NEXUS BETWEEN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS IN NAKURU COUNTY, KENYA BETWEEN 1992 AND 2017

Geoffrey Makokha Odanga

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DECLARATION

This research thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources and support and has not been presented for any other degree or any other award.

Signature: ………………… Date: ………………………………….

 Odanga Geoffrey Makokha

CDC/G/01/10

CERTIFICATION

The undersigned certify that they have read and hereby recommend for acceptance of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology a thesis entitled *The Nexus between National Elections and Inter-ethnic conflicts in Nakuru County, Kenya between 1992 and 2017*.

Signature:……………………… Date:………………..

Prof. Crispinous Iteyo (PhD)

Department of Peace and Conflict Studies

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

Signature:………………………..Date:………………….

Prof. Kennedy Onkware (PhD)

Department of Emergency Management Studies

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my lovely family.

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ABSTRACT

Wars and conflicts determine political boundaries, disperse populations, shape political discussions, and have far-reaching effects on all aspects of human societies. The use of violence is common and can be mobilized for many ends, including but not limited to electoral success. An unstable political climate has persisted in areas with a diverse ethnic makeup ever since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992. This study sought to assess the nexus between national elections and inter-ethnic conflicts in Nakuru County, Kenya since the re-introduction of political pluralism in Kenya in the early nineties. The specific objectives were; to examine the nature of inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections; to evaluate the strategies used towards addressing inter-ethnic conflicts; and to assess the challenges and opportunities in managing inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County since 1992This research helps shed light on how best to manage conflicts that have ethnic undertones, and it suggests strategies for doing so. Government officials and security agents will benefit from this study because it will help them build on their successes and address their failures during the ethnic conflicts that occurred between 1992 and 2008.This study is relevant in contributing new knowledge as well as advising policy makers, locally and internationally. The study was anchored on Primordialism, Instrumentalism and Democratic theories. A descriptive research strategy was used for this investigation. Household heads in the conflict-plagued Kuresoi North and Molo sub-counties were surveyed for this study. An estimated 14,054 participants were needed for this investigation. In-depth interviews were conducted with members of the government, security forces, CSOs, opinion leaders, religious figures, and youth organization representatives. There were 390 participants in the study. Questionnaires, focus groups, and interview guides were used to gather data. Methods of sampling included stratified strategic sampling, simple random sampling, and purposive sampling to collect data from household heads and important informants, respectively. Quantitative data is provided in the form of charts, graphs, and tables, while qualitative data is organized thematically. Data analysis was performed using the Statistical Package for the Social Scientists (SPSS). The findings revealed the causes of conflict being diverse and dynamic constructed along historical disputes over land ownership, incitement by politicians and tribal leaders through hate speeches and negative media influence. The state, as the primary actor in conflict resolution, has switched its attention from nationwide to local levels of government for action. However, in order to attain peace, existing obstacles such as marginalization perception, mass mobilization, displacement, and militia/gangs must be addressed. The research found that negative ethnicity, external actors, and insufficient public involvement all played a role in sparking inter-ethnic conflict and affecting the outcome of county national elections in Nakuru. Problem-solving seminars with at-risk populations were recommended. The report also suggested ways to combat negative ethnic attitudes, such as better coordination and integration through strengthened inter-ethnic forums and local peace building blocks.

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LIST OF ABREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AU: African Union

CSOs: Civil Society Organizations

FLM: Fulani Movement

FEPADE: the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes

GIZ: German Agency for International corporation

ICC: International Criminal Court

IDP: Internally Displaced People

IEBC: Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

KANU: Kenya African National Union

KBS: Kenya Bureau of Statistics

KNCHR: Kenya National Commission on Human Rights

LPSs: Local Peace Committees

LTTE: Liberation of Tamil Tigers Eelam

NACOSTI: National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

NCIC: National Cohesion and Integration Commission

NGOs: Non-Governmental Organizations

NSC: National Security Committee

OAG: Other Armed Groups

OPC: Oodua Peoples Congress

PEV: Post-Election Violence

SDA: Social Democratic Action

SNSD: Alliance of Independent Social Democrats

SPLA: Sudan Peoples Liberation Army

SPLM: Sudan peoples Liberation Movement

SPSS: Statistical Package for Social Sciences

SSIM: South Sudan Independence Movement

TEPFJ: The Federal Electoral Tribunal

UNHCR: United Nations High Commission for Refugees

 US: United States

USAID: United States Agency for International Development

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Challenges: The impasse obstructs progress toward a common ground for resolving or averting conflict amongst the ethnic groupings in Nakuru County.

Civil society Organizations: The collection of non-governmental popular organisations, institutions, associations (formal and informal), authority structures, and collective activities that bring together large groups of people in various ways. A number of them are active among the ethnic communities in Nakuru County.

Clientelism: Social order which depends on relations of patronage perpetrated by elites/politicians especially against the poor and the unemployed youths in Nakuru County

Conflict: Disagreements between the Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Kisii and other ethnic groups in Nakuru County as they compete over water, land, power, historical injustices as well as incompatible livelihood goals. The ethnic groups express hostile attitudes or pursue their interests through actions that damage the other parties through fighting, cattle rustling, mass killings and property destruction.

Inter-ethnic conflict: A dispute or disagreement or more language groups or communities. Typically, the dispute is not about ethnic differences but rather over political, economic(resources), social, cultural, or geographical issues.

National Elections: Refers to Presidential elections which, constitutionally, are held after every five years alongside Parliamentary, gubernatorial and the 47 County Assemblies in Kenya.

Nexus: Refers to a link between ethnic conflict and national elections…what motivates ethnic chaos or election violence in Nakuru county.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study was largely motivated by various scholars who argued for as well as against the nexus between inter-ethnic violence and elections. This chapter introduces the study under the following sections: background to the study, statement of the problem, research objectives, research questions, justification, scope of the study and summary of the chapter.

1.1 Background to the Study

Wars and battles establish political boundaries, relocate populations around the world, define political arguments, and have a general impact on almost everything in our civilizations (Max, 2017). The first half of the twentieth century was the bloodiest in contemporary European history (Santa Ann, 2013). From 1914 through the early 1950s, most of the continent was marked by conflict, revolution, civil war, and the purposeful expulsion or annihilation of whole ethnic and cultural groups. Following that, violence was locked in less violent and more institutionalised forms until the last decade of the twentieth century, when the Cold War ended and Europe's extraordinary peaceful integration began - a process that continues to this day (Boutwell, 2017).

Ethnic conflict in European Union countries draws back before the Enlightenment up to 1914, a historical writing of Europe (Garcia, 2017). The end of the Cold War era resulted in some pleasant occasions, such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall, when many Germans (from 'the East' and 'the West') rejoiced at their country's reunification. Many nations, including the (former) Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, experienced relatively smooth democratic transitions. Nonetheless, the collapse of communist

governments in a number of nations, most notably Yugoslavia, created a Pandora's Box in the heart of Europe (Kim *et al.,* 2017).

Ethnic profiling is pervasive in industrialised nations' policies that discriminate against ethnic minorities. In the United States of America, for example, racial discrimination is a pervasive experience for minorities, with up to 25% reporting interpersonal prejudice based on race, ethnic origin, or ancestry and up to 60% reporting some sort of discrimination (Boutwell, 2017).

The majority of civil wars around the world in the postwar era were fought in favour of ethnic or national independence. In the 19th and 20th centuries, civil wars such as the Balkan Wars or the disintegration of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires had the same effect. Ethnic tensions have been on the rise since the 1950s. There have been ethnically motivated violent political disputes in Africa since the mid-1960s, including in some cases civil wars. These conflicts have primarily occurred in Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (previously Zaire), Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger Republic, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia. Throughout Africa's multiparty systems, the modal presidential election features a small number of famous candidates from a variety of ethnic groups, none of whom confronts significant internal rivalry (Arriola, 2012). Co-ethnic voting blocs are likely to have no doubts about which candidate best represents their own ethnic group, especially if the primary contenders come from various ethnic groups, as is frequently seen.

Voters will be more perplexed as to which of two (or more) non-co-ethnic candidates best represents their community's interests if there is no co-ethnic candidate to choose

from (Horowitz, 2012). In order to get a sense of the parties' larger ethnic profiles, these voters may "count heads" of co-ethnic leaders who are spread across the various parties (Ferre, 2011). In the absence of a co-ethnic candidate, elite coalitions formed before the election can send important messages to voters. A crucial part of Africa's electoral competitiveness is the creation of pre-election alliances (Arriola, 2012).

Coalition members and lower-level actors, on the other hand, provide a faint signal as compared to the ethnicity of presidential candidates. In part, this is due to the fact that African parties remain highly centralised, with party leaders exerting considerable control over the distribution of state-controlled goods while in office, whereas lower-level players often have less influence on government activity (Muema, 2017). This means that the identities of presidential candidates are widely known, whereas the identities of lower-level officials and coalition partners are less well-known Due to Angola's strategic location in Southern Africa and its abundance of natural resources, it was a treasured property during both the regional and cold wars. Because of international interests and support for various factions, the conflict dragged on. Living conditions worsen and unresolved grievances persist when political instability degenerates into civil war or military confrontation, resulting in protracted and serious conflicts (Bvirindi, 2019).

The extent to which a candidate's co-ethnic backers support him or her effects campaign strategy in two ways. Voters within a candidate's own ethnic community become more likely swing voters when support from other ethnic groups dwindles (Horowitz, 2016). It is hoped that as a result, politicians will be more inclined to devote more time to persuasion in their core ethnic strongholds. Since opponents are more likely to believe that members of the candidate's group are susceptible to

conversion when the candidate's co-ethnic support is low, there is a greater risk of intrusions into the home territory of the candidate.

With the restoration of multiparty politics in 1991, the country has had to deal with numerous electoral conflicts (Muema, 2017). Kenya's pluralist elections, as a multi-ethnic society, are inextricably defined by ethnic undercurrents and strategy. Since 1991, when pluralist democratic politics was reborn in Kenya, the country that was once hailed as Africa's symbol of peace has frequently faced electoral turmoil. Kenya suffered electoral violence during the 1992, 1997, 2007, and 2017 general elections, resulting in fatalities and internal displacement (KNCHR, 2017).

The purposeful division of extra-ethnic disputes by state and non-state actors has dragged the country into an electoral conflict trap on an ongoing basis. Kenya's internal turmoil has harmed the country's ability to maintain peace. Since 1963, when the country gained independence, the country has seen election reversals and conflicts (Kanyinga *et al.* 2010). This has resulted in a scenario in which peace is mostly absent or, when it does exist, it is characterised by negative peace. However, the negative peace is frequently disrupted by periods of open fighting, most notably around general elections (African Journal on Conflict Resolution, 2017). According to Matanga (2018), peace is not just the absence of physical and direct violence but it should also be anchored in cohesion and social justice. He further asserts that there is need to relook at peace initiatives from a state-cantered to a person cantered perspective.

The defining moments within the Kenya political cycle is normally the election period. Nakuru County has over the years been at the center of electoral tension and conflicts. The 1992 general elections were a major milestone in the development of the embattled democratic discourse in Kenya. However, the election was marred by

incidences of violence propagated by the political machinations of the Moi administration and targeting areas that were seen as anti Moi, this classification was done on the basis of ethnicity with communities like the Kikuyu, Luo, Luhya among others being targeted for opposing the Moi regime. (Throup and Hornsby 1998). Nakuru County being a cosmopolitan area was an epicenter of electoral violence during the elections with people being attacked on the basis of ethnicity in areas like Molo, Naivasha and other parts of the county. Vote manipulation and voter buying were prominent examples of electoral malpractices that marred the election. The well-coordinated electoral fighting in Nakuru and other Rift Valley areas during this election was extremely disruptive (Oyugi 1997; Kenya National Assembly 1992; Akiwumi Commission 1999). Furthermore, ethnic mobilisation of the jobless youth through propaganda and violence has replaced genuine political engagement in this election. The 1997 election had as similar scrip to the 1992 election and most of the atrocities committed in 1992 were repeated in Nakuru County in 1997. The 1997 election saw an increase in the number of internally displaced persons (Brown 2011).

The 2007 election was one of the most dangerous ones with the amount of violence witnessed being at its highest since the advent of multiparty politics. The pre-election campaigns were marred by tension and hate messages from all quarters including the media. Vernacular radio stations were a key medium for the dissemination of hate propaganda. KASs FM, a radio station that broadcasts in the Kalenjin language, has been accused of airing xenophobic content directed at the Kikuyu people. The Kikuyu-language radio stations Kameme and Coro FM played shows that stoked racial tensions. The political elite provided financial backing and weaponry (machetes and arrows) to militia groups including the Mungiki, Kalenjin Warriors, and Baghdad Boys, who then exploited these resources in the violence that erupted in 2007 (CIPEV

2008). Nakuru County was one of the areas where these hate messages and militia groups had the biggest impact, causing massive losses to property, death, injuries and displacement in Nakuru town, Naivasha and Molo among other areas. The 2013 and 2017 election were also marred with violence targeting other communities who were opposed to the jubilee coalition that had brought the Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities together. However the intensity of the conflict was not as high as the previous ones. Tension was however high especially in 2017 following the nullification of the 2017 presidential election results. In this regard, the issue of ethnic tensions/conflicts in Nakuru county during National elections is a complex problem whose root cause is yet to be established through research, hence the current study.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Nakuru County has a history of rising inter-ethnic conflict, which has persisted from 1991 to the present day. A number of measures have been implemented to mitigate the potential for violence during the national elections. There have been established bodies and commissions to ensure long-lasting peace initiatives in Kenya following the enactment of the Constitution of 2010 and several changes made by the government. There have been multiple inquiries into the post-election violence, including the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) and the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV). It was thought that implementing numerous transitional justice systems and other reforms would help with the process of national reconciliation (Gutiérrez-R, 2014). Nakuru Peace Accord, an agreement reached in 2012 to address the causes of ethnic violence, established norms of conduct for the communities involved and called for immediate follow-up efforts to spread the word and educate key actors (Nderitu, 2020).

Despite the efforts, studies by Matanga, Okoth and Buchere (2012) and Ndege (2018) show that Nakuru is still experiencing conflict during the national elections. For instance, the 2007 elections led to 1,200 deaths and 600,000 displacements, most of which took part in Nakuru County (Matanga et al., 2012). In 2013 and 2017, people who are deemed to be non-locals migrating to their perceived ancestral homes for fear of being attacked. Molo and Kuresoi North are among the most affected subcounties when it comes to inter-ethnic conflict emanating from national elections. In 2015, two years before the General Elections, leaflets were distributed in Kuresoi North and Molo, warning some residents to vacate, resulting in 5 deaths, 162 displacements and the torching down of 15 houses (The New Humanitarian, 2015). According to the IDP Network, 3,000 people have lost their lives, 5,000 houses burnt down and 50,000 people displaced since 1992 in Molo alone.

Before the just concluded 2022 General Elections, the CS for Interior, Fred Matiangi, beefed up security in Molo and Kuresoi and arrested 8 local politicians for incitement (Ombati, 2022). This was based on the previous incidences of inter-ethnic violence that normally recycles during elections. All these incidences are still taking place in spite of the 2012 Nakuru Peace Accord and other interventions taken to ensure peace in Nakuru County. This study, therefore, examined the nexus between national elections and the recurring inter-ethnic conflict in Nakuru County.

1.3 Objectives of the Study

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of the study was to evaluate the nexus between national elections and inter- ethnic conflicts in Nakuru County, Kenya between 1992 and 2017.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

  i. Examine the nature of inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County, Kenya between 1992 and 2017

  ii. Evaluate the strategies employed in the management of inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County, Kenya between 1992 and 2017

  iii. Assess the challenges and opportunities towards addressing inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County, Kenya between 1992 and 2017

1.4 Research Questions

The study was guided by the following questions:

  i. What is the nature and causes of inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County between 1992 and 2017?

  ii. What strategies are employed in managing the inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County between 1992 and 2017?

iii.   What are the challenges and opportunities towards addressing inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County between 1992 and 2017?

1.5 Justification of the Study

1.5.1 Academic Justification

National elections can fuel or reduce inter-ethnic conflict and advance some forceful changes. However, inter-ethnic conflict has taken root in all election years since 1992, the worst being 2007/2008 post-election violence. Only empirical research provides data that may be utilised to create and implement policies to reduce such ethnicities in the near future, which will have an adverse effect on the general well-being of the residents of Nakuru County. The investigation was necessary since Nakuru has been a centre of Kenyan politics and electoral violence every five years.

Numerous studies have been conducted on post-election violence and ethnic strife. Muchai, Ngari, and Mumiukha (2014), for example, undertook a study to determine the effect of reported post-election violence on the emotional well-being of Secondary School Students in Nakuru County, Kenya. The study's findings indicated that purported post-election violence had a little beneficial effect on secondary school students' mental well-being. The study focused heavily on students' psycho-social well-being, with less emphasis on negative ethnicity, which is the study's focus.

Kirima's (2015) study on the consequences of 2007/2008 post-election violence on basic education in Nakuru, Kenya discovered that the 2007/2008 PEV resulted in poor school infrastructure, insufficient basic necessities, insufficient educational facilities, and even psychological torture. The findings favoured a connection between violence and education.

Many people who were informed about the dangers and costs of inter-ethnic conflict and sensitized to the need of maintaining peace did not engage in ethnic conflict, suggesting that community education plays a critical role in ethnic conflict reduction.

Since 1991, ethnic conflicts in Kenya, particularly in Nakuru County, have resulted in significant loss of life, injury to persons, and property destruction, instilling fear, distrust, mistrust, and insecurity. They have harmed our society's progress toward social stability and integration; they have jeopardised public tranquillity, national tranquillity, law and order, human rights, and the rule of law, all of which are necessary pillars of social and economic growth. The purpose of this study is to contribute to the development of solutions and approaches for ethnic conflict resolution. This will have a tremendous impact on Nakuru's reduction of criminal activity and lawlessness. The following groups will benefit from this study: government officials and security agents, who will benefit from consolidating their strengths and improving their weaknesses from the 1991–2017 ethnic conflicts; and members of the public, who will use this research literature to present their perspectives on the research topic, which will be brought forward and disseminated while releasing pent-up emotions. As a result, the vast majority of citizens will benefit.

Additionally, students will examine, evaluate, and conduct additional research to fill in the gaps. Internally displaced persons would also benefit, since certain recommendations regarding their living in camps may be addressed. Solving such difficulties will have a beneficial effect on the lives of those impacted, allowing for growth and development.

1.5.2 Policy Justification

The study findings will be instrumental in shaping policy among various government and non-governmental bodies on how they can improve their approaches towards strengthening peacebuilding in Nakuru County. First, the findings will inform policymakers in the Ministry of Interior to come up with mechanisms that will improve information sharing between the public and the police. Besides, the findings will also help inform how the grassroots administrators can be trained on early warning interventions. Second, the findings will help guide the commissions tasked with ensuring long-lasting peace in Nakuru County and Kenya in overall to approach the conflict-prone areas holistically. Lastly, the findings will help inform the policies set forth by the faith-based organizations and NGOs on how they can assist in ensuring positive peace in Nakuru County.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This study evaluated the nexus between national elections and inter-ethnic conflicts in Nakuru County, Kenya since 1992. The study focussed on the period between 1992 and 2017. The study was also delimited to the inter-ethnic conflict brought about by the national elections. Tensions in Nakuru county have existed for a long length of time, mostly as a result of the politicization of views of economic exploitation, exclusion, and uneven access to resources and opportunities during electioneering seasons. By the time multiparty politics was reintroduced in 1991, the Rift Valley was primed for violence, and tensions simmered under the surface in a number of towns. The issue came to a head during the 1992 elections, which explains why the time / period was chosen. The Kalenjin's ideological position was that immigration from other cultures, particularly the Gikuyu, represented past injustices. This sentiment is

based on their notion that 'migrant' groups, notably the Gikuyu and Kisii, support their own in elections and provide them with free white farmland. Leaders are elected on the basis of ethnic affiliations or lines. The focus of the study was on three premises: the nature and causes of inter-ethnic conflicts caused by national elections, the strategies employed in the management of inter-ethnic conflicts caused by national elections, and the challenges and opportunities of overcoming/addressing inter-ethnic conflicts caused by national elections in Nakuru County.

1.7 Chapter Summary

This chapter offered context for elections and violence, particularly along ethnic lines. To avoid refueling the conflict, it is vital to have a complete grasp of the nature, sources, and effects of inter-ethnic generated conflicts in order to incorporate them into efforts for integration, peace building, and reconstruction. In the following chapter, a critical literature evaluation is conducted to identify the underlying gaps that were addressed by this study.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This study was undertaken to evaluate the nexus between national elections and inter-ethnic conflicts in Nakuru County, Kenya since the country returned to multi-party democracy following the repeal of section 2(A) of the old constitution in 1991. The study literature was reviewed thematically in line with the specific objectives under the following sections: nature and causes of inter-ethnic conflict occasioned by national elections; strategies employed in managing inter-ethnic conflicts; challenges and opportunities towards addressing inter-ethnic conflicts; conceptual framework and the summary of the chapter.

2.1 Nature and Causes of Inter-Ethnic Based Conflicts occasioned by National Elections

2.1.1 Ethnicity

Ethnicity is a term that encompasses both the communal and individual components of ethnic identity. Groups of people that identify with each other based on similar characteristics distinguish them from other groups are known as affinity groups. Among other things, ethnicity can be seen as a societally imposed or an inherited construct that is defined by common cultural history, ancestry, origin myth, and language (Mwaindi, 2014). Ethnic mobilisation has an impact on ethnicity. Ethnic identity can become an issue of group rights and autonomy inside a state, government legitimacy and participation, or even state integrity if it is taken to a high enough level. It is human nature to take meaningful collective action when people are dissatisfied. Collective action is frequently studied from a rational-choice-theory perspective, in which people engage the action because they believe they will gain

something in return. This is extremely close to the idea that racial conflicts are primarily motivated by greed or, in a broader sense, economic factors. Structure changes like modernization, technological progress allowing for increasing communication across ethnic groups and the strength and changes in traditional social networks inside communities all influence ethnic mobilisation. Group complaints and political, economic, and societal closures are also examined in this context (Penzar & Srbljinovic, 2003). As a result of the conclusion of the Cold War, a new set of political problems has come to the fore, such as self-determination and the goal of a truly multi-ethnic global order. As mankind progresses toward a more complex and diverse global system, the concept of state sovereignty may have new connotations. Multicultural, multi-ethnic, and pluralistic global systems are becoming more widely accepted in the modern world. The resurgence of ethnicity and the quest for personal identity are both manifestations of modernity that contribute to greater social equality. If institutions for a multi-ethnic plural order are built, the resurgence is beneficial and may not lead to bloodshed and conflict.

According to Achankeng (2014), ethnicity continues to be a significant force that bonds a group of people together in Africa because other forms of alignment such as religion, class, and nationalism are frequently viewed as recent occurrences or missing the strong pull of blood links. In many African countries, ethnic identification has a significant impact on political and social behaviour. A lot of people disagree on why Africans place such a high value on ethnicity. There are others who say that ethnicity is a natural part of the socio-economic system, and that there are no incentives for people to change their ways. Ethnic identities, according to some, is nothing but a political fiction. As a result, multiparty politics in Africa is generally composed of factions that are self-serving, ethnically motivated, and isolated from the

general population they profess to represent. It is possible that this style of political competitiveness will lead to ethnic conflict by dividing the population. The human toll of this battle goes far beyond the loss of life and health; it also results in the relocation and destruction of property, all of which have a negative impact on future development. At the expense of economic development, states that prioritise physical security over raising the standard of living for their people bear a heavy burden in their efforts to restore peace. As the cases of Rwanda, Burundi, the DRC, Somalia, and others show, the effects of political violence are not neatly contained inside the state in which political struggle occurs. The education system and wealth redistribution have helped certain countries with high ethnic diversity, such as Tanzania, to foster a national rather than ethnic identity. Political parties in ethnically diverse countries, such as Kenya, have used ethnic identity to organise voters and form political alliances, which in some cases have resulted in violent ethnic clashes. Ethnic attachment and ethnic mobilisation are more important in Kenya than ethnic identification, and this has a significant impact on how the society functions (Alesina & Ferrara, 2005).

Kenya is a multi-ethnic country with 42 distinct ethnic groups that have mainly co-existed peacefully. Ethnicity used to be a more fluid concept before the mid-20th century. As early as the pre-colonial and colonial era, ethnic groups established themselves in distinct regions of the country for reasons of trade, searching for pasture, or even expansion. Trade, intermarriage, co-existence, and other forms of symbiotic relationship have been common features of interactions between different ethnic groups. Many ethnic conflicts and raids took place as a result of this interplay. When it came to establishing the frontiers of Kenya and other African countries, the 1884/85 Berlin Conference was a major factor. Kenya's borders were drawn without

the input of the Kenyan people, resulting in the consolidation of more than forty previously separate communities into a single territorial unit. It would be a difficult effort for the colonial and post-colonial states to unite these disparate groups into a single nation-state. Some villages that were located on either side of an international border were also separated by the established state boundaries (Ogot, 2000).

2.1.2 Inter-ethnic Conflicts

According to the Social Science Research Council (2018: 3) in Avis, 2019 "conflicts and widespread violence have complex socio-cultural, economic, and political dimensions that operate through power networks which transcend conventional conceptual boundaries, e.g. public vs. private or local vs. national". Violent conflict is becoming increasingly complicated, and this complexity is making it more difficult for people who respond to conflict since they lack the appropriate frameworks, analysis, and directives for dealing with conflicts across boundaries. Defining the type of conflict, the positions and vulnerabilities of minority groups in that conflict may be examined. Other relevant issues are the types and manifestations of ethnic conflict. The primary issue comes in the relationship between the dominant and subordinate groups. Thus, group conflicts may be defined as the product of social, economic, and cultural dominance within the context of power relations (Esra, 2014).

In the first instance, a dispute between ethnic groups in one state can spark a conflict between groups in another state that has similar characteristics. As a result of the inspiration and encouragement that successful movements bring, other ethnic movements facing comparable economic and political challenges are inspired to take action. When a crisis in one country spills over into another country where an ethnic minority population resides, this might have escalation or contagion effects. In most

cases, this is done by bringing in new foreigners who are hired by the local elites. When foreign forces get involved in ethnic conflicts, they might turn into regional or worldwide catastrophes. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, torture, and other forms of mass murder are all consequences of ethnic conflict, and they all cause a great deal of pain and suffering for the people involved. Discrimination and exclusion from national and municipal politics, appropriation of ancestral homelands, and policies that marginalise ethnic minorities are all prevalent practises in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts. As a result, ethnic conflicts have a wide-ranging impact on the lives of those who are not directly involved in them. Some of these include the influx of refugees and internal displacement, as well as regional instability, economic failures, natural disasters, spillover effects, and conditions conducive to organised crime and terrorism (Halakhe, 2013).

Bosnia and Herzegovina's institutional robustness is critical in resisting the impact of external powers such as Turkey and Russia. Following the failure of a Russian-backed coup attempt in Montenegro in 2016, Russia has relaunched its quest for Balkan influence (Damir, 2018). Russia's objective of establishing powerful networks of allies and clients is arguably being accomplished through Bosnia's nationalist parties, such as the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD), which maintains close ties with Russia; the SNSD's leader, Milorad Dodik, frequently travels to Moscow (his most recent trip occurred just before the elections) and has procured arms from Russia. Similarly, Turkey wields considerable influence in the nation via Social Democratic Action (SDA), as Erdogan's campaign rally in Sarajevo revealed. Bosnia's existing ethno-national structure makes it vulnerable to external influences, jeopardizing the region's geopolitical stability (Timo, 2012). Therefore, it is apparent that the majority of new disputes are related to state structure and formation. This is a

common theme, regardless of whether disagreements arise over devolution of power; federalism; governance; or how resources are dispersed. Violence and carnage have spawned a number of countries. State hegemonicity is built on ethnic or religious allegiance, and patterns of recruitment to the military or the bureaucracy are based on ethnic affiliations in certain nations. States that continue to create their own retardation can be referred to as faulty states, yet all states face the same problems. The most difficult task is to keep up with the rapid, hectic, and diminishing pace of the global economy. Developing democracies face internal and external dangers from the military as well as from ethnic and religious fundamentalists. Because of this, the state is often a source of arbitrary violence, encouraging the use of force and militarism as a means of conflict resolution.

Ajay (2014) investigates ethnic conflict in India, concluding that the legacy of British rule explains significant disparities in modern conflicts, most notably whether they are organized primarily around caste/tribal or religious divisions. In summary, he discovers that modern conflict is more likely to be structured around caste/tribal concerns in regions under direct British authority (three-fifths of the Raj), whereas religious conflict is more likely to occur in places under indirect British influence, the princely states.

Additionally, Gomes (2015) conducted a study on the political economics of India's Maoist conflict. The study's findings indicate that colonial-era property rights structures are the primary source of contemporary conflict. According to Gomes, ethnic conflicts are disputes or disagreements between members of one ethnic group or tribe and members of another ethnic group or tribe. Additionally, it may be defined as a conflict in which the persons involved sense a danger to their needs, interests, or

concerns. He says that ethnicity has emerged as one of the most relevant social science ideas in recent years. The theoretical development is correlated with the awareness that the major social events of our day are significantly influenced by ethnic occurrences and influences. Ethnic conflict happens on all continents, and such violence has been a defining element of current social life for decades, particularly in locations where mixed societies co-exist or where members of many ethnic groups come into contact.

Another study conducted by Nellis and Rosenzwei (2016) to determine whether political parties contribute to ethnic violence in India discovered that the observed effect is the Congress candidates' reliance on local Muslim votes, as well as concerns about the electorate's religious division in the event of riots. An ethnic group is defined as a collection of people who have common racial and cultural characteristics. They may share a cultural, political, geographical, or economic framework (common aspects). Thus, ethnic conflict is defined as any period of protracted violent conflict in which national, ethnic, religious, or other social groups press governments for substantial status changes. A violent ethnic war results in enormous human pain. Nowadays, many ethnic community subordinate leaders struggle with racial identity. Given the extent of racial prejudice in contemporary culture, ethnic identity is typically linked to hierarchical and conflictual qualities.

Bejoria (2019) claims that since Sri Lanka, formerly known as Ceylon, earned independence from British rule in 1948, it has been embroiled in ethnic conflict. According to a 2010 official census, Sri Lanka's major ethnic groups are Sinhalese (82%), Tamil (9.4%), and Sri Lanka Moor (7.9 percent). Resenting British favouritism for Tamils during colonial times and in response to this, Sinhalese

adopted Sinhala as the national language after independence and disenfranchised Tamil plantation workers from India. When the Sinhalese took power in Sri Lanka in 1972, they renamed it Sri Lanka and declared Buddhism to be the official religion of the island nation. Tensions between the Tamil majority in Sri Lanka's north and east have prompted Velupillai Prabhakaran to form the LTTE, which has been fighting for an independent Tamil homeland since its founding in 1976. 2,500 Tamils were killed in 1983 when the LTTE assaulted an army convoy. Thirteen soldiers were killed and many more were injured.

Racial violence has persisted in Africa for decades and is at the heart of multiple continents. Ethnic disputes continue to exacerbate violent confrontations in Rwanda, Congo, Nigeria, Somalia, Kenya, and Darfur, among other places. Asia has also had comparable ethnic conflicts, most notably in Iraq, Turkey, and India. This is also a competition in which a large contemporary country has absorbed the traditional homelands of ethnic groups like China and the United Kingdom, as well as the Bretons in France, the Basques in Spain, and indigenous peoples in the Americas.

According to a study by Ufumba and Onuoha, 2017, elections in Africa have always been a "turbulent and violent affair" across the region. Ethnic and religious divisions have been cited as two major elements contributing to this quandary. Most scholars agree that the roots of African election violence may be traced back to European colonial politics, which fostered ethno-religious polarisation and impeded the growth of national politics and integration across the continent. For instance, Bukari *et., al.* (2017) conducted a study in Ghana on the impact of chieftaincy and land disputes on the socio-political development of Northern Ghana. The study's findings indicate that key beneficial benefits of disputes include altered decision-making processes

regarding community expansion, increased inter-ethnic cohesiveness, and assistance in re-establishing a group's identity.

One of the greatest dangers to world peace and stability is inter-ethnic conflict. There are many examples from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries that are widely known and deadly. These include the Balkans, Rwanda and Chechnya; Iraq, Indonesia; Sri Lanka; India; and Darfur, Sudan. Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip are all examples. Provinces, states, and even entire regions can become unstable as a result of inter-ethnic warfare. Genocide and other crimes against humanity, economic collapse, governmental collapse, environmental damage, and refugee surges are all common outcomes of ethnic warfare.

Since 1994, election violence in South Africa has decreased due to the country's PR voting system, which permits minor parties to participate in the legislature despite the African National Congress's overwhelming majority. According to data collected from across Africa, countries with majority rule elections had a higher incidence of violence. Electoral outcomes under PR systems tend to disperse political power nodes among a broader range of groups, whereas under winner-takes-all and the high political premium provided to the largest party, majoritarian norms imply higher electoral stakes" (Fjelde and Höglund 2016, 301). So the costs of losing are considerably higher in majoritarian voting systems, which may lead to a greater propensity to use violence to obtain positions of power due to the potential exclusion of big minorities. Particularly troubling is the potential for majoritarian electoral laws to exclude sizable ethnic minorities. It's more likely to fuel grievances and stimulate political activism when "political exclusion follows racial lines," according to Fjelde & Höglund (2016). This could lead to an increase in ethnic voting, which could lead

to an increase in the incentives for politicians to use exclusionary ethnic rhetoric in their campaigns.

Bariyam (2018) discovered that ethnic conflicts in Bawku are often sparked by the "Samanpiid" festival and then worsened by political party politics in another study done in the municipality. A fight over ethnicity can be distinguished from other forms of identity, such as proximity, origin, ethnicity, and religion. However, ethnic disagreements do not constitute a separate type of conflict. Depending on the setting and nature of one's social connections, one's sense of belonging to a common ethnic group might vary greatly. Individual and group interests must be balanced against one another as well as against the interests of the community as a whole. In order to organize people for collective action and to bargain with other groups beyond the context of personal contacts, a common ethnic ancestry may be useful. However, some people may try to take advantage of the system.

On August 28, 1991, military leaders led by Commander Riek Machar, the current rebel leader in conflict with Salva Kiir, announced Garang's death (Copnall, 2014). "Nasir Declaration" was the first step toward South Sudan's independence (SSIM). SSIM-backed Naath inhabitants assaulted members from the Bor-the Jieng subgroup, which Garang was descended from three months after the coup's success. Because the Bor were the ones who attacked the Naath people during Machar's coup against Garang, the attack against them was a revenge strike. But the Naath were just as intent with exacting revenge on the Jieng during Garang's rule for atrocities against them (De Chand 2014). In Bor, Amnesty International thought that 2,000 people had been massacred (Copnall 2014).

The Jieng ethnic group's military and political leaders were also slain by the SSIM. Garang referred to this as a "apparatus against the Jieng" in order to secure the support of the Jieng and the international community for the coup. Due to the Jieng's abandonment of the SSIM, at first, Machar denied that the Bor massacre had taken place, but in 2011, he admitted his guilt and apologised to the Bor people.(London Evening Post, 2011).

Machar's ineptitude was cited by soldiers and politicians from other ethnic groups, as well as the Naath. Rejoining the SPLM in 2002, Machar was promoted to second place after Garang's death; he held that post until his retirement in 2005. (Copnall, 2014).

This year's Naath massacre was a culmination of a longstanding hatred between the Naath and Jieng tribes that began with the Bor massacre. Because Machar didn't spare the Jieng accompanying him, Kiir claimed that the Naath who complained in Juba about the deaths of their loved ones "are much more fortunate" (Sackur 2014). Such a statement indicates that civilians were deliberately targeted for death.

Then-Chief of General Staff James Hoth Mai, Director of Military Intelligence Major General Mach Paul, and other high-ranking military and intelligence officials all stated there had been no coup. When summoned to testify in the trial of politicians accused of the coup, Paul said that there had never been a coup. This accusation of coup was made by Kiir to discredit his opponents, however senior officers have stated that no coup took place (De Chand 2014).

Furthermore, the military is always behind a coup. Military support is required for a political coup to take place. Amazingly, Kiir stated that politicians planned a coup

without the involvement of the military, despite the government making no charges against any troops. The fact that Kiir ordered the killing of people while only detaining "coup plotter" shows that his actions were planned (Ruey, 2017).

A steadfast military ally of Kiir's, Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, declared in Kiir's presence on June 11 that there had been no coup in Juba. On President Kiir's orders, he said, a fight between Presidential guards disarming persons of Naath origin began the violence and ultimately the war (Sudan tribune 2014). Because he had helped Kiir so much during the civil war, why did Museveni publicly humiliate him? It was an admission of guilt, meaning that the war was planned jointly by both leaders with the expectation that it would be simple.

Johnson (2014), De Waal (2014), Rolandsen (2015), and Frahm (2015) all examine the civil war from a different perspective. It has been suggested by Johnson (2014) that the lack of vision and insufficient integration of other armed groups (OAG) into the SPLM ranks and files of the SPLA sparked the civil war Johnson (2014). The OAG war made up of former members of the Anya Nya II and defectors from the SPLA and SSIM who operated independently under the control of the Sudanese government. Due to their lack of integration, they caused a problem for the SPLA. Due to the government's treatment of them and attacks on their positions, Kiir rejected their integration. Rather than being the root of the conflict, the OAG debate served as an outward manifestation of the racial tensions that existed already within the two sides of the conflict.

According to De Waal (2014), kleptocracy, neo-patrimonialism, and hasty leadership decisions are the primary causes of civil strife. Rolandsen (2015) contends that the war's causes are structural, including a lack of patrimonialism and a rebel mindset

passed down through generations. Arguments like these show that there is a root cause to the problems. The lack of vision of the SPLM, the Naath-Jieng enmity, kleptocracy, weak leadership, militarism, and ethnocentricity are all blamed for the conflict, according to the literature review.

During elections, ethnic tensions can be exacerbated by the large compensation given to public officials. Elections can become high-stakes contests, and the monetization of political positions can exacerbate tensions. Others view politics as an opportunity for personal gain rather than an opportunity for the people. Even in countries where the level of public accountability is still very low and the amount of corruption among public officials is quite high, getting elected is regarded an investment with good returns because it is a sure way of having access to public coffers. Because of this, it is not uncommon for politicians and their supporters to use extreme measures to win elections. Based on Nigerian and Kenyan examples, the study concludes that in presidential systems of government, no room is left for the opposition: the victor takes it all. During the term of a political party that wins an election, it retains power. Some opposition parties believe that waiting until the next election might be too lengthy for them to be excluded from government, and they would rather resort to violence in order to maintain their relevance in the meantime.

Corradetti (2015) analyzed the international criminal court's role in Kenya's post-election violence in 2007–2008 and 2013. The study's findings reveal that the ICC's dissuasive effects in Kenya are predicated on a general condition of direct enforcement by rational self-interested actors and on unforeseeable repercussions of ethnic stability. Ethnicity is described as the consequence of inter-ethnic connections between two separate groups or cultures that result in the establishment of distinct

sorts of geographical, politico-economic, cultural, and social linkages. Throughout history, ethnic conflicts have been a key component of international affairs. Additionally, ethnic warfare continuing to be the most widespread sort of armed conflict worldwide today. Recent occurrences include ethnic warfare in Somalia, Kurdish struggle for autonomy in Iraq and Turkey, civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua, Chechen uprising, and, the combat between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda,to mention a few. It is evident, however, that some areas and nations are more prone to ethnic strife than others.

Kisaka and Nyadera's (2019) study on ethnicity and politics in Kenya's rocky road to democracy and prosperity reveals that the country's privileged few have routinely used ethnic divisions for their own ends. Kenya is afflicted with high levels of intercommunal violence, significantly greater than the rest of Africa. Identity-based communal militias frequently engage in vicious cycles of assaults and counterattacks. The violence that has erupted on Kenya's periphery in recent years is linked to battles over the country's democratic devolution. Often, political goals "mobilize and exploit competitiveness and animosity among communities to incite violence between ethnic and regional groups vying for access to resources and power." (Rorwerder, 2015).

Another study by Mwiandi, 2014 illustrates the link of inter-ethnic conflicts and elections in Kenya. Because of its multi-ethnic population, Kenya has had to deal with ethnic confrontations, or acts of political violence, on a number of occasions, according to the findings of this study. In Kenya, ethnic tensions have been exacerbated by the country's political violence. While investigating the politicisation of inter-ethnic conflict in Nakuru County, Owino (2019) discovered a correlation between the return to Multi-Party politics in Kenya and an increase in political ethnic

conflict, where political elites and other players use various methods to win elections. People's ethnic preferences may change, conflict management skills may be disrupted, and participants may regard their interactions with members of an opposing ethnic group as one-dimensional when mobilised by people from different areas. In order to encourage ethnic negotiation, international organisations, including governments, might provide promises that assist resolve inter-ethnic conflicts. Racism has been blamed for fueling many of today's wars, according to an investigation of ninety-two hostilities that took place between 1945 and 1989. The Kalenjin and the Kikuyu have had a long-standing disagreement over settlements, political affiliation, citizenship, and land ownership since the post-independence era. These conflicts were sparked by political disagreements, with distinct factions identifying themselves with different political parties. Nakuru County's inter-ethnic election-related violence first appeared during the 1992 election. This period saw the institutionalization of violence in presidential and legislative elections, contributing to the spread of violence that culminated in the County-related violence.

2.1.3 Nexus between inter-ethnic conflicts and National elections

Given the apparent ethnic dynamics at play in some well-known situations of high violence, such as Kenya, India, and Nigeria, ethnic diversity may also matter during elections. Evidence suggests that contested elections in emerging nations tend to perpetuate racial divisions in society. Ethnic self-identification is more prevalent in surveys conducted near elections in African countries, according to Eifert et al. (2010), who studied data from surveys conducted in Africa. This, according to the authors, is attributable to politicians' proclivity for focusing on voters' ethnic backgrounds. Indian politicians have been known to instigate ethnic rioting as a

means of garnering support for their cause rather than relying on any other ideological basis.

Diversity of ethnicity alone should not be grounds for concern during national elections, though. Violence is not inevitable when ethnic parties or ethnic bloc voting are present in elections, but it is not unheard of.

Increased risk of violence is created when a governmental system based on patron-client relationships is paired with the ethnic diversity that already exists and a long history of social conflict between different ethnic groups. People believe that winning political power gives them access to patronage goods and other resources for their co-ethnics. The government's capacity to provide land rights to some ethnic groups while denying them to others is one way this can be manifested.

Political influence is often considered as the sole means to gain access to the country's riches in West Africa, specifically in Francophone countries. People in power, ethnicity, and income redistribution could all be affected by this pattern. Many of the ethnically polarised countries in the region are at risk of witnessing significant ethnic tension during an election season as long as the narrative about the ethnic group in power being directly in charge of the country's resources remains. A lack of equity in the allocation of income and resources was one of the main causes of the post-election violence that led to the 2010 civil war and the eventual dissolution of society in Côte d'Ivoire. The pandemic has escalated intra-group conflict over few resources in many countries. Due to the worldwide lockdown, movement between these two countries has been severely restricted, further weakening their already fragile economies (Onuofa & Ufumba, 2017).

According to critics, African conflicts are misdiagnosed as ethnic and ignored the political nature of the issues at stake. Rather than ethnic distinctions causing conflict, it is the promotion of these disparities as a barrier to growth and opportunity that causes conflict. That some African communities are vulnerable to this kind of political exploitation emphasises the fragile nature of nation-building in Africa. States' political decisions can set the stage for ethnic mobilisation. As a result, "ethnic conflicts" frequently arise in societies with a diverse population and low levels of development when a state's behaviour is perceived as being dominated by a particular group or community, when groups fear marginalisation, or when there is no avenue for redressing grievances at all. Rather than stemming from a deep-seated animosity, ethnic sentiments and movements are often the product of unequal distribution of wealth and power in society at large (Aapenguo, 2010). According to the researcher, Kenya's recent elections were tainted by ethnicity because of a political power struggle that used ethnic tensions to organise support.

However, it was not the sole cause of this post-election violence. After 25 years of Daniel arap Moi ruling Kenya with an ethnic minority patronage network, group identification has been imprinted on Kenyan politics, yet cross-group cooperation is common. One of the most notable of them was the foundation of the Kenya African National Union by the Kikuyus and Luos in 1960 in order to fight for independence, and the formation of The National Rainbow Coalition in 2002 in order to break the one-party monopoly on power, respectively.

 Cooperation between groups is the norm rather than the exception. Kenyan youth, especially in the metropolitan regions, are more likely to identify themselves as Kenyans first, followed by their ethnicity. However, the post-election violence in

2007–2008 was not an inevitable outbreak of sectarian hatred; rather, ethnic tensions linger.

Electoral violence has plagued Kenyan politics since at least 1992, when the first study on the subject was published (Eifert et al (2010). Violence was a real possibility this year. Political campaigns now take place in an atmosphere of fear and worry as a result of the country's history of bloody elections. Since political parties are still dominated by wealthy individuals who represent distinct ethnic groupings, there is a persistent perception of injustice in the country. Kenya's peace initiatives are hampered by the country's long history of patronage politics and ethnic tensions. According to Matanga, Amutabi, and Musya (2017), inequality is one of the main causes of ethnic grievances. This is exhibited through a relationship between those who were born in that area (in-group) and those who came to settle there (out-group).

2.2 Strategies employed in managing inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by National Elections

2.2.1 Mechanisms for National Elections

Onuoha & Ufumba, 2017 describe election as a political concept, implying a sequence of acts leading to the selection of one or more people from among many to serve in positions of authority in a community. It is democratic technology institutionalised and has the potential to increase government accountability while also legitimising it (Collier 2009). A central tenet of this philosophy is that citizens should have the power to choose their government, to hold them accountable for their actions, and to impose legal restrictions on the power of the state. People in a country choose one or more candidates for public office in a formal and organised manner during an election (IPI,2011). Modern representative democracy has relied on this system since at least

the 17th century. As a result of the increasing use of competitive mass elections in Western Europe over the 19th and 20th centuries, there has been a larger institutionalisation of regional variation in electoral systems. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, from the end of World War II to the beginning of the 1990s, mass elections had a variety of purposes and consequences. In these elections, candidates were restricted to supporting or opposing the official candidate exclusively (Eulau, et., al 2021).

Gradually in Latin America, the introduction of competitive elections was phased. Elections were conducted in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay in the century after 1828, but all except Chile reverted to dictatorship. Competitive elections were held throughout Asia following the end of World War II, in many areas due to decolonization (e.g., India, Indonesia and Malaysia), although authoritarianism was once again widespread. Several nations, like the Philippines and South Korea, restored competitive elections in the 1970s. Countries in the Middle East seldom have contested elections with the exception of Turkey, Iraq, and Israel (Eulau, *et.,al* 2021).

 Despite the fact that elections are at the heart of a democratic system, their experimentation in Africa has proven controversial. However, rather than uniting the continent, it has steadily been associated with bloodshed. "There seems to be a growing amount of work on the relationship between democracy and violent conflict," write Onuoha and Ufumba (2017). As with any democratic institution, elections as an essential component have sparked intense debate. The introduction of competitive elections based on universal suffrage occurred in three major times in sub-Saharan Africa. There were elections in many countries after independence in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite this, there were some notable exceptions to the rule of tyranny (e.g.,

Botswana and Gambia). In the late 1970s, when certain military dictatorships (e.g. in Ghana and Nigeria) were disassembled and other countries in southern Africa were decolonized, elections were first adopted in a smaller number of countries (IPI,2011, Eulau et.,al, 2021).

Citizens can only choose their representatives and hold them accountable for their conduct during their time in office if they have the ability to vote for them. If elected officials don't care about their re-election or if one party or coalition is so powerful that voters have no other options among alternative candidates, parties, or views, accountability can be degraded.. (Maphazi, 2012). In order to maintain a democratic government, elections must be held frequently and regularly. With an open and competitive electoral process, elections can serve as forums for the discussion of public issues and as a means of encouraging citizens to express their opinions. Voters learn about the political process through elections, which also help to ensure that democratic administrations are attentive to their citizens' needs. Furthermore, they justify the behaviour of those who wield power. Non-competitive elections still have some level of this duty being performed. For many people, voting is a way to express their partisanship and have a say in the political process. Non-voting is a means for some people to show their displeasure with politics (Mangu,2005). In light of these considerations, the protracted struggle for the right to vote and the desire for fair participation in the democratic process may be regarded as manifestations of a fundamental human need for personal fulfilment.

Elections, on the other hand, have frequently been utilised by authoritarian governments to gain some degree of public support. There may be no effective mobilisation of prospective supporters for opposition parties even if they are allowed

to participate in elections by the administration and its allies. Otherwise, a dictatorship may delay elections if it is worried about losing the election. In addition, authoritarian governments have a long history of influencing the results of elections by intimidating voters (e.g., by physically assaulting them) and altering the vote totals.

There is a growing void because elections are a complicated undertaking. Beyond their ability to assist nations in making the transition from authoritarian to more democratic regimes, the focus should be on "transformations rather than transitions." The fact that elections are held does not always indicate the level of democracy in a nation, as has been proved time and time again. Electoral corruption is not confined to bribery or voter intimidation, but rather encompasses a wide range of actions. There are a number of ways to interfere with the voting process, such as by stomping on polling stations with fake ballots, manipulating the counting or reporting of votes, and ignoring election results by incumbents (e.g., by mobilising the military to thwart an election loss). A population's commitment to civility and democracy is more important than the enforcement of legislative restrictions or punishments when it comes to these practises' existence. As a whole, Africa has made great strides over the past several decades toward democracy and good governance both normatively and in reality; nonetheless, there is still a lot of work to be done.

2.2.2 Effects of National elections on Ethnic community relations

Electoral violence is not caused by ethnic diversity on its own. Even though ethnic parties or ethnic bloc voting are present during elections, violence is not an unavoidable result. Violence is more likely when ethnic diversity is paired with a political system dominated by patron-client relationships and a history of ethnic strife. People of the same ethnicity who hold positions of authority tend to believe that

achieving political power entails gaining access to patronage goods and other valuable resources (Taylor, 2018).

As Green and McElwee (2019) found, local economic hardship was strongly linked to non-voting by people of colour in the US, making it difficult to make clear comparisons between the racial and economic explanations of the 2016 elections and warning against generalizations about causal focus. In order for democracy to take root, the democratic losers must accept defeat. Elections are connected to aggressiveness, and elections in divided democracies enhance the likelihood of war. Political minorities in modern democracies are more prone to experience post-election strife. Elections, on the other hand, occur in many shapes and sizes and are held in both democratic and autocratic regimes. With or without the rule of law, elections cannot guarantee fair political competition since the losing parties are unwilling to accept their defeat.

For example, Knowles and Tropp (2018) studied Trump supporters in the United States, focusing on the racial and economic background of Trump support in relation to how danger, identity, and contact influenced the 2016 presidential election. Experiments on the effects of racial and ethnic minorities on Whites found that those who live near minorities are more likely to be vulnerable to discrimination, and they are more likely to support Trump in the general election. Inter-group contact among Whites was encouraged by the variety of the community, which led to decreased threat rates and White identity and support for Trump. Analysis shows that risks in diverse situations can be mitigated by a stable local environment, allowing communication processes to take centre stage. Many social scientists, journalists, and the general public were surprised by Donald Trump's ascendancy to the presidency of

the United States. The emergence of Trump has thus far been mostly attributed to White Americans' personality and demographic characteristics. Violence can be sparked by the outcome of the election, either because of genuine or imagined abnormalities, or because actors disagree with the outcomes of the election. Ethnic and non-ethnic disputes are included in this category.

Allegations of fraud were immediately dismissed by the Central Electoral Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina following the 2018 elections. Prior to the elections, there were certain claims made concerning the eligibility of some voters on electoral lists, including the existence of deceased individuals. Elections did not lead to any complaints of this sort, though. Problems arise when elected officials at the municipal level owe their positions to power-holders and are supervised by party members. Nationalist forces in power have separated the country's people, thus activists from those groups that monitor and manage the proceedings in many of the country's election districts. This is well-known and has led to accusations and assertions of wrongdoing. However, it is difficult to show election commission misconduct at the lower levels. It appears that the political alternative is too weak to act appropriately, and the international community is too slow to realise that there is room for malpractice in Bosnian elections (Neven, 2018).

Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura form India's northeastern region (India spend, 2004). An ethnically and culturally diverse region, as well as its geographic and cultural isolation from the rest of the country, has resulted in a tangled web of threats. There have been a number of rebel organizations in India since the 1950s that have been demanding independence or a significant degree of autonomy. Protests by the local populace have increased in

recent years, despite a decrease in armed violence. Immigration policies and the conflict between indigenous and migrant populations have been a major source of social upheaval in recent years (ACLED, 2021).

There has been a protracted insurgency against the Indian state by left-wing extremist organisations in the "Red Corridor" area, which includes a wide swath of central, eastern, and southern India. Parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal, and Uttar Pradesh are impacted by the Naxalite-Maoist insurgency. For this insurgency, the reasons are numerous and complex. India's Human Development Index ranks the states of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha at the bottom (Global Data Lab, 2020). These states have a richness of natural resources and are frequently targeted by big mining corporations. Over the past five decades, more than 50 million people in India have been relocated for development projects; majority of the displaced populations are from this region, which is home to indigenous tribal groups (India Spend, 2014). Property rights are a major issue for these communities, as well.

Maoist guerrillas in the "Red-corridor" states have fought against all land acquisition efforts, and have gained some sympathy from the local community as a result. Maoist insurgents condemn the validity of the Indian state and, as a result, the legitimacy of democratic institutions like elections in India. If they don't get their way, Maoist rebels will resort to violence to impose their election boycotts. Political parties, voting locations, polling workers, and media are frequently targeted in election campaigns. Election-related Maoist insurgent activity and state-sponsored anti-Maoist operations tend to rise dramatically (ACLED, 2021).

Early on in modern Sri Lankan history, ethnic politics and the fear of discrimination pushed Tamil leaders in the direction of federalism. There has been a long-standing demand by Tamil political parties for more political autonomy for the districts in which they predominate. A decentralization of authority between the two groups has been acknowledged at various points in time as a way to ease tensions. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, signed in July 1957, was one of a series of pacts formed to describe the methods for devolving authority, including a framework for regional devolution. The pact's stipulations were never executed, however, owing to different political forces. It was agreed upon in 1965 that the Dudley-Chelvanayagam Pact would be formed and implemented. Nonetheless, the terms of this contract, like those of the previous one, were invalidated.

It was the inability to execute these recommendations that led to Tamil calls for independence, rather than the Federalism that they had been pursuing up until that moment. Many Tamils, particularly Tamil youth from the north, lost faith in parliamentary politics as a result of the collapse of these pacts. Taking advantage of a tense and divisive political climate, the Tamil United Liberation Front scored a landslide win in the 1977 elections. Voters cast their ballots in the District Development Council elections in July of that year (Bejoria, 2019). As a result, this effort was likewise a failure due to the absence of government support for decentralization of authority. Politics in Tamil society had begun to change from a commitment to parliamentary democracy (held by its conservative leaders) to a commitment to armed resistance after this moment (held by considerable sections of Tamil youth). A harsh anti-terrorism statute was initially passed in 1979 as a stopgap measure, but it was permanently revised in 1982 and is now part of the law (Global Data Lab, 2014).

Conflicts that have erupted after independence in Africa have mostly included ethnic rivalries inside a single country. Clearly, conflicts in Africa have impeded the advancement of Africans' well-being. Ecclesiastical dynamics have contributed to or aggravated conflicts in places like Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Sudan. While it is true that ethnic variety can lead to conflict, it is not the only factor. There have been conflicts that have harmed political and economic outcomes because political institutions have failed to accommodate multiple interests (such as those of different ethnicities, religions, or languages). Unitary administrations that were established by the colonialists were a priority for post-colonial leaders. Political systems have become more and more centralised as a result of this. As a result, the ethnic group's leader is in charge of a massive quantity of resources. The distribution of these has been skewed in favour of certain groups. Rather than bringing ethnic groups together, the converse has occurred. In the eyes of the preferred group, the other group's reaction is a danger to its ability to maintain control of the resources. Consequently, the unequal distribution of resources in Kenya has been a major source of conflict in the African country. Disputes arise from a lack of basic human needs being met - the demand for autonomy (Odhiambo *et., al,* 2005). In support of this, Onuoha & Ufumba, 2017 study indicates that the state's resources in Africa are concentrated at the centre, and each ethnic group struggles for its control, which can only be done legitimately through the acquisition, consolidation, and deployment of state authority. Therefore, rather than having an overarching nationalistic tone, political mobilisation takes on an ethno-religious character as a result of this. Whether elections are peaceful or violent in Africa is largely determined by ethnic and religious divisions already present in society.

In Mali, Koufa's success was in part due to his ability to communicate effectively in Fulfulde, the Fulani language. Young Fulani herders who had been robbed of their livestock, abused by administrative authorities and some traditional leaders, as well as having an identity crisis over their role in the religious, ethnic, and inter-generational crosscurrents buffeting many Sahelian communities resonated with his calls for more equal opportunity and political reform. There are numerous Fulani in the ranks of Koufa and Malian media who refer to FLM as a Fulani movement because of this. Despite this, there is scant indication that the FLM integrates Fulanis from other parts of West Africa. Only a small percentage of Mali's 3 million Fulani (about 17% of the population) are known to have joined or supported the FLM (Pauline, 2019).

That the FLM has leveraged on the problems of the Fulani population to inflame tribal tensions and rivalries that have existed for decades is confirmed by Pauline (2019), who echoes Fadimata (2018). Herdsmen from the Fulani tribe and farmers from the Bambara and Dogon tribes have long had a tense relationship in these parts. Since then, there have been only a few large-scale outbreaks of violence.

Amadou Koufa successfully exploited these tensions by promoting the prevalent emotions of unfairness and discrimination among the Fulani population and used their concerns as a rallying cry to promote solidarity among the people of Nigeria. There were no police personnel present in Sari (Koro circle, southeast of Mopti) when 16 Fulani herders were massacred by Dogon farmers in May 2012 because of a land dispute. Because of this incident, which was never thoroughly investigated and for which no one was ever held accountable, it is widely assumed that nomadic Fulani tribes began arming themselves (Arthur, 2017). It was in the same year that some of them were involved in the anti-government protests in Gao. FLM is accused of

attacking Dogon and Dozo villages after the establishment of the Katiba Macina in central Mali in 2015, typically in revenge for Fulani violence. The Fulani have become the focus of violent reprisals because of their association with the FLM. Since early 2018, there has been a substantial spike in communal violence in central Mali, with the largest number of fatalities among Fulanis. A further layer of concern is that foreign mercenaries were utilised to inflame ethnic tensions and stoke bloodshed (Jonathan, 2018).

Islamist extremist organizations pose the greatest threat to the country's north, but in the centre, the threat dynamics are more complex. Increasing violence in the absence of governmental protection is exacerbated by ethnicity, farmer vs. herder struggle for land, and historical conflicts between noble and slave social groupings (Alix, 2018).

A militia of central Malian traditional Dogon hunters clashed with Malian security forces in early July, for example, after the hunters threatened to prevent elections from taking place. The militia was formed because the hunters and farmers in the area felt threatened by rising tensions with nomadic Fulani herders. They also destroyed the hunters' motorcycles when they tried to stop the Dogon gathering and collecting their firearms. Meanwhile, radical Islamist organisations have seized on these rifts to further undermine the region's stability and pose a threat to the country.

According to Ayatse and Akuva (2013), post-colonial government in Nigeria is affected by ethnic politics. For the British colonial administration to fulfil its imperialist and colonial economic and political goals, it was found that the government purposefully adopted and encouraged ethnic animosity. Since colonialism ended in 1960, Nigeria has carried the spirit of race into post-colonial Nigeria, and this vice was proven to be responsible for the bulk of Nigeria's political,

administrative and social and cultural ills. Elections can have a wide range of outcomes depending on how they are conducted. When it comes to elections, the causal processes which link decisions to conflict function in a variety of ways. Race may have a bigger impact on society than other social cleavages because of its unique characteristics.

So many variables may be ascribed to ethnic conflict in Nigeria since the conflicts occur in a variety of forms and levels. There are a variety of contributing factors, such as the history of the colony, territorial disputes, struggles over power and resources, the failure of the traditional model for conflict resolution, poverty, a lack of trust in government, the manipulation of society's elites, and intolerance toward different races or religions. These are just a few examples! For this reason, ethnic violence over minor theological disputes is extremely crucial in Nigeria (Alao, 2015).

Ethnic tensions have gotten worse in Nigeria due to a lack of faith in the government's capacity to distribute government benefits fairly and equally. A sense of marginalization can be expressed through the expression of a sense of parochialism and community identification when the government is perceived to be serving the interests of a certain group in society.

So, it is no surprise that ethnic militias, such as the Oodua's peoples' congress (OPC), Bakassi boys and the like have popped up in Nigeria to fight for their own ethnic groups' interests, such as the Arewa peoples' Congress, Ohaneze Ndigbo and the like. These have frequently exacerbated already-existing tensions, and in certain situations, this has resulted in an ethnic crisis. As a result, ethnic jingoists have long used the country's high rate of unemployment, high percentage of illiteracy, and unequal distribution of wealth for their own (elites) selfish objectives (Popoola, 2012).

Studies have been done to see if primaries increase election success, clientelism, and intra-party conflict in Ghana (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). The study found that primaries may either harm a party by picking radical candidates or improve the party's reputation by selecting high valence candidates. Clientelism precludes the use of these methods. The majority of the time, election management agencies, election courts, political parties, and NGOs, as well as media organisations, have been effective in providing standards and creating capacity through electoral process technical support. Voters feel that election organisers use security planning and security equipment to protect democratic processes from resistance and hostility. A pattern of responding to anticipated disputes in elections is being developed by the international community through its oversight. When a political participant is intimidated, blackmailed, harmed, or otherwise abused in an attempt to influence the outcome of an election, it is a conflict in the electoral process.

There has been a lengthy history of conflict in South Sudan involving many different communities, according to Richard (2012). It is particularly difficult to interrupt the cycle of conflict because of the retaliatory nature of each incident of violence. Another exacerbating problem is the growing trend of kidnapping children from opposing communities during times of conflict. The Luo Nuer and Murle are longtime adversaries in South Sudan, where ethnicity is a major source of division. At times, local and national leaders have used their concerns to their advantage in order to achieve their own goals.

However, blaming racial chauvinism only for the violence is incorrect. Conflict is sparked by a variety of other circumstances. Conflicts between ethnic groups are rooted in a struggle for limited resources (Lako, 2016). South Sudan's primary

currency is cattle. Dairy cows are a symbol of wealth and rank because of their usage in dowries and as a means of settling differences between families. In a location where rainfall is unpredictable, ethnic groups must frequently interact with one another in order to locate pasture and water for their livestock. Disputes are a fact of life (Caleb, 2012). When it comes to the Lou Nuer, who lack direct access to water and grazing pasture in the dry season, this is especially true. In this region, livestock raiding has long been a way of life and rustling is a common rite of passage for males in their twenties. These raids have gotten more lethal due to the development of small guns in recent years. The rising cost of a bride in South Sudan has provided an additional incentive for young people to engage in cattle rustling (Richard, 2012).

South Sudan's dilemma, according to Lako (2016), includes a social and humanitarian dimension as well as a political one. Communities have been divided and the social fabric of the country has been irreparably damaged as a result of the regime's actions. In many places of South Sudan, starvation has happened or is imminent because of the brutality of the civil war. An African team's ability to tackle such a massive challenge is less encouraging. There is little faith that this time around will be any different from prior AU expeditions that have had more failures than successes.

A second analogy for the African regional troops deployed in South Sudan is like delivering a patient a drug that cures his/her ailment, but has long-term negative effects that might be dangerous, as Caleb (2012) points out. There are expected to be troops from the countries of Kenya, Rwanda, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Most countries have obvious political interests in South Sudan, except for Rwanda.

The disputed region of Abyei and others, the oil resources in Heglig, and the transportation costs for South Sudan's oil are among the many problems that remain

unsolved between South Sudan and Sudan. Although the Elleimi Triangle is a part of Kenya, it is actually part of South Sudan. There is no question that the matter will be brought up at some point. The western province of Ethiopia, which borders South Sudan, is home to a sizable Nuer and Anuak communities. As a result of the influx of refugees and the cross-border raids by the Murle militia during the South Sudanese conflict, we have seen how Ethiopia has been affected (Lako, 2016).

Uganda's involvement in the conflict shows a lack of neutrality on the part of the government, which raises certain concerns. There is a UPDF presence in Western Equatoria since 2005 in an effort to eradicate the danger posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) in that area of the country. UPDF troops remain in Western Equatoria, even though the LRA is nowhere to be found (Richard, 2012).

It's even more worrisome that villagers in Eastern Equatoria have recently complained about the presence of the UPDF, which some believe to be engaged in illicit mining. Uganda's principal export market is South Sudan, thus it will do anything it can to influence the situation there. South Sudanese citizens may not always benefit from Ugandan influence. These regional powers have had their fair share of ups and downs, and even open antagonism. A serious danger exists thus that South Sudan's political groups and militias may be employed in proxy battles, as well as a stage for the settlement of old scores. It's possible that South Sudan will be "destroyed" by regional forces (Lako, 2016).

Inter-ethnic conflicts, trends, causes, impacts, and interventions in the Rumuruti Division in Laikipia County, Kenya, were studied by Warurii (2015). Since the colonial era, there has been a conflict of interest in the exploitation of land resources. In the Rumuruti Division of Laikipia County, inter-ethnic conflict was exacerbated by

socio-economic resource competition between and among communities. Such inter-ethnic conflicts may be reduced if the region's state marginalisation strategy could be handled effectively. As long as it comprises organised political movements, social struggle, violence perpetrated by separatists, and civil war with ethnic lines of opposition, the conflict is referred to as ethnic.

A common ethnic identity can lead to inter-ethnic strife, while a shared ethnic identity can lead to internal feuding. Kenya's fourth multiparty election was conducted on December 27, 2007. Opposition parties later claimed that the election had been manipulated, and foreign observers found numerous anomalies (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2008). After the election results were announced on December 30, protests took a more confrontational tone. Violence and strife erupted in Nairobi, Kenya's capital city, as a result of political protests in the city.

Kasiku (2012) looked at the elements that influence ethnic violence in the Kirindon division of Transmara West district, Narok county, Kenya, and found resource rivalry to be the most significant cause of ethnic conflict. Due to dwindling resources and increasing population, societies are forced to expand their borders, resulting in tensions with their neighbours. The incidence of ethnic conflicts in the Kirindon division is influenced by attitudes and cultural practices, but the extent and impact of cultural practices on ethnic conflicts is limited because societies prefer to use culture for their own internal advantages rather than for the benefit of others. Ethnic disputes in Kirindon are exacerbated by group schooling, according to a recent research. Ethnic disputes can be avoided if people are educated about the dangers of violence and the need of peace, which suggests that community education is a crucial factor in reducing ethnic conflicts.

Muchai, Ngari, and Mumiukha (2014) performed a study in Nakuru County to see how students' mental well-being was influenced by the alleged post-election violence. Emotional well-being among secondary school students was shown to have a little favourable influence following the claimed post-election violence. During the 2008 post-election violence (PEV) in Kenya, Nakuru County was among the places impacted. Violence following the election resulted in the deaths of over 1200 people, the mutilation of many more, and the displacement of approximately 350,000. More individuals were killed and displaced by the strife between residents in Njoro, Molo and Kuresoi than any other district.

Studying the consequences of post-election violence in Nakuru, Kenya in 2007/2008, Kirima (2015) found that the lack of basic necessities and educational facilities exacerbated the psychological pain caused by the PEV. A terrible chapter in our nation's history has been written by the ethnic clashes that have taken place since 1992. As a result, they have contributed to a general sense of distrust, fear, and mistrust among the general population of the Republic; they have impeded progress toward social stability, integration, and the rule of law; and they have jeopardized the rule of law as a foundation for both social and economic growth.

2.2.3 Conflict Management Strategies employed towards inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by National Elections

Democracy relies heavily on elections as the latter provide for a peaceful transition of power in a transparent and democratic manner. International policymakers began placing a high value on democracy as a tool for long-term peacemaking in the early 1990s. Because of the realization that political persecution and discrimination are typically the driving force behind armed organizations, the concept of assisting peace

building in combination with democratization was born. This means that democratization is considered as a way to address the core causes of conflict, and not only as a way to free up political rights. The need of promoting democratic values and ensuring democratic rule of law is now widely recognised as essential for peace-building. As a result, elections and the promotion of democracy have become fundamental to efforts to restore peace in nations devastated by violence.

Violence during elections may be controlled and prevented using a variety of methods. Different actors employ these tactics to a varied degree; (1) local and international observers;(2) national, regional, and local conflict resolution and mediation missions are all involved in averting election-related violence. Many different organisations play a role in these activities: the government, political parties and commissions, religious institutions as well as civil society and NGOs, as well as traditional authority like chiefs and clan leaders. There are five primary forms of strategy. Monitors can help avoid violence in elections by publicly identifying and condemning the perpetrators, as well as raising public awareness of the tensions that are building up. Second, in high-stress situations, mediation can be used to resolve a continuing electoral disagreement. A further way to discourage violence is to ensure that the legal and institutional structures are in place to discourage it. Security forces' deterrent effect is also highlighted by law enforcement. This strategy emphasizes the need of long-term prevention through cultivating democratic norms and tolerance among the general population.

Divisive politics are hampering efforts by civil society, the international community and inter-religious groups throughout the world to reduce bloodshed. Formal peace declarations have been made over the years by local political settlements based on a

long-established system of customary and civilian government, despite the fact that they have failed to provide peace and justice as contemporary state law (Rohwerder, 2015).

Pre-election violence by the incumbent increases the likelihood of post-election protest by the opposition, according to Eulau *et., al.* This is especially true when faced with large-scale protests, which can lead to incumbents being obliged to make significant concessions, such as annulling election results or even being removed from office altogether. As a result, governments in power take a risk when they resort to violence. Elections may have a way of perpetuating and even increasing the intensity of existing disputes, based on the fact that social violence tends to peak at this time. According to Rohwerder's (2015) analysis of the conflict in Kenya, those who have experienced electoral violence are more likely to identify in ethnic terms and tolerate the use of violence in the future than those who haven't. Ishyama *et. al.* (2016), on the other hand, disagree with these other experts, finding that the 2007 election violence did not increase Kenyans' ethnic identities.

In order to understand the connection between national elections and inter-ethnic conflicts, there is a hole in this research.

Few systematic researches have explored what works in terms of policy interventions since it is difficult to measure the effectiveness of a specific approach in the literature on strategies, which is still in its infancy. Conflicts between various ethnic groups during elections can have a variety of origins and outcomes. According to research into the causes of election violence, a spike in violence does not necessarily indicate that intervention measures were a failure; in fact, the violence may even have been worse without them, as evidenced by the literature. Not all interventions are

successful just because there is no violence (Eulau, *et.,al*. 2021, Birch, *et.,al.* 2020). In spite of this, more researches are looking at the effectiveness of various techniques in diverse circumstances. Strategies for resolving conflict may work in one situation, but not in another. Context-based conflict management solutions are the focus of this study.

An anti-violence campaign was launched in advance of the 2007 general elections in Nigeria by Collier and Vicente (2014) and the NGO Action Aid. "We ran on a platform of 'No to political violence!' In order to avoid aggressive politicians, you should vote against them." The programme was carried out by local NGO partners in 24 randomly chosen towns in six Nigerian states through town hall meetings and popular theatre. On T-shirts, hats, hijabs, booklets, stickers, and posters in the treatment villages, the motto was also prominently displayed. In order to lessen local strife, town hall meetings "Were meant to reduce a problem with collective action. Every state had the same popular play, which featured a good politician and a bad politician, the bad one instilling violent intimidation, and was aimed at youths (usually the ones providing labour for violent activities) and others (for example, women) who were difficult to attract to town meetings" (Collier & Vicente 2014).

As a first step to addressing and reducing social and electoral violence in conflict-prone cultures, the focus on specialised election system design is essential. The Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research (2010) stated that political and social isolation was one of the key causes of violence in Nepal (Alihodzic, S & Asplund, E, 2018). Electoral reform prior to the 2007 Constituent Assembly of Nepal included gender and minority participation. Because of this, quotas for women and other

historically disadvantaged and oppressed groups, including indigenous tribes, were built into the election system (Alihodi & Asplund, 2018).

As a second step, developing structures for cooperation and exchanging information with the security sector and other relevant organisations and citizen groups is necessary. As a result of an inter-agency collaborative process in Mexico involving the Federal Police, Army, Office of the Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes (FEPADE), Federal Electoral Tribunal (TEPFJ), Navy and CISEN, as well as local governments and telecommunications (TELMEX) and infrastructure (water and electricity) agencies, the IFE came to a formal political agreement with SSAs and other organisations on how to respond to the fraud.

The third method is to build trustworthy and effective conflict resolution systems, as well as to introduce tools to punish those responsible. When a disagreement arises, the legal framework dictates which entity will be responsible for hearing and resolving it. There should be a clear and consistent legal framework in order to make the procedure for resolving electoral-related issues accessible and understood. Even while individuals and organisations may be enticed to participate in election fraud or conduct acts of inter-ethnic based violence in order to obtain political benefits, in most situations they feel that they are protected from punishment. To combat election violence, the attitude modification strategy takes a more grassroots approach by focusing on community disputes that may be at the foundation of it. In this method, "peace message" and "youth programmes" are used to change ideas about the usefulness and profitability of violence as an electoral tactic, as well as to provide alternative activities for the youth who are often involved as agents of violence.

"Attitude change also involves different pacting procedures (such as round tables and peace pledges), conversation fora and mediation that try to create trust and give dispute-resolution tools to the elites," according to the authors of this paper.

Minority rights should be respected, minorities should be protected from the abuse of state authority and their grievances should be handled seriously in order to decrease ethnic mobilisation. Another option is a complete legal system. It is essential that the state's different services and employment opportunities be made available to all citizens on an equal basis. Minority representation in security sector leadership and ranks is critical to these governmental operations. The military has the potential to be a uniting force in society, fostering links between people of different ethnicities, fostering a sense of national belonging among the nation's children, and giving opportunities for minorities to rise through the ranks through hard work and dedication. In addition, ethnically varied police forces have been associated to lower levels of conflict in ethnically diverse countries. Elections are a potential trigger for ethnic tensions, thus preventing violence during them should be a top focus. Elections provide clear avenues for politicians to exploit ethnic divisions in order to get votes. These can be thwarted by establishing an impartial, representative electoral commission, led by individuals known for their high moral standards. Ethnic violence can be avoided with the help of a professional electoral commission, as seen in Ghana and elsewhere. Candidates can be rewarded for creating cross-regional and inter-group coalitions if independent electoral commissioners set electoral laws that demand this. One element of such a strategy is to make certain that electoral jurisdictions do not overlap with ethnic boundaries (Aapenguo,2010).

Inter-ethnic tensions sparked by Kenya's recent national elections have been addressed by policy changes implemented in the country. Peace programmes and training have been used in the last many cycles of election-induced violence. This endeavour was led by the international community in the run-up to the 2013 elections. This entailed, among other things, spreading messages of peace and offering media and basic mediation training. Aside from that, they put a lot of pressure on the government to enact constitutional changes that would help prevent future bloodshed. Pre-election tensions were lessened and factions felt less threatened by each other because of the efforts of both international and local peace initiatives (Rohwerder, 2015). Empirical data show that EISA deployed CMPs from four areas to prevent or deal with any disputes that may arise before to the general elections because of the heightened political atmosphere. While on deployment, panelists met with freshly appointed County Commissioners, who were responsible for keeping peace in their respective jurisdictions, among other things. For each location, the panelists drew out conflict prone places, as well as scenarios that were likely to stoke electoral-related tensions and devised cooperative plans for their settlement. Political hopefuls in their different areas met with the panelists and asked them to help minimise election-related unrest by appealing for peace and refraining from making statements that would incite conflict.

However, peace initiatives were not able to reach rural regions, where many potential election violence victims and perpetrators reside. Too often, training was aimed at the "informed" rather than the "uninformed," which resulted in a lack of community impact and the need for repeated training. A lack of international assistance for pre-election peace activities leaves communities at risk of intermittent violence following the election. It's also lacking in persistent involvement and adequate finance for the

peace-building activities that erupted ahead of the national elections (Taylor, 2018). One of the conflict management tactics is media self-censorship. Alternatively, the media has the potential to be a strong advocate for peace. TV newscasters utilize their platforms to advocate for tolerance and understanding among viewers. The media has been criticized for failing to provide accurate and complete coverage of protests and rallies that erupted after the revelation of election results and for avoiding live news conferences on election day (Clairs, et.al., 2014).

Findings by Matanga, Okoth and Buchere (2012) show that ethnic conflict in Nakuru might be exacerbated by the unpreparedness of the Chiefs and Assistant Chiefs in handling a number of conflicts. Most of these administrators are not well equipped to identify triggers of conflict and provide early warning to the relevant authorities to thwart any efforts that might result in violence.

2.3 The Challenges and opportunities of Overcoming Inter-Ethnic Conflicts Occasioned by National Elections

2.3.1 Challenges of overcoming inter-ethnic conflicts

Even though conflicts occur in every civilization, each one is distinct in terms of its participants, causes, outcomes, and dynamics. Locally and across nations, many of the most serious conflicts are the result of widening disparities in wealth and power. Instead of worrying about a global conflagration, people are now more worried about civil wars, secessionist movements within existing states, intra-party strife, and conflicts based on religion or ethnicity. International political debate has become increasingly concerned with ethnic violence during the past decade or two. Events in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Balkans have brought the subject to national attention, but the continent of Africa is littered with examples that show it is not a new problem.

Conflicts between different ethnic groups, as well as the consequent polarisation of those groups, have resulted in a wide range of undesirable outcomes, including genocide. Elections are viewed as a zero-sum game when they are held in such high-stakes institutional circumstances. It may be a matter of life and death for the political parties and entire communities in the state to win an election. Consequently, electoral violence may be more likely in situations where the stakes are higher in terms of political competitiveness and the potential for a shift in power dynamics. All elections have some degree of uncertainty, but if the winner takes it all, democracy's uncertainties come at a tremendous cost to the people. Because of this, a growing number of politicians are resorting to illegal electoral techniques and using militant youth wings, militias, or the state's security services to either win the election or boost their post-election bargaining power.

Aside from the inherent character of a competitive election, it's also an opportunity to mobilise a wide range of diverse interests in society and to stimulate political competition amongst political actors and parties. Electoral contests can exacerbate already-existing socio-economic cleavages and other social differences in societies where mature democracies' nonviolent traditions have not yet completely established.

Even in civilizations where political or socio-economic imbalances have sparked violent confrontations in the past, this is especially true. Elections in these situations may signal a return to or a shift toward violence. As a result of the modern world's circumstances, ethnicity has emerged as a potent symbol of significance and value. Ethnic tensions in the present day are unprecedented in their breadth and intensity. An ethnic group is more than just a collection of people; it's a self-aware group of people who have shared experiences and a shared history. Multi-ethnicity or a multi-ethnic

society is difficult to define. As a result, this suggests that there are multiple cohesive and solidaristic groupings, each with members who have common origins and interests but do not share those of other groups. Few states are ethnically homogeneous and many are heterogeneous in makeup. Since the Hindu majority in India is surrounded by other nations and ethnic groups, the country is organised into a federal system. A complicated system of ethnic stratification has been passed down to the entire former Soviet Union from its nation-building forebears. It's impossible to simplify the complexity of such situations down to a single conflict. The state has more leeway and necessitates a more forceful management approach.

African democracies have come a long way over the last two decades, but regional and country differences remain large. On the contrary, the basic socio-economic underpinnings of society in many African countries have remained mostly intact. So because of the increasing importance of elections in society, they are often seen to have a significant impact on how power is distributed and regulated. Exclusive voting systems, as well as weak or biassed electoral institutions, increase the likelihood of elections being a "do-or-die" event in countries where the incumbent has practically complete control over political authority and economic resources of the state (Halakhe, 2013, Onouha & Ufumba, 2017).

The first obstacle is the recurrence of conflict. A "frozen" phase in the conflict cycle has been generated by the stalemate in Armenian-Azerbaijani peace talks over Nagorno-Karabakh. As the battle escalated in 2016 during the Four-Day War, there were several instances of clashes. Efforts to resolve the issue peacefully or violently have been ineffective, as evidenced by the escalating and de-escalating violence on the front lines (Akebo, 2016).

The political leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the Minsk Group, are to blame for the conflict's "frozenness." Negative labelling, uncompromising declarations, and the self-victimization of the belligerents all contribute to the inability to accomplish a peaceful change. The Azerbaijani and Armenian peoples' concerns are exacerbated by such acts, which do not support any compromises in discussions (Bebler, 2015). Even while there is no tangible blueprint for a peaceful settlement, the Minsk Group does not have any influence on the belligerents. Third parties in the region prevent a full-scale war from being waged, making a violent transformation of the situation impossible (Broers, 2015). Findings from this study indicate that Armenia and Azerbaijan's political leaders must cease hostilities, the negotiation agenda and framework must be changed, and the third parties involved must actively participate in the peace process in order to avoid future negotiations' failure and violent escalation at the border (Blahova, 2019).

When it comes to national matters, there is another obstacle. There is a lack of political debate on Europe in European elections due to significant internal disagreements in mainstream parties about European problems, as argued by Julian (2017). Mainstream parties prefer to avoid bringing up such problems during election campaigns as a strategic reaction to such confrontations. It's possible for new parties to take advantage of this technique, especially those that are Eurosceptical, by de-emphasizing European problems (so-called challenger parties). It also relies on the prominence and polarisation of European issues in public opinion however big this window of opportunity is. There is a greater window of opportunity for new challengers if those concerns are prominent and the percentage of Eurosceptical attitudes in public opinion is larger (Susan, 2017). The strength of Euroskeptic challengers affects the strategic reactions of mainstream parties. Due to internal strife

within the major parties, there is an increased chance of arousing the "sleeping giant" and mobilising people who would otherwise stay away from the mainstream parties.

The third issue is the representation of ethnic minorities and majorities. Bosnia-Herzegovina's legislative systems are complicated and need a certain proportion of elected representatives from each ethnic group to be elected at different levels. Ethnic cleansing was used throughout the conflict to reduce the population of Bosnian ethnicities in some areas, which resulted in individuals controlling ethnic groupings in other regions of the nation. After the conflict, a new phenomenon emerged: peaceful ethnic cleansing. As ethnic minorities in their pre-war villages, many people decided to relocate to locations where their own ethnic groups were a majority. Thus, less ethnically diverse representatives are elected to public office at all levels of government, including the state and federal legislatures, as a result of these procedures (Neven, 2018). According to the Minority Rights Group, Bosnia international Herzgovina (BiH's) governmental, educational, and social structures are rife with discrimination (Damir, 2018). As the Council of Europe has discovered, "persons" classified as "Others" are institutionally discriminated against and prevented from fully participating in democratic processes (Advisory Committee, 2017). The international community in Bosnia-Herzegovina has done relatively little to push reform despite considerable condemnation from governments and international non-governmental organizations. Apathy among Bosnians in the political arena goes beyond the misdeeds of domestic political parties. Bosnia-international Herzegovina's community has the obligation to break the cycle by supporting and, if necessary, enforcing a change in the constitutional order and the election system. This type of election analysis will continue to be released every four years until these two adjustments are implemented.

There is also a problem with dynamic sources of conflict. The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka stems from a complex web of interconnected causes and outcomes. It should not be inferred that these factors are linked to one another in a linear historical progression. Root causes can frequently be found in a single, but extended, context, and they can even arise at the same time. Ethnic and religious differences are evident in Sri Lankan society, which is a mosaic of ethnic and religious groupings (Economic Times, 2019).

Ethnic diversity is another challenge. Mali's post-colonial state-building process has been accompanied by a history of national and inter-community violence. Malian unity has been threatened by a series of security crises since 1963, including rebellions and armed conflicts. Malian ethnic and cultural variety has been utilised as a divide-and-rule tool, first by French colonists and subsequently post-colonial politicians, to exercise their control in the north, but also by the Tuareg noble class to impose its leadership onto the whole society (Diara,2012). All previous peace accords have failed because of this division and the difficulties in meeting the needs of all populations in the circumstances, according to a CRU Report (2015) (which would, in turn, guarantee a post-conflict stability). There has been no long-term peace between the north and the south and inside the northern villages since local interests diverged and even conflicted. Tense relations between the north and the south have been exacerbated by recurring outbreaks of violence since the country's independence. Bamako's historically 'tough' posture was further bolstered by the rise of illegal trafficking and criminal activity in the north (McGregor, 2012). Conflicts have worsened due to excessive militarization, inability to deal with the economic component of crises, and discretionary advantages given to a small number of associated or supportive clans. 'Solutions' of the past have only complicated political

conversations and postponed a debate on Mali's national balance, notably at the economic and political levels (International Crisis Group,2011). Ethnic, religious, and regional chauvinism is a common tactic used by Nigerian politicians to gain support in elections.

As a result of the increased competitiveness among different socio- economic groups and the resulting rise in conflict, corruption has been a significant obstacle. Aside from the public's distrust and lack of collaboration stemming from the security services' perceived corruption, the state's reaction to violent outbreaks has frequently been delayed by corruption due to the syphoning off of equipment and salaries by high-ranking officials (NSRP, 2012). A new anti-corruption agency in Nigeria, the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), which was founded in 2002, has had some success and might be seen as an example of institutional resilience. The EFCC has charged 30 notable politicians, including 15 former state governors, despite the fact that convictions have been rare (Persson2014).

Another issue is the choice of intervention methods. Protracted hostilities in East Africa include the conflict in South Sudan, the breakdown of Somalia's state, the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi, the crisis in Ethiopia, and the battles in former Zaire. Despite the severity of the issues, just a superficial look was given to them. Although the crisis in Burundi posed a serious threat, the focus was mostly on diplomatic efforts by a number of different agencies and actors. As a result of these actions, there are now War Crime Tribunals, but no one involved has given any regard to the necessity to address the deep concerns of those involved in the fight. Instead of uncovering the core reasons of conflict, the courts appear to have been set up to

punish those who were picked for destruction by the strong parties (Anchakeng, 2014).

Another problem is that ethnic communities have a wide range of beliefs and practices. Federal design in South Sudan is based on a conventional division of powers legislative/executive/judicial) that is tailored to the region's distinct cultures (UNHCR, 2014). The core state of South Sudan is, however, mostly under the leadership of the SPLM, a former rebel organisation that fought against the government. All levels of government, including the sub-national ones, are populated by former or current SPLM officers and/or loyalists. The state's performance has suffered as a result of a lack of emphasis on formal credentials in the selection process for government positions. A lack of trust in the state is being caused by the SPLM's informal networks, which have undermined the South Sudanese constitution's official democratic institutions and processes. As a result, the state is weak, lacking in institutional capacity and legitimacy, and the military, government, and state have formed an unhealthy symbiotic relationship (Koos, 2014).

Another problem derives from the disparities in ethno-regional growth. Ethnicity is a major issue in Kenya's politics because of the colonial goal of cultivating areas occupied by the colonial settlers, such as the White Highlands, which has resulted in a wide disparity in ethnic development. As a result, racial inequalities are linked to geographical disparities in economic development. The failure of successive governments to invest in underdeveloped regions has been blamed by groups in these areas. Conflicts are exacerbated because they see political power and control of development resources as a symbiotic relationship. There is the belief that the president's home region is given preferential treatment when it comes to allocation of

development resources. As a result, ethnic alliances are created in order to share power (Nyaura, 2018). Ethnicity was further cultivated during the post-colonial era. According to Ndege (2018), Kenya's first president Jomo Kenyatta, and his successor, Daniel Moi, created an authoritarian state. They ethnized the state by appointing their henchmen and rewarding their people with chunks of land in prime areas, making the country prone to violence. Since colonialism, the 2 presidents failed to solve the land question, which has remained to hurt the peace building process in some parts of the country, Nakuru included.

Crawford (2014) also points out that politicians use ethnic differences to incite violence in order to consolidate their authority by reviving old grudges. According to Rothschild's theory, political entrepreneurs utilise the anxieties and worries of the groups they represent in order to generate a sense of collective wrongdoing and a desire to right it. Ethnic polarisation is a result of their efforts. As a result, ethnic cleavages empower political entrepreneurs to organise grievances against benefit distributions that are regarded as unfair to any one group. The vocabulary of fear, stupidity, and hatred is used by political entrepreneurs as a weapon of division and control. Aside from explaining how politicians play a crucial role, this author fails to explain why ethnic mobilisation takes place.

Halakhe, 2013 introduces a new issue in Kenya's election-related violence by pointing out that no one has been prosecuted. There has been a rise in inter-ethnic violence during national elections in Kenya since the commencement of multi-party elections in 1991, according to him. After the elections of 2007, there has been no effort to prosecute individuals who purportedly carry the greatest culpability for mass atrocity crimes. "Up to 5,000 cases" will be reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecutions in

order to prosecute them before the 2013 elections, he said. Although only 94 people were convicted in 2011, the government declared that just seven people had been convicted for crimes committed during the 2007 post-election violence, according to Human Rights Watch. The poor success rate of prosecutions can be attributed to a variety of causes. There was a hurry to apprehend those suspected of being responsible for the violence, with little thought given to identifying any eyewitnesses. As a result, a large number of cases were dismissed early on. As a result of the poor evidence collection, the quality of the material available for prosecutions was significantly weakened. This has had a terrible effect on individuals who are seeking redress. Because the government and police were frequently complicit in the violence, they had a strong motivation to thwart efforts to hold officials accountable (Halakhe, 2013).

There has been an increase in episodic violence and inter-ethnic disputes in Kenya since the 1992 general elections, according to Ongoro (2013) as a result of both the state's inability to hold free and fair elections, as well as elite manipulations from several departments (Williams, 2018). The ability of political entrepreneurs to mobilise ethnic groupings into violent conflict depends on the strength of existing state institutions. It was Daniel Moi's rule that inherited and maintained Jomo Kenyatta's system of governance, and he adapted it for his own purposes (Kimoth2018). All of Kenyatta's oppressive measures, including the Public Order Act and the Chief's Authority Act, were kept in place after independence. Recurrence of ethnic violence in Nakuru County is linked to the strength and shortcomings of existing state institutions, such as court systems and police departments. However, the subject of relevance to the research is why Nakuru County's inter-ethnic relations have been shaped by successive political coalitions.

According to Adar (1998), provincial administrators were accorded immense power by the then president, Daniel Moi, which made them control over and even manipulate the functions of members of parliaments. With such immense power, these Provincial administrators could not now be objective in looking at the ethnic conflicts. Indeed, they now became the ethnic Kings and their word and decisions played a key role in either escalating conflict or reducing it.

It is the elites' purpose to incite a state of animosity and create a challenge for national security, according to Pierce (2016). As a result, leaders of mass-led wars want to hurt their opponents. Using Pierce's example, we can see how the leader and the people are connected. Threats elicit a response from the populace, which is seen as a sign of goodwill. Elites are viewed as harmful because they produce such threats. There is a widespread belief amongst leaders that an ethnic community is under threat and that this threat is based on inaccurate or misleading facts and emotional symbolic problems (Hugo, 2017).

2.3.2 Opportunities for Managing inter-ethnic Conflicts occasioned by National Elections

Centralization and bureaucratic management were hallmarks of state-building around the world. It's not uncommon for hegemonic elites to marginalise the periphery and alternative identities in unitary states. In many cases, a single language and a single nationality are a byproduct of the process of uniting a state. State structures are in various stages of development. Some groups, like the European Union, have reached a high degree of integration, where border controls for members of the community are almost eliminated. State-by-state, the vast majority of countries are in various stages of development. Almost every decolonized society, including the former Soviet Union

and parts of Eastern Europe, follows some variation of this pattern. State building is seen as a form of promoting national cohesion and integration.

In the African context, decentralisation might be considered as a chance for peace in society. The concepts of power devolution allow individuals to negotiate the conditions of political loyalty, to influence the political system in which they live, to retain their identity, and to secure their security. With the cooperation of the parties involved and the support of the international community, these goals may be achieved without resorting to secession agitation. Because it is predicated on the idea that when ethnic groups are arranged according to their relative importance, conflict between them tends to spiral upward. Parallel groups, on the other hand, don't have to deal with conflict in the same way. There is a strong correlation between ethnicity and rank in ranked systems. Group identification restricts mobility options. The government's responsiveness and efficiency can be improved via decentralisation (Odhiambo2005). As a result, critics of decentralisation say that every 'tribe' would become an autonomous country.

Nyarau, 2018, argues that the solution to ethnicity in Kenya is to support institutions that are designated to maintain cohesion and togetherness. The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), which has the mandate to eliminate prejudice on the basis of ethnicity and promote tolerance among Kenyans, is an example of an institution or independent body that can help. The NCIC is there, but it lacks the ability to prosecute hate-mongers because of its lack of prosecution authority. The Kenyan parliament must strengthen such legislation. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) should be empowered with prosecutorial authority in order to combat corruption and the propagation of negative racial stereotypes by the political

class. They have lain dormant due to a lack of 'teeth' to deal with such vices. These organisations are self-reliant and tasked with enhancing greater transparency and accountability among Kenyans as a whole.

In addition, the 2010 Kenyan Constitution contains a number of principles intended to promote the political inclusion of all the ethnic groupings in the country. As a first premise, it is important to recognise that Kenya has a diverse population of ethnic groups, which until recently has been considered anathema in the Kenyan political discourse. Ethnic variety among Kenyans is well-represented in the Constitution, although it does not go much farther in terms of instituting ethnicity in Kenya. There are no formal statuses given to the languages of the numerous ethnic groups in Kenya, unlike in Ethiopia and South Africa, where there are official statuses. Kenyans' ethnic diversity is acknowledged, but their commitment to "live in peace and harmony as one indivisible sovereign nation" is emphasised, which serves to contrast this awareness with an emphasis on their oneness. Ethnic diversity is still a political taboo that the Constitution's authors were unable to overcome. As a result, the Constitution is imprecise and murky when it comes to ethnic diversity in institutions.

However, the foregoing does not imply that the Constitution remains mute on the subject. Specifically, it aims to make sure that ethnic minorities, as well as other marginalised groups, are included in the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the country. The Constitution's primary institutional tool for achieving this goal is devolution. It's possible to deduce this from the constitutional goals of devolution, which include acknowledging Kenyan diversity and safeguarding and promoting marginalised groups' interests (Nyabira and Ayele, 2016).

Devolution, as an institutional vehicle for ethnic communities' political engagement, provides an additional chance to address inter-ethnic disputes in Kenya. It takes care of the territorial aspect, which means that the country's sub-national boundaries are organised in a way that accommodates the country's numerous ethnic groupings. Instead of creating a single mega-county for each of the country's five main ethnic groups, Kenya's decentralised government distributes power regionally rather than federally, as is the case in Ethiopia. Ethnic groups with considerable populations are split up into multiple counties as a result of this. In order to accommodate Kenyans' ethnic diversity on a territorial level, the country has been divided into various counties, with the main ethnic populations being divided into smaller counties. With this plan in place, new counties have been created in which ethnic minorities, including those that were previously marginalised, hold a majority share of the population (Nyabira & Ayele, 2016).

Political parties and ethnic inclusion serves as another opportunity as opined by Nyabira and Ayele, (2016). Despite claiming to be nationalists, Kenya's political parties have always been organised along ethnic lines, according to a new study. Kenyans have historically been divided along ethnic lines by political parties, leading to the marginalisation of various ethnic groups. Some constraints on ethnic mobilisation by political parties were included in the Kenyan Constitution of 2010 in order to reduce ethnic exclusion from politics. The Political Parties Act (PPA) of 2011 was passed in order to implement this and other fundamental objectives. The Act stipulates that a political party must have at least 1,000 registered voters in at least half of the state's 47 counties in order to register. Additionally, the voter list must reflect the geographic and ethnic diversity of the population, as well as the representation of minorities and underrepresented groups.

National Steering Committee (NSC) has also helped promote the formation of the national Conflict Early Warning and Response Unit (CEWERU), which is aimed to increase the government's capacity for prompt and effective response to imminent violence. Projects aimed at promoting ethnic harmony and integration were made possible in part thanks to the support of civil society and the general public provided by CEWERU and the District Peace Councils. Hence, it is imperative that the Kenyan government devotes more resources to building a nation that is committed to upholding the rule of law, ensuring the protection of fundamental freedoms, and upholding the Constitution.

Matanga, Okoth and Buchere (2012) advise that training in conflict management should be based on broad-based themes and any relationships among factors. In this case, strategies should be developed based on the historical issues. Besides, there should be mechanisms to prevent politicians from triggering these issues during elections, which then result in skirmishes.

The Vision 2030 also highlights the need for equity and poverty elimination as one strategy of overcoming conflict in conflict-prone areas. There is need to reduce the number of people living in absolute poverty and guarantee access to opportunities. When this happens, the rate of conflict in Kenya, mores o Nakuru County, will reduce. According to Oyoo, Okoth and Matanga (2030), poverty is one of the major causes of ethnic conflicts and it normally manifest itself during the elections period.

County governments also have a role to play in mitigating conflict in Kenya. The Vision 2030 advocates for ensuring resources in the counties through devolution. This will help county governments to play a key role in empowering their residents and

eliminating some of the age-old structural challenges such as access to social amenities and water among others.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

This study was anchored on three theories namely; the Primordialist theory, instrumentalist theory and Democratic theory.

2.4.1 Primordialist Theory

The Primordialist theory can be traced to the works of two German Philosophers namely Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried Herder. The philosophers focused their discussions on aspects of nationalism which was linked to language and community's ways of thinking. The theory was however brought to mainstream usage by Clifford Geertz (1963) through his work titled *The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Politics in the New States* which he stated that ethnic conflicts are inevitable due to ancient hatreds between ethnic groups and mutual dread of dominance, expulsion, or even extinction since ethnic differences under primordialism are ancestral, profound, and irreconcilable (Geertz 1963). Primitivist thinking, according to these academics, has long been tied to ethnicity and war. Primitivists argue that variations in ethnic identities are the root cause of ethnic strife (Vanhanen 1999; Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012). Being of a certain ethnic group is innate to the human condition and is carried down through the family tree. As a result, according to primordialism, ethnicity is unchanging over generations. Primitivists expect in-group members to be hospitable and cooperative with one another, while expecting out-group members to be hostile and divisive (Harowitz, 1985; Hammond and Axelrod, 2006). Primitivists argue that ethnically diverse groups would inevitably

have ethnic conflicts because of the centrality they assign to disparities in ethnic identities as the root cause of inter-ethnic hatreds, fear, and wars (Vanhanen 1999).

The connection of 'ethnic' and 'conflict' has been accomplished in a number of ways, resulting in less generalizable definitions of ethnicity. Once disseminated into components and distinct facets in order to ascertain the causes of ethnic conflict, broad definitions of ethnicity and ethnic groupings evolve into a diverse spectrum of perspectives with more precise focus points. Among these factors, human biology has historically served as a foundation for primordialist theories of ethnic groupings. Isaacs, for example, views ethnicity as the fundamental group identity and defines it as the ready-made set of endowments and identifications that every individual shared with others from the moment of birth by chance of the family into which he is born at that given time and place (Isaac,1975).

According to this concept, an ethnic group is defined by an entrenched, fixed, and unchangeable ethnicity, since the starting point is the circumstances that people cannot alter. In other words, ethnic groupings are established by causes that are completely unrelated to the group members. This represents the 'given' components of ethnic identities, a recurring theme in primordialist interpretations of ethnic conflict. Simultaneously, if less biologically, Geertz emphasizes the 'givens' underlying 'primordial attachments' by claiming that ethnic groupings are determined by religion, language, and kinship. As a result, primordialist explanations of ethnicity ignore factors such as personal conceptions, preferences, and requirements (Greetz, 1963). As a result, this theory of ethnic conflict has two consequences.

To begin, if ethnic identity is viewed as a biological given, as Isaacs argues, then ethnic conflicts are a natural part of human nature. Second, if 'social givens' like

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kinship, family, language, and religion are emphasized (as Geertz argues) ethnic conflict may develop only when these values are threatened. These primordialist concepts play a significant role in ethnic conflicts as 'ethnic emotions,' which are considered to derive from circumstances beyond the control of ethnic groups. Blagojevic names one of these ethnic feelings as 'old hatreds' (Blagojevic, 2009).

In this sense, when a group's ethnic identity is believed to be threatened, ethnic emotions manifest as conflicts (Horowtz, 1985). These feelings are seen as manifestations of 'primordial attachments,' such as family ties and historical recollections, rather than as responses to present needs. In other words, according to primordialist theory, while ethnic reactions are motivated by an ethnic group's hate, the causes of these atrocities are the accumulation of biological, historical, immutable, and fixed factors. This hypothesis is significant to the study because it implies that individuals become violent in response to perceived or actual hurdles to their success in life. Conflicts arise in this instance when one side is unhappy with its requirements.

This hypothesis contributes to this study by explaining politicised negative ethnicity, which is at the root of inter-ethnic violence. The idea explains how people possess a fixed ethnic identity that is exogenous to historical processes. The theory discusses the variables that contribute to negative ethnicity and inter-ethnic conflict; however, it does not address the relationship between politics, national elections and inter-ethnic conflict, which will be addressed in the second theory- the instrumentalist theory.

2.4.2 Instrumentalist Theory

Many scholars, such as Posen (1993), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), and Gurr (1996), have argued in favor of instrumentalist theory (1994). As the instrumentalists see it,

ethnic strife develops when one group uses its ethnicity to gain political and social benefits at the expense of other groups' ethnicities (Posen 1993; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Ruane and Todd 2004). The instrumentalists argue that ethnic conflicts have causes other than ethnic identity. Safety worries (Posen, 1993), economic disparity (Gurr, 1994), and avarice (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004).

Primordialism assumes that ethnicity is a dependent variable on variables that are not within the control of ethnic groupings. Ethnicity, likewise, is a dependent variable in instrumentalism. However, the latter maintains that ethnic conflicts may be influenced by reasons other than an uncontrolled, ingrained ethnicity. These are more about the practical utility of various ethnic groups, people, and elites than they are about deeply ingrained factors such as family connections and history. Cohen views ethnicity as a political and economic phenomena, whereas ethnic groupings are characterised as 'interest groups.' Although ethnic groups' cultures are originally 'apolitical structures and activities,' he contends that they become politicised via social activity in pursuit of economic and political aims (Cohen, 1974).

According to instrumentalists, ethnic conflict does not arise from ethnic identification but rather from the politicisation or manipulation of political identities in order to achieve political and economic benefits for one ethnic group at the expense of depriving or ignoring other ethnic groups. This act of politicisation is accomplished by the manipulation of ethnicity in order to make it useful for specific purposes. For instance, ethnic nationalist appeals in conflicts invoke previous grievances and hostile nationalist concepts in order to endow their objective with credibility. According to a research conducted by Omar (2010) on ethnic violence in Nakuru County, politicians engaged hungry, jobless, and vulnerable adolescents in exchange for modest handouts

to inflict terror and mayhem on impoverished residents each election year. Another instance of ethnicity being used to legitimise and mobilise speech is when ethnic groups' political and economic interests are at risk (Keen, 2010). When various populations compete for relatively few resources like employment, housing, political power, or social prestige, 'ethnic and racial identities provide a basis for collective conceptualization and action' (Cornell,1998). For instance, in the case of election violence in Nakuru County from 1992 to 2013, political leaders anticipated opportunities to win politically, economically, or socially by violence (Muema, 2017).

It's worth noting that the unequal allocation of political and economic resources is achieved through an ethnic taxonomy rather than a class-based one, even though this latter situation is recognised as a distinct theory of ethnic conflict (the "competition for resources approach" in Blagojevich's essay, for example) (Blagojevich, 2009). So ethnicity is still a strategy in this circumstance, being used to legitimise competition for resources. As a result, instrumentalist theory of ethnic conflict establishes a relationship between ethnicity and conflict, so legitimising the latter.

This theory is relevant to the study because it argues that rivals engaged in conflict are motivated by a desire to improve their situation and conduct an informal cost-benefit analysis to see whether the benefits of revolting outweigh the drawbacks. The theory recognises the critical role of political and socio- economic structural dynamics in explaining temporal and regional variation in the occurrence of inter-ethnic conflict. While the theory does not explain why people organise themselves easily, peacefully, and successfully along ethnic lines, it does explain how elites use or politicise ethnicity as a source of grievances that precipitate ethnic conflict. When it comes to national elections, neither the primordial nor instrumentalist theories have much to

say about how ethnic groups feel about their sense of identity and how strong their bonds are. The tyranny of the majority during elections is therefore explained by democratic philosophy**.**

2.4.3 Democratic theory

Democratic theory is cross-disciplinary and does not adhere to Warrens (1989) separation of political theory and political philosophy (ontology, epistemology, and normativity). The tyranny of the majority is central to Fishkin's (2001) theory of democratic thought. He argues that the will of the people expressed through democratic processes can sometimes run counter to the interests of justice or have unfavorable effects on a marginalized group.

People have the right to participate actively in politics and civic life; the right to the protection of their human rights; the right to the rule of law, in which all citizens are subject to the law; and the right to elect, check, and change their leaders (Maphazi,2012). Citizens having a say in how their government allocates resources has long been valued as a cornerstone of democratic decision-making. Citizenship activism can be traced back to premodern Greece and Colonial New England.

This philosophy seeks to lengthen the time it takes to get from authoritarianism to liberalism and then to democracy. Liberalization, whether economic or political, refers to the easing of restrictions and the expansion of individual and collective rights (Keller, 1996). Just increasing political rights isn't enough to call it a democracy. Though liberalization typically precedes democracy, the two developments are not mutually exclusive. According to Maphazi, liberalization occurs when an authoritarian government is overthrown, transition occurs when a multi-party election

is held, and consolidation occurs when democracy is consolidated (2012). Democracies can be identified by their amount of competition and regularity in their elections; liberal democracies set a higher bar, while procedural democracies make it simpler to track voter turnout.

This theoretical framework suggests a more precise measure of democracy by considering a society's technological and institutional frameworks. Voting, the president, and the legislature all play larger roles in procedural democracies than they do in direct democracies (Mangu, 2005). Proponents of procedural democracy hold that liberty, effective citizen control over government policies by citizens, excellent governance, truth and openness in politics, well-informed and spirited discussions, maximum involvement, and many other values are at the core of what democracy is all about. For them, democracy is deciding for themselves whether to accept or reject those who would rule them.

The theory provides additional explanations of substantive democracy, with an emphasis on economic shifts. It would appear that most African nations lack a strong democratic foundation upon which to build better economic and social conditions and more equitable societies (Maphazi, 2012). According to Mangu, a country's democracy should improve people's lives through measures like increasing employment and lowering poverty (2005).

Observing national elections through the perspective of democratic theory is crucial. The concept of freedom is crucial to comprehending democracy. Voting is fundamental to a democratic society because it gives citizens a chance to express their rights.

Independent Variable	Intervening Variables	Dependent Variable

National Elections:
- Liberty
- Politicians rhetoric/ Debates
- Form of governance
- Mobilization
- Ethnic Parties
- Election results inconsistencies
- Weak political institutions
- Unmet Electorate expectations
- Uneven resource distribution

Inter- Ethnic Conflicts:
- Destruction of property
- Torching of homes
- Economic sanctions
- Deaths and injuries from political violence
- Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)
- Disunity Among the ethnic groups
- Loss of lives and property
- Poverty

- Political intolerance
- Bungled elections
- Political interference in the Electoral commission
- Negative Ethnicity
- The Media
- Social Justice
- Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission reforms
- Security sector reforms
- Role of external actors
- Civic education to electorates
- Public participation

Figure 2. 1: Conceptual Framework model showing interaction of variables

Source: Researcher (2020)

2.5 Summary of Research Gaps

A number of studies have looked at the prevalence of electoral violence in Nakuru and the strategies that can be used to curb such conflict. Studies such as Matanga, Okoth and Buchere (2012); Ndege (2018); Matanga, Amutabi, and Musya (2017) dissect ethnic and electoral violence from different angles in various parts of the country and suggest strategies that can be used in the peacebuilding efforts. However, only a few studies have tried to focus on the relationship between national elections and inter-ethnic violence. The current study fills these gaps by developing a nexus between national elections and inter-ethnic conflicts in Nakuru County. Besides, a number of studies conducted on this area have been suffering from gender bias, with male participants seemingly higher than the female participants. However, the current study ensured a gender balance in terms of the sample populations selected.

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter presented the discussion on the existing literature on the issue of national elections and inter-ethnic conflicts. The chapter presented the various gaps existing in literature and also elaborated on the key guiding theories. The next chapter discusses the research methodology adopted by the study

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The chapter discusses the technique employed in the study's data gathering procedure and how the acquired data was processed to meet the study's objectives. The chapter is separated into sections that discusses the study design, study population, and sample size determination technique. Additionally, it discusses the research tools, techniques of data collecting and data processing and presentation.

3.1 Research Design

A study design is a strategy, framework, or plan used to find answers to research problems. According to Lewis (2015), research design is a time- and activity-based plan that includes the following components: the research question; the selection of sources and types of information; the specification of the relationship between study variables; and the procedures for each research activity. Descriptive research methods were used because they allowed the researchers to answer questions like "what," "when," "where," and "how" (Kim, Sefcik & Bradway, 2017). This design focused on gathering data that was used to analyse occurrences and generated pertinent findings and suggestions. The design was chosen due to the ease and convenience the researcher would find in obtaining respondents' thoughts or opinions.

3.2 Study Area

The researcher chose to undertake this study on the topic: The Nexus between inter-ethinic conflicts National elections in Nakuru County between 1992 and 2017 because the county has witnessed inter-ethnic violence in every election year since the re-

introduction of political pluralism in Kenya in the early nineties. The County is appropriate for this study because inter-ethnic conflict has resulted in loss of human lives, deteriorated inter-ethnic relations, negative ethnic stereotypes, land and boundary disputes, forced human displacements, property destruction, cattle rustling, slow economic growth, and disruption of education. Inter-ethnic violence has flared with alarming regularity since 1992. The researcher chose two Sub Counties for the study: Kuresoi North and Molo, both of which have a history of inter-ethnic violence, as evidenced by prior studies such as Nyanga'u 2019. Nakuru County is cosmopolitan, with a diversified population of ethnic and national origins. Availability of natural resources, soil fertility and rainfall, pasture, infrastructure, economic possibilities, proximity to metropolitan areas and security- all impact settlement patterns. Although rural regions have a sizable population, urban areas have the highest population density due to rural-urban mobility facilitated by well-developed infrastructure and economic possibilities (CGN, 2018).

Nakuru has a population of 2,162,202 people, according to the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. Agriculture is the primary economic activity, while tourism comes second (Economic Survey, 2020). Nakuru County is located at an elevation of 1871m above sea level. The County's climate is pleasant, with temperatures ranging from warm to cool. Rainfall in Nakuru is primarily in the winter, with very little rain in the summer. The Köppen-Geiger climate classification is Csb. The temperature here averages 17.5 °C | 63.5 °F. The rainfall here is around 895 mm | 35.2 inch per year (Kenya Meteorological Department, 2020).Nakuru County is made up of eleven (11) sub-counties or constituencies.

The researcher settled on Molo and Kuresoi North subcounties because they are among the most affected subcounties when it comes to inter-ethnic conflict emanating from national elections. In 2015, two years before the General Elections, leaflets were distributed in Kuresoi North and Molo, warning some residents to vacate, resulting in 5 deaths, 162 displacements and the torching down of 15 houses (The New Humanitarian, 2015). According to the IDP Network, 3,000 people have lost their lives, 5,000 houses burnt down and 50,000 people displaced since 1992 in Molo alone.

Before the just concluded 2022 General Elections, the CS for Ineriror, Fred Maiangi, beefed up security in Molo and Kuresoi and arrested 8 local politicians for incitement (The Star, 2022). This was based on the previous incidences of inter-ethnic violence that normally recycles during elections.

Figure 3. 1: Map of Nakuru County

Source: Researcher (2021)

3.3 Study Population

A study population is a large population of interest to the researcher from which the sample respondents are drawn (Le Ray *et al.,* 2015). The study population of the survey included 14,054 respondents of selected household heads from the two sub-counties who form part of the ordinary voters, Community leaders, County administration (county officials, chiefs, assistant chiefs, security officers) and IEBC officials, officials from Civil Society Organizations(CSOs), Faith Based Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and Community Based Organizations(CBOs) including USAID and GIZ, Security experts, Religious leaders, Government administrators including DCC, ACC, Chiefs and Assistant chiefs.

3.4 Sampling Technique and Sample Size

This study sampled the intended population using both probability and non-probability sampling approaches. Proportional stratified sampling, purposive sampling, and random sample procedures were utilised in this study. Collecting data in research is frequently problematic due to the large number of possible units of analysis involved in the research challenge. As a result, a sample must be chosen that accurately reflects the important characteristics of the entire collection of units referred to as the population (Landreneau, 2004).

According to Kothari (2004), if the population from which a sample is to be selected is not homogenous, a stratified sampling approach is typically used to get a representative sample. The population is separated into numerous subpopulations that are more homogenous than the whole population (the various subpopulations are referred to as 'strata'), and then items are picked from each stratum to form a sample.

Kurosei North and Molo sub-counties were chosen from among Nakuru's 11 sub-counties. Two wards from each of the two counties were purposefully chosen because they are more prone and sensitive to ethnic strife. Due to the fact that each strata was more homogenous than the entire population, exact estimates were obtained for each.

Table 3. 1: Household Respondents Sample Size

Sub-county	Ward	Number of households	Sample size	Sampling technique
Kuresoi North	Mau Summit	2,258	64	Simple random
	Kamara	1,019	28	Simple random
Molo	Elburgon	7,379	204	Simple random
	Molo	3,398	94	Simple random
TOTAL		**14,054**	**390**	

Source: Researcher, 2021

Due to the variance in the number of home units in the four administrative wards, stratified sampling and random sampling procedures were employed to determine the number of household units to sample in the two sub-counties (Table 3.1). The sample size for household heads from a population of 14,054 was 390, as indicated in the sample size chart in Table 3.2. (Smith, 1983; Isaac & Micheal, 1981). Three hundred and ninety heads were randomly picked from the sampled household units in each area.

Table 3. 2: Sample Size Selection Chart

SAMPLE SIZE SELECTION CHART

Recommended sample sizes for two different precision levels Source: Isaac and Michael, 1981; Smith, MF, 1983					
	Sample Size			Sample Size	
Population size	+5%	10%	Population size	5%	10%
10	10		275	163	74
15	14		300	172	76
20	19		325	180	77
25	24		350	187	78
30	28		375	194	80
35	32		400	201	81
40	36		425	207	82
45	40		450	212	82
50	44		475	218	83
55	48		500	222	83
60	52		1000	286	91
65	56		2000	333	95
70	59		3000	353	97
75	63		4000	364	98
80	66		5000	370	98
85	70		6000	375	98
90	73		7000	378	99
95	76		8000	381	99
100	81	51	9000	383	99
125	96	56	10000	385	99
150	110	61	15000	390	99
175	122	64	20000	392	100
200	134	67	25000	394	100
225	144	70	50000	397	100
250	154	72	100000	398	100

Source: Isaac & Micheal (1981) http://www.uwex.edu/ces/tobaccoeval/

Various sampling techniques were used to select key informants who took part in the study. Security officers from GSU and RPU were purposively sampled and hence one officer from each category selected for the study. The study population also included civil society organizations (CSOs) who included FBOs, NGOs, CBOs as well as election observers. The researcher identified 60 CSOs, 10% of these CSOs were sampled as supported by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003). Sample random sampling

was then used to select the 6 CSO as that were sampled. Religious leaders also took part in the study. In this case, the researcher identified 30 religious leaders who formed part of the study population and using 10% as recommended by Mugenda and Mugenda (2003), the researcher sampled 3 religious leaders. The researcher reached the 3 religious leaders through convenience sampling. Census method was used to reach D.Cs (presently DCCs) and D.Os (ACCs); Molo, Elburgon and Mau summit administrative regions.

Purposive sampling was used to select Chiefs, Assistant chiefs and Local leaders (elders) as well as IEBC officials (Head office, Molo and Kuresoi North Constituencies officers). Purposive sampling is justified in this study on the basis of Kombo and Trump's (2006) argument that it is beneficial when the sample has sufficient data for in-depth investigation of the topics being addressed. As Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) support, 10% of the target population was applied to select Opinion leaders. Additionally, two Focus Group Discussions were conducted with the youth groups, each with at least eight participants, for a total of sixteen respondents.

Table 3. 3: Key Informants Sample Size

Key Informants	Target Population	Sample Size	Sampling Technique
Security officers(GSU, RPU, AP)	30	3	Purposive
CSOs (FBOs, NGOs, CBOs) officials/ election observers)	60	6	Simple random
Religious Leaders	30	3	Convenience
D.C.Cs and ACCs; Molo, Elburgon and Mau summit administrative regions	4	4	Census
Chiefs/ Assistant chiefs/ Local leaders (elders)	12	4	Purposive
Opinion leaders	30	3	Purposive
IEBC officials (Head office, Molo and Kuresoi North Constituencies officers)	9	3	Purposive
TOTAL	146	**25**	

Source: Researcher, 2020

The total sample size for this study was 390 household heads, 25 key informants and 16 FGDs respondents leading to 431.

3.5 Data Collection

The study used both primary and secondary data. The primary data was acquired directly from the respondents using various data collection tools, while Secondary data was acquired through various secondary sources of data,more so written or recorded sources.

3.5.1 Primary Data

Primary data sources imply sources of data that the researcher gets directly from respondents (face to face) which included use of questionnaires, interview

guides/schedules and Focus Group Discussions. The data gathered included information on the historical, ethnic, socioeconomic, and political aspects that contribute to conflict, as well as conflict management strategies implemented. The data collection procedure was aided by questionnaires, interview guides, and Focus Group Discussions.

3.5.1.1 Questionnaires

The survey covered participants using both open-ended and closed-ended questions. The questionnaire's items were designed and influenced by the study's aims. As Nkapa (1997) and Okoth (2012) describe, an open-ended or unstructured questionnaire is used when the researcher wishes for respondents to explore subjects freely and without restriction. Additionally, the researcher will employ closed-ended or structured surveys in which respondents will be offered options. According to Babbie (1990), the close-ended questionnaire design appears to be the optimal way for gathering unique data in order to characterise a population that is too vast to observe first hand. The researcher also employed closed ended/structured surveys since they are quicker and easier to complete because they need little writing. Pre-tested questionnaires were utilised to elicit information from chosen household respondents about the variables that contribute to conflict and the intervention measures employed in the County's management. The questionnaires (Appendix 1) were administered to the household heads in both Kuresoi North and Molo Sub-counties.

3.5.1.2 Interview guides/Schedule

Interview guides (Appendix 2) were utilised to elicit information from key informants, which included government officials, CSO representatives, IEBC officials, security agencies and local leaders. This type of data collection is essentially similar to that of questionnaire collecting, with the exception that schedules (proforma comprising a series of questions) are filled out by professionally designated enumerators/research assistants. Enumerators clarify the investigation's purpose and objectives and help alleviate any respondents' confusion about the ramifications of a specific query or the meaning or notion of tough terminology (Kombo & Tromp, 2006). In some circumstances, respondents may be given schedules and enumerators may assist them in recording their responses to various questions on the schedules.

3.5.1.3 Focus Group Discussions

There are two FGDs that were conducted in the study area. The Two Focus Group Discussions were homogenous in terms of gender with both male and female youths in the study area attending a different FGD. Each FGDs was made up of eight participants. The groups were formed from the Molo and Kuresoi North sub-counties, respectively. The male FGD was held in Molo while the female FGD was held in Kuresoi North. The purpose of the Focus Group Discussions was to ascertain the respondents' perspectives on the problems under consideration. Appendix 3 contains the FGD guide. The first plate depicts one of the FGD interviews.

3.5.2 Secondary Data

The study gathered, synthesised, and utilised secondary data which refers to information from books, journals, government papers, and online publications

pertaining to national elections, inter-ethnic conflicts, and conflict management. Secondary data are classified as either published or unpublished. These included publications by national and county governments; publications by foreign governments or international organisations and their subsidiary organizations; technical and trade journals; books, magazines, and newspapers; reports and publications by various associations associated with business and industry, banks, and stock exchanges; reports prepared by research scholars, universities, economists, and others in various fields; and public records. When a researcher uses secondary data, he or she must investigate numerous sources in order to collect them. In this instance, he or she is almost definitely not confronted with the difficulties inherent in the acquisition of primary data (Kothari, 2004).

3.6 Data Analysis and Presentation

Quantitative data collected through questionnaires was cleaned and coded then entered into the Statistical Package for Social Scientists (SPSS) versions 25. The data was then analysed to get frequencies and percentages which were then presented in the form of tables, charts, and bar graph. Qualitative data from interviews and Focus Group Discussions were transcribed then organised in a thematic form. The thematic analysis of qualitative data acquired from Key informants and FGDs were used to create narrative reports and verbatim quotations which were presented in the findings of the study.

3.7 Reliability and Validity

Content and face validity are required to determine if the questionnaire's content is acceptable and pertinent to the study's goal (Parsian and Dunning, 2009). Items that

are deemed to be insufficient for measuring the variables are then adjusted to increase the instrument's quality. Face validity, which assesses the questionnaire's appearance in terms of practicality, readability, style consistency, formatting, and the clarity of the language employed, was accomplished through supervisory discussions. Reliability of the study was conducted using test-retest method. Prior to doing the real data collection, the researcher ran a pilot study in Naivasha sub-county to ensure dependability. The pilot study's findings aided in resolving misinterpretations and a lack of clarity on some of the questions posed. The researcher was able to determine the necessary modifications to the data gathering instruments using data from the pilot study.

A research assistant familiar with the geographical places, with a minimum of a secondary education and fluency in local languages, was hired and the researcher set aside one week to guide her. Questionnaires were further assessed in cooperation with supervisors and other lecturers relevant to the topic of study during departmental discussions.

3.8   Limitations and delimitations of the Study

Several constraints and challenges were met in collecting information due to its sensitivity and, consequently, mistrust. To mitigate this, the researcher, through the Research Assistant, briefed respondents about the research's objectives, which are mostly intellectual and academic in nature, and also ensured respondents' anonymity. He promised would be respondents that the information they submitted would be kept private and confidential.

Additionally, it was difficult to locate the sampled groups on time, resulting in the collection of data consuming an excessive amount of time. To minimise time and assist in overcoming the language barrier, the Research Assistant who was familiar with the geographical places and local languages was employed.

3.9 Ethical Considerations

The researcher made sure that the study upholds quality by obtaining an introduction letter from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology authorizing the research. The university authorization letter was then forwarded to the National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovations (NACOSTI) for issuance of a research permit and later authorization from the Nakuru County Commissioner's office. Before distributing the questionnaires for collection of primary data, the researcher assured would be respondents of confidentiality and privacy thus he would carry out the research on free consent (without coercion to participate in the study). National and County Government officers who provided secondary data (records, archival materials, books, journals and publications) were also assured of privacy and confidentiality of the information they would provide. The researcher assured the foregoing by emphasizing that the information to be provided by the respondents was for academic or intellectual purpose only.

3.10   Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the methodology employed and the manner in which the study data was gathered, evaluated, and presented for simple reading and comprehension of the relationship between national elections and inter-ethnic conflict in Nakuru

County. The methodology mentioned is essentially a triangulation approach that employs both quantitative and qualitative data collecting and analysis methodologies.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATURE OF INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS OCCASIONED BY NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN NAKURU COUNTY BETWEEN 1992 AND 2017

The chapter presented results of analyzed data based on the variables of the study. The chapter also sought to focus on reviewing the first objective of the study which was to examine the nature and causes of inter-ethnic conflicts in Nakuru County, Kenya. The results included demographic data of respondents, causes of inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections and the involvement of respondents in the election processes.

4.1 Response Rate

Out of the 395 questionnaires that were distributed to respondents of Molo and Kuresoi North constituencies, 330 questionnaires were returned, dully filled representing 84.6 % response rate as shown below. Similarly interviews for the key informants and FGDs were 100% achieved.

Table 4. 1: Response Rate

Respondents	General Respondents (Questionnaires)	FDG, Youth Reps, Opinion Leaders, Religious Leaders, Security Personnel, CSOs, IEBC, Government Officials (Interview)
Frequency	390	25
Response	330	25
Percentage (%)	84.6	100

Source: Research Data (2021)

The study targeted 390 respondents from different social strata in Molo and Kuresoi North sub counties of Nakuru County. As shown above, out of 390 questionnaires sent out, 330 questionnaires were returned duly filled. This represents 84.6 % response rate. Additionally, two FGDs and interviews with key informants were conducted. This rate was possible because the researcher personally visited the areas of study and also used a Research Assistant who was conversant with the area under study and understood the local languages. For a period of three months (between November 2020 and January 2021), the researcher distributed questionnaires and interviewed respondents in Kuresoi North and Molo sub counties and collecting filled forms.

4.2 Demographic Data

4.2.1 Age of Respondents

The study analyzed the age of respondents as shown in Table 4.2.

Table 4. 2: Age of the Respondents

Respondents' age	Frequency	Percentage %
18 Years-27 Years	54	18.5
28 Years-37 Years	117	33
38 Years-47 Years	115	31.6
48 Years-57 Years	30	9.6
58 Years-67 Years	18	5.6
Above 68 Years	7	1.6
Total	**330**	**100**

Source: Research Data (2021)

The results show that out of 330 respondents, the majority 117 with a percentage of 33% were aged between 28-37 years. Similarly, 115 respondents were aged between 38-47 years, 54 of the respondents were aged between 18-27 years, 30 of the respondents were aged between 48-57 years, 18 of the respondents were aged between 58-67 years and 7 of them which accounts for 1.6 % were above 68 years.

A large proportion of respondents as indicated from the study findings were between the ages 18 to 47 years, who had stayed in the area for some time and hence understood the nature of conflict. Additionally, the age bracket of a majority of the respondents was in line with the voter requirement and hence could participate and explain matters election violence.

Key informants were selected from community leaders, county administration (county officials, chiefs, assistant chiefs, and security officers), IEBC officials and officials from Civil Society Organizations: Faith Based Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations and Community Based Organizations including USAID, UNAIN, SCCRR, GIZ. Additionally, two Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were conducted at local level with selected groups representing leaders of youth groups from the two Sub counties.

4.2.2 Gender of Respondents

The study findings on gender are displayed in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4. 1: Analysis of Gender of Respondents

Source: Research Data (2021)

The results show a fair distribution of gender within the two sub counties in Nakuru county where 170 respondents were male and 160 being female. The results indicated a closer balance between the male and female household heads. The study results are in agreement with the KNBS statistics (2009) which indicated that Nakuru County has a total population of 937,131 male, while there are 930,330 female. The study findings are contrary to various scholarly works which indicate that Kenya is patriarchal in nature with most of the communities being male dominated. Many scholarly works have linked persistent disparities associated with patriarchal nature existing along cultural issues to remain potential sources of conflict. This seems not to be the case in Nakuru County.

4.2.3 Employment of Respondents

The outcome of the study indicated that 215 (65.3%) of the respondents worked in informal sectors being self-employed, 70 (21.5%) of the respondents work in formal settings (private and public organizations). The others 45 (13.2%) were neither in formal nor informal type of employment.

Table 4. 3: Employment of Respondents

Employment	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Formal	70	21.5
Informal	215	65.3
None	45	13.2
Total	**330**	**100**

Source: Research Data (2021)

According to the findings, the vast majority of respondents were unemployed. According to the IPI Report (2011), successive administrations have disregarded the problem of young unemployment for many years, to the point that it has developed into a chronic economic disaster. Kenya's youth unemployment rate requires genuine answers, failing which the same circumstances that drove young people to the streets during the subsequent elections would prevail. Unemployment makes groups attractive targets for mass mobilisation and provocation by politicians, which can result in unrest in Nakuru county.

4.2.4 Education Level of Respondents

The study sought to know the level of education for a citizens capability to communicate through writing and expressing ideas. The results are as tabulated in Table 4.4.

Table 4. 4: Education levels of respondents

Education level	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Post-Secondary	80	24.4
Secondary school	166	46.7
Primary	48	16.5
Informal	30	9.8
None	5	2.4
Total	**330**	**100**

Source: Research Data (2021)

The results in Table 4.4 indicated that out of 330 respondents, 166 (46.7%) were form four leavers, 80 (24.4%) schooled up to post-secondary level, 48 (16.5 %) went to school up to primary level, 30 (9.8%) had informal while the others 5 (2.4%) responded with no level of education.

The low education levels reflect the fact that the majority of respondents face financial restrictions, poor enrolment owing to school inaccessibility, relocation, and tensions linked with violence between the region's inter-ethnic groups. The low level of education may be used to explain the frequent incidence of election-related violence, which continues to be prevalent.

4.3 Causes of continual electoral crisis in Nakuru County

The study sought to identify the causes of perennial election violence in Nakuru county.

Table 4. 5 Causes of prevalent inter-ethnic clashes in Nakuru County

Statements	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Unfulfilled political manifesto	10	3.5
Political lies	28	9.4
Tribalism/ Negative ethnicity	138	41.5
Unresolved past injustices	121	42.1
Land related issues	5	0.9
Incitement from political leaders	9	2.6
Total	**330**	**100**

Source: Research Data (2021)

The results show that out of 330 respondents, 138 (42.1%) believe unresolved past injustices is the cause whereas 121 (41.5%)of them acknowledge tribalism as the cause of electoral crisis in Nakuru County, 28 (9.4%) of the respondents stated political lies to be the cause whereas 10 who account for 3.5% mentioned lack of fulfillment of political manifesto(promises) by their elected leaders causes electoral crisis. 9 (2.6%) stated that incitement from national political leaders cause recurrence of electoral crisis while 5 (0.9%) attribute the recurrence to land issues.

From the results the major cause of election crises are historical injustices as well as negative ethnicity/ tribalism.

Other causes worth noting as identified through the FGDs included human rights abuses (absence of health facilities, work and education opportunities), forced displacements from their ancestral lands, discrimination in many areas of their lives and exclusion in the decision-making process especially in the areas that directly affect their lives.

As one respondent noted,

> Nakuru County, especially here in Kuresoi, has always been affected by forced displacements. Many people have been evicted from their ancestral land, and this mostly happens during the elections. Under normal days, we are okay. But when election period nears, people start fearing for their lives and property.

The results indicated the causes of conflict to be failures of macro-level as well as micro level institutions. The findings further indicated that the causes were both from within and without the ethnic communities affected. There are four primary causes of post-election violence in Kenya, according to the UNCHR report (2008) on the causes of conflict: protracted land disputes, recurring violence and impunity, pre-existing violations of economic and social rights and vigilante groups.

One of the key interview informants said;

> The fact is that the county is built on favoritism and unjust acts especially power to control masses through land and ballot since Kenyatta's time (Field Interview at Mau Summit on 20th June 2021).

Another respondent from the Kuresoi North responded that:

> Ethnic conflicts have been witnessed since 1992 between the Kalenjins and the Kikuyus in Njoro, Molo, Kuresoi; conflicts arise over land between the Kikuyus as foreigners,the Maasai, the Kalenjin and the Samburu as natives.

> The crux of the conflicts aims to regain what the Natives believed rightfully belonged to them. This has always reoccurred during subsequent election periods. (Field interview with key informant on 20th June 2021)

From the responses obtained from various tools it is evident that perennial conflict in Nakuru County occurred along ethnic lines with multiple conflict incidences ignited during the electioneering period.

4.3.1. Negative ethnicity

Negative ethnicity and tribalism have been highlighted as one of the major causes of conflict in Nakuru County. A study by Nellis and Rosenzwei (2016) indicates that an ethnic group is considered to be a set of people who share similar racial and cultural traits. They can share the same cultural, political, territorial or economic structure. On the other hand, inter-ethnic conflict is characterized as any episode of prolonged violent conflict in which national, ethnic, and religious minorities or other social groups challenge governments to pursue significant status of change. An ethnic conflict that is violent leads to immense human misery. Nowadays, many subordinate leaders of the ethnic community face a racial identity problem.

As indicated by one key informant,

> Negative ethnicity is a disease here in Nakuru County. In Molo, historical issues together with the tribal question has always acted as a time bomb. This bomb normally comes to explode during elections when one side whose presidential candidate loses.

Ethnic identity is frequently synonymous with hierarchical and conflictual characteristics, considering the degree of ethnic discrimination in contemporary society. It is possible to differentiate the ethnic aspect of social relations from aspects based on neighborliness, national origin, ethnicity and faith, etc., but ethnic conflicts are not a specific class of conflicts. The sense of a common ethnic heritage varies with the location and nature of the social ties. Relations in local communities are

100

multidimensional; links are balanced against each other and against individual interests, based on different attributes.

A mutual ethnic heritage may be a foundation on which individuals are organized for collective action and negotiating with other groups beyond the context of personal associates, although some individuals may try to be free-riders. According to a study by Kisaka and Nyadera (2019) on ethnicity and politics in Kenya's turbulent path to democracy and development, ethnicity has, over time, been used by the self-aggrandizing political elite for self-serving interests.

It is consistent with Owino (2019) who found that the reinstatement of Multi-Party Politics in Kenya corresponded with an increase in political ethnic antagonism when political elites and other players use various methods to win elections. People's ethnic preferences may change, conflict management skills may be disrupted, and participants may regard their connections with members of an opposing ethnic group as undimensional when mobilised by people from different locations. In order to encourage ethnic negotiation, international organisations, including governments, might provide promises that assist resolve ethnic conflicts. A survey of ninety-two armed conflicts over the years 1945–89 concluded that 'racial hostility is the engine that fueled much of today's world wars.' There has been a longstanding dispute between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu dating to days of post-independence concerning the question of settlements, political affiliation, citizenship and land ownership. Political differences were at the center of these disputes where various groups identified with the different political parties. The emergence of inter-ethnic election-related violence in Nakuru county emerged during the 1992 election cycle. Throughout this time, violence was institutionalized in both presidential and

parliamentary elections, thereby contributing to the proliferation of violence that culminated in the county's related violence. Similarly, Oyoo, Okoth and Matanga (2019) found out that historical injustices are the main causes of conflict in Kisumu County.

4.3.2 Land related issues and Historical injustices

Land related fights and historical injustices were also noted as one of the causes of conflict in Nakuru county as evidenced by this study. Natural resource conflict is mostly motivated by shortage. The colonial governments in Nakuru County created ethnic categories. Belonging to a specific ethnic group quickly turned ethnic differences into physical ethnic divisions and violence, as was the case in Rwanda between the Tutsi and Hutu groups. A 2002 research by Sommers found that colonial governments exacerbated disparities between different groups of people in their own countries. Environmental deterioration and irregular precipitation patterns have led to violent ethnic conflicts over diminishing natural resources, such as pastures and water. With the politicisation and manipulation of tensions by politicians who aim to exploit issues for political benefit, the situation becomes even more tense (Fisher, 2002).

One senior government officer noted that

> We have always tried to set mechanisms to ensure that residents in Nakuru coexist in peace. However, there are some areas that are difficult to manage because of the land issue. When you try to solve the existing conflicts, they will always tie their demands across the land question. When such issues are not solved, it will escalate during an electioneering period.

Scarcity has contributed to the decline of the resource base and the destabilising effect that seasonal migration exerts on inter-ethnic/clan conflict (Kimani, 2008), according to the findings of this study. Conflicts involving both direct and indirect

users of resources, such as farmers, developers, and businesses, have taken place in recent years throughout Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Political polarisation and incitement, as well as attitudes, biases, cultural beliefs, and behaviours (for example, teasing of adolescents by women, insults, and abusive songs) that drive communities to fight, have been cited as causes of conflict in the literature. Conflicts have taken on political dimensions, particularly when connected to concerns of land borders and inter-ethnic participation in the leadership of civic, constituency and administrative organisations, it should be noted.

It is worth noting that inter-ethnic violence in Nakuru County as highlighted by this study is exacerbated by ethnic mistrust and politicization which is in agreement with the UN report (2009), which notes that ethnicity causes conflict in the presence of politicization. However, it was noted that politicization not only emanates from political elites, but also from various 'groupings' within the communities e.g. across ethnic lines, age or gender. Relationships between dominant and submissive groups are at the heart of the conflict group disputes in Nakuru County can be attributed to social, economic, and cultural dominance in the framework of power relations in Nakuru County.

4.3.3 Incitement and political Lies

From the household respondents, hate speech was cited as one of the cause of inter-ethnic conflict in Nakuru County. There has never been an exception to the use of hate speech, and Kenya is no exception, serving as a significant catalyst for inter-ethnic violence. Media, rallies, and other avenues have all been used by leaders to spread anti-social rhetoric and turn people against one another. Between 1991 and 1994, Kenya had its first wave of violence. KANU politicians instilled fear among the

KAMATUSA (Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu) ethnic groups, alleging that Kikuyu settlers would expropriate their land in case the Kikuyu won the elections; regarding the opposition as a threat, the leaders called upon the ethnic groups to remain united against their common threat.(Oyugi, 1997).

As observed from the FGDs discussions:

> Politicians always campaign by use of disrespectful words and comments against their opponents and even sometimes against other communities. FGD discussion in Kamara on 27th June 2021)

Scholarly works including Nyaura (2018), confirm that the political elite manipulate the masses into forming groups, more so along ethnic lines. With the such formations, inter-group competition thereby arises. Worth noting is the hatred and struggles for power culminating when these groups compete for survival. This is because the ethnic groups compete overly through political parties formed along ethnic lines. In the end, it is the majority groups that gain control over the minorities. Discrimination and bias can manifest itself in a variety of ways, including through social exclusion. Prejudice can be used to keep some groups from taking full use of society's money, power, knowledge, or decision-making capacity and prohibit them from participating completely (Omondi, 2021). When ethnicity takes precedence over class as the primary means of social stratification, "catching" and "channelling" class-like attitudes into ethno-nationalism occurs, according to Nyaura (2018). From the Nakuru County perspective, it, therefore, becomes much easier for political elites to manipulate citizens along ethnic lines especially with pre-existing perceptions of social exclusions by some groups and this has always become full blown during national elections as noted by this study.

Ethnic awareness, rather than ideology, has always been the driving force behind Kenyan political mobilisation, according to several academics. Political affiliations are strongly linked to ethnicity, and party politics are just a way to advocate the interests of "your people." When it comes to deciding who will run for office, the "correct" party is almost always the one led by a member of the local political "big wig." it does not matter how popular a candidate is. He or she will have a tough time being elected if they are on the platform of a "rival" ethnic party. In Nakuru County, this was proven to be the case.

1.3.3 Unfulfilled political manifestos

During campaign periods, political parties seek votes through use of manifestos. Results from this study indicated that the issue of opportunities and resources was linked to allocation as well as accessibility. As noted by an opinion leader:

> The politicians take advantage of the absence of necessary opportunities like jobs, bridges, roads to convince voters with rich manifestos that they end up not fulfilling once they are elected (Field interview at Kamara on 26th June 2021)

Contrary to this assertion, it was established that government provided resources such as hospitals, dispensaries, or schools which were well utilized and served people from all ethnic communities. However, some respondents felt the facilities were not adequate enough or some were located in far away places being a disadvantage to some ethnic groups.

To address this issue, Kenya's 2010 constitution included devolution, which resulted in the development of county administrations and structures. By embracing variety, devolved governance strives to create national unity. The objective is to build community, and hence national cohesiveness and a respect for a shared national culture. However, it is possible that the bulk of leadership at the different county

government levels, including Nakuru County, comes from the same tribe or clan/community. The absence of tribal variety might be regarded as impeding service delivery at the community level. This will have a long-term influence on county service delivery. For example, some county governments have seen it fit to hire residents of the region or the main ethnic group where the county government is located. This has been observed to be increasing. This anti-ethnic sentiment stymies service delivery and, therefore, growth. These counties have been subjected to widespread plundering by various county government officials. When the leadership provides economic possibilities to a select few (within their ethnic enclave), it becomes a source of contention for the remaining populations.

4.4 Causes of Tensions during electioneering period

The study sought to identify the causes of inter-ethnic tensions during national electioneering periods. The results are indicated in Table 4.6.

Table 4. 6: Causes Tensions during electioneering Period in Nakuru County

Statements	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Electoral theft	190	54.6
Voter Bribery	32	10.8
Incitement from Aspirants	92	29.3
Self Anger	2	0.5
Political Misrepresentation	14	4.8
Total	**330**	**100**

Source: Research Data (2021)

The results displayed in Table 4.6 show that the most mentioned cause of tension is electoral theft at 190 (54.6%). Incitement from leaders recorded a frequency of 92 (29.3%) while voter bribery was the third most mentioned at 32 (10.8%). Political misrepresentation and self-anger were lowly mentioned at 14 (4.8%) and (0.5%) respectively.

Responses from key informants noted that:

Based on past experiences most people here in the county lack trust with the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission process and officials (Field interview with Key informant in Kerusoi North on 28th June 2021).

Another respondent shared that:

Politicians agents incite their supporters to concede defeat or not to concede defeat, which brings tensions that escalate to violence (field interview with a key informant in Elburgon ward on 20th June 2021).

The perception that communities profit from having one of their own in authority is supported by NCIC's (2009) study, which indicates that Kikuyu and Kalenjin have benefited the most from appointments to public posts. According to the NCIC, their dominance in the civil service is related to the term of prior presidents.

According to Rohwerder's 2015 study, Kenya is a vast multi-ethnic country with around 40 distinct ethnic groupings. The Kikuyu are the biggest ethnic group, accounting for around 17% of the population (6,622,576). Other significant ethnic groups are the Luhya (5,338,666), the Kalenjin (4,967,328), the Luo (4,044,440), the Kamba (3,893,157), the Kenyan Somali (2,385,572), the Kisii (2,205,669), the Mijikenda (1,960,574), and the Meru (1,960,574). (1,658,108). Kenya is riddled with violence as a result of its numerous ethnic divides. This includes high rates of

intercommunal violence, low rates of sustained violence, and election-related violence in cycles. Multiple and overlapping conflicts exist in Kenya due to a variety of factors, including: (i) ethnic intolerance; (ii) border disputes; (iii) political party zoning; (iv) land and other resource rivalry; (v) small arms proliferation; (vi) insufficient security; and (vii) poverty, underdevelopment, and marginalisation. According to Rohwerder (2015), inter-ethnic conflicts are sparked by rivalry for the rewards of devolution and elite manipulation of local populations.

To contextualize the study findings, it is essential remembering that the employment of divide and rule tactics and ethnic mobilization against other ethnic groups is widespread around the world. For example, the Rwandan genocide, the civil wars in Bosnia and Afghanistan, and the battles between Hindus and Muslims in India and Nigeria. The demographic balance of ethnic populations within electoral seats has a significant role in Kenyan election contestation. Political campaigns are frequently conducted in the ethnic blocs' language, and Nakuru County is no exception.

Early on in modern Sri Lankan history, ethnic politics and the fear of discrimination pushed Tamil leaders in the direction of federalism. There has been a long-standing demand by Tamil political parties for more political autonomy for the districts in which they predominate. A decentralisation of authority between the two groups has been acknowledged at various points in time as a way to ease tensions. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact, signed in July 1957, was one of a series of pacts formed to describe the methods for devolving authority, including a framework for regional devolution. The pact's stipulations were never executed, however, owing to different political forces. It was agreed upon in 1965 that the Dudley-Chelvanayagam

Pact would be formed and implemented. However, much like the last agreement, the terms of this treaty were avoided (Taylor, 2018).

4.5 Nexus between elections and ethnic violence

4.5.1 Electoral inconsistencies

The study sought to obtain both qualitative and quantitative data from the respondents. The findings are as shown in figure 4.2;

Tensions before, during and after elections

	Male	Female
■ Yes	185	180
■ No	18	7

Figure 4. 2 Are there tensions before, during and after elections?

Source: Research Data (2021)

The outcome above shows out of 390 respondents, 185 of male agree while 180 of females agree to availability of tensions. 18 and 7 of the respondents represented males and females who disagreed respectively. The respondents gave varied answers to elaborate their understanding of tensions during elections.

According to a NCVPR report 2019, there are sporadic ethnic and political tensions within Nakuru county that potent relapse to repeat violence. According to Gichuhi (2020), elections of 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2013 had been informed by ethnic

census as a guarantee for capturing state power assets and ensure the political survival. Its a strategic move aimed at maintaining the regime in power by making sure they win elections through violence. Negative ethnicity exacerbates ethnic tensions, which can escalate to conflict, as was the case in the post-election riots in 1992, 1997, and 2007/2008 over the distribution of power and national resources. Politicians incite and sponsor violence, but no one has ever been held accountable by the justice system for their actions. Violence over natural resources like land is real; there are heightened political tensions during elections that disenfranchise groups that feel insecure and have to relocate to relocate to 'safer' areas. The prevalence of organised unlawful gangs such as Mungiki, which are widespread and established and pose a threat to peace and security because they can be readily mobilised to carry out violence; and a lack of trust between the communities and the police, which makes it difficult for them to work together effectively in the prevention of violence. A further finding of the study is that an outbreak of violence in Nakuru County, particularly in the metropolitan regions of Nakuru, Naivasha, and Molo, readily spreads throughout Kenya's urban areas.

Although Nakuru County has been plagued by long-standing conflicts, the conflict has been exacerbated by the politics of economic exploitation, exclusion, and uneven access to resources and opportunities. There is a widespread belief among 'migrant' populations like the Kikuyu and Kisii that they do not support Kalenjin candidates in elections and instead favour their own (Nderitu, 2014).

In order to further solidify this ethnic political framework, the post-colonial government aligned parliamentary seats with ethnic borders, which has remained the

manner of Kenyan politics and province administration to this date. As a result, ethnic politics have been deeply ingrained across Kenya, resulting in tensions and clashes at the slightest provocation. When ethnic variety and patron-client relationships are mixed with lengthier histories of social conflict between ethnic groups, Taylor, 2018, says that violence increases significantly. It's because people believe that attaining political power gives them access to patronage goods and other resources for the ethnic group with which they identify, the author argues. Studies of Kenya's post-independence election violence show that many land settlement programmes have benefited some ethnic groups over others since the country's independence in 1963. Some ethnic groups have been granted land rights, while others have been denied them by the government. As many current societal conflicts are, at least in part, based on perceptions of uneven or unjust land rights, experts have recognised this type of patronage. There are several clusters of ethnic borders and communities in Nakuru county, which are distinct from one ethnic group to the next. Thus, ethnic groups are clustered together from the sub-county to the county level, such that areas in Kenya are unique ethnically. Elements such as resource allocation and development, discrimination and access to opportunities during the electioneering period continue to form the basis of ethnic conflicts.

4.5.2 Bodies in charge of national elections

All respondents (390) agreed that the bodies in charge of elections like Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission have been either weak, compromised or both. Their narrations are represented in Table 4.7;

Table 4. 7: Bodies in charge of Electoral Exercise.

Statements	Male	Female	Frequency
Compromised by executive	121	114	235
Corruption	50	38	88
Lack independency	32	35	67
			390

Source: Research Data (2021)

Out of 390, 235 of the respondents reported that bodies in charge of electoral processes are influenced by the executives at national and county levels. 88 of them had it that corruption marred the integrity of the staff of the electoral bodies while the rest 67 noted that the electoral bodies lack independence because they act as agents to the arms of the government.

From the Key informant it was reported that:

> During elections the agents get bribed by aspirants openly (Field interview with an opinion leader at Mau Summit on 2th June 2021).

People's lack of faith in the government's ability to ensure the fair and balanced distribution of government benefits has exacerbated the ethnic problem in Nigeria, according to ALAO 2015. A sense of marginalisation can be expressed through the expression of a sense of parochialism and community identification when the government is perceived to be serving the interests of a certain group in society. So, it is no surprise that ethnic militias, such as the Oodua's peoples' congress (OPC), Bakassi boys and the like have popped up in Nigeria to fight for their own ethnic groups' interests, such as the Arewa peoples' Congress, Ohaneze Ndigbo and the like.

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Certain of these have exacerbated community tensions, which in some cases have led to ethnic conflicts. Consequently, ethnic jingoists have always exploited the high unemployment, high illiteracy and unequal wealth distribution in the country to entangle the people in ethnic warfare for their own (elites) selfish objectives. Studies have been done to see if primaries increase election success, clientelism, and intra-party conflict in Ghana (Ichino and Nathan, 2013). The study found that primaries may either harm a party by picking radical candidates or improve the party's reputation by selecting high valence candidates. Clientelism precludes the use of these methods. The majority of the time, election management agencies, election courts, political parties, and NGOs, as well as media organisations, have been effective in providing standards and creating capacity through electoral process technical support. Voters feel that election organisers use security planning and security equipment to protect democratic processes from resistance and hostility. A pattern of responding to anticipated disputes in elections is being developed by the international community through its oversight. When a political participant is intimidated, blackmailed, harmed, or otherwise abused in an attempt to influence the outcome of an election, it is a conflict in the electoral process.

There are limited channels for peacefully pursuing charges of election misconduct due to a lack of public faith in the validity of political institutions under hybrid regimes, especially electoral administration organisations. The offended parties may feel justified in resorting to violence if small electoral violations are viewed as attempts to manipulate the vote.

In 2008, Kenya experienced post-election violence (PEV), and Nakuru County was one of the locations impacted. Violence following the election resulted in the deaths

of over 1200 people, the mutilation of many more, and the displacement of approximately 350,000. In the districts of Njoro, Molo, and Kuresoi, inter-ethnic hostilities erupted, leading to the deaths of many people and the relocation of many others. A terrible chapter in our nation's history has been written by the ethnic clashes that have taken place since 1991. As a result, they have contributed to a general sense of distrust, fear, and mistrust among the general population of the Republic; they have impeded progress toward social stability, integration, and the rule of law; and they have jeopardised the rule of law as a foundation for both social and economic growth.

The study's findings are explained by the Primordialist theory, which has two implications: in terms of ethnic identity, where an inference can be drawn that ethnic conflict is inherent in human nature; and in terms of 'social givens,' such as kinship, family, language, and religion (as Geertz argues), where ethnic conflict can occur only when these values are threatened. These primordialist conceptions are prominent in ethnic conflicts as 'ethnic feelings,' which are believed to be a result of circumstances beyond the control of ethnic groups, as Blagojevic notes (2009).

4.6 Nature of national elections and inter-ethnic violence

Ethnic mobilisation of the voting public and the deep-seated political concerns of the people are often the catalyst for violence during elections. Violence has been a problem in three of Kenya's five elections since the restoration to multi-party democracy- 1992, 1997,2007, 2013 and 2017.

Although elections don't inevitably lead to violence, they often heighten existing tensions and lead to bloodshed throughout the process of contending for political power. Typically, election-related violence aims to disrupt and disenfranchise

opposing forces and/or to influence voting behaviour through threats and intimidation in order to influence the outcome of elections. Political geography has been shaped through electoral violence in Kenya, where certain communities have been moved before the polls to prevent them from voting.

According to the research conducted in Nakuru County, violence can occur throughout the electoral cycle: during the pre-election period, on Election Day, and following the election. Prior to elections, violence can occur as a result of some groups being excluded from the electoral process, rivals disrupting political campaigns, voters and candidates being intimidated, and the use of threats and violence to influence voter participation. In certain instances, the rivalry is resolved at the polling place. Following an election, violence is sometimes sparked by disagreements over election results and the failure of legal systems to handle disputes in a fair, fast, and transparent way, or when certain groups perceive they lack representation in the government.

As noted from the FGDs discussion, one respondent opined that:

> Pre-election violence is often intended to influence voting behavior, either through discouraging voters from turning out or coercing them into supporting particular candidates. Post-election violence is often for the purpose of protesting an election result or repressing protests by supporters of the losing party. (FGD interview in Mau Summit on 26th June 2021).

Research studies reveal that pre and post-vote violence tend to reflect distinct patterns. Most electoral violence in sub-Saharan Africa occurs before the polls and is often perpetrated by incumbent administrations, according to Taylor (2018) Post-election violence, on the other hand, is more likely to involve offenders who are loyal to the opposition and is also more likely to be serious. Political and economic elites can engage in mutually beneficial transactions that reduce the incentives for coercive

tactics in political competition in a stable patronage system" (Arriola & Johnson 2012). Rather than being a source of election violence, clientelism is seen as a way for incumbents to prevent anti-government violence. When stable clientelistic connections are broken down by either a government that does not have sufficient patronage resources or by institutional reforms that restrict particular elites from having access to patronage, they are seen as causes of violence.

4.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter captured the full understanding of the nature, origins and impact of conflicts which is necessary if they are to be taken into account to avoid refueling the conflict. Evidently from this study, conflicts in the county result from more than one cause. Conflicts experienced were inter-ethnic, ignited by national elections. The situation was further exacerbated by negative ethnicity, historical injustices, political incitements and marginalization. Perceived marginalization within and without ethnic lines was seen as a conflict trigger noted by the study. Effective conflict management requires dealing with root causes of conflicts and the consequences which may be explosive sources of conflicts in future. This summary leads to a discussion of the strategies undertaken by the major actors in conflict management,the subject of the next chapter.

STRATEGIES EMPLOYED IN MANAGING INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS OCCASIONED BY NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN NAKURU COUNTY BETWEEN 1992 AND 2017

This chapter presented the strategies employed in managing inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections. It addressed the participation in national election processes and ethnic diversity, role of various actors involved as well as the strategies employed and the chapter summary.

5.1 Participation in national elections and voting process

The respondents were asked to explain their role in election and the election process. The results are given in table 5.1

Table 5. 1 National Elections and voting process

Role	Male	Female	Frequency (%)
Aspirants	4	1	5 (0.5%)
As Agent	10	12	22(6.2%)
Voter mobilization	21	19	40 (10.3%)
As a Voter	99	88	187 (58.2)
I do not vote	40	35	75(24.6)
None	1	0	1 (0.2%)
Total			**330 (100%)**

The study findings indicate that 187 out of 330 respondents do get involved in the national election process while the others 75 do not get involved in the electioneering period.

The above results indicate that a majority of the respondents participate during the electioneering period by voting at 58.2% whereas 24.6% do not vote. 10.3% of the respondents mobilize for aspirants while 6.2% participate as agents. 0.5 % participate in elections as aspirants while 0.1% reported none. This implies that majority of the respondents exercise their voting rights. The results indicate that residents in Nakuru County participate in the election process as agents, voters or mobilisers.

Citizen engagement in politics and civic life is encouraged, as well as the preservation of people' human rights and a rule of law that applies to all citizens. This is according to Maphazi (2012). Those who vote equally in a democratic system have the opportunity to compete for a variety of elected positions, according to a key informant. The results are in direct opposition to what an influential person had to say about them:

As noted by one opinion leader:

> A leading tribe can have all political seats from county to member of county assembly in regions that have higher number of voters from one tribe. Some handle the issue by alternating local seats to another tribe to spread out opportunity to all (Field interview with Opinion leader in Elburgon on 27th June 2021).

This claim is in direct conflict with Maphazi's (2012) claims of free and fair elections. Public engagement has always been an element of democratic decision-making processes, and this study's findings are consistent with the notion of participation as a chance for citizens to influence public choices (Teshome, 2008). Taylor (2003), on the other hand, argues that public engagement might exacerbate already-existing inequities in society. People in positions of power may use this as an opportunity to talk directly with government officials about topics that concern them. It is argued that political power conflicts impede successful public engagement procedures.

In support to these, findings from key informant at IEBC official in Molo indicated that:

> Parties adhere to stipulated regulations including regional and ethnic diversity as a requirement for the official approvals, but parties in most cases remain strongly inclined along certain ethnic lines. (Field interview with IEBC representative in Molo on 29th October 2021).

KNHR report 2019 concurs with these by stating that reference made to the constitution of Kenya 2010 bars parties being formed along ethnic lines. Political parties therein are supposed to be formed based on national character with its membership reflecting on regional and ethnic diversity. The drafters of the 2010 Constitution hoped the new law would address the simmering issues that resulted in violence in every electoral cycle. Pockets of violence experienced after the 2013 and 2017 elections and the growing calls for constitutional review exposed the soft underbelly of the 2010 Constitution. However, the report further opines that the political parties in the post 2010 constitution era still carry the unresolved challenges of the pre-2010 constitution era.

5.2 Politics and Ethnicity during national elections

The study sought to establish the nature of politics practiced during national election periods. From the FGD discussions one of the respondents had this to say:

Political parties in the region are formed along ethnic lines, campaigns/rallies and voting are also along ethnic lines. Candidates are voted along ethnic lines and even conflicts are   along ethnic divides. (FGD respondent at Elburgon, 27th June 2021).

The findings suggest that elections in Kenya are defined by affiliations and identity to ethnic groups, thus prone to violence along ethnic divides. Political elites have for

many years resorted to using identities for political mileage. Politics in Kenya is seemingly narrowed to deeper fragmentations that threaten the advancement of liberal democracy, institutions and stability. As such many scholars have attributed Kenya's ethnic animosity and antagonism to the colonial masters. Violence in Kenyan elections has been on the rise ever since 1992, and Taylor (2018) agreed that there was a significant likelihood of violence in 2017. Historically violent elections have created an atmosphere of fear and trepidation in the country's political context. Affluent people who represent specific ethnic groups dominate politics, and the country continues to suffer from perceived injustices stemming from the exclusion of particular ethnic groups from political and economic power centres.

As Nyaura, 2018 notes, the colonial aim of improving the territories inhabited by settlers has led to an unequal distribution of socio- economic resources across ethnic groups in the regions they control. As a result, racial inequalities are linked to geographical differences in development. Those who live in marginalised and underdeveloped areas see political power as a gateway to development/resources, which exacerbates the conflict. As a result of such viewpoints, ethnic alliances are created in order to share resources and power. As this study demonstrated, there is still a link between politics and ethnicity in Kenya.

According to Kisaka and Nyadera (2019), African states' access to power is still highly important. Ethnic communities believe that they are entitled to certain benefits because of their political status. An ethnic group or even a single person is motivated to seek power because of this. Elections in many transitional democracies can exacerbate existing socio- economic, ethnic, political, or religious cleavages (e.g., Kenya, India, Guyana and Kyrgyzstan). As in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh,

there may be militant organisations that pose a danger to the integrity of the voting process (Bardall, 2011).

We must be aware of conflict dynamics so that we can evaluate, minimise or resolve disputes while supporting the political process. The formation of county administrations in Kenya in 2013 was intended to address the issue of marginalisation and uneven access and allocation of resources that had become a national concern. County governments are entitled to budgetary allocations from the national revenue with additional equalization fund as provided for under article 204 of the Constitution to provide basic needs to the marginalized areas (KNHRC, 2019). However, critiques to devolution and county governments have expressed concerns over the emergence of inter-county minority groups. The emergence of county majorities and minorities has revealed that ethnic cleavages are important aspects of county politics just as in the national politics.

5.3 Actors involved in conflict management in Nakuru County

The respondents were asked to identify the actors involved in the management of conflicts in Nakuru county. The results are indicated in Table 5.1.

Table 5. 2: Actors involved in conflict management in Nakuru County

Media	Frequency	Percentage
Media	30	11.7
Government	98	27.6
CSOs	72	21.5
Local Peace Committees	59	18.5
Local Administration/ Security personnel	70	21.6
Total	**330**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2021)

From the results, the main actor in conflict management in Nakuru county was the government at 98 (27.6%), CSOs at 72 (21.5%), the local administration/ security personnel at 70 (21.6%), peace committees 58 (18.5%), and the media at 30 (11.7%).

5.3.1 Government/ the state

Organizations at the national and subnational levels function under the rules set out by the state's institutions or regulations (which may be official or informal) to control political, social, and economic participation across a region. For instance, the executive and ministry branches, legislature and judiciary.

The immediate political crisis were ended and laws like the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (Act of 2008) and the National Cohesion and Integration Act (Act of 2009) were paved the way for after the aftermath of the 2007/2008 PEV mediation (2008). The National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC) was established by the latter Act to carry out initiatives to remove prejudice and promote equality and

peaceful coexistence among Kenya's various ethnic and racial groups. (NCVR, 2019). The peace process in Nakuru County was also started as a result of utilising these national peace measures.

The NCIC intervened in Nakuru county ahead of the upcoming elections in order to end the Rift Valley's cycle of violence. In April 2011, the NCIC and NSC began formal participation in Nakuru county, driven by an approach that focused on the two primary protagonists in conflict, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin groups. The mediation team began by meeting with the elders of each village in order to secure their support for the process. Afterwards, the team met with each community individually to gather information about their issues and prepare them for bilateral conversations with the Kikuyu and the Kalenjin (NCPVR, 2019).

When the NCIC launched its mediation effort, it identified factors such as Nakuru's electoral politics, land and economic imbalances, and the interests that would bring the conflict's principal parties - the Kalenjin and the Gikuyu – to the negotiating table. All of these factors contributed to the outbreak of violence and conflict and must thus be considered in any effort to resolve it. The NCIC was also cognizant of the Elders' awareness of their significance and their specific aversion to commissions. Both the Akiwumi Commission and the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights identified several of them as violence planners and instigators. As a result, the NCIC approached male Elders via the Provincial Administration.

Among the difficulties the NCIC encountered was the fact that the Provincial Administration and the police had displayed a lack of impartiality during the 2007-2008 unrest. However, following multiple rounds of talks and advances with the Elders, the NCIC and NSC determined that technical competence was required to develop a peace deal. On Sunday, 19 August 2012, the Nakuru County Peace Accord

was ultimately signed. The accord called for a series of immediate initiatives, including meetings without the NCIC, NSC, or HD Centre, to demonstrate the Elders' commitment to the peace pact. Additionally, they were compelled to assemble both political leaders and young people, individually and collectively, to instruct them not to foment violence (Wairimu, 2019). The peace agreement's objective was to ensure that residents of all ethnic communities in Nakuru lived in harmony. The agreement was divided into five sections: purpose, guiding principles, dialogue-related actions, conflict resolution, and links with other processes and institutions.

Institutions or regulations that govern political, social, and economic activity throughout a territorial area constitute the state. Elders from both communities came together in working groups over the course of 16 months, and a climate of understanding developed as a result of several meetings and public apologies. When it came time to create a peace accord with participation from the communities, the NCIC and NSC turned to the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue for technical assistance.

It was organised to remember past violence, recognise elders' responsibilities, and discuss collaboration to prevent future bloodshed, especially around the 2013 elections.. The pact was a political commitment by the elders of the community to cooperate to avert future violence. There were two separate commissions set up to handle issues of justice and impunity and land grievances. This was done in order to expedite the process of collaboration between these two agencies.

Communities were given a code of behaviour to follow, with emphasis on rapid follow-up activities and publicising the agreement. As part of the NCIC's encouragement, the communities collaborated with the provincial government and law enforcement authorities to organise joint media appearances and roadshows. For the 2013 presidential and senate elections, the elders interacted directly with candidates for President and Deputy President. As a result, the 2013 elections were very calm because of widespread political support for the pact.

The findings, however, are at odds with a UN (2009) assessment stating that governmental interventions have only been helpful at the surface level. State involvement focuses on top leadership and macro-level conflict transformation and connections while disregarding the bulk of the people and micro-level conflict resolution, according to this research. It is common for the leaders of the disputing parties to meet at the macro level to negotiate a ceasefire and peace accord that would then spread to the entire populace. First and foremost, state involvement is accused of ignoring local concerns and challenges. To justify this, it is necessary to show that a strong political party or governmental agency is regularly threatening or intimidating voters. In Nakuru County, however, this does not appear to be the case.

5.3.2 Civil Society Organizations

According to the findings, CSOs play a significant role in conflict management in Nakuru County before, during, and after inter-ethnic conflicts. More than a handful of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), including Mercy Corps (USAID), SCCRR (Peace Caravan), and Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) like NCCK, have worked with Molo's community leaders to promote peace and harmony. Researchers found

that small groups of twenty individuals, organised by the Catholic Church in Bondeni, to discuss peace and social cohesion were effective.

These CSOs processes have been characterized by enhanced coordination and facilitation of intervention through resource allocation. As a result, these efforts have significantly contributed to the implementation of peacebuilding activities as well as building the national and local capacities in conflict transformation. However, it was also noted that there exists inherent failure to develop an extensive list of structural and direct prevention tools. The intervention strategy is only activated during the election period and lacks strategic coordination where multiple prevention measures are not utilized.

FGDs found that ward administrators, peace committees, and religious leaders use Barazas to promote understanding and tolerance, as well as the use of civic education through Barazas. Those in rural regions are considered to be more successful than those in urban areas, and they are supposed to collaborate with CSOs and churches to identify and prepare solutions. Peace gatherings, talks, and mediation between competing towns, corporations, and families embroiled in conflict are all examples of this type of activity.

Accordingly, the context of contemporary conflict environment in Nakuru County remains complex and highly unstable. This scenario is highly correlated to the determinants that dictate the onset, duration and intensities of ethnic clashes by providing the rationale choice for the causes and reaction for conflict transformation. According to a report by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in 2006, depending too heavily on civil society actors might have the potential to delegitimize

and substitute for state institutions, which could undermine long-term attempts to develop them. As a result, the representation of civil society in the dispute may be weighted towards urban-based groups rather than grassroots communities, which appears to be the situation in Nakuru County. Cohesion and unity are protected at all levels of Kenyan government. Nakuru County's ethnicity may be addressed with the help of institutions like NCIC that have the mandate to remove ethnic prejudice and promote tolerance in Nakuru County by supporting them.

The Nakuru peace process was initiated by the NCIC in 2010 as an attempt to help and transform the culture of violence in the county. This was informed by the need for a holistic healing and inclusive process that would help nurture peace and address structural issues that had for many years simmered beneath the surface. This was underscored by the fact that the hitherto drivers and conditions that had allowed for deliberate political elites mobilization along ethnic lines was very much present in Nakuru County.

5.3.3 Local Administration/ Security Personnel

This research focused on the Chiefs, Assistant County Commissioners, and local political leaders who commonly act as third-party neutrals in local conflicts. National Government Administration (previously provincial administration) workers are responsible for enforcing the law and order in their respective communities. They are natives of the communities they serve, and hence have a deeper understanding of the conflicts identified in the research. Community problems can be resolved through increased security and the support of government peace initiatives.

As the results of interviews with local government officials revealed, they play an important role in coordinating different peace-building activities, including the local

peace committees chaired by the then District Commissioners, now Deputy County Commissioners (District Peace Committee and District Development Committees). Resettlement and economic restoration of the affected communities are responsibilities of the team in charge of enforcement of peace accords. As a result, they have helped to improve the government's responsiveness to underprivileged populations and develop local peace-building blocs.

According to the findings of the study, government-sponsored seminars and workshops teach local administrators in a variety of conflict resolution skills, risk reduction techniques, resource mobilisation and utilisation, and administration and security duties. In addition to barazas and field days, the local authority teaches these skills to their citizens.

There are government police officers involved in this study's safety measures. Several police stations and patrol sites have been established in regions considered to be at risk. In addition, the government has improved a programme for open and accountable police services in the community. These officers are tasked with responding to local crime and disputes, such as land disputes in the region, as well as providing early warnings to avert problems like hate speech and mass mobilisation.

Another government project aiming at enhancing community policing is the Nyumba Kumi (10 homes) Initiative, which encourages residents to know at least 10 of their neighbours so that they may better protect themselves. The findings of the investigation show that the project is still ineffective, with a number of critical flaws uncovered.

5.3.4 Peace Committees

The study identified peace Committees as actors involved in conflict management in Nakuru County. District or Sub-County Peace Committees serve as a critical unit for National Early Warning and Early Response Centers. An interview by an elder in a Peace Committee in Molo Sub-county elaborated:

> As a committee we are tasked by addressing early warning signs before conflict incidents. Some of the key areas we focus on include political incitement, mobilization of people especially the youth and other gangs/ militia, hate speech as well as proliferation of Small Arms and Weapons characterized by pre-conflict contexts. (Field interview   with a committee member in Molo on 28th June 2021).

The study findings highlight the role of the local peace committees in preventing conflicts in Nakuru County. The findings are in agreement with other scholarly works, for instance, Owino 2019 who notes that despite the challenges of conflict recurrence the Local peace committees have played a major role in both the national and local early warning and response. However, it is worth noting that their efforts have been dwindled by poor strategic coordination and planning, but better still they have been able to identify conflict hotspots, perpetrators among other issues within Nakuru County.

5.3.5 Media

The responses for the actors involved in conflict management in Nakuru County cited media as one of the participants. Media liberalization and the transition period in Kenya started in 1992 following the restoration of multi-party pluralism. The media is

used as a tool to disseminate positive messages and promote peace education to promote unity across different ethnic groups as identified by the study findings.

From the FGDs it was illustrated as follows:

> The emergence of more radio and Television stations in the county has prompted ethnic groups and individuals to use these outlets to promote their interests-the enhancement of unity and social cohesion and a sense of belonging among groups of people (Field interview with youth leaders at Molo Town on 21st June 2021).

The media has been used to send messages of cohesion and unity amongst the ethnic communities within the county. These findings are in agreement with a study by Howard, 2019 who confirms that the media plays a role of bringing peace and not conflict as was the case of Tanzania where the community radio was used to resolve land conflicts among the Masaai herdsmen in Arusha. Contrary to these findings, however, responses from key informants indicated media as a source of conflict during the 2007/2008 PEV.

One key informant noted:

> Vernacular radio stations participated in mass mobilization and spread of hate messages with name callings reported along ethnic divisions (Field interview with an Opinion leader at Kuresoi North on 27th June 2021).

An impartial "mirror" of society that transmits knowledge that citizens may utilise to make democratic and informed decisions is what the liberal view sees in the media. Radical views of the media are backed by Steenveld, 2004, who sees media as a means by which dominant social classes retain their grip over society. It reinforces the premise that these great forces are fighting to win the hearts and minds of people in order to exert authority. These adversaries are now using the media to battle for control, putting the media's authority and independence at risk, especially in places like Nakuru where tensions are high. The international community has given

inadequate attention to the use of media and particularly community radio to incite violence, on the other side. Some media stations foment ethnic divide, hatred, violence, and bias against other groups. Kenya's community radio has been heavily criticised for its role in the escalation of the post-election instability that resulted in hundreds being killed or displaced. Media Self-Censorship can be considered a conflict management strategy to support both of these points of view. On the other side, the media may be a powerful force for peace. People are encouraged to accept each other's beliefs and perspectives by television news anchors, who use their platform as an outlet for promoting peace. When it comes to coverage of protests and demonstrations that occurred following the release of election results, the media is condemned for censoring and concealing information and skipping live news conferences on election day (Clairs, *et. al.*, 2014).

5.4 Strategies employed in conflict management in Nakuru County

The respondents were further asked to explain some of the approaches used in conflict management within Nakuru County. The results are shown in Table 5.3.

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Table 5. 3: Approaches used in the management of inter-ethnic conflicts within the two sub-counties.

Approaches	Frequency	Percentage
Intercommunity negotiations	80	25.4
Mediation	75	24.2
Dialogue	32	19.0
Judicial settlements	15	11.0
Peace education/ Confidence building measures	12	9.8
Resettlement and re-integration	6	2.8
Empower marginalized groups	8	3.8
Use of non-judicial bodies	4	1.0
Total	**330**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2021)

The results indicated that the approaches used by CSOs to attain peaceful co-existence within the county are intercommunity negotiations (25.4%), mediation (24.2%), dialogue (19.0%), judicial settlement (11.0%), peace education and communication (9.8%), resettlement and reintegration (2.8%), empowerment programs (3.8%) and use of non-judicial bodies (1.0%). Reconciliation programs and income generating activities are the main approaches used by the CSOs and the government towards conflict management within the county.

Results from the FGDs and non-state actors' officials highlighted multiple roles of CSOs including: peace processes; lobbying and advocacy for resettlement and peace for the internally displaced; psycho-social therapy; sensitization of individuals and communities on justice and peace issues; facilitation of implementation of peace building activities and innovative economic empowerment; provision of livelihood

vouchers and conducting baseline surveys in target areas. From the study findings it is evident that the CSOs adopt various strategies towards building peace within the county.

The CSOs consider Integrated Holistic Conflict Strategies through their emphasis on the local context and capacities as was revealed by the study findings. More emphasis should be placed on creating capacities rather than simply constructing buildings for peace; conflict analysis and mapping should be carried out, as well as methods for phasing out the various projects, as well as an exit strategy. According to a report by Fisher (1997), CSOs strive to address the core causes of conflict and rebuild relationships between parties and actors through a balanced approach that is further reinforced through partnerships and community engagement.

"Informal" solutions include multi-stakeholder groups, mediation by community leaders, party leaders, etc. according to Bardall (2011: 11). Advocacy, nonviolence promotion, and troubleshooting methods can be formed by civil society organisations. However, it is important to build ties with the governmental, electoral, and security sectors to guarantee that the information can be used in a timely manner.

A study by Owino 2019 notes that the operations of conflict transformation in Nakuru County are explicitly directed towards prevalence crises with the use of approaches such as negotiation, mediation, dialogue being applied. He further asserts that in the longterm practice, conflict managers tend to focus on adherence to human rights, economic, social and political stability as well as CSO building measures.

From the study findings it was further revealed that conflict management in Nakuru county is also exhibited through multi-actor participatory approach. There was

evident cooperation and coordination noted between the NCIC, NSC and elders in formulation and implementation of peace agreements. Worth noting is The 2010 Nakuru Peace Accord. The accord was initiated by the NCIC with the aim to avert a culture of violence that was perennial during electioneering periods. As quoted by Owino 2019, the peace accord was triggered by the adverse impacts of the 2007/ 2008 Post Election Violence on Kikuyu and Kalenjin in the two sub-counties and the larger Nakuru County.

The Accord was aimed at reconciliatory programs through dialogue forums with the affected communities in established dialogue structures. For instance, activity/project involves partnering with DPC and strengthening village committees through exchange programs, economic empowerment and experience sharing. As noted by one key informant:

> The peace agreement was important as it brought forth initiatives aimed to enhance economic empowerment and ownership, as well as peace coexistence especially amongst who were greatly affected and displaced in 2007 (Field interview in Kuresoi with an elder on 25th June 2021.

When ethnic diversity is paired with a patron-client political structure and a lengthy history of ethnic conflict, Taylor, 2018 concludes that violence is far more likely when these factors are present. People of the same ethnicity as those in authority tend to believe that gaining political power entails gaining access to patronage products and other resources. However, elections come in various types and sizes, and are held not only in democratic (or democratizing) systems, but also in autocracies. Elections can only help ensure fair competition for political power if the rule of law is guaranteed, and if not, conflict will occur as the losing parties are unable to accept their result.

Another approach used in conflict management worth noting is the role of Shalom Center for Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (SCCRR). The center aims to empower communities with knowledge and skills in conflict prevention, management and transformation. The centre works in collaboration with the local leaders and youth leaders. The key areas of concern for the team include conflict prevention and adopting the formal and informal early warning structures. As noted by one of the key respondents:

> Shalom Centre has undertaken various peace drives undertaking various inter-communal cohesion activities recruiting over 500 peace ambassadors. (Field interview with key informant at Kivumbini on 23th June 2021).

The study findings also noted that SCCRR supports communities in Kuresoi and Molo through peace building workshops. In order to identify the conflict concerns, an all-inclusive method is employed to establish the best tactics and solutions for peace. To ensure that all perspectives are heard, SCCRR uses a multi-level approach that includes county leaders, local government representatives, and grassroots community leaders. SCCRR also works with CBOs, socio-economic empowerment groups, village leaders, clusters (Nyumba Kumi) religious organizations and schools.

United States Institute of Peace book discusses several techniques to back up these conclusions. Preventative measures have been shown to reduce violence, according to the book's findings. Moreover, the research found that "despite theoretically convincing reasoning, the quantitative impact of citizen- or community-oriented instruments such as peace messages, voter consultations, and even youth programming remains minimal and uncertain." State-led measures such as security sector participation and strengthening election administration and management may

be the most successful methods of reducing violence, according to case studies. Nakuru County can benefit from this strategy.

5.5 National and County governments Programs

More than three quarters of the respondents have experienced the impact of both governments' programs in their areas of residence. 98 did not feel any impact. This is explained in figure 5.1;

Figure 5. 1: Impact of national and county government's programs

Source: Research Data (2021)

110 of the respondents receive bursary from either of the governments, 81 do not feel any impact from both governments, and 52 of the respondents admit to have improved roads within areas of residence while 36 have participated in kazi mtaani or felt its impact. The rest 31 have access to clean water.

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The state officials as noted from the findings indicated using diverse integrated conflict strategies towards conflict transformation. Results from the FGDs highlighted multiple roles of government to include: peace processes; lobbying and advocacy for resettlement and peace for the internally displaced; psycho-social therapy; sensitization of individuals and communities on justice and peace issues; facilitation of implementation of peace building activities and innovative economic empowerment; provision of livelihood vouchers and conducting baseline survey in target areas and more so in Molo and Kuresoi North Sub-counties. The study findings indicated the efforts made by the government to manage conflicts at the grass root level within the county. This is in disagreement with UN report (2009) indicating that state intervention has only been successful at the formal and superficial levels.

The study also revealed through household respondents as well as FGDs and key informants' feedback, that support by the government to the facilities includes funding and technical support of inter-ethnic community projects (mainly through C.B.O.s) and community connector initiatives. Income generating activities which include farming and trading activities facilitated by County and national governments as well as CSOs as noted by this study aimed at reducing vulnerability among communities through poverty alleviation. This has brought about increased levels of confidence in the settings such as markets, empowerment of marginalized groups, associations between groups motivated by the incentives to interact and cooperate. However, most respondents indicated experiencing challenges including market fluctuations for the products, inadequate funding and poor infrastructure which remain to be a hindrance to marginalization and poverty alleviation which cause conflict in the area.

The Community Policing Aassociations(CPAs), led by governors or their representatives, have an important role in securing Kenya's counties, as stated in the country's constitution. Another six appointees are picked from a variety of stakeholders in the county, including business leaders, women and people with special needs; religious groups; community-based organisations; and the county assembly. As a result, CPAs are tasked with keeping tabs on crime trends and patterns, drafting proposals for specific goals and objectives for police performance, keeping tabs on those goals and objectives' progress and accomplishments, and overseeing and promoting community policing initiatives while also facilitating public participation and overseeing the policing budget. Legal snags have prevented the formation of CPAs. Civilians are represented in security decision-making through the CPA, which also serves as a tool for holding police officers accountable to the public (NCVPR, 2019).

In this study's FGDs, school projects, road newtorks, water projects, and bridges were found to be some of the peace-building projects highlighted. People-to-people project connectors include Koiluget Secondary School and Burnt Forest. Kikuyus and Kalenjins built the school. Furthermore, the secondary school intends to assist the education and employment of young people, which not only helps to reduce poverty but also makes them less subject to political influence. There's also the Kipkalel Bridge Project, which aims to improve relations between the Kikuyu and Kalenjin residents of the Rurigi and Olave farms by linking their two communities (respectively valley). Kalenjins regarded the Kipkalel bridge as an excellent chance to provide transportation linkages between the Rurigi farm and the Burnt Forest Trading Centre, which the PEV considered as a threat. In addition, programmes aimed at developing the ability of individuals and groups to participate in governance,

advocacy, and peacebuilding activities are employed. These programmes also aim to improve already existent efforts. This programme aims to increase individuals' understanding of and involvement in the devolved system of government under the county structure, as well as to coach, design, and produce strategic plans for local communities to modify and implement.

Other government support initiatives identified were: The Government's National Reconciliation Fund for Mitigation and Resettlement; The Government's National Reconciliation and Emergency Initiative; and The Social and Economic Recovery Strategy which provide financial and logistical support to the community. The Community Development Funds were also revealed to be common government sources with the affected social amenities having been beneficiaries. Reports from the CSOs officials indicated having received grants as well as loans from the government through the Ministry of Social Services, Ministry of Special Programs and District Development Department, to enhance their projects especially health facilities and farm projects aimed at improving community livelihoods. Government technical advisers and staff have been sent to help improve the operations of the government sponsored projects and initiatives. The study findings are in agreement with other studies which recognize the government as the lead agency towards conflict management (Pkalya & Mohammud, 2006).

Findings from the FGDs and key informants also revealed that the government and CSOs coordinate with the community as well as their local government leaders in their peace initiatives and through local peace building blocs to understand well the problems and desired mechanisms to be implemented. Conception of a holistic, multi-actor, participatory programs is sought to ensure that processes, mechanisms and

structures are put in place to generate and sustain a common strategic objective among the political, security, development and human rights interventions. This helps overcome arising challenges, reduce duplication and provide a means to identify ways in which different processes link together towards achieving sustainable peace.

Peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo are connected to the findings. UN Security Council resolutions 1279, 1291, 1493, 1565, and 1592 mandated the creation of MONUC as a special mission to address the political issues in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN Charter's Chapter VI offers MONUC a range of options for assisting conflict resolution in the Democratic Republic of Congo through collaboration. Co-operation includes monitoring ceasefires, delivering humanitarian supplies and facilitating the transition to democracy, as well as supporting the national electoral framework and supporting the establishment of national human rights and rule of law standards set by the United Nations with regard to democracy and human rights,

5.6 How to achieve Social Interests and Inclusivity

The study sought to establish ways in which citizens are assisted by the leaders to achieve inclusivity along ethnic lines. The study findings are shown in Table 5.4. The study reported that 45 of the respondents socialize well with members from other communities while 64 feel segregated. 35.5% of the respondents reported roads to be the common provision for use developed, 21.5% indicated they hardly know when public participation is done to enable them participate in the affairs of the county meant for them. 13.5% acknowledge receiving bursaries from national and local leaders. 11.5 % indicate favoritism of only people close to their leaders get to enjoy services meant for the public. 7.9 % reported none. 6.7% of the respondents have

participated in *kazi mtaani* through the National Youth Service program while 3.3 %

are happy to have piped water around their residence as shown below.

Table 5. 4: Social interests and inclusivity

Project	Male	Female	Frequency (%)
Bursary	20	25	45 (13.6%)
Favoritism	20	20	40(11.5%)
Kazi Mtaani	12	14	26 (6.7%)
No Public Participation	30	34	64 (21.5%)
Water	9	4	13 (7.9%)
Roads	47	51	128(35.5%)
None	13	18	31 (7.9%)
Total			**330 (100%)**

Source: Research Data (2021)

From the household respondents, road projects were identified as a major approach

that can be used to promote inter-ethnic cohesions. Additionally, respondents from the

FGDs discussion highlighted the use of sports such as football through Football

Kenya Federation (FKF) that have had an increase in registration in the past few

years.

One opinion leader shared that:

> The communities have to interact, intermarry and share cultures to increase
> integration. Most of the civic institutions are spread out for all members from
> different communities to share. *Nyumba Kumi* initiative does not limit sharing
> and visiting other members from different communities (Field interview in
> Kivumbini, 23rd June 2021).

From the study findings it is apparent that businesses are not limited to specific people from one community, priority is on the availability of space that will enable one operate from an area of wish.

It is imperative to note that in Kenya, measures have been put in place to address the issue of inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections. Contrary to the study findings, Taylor, 2018 asserts that Peace campaigns and training have been applied in various cycles of election prompted violence. However, peace campaigns failed to reach potential victims or perpetrators of electoral violence in rural areas. Too often, training was targeting the informed rather than the uninformed, which resulted in limited trickle-down effects for the community and the repetition of training. Intentionally supported peace initiatives in the pre-election period are inadequate and communities are left vulnerable to sporadic violence in the post-election period. Additionally, there is lack of sustained engagement and sufficient funding to the peace-building efforts in the months preceding the national elections (Taylor, 2018).

5.7 Chapter Summary

Coordination among the core actors involved in conflict management cannot be fully realized without constructing effective strategies that give birth to sustainable peace. The actors involved in conflict management are the media, the government (county and national), CSOs, LPCs, and the local administration/ security personnel.

The strategies employed in conflict management and peace building include facilitation of peace programs, livelihood restoration and empowerment programs with the emphasis on an all-inclusive participatory approach involving community members and other co-actors. Inter community negotiations, mediation, dialogue, judicial settlements, resettlement and reintegration as well as non-judicial approaches

are used to address inter-ethnic conflicts in the county. Additionally, the government uses bursaries, *kazi mtaani*, schools, bridges, water and road projects to promote unity and social harmony among the warring communities.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN ADDRESSING INTER-ETHNIC CONFLICTS OCCASIONED BY NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN NAKURU COUNTY, KENYA BETWEEN 1992 AND 2017

The study sought to assess the challenges and opportunities of addressing the inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru County. The chapter highlights the actors involved, strategies adopted and the challenges and opportunities towards addressing inter-ethnic violence occasioned by national elections.

6.1 Challenges towards addressing inter-ethnic violence

Table 6. 1: Challenges experienced by residents Nakuru County

	N	SD (%)	D (%)	U (%)	A (%)	SA (%)	Mean	Std. Dev.	Max	Min
Marginalization	331	20	28	24	127	132	4.41	1.300	5	1
		(6.2)	(8.3)	(7.4)	(38.3)	(39.8)				
Gangs/ Militia Groups	331	24	40	58	151	58	4.01	1.201	5	1
		(7.2)	(12.0)	(17.6)	(45.6)	(17.6)				
Land Disputes	331	6	35	68	105	117	4.11	1.300	5	1
		(1.8)	(10.6)	(20.4)	(31.9)	(35.4)				
Displacement	331	20	28	24	127	132	4.56	1.201	5	1
		(6.2)	(8.3)	(7.4)	(38.3)	(39.8)				
Negative ethnicity	331	19	36	48	164	64	4.81	1.261	5	1
		(5.6)	(11.2)	(14.4)	(49.6)	(19.2)				
Illegal arms in the region	331	5	29	42	143	111	4.81	1.302	5	1
		(1.6)	(8.8)	(12.8)	(43.2)	(33.6)				
Election Rigging	331	24	40	58	151	58	4.76	1.142	5	1
		(7.2)	(12.0)	(17.6)	(45.6)	(17.6)				
Political influence/ incitements	331	19	36	48	164	64	4.90	1.363	5	1
		(5.6)	(11.2)	(14.4)	(49.6)	(19.2)				

Source: Field Data (2021)

The respondents indicated that the challenges facing conflict management include marginalization, election rigging, political incitements, proliferation of illegal arms, militia groups among other reasons.

Marginalization was cited as one of the challenges affecting peace efforts in Nakuru county as shown in Table 6.2. Protracted social conflicts are defined by Azar (1990) as a long-term and frequently violent battle by groups of people for fundamental necessities such as security, recognition, acceptability, equitable access to political institutions, and economic involvement. He points out that in many multi-ethnic societies, a single communal group is the dominant force. Dissatisfaction and division are spawned by a lack of attention to the interests and concerns of other groups.

According to Lederach (1997), conflict is exacerbated when identity groups are located in close proximity to one another. They typically erupt as expressions of accumulated grief, with clear emotional and psychological patterns of institutionalised hatred and division as a byproduct of these eruptions. Anger, fear, and extreme stereotyping characterise the clashes here. Lederach (1997) adds that conflict creates division among groups based on fear, victimhood and divisive political rhetoric as well as misconceptions of differences. Along ethnic lines, a 'we against them' split emerges. These dynamics, which are based on personal and subjective perceptions and emotions, render national and mechanical approaches to conflict transformation not only ineffectual but offensive as well.

Another challenge noted was political incitement. By exploiting the concerns and anxieties of the groups they represent, political entrepreneurs are able to raise a knowledge of collective grievances and an urge to correct these wrongs, according to

Rothschild (2002). Ethnic polarisation is a result of their efforts. As a result, ethnic cleavages empower political entrepreneurs to organise grievances against benefit distributions that are regarded as unfair to any one group. Political entrepreneurs use rhetoric of fear, lame, and hate as a tool of division and control. Though the author explains the critical role of politicians in mobilizing their communities he fails to explain why ethnic mobilization occurs. The findings of this study explain why residents of Nakuru County have experienced recurring electoral related inter-ethnic conflicts.

According to Ongoro (2013), since the 1992 general elections in Kenya, there has been a significant escalation of sporadic violence and inter-ethnic conflicts. This is partly attributed by the failure of state to conduct free and fair elections while watching elite manipulations from different functions trying to ensure political dominance. The success of political entrepreneurs in mobilizing ethnic groups into violent conflict depends on the strength of the existing state institutions. The Daniel Moi regime inherited and maintained a governance system from Jomo Kenyatta and used this system to regulate political activities in the field to his own advantage. The infrastructure of authoritarianism inherited at independence (Public Order Act, Chief's Authority Act etc.) and other additional repressive legislations enacted under Kenyatta were all retained.

The recurrence of inter-ethnic clashes in Nakuru county is connected to the strength and weaknesses of the existing state institutions such as the judiciary, electoral management bodies and the police. However, the question of interest to the study is why successive political alliances have continued to shape inter-ethnic relations among the communities in Nakuru county.

It is the elites' purpose to incite a state of animosity and create a challenge for national security, according to Pierce (2016). As a result, leaders of mass-led wars want to hurt their opponents. Using Pierce's example, we can see how the leader and the people are connected. Threats elicit a response from the populace, which is seen as a sign of goodwill. Elites are viewed as harmful because they produce such threats. There is a widespread belief amongst leaders that an ethnic community is under threat and that this threat is based on inaccurate or misleading facts and emotional symbolic problems (Hugo, 2017). Many conflicts have been sparked by ethnic tensions that have been politicised in countries like Yugoslavia, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka.

Another concern raised by the study findings is the presence of gangs in Nakuru county. The issue of gangs was adequately reported by respondents as being one of the peace impediments in the county.

From the FGDs discussion it was noted that:

> The county has a number of gang/militia groups namely Wajanja, Wazalendo, Mungiki, Genge juu, Backyard, Lumumba, Mtaro Base, Makaveli and West side. These groups are sometimes supported by politicians through funding. (Field interview in Elburgon on 28th June 2021)

Based on the findings of this study, it is clear that organised criminal syndicates play an integral part in urban violence in Kenya, which includes armed robbery and abduction, human and weapon trafficking and the drug trade. A total of 46 gangs are thought to have existed in Kenya by the National Crime Research Centre (NCRC) in 2013; these gangs are primarily composed of young men in their 20s, but there is evidence that some of these gangs have also recruited youngsters. Violence was orchestrated by politicians, merchants, and local leaders who joined criminal groups,

according to Human Rights Watch. Gangs of Nakuru were assembled and utilised to unleash violence against Luos, Kalenjins, and Luhyas and to evict them from their homes (CSIS Report, 2009). These gangs have created an environment upon which conflicts can easily flare up into economic or political violence that inevitably tends to take an ethnic dimension. In the previous worst-case scenarios the organized gangs in the Nakuru County have capitalized on the poor economic condition to justify state failure through legitimization of violence. The relationship between militia groups and politicians is largely symbiotic where the existence of one depends on the survival of the other.

Displacement is another challenge that is still experienced in Nakuru county. People were displaced as a result of violence and threats of recurrent violence. They moved to safer places like police stations, churches, integrated with relatives and friends in ancestral homes or urban areas. For instance, in 2007/8 election violence approximately 350,000 people were displaced. The government embarked on resettlement plans but apparently some of those displaced remain unsettled to date. This is in agreement with previous studies which highlight that conflicts in the Balkans, Rwanda, Chechnya, Iraq, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India and Darfur, as well as in Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are among the best known and deadliest examples of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. A common outcome of ethnic conflict is the destabilization of provinces, states and, in some cases, even entire regions. Ethnic conflicts are also followed by gross abuses of human rights, displacement, genocide and crimes against humanity, economic downturn, state collapse, environmental degradation and waves of refugees.

The conflict environment in Nakuru County feature complex interactions of different forces with the recent years witnessing the new types. Among the emerging drivers are directly linked to the devolution system of governance with the entry of more potential conflict parties unlike the pre devolution period. Political devolution had indeed provided county political players with a platform and an environment upon which community interest can easily be harnessed for mobilization. The challenges to peace in Nakuru County has been linked to Socio- economic factors such as widespread poverty, unequal distribution of resources, high unemployment rates and land disputes. The ethnic diversity in the county offers fertile material for political mobilization. In the presence of favorable, necessary and sufficient conditions, ethnic differences in Nakuru town have led to political manipulation by ethnic entrepreneurs, who seek to mobilize and capitalize on ethnic differences for their personal and political gain. The success of the past political mobilization in Nakuru has been attributed to existence of a number of circumstances. These specific circumstances include, the communities' perceived reasons to fear the policies or activities of other communities, or experiences economic and social position as clearly inferior to that of other groups with little prospect of amelioration. In addition, this situation has been compounded by insider and outsider politics where communities abiding experiences is characterized by disempowerment and vulnerability. Such circumstances have been critical in understanding and operationalizing myths justifying hostility as those that explicitly identify the other group as an enemy, inferior, or both in the county.

6.2: Opportunities that exist for peace within Nakuru County

The study sought to examine the opportunities for peaceful co-existence available in Nakuru county. The results are shown in table 6.2:

Table 6. 2: Opportunities that exist for peace within Nakuru County, Kenya

Measures	Frequency	Percentage
Resolving land disputes	44	60.9
Reinvesting peace	150	20.3
Joint Peacebuilding efforts	62	8.7
Recruiting more Security personnel	52	7.2
Devolution	22	2.9
Total	**330**	**100.0**

Source: Field Data (2021)

The results pointed out that sustainable peace could be attained through resolving land disputes (60.9%), investing in peace (20.3%), joint peace-building efforts (8.7%), recruiting more security personnel (7.2%) and devolution (2.9%).

The FGDs further recommended cultural reforms as well as enhanced participation and effective inclusion of all groups, especially the youth and women. Enhancing inter-community dialogue especially where tension seems prevalent helps in the identification of problems as well as coexistence mechanisms and this can build trust and cohesion as well as understand cultural issues amongst the communities as supported by Curia (2010). Police posts built at the perceived hot spots are poorly equipped with inadequate staff. The reservists who serve as security complimentary are few, poorly equipped and not well trained and therefore the need to have more security personnel who are well equipped. Perpetrators need to be punished either by the informal or formal justice systems; however, strategies have to be developed and

implemented to overlook the contradictions which might arise from the judicial process.

6.2.1 Resolving Land Disputes

According to the conclusions of the study, inequitable land ownership and access, as well as development projects that are not executed in a conflict-sensitive manner, both produce widespread complaints. In turn, this leads to discrimination and marginalisation: ethnic groups have exploited long-term prejudice and marginalisation of specific groups and locations. This study on Kenyan politics and post-election violence found that unresolved historical grievances, notably over land allocation, were a substantial underpinning element of violence. Ethnic, religious, or other group divisions are typically an element of current conflicts, according to Sommers (2002). Competition for resources and, more often than not, power and influence are at the basis of most conflicts, as is the case here. Political entrepreneurs utilise ethnic identification and ethnic grievances as the basis for political mobilisation in order to achieve power and control over resources as a result of politicised ethnicity and partisan politics.

Political hopefuls, according to Wamwere (2008), use the high value of land to entice a following by stirring communities against one other over the ownership of property. As an example, the Kenya Africa National Union (KANU), the ruling party in Kenya during the 1992 and 1997 civil wars, was motivated by the desire to maintain power in the wake of incitement from politicians and political parties formed along tribal lines, resulting in significant damage to educational resources.

These conclusions are also supported by Gichuhi 2020, who claims that the colonial authority confiscated a large amount of agriculturally productive land for settler farming purposes. Many kikuyu squatters moved in as a result of this. The 1992, 1997, and 2007, national elections sparked ethnic violence that worsened the situation by escalating the number of internally displaced people, many of whom have not yet been relocated. According to interviews with respondents, many felt as if the state was ignoring them;

> I lost my home during the election violence in 2007/2008. I moved in with my relatives   from   my   original   home   in Molo. Upto date I have never been resettled by the government   and I feel so bad. (Field interview with a resident in Molo on 22nd June 2021)

To avert the situation in Nakuru county, there is need for resettlement of squatters as well as IDPs. This can be achieved if the NLC works with the County Land Management Boards (CLMB) to address all pending land issues. Additionally security cooperation is needed to prevent mass mobilization, hate speech and politicization of the land issue.

6.2.2. Reinvesting peace

People are more likely to resort to acts of violence against established systems if they are experiencing economic instability and deprivation, according to this study. There are reports from FGDs and Key informants that tensions in Nakuru County are generated by inequalities between Majimboism and the uneven distribution of wealth.

As the Nakuru Peace Accord is fully implemented, there is a potential to reinvigorate the peace process by bolstering existing peace mechanisms. As the name suggests, this peace accord was signed by representatives of the Agikuyu and Kalenjin

communities as well as other ethnic groups in the county back in 2012. Ethnic tensions in the county were addressed by the NCIC in this effort. Atrocities committed by both ethnic groups were acknowledged, a code of conduct established, and dispute resolution committed to in an effort to avert future confrontations.

As a result of the agreement, the public was involved through media and road shows, as well as the provincial administration and the law enforcement organisations. In addition, Nakuru County's elders engaged the candidates and elected officials in the 2013 elections, which is thought to have resulted in a relative calm before, during and after the elections that year. Positive outcomes might be reached in the future if this is improved upon.

6.2.3 Joint Peace-building efforts

Table 6.2 shows that Nakuru County's residents see collaborative peace-building activities as a way to bring peace to the area. National Policy on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management was developed in 2012, according to Ernstorfer in 2019, one of the few nations with such a policy. In the early 1990s, civil society groups in Kenya began a more systematic peace-building effort following the 1992 elections, when land disputes erupted. Initiatives such as Dekha Ibrahim's Wajir Peace and Development Network and the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK)'s Rift Valley Relief and Development Project were part of the early donor and funder commitments to more deliberate peace-building work outside of government efforts to maintain peace and security. As noted by one key informant in Kuresoi North:

> Various organizations came together to help address cases of violence and hatred in the   region. Campaigns were done and information of peace spread by these organizations. (Field interview with a religious leader at Kuresoi North on 29th June 2021)

To achieve long-term peace, all members of society, including the government, must play a strategic role. That's why the multi-stakeholder model was developed. There was a need to include government officials at every level of government, including those who represent diverse constituencies that had faced violence on a regular basis. These committees would subsequently be renamed District Peace Committees, and their inception began during this time period

The Peace and Development Network Kenya (PeaceNet; now the Peace and Development Network Trust) and the Kenya Partnership for Peace (which brought together UNDP, the police, and two representatives of CSOs to support peaceful elections) emerged over time, as well as many other peace-building actors, networks, and partnerships. For peace-building and conflict management in Kenya, the Kenyan government formed the National Steering Committee on Peace-building and Conflict Management (NSC) with the secretariat located inside MOSPAIS (Ministry of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security).

Various levels of participation and involvement are possible in this inter-agency mechanism, which includes government departments and commissions, parliamentary committees, county governments, national and international non-governmental organisations, inter-religious organisations, academia, the private sector, bilateral donors and multilateral agencies, and regional organisations (such as IGAD). Different organisations work together to support the NSC's major mandate areas: conflict analysis, early warning, capacity building and training, media and communication, as well as coordination of national peace-building efforts. A direct link between the NSC and county governments and commissions ensures that security is coordinated at all levels of government at the county level. A multi-stakeholder team of county governments, the National Security Council (NSC), and local peace

players is brought together by county commissioners to address peace-building and specialised crisis response initiatives (such as during elections).

Coordination groups of CSOs in Nakuru County and previously existing platforms like Uwiano enhanced their early warning capacities and reach at national and county levels in Nakuru County, Kenya. Gender-based violence was specifically addressed using a scenario room and SMS-based early warning systems.

It has been found that the actions of local peace committees have been hindered by their lack of organisational structure, varied cultures (ethnic networks), and community desire to participate. Furthermore, commercialization has reduced their separate capacity to access talented and experienced peace builders, and has substantially undercut the justification for establishing and promoting peace committees. Some kind of explicit institutional modus operandi is needed for the committees in order to increase their effectiveness. In addition, women, adolescents, the elderly, and members of underrepresented groups are still marginalised in peace committees. This participation has waned since the elections, but it holds the potential to help establish long-term stability in Nakuru County.

6.2.4 Recruiting more Security personnel

State interventions in conflict situations through the security personnel are short-term and reactive, with little implementation of visionary policies. In Kenya, the integration of conflict management in national planning is weak resulting in the duplication of efforts by the various actors who end up being unable to articulate priorities and find solutions to conflict situations as noted by UNDP 2011.

According to the report, security officials in Nakuru County collaborate with the local authorities to deal with issues of violence. According to the findings of the study, government-sponsored seminars and workshops teach local administrators in a variety of conflict resolution skills, risk reduction techniques, resource mobilisation and utilisation, and administration and security duties. Through barazas and field days, the local authority teaches these skills to their citizens. According to the report, they play a significant role in teaching security staff on how to manage disagreements at least once a month. The challenge experienced as noted from FGDs and key informants discussion is the inadequate number of the security personnel and police posts which once enhanced will help bring calm in the region.

6.2.5 Tapping on Devolution

The constitution of Kenya 2010 was among other things to address issues of marginalization and accessibility to resources. Feedback obtained from key informants pointed to devolution as an opportunity for peace. There are several ways in which the Nakuru County Government and Barazas may contribute to the development of inclusion policies that promote fairness and equality for all county residents, regardless of ethnicity. As an added benefit, the county can lend its support to national initiatives carried out at the local level to remedy historical injustices. First and foremost, IDPs uprooted by political and ethnic violence in prior elections must be reintegrated.

Some say that by creating a new arena for local competitiveness, counties have served as a new source of conflict. Divisive political mobilisation at the county level has resulted in the possibility for political tyranny and intolerance as a result of this fight for power. A series of ethnic alliances and counter-alliances were formed in the run-

up to the 2013 General Election. As a result, including county governments in the development of measures aimed at ensuring future elections are crucial. An in-depth understanding of the core causes of conflict and security is essential to designing successful responses. Since the concerns of teenage unemployment and radicalization are closer home for county governments, they are an important partner for the national government.

6.2.6 Enforcement of discrimination laws

In Kenya, a number of institutions have been put in place to enforce discrimination laws as well as fight corruption. Thus, NCIC, an autonomous body, has the duty to abolish ethnic prejudice and foster tolerance among Kenyans. EACC should have prosecution powers to tackle corruption and ethnic prejudice perpetuated by the political class.

At both the national and devolved levels, the autonomous institution operates. The institutions, on the other hand, have failed because they lack the ability to punish. As this research points out, these committees may be bolstered with the backing of the parliament to have stronger powers of prosecution, to encourage openness and accountability, in addition to promoting social cohesion and togetherness. For the sake of preventing racial prejudice and enmity, strict legislation must be passed by the parliament.

6.3 Chapter Summary

Holistic, multi-actor and participatory programs have to some extent enhanced stability within the county but not without challenges. The actors coordinate through shared objectives/tasks/goals, sharing resources as well as implemented activities

which have fostered peace through building trust, promoting security, respect for fundamental rights and developed co-existence mechanisms that address the underlying conflict issues among the communities.

However, as highlighted from the study, conflict root causes have not been entirely addressed. There still exist forms of marginalization and historical injustices which have not been adequately addressed. Other challenges include the presence of gangs, displacements/ IDPs, negative ethnicity, political incitement and mass mobilizations. Despite the challenges aforementioned the county still has a chance of attaining peace through resolving land conflicts and other historical injustices, reinvesting in peace, strengthening joint peace- building initiatives, tapping on devolved functions as well as recruiting more security personnel.

From these findings, together with those in chapters four and five; overall summary, conclusions and recommendations are made in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This chapter presented a summary of findings, conclusions and recommendations in line with the study objectives.

7.1 Summary of Findings

The study set out to evaluate the nexus between inter-ethnic conflicts and national elections in Nakuru county, Kenya. The specific objectives of the study were to:

 i. Examine the nature and causes of inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru county, Kenya between 1992 and 2017

 ii. Evaluate the strategies adopted to address inter-ethnic conflicts occasioned by national elections in Nakuru county, Kenya between 1992 and 2017

 iii. Assess the challenges and opportunities for conflict management in Nakuru county, Kenya between 1992 and 2017

In line with the first objective the study observed that Nakuru county experienced a series of inter-ethnic violence in 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2013 and 2017. The conflict was mainly between the 'migrants' with the main cause being dispute over resource allocation. The root causes identified of these cyclic violence included poverty, historical injustices, land issues, negative ethnicity, forced displacements and political incitement. Perceived marginalization explained in terms of forced displacements, loss/lack of production and ownership, poor infrastructure, inaccessibility to social services as well as in terms of gender disparities also played a role.

Additionally, other triggers of conflict in relation to perceived marginalization included discrimination of 'groups' in areas that affect their lives. The youth who

were seen to be the perpetrators of conflict as was supported by majority of respondents (figure 4.10) were easily manipulated by the elites because of high unemployment rates (reports indicated 70% youth unemployment) among them within the county. Marginalization was also in relation to age and ethnicity further enhanced through corruption in terms of service delivery which seemed to have trickled down to the post 2010 Constitution and devolution. These causes emanated as consequences from previous conflicts but formed a new set of conflicts within the county. Politicians supported divisions and groupings through incitement only to foster their own interests as was noted by this study. All the politicization was done along ethnic lines and tensions and violence heightened more so during national election periods and immediately after.

It was established through the second objective that the state takes the lead role in conflict management. To disagree with allegations of state concentration at the macro-level conflict transformation, the study established the shift to micro-level conflict transformation using local level capacities within the county. Additionally, Non state actors revealed by this study were CSOs; USAID, SCCRR, GIZ, local peace committees and the community members which coordinated through the local peace building blocs, though there is lack of a clear institutional framework that binds their interaction and implementation of activities. Both state, non state actors and community members were noted to forge links through local peace building committees so that local programs could be aligned with sector and peace building priorities.

The strategies for conflict management in the county were inter-community negotiations, mediation and dialogue, resettlement and use of non-judicial approaches.

Worthy noting was the Nakuru Peace Accord agreement signed in 2012 that highlights modalities for building peace in Nakuru County. Furthermore, the study established that inter community projects and programs are also utilized to promote unity and cohesion in the county. Projects worthy noting included schools, dispensaries, roads and bridges that were constructed to foster cooperation between the two major ethnic communities, Kikuyu and Kalenjin.

In respect to objective three, the challenges noted included perceived marginalization, gangs/ militia groups, illegal arms proliferation, negative ethnicity, land issues and forced displacements. The study also established that some of the gangs and militia groups were funded by politicians. Other challenges identified from the FGDs included the criticism levelled against devolution as being a perpetrator of discrimination and marginalization; the lack of clear discriminatory laws as well as lack of enforcement powers by institutions like the NCIC. However, opportunities for peace exist and these include reinvesting in joint peace building efforts, strict enforcement of discrimination laws and tapping on the devolution functions among others. Joint efforts between the government and non-state actors as well as community participation were seen to be good recipe for peace during national elections.

7.2 Conclusions

The findings of this study based on the first objective, added some knowledge to the empirical research by revealing the causes of conflict within the county which are diverse and dynamic with the consequences from previous conflicts forming a new set of conflict causes. Inter-ethnic fighting during the electioneering period was exacerbated by ethnic tensions over property ownership, provocation by politicians

and tribal leaders, and unfavourable media coverage. Nakuru County's inter-ethnic strife is exacerbated by deep-seated jealously arising from the economic empowerment of some ethnic groups over others.

On the second objective, the state which is the lead agency in conflict management has shifted from macro-level focus to micro-level intervention through local government institutions. The state and non- state actors coordinate with each other through local peace-building blocs. All-inclusive approaches to peace building are key in addressing the inter-ethnic conflict in Nakuru County which remains volatile and multi-faceted in nature. Projects designed to promote cohesion and unity like schools, bridges and dispensaries are developed between the Kalenjin and Kikuyu and have been used to prevent inter-ethnic conflicts.

In line with objective three, to some extent, conflict management strategies have enhanced societal transformation and human potential through peace restoration, coordination and integration (shared objectives/ resources/ tasks), inclusiveness and participative programs, and violence elimination which are prime elements for building sustainable peace. However, existing challenges including perceived marginalization, mass mobilization, displacement and militia/ gangs need to be addressed for peace to be achieved. Opportunities for peace include reinvesting in peace, strengthening joint peace- building initiatives and tapping on devolved functions.

The overall conclusion is that there is a nexus between inter-ethnic conflict and county national elections in Nakuru triggered by negative ethnicity, external actors and insufficient public participation among others. Bitter contests along inter-ethnic lines during national elections are therein attributed to the possibility of attaining

control of state resources and being in charge of their allocation. Nakuru county remains volatile with the main conflict trigger factors such as perceived marginalization, negative ethnicity, forced displacement and historical injustices remaining unresolved. The tendency for social violence to peak around election time suggests that elections may have a way of sustaining and even increasing the intensity of existing inter-ethnic conflicts. The underlying causes are ignited during electioneering period on the basis of deep rooted jealousy stemming from economic empowerment of some ethnic groups over others, thus frequent inter-ethnic conflicts experienced in the county.

7.3 Recommendations

The following recommendations were made based on the findings and the conclusions of the study:

Based on the first objective, there is need for enhancing capacities in search for triggers, fuellers and root causes, as well as consequences which may set a new source of future conflicts. This can be achieved through problem- solving workshops with the vulnerable groups from within the county.

In line with the second objective, the study recommends improved coordination and integration through enhanced inter-ethnic forums, strengthening of local peace-building blocs, which may help eliminate stereotypes and negative ethnicity. The existing peace agreement such as the Nakuru Peace Accord be strengthened and enhanced to enable stakeholders involved have coherent platforms for effective intervention efforts and coordination between and amongst the national and local peace- building blocks.

Based on the third objective, local peace committees' activities having been hampered by their weak structures, varying cultures (ethnic networks) as their success is dependent on efforts of the committees as well as willingness of the communities, there is need for clear institutional modalities to be effected to the committees to enhance their efficiency and output. Additionally, tapping on the potentials of women and youth, as well as the devolved functions may strengthen the functionalities of the peace- building structures and processes in the county.

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Appendix I: Questionnaire for Household Heads

 Geoffrey Makokha Odanga

CDC/G/01/10

Study on The Nexus Between National Elections and Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Nakuru County, Kenya.

The study seeks to find out the link between national elections and inter-ethnic violence in Nakuru county. The data is for academic purpose only and it will be treated with the confidentiality it deserves. It is my request you respond objectively to the statement in this questionnaire to the best of your knowledge. Your support in facilitating this study will be highly appreciated.

Kindly tick in the spaces provided ( ) the correct response or supply information where required. Please specify and elaborate where necessary.

PART A

Respondents' Information

1. Age of respondent

    18-27 years ( )   28-37 years ( )

    38- 47 years ( )   38- 47 years ( )

    48-57 years ( )   58-67 years ( )

    Above 68 years ( )

2. Gender of Respondent. (Tick where appropriate)

Male ( )   Female ( )

3. Mark/ Cross and write the type of employment/occupation you do in the area you live.

    i)   Formal employment ( )………………………………….…..

    ii) Informal employment ( )…………………………………………

    iii) None of the above ( )………………………………………….

4. What is your highest level of education?

    i)   Tertiary level ( )

    ii) High school ( )

    iii) Primary ( )

    iv) None ( )

PART B

  Causes of inter-ethnic conflict

5. Why are there continual electoral crisis in Nakuru County?

…..……………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………..

6. What makes people get frustrated during the electioneering period?

  a) Electoral theft ( )

  b) Voter bribery ( )

  c) Incitement from aspiring leaders ( )

  d) Self-anger ( )

e) Political misrepresentation ( )

f) None of the above( )

Any other

…………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………

7. What causes the misunderstandings that cause violence during electioneering period?

a) Misinterpretation of the political messages ( )

b) Joblessness ( )

c) Fear of the unknown ( )

d) Envy ( )

e) Political lies ( )

f) Any other

…..……………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………..

PART C

Nexus between election and ethnic violence

8. Are there inconsistencies before, during and after elections? Yes ( ) No ( )

Elaborate

…..……………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………………

…

9. Do you feel elections are treated as an individual property? Yes ( ) No ( )Kindly narrate your thoughts

….…………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………..

10. Do bodies that are in charge of electoral exercise become compromised or they are weak? Yes ( ) No ( ). Elaborate

….…………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………..

11. Who are the actors helping in managing ethnic, resource based and politically instigated conflicts within the county?

1. The government institutions 2. Police 3. Civil societies 4. Community members 5. Local adminstration 6. Others .(specify)

….…………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………………

12. What are the approaches used for the community to achieve a level of tolerance and peaceful co-existence after the conflicts by the NGOs/CBOs/ church?

1. Discourage revenge   [   ]

2. Health care

3. Peace education

4. Community policing

5. Reconciliation programs

6. Break cycle of impunity

7. Use of non-judicial bodies

8. Income generating activities

8. Others (Specify)

PART D: STRATEGIES OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

11a How is the situation like prior to election period

11b.What are some of the ways used to ignite tensions and who are the perpetrators of the pre-voting tensions

11. Do the locals get involved in the electioneering period to be aware of the voting process? Yes ( ) No ( ).

How active do you become?

....………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………….....

12. In the community that you are surrounded with, are you living in harmony? Yes ( ) No ( )

Where does the problem of disunity come in during elections when you always live in harmony?

….…………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………

13. Are the elections process too private such that you lack ownership of the electioneering period as a citizen? Yes ( ) No ( )

Why do you feel so?

....

13b. What issues create disunity in the aftermath of the elections?

13c What can be done to avert conflicts in future?.........

PART E: Challenges and opportunities

14. How are political interests represented in the county?

      a. All regions represented ( )

      b. Majority group overly presented ( )

      c. Minority group over represented ( )

      d. None of the above ( )

Kindly elaborate where possible

…..………………………………………………………………………………

…………………………………………………………………………………..

15. How are the social interests among the residents of this county, where you live in particular?

    a) Do you feel segregated to the people you know when socializing or you can create friendship wherever you are? Yes ( ) No ( )

    Are the county activities inclusive in order to enable you participate in your area of residence ? Yes ( ) No ( )

Kindly elaborate?

....

16. Is the process of starting a business difficult within the county? Yes ( ) No ( )

How difficult/ easy is it?

....……………………

……………………………………………………………………………………...

17. Do county and national government programs have impact in the region you are

living? Yes ( ) No ( )

Which program and how have you benefited or not benefited?

....……………………………………………………

……………………………………………………………………………………………

………………………………………………………………………………………….

Appendix II: Key Informants Interview Guide

1.   What are the causes of conflict recurrences especially during elections?

2.   Who are the conflict perpetrators?

3.   How do you prevent relapse of the violence situations?

4.   How do you transform inter-ethnic use of conflict situation into stability/ peace?

5.   What strategic steps related to conflict transformation and peace building have

been performed for the community?

6.   How can conflict transformation and peace building contribute to addressing the

root causes of armed conflicts?

7.   What are some of the measures adopted to ensure free and fair elections and

how effective are they?

8. State how to build a strong network and relationships among communities as well as actors?

9. How to improve the role of other actors in the conflict resolution and prevention?

10. What to do when parties to the conflict are not interested in conflict transformation and peace building?

11. How to coordinate with all parties in the conflict as well as peace building?

Appendix III: Focus Group Discussion Guide

1. What are the causes of conflict recurrences especially during elections?

2. Who are the conflict perpetrators?

3. How do you prevent relapse of the violence situations?

4. How do you transform inter-ethnic use of conflict situation into stability/ peace?

5. What strategic steps related to conflict transformation and peace building have been performed for the community?

6. How can conflict transformation and peace building contribute to addressing the root causes of armed conflicts?

7. What are some of the measures adopted to ensure free and fair elections and how effective are they?

8. State how to build a strong network and relationships among communities as well as actors?

9. How to improve the role of other actors in the conflict resolution and prevention?

10. What to do when parties to the conflict are not interested in conflict transformation and peace building?

11. How to coordinate with all parties in the conflict as well as peace building?

Appendix IV: Permit from National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION

Ref No: **407994**

Date of Issue: **06/May/2021**

RESEARCH LICENSE

This is to Certify that Mr.. Geoffrey Makokha Odanga of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research in Nakuru on the topic: THE NEXUS BETWEEN NATIONAL ELECTIONS AND INTER ETHNIC CONFLICT IN NAKURU COUNTY, KENYA for the period ending : 06/May/2022.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/21/10345**

407994

Applicant Identification Number

Director General
NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION

Verification QR Code

NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document,
Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.

Appendix V: Nakuru County Commissioner's Authorization Letter

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Ministry of Interior and Coordination of
National Government

Email: ccnakurucounty@yahoo.com
ccnakurucounty@gmail.com

COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NAKURU COUNTY
P.O. BOX 81
NAKURU

When replying please quote:

Ref No. CC. SR. EDU 12/1/2/VOL.VI/20

18th May, 2021

Deputy County Commissioner
- Kuresoi South
- Kuresoi North
- Molo
- Nakuru Town East

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – MR GEOFFREY MAKOKHA ODANGA

The above named from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology has been authorized to carry out research on the topic - the Nexus between National Elections and Inter Ethnic Conflict in Kuresoi South, Kuresoi North, Molo and Nakuru Town East Sub Counties in Nakuru County for the period ending 6th May, 2022.

Please accord him all the necessary support to facilitate the success of his research.

MWANGI NYAGA
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
NAKURU COUNTY