possible chiefly by suppressing the poor and the powerless (Coombs *et al.*, 2013). A basic premise of conflict theory is that individuals and groups within a society work to maximise their own benefits. It focuses on competition between groups within the society, it views social and economic institutions as tools of struggle between groups or classes used to maintain inequality and the dominance of the ruling class (Cragun and Cragun, 2006).

In Africa, the culture of conflict and violence stems from ethnic, religious, regional, racial differences and class divide. These reflect the diversity of cultures, and increased economic inequalities between the haves and have not but also significantly the available livelihood options. Oftentimes, cultural and economic factors intertwine as causes of conflict, highlighting the complexity of conflicts in Africa. Violent conflicts in Kerio valley between Baringo, Elgeyo Marakwet and west Pokot counties. In the past years, Elfversson (2016), left more than 30 people dead and many others displaced from their homes and farms. Competition over access to pasture and water and control of dwindling

resources along River Kerio, ethnic intolerance and political differences have been blamed for the conflict in the valley.

The results here can be given the researcher's voice in this way: One element that appears to come out from livelihood options and among the respondents has got to do with Relative deprivation (RD). The argument and conceptualization of RD is almost similar; that at a rudimentary level people love to compare themselves with other people but more expansively, there are comparisons across timeframes with people comparing their past situations with future prospects and options. This comparison has led, according to significant responses from the community elders and leaders from Kerio Valley Delta to conflict. From the results, this study asserts that RD which is fuelled by feelings of frustrations and resentment due to economic, social and political deficits is directly and positively linked to conflict. Contrariwise, of course, some scholars have noted that relative deprivation is not an effective theory that can be argued exhaustively and fully to have caused or fostered conflicts.

People who are confronted with RD show different reactions to it. Some react by working hard to change their status, or change the group within which they belong or others defy or interrupt the status quo. While there exist significant factors that can be argued to have a significant impact on RD and how people react to it, the most notable influencer among scholars has been that people react significantly to RD based on their ability to ameliorate the present status. In other words, when people feel that they can change the situation in their favor, they are more likely to deal favorably with RD. However, if they feel that they cannot change their status to their favor, they are more

likely to let RD lead to conflict which sometimes is characterized by violence and which appears to be the case in Kerio valley Delta.

7.3 Chapter Summary

This chapter indicates that pastoralism is a major source of livelihood for pastoral communities in the Kerio Vally Delta. Livestock forms the cradle of pastoralism and livelihood options means that cattle raids are important in restocking herds after calamities such as drought, famine and diseases. However, traditional coping mechanism involved pastoral mobility which sustained livestock during droughts or keeping cattle with friends in this period. But these traditional coping mechanisms no longer exist due to unsound land tenure systems that limit mobility, scare pasture and access to water. The intervention has been food aid during droughts which is not sustainable at all to the pastoral communities in Kerio valley Delta.

CHAPTER EIGHT

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter considers the summary of findings, conclusions drawn thereof and the recommendations together with suggestions for further studies.

8.1 Summary of Findings

Based on the first objective, it is evidently clear that all the statements on maintaining status were significantly valid and true. The raids were meant to maintain status of individual men and ethnic group in general. Among pastoral communities, size of ones livestock herd would command respect, pride and prestige that are the hallmarks of status. To an extent, young men prided themselves as successful raiders and also having cattle to pay bride price. Thus, the respondents felt that their community was highly respected (M=2.80 SD=0.75); the family was also highly respected (M=2.18 SD=0.87); they fought to maintain the respect (M=2.27 SD=0.94); the other tribe did not respect them and they had to teach them a lesson (M=2.89 SD=0.83); Generally, fought to keep the respect (M=2.19 SD=0.72); For one to be recognised they had to have large stock (M=3.11 SD=1.02); For one to be respected they must have more than one wife (M=2.07 SD=1.04); and for one to be respected they must participate in raid (M=2.89 SD=0.79).

Based on the second objective on whether there is a relationship between ethnic identity and conflict dynamism, it is clear that all the statements were significantly valid. Ethnicity is symbolized in language, way of life and sense of belonging. The pastoral community have identity in cattle ownership as main source of livelihood and they distinguished themselves from non-pastoral communities. Ethnicity identity is a source

of conflict since it was a way to rival others in pursuit of livelihood. Politics has also been a catalyst that brings out consciousness about ones tribe. Politics have altered the way ethnic groups relate and increased violence particularly in election times. Thus, our tribe owns the land we fight for was valid (M=2.10 SD=0.76), the tribe was a warrior tribe (M=2.77 SD=0.77); the tribe could not lose the war at all (M=2.11 SD=0.74); the tribe was superior to other tribes (M=2.99 SD=0.93); and the tribe's respect must be won through fighting (M=2.19 SD=0.72).

Based on the third objective all the responses were significantly valid and true. Historically, cultural beliefs are engines to the raids that are organized and passed on for posterity. These belief systems included use of rituals, set-age systems to prepare raids and leadership ranking. Thus, the elders were leaders in war (M=3.10 SD=0.96); They had a cultural system arranged to fight (M=2.76 SD=0.73); The culture demanded that they fight for their position (M=1.11 SD=0.64); No other tribe had a better culture than theirs (M=2.09 SD=0.73); and the cultural belief was a major cause of conflict (M=2.14 SD=0.76).

Based on the fourth objective, it is shown that there were significantly valid and true responses as regards the statements presented. Pastoral communities are dependent on their livestock as main sources of livelihood. Therefore, threats of raids, drought, famine due to climate changes have made raids an integral part of their survival tactics. The reverting to agro kind of livelihood has never been a success among these pastoral groups. Consequently, the inhabitants considered themselves poor (M=2.60 SD=0.71). They had insufficient sustaining resources (M=2.08 SD=0.77); they were significant

pastoralists (M=2.87 SD=1.84); they had been forced to fight for survival (M=3.01 SD=0.99); and they had protected themselves from conflicts by having resources (M=2.97 SD=0.93).

8.2 Conclusions

The first specific objective assessed the maintenance of status with regard to conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta. From the key findings of the objective, the study concludes that dictates of status maintenance is no longer for pride, prestige and possession of huge livestock as a status of wealth. The commercial nature of raids, politicization has led to deadly raids that prides in killing. For the Marakwet, Pokot and Turkana, these communities experience high levels of inter-communal violence as a result of small arms, raids geared towards business and politicization of cattle raids. Therefore, the raids nowadays are not just pride, prestige and wealth status. It is evidently clear that the Kerio Valley delta inhabitants felt that their community was highly respected, the family was also highly respected, they fought to maintain the respect and the other tribe did not respect them and they had to teach them a lesson. Generally, they fought to keep the respect and for one to be respected they must have more than one wife and must participate in raid. It can thus be concluded that maintaining status has a strong and positive relationship with conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta.

The second specific objective examined ethnic identity in relation to conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta. From the key findings of the objective, the study concludes that ethnicity is negatively used to perpetuate violence against other pastoral and non-pastoral communities for reasons not limited to competition over pasture and water

resources. However, marginalization of pastoral communities is an important factor in understanding deadly and incessant conflicts between and among pastoral and non-pastoral communities. It can thus be concluded that ethnic identity has a strong and negative relationship with conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta.

The third specific objective analysed cultural belief systems in context of conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta. From the key findings of the objective, the study concludes that traditionally raids were conducted using arrows and bows, modernity introduced small arms, commercialization and polarization of raids. In recent years raids have been deadly and near impossible to manage due to this factors that socialized communities new ways of conflict. It can thus be concluded that the new cultural belief systems have altered nature of conflict in the Kerio Valley Delta.

The fourth specific objective evaluated livelihood as a deterrence of conflict within Kerio Valley Delta. From the key findings of the objective, the study concludes that current livelihood options are not sustainable to deter conflicts among pastoral and non-pastoral communities. It can thus be concluded that livelihood option had a strong and positive intervening relationship with conflict dynamism in the Kerio Valley Delta.

8.2.1 Overall Conclusion

The overall conclusion is that socio-cultural factors have a strong nexus with dynamism of conflict in the Kerio Valley Delta.

8.3 Recommendations

From the conclusion made from the findings of the first specific objective, the study recommends that on negative status maintenance factors such as commercialization of

raids with aim of preserving pride, prestige and wealth need to be addressed alongside traditional and historical factors on the same.

From the conclusion made from the findings of the second specific objective, the study recommends that negative ethnicity among pastoral communities under the umbrella of disarmament and development needs to be readdressed to reduce discriminatory practices between and among pastoral and non-pastoral communities.

From the conclusion made from the findings of the third specific objective, the study recommends that positive cultural practices such as intermarriage be encouraged but socialization into new cultures of small arms need to be addressed. This will help iron out differences and provide seamless assimilation of warring tribes into peace understandings. This will also help in debunking the cultural conflicts that lead to conflicts.

From the conclusion made from the findings of the fourth specific objective, the study recommends that sustainable livelihood options need to be introduced to stem conflicts in pastoral communities. This includes promotion of education alongside improvement of crop production with resilient crops besides pastoralism as a means to income generation.

8.4 Suggestions for Further Research

Further research is suggested to deal with

- i. The extent to which leadership, whether from tribe elders or politicians, influence conflict dynamisms in the Kerio valley Delta.

- ii. To determine the economic factors that exacerbates conflicts in the Kerio valley Delta
- iii. To investigate the impact of capacity building on conflict dynamisms in the Kerio valley Delta.
- iv. To establish the influence of government policies on security on conflict dynamisms in the Kerio valley Delta.

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APPENDICES

Appendix I: Introductory Letter

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology
School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (SDMHA)
P.O Box 190,
Kakamega.

Dear Sir/Madam,

RE: REQUEST FOR RESEARCH DATA.

I am a doctoral candidate in Department of Emergency Management Studies pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) degree in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance. I am conducting a research titled; “Nexus between Social-cultural factors and Conflict Dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta, Kenya”.

You are kindly requested to facilitate the research study by filling the attached questionnaire and/or participate in the interview as truthfully as you can. The information you provide was treated with utmost confidence and used purely for academic purpose of this study. Please do not include your name.

Your assistance and cooperation is highly appreciated.

Yours sincerely,

Michael Kiplagat Aiyabei
Cell-phone No. 0722850484

Appendix II: Questionnaire

Q/No:.....

This academic questionnaire is prepared purposely to assist in collecting data relating to and establish the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta, Kenya. Please complete the questionnaire to the best of your ability and be assured that no part of the responses was disrespected as far as your confidentiality and integrity is concerned.

Kindly tick your permission before completion.

I agree I disagree

PART ONE-DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

1. Gender

Male [] Female []

2. Age

[] 18-25 years [] 26-30 years [] 31-35 years
[] 36-40 years [] Over 40 Years

3. Highest level of education attained

No schooling [] KCPE [] KCSE [] [] Certificate [] Diploma [] Degree []
Masters [] PHD

4. How many years have you lived in the delta?

[] Below 5 [] 6-10

11 -15 15, and above

SECTION B

Conflict Dynamism

5. What is the manifestation of conflict in your area?

Political economic environmental exploitation of natural resources land clashes religious differences terrorism

6. Which year did you witness much conflicts?

1997-2002 () 2003-2007 () 2008-2013 () 2014-2016 ()

7. Please tick and show the extent to which you agree or disagree with the subsequent declarations. The Value of Scale is shown below

SA-Strongly Agree (5), A-Agree (4), U-Undecided (3), D-Disagree (2), SD-Strongly Disagree (1)

	SA	A	U	D	SD
1. Conflicts has become our way of life					
2. We have been unable to resolve conflicts					
3. The conflict has become too much					
4. Many people have died as a result of conflict					
5. We would wish to resolve the conflict					
6. Conflicts have affected education attainment in our region					
7. Conflicts have created diminishing economic returns in our region					

8. Conflicts have affected our social lives in our region					
---	--	--	--	--	--

9. What are the causes of conflict in your opinion?

.....

10. In your opinion, who are the main actors of conflict in your area?

.....

PART C- socio-cultural factors

8. Please tick and show the extent to which you agree or disagree with the subsequent declarations. The Value of Scale is shown below

SA-Strongly Agree (5), A-Agree (4), U-Undecided (3), D-Disagree (2), SD-Strongly Disagree (1)

Items	SA	A	U	D	SD
Maintaining status					
1. My community is highly respected					
2. My family is highly respected					
3. We fight to maintain the respect					
4. The other tribe does not respect us and we must teach them a lesson					
5. Generally, We must fight to keep the respect					
6. For one to be recognised they must have large stock					
7. For one to be respected they must have more than one wife					

8. For one to be respected they must participate in raid					
Ethnic Identity					
9. Our tribe owns the land we fight for					
10. My tribe is a warrior tribe					
11. My tribe cannot lose the war at all					
12. My tribe is superior to other tribes					
13. My tribe's respect must be won through fighting					
Cultural Belief System					
14. The elders are our leaders in war					
15. We have a cultural system arranged to fight					
16. My culture demands that we fight for our position					
17. No other tribe has a better culture than mine					
18. My cultural belief is a major cause of conflict					
Livelihood Options					
19. I consider myself poor					
20. I have sufficient resources to sustain myself well					
21. I am a pastoralist					
22. I farm					
23. I have been forced to fight so as to meet my daily needs					
24. I have protected myself from conflicts by having resources					

11. What other issues can you say about your socioeconomic factors that impact on conflict?

.....
.....

Appendix III: Focus Group Discussion Guide

This academic questionnaire is prepared purposely to assist in collecting data relating to and establish the nexus between socio-cultural factors and conflict dynamism within Kerio Valley Delta, Kenya.

We are going to begin this conversation by talking about conflict:

1. What do you understand by conflict?
2. Have you ever experienced conflict in this area?
3. What types of conflicts are experienced in this area?
4. What were the causes of conflict that you mentioned you experienced?
Probe for: other causes of conflict.
5. In your opinion, what are the major parties involved in conflict in this area? For all mentioned, Probe for:
 - What are their roles in the conflict?
6. Do you as a community (mention the community name) feel valued in this area?
Probe for:
 - Why they feel valued or why they feel less valued?
 - How do you feel about other communities (mention each community by name)?
7. Mention some of your cultural beliefs as a community (mention community name). How do they influence your relations with other communities?
8. Are there alternative livelihood options for community members in this area?
Probe for: How do they influence conflict?
9. What are some of your recommendations as a community to avoid conflict?

Appendix IV: Key Informant Interview Guide

1. What do you understand by conflict?
2. Have you ever experienced conflict in this area?

If yes, probe for:

- Which type of conflict?
- Who were the main actors?
- What were the Causes of that particular conflict?

3. Apart from the one you experienced, what types of conflicts are experienced in this area?
4. Apart from the one you experienced, what are the causes of conflict in your opinion?
5. In your opinion, what are the major parties involved in conflict in this area? For all mentioned

Probe for: What are their roles?

6. Which communities are involved in conflict in this area?

Probe for: Reasons

7. Do this community (mention each community one by one plus any other) feel valued in this area?

Probe for: Why they feel valued or why they feel less valued

8. Mention various cultural beliefs in this area. Do you think they contribute to conflict?

If yes, probe for how?

9. Can you mention some of the livelihood options for community members in this area?

Probe for: How do they influence conflict?

10. What are some of your recommendations to avert conflict?

Appendix V: Observation Check list

	Yes	No
Cultural differences (Physical, institutional and Attitudinal)		
Presence of small arms and other weapons used in cattle raids		
Mixed ethnic identity (existence of different ethnic groups)		
Existence of traditional mechanisms to conflict management		
Presence of herds of cattle/livestock as a sign of wealth and pride		
Presence of community morans as defenders of ethnic groups		
Existence of destruction of property (houses)		
Presence of livestock/alternatives to livelihoods		
Bodily injuries/ disability as a result of cattle raids		

Appendix VI: DPS Research Proposal Approval letter



MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870
Fax: 056-30153
E-mail: directordps@mmust.ac.ke
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke

P.O Box 190
Kakamega – 50100
Kenya

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099

4th July, 2019

Michael Kiplagat Aiyabei,
CDM/H/01-57617/2016,
P.O. Box 190-50100,
KAKAMEGA.

Dear Mr. Aiyabei,

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your Ph.D. proposal entitled “*The Nexus Between Socio-cultural Factors and Conflict Dynamisms within Kerio Valley Delta, Kenya*” and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Dr. Ferdinand Nabiswa Makhanu - SDMHA, MMUST
2. Dr. Standslaus E. Odhiambo - SDMHA, MMUST

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee; Chairman, Emergency Management Studies & Departmental Graduate Studies Committee. Kindly adhere to research ethic: consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of three years from the date of registration to complete your Ph.D. thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours Sincerely,

DEAN
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES
MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

DATE: SIGN:
Dr. Consolata Ngala

DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

Appendix VII: National Commission for Science Technology and Innovation

Research Permit


REPUBLIC OF KENYA


NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: 371367 Date of Issue: 29/July/2019

RESEARCH LICENSE



This is to Certify that Mr. Michael Aiyabei of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research in Baringo, Elgeyo-Marakwet, Samburu, Turkana, Westpokot on the topic: Nexus Between Socio-Cultural factors and Conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley Delta for the period ending : 29/July/2020.

License No: NACOSTI/P/19/294

Applicant Identification Number: 371367


Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION

Verification QR Code



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Appendix VIII: Ministry of Interior and Co-ordination of National Government

Authorization Letter



CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Telegraphic Address "Roti"
Telephone: Nairobi 2227411
When replying, please quote

**MINISTRY OF INTERIOR
AND CO-ORDINATION
OF
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT**

P.O. Box 30510-00100
Nairobi

Our Ref. **MING. 6/4** Date. **2nd July, 2019**

County Commissioner
BARINGO COUNTY

County Commissioner
TURKANA COUNTY

County Commissioner
SAMBURU COUNTY

County Commissioner
WEST POKOT

County Commissioner
ELGEYO MARAKWET

**AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH: MICHAEL KIPLAGAT
AIYABEI ID. NO. 13127355**

The above subject refers.

The request for an authority to conduct academic research in Kerio Valley Counties of Baringo, Turkana, West Pokot, Elgeyo Marakwet and Samburu Counties has been granted.

Mr. Aiyabei is a PhD Student of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology conducting research in the field of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance on the topic: "Nexus between Socio-Cultural factors and conflict dynamism in Kerio Valley". He already acquired the necessary licence from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), a copy of which is herewith attached.

This is to request you to accord him the necessary support as he conducts the research.



E. H. NYALE, OGW
FOR: PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/INTERIOR

Encl

Copy to:
Regional Commissioner
RIFT VALLEY

Mr. Michael K. Aiyabei

CONFIDENTIAL