

**CONTEXTUALISING IMPLICATIONS OF TRANSITION OF
KENYAN CONTINGENT IN AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN
SOMALIA ON KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY**

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**A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment for the Conferment of Degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies
of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology**

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DECLARATION

This thesis is my original work prepared with no other than the indicated sources, and support, and has not been presented elsewhere for a degree or award.

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CERTIFICATION

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DEDICATION

Dedicated to my Mother (posthumously), the late Mrs. Mary Arot Akitela. Her vision that through education I would become 'President', has kept me steadfast and hopeful.

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ABSTRACT

This study sought to contextualise the transition implications of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Mission in Somalia on Kenya's National Security. Peace support operations portend challenges to, as well as opportunities for, national security objectives. Statist national security perception tends to overlook the broader context in which states exist, strategise and function, including peace support operations in immediate neighbouring states, which influence national security. A dearth of studies examine the implications of peace support operations transition to a State's national security. The specific objectives of the study were to: assess African Union Mission in Somalia transition strategies affecting Kenya's National security, examine the impact on Kenya's National security from the Transition of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia, and explore challenges and opportunities for Kenya's National security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia. Neo-functionalism theory, Strategic theory and securitisation theory underpinned the study. The study used a descriptive survey research design entailing mixed methods approach. The study was conducted in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu counties and Jubaland in Somalia. The target population was 3,340 comprising Security Personnel, County officials, NPS officials, KRA officials, Immigration Officials and community elders. The study used cluster and purposive sampling to select respondents and key informants. A sample of 400 respondents and 49 key informants were selected for the study. Data was collected using questionnaires and interviews guides and analysed using SPSS for quantitative data and thematically for qualitative data. The results were presented using descriptive statistics such as percentages, charts, graphs, frequency distribution, and thematic analysis of the excerpts. The study was justified academically owing to the dearth of research on the topic and as a basis for further research. Regarding policy justification, the study informed the process of formulation of the transition strategy, revision of key national security policy documents and multilateral PSO engagement. The study contributed to the rational realist philosophy requiring rational consideration of external and internal factors in advancing national security objectives. The study established that although AMISOM was generally successful, it failed to achieve adequately security and governance mandate objectives critical to creating suitable conditions for Somalia's long-term stability and development. Thus, the AMISOM transition portended negative security implications to Kenya's National Security, affecting border Counties, viz territorial claims, Al Shabaab terrorism, armed incursions, contraband smuggling, and diplomatic misunderstanding. The study established that the opportunities for National Security include shaping and influencing STP, strengthening buffer zone, improving the socio-economic development of border Counties, and comprehensive border security measures. *Inter alia*, the study found that the challenges to Kenya's National security include the *Al Shabaab* resurgence, the spread of terror groups such as ISIS, violations of territorial integrity, and economic sabotage. Overall, the study concluded that the ways, means and ends of the AMISOM transition were not adequately aligned, thereby limiting the creation of a conducive environment for Somalia's long-term stability and development; thus posing a threat to Kenya's National Security. The study recommends a review of STP to factor security forces of federal member states, enhance SSF capacity, sufficient transition timelines, securitisation of national security effects, and mitigation of national security challenges and seizing of the opportunities to enhance Kenya's national security.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADRM: Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanism

AFP: *Agence France-Presse*

AfriCOG: Africa Centre for Open Governance

AfSol: African Solution

AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia

APF: Africa Peace Facility

APSA: African Union Peace and Security Architecture

ASAL: Arid and Semi-Arid Lands

ATMIS: African Union Transition Mission in Somalia

AU: African Union

BPU: Border Patrol Unit

CAR: Central African Republic

CDI: County Development Index

CDP: County Domestic Product

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (USA)

CIDP: County Integrated Development Plan

CMO: Civil-Military Operations

COE: Contingent Owned Equipment

CONOP: Concept of Operation

CRA: Commission on Revenue Allocation

CSO: Civil Society Organization

CT: Counter-Terrorism

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

DDR: Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration.

DIME: Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy

DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo

DSS: Decisive, Shaping, Sustenance

EAC: East African Community

EASF: East Africa Standby Force

EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone

ENDF: Ethiopia National Defence Forces

EU: European Union

EUTM: European Union Training Mission

FC: Force Commander

FDLR: *Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda*

FET: Female Engagement Team

FGS: Federal Government of Somalia

FOB: Forward Operating Base

GCP: Gross County Product

GoK: Government of Kenya

GWOT: Global War on Terror

HoA: Horn of Africa

ICGLR: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

ICJ: International Court of Justice

ICT: Information and Communication Technology

ICU: Islamic Courts Union

IDP: Internally Displaced Person

IED: Improvised Explosive Device

IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IGASOM: Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia

IPSTC: International Peace Support Training Centre

ISCAP: Islamic State Caliphate in the African Peninsula

ISIS/L: Islamic State in Syria and the Levant

JSF: Jubaland Security Forces

KDF: Kenya Defence Forces

KENCON: Kenyan Contingent

KII: Key Informant Interview

KLE: Key Leader Engagement

KNBS: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

KRA: Kenya Revenue Authority

LAPSSET: Lamu Port, South Sudan Ethiopia [Transport Corridor]

LRA: Lord's Resistance Army

LTTE: Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam

MAA: Multi-Agency Approach

MINURSO: *Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental*

MINUSCA: *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en Centrafrique*

MINUSMA: *Mission multidimensionnelle intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali*

MMUST: Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology (Kenya)

MNJTF: Multinational Joint Task Force

MoD: Ministry of Defence (Kenya)

MONUSCO: *Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo*

MOU: Memorandum of Understanding

MRC: Mombasa Republican Council

NACOSTI: National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCDDR: National Committee/Commission for DDR

NCTC: National Counter Terrorism Centre

NEP: North Eastern Province

NGO: Non-Governmental Organization

NIS: National Intelligence Service

NPS: National Police Service

NSAC: National Security Advisory Committee

NSD-S HUB: NATO Strategic Direction South Hub

OAB: Operation Amani Boni

OCHA: Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Agencies

OODA: Observation, Orientation, Decision and Action

PKO: Peace Keeping Operations

PSC: Peace and Security Council

PSO: Peace Support Operations

QIP: Quick Impact Projects

QRF: Quick Reaction Force

R2P: Responsibility-to-Protect

R-ARCSS: Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan

RKB: Ras Kiamboni Brigade

SALW: Small Arms and Light Weapons

SDA: Somali Democratic Alliance

SDMHA: School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance (at MMUST, Kenya)

SMG: Somali Manifesto Group

SNA: Somalia National Army

SNM: Somali National Movement

SNP: Somali National Police

SNSF: Somalia National Security Forces

SOP: Standing Operating Procedures

SPM: Somali Patriotic Movement

SPSS: Statistical Packages in Social Sciences

SSDF: Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SSF: Somalia Security Forces

SSR: Security Sector Reforms

STP: Somali Transition Plan

TCC: Troops Contributing Country

TFG: Transitional Federal Government

UN: United Nations

UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone

UNCLOS: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

UNHCR: United Nations Commissioner for Refugees

UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force in Abiyei

UNITAF: Unified Task Force

UNOSOM: UN Operation in Somalia

UNSC: United Nations Security Council

UNSCR; United Nations Security Council Resolution

UNSOS: United Nations Support Office in Somalia

US: United States

USC: United Somali Congress

USS: United States Ship

USSR: United Soviet Socialist Republic

WHAM: Winning Hearts and Minds

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

OPERATIONALIZATION OF KEY CONCEPTS

Border Counties: Within the scope of the study, border counties referred to the Kenyan counties bordering Somalia, such as Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu.

Border Securitisation: The study used the concept of border securitisation to denote justification of the Kenya-Somalia Border as a security issue, thus requiring measures such as the construction of a border security fence, deployment of security forces as long the border as well as installation of technology devices to monitor and respond to trans-border threats such as incursions, contraband smuggling among others.

Border Security Management: The study used the concept of Border Security Management to mean all the measures undertaken to manage and secure the common border between Kenya and Somalia. These include the border fence, intrusion detection, surveillance measures, customs points, immigration points, security outposts, cross-border security initiatives, policies and procedures.

Challenges: According to the study, these are the peace and security problems arising from the AMISOM transition and its implementation, such as funding, Somalia's SSR, Somalia's political instability, porous and insecure common border, and clan dynamics, among others.

Clan Elder: The study used to concept to denote respected individuals above 60 years of age and who represented their respective sub-clan in any gatherings and functions (both formal and informal ones).

Community participation: Community participation denoted community engagement in national security programmes through various initiatives envisaged under Track three diplomacy.

Conflict Management: The study construed conflict management as measures undertaken by Kenya to mitigate the conflict implications arising from involvement in AMISOM and the transition of AMISOM.

Contextualise: The study used the concept contextualise to put into perspective the implications of the AMISOM transition concerning Kenya's National Security in space and time.

Contiguity: The study used the concept to mean the cross-border continuity of ethnic composition as well as the attendant effects on security in space and time.

Contraband: According to the study, contraband meant the smuggled goods from Somalia into Kenya without following the due importation/exportation processes and paying the requisite taxes.

Country of intervention: This concept denotes a country where PSO or military intervention is deployed, such as in Somalia.

Defection: The study used the concept of defection to imply the shift of allegiance by a member of *Al Shabaab* or SSF by joining a rival armed group(s).

Desertion: The study used the concept of desertion to denote the deliberate act by a member JSF, SNA or any component of SSF to abandon their duties/post without the intention of returning to duty.

Federal member states: According to the study, the concept of federal member states denoted the six semi-autonomous regions of Somalia viz, *Jubaland, Puntland, Galmudug, Hirshabelle, Banadir* and *Southwest*.

Governance: The study used the concept of governance to refer to the political and administrative institutions and functions of the federal state of Somalia and the federal member states.

Host Country: According to the study, host nation refers to the country where refugees are sheltered in camps and administered by the relevant UN agencies and NGOs.

Implications: According to this study, implication meant socio-political, economic and security effects ensuing or potentially ensuing following the AMISOM transition.

Incursion: According to the study, incursion meant the deliberate and unlawful entrance into the territory of Kenya by *Al Shabaab*, SNA or any other foreign security or military forces to conduct attacks and perpetrate insecurity against the civilian population, security personnel and critical infrastructure or installation.

Kenyan Contingent: According to the study, the concept of Kenyan Contingent denoted Kenya's Military and Civil Police Personnel Serving under AMISOM PSO at the time of the study and deployed within the assigned area of responsibility within Somalia.

Marginalisation: The study used the concept to imply multifaceted condition in which a group, a community or an area is considered excluded from the dominant majority in a given social, economic or political setting.

Multi-Agency Approach: The concept was used to refer to the collective and synergistic efforts by relevant government ministries and agencies in tackling socio-economic and environmental issues such as insecurity, famine, natural calamities and disasters, among others. It includes collaboration with CSOs, NGOs and other relevant entities.

National Security: According to the study, National Security meant the ability of the state of Kenya to cater for the protection and defence of her territorial integrity and citizenry through diplomatic, military, political and Socio-economic measures in a multi-agency, bilateral or multilateral setting.

Nature of AMISOM transition Strategies: The study used this to denote the structure, content and scope of transition strategies advanced for AMISOM transition and exit from Somalia.

Opportunities: The study used the concept of opportunities to denote a set of circumstances that present themselves owing to the AMISOM transition that can be exploited for the benefit of Kenya's peace and national security.

Peace Building: Peacebuilding meant all socio-cultural, political, economic, security, and judicial efforts undertaken by AMISOM, FGS and international partners to rebuild

governance, economic, security and peace structures in Somalia and Kenya's North Frontier Counties.

Population Displacement: Population displacement was used to mean the forceful and involuntary movement of Somalia's citizens from their usual residence to other neighbouring countries (Refugees) or within Somalia (IDPs). This displacement was because of *Al Shabaab* threats, instability due to the AMISOM transition, government persecution, economic hardships, or climatic conditions giving rise to drought and famine.

Post-AMISOM: The study used the concept post-AMISOM to refer to the period after AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS on 01 April 2022.

Pre-AMISOM: The study used the concept pre-AMISOM to refer to the period before AMISOM deployment in 2007, entailing the Shifta period, Somalia civil war, and deployment of UNOSOM I and II, UNITAF and subsequent interventions by ENDF.

Security Approaches: The study used the concept of security approaches to mean the planning and structural configurations attending security operations and responses to include purely militaristic or a hybrid configuration incorporating military, other security agencies, county administration, CSOs, NGOs, humanitarian organizations and other relevant institutions in a Multi-Agencies set-up.

Security profiling: The study used the concept of security profiling to denote the cataloguing of biodata and other relevant details of individuals deemed to pose a security threat for surveillance by relevant security agencies.

Security Responses: The study construed security responses as Kenya's various proactive and reactive measures to prepare for or respond to National Security implications arising from the AMISOM transition.

Security Sector Reforms: This meant all measures to rebuild, restructure, and reform the security institutions to enhance security provision to the citizens, their property and the country from internal and external security threats.

Territorial Claims: Territorial claims meant past, present or possible future allegations by the Federal Republic of Somalia as to her ownership rights over any terrestrial or maritime geographical space of the Republic of Kenya, including all political, diplomatic as well as legal efforts to actualize such alleged ownership claims.

Terrorism: In the context of this study, terrorism denoted the actions by *Al Shabaab* against Civilians in Kenya and Somalia, SSF, AMISOM troops and Kenya Security Forces aimed at spreading fear to coerce acceptance of their ideologies and fundamentalism. It includes various forms of attacks, i.e. ambushes, raids of FOBs, kidnappings, executions, propaganda, forceful tax (*Zakat*) collection and interference in electoral processes.

Transition: In the context of this study transition was used to mean the change in mandate, mission designation and eventual exit of AMISOM peace support operations in Somalia.

Transition Strategy: According to this study, the concept transition Strategy meant the comprehensive plan of action developed by AMISOM in collaboration with Troop Contributing Countries and the Federal Government of Somalia for changing the nature of

AMISOM PSO into different configurations with different sets of structures, Mandate, and objectives such as ATMIS.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provided the background to the study, the problem statement, the study's objectives and the research questions. The chapter also justified the study in terms of academic, philosophical and policy justifications. The scope of the study was outlined, and finally, the chapter was summarised.

1.1 Background to the Study

Peace support operations (PSOs) connote a continuum of planning, transitions and exit of multilateral efforts to restore peace in conflict areas as sanctioned under article 33, Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. PSO portend challenges as well as opportunities for the attainment of national security objectives. Such national security objectives are pursued in the context of military interventions to bid for collective security, self-defence or other national and international interests (Williams & Hashi, 2016). Specifically, PSOs have strategic objectives, which require apt planning to align ends, ways and means (Clark, 2006). Unfortunately, transition strategies have often fallen short in one way or another, as evidenced in various bungled PSO transitions and exits, such as in Afghanistan in August of 2021.

In Vietnam, the USA-led military operation was adjudged as having failed due to rigidity by the operational commanders in adapting their strategies to the unconventional nature of the conflict (Angell, 2015). The twenty-year operation ended in 1975 after arduous jungle fighting resulting in the disgraced exit of a conventionally superior USA Military force. The guerrilla tactics employed by the rag-tag Vietcong bogged the mighty USA Army in a

protracted jungle warfare that proved costly, with more than 55,000 American soldiers and between 3 and 4 million Vietnamese killed in action (Waldron, 2017). The protracted nature of the conflict resulted in the waning of the American public support for the war and the draining of the USA's coffers (approximately \$ 168 billion as of the then dollar value). Among the outcomes was the withdrawal of the crestfallen allied troops without a concrete post-conflict plan to stabilise the country. The Vietnam War debacle has haunted the USA's international reputation for years in the field of military intervention. A similar fate is possible for AMISOM Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), especially Kenya, if the transition strategies are not carefully planned to consolidate the AMISOM mandate and achieve the set Kenya National Security goals of the operation.

Over in Afghanistan, both the USSR and the USA had embarrassing military outcomes of their campaigns contrary to what would be expected of superior military powers. As such, Afghanistan has been touted as the graveyard of empires. In December 1978, the USSR invaded Afghanistan to effect regime change (Vedder, 2009). However, after a decade of fighting, the mighty Soviet army suffered a loss at the hands of the *Mujahideen* Militia despite the asymmetry in military strength (Gompert, Binnendijk, & Lin, 2014). The *Mujahideen* considered the Soviets as *Kaffirs* (apostates), and their presence in Islamic territory was sacrilegious, thereby justifying the use of all possible means to drive them out. Thus, with the aid of the CIA, they used unconventional tactics to offset the asymmetry in military might. The Soviet occupation and eventual defeat deepened the socioeconomic and political woes that added to the factors that led to the eventual collapse of the USSR at the end of the cold war.

Furthermore, in the late 1970s, Military campaigns by USSR in Afghanistan entailed an undeclared proxy war where the USA was clandestinely supporting the *Mujahideen* against the USSR. It stemmed from the cold war relations between the West and East blocs; thus, any opportunity that would hurt the opponent was capitalised on (Dormandy, 2007). Besides unstable Afghanistan left behind in the wake of the war, the *Mujahideen* led by Osama Bin Laden later morphed into Al Qaeda. Afghanistan came under extremist governance by the Taliban and accommodated Al Qaeda extremists destabilising the region and the globe through acts of terror (Jackson & Amiri, 2021). In the case of AMISOM transition and exit, and more so, Kenya contingent's exit, the peace and stability situation of areas bordering Somalia will likely deteriorate if a good transition strategy is not implemented. The security vacuum created by exiting troops may enable *Al Shabaab* militants to have freedom of movement to conduct incursions in the immediate border regions in counties such as Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu. The counties are already experiencing significant attacks and other activities by *Al Shabaab* operatives.

Military operations by the USA in Afghanistan were justified in the context of the Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the 11 September 2001 (popularly known as 9/11) attack on the USA (Okoth, 2003). However, after two decades in the country and two successive weak pro-west regimes (led by Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani, respectively), the USA-led operations ended in anti-climax after the hasty exit by August 2021 (Crocker, 2021). The exit had been preceded by peace talks between the Government of the USA and the Taliban anchored on four pillars *viz* withdrawal of troops, guarantees that Afghanistan would not become a platform for terrorism, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire

(Jonegård, 2019). The poor alignment of ends, ways and means by the USA military and foreign policy experts has been alluded to as one of the critical factors in the bungled exit from Afghanistan (Sopko, 2021). The significant consequence was the takeover of the country by Taliban fundamentalists, thus posing a threat to the peace and security of western nations in militating the fourth pillar of the peace talks.

Whereas it can be inferred that a moderate Taliban regime would have taken over, according to the negotiations, it turned out to be the old fundamentalist Taliban in a 'moderate' guise. A similar trend was witnessed earlier in Iraq, where even after a phased draw-down of coalition forces, militants of Islamic State in Syria and the Levant (ISIS/L), aka *Daesh*, swept through the country in 2014, filling the vacuum left by coalition forces (Crocker, 2021). It is a damning indictment of the USA and its allies regarding their concern for the post-intervention stability of countries. As Kagwanja, Mutuku, Njuguna, Gitogo, Saman, Imbiakha, Kwach and Mugoro (2020: 121) submitted, the Iraq invasion was focused on regime change with little regard for post-Saddam stability of the state of Iraq and no consideration was given for regional and global implications of Iraq's destruction. Such transition-failed outcomes are possible motivations for other jihadist organisations, such as *Al Shabaab*, who hope the same will occur with AMISOM transition and exit, thus presenting an opportunity to exploit.

In Africa, Peace support operations (PSO) under the auspices of the UN have been conducted in many countries with varied outcomes. Some well-executed PSOs, such as in Namibia, Sierra Leone, Burundi, and Ethiopia-Eritrea, among others, have seen some

measure of success in peace and stability (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). These PSOs have employed a mixture of approaches, including hard power, soft power or a blend of the two in what some scholars call military diplomacy or smart power (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Imbiakha, Okoth & Were, 2021). Attempts in Somalia illustrate failed PSO interventions. It is a fact noted in a thesis by Ligawa (2018:175) arguing that the nature of AMISOM strategies slows down peacebuilding, therefore, needing realignment to support peacebuilding in Somalia. After the fall of Siad Barre's regime in 1991, the UN attempted to stabilise the situation in Somalia to provide security for humanitarian aid, which activities of warlords such as Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohamed had hitherto hampered. The result was the deployment of UNOSOM I in 1993, then UNITAF in 1994, which shortly transitioned into UNOSOM II, which eventually exited in 1995 (Ligawa, 2018; Nzau, 2018). The infamous 1993 incident dubbed '*Black Hawk Down*' resulted in a reconsideration of USA Military interventions in Africa guided by a risk-averse approach termed '*Somalia Syndrome*' (Bass & Zimmerman, 2013; Patman, 2015). This partly explained the unwilling and lukewarm attitude towards intervention in conflicts in Africa.

The 'black hawk down' was a botched attempt by the USA Special Forces to capture the rebel leader, Farah Aideed, in Mogadishu. The ensuing battle claimed hundreds of Somalis' lives, and about 18 American soldiers were killed (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). The debacle was attributed to a lack of local support for the mission, a lack of understanding of Somali clan dynamics by the peacekeepers, and poor operation planning, among others (Ligawa, 2018; Hersi, 2015; Bass & Zimmerman, 2013). The USA eventually withdrew, leaving the country to cascade down the path of decades of conflict and instability with spillover

effects into Kenya. Besides, the lack of a stable government and security structures meant that anarchy remained and escalated in Somalia post-PSO exit.

Lessons learnt from the highlighted PSOs indicate that anarchy is a possible scenario post-AMISOM transition and exit. While some semblance of political administration, i.e. Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and security sector reform (SSR), has been created through AU and AMISOM efforts, they only have weak influence in Mogadishu (Ligawa, Okoth, & Matanga, 2017). The rest of Somalia is largely at the mercy of warlords and militia such as *Al Shabaab*, save for the few cantonment environs secured by AMISOM troops and Somalia Security Forces (SSF) (Williams *et al.*, 2018). *Al Shabaab* has made alliances with ISIS, and they are keen on spreading terror activities well into Kenya and the African Great Lakes region. It is in the form of an Islamic State in Central African Peninsula (ISCAP), whose operations span Kenya, Uganda, Eastern DRC, Tanzania and *Cabo Delgado* regions of Mozambique.

Some scholars have attempted to develop contact dilemma as a conceptual tool to explain soldiers' reactions on the battlefield in the peace enforcement PSO context. Contact dilemma has been advanced to explain why soldiers may choose fight or flight options when faced with overwhelming enemy attack and the imminent dangers of death, injuries or being taken captive in an environment like Somalia (Ligawa, Odhiambo, & Rahoy, 2016). The scholars highlight the battlefield conditions contributing to contact dilemmas, such as hostility, uncertainty and disorder, violence and danger, and human stress (Ligawa, Odhiambo, & Rahoy, 2016). In as much as the ingredients of contact dilemma can

reasonably explicate a possible reaction of a soldier in the face of mortal danger, they are nothing new since they are adequately expounded in military doctrinal manuals as 'the enduring characteristics of the battlefield'. Glaringly, the scholars do not adequately appreciate the importance of planning and strategy in the entire scheme of military operations. Whereas they give it a cursory mention in their recommendations, their focus is more on the moment of attack and thus overlook the enduring nature of contact dilemma across the operational spectrum. It would require a proper appreciation of how it manifests throughout the continuum of PSO and, more importantly, at transition points; since such points form critical nodes and stepping stones that would determine subsequent successes or failures.

The protracted conflict in Somalia has had far-reaching effects on Kenya's peace and stability. According to Williams and Hashi (2016), due to the collapse of the State of Somalia in 1991, the country has been breeding as well as a playground for Islamic fundamentalists that prefer approaching disputes through extremist stances and violent means. Prominently, the *Al Shabaab* arose out of a metamorphosis of the military wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which was routed out of Mogadishu by the Ethiopian Nation Defence Forces (ENDF) in 2006 (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). In attempts to stabilise the situation and seek conflict resolution, the African Union (AU) has played a significant role with support from the United Nations, European Union (EU) and other international partners (Williams *et al.*, 2018). African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was a successor to Intergovernmental Authority on Development in Somalia (IGASOM), and it operated in the country from 2007 until April 2022, when it changed into African Union

Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). IGASOM was preceded by UNOSOM I, UNITAF and UNOSOM II (Ligawa, Okoth, & Matanga, 2017; Nzau & Guyo, 2018). The changes from one mission type to another can be considered transition nodes in PSO's attempts to stabilise Somalia. As indicated earlier, the transition nodes have had mixed outcomes in fulfilling intended objectives.

Deployed under the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the operating environment required that AMISOM's mandate be oriented towards a peace enforcement posture (Nzau, 2018). It is further justified by the fact that there is no ceasefire agreement between FGS and *Al Shabaab* and, thus, no peace to keep (Oluoch, 2018: 533). Thus, the AMISOM mandate had to take a peace enforcement trajectory to create the necessary conditions for restoring peace and stability in Somalia (Williams *et al.*, 2018). The Kenya Defence Force (KDF) has contributed troops to AMISOM since 2012 as part of collective security responsibility in her international peace and security commitments (Migue *et al.*, 2012; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). Over the operational period, KDF Contingent has played a pivotal role in degrading *the Al Shabaab* threat and stabilising Somalia since joining re-hatting to AMISOM.

Consequently, with the need to hand over security responsibilities gradually to FGS and SSF, a transition and exit of AMISOM has been under consideration since 2017, which was to culminate with AMISOM's exit in December 2021. It was on condition that FGS could assume governance and security responsibilities (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Williams & Hashi, 2016). However, there were concerns that the planned transitions were being hurried and

the critical milestones needed to be achieved; thus, rethinking the transition, its implementation, and its consequences were crucial (Williams *et al.*, 2018). The planned transition did not materialise at the projected timelines leading to extensions and mandate renewals of AMISOM. Currently, AMISOM has transitioned to ATMIS, a force configuration tasked with implementing the STP, and eventually handover to SSF or a hybrid UN-led peacekeeping mission alongside SSF at the end of 2024. Since AMISOM has transitioned to ATMIS and has an outlined concept of operation, it is important to contextualise the implications of the transition to Kenya's national security, thus the need for this study.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Although AMISOM has been instrumental in supporting the peacebuilding efforts in Somalia, the protracted nature of the operations, coupled with geopolitical intricacies, stretches the resource capacity of states and partners (Williams & Hashi, 2016; Crisis Group, 2022). Furthermore, the fact that, ultimately, the future of Somalia is the responsibility of its people and government requires that such responsibilities be transferred gradually and measuredly (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Williams & Hashi, 2016; Nzau, 2018). Experts have observed that AMISOM made significant progress in pursuit of its strategic objectives, which include, *inter alia*; reducing the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups; providing security to enable Somalia's political process and efforts at reconciliation; and handing over its security responsibilities to the Somali security forces (Williams *et al.*, 2018).

However, the instability in Somalia has been a security concern to Kenya and the neighbouring countries due to spillover effects such as refugee influx, *Al Shabaab*

incursions and attacks, Piracy and hijackings in the in the Indian ocean among others. Migue *et al* (2012) observed that Kenya had to pursue Al Shabaab into Somalia due to increased attacks in the Nairobi before 2011. The Westgate Mall attack in 2013, the Garissa University attack in 2015, and the Dusit D2 Hotell attack in 2018, among others, were indicators that Al Shabaab activities were a threat National Security of Kenya despite being degraded in Somalia by AMISOM. Besides, the contiguous ethono-geographical zone characterising the NFD counties and adjacent Jubaland in Somalia saw Al Shabaab conducting attacks against security posts and non-somali locals in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu including the 2014 Mpeketoni attack. Considering the trend, it was instructive to determine how AMISOM transition would affect Kenya's national security.

AMISOM has been mooting to exit Somalia since 2017 with various plans broached for implementation (Williams & Nguyen, 2018). However, deadlines have lapsed without key exit milestones being attained, leading to revisions of plans and extensions of mandate. It indicates a shortcoming in the alignment of ends and means. Military experts have raised concerns about the hurried manner of the AMISOM exit plan, the preparedness of FGS and SSF to assume security and governance responsibilities and the possibilities of *Al Shabaab* resurgence (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020:119; Williams & Hashi, 2016). With the examples of USA operations in Afghanistan and the disorganised exit in 2021, the AMISOM transition requires careful implementation through a realistic strategy. Considering reservations on FGS and SSF's capacity to assume governance and security responsibilities of Somalia, bungled exit is inimical to the national security and stability of neighbouring states like Kenya and beyond. Aspects of the implication of AMISOM transition to Kenya's national

security are given urgency and credence, *inter alia*, in the context of frosty historical relations with Somalia, which will likely shape future relations, including maritime and terrestrial borders. Furthermore, Kenya is experiencing the spillover effects of conflicts from Somalia such as attack of non-somalis teachers and quarry workers in Wajir and Mandera Counties, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) attacks against Kenyan Troops in NFD and AMISOM, Maritime territory claims by Somalia, refugee problems among others. The effects will likely escalate if the transition does not result in a stable Somalia, thus leading to warring factions.

Besides, with a dearth of scholarly work, there is a need for more studies to examine adequately the implications of peace support operations transition and exit on National Security, more so in Kenya. For instance, Ligawa, Okoth, & Matanga (2017) examined the nature of the AMISOM operating environment concerning Somalia Peace Building. While the study propounded the importance of realigning AMISOM operations to support durable peace in Somalia, it did not look at the effects of such efforts on Kenya's national security, especially at the point of transition. A similar study by Ligawa (2018) on the nature of AMISOM in Somalia peacebuilding examined the crucial peacebuilding activities by the military component of AMISOM. These were activities to assist military operations and create a conducive peacebuilding environment. The study needed to locate the significance of SSR, which is conspicuously lacking and inimical to a proper transition of AMISOM. Such academic and planning gaps expose Kenya to post-transition and exit consequences that may be detrimental to security. Furthermore, in the context of national security, the security situation of ASAL border counties, such as Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu, among others, has been precarious and likely to worsen post-AMISOM. This study,

therefore, sought to contextualise the transition implications of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM on Kenya's National Security.

1.3 Research Objectives

1.3.1 General Objective

The general objective of this study was to analyse the transition implications of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia on Kenya's National Security.

1.3.2 Specific Objectives

The specific objectives of the study were to:

- i. Assess nature of African Union Mission in Somalia transition strategies affecting Kenya's National security.
- ii. Examine the effects on Kenya's National Security from the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia.
- iii. Identify opportunities and challenges for Kenya's National Security from the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia.

1.4 Research Questions

- i. What is the nature of the African Union Mission in Somalia transition strategies affecting Kenya's National security?
- ii. What are the effects on Kenya's National Security from the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia?

- iii. What are the challenges and opportunities for Kenya's National Security from the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia?

1.5 Justification of the Study

This section highlighted the justification of the study in three key areas, i.e., academic justification, philosophical justification and policy justification.

1.5.1 Academic Justification

There are few academic inquiries into strategies of military PSO transition and exit strategies, especially in Somalia. For instance, a thesis by Ligawa (2018) examined the nature of AMISOM in peacebuilding in Somalia, outlining the strategies for successful post-conflict reconstruction outcomes. However, the study should have proceeded to appreciate the implications of post-AMISOM PSO on neighbouring states such as Kenya. Ligawa, Odhiambo and Rahoy (2016) examined the effects of the contact dilemma faced by AMISOM forces deployed in Somalia following a series of spectacular defeats inflicted on AMISOM troops by *Al Shabaab*. These scholars dwelt mostly on the tactical aspects of AMISOM operations by recasting established military assessments of the battlefield environment. Thus, they failed to capture the consequence of such defeats to the security of neighbouring TCCs such as Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. William and Hashi (2016) attempted to examine the transition strategies by AMISOM. However, they dwelt mostly on those already mooted in AMISOM CONOPs and failed to examine the effects on neighbouring TCCs. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) outlined some broad parameters for AMISOM exit without proposing coherent strategy options.

Besides offering a general caution on the need for a well-planned transition that considers the security and stability of Somalia and its neighbours, the studies failed to identify the implications of the transition that would inform specific strategy formulation by concerned states such as Kenya. With a dearth of systematic studies into these aspects, the implications of the same to the national security of neighbouring countries still need to be adequately analysed. Therefore, the study contributed knowledge to peace and conflict studies concerning peace support operations transitions, exits and implications for the national security objectives of TCCs. The study also formed a basis for further research to enhance knowledge in this area.

The study interests national security policymakers, military planners and state security agencies who have to widen their scope of considerations and factor emerging threats to state security more so in the context of the PSO transition. Such considerations are important in building-in sufficient flexibility in plans that can reasonably anticipate emerging issues while advancing national security interests. The study also interests students and scholars of international relations, peace and conflict studies, and political science.

Furthermore, it was envisaged that the study would excite further scholarly debates on the issues around PSO planning, conduct and transition. It is especially important where Countries have to be involved in military and humanitarian interventions in immediate neighbour's territories, such as in Somalia, where immediate neighbours like Kenya,

Ethiopia and Djibouti have boots on the ground, despite the reservations of having such neighbours with shared borders intervene due to impartiality considerations (Williams, 2012). It also contributed to the debate on the effectiveness of military interventions in a regional context through regional organisations such as IGAD, EAC, and ICGLR, among others.

1.5.2 Philosophical Justification

The study contributed to the contemporary realism philosophy by adopting rational realism, accommodating a more rational perspective. Rationality in realism philosophy is a contemporary conception that departs from the inflexible postulations of Morgenthau (1948: 2006) and Waltz (1979). According to Wieclawski (2020), contemporary realism departs from the rigid and parsimonious structural perspective, especially after the collapse of the bipolar international system. Post-Cold War realists declare a need for systemic and rational analysis frames by encouraging a wider openness to domestic nuances of foreign policymaking (Więclawski, 2020). Thus, states have to calculate properly risks and benefits, understand their place in the international ecosystem, and select a policy optimal to structural conditions.

Therefore, this study contributed to this contemporary shift in the realism paradigm by examining how the interests of states influence the PSO transition processes (e.g. AMISOM) and how they react to resulting implications in a state-centric manner yet tampered with external considerations. Classical realist philosophy has four assumptions, i.e. that a state is a principal actor in international relations, the state is a unitary actor, decision-makers are rational in their decisions to pursue national interests, and states exist

in an anarchical international order (Antunes & Camisã, 2018; Morgenthau, 2006). As Matanga (2018: 28) noted, nation states seek power to pursue and preserve their core national interests, such as sovereignty and territorial integrity, thus giving the security concept a statist approach. Despite maintaining the centrality of the state and its interest in international relations, including peace operation transitions and implications thereof, this study considered that it is prudent to advance national interests through rationality in plans and decisions, including adjustment of ends, ways and means for proper response in line with national security interests.

1.5.3 Policy Justification

The study was significant to policymakers and planners for streamlining national security, especially in competitive multilateral and multidimensional peace support operations. The study was also significant for advancing recommendations to proactively plan for and respond to national security challenges and opportunities presented by the AMISOM transition. It was critical for the review of the National Security Policy and National Defence Policy and planning to align the responses and scenarios to emerging external security threat factors (MoD, 2017).

Article 238 of Kenya Constitution 2010 outlines that national security is subject to the constitution and parliament's authority. Its pursuit complies with the law, with the utmost respect to the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and fundamental freedom (GoK, 2010). This conception of national security and its pursuit is state-centric, and it ignores the international influences that arise from involvement in PSOs by immediate neighbouring states. As rightly advised by Nzau and Mwanzia (2018: 353), the security concept requires

wide redefinition to encompass broader issues beyond traditional military strategies, classical realism and neorealism.

Furthermore, the findings and recommendations were useful for reviewing security laws, such as the Security Laws amendment act of 2014, to align security laws accordingly. Such security laws and policies require a broad conception of national security to factor in external influences directly affecting the state. The respective County Integrated Development Plans (CIDP), peace, and conflict management initiatives are expected to benefit from adjustments that encompass national security.

1.6 Scope of the study

This study focused on the implications of AMISOM's transition to Kenya's national security. Specifically, it examined and contextualised the effects that AMISOM transition and exit have on Kenya's national security. The study was confined within the geographical bounds of the North Eastern Counties of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa, the coastal county of Lamu, and Jubaland in Somalia. These Counties were chosen because they lie along the common border with Somalia and have experienced the spillover of negative security effects of KDF participation in AMISOM (Migue, *et al.*, 2012). The Counties act as a gateway into Kenya's interior from Somalia. Academically, the four Counties provided a varied frame for comparative analysis of post-AMISOM security effects in intensity, clan dynamics, and geographical aspects. Additionally, as noted by Bahadur (2021), they share a common thread of contraband avenues, porous borders, and poor infrastructure.

The adjacent state of Jubaland in Somalia was also part of the study area since security implications affecting Kenya emanate from, or through, Jubaland (Breidlid, 2021; Abdille, 2019). The respondents for the study were drawn from the military personnel (including AMISOM Jubaland), county administration, NPS officials and community elders in the border counties delimiting the study area. Kenya was particularly chosen since it has borne the brunt of Al Shabaab attacks as well as territorial claims by Somalia during shifta war as well as the recent maritime border claims. This is contrary to other TCCs such as Ethiopia, Uganda, or Djibouti who have experience lesser to no attacks from Al Shabaab and disputes with the Government of Somalia (Miyanzi, 2012). Moreover, historical antecedents such as Shifta and Maritime border disputes are likely to precipitate similar claims post AMISOM and this the need to contextualize the study to Kenya.

The study examined events between 2011 and 2022 when KDF launched into Somalia, re-hatted, operated as part of AMISOM and transited to ATMIS. Data collection for the study was conducted between July 2022 and January 2023. It was sufficient time since the AMISOM transition, and most of the transition implications were felt fully in the study areas.

1.7 Chapter Summary

The chapter presented the background to the study, laying the context within which the study is nested as well as the prompting notions for the study. A statement of the problem was presented to highlight the issues to be addressed by the study. It was noted that few studies examine the national security implications of PSO transitions for immediate

neighbours actively involved. The justifications for the study were outlined in terms of academic, philosophical and policy justifications. Finally, the scope of the study was outlined in terms of the subject area, geographical limit and timeframe. This chapter summary, therefore, leads to a review of related literature, the subject of Chapter Two.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter thematically reviewed literature relating to the study title. The main themes for the research were drawn from the study's specific objectives. They included the nature of AMISOM transition strategies, consequences of AMISOM transition to Kenya's national security, as well as opportunities and challenges arising from the transition. The study reviewed relevant books, published peer-reviewed journal articles, reports, resolutions by the UN, AU, and other international bodies, national policy documents, credible websites, and online libraries. Before summarising, the chapter also presented the conceptual framework discussing relevant theories underpinning the study and the conceptual model showing the relationship of variables in the study.

2.1 Nature of African Union Mission in Somalia Transition Strategies Affecting Kenya's National Security

Examining the strategic intervention environment in Somalia, Nzau (2018: 548) submits that any typical military venture must have a clear national objective based on a plan to attain the mandate. It should consider those operations' political, legal, economic, institutional, and material environments. While scholars and military experts have tended to look at activities in Somalia in the context of interventions, only a cursory glance has been given at the implications of such a transition to Kenya's national security. From buffering, zoning, and sectoring (Nzau, 2018) to six scenarios (Williams & Hashi, 2016) and the six pillars (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020), only sporadic mention is done of the implications of such transitions and strategies to Kenya's security; an aspect that this study sought to contextualise.

Before examining the nature of AMISOM transition strategies, it is prudent to interrogate the concept of transition strategy in PSO and military intervention contexts and highlight the evolution of Somalia conflicts and stabilisation efforts thus far, including AMISOM. Besides, since the study sought to contextualise the implications of AMISOM's transition to Kenya's national security, reviewing the Kenya-Somalia relationship was instrumental in placing the subject into perspective.

2.1.1 Transition strategies in PSO and military intervention context

Planning and conducting military interventions, including PSOs, are interdependent and work cyclically. Military strategists refer to this cyclical planning-execution relationship as the OODA loop that entails Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action before beginning again with Orientation. According to Luft (2020), the OODA loop is a critical military strategic planning model that requires a comprehensive appreciation of all possibilities, including a possible forecast of outcomes to enable timely development of branches and sequels for the plans. The branches and sequels are meant to address transition strategies in the continuum of conflict management, more so in the context of PSOs to cater for the 'what next' and the 'what ifs' of military operations.

Gilpin (1997) advocated for transition strategies to be inbuilt into military plans *ab initio*. However, there has been noted that there are ambiguities surrounding transition and exit strategies for military operations. For instance, there are inadequacies in the information required to develop and execute a transition/exit strategy. This inadequacy of focus on exit strategies leaves a gap in providing guidance for planning and executing an exit strategy.

Clark (2006) and Yager (2006) observed an irony that military leadership is advised to make sure they account for an "exit strategy," but they are never told what it is or how to go about formulating one. It leaves the issue of an exit strategy to the imagination, creativity, originality, and initiative of individual planners augmented by case studies and experiences of past operations; thus creating an undesirable disparity in strategic approach.

Notwithstanding the planning ambiguities, Nzau (2018: 538) advises that there are no straightforward theoretical models for military PSO strategies, and thus it has to adapt to prevailing situations. The notion conforms to the concept of 'chaos and uncertainty' as propounded in the Contact Dilemma hypothesis by Ligawa, Odhiambo, and Rahoy (2016). Thus, sufficient flexibility should be built into plans to adjust to terrain and operational realities.

As noted earlier in chapter one, various military interventions and PSOs have been undertaken to attain set objectives for the operations, and in the context of GWOT, the USA and allied forces intervened in Iraq to topple Saddam Hussein's regime on the unsubstantiated claims of developing or possessing Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Kanat, 2019). It was codenamed Operation Iraqi Freedom and conducted between 2003 and 2011. However, due to the urgency to intervene, there seems to have been no clear transition and exit strategy to guide the stabilisation and post-conflict stages. Notably, Operation Iraqi Freedom paid little attention to post-Saddam stability, the state of Iraq, and the regional and international implications of Iraq's destruction. This lack of a proper transition and exit strategy is affirmed by sentiments attributed to the then USA's Secretary

of State, Donald Rumsfeld, that there was no exit strategy but a victory strategy (Kanat, 2019). A victory strategy is a subjective idea based on USA's interests and conditions on the ground that are dynamic and prolong operations. The prolonged presence of an intervention force is inimical to public perception and support, jeopardises prospects of a post-facto transition strategy, and thus endangers state, regional, and international security.

As part of the GWOT engagement, there is noted hypocrisy of the USA in pursuing global hegemony (Okoth, 2003). The eminent scholar observed that the government of the USA unilaterally invaded Iraq under the pretext of curtailing WMD, although none was found. The debacle is noted as a biased approach by USA intelligence agencies to effect regime changes in the middle east and to cover up their apparent failures to forestall the 9/11 Al Qaeda attack (Okoth, 2003:16-20). In the case of the USA in Iraq, the bungled intervention and subsequent exit led to protracted civil wars between Shia and Sunni Muslim sects and the collapse of the post-conflict Iraqi administration, leaving Iraq under the grip of ISIS/L.

Crocker (2021) observed that in Afghanistan, GWOT similarly motivated USA-led allied intervention to rout out the Taliban regime that was said to harbour Al Qaeda. As in Iraq, the USA did not have a proper exit plan from Afghanistan except on the condition of vanquishing the Al Qaeda-friendly Taliban regime (Crocker, 2021). Similarly, Jonegård (2019) interrogated the implications of the USA withdrawal from Afghanistan by examining four scenarios. The study used a 2 x 2 matrix as a framework to analyse possible consequences of an American troop withdrawal and as a tool for thinking strategically about the future.

The possible scenarios-outcomes combinations included Civil war and chaos (precipitant US withdrawal + No peace deal), CT and reversal of gains (precipitant US withdrawal + peace deal), the rule of warlords, (timely US withdrawal + no peace deal) and Fragile peace (timely US withdrawal + peace deal) (Jonegård, 2019). Table 2.1 illustrates the matrix depicting the four possible scenarios for the USA exit from Afghanistan:

Table 2.1 Scenarios for USA exit from Afghanistan

<p>1. Civil war and chaos: Precipitant US withdrawal + No peace deal</p> <p>Washington runs out of patience before any formal progress in the talks between the US and the Taliban has been achieved. Consequently, all US troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan.</p>	<p>2. CT and reversal of gains: Precipitant US withdrawal + Peace deal</p> <p>After allowing the Taliban to play it for a time in the peace talks, and after satisfying a limited agreement with the Taliban that involves only the first two pillars, the USA withdraws the majority of its troops. A small US counterterrorism presence remains in Afghanistan to ensure it does not become a haven for terrorists that threaten the US.</p>
<p>3. The rule of (war)lords: Timely US withdrawal + No peace deal</p> <p>The US reduces its troop presence within RSM in dialogue with other Troop Contributing Nations (TCNs), leaving only critical enablers and a US CT presence in OFS. No peace deal is reached.</p>	<p>4. Fragile peace: Timely US withdrawal + peace deal</p> <p>The US conducts a phased troop withdrawal, pinning each phase to certain political milestones agreed upon in advance in Afghanistan. A well-designed peace deal is reached: it reflects the reality in Afghanistan through changes in the constitution and decentralised power sharing.</p>

Source: Adopted from Jonegård (2019: 3)

As illustrated in Table 2.1, the USA had four options to guide an *ex-post facto* exit from Afghanistan. Whereas scenario four was desirable, the turn of events in 2021 indicates that

scenario two played out. The implications are the continued instability in Afghanistan, Taliban rule and the return of religious fundamentalism and insecurity spill-overs to other countries such as Pakistan. While Jonegård's (2019) analysis was good, it concluded pessimistically without offering a clear way forward. Jonegård (2019) recommended different approaches to the exit, which is unclear to strategists. AMISOM ought to have taken a similar approach to consideration of possible exit scenarios so as to inform strategy.

In Africa, PKOs and unilateral military interventions have been undertaken under UN, AU or regional mechanisms. Felter and Renwick (2021) reviewed the role of UN missions in Africa. They noted that about half of the dozen UN peacekeeping missions are in Africa; including UNISFA in *Abiyei* (an area contested by Sudan and South Sudan); MINUSCA in the Central African Republic; MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo; MINUSMA Mali; and MINURSO in Western Sahara. Additionally, several peacekeeping or security missions are under the auspices of the AU, EU, and other regional blocs. Notable ones include AMISOM in Somalia, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin, and the Group of Five for the Sahel (G5 Sahel) Joint Force (Felter & Renwick, 2021).

Regarding PKO effectiveness, Felter and Renwick (2021) concede that many PKOs deployed in Africa have had mixed outcomes. Those that were deployed in countries such as Ivory Coast, Liberia and Sierra Leone were generally considered to have successfully attained their objectives of bringing stability to those countries even post-PKO. However, UNMISS in South Sudan ended without bringing stability to the country, characterised by

fighters between political factions and their allied militia (van-der Lijn, 2010). Whereas the successes of UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone cannot be readily attributed to its transition and exit strategy, the same could be inferred from the fact that there is stability post-UNAMSIL.

Among many other factors, the many dismal outcomes of PKOs have to do with a lack of clear transitions in-built into the mandates and plans, besides the fluid PKO environment that negates PKO principles (Salaün, 2019). It was a fact that the UNSC admitted in 2002 when it discussed the need for a UN PKO exit strategy (United Nations, 2000). Besides the affected state(s), immediate neighbouring countries withstand the worst of botched PKO exits that lead to a resumption of hostilities and spillover of conflicts.

As evident in the few PSO examples reviewed, transition plans are usually not built-in, but retrofitted. It is in response to the 'need to exit due' to the threat environment, the protracted nature of conflicts, the resource burden, and waning support for the operations. The lack of adequately executed exits has led to more instabilities that extend into neighbouring states, more so the immediate neighbours (Goldmann, 2005). It thus requires that military strategists for AMISOM and respective TCCs ensure that despite not having a clear transition and exit plan, the *post-facto* plans need to ensure more stability for Somalia Post-AMISOM PSO. It is then instructive that the proceeding sections highlight the nature of the Somali conflict and be put in perspective, including the attempted PSO interventions to contextualise the possible transition strategies.

2.1.2 Transitions in Somalia conflict

Scholarly analysis indicates that the Somalia conflict has been through three distinct phases viz phase of the war, phase of war and peace and the phase of extremism (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 23-45). The phase of war lasted from 1963 to 1989 and was marked by a frosty relationship between Kenya and Somalia. It is because Kenya accused Somalia of inciting secessionist movements in the then Kenya North Eastern Province (NEP), from 1963 to 1967, as part of the latter's 'Greater Somalia' expansionist ideology. The 'Greater Somalia' ideology aimed at uniting all Somali-speaking people found in Kenya's NEP, South Eastern Ethiopia and Djibouti (Chonka & Healy, 2021; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 41). The phase of war and peace spanned from 1989 to 2004 and was characterised by toppling of *Siaad Barre's* regime, followed by the warlords, civil wars and eventual collapse of the state of Somalia including failed foreign interventions. During this period, Kenya was instrumental in searching for peace in Somalia by participating in and hosting peace meetings. The phase of extremism began in post-2004, corresponding with the rise of various Islamist extremist groups culminating with the rise of *Al Shabaab* in 2007.

The above phases can be construed as transitions in developing conflicts in Somalia. The stages shift from post-colonialism through nationalism and secularism to religious fundamentalism. All these Somalia conflict transitions have had implications for Kenya's national security, including the *Shifita* secessionist insurrections, banditry, and currently, *Al Shabaab* terrorist attacks.

2.1.3 Transitions in Military Intervention efforts

Jess (2018) submitted that the Somali civil war flared from 1988 through the 1990s. The conflict pitted the ruling military junta led by *Siaad Barre* and a mix of opposition-armed

groups such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), Somali National Movement (SNM), United Somali Congress (USC) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). All these groups used violence to challenge the junta.

Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 28), and Chonka and Healy, (2021) noted the presence of other non-violent groups, which included the Somali Democratic Alliance (SDA) and the Somali Manifesto Group (SMG). It is the USC, led by General Mohamed *Farah Aideed* and businessperson Ali Mahdi Mohamed, which eventually toppled Siaad Barre in January of 1991. The ensuing instability saw a ruthless reign of warlords along clan lines and a counterattack by the ICU to dislodge the warlords from Mogadishu, eventually leading to ENDF intervention in 2006 against the ICU.

During these phases of the Somalia Conflict evolution, several interventions were attempted by regional and international countries. According to Williams *et al.* (2018), five international military interventions were organised between 1992 and 2011. The first intervention was the United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), which deployed between April to December 1992, comprising a multinational contingent of 54 military observers and 893 military personnel from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Egypt, Fiji, Finland, Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan and Zimbabwe . Notably, UNOSOM aimed to provide security to Humanitarian agencies for relief aid distribution, which was being hampered by the activities of various warlords. However, UNOSOM I failed to fulfil its objectives and ended prematurely.

The second intervention was launched in 1992 following the creation of UNITAF to replace UNOSOM I. UNITAF aimed to prepare for the return to peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding. It comprised about 37,000 personnel from 40 countries, with the bulk (approximately 25,000 personnel) from the USA (Oluoch, 2018). While UNITAF was instrumental in creating an enabling environment for the negotiation and signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in early 1993, it failed to create sustainable peace, thus the civil war continued. Besides, Oluoch (2018) noted that the lack of a robust mandate hampered the work of UNITAF and as such, UNITAF was short-lived and transitioned to UNOSOM II in March 1993

The third intervention by UNOSOM II comprised approximately 28,000 military personnel from 40 countries Ali and Matthews (2004: 253). The mission was mandated to secure continued humanitarian relief efforts, restore peace, and rebuild the Somali state and economy. However, the mission suffered setbacks in implementing its mandate to the hostile activities by warlords such as *Farah Aideed*. The last straw in the string of setbacks was during the 'black hawk down' incident, where about 18 American Rangers Quick Reaction Force (QRF) were killed during a mission to capture *Aideed*. It is estimated that 150 UN personnel died during UNOSOM II. Ali and Mathews (2004) surmised that the mission exited Somalia in March of 1995 and abandoned Somalia to local warlords and terrorists, thereby threatening the security of Somalia and neighbouring state such as Kenya. The implications to Kenya included incursions by bandits and criminal elements, the smuggling of contraband goods and refugee influx.

The fourth intervention took place in June 2006 when ICU militia defeated western backed warlords and captured the Capital city, Mogadishu, toppling the interim government of President Ali Mahdi (Ligawa, 2018:54). In December of the same year, Ethiopia sent troops to protect the interim government in Mogadishu. ENDF managed to route out ICU before officially withdrawing in January 2009. Consequently, the intervention by ENDF sparked off the Somali nationalism wave in which *Al Shabaab*, an offshoot of ICU, rode to power. Kenya was instrumental in participating in peace talks and hosting key peace conferences. The critical peace conference was the 2004 Nairobi peace conference that saw the formation of the Transition Federal Government(TFG). Kenya also played a significant role in forming the Federal Government of Somalia in 2012.

The centrality of IGAD and AU characterised the fifth intervention as regional and continental bodies with the duty to bring about peace, security and stability in the spirit of "Responsibility-to-Protect". As de Coning, (2019) observed, the 1990s failures by foreign interventions in Somalia left the country to its own devices. As such, the Somali conflict gradually morphed into jihadism. Therefore, IGAD member states mooted the idea of deploying African forces to restore peace and order in Somalia.

The AU Peace and Security Council authorised IGAD to deploy a peace mission in 2005. However, the deployment did not occur due to policy differences between the IGAD and AU on the one hand and the UN on the other, mainly along the lines of the UN arms embargo and opposition to deployment by immediate neighbours (Williams, 2012). Eventually, AU assumed responsibilities from IGAD and contingents from Uganda,

Burundi, Djibouti, and Ethiopia deployed in 2007 under AMISOM. Kenya joined in 2012 after the initial pursuit of *Al Shabaab* into Somalia during Operation *Linda Nchi* in October 2011. AMISOM mandate ended on 30 April 2022 and ushered ATMIS, which is planned to gradually hand over security responsibilities to SSF in a phased manner until it exits at the end of 2024.

The preceding account of the various interventions is critical for this study as it indicates the transition markers for the intervention missions. Scholars such as Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) did not explicitly refer to the shift to successive interventions as a 'transition'. Thus, they were not able to properly analyse the circumstances around the transitions and security implications to Somalia and neighbouring states such as Kenya. Having examined the intervention phases, a review of the conceptual aspects of the transition strategy is helpful for the study to contextualise the strategies employed by AMISOM, or the lack thereof, to appreciate the implications to Kenya's National Security.

2.1.4 Nature of Transition Strategies for AMISOM PSO

Examining the challenges to AMISOM's exit from Somalia, William and Hashi (2016) submitted that it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia without leaving behind capable, legitimate and inclusive Somalia Security Forces. It was often underscored that AMISOM was not an occupation force and must eventually exit Somalia. However, such a governance and security responsibilities transition can happen in a well-formulated transition strategy that looks beyond post-AMISOM stability in Somalia and the national security implications on immediate neighbours.

According to Musoma (2021), military strategists often underscore the need for a transition plan inbuilt into Concepts of Operation (CONOP) for military operations in order to avoid falling into the hastiness of the 'need to intervene' in conflicts; which often entails retrofitting transition strategies. However, caution against having rigid transition strategies is crucial because conflict environments such as the Horn of Africa (HoA) are often unpredictable and thus require plans that can be adapted to unforeseen circumstances (Musoma, 2021). Despite this realisation, many military operations do not emphasise the transition plans but develop them as the operations continue. Where such are developed, they tend to be inadequate in considering all the possibilities that could affect the outcomes.

There have been plans mooted for AMISOM exit since 2017. The earlier plan was to have the mission by the end of 2020 on the condition that the SSF would have sufficient capacity to assume security responsibilities. The strategy emphasised territorial recovery and consolidation by AMISOM and Somali National Security Forces (SNSF) until October 2018 and a subsequent drawdown and transfer of security responsibilities to the SNSF from 2018 to December 2020 (African Union, 2016). However, the planned transition did not materialise at the projected timeline; an indication of gaps in planning and strategic considerations.

The then AU Special Representative for the Secretary-General (SRSG), Ambassador Francisco Caetano José Madeira, articulated the identified challenges that could have hampered this transition. He highlighted the challenges as being; the enhancement of the

‘AMISOM Model’ to suit a transition Mission engaged in asymmetric warfighting, provision of the appropriate level of enablers and multipliers to enhance the operational efficiency of the new mission, and the importance of force generation (Madeira, 2022). However, whereas they may be expert observations, the challenges need scientific verification through research data to inform policy and academia.

Cognizant of the complex nature of the Somali conflict environment, the last challenge is significant for planners of AMISOM transitions as it hinges on the security aspects of solving the other two challenges as identified by Madeira (2022). Issues of force generation go beyond manpower provision. It entails capacity building and professionalisation of the force to assume security responsibilities, albeit adequately graduated. Some scholars took note of the inadequacies of this initial transition plan. They aver that AMISOM [transition] and exit strategy should consider its ramification for the security of Somalia's neighbours (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 122). Observing that the future of Somalia will not rest on militarism but civilian rule in a law and order framework, they suggest that the AMISOM exit (and transition) strategy must be comprehensive, with clear timelines considering two key factors, *viz*, transition of AMISOM operations to Somali-led operations and transition from military to police led operations. These sentiments echo the line of thought by William and Hashi (2016), who submitted that the AMISOM transition must have two major distinct phases, *i.e.* transition from operations led by foreign forces to Somali-led operations; and second, a transition from military-led operations to police-led operations. However, such transition ought to be conditioned on attainment of credible stability and governance; a matter not adequately appreciated by the scholars.

This study notes the apparent arguments by military experts and scholars on the need for AMISOM transition/exit strategy. Chumba (2016: 743) found that Kenya's interventionist Operations in Somalia attracted mixed perceptions, with the majority noting that it was a short-term strategy to a long-term problem. Moreover, the KDF strategy in Somalia was unclear from the outset. However, it was noted that during the incipient stages, AMISOM was conceptualised to have four phases: an Initial Deployment phase; an expansion of deployment phase; a consolidation phase; and, finally, a redeployment/exit phase (Williams & Hashi, 2016: 24). The confusion arose from the need to have AMISOM give way to an UN-led mission at six months after its inception. The hurried need for transition failed to appreciate the complexities of the Somali operating environment and geopolitical imperatives. The outcome has been constant extensions of AMISOM mandates due to the impracticalities of having an UN-led operation. The UN was relegated to logistics support through the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), while the EU provided funding through Africa Peace Facility (APF).

Nevertheless, scholars and Military experts have suggested several exit/transition strategies for AMISOM. Notably, five options for possible AMISOM transition and exit scenarios have been postulated. They are broadly categorised as muddling through, political settlement excluding *Al Shabaab*, a political settlement including *Al Shabaab*, AMISOM enabled, AMISOM reduced and financial austerity (Williams & Hashi, 2016: 35-39). These scenarios were modelled on considerations of difficulties that AMISOM was facing, including lack of operation enablers such as crucial equipment and command structures, the nuisance of *Al Shabaab* asymmetric operations, lack of proper capacity development of

SNA and negative clan dynamics, waning support from local Somali population and Somali political wrangles.

According to Williams and Hashi (2016), muddling through would entail AMISOM struggling with operations in an environment marked by a lack of political settlement and development of security and governance structures. AMISOM would be left to resolve the Somali problem independently without local assistance. The second scenario would involve political settlement in Somalia, including a constitution and cordial relations with federal states, excluding *Al Shabaab*. It would be beneficial to AMISOM's transition and exit strategy as well as enable the development of an inclusive national-level legitimate SSF through the military integration process of the federal forces into the SNA/ Somali National Police (SNP) (Williams & Hashi, 2016; Kamais, 2019). The scenario would also effectively exclude *Al Shabaab* from playing a significant political role in Somalia's future and consign the militants to pursue a war of destabilisation and terror, eventually causing them to lose even more support inside Somalia and across the diaspora.

On a pessimistic flipside, the exclusion of *Al Shabaab* would force it to seek an expanded recruitment pool, including Kenya and affiliation with international terror organisations such as ISIL (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2019). Currently, *the Al Shabaab*-ISIL alliance seeks to establish a caliphate in Africa's great lakes under ISCAP to include Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, DRC, Tanzania, and Mozambique, among other countries.

Furthermore, the third scenario would be similar to the second, except that *Al Shabaab* would be part of the process. The option lends to a suggestion by peace and conflict think tank organisations such as Crisis Group (2022) broaching a consideration for negotiation with *Al Shabaab* for a political settlement. The negotiated Somali government would have to adopt conservative Islamic governance to appease *Al Shabaab*, but spoilers allied to the fundamentalist ISIL would be less amenable to such an arrangement. The same perspective is espoused by Crisis Group (2022), a reputable think tank on peace and conflict, calling for consideration of political engagement with *Al Shabaab* in Somalia. AMISOM's role would be reduced to observer and advisory without active political participation. Consequently, the terror threat levels to Kenya would not have been reduced but legitimised and brought closer.

The fourth and fifth scenarios examine variations in AMISOM capabilities that determine how the PSO would be able to execute its mandate and transition security responsibilities to SSF. In scenario four, AMISOM would get all its mission-enabling equipment and systems, thus degrading *Al Shabaab* significantly while handing over responsibilities to Somali Army, Police and Intelligence services. However, *Al Shabaab* would retain the capacity to conduct incursions into Kenya owing to the weakness of SSF (Williams & Hashi, 2016). The fifth scenario envisaged the reduction of AMISOM forces by TCCs making autonomous withdrawal decisions (Williams & Hashi, 2016). It would be premised on many factors in TCC countries, such as waning public, pandemics, massive battle casualties, and poor economic performance (Williams & Nguyen, 2018). Thus, it would leave progressive gaps in the mission areas that *Al Shabaab* would readily fill and, thus,

failure by AMISOM in its mandate. A new *Al Shabaab* resurgence would then be detrimental to Kenya's national security, especially in the North Eastern Counties and Lamu.

Realising the need for a proper phased transition to address Kenya's post-AMISOM security concerns, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 123-128) advanced a six-pillar vision for a post-AMISOM security order to secure Kenya's borders from *Al Shabaab* threats. The first pillar is the creation of conditions for AMISOM exit from Somalia. In doing this, AMISOM needed to review its operational activities by prioritising areas for handover to SSF and enabling SSF to lead operations progressively. Other critical activities for the pillar include governance institutional capacity building, aligning non-security efforts towards sustainable peace and development, security sector reforms, and creating capacity for justice.

The second pillar hinges on creating a stable, peaceful and prosperous Jubaland as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*. Whereas Nzau and Mwanzia (2018: 361) aver that KDF entered Somalia to support TFG troops to contain *Al Shabaab*, the strategic objective was to create a buffer zone comprising Jubaland. It bears directly on Kenya's national security. The intervention was justified to degrade *Al Shabaab* and deter its attacks on Kenya. To achieve this, using hard and soft power to produce smart power, as postulated by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 61-70), would be required. Activities attending the pillar entail investing in economic activities, creating harmony between FGS and federal states such as Jubaland, creating a safe Jubaland corridor by defeating *Al Shabaab* and its networks, securing access

routes from Somalia to Kenya such as through *Mandera, El Wak, Gherille, Liboi, Boni* forest and the Indian Ocean; and finally consolidating gains made by creating conditions for the return of displaced population of Somalia (IDPs and refugees).

The third to sixth pillar concentrate on activities within Kenya that will be able to contain the security consequences of the AMISOM Transition. It includes a comprehensive border management system that considers socio-cultural and ethnic contiguities peculiar to counties bordering Somalia; a notion espoused by other experts and scholars such as Mutisya (2017), Chumba (2016) and Opon (2015). The same has been attempted as a border fence at the shared border, although it faces challenges of sabotage by the local community and *Al Shabaab*.

Notably, the fourth pillar looks at strengthening the integrated Multi-Agency Approach (MAA) to operations, especially along the border counties. MAA is a concept that champions synergistic planning, implementation and review of government operations by incorporating all the relevant departments of the government, CSOs, and NGOs, among others (Kibusia, 2020). The lead agency will be determined by the preponderant activity being undertaken; for instance, operations against *Al Shabaab* in Boni forest, Operation Amani Boni (OAB) is predominantly military with significant internal security participation. A study by Onditi (2015) observed that the 'informal' and asymmetric nature of present conflicts requires balanced response structures entailing civilian and military efforts. The fifth and sixth pillars explore ways Kenya can cooperate with regional and

international bodies and peace and security training institutions to counter terrorism threats through bodies such as EAC, IGAD, EASF, IPSTC, AU and UN.

In postulation of the pillars, the scholars acknowledge the socio-cultural peculiarities of the Somali community that ought to inform PSO strategies. However, there are no discernible suggestions for tackling the peculiarities except for the submission by Ligawa (2018) on cultural intelligence and Mutisya (2017) advising on the need to consider the effect of the border security measures on the community. Such omission is an academic gap in matters of military strategy thereby requiring strategists to employ experiential knowledge without the benefit of empirical knowledge.

Nzau (2018) identified two strategies for AMISOM PSO, which are more deployment-oriented than exit/transitionary in outlook. The first is the buffering strategy which involves creating 'safe zone' areas immediately inside Somalia and adjacent to the shared border (Nzau, 2018: 562). Immediate neighbours of Somalia have attempted this; for instance, Kenya in Jubaland (Gedo, Middle Juba and Lower Juba areas), Ethiopia in parts of *Gedo* and *Baidoa* regions and Djibouti in *Beledweyne* region. It mirrors the second strategy of Zoning and Sectoring, which entails assigning AMISOM contingents to specific areas (Nzau, 2018: 563). The force deployment into those zones were partly informed by the strategic security interest of the TCC, with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti taking up positions proximal to their shared border with Somalia. Such is critical since it helps the concerned country influence the security threats to them and shape the post-AMISOM national security considerations.

2.1.5 Post-AMISOM transition to ATMIS

As earlier noted, various PSO efforts in Somalia and their transitions did little to resolve the Somali conflict. However, Blyth (2019) noted that AMISOM has had some commendable contributions to the stabilisation of Somalia according to its mandate, which evolved from protecting the Somali authorities and facilitating a political process to warfighting and counter-insurgency and stabilisation with a mixture of state building. Ultimately, the governance and security responsibilities have to be assumed by Somalia. Such a transition has to be cognizant of previous pitfalls. Given this, any AMISOM transition plan should consider Somalia's post-AMISOM stability and regional peace and security. It would imply more time allocation for a phased handover, accelerated training of SSF, and the building of institutions; further weakening *Al Shabaab* (Blyth, 2019).

Over time, the UNSC has been renewing AMISOM mandates for six months. In 2019 through UNSCR 2472(2019), redeployments and drawdowns of forces were initiated to conform to a possible exit in 2021. The last mandate extension was in 2020 through UNSCR 2614/2021, extending AMISOM's stay by three months as stakeholders agreed upon a transition plan per the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) (United Nations, 2021). The STP to be implemented by ATMIS was developed in 2018, and revised in 2021, to transfer security responsibilities from AMISOM to the country's security forces over the next three years to 2024. However, Ligawa (2018) pointed out that the frequent changes in mandate within short periods militated against Somalia's peacebuilding efforts. The PSO mandates are not given adequate time to realise any significant impact towards peacebuilding.

ATMIS effectively took over from AMISOM on 01 April 2022, in line with the decision of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) during its 1068th meeting on 08 March 2022. It inherited AMISOM's 18,000 troops, 1,000 police and 70 civilian staff (Dessu, 2022). The AU PSC mandated ATMIS to support the Federal Government of Somalia in implementing the STP and to transfer security responsibilities to the Somali security forces and institutions by 31 December 2024. The mandate included activities to: degrade *Al Shabaab* and other terrorist groups; provide security to population centres and open the main supply routes; develop the capacity of the Somali Security Forces to enable them to take over security responsibilities by the end of the transition period; support peace and reconciliation efforts of the FGS; and help develop the capacity of the security, justice and local authority institutions of the Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States. As observed by Dessu (2022), there is pessimism that the ATMIS mandate does not significantly depart from its predecessor. The new mission will likely face political and funding challenges that hamper AMISOM. Whereas inferences can be drawn from AMISOM and preceding PSOs, it may be premature to dismiss ATMIS potential, hoping that past lessons informed STP CONOP.

The STP CONOP was designed into four phases (African Union, 2022). The first phase entailed reconfiguration to include redeployments of FOBs, downsizing, and reconfiguring forces to a mobile offensive posture. It was envisaged to take the initial nine months ending in December 2022. The second phase entailed joint shaping and clearing operations and the handing over some FOBs to SSF, while the third phase was to be decisive operations and handing over of the remaining FOBs. The two phases were to take nine months each up to

October 2024. The last phase will be the withdrawal and liquidation of ATMIS by 31 December 2024.

This phasing of operations partly alleviates the concerns that hurried exit will repeat experiences like those in Iraq and Afghanistan. The consequences of a hasty exit from Somalia would be more instability and a threat to Kenya's national security. However, concerns remain regarding the state of FGS and SSF to credibly assume governance and security functions. The political wrangles and the Somali question (clannist political dynamics) have not been adequately resolved (Nzau, 2018: 544-546). The capacity of SSF is not yet convincing for added security responsibility or independent operations. The lack of consideration of federal states' security forces as part of SSF in the STP is likely to inflame the situation, cause animosity, defections as well fighting between forces considered under SSF (SNA, SNP and Prison services) and federal state forces such as Jubaland Security Forces (JSF), *Ras Kiamboni* Brigade (RKB), among others. These are some of the outstanding pitfalls that ATMIS will have to contend with and address if they are to operate within the timelines envisaged by STP.

2.2 Effects on Kenya's National Security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia

Having placed into perspective some PSO transitions/exit points and strategy options, it is evident that such transitions not only significantly bear on the security of the concerned states but also have implications for the immediate neighbours. This notion formed the focus of this section, in attempting to contextualise the consequences to Kenya's National security ensuing from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM. As Nzau and Mwanzia (2018: 357) and Masese (2012) observe, the civil war in Somalia since 1991 has

become a regional security quagmire giving rise to massive refugee flows into Kenya, the proliferation of small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and lately the infiltration of the international terrorist organisation and maritime criminals. On this note, security experts and scholars have called for proper considerations of post-AMISOM governance and security dispensation in Somalia and its neighbours, especially in Kenya. Before exploring the implications of AMISOM's transition to Kenya's national security, it is imperative that this is based examination of the concept of national security in relation to PSO. After that, the implications to Kenya's national security will be examined under three scenarios the study coins: collapsed, fragile, and Stable FGS. It would then inform Kenya's likely response to mitigate negative implications while capitalising on the positives.

2.2.1 Contextualising National Security in Kenya-Somalia relational perspective

Depending on how they are planned and executed, operational transitions in military operations affect the host state and TCC(s) (Hardy, 2004). The implications affect the social, economic, political, and security aspects of the concerned country of intervention, intervening countries, and the immediate neighbouring countries. The study focused on the security context of such implications, especially on the national security of immediate neighbours.

According to Opondo (2018), security implies the freedom of threats to core values for both individuals and groups. Thus, it is measured in terms of the degree of resistance to or protection from harm. Furthermore, he avers that national security is a concept that a government and its parliament should protect the state and its citizens against all threats to the nation (Opondo, 2018: 377). Additionally, Were (2018) conceives the endeavour of

national security as a pursuit incumbent to a progressive state. The study construes the implications to national security arising from the AMISOM transition within this context. The issue of national security originates in the 1648 Westphalian state system, where the concept of state sovereignty became the basis of the new international order. Before this period, the Hobbesian social contract, where citizens voluntarily surrendered some of their rights and freedoms to the sovereign for a security guarantee, characterised a nascent national security concept (Hansen, 2013). This re-conceptualisation of national security arose from periods of turmoil such as the 30 years' war (1618-1648) that ushered the Westphalian state system as a transitional conflict consequence.

Identification and exploitation of the opportunities is a matter for securitization by the relevant authorities. Such would enable timely seizure of the fleeting opportunities from the transition in order to enhance national security. Wæver (1995) posits that political issues are framed as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently through a labelling process that portrays them as dangerous, menacing, threatening, or alarming. An authority does such framing as a securitizing actor possessing the social and institutional power to advance the issue beyond politics.

Among other aspects, States engage in foreign affairs to pursue and advance national security interests in the context of transnational security threats that require bilateral or multilateral diplomatic engagements (Okoth, 2018). Porous borders, effects of information technology, and border ethnic contiguity, among other factors, increase the permeability of states to outside influences, thus shifting the understanding of peace and security away

from the traditional state-centric (isolationist) towards international context within which a state exists and must operate (Okoth, 2018: 46). This often necessitates the employment of military diplomacy as one of the instruments of national power to secure national security.

In the context of Kenya and Somalia, the national security issue can be set on the historical past, which shaped the way terrestrial and trans-border issues manifest and plays out between the two states. A study by Chumba (2016) found that historical relations between Kenya and Somalia, and the prolonged collapse of the Somali state, have had a disastrous impact on the security of the two states. This relationship can be traced back to the *Shifita* skirmishes (1963-1967), where Somalia supported the irredentist push by the NFD in the context of 'Greater Somalia' ideology.

Nzau and Guyo (2018: 574-576) observe that colonial and post-colonial administrations brewed the *Shifita* irredentism urge through segregationist administrative policies that excluded the NFD comprising present-day counties of Mandera, Wajir, Isiolo, Garissa and Marsabit. This fomented grievances that Somalia exploited to urge the mostly ethnic Somali population to secede and join the Republic of Somalia. Kenya vehemently resisted the agitation and viewed Somalia's involvement as a breach of her territorial integrity and sovereignty. Despite signing the Arusha Agreement in 1967, spelling out the terms of hostilities cessation and official ceasefire, the *Shifita* conflict has continued to shape mutual suspicion between Kenya and Somalia (Nzau & Guyo, 2018: 576).

With the example of the Arusha Agreement, failures of peace agreements to sustain peace or ceasefires are noted elsewhere. A study by Mwasi (2022) revealed failures of ceasefire agreements when he noted that the conflict in South Sudan has continued for over five decades despite various peace agreements brokered by regional and international actors. He identified certain factors that accounted for failures in peace agreements, more so, in South Sudan, including; a limited number of mechanisms to address impediments to the agreement, little agreement on the ownership of natural resources, inadequate modalities of navigating the interests of external actors, and poor handling of different political interests. This observation reflects Kimokoti's (2016) argument that, to resolve resource-based disputes effectively, there is a need to shift from macro-level state-centric diplomatic approaches to micro-level grassroots-oriented diplomatic approaches.

While the study by Mwasi (2022) brings pertinent factors accounting for why peace agreements fail to achieve desired results, the Somalia conflict presents two significant points of departure from the Sudan conflict. The *Al Shabaab* in Somalia is regarded as terrorists, while belligerents in South Sudan are regarded as armed groups. However, they both share the aspect that they fight an established state government, although *Al Shabaab* strikes targets beyond Somalia. The extension of conflict beyond Somalia's borders by *Al Shabaab* is premised on the second difference with the South Sudan conflict. *Al Shabaab* has advanced religious ideology. The terror group views the FGS and intervening states as apostates who should be vanquished from the 'holy Islamic territory'. The say view informed the Mujahedin of Afghanistan who fought Russians in late 1970s and later morphed into *Al Qaeda*.

On the other hand, the armed groups in South Sudan fight the government for control of natural resources and political power along ethnic lines. Therefore, the study by Mwasi (2022) did not adequately analyse the effects of terrorist vs armed group differential in the identity of non-state belligerents and religious ideology factors on peace agreements. Such factors have been debated in the case of the Taliban versus the USA in Afghanistan and the possibility of engaging *Al Shabaab* for a political settlement in Somalia (Crisis Group, 2022).

The post-*Shifita* period was characterised by Somalia's engagement in the *Ogaden* war (1977 to 1978) with Ethiopia over similar irredentist ideology (Tareke, 2000). After that, the collapse of the state of Somalia was set in motion by two civil wars. According to Kagwanja, *et al.* (2020), the first was a civil uprising in 1982, and by the mid-1980s, it was being actively supported by Ethiopia. The decisive civil war flared between 1988 through the 1990s to the early 2000s, leading to the fall of Siad Barre's military regime, warlords' feuds, the rise and fall of ICU, and the rise of *Al Shabaab*. These events were interposed by PSO interventions, attempts and efforts to re-establish governance. The government of Kenya was actively involved in attempts to bring stability to Somalia and secure her NFD counties from incursions. This period marked a period of subdued hostilities between the two states since, as Masese (2012) analysed, Somalia was practically a collapsed state, and Kenya was engaging in stabilisation efforts to maintain her national security.

According to Opondo (2018: 379), active military involvement by Kenya in the affairs of Somalia came in October 2011 when the KDF crossed into Somalia in pursuit of the *Al Shabaab* militia who had hitherto perpetrated heinous attacks in Kenya, threatening the social and economic security of the Country. This pursuit was in the context of Article 51 of the UN charter upholds the inherent right of states to use all measures to defend their territorial integrity and sovereignty. With some reservations from the TFG and segments of the Somali population, the KDF re-hatted to AMISOM in August of 2012, officially joining the collective responsibilities to stabilise Somalia by AU forces. As affirmed by Opondo (2018), this gave AMISOM the much-needed boost in force numbers while relieving the Kenyan government of approximately \$2.8 million in operational costs per month.

Whereas the KDF contingent has been instrumental in AMISOMs achievements of liberating large swaths of territory from *Al Shabaab* and the shepherding of the formation and functioning of Somalia governance (TFG and now FGS), there have been suspicions between the two states (Miyandzi, 2012). Traced to the *shift* experiences, the FGS views Kenya's involvement in Jubaland as a ploy to foment the formation of an autonomous state uncontrolled from Mogadishu. The suspicion has played out mainly in how the FGS treats the Jubaland administration, including interferences in electoral processes. Some simplistic views considered the interventions by Kenya from a geostrategic perspective claiming that the country wanted to create a buffer zone to secure the Lamu Port, South Sudan Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) project (Warah, 2014: 84). This dicey relationship led to various economic and diplomatic spats including banning of flights and recalling of diplomats.

According to Ali and Muyonga (2021), the carbuncle of it all came to the surface in 2014 when Somalia decided to file a case against Kenya in the International Court of Justice (ICJ). The case was over a maritime territorial boundary with Somalia claiming many of Kenya's territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). This notwithstanding a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) guiding their operations in the disputed territory (Ali & Muyonga, 2021). Despite Kenya's protest about ICJs jurisdiction, the case went ahead without Kenya, and the court ruled partly in favour of Somalia in October 2021 (Elias, 2021). Kenya has since not recognised the ruling and vowed not to cede an inch of her sovereign and internationally recognised territory. The highlighted negative relational aspects will likely define the Kenya-Somalia relationship post-AMISOM and its impact on Kenya's National Security.

2.2.2 Military interventions' transition in security implications perspective

There have been various unilateral as well as collective security military interventions. The Cold War, the Korean War and the Vietnam War are examples. The Korean War was an intervention by the USA under the auspices of UN Peace Operations. The war lasted from 1950 to 1953 (Haskew, 2022). Besides the loss of thousands of lives and damage to infrastructure and economy, the war and its exit resulted in a division of Korea into two countries along the 38th parallel allied to respective ideological blocs (Millett, 2019). The People's Republic of North Korea (North Korea) is aligned with a socialist ideology, while the Republic of South Korea (South Korea) is aligned with a capitalist ideology. Although the armistice was declared in 1953, there has been no formal peace treaty between the Koreas, and they technically remain at war (Haskew, 2022). The ideological animosity

between North Korea and South Korea has persisted. It has shaped the engagements of significant powers such as the USA, Russia and China in the Korean peninsula.

Waldron (2017) argues that the Vietnam War was the central struggle of the Cold War era and one of the major military defeats in United States history. The war lasted from 1963 to 1978, involving skirmishes between the Communist North and the pro-capitalist South. Fearing the domino effect, characterised by countries falling to communist control, in 1963, the USA unilaterally supported South Vietnam by sending 16,000 troops in what was termed 'military advisors'. The war escalated into active USA military operations in 1964 after an attack on USS Maddox in the gulf of *Tonkin* by Vietcong militants. By the war's end, South Vietnam had been overrun, and by 1976, the country was unified under communist rule (Waldron, 2017). The Vietnam conflict blighted the USA's international reputation as an international superpower that can guarantee the security of allies more so at the height of the cold war.

As averred by Kanat (2019), the USA's invasion of Iraq from 2003 to 2011, ostensibly in search of WMDs, turned into a venture of regime change that left the country cascading down a political instability rabbit hole. Two events were pivotal to Iraq's operation and post-operational mayhem. First, the USA's decision to bar the Baath Party left a political vacuum. Second, the disbanding of the military, thereby alienating hundreds of thousands of trained men with no alternative, thus creating a security threat (Kanat, 2019). Iraq suffered through a civil war, political turmoil, widespread corruption, sectarian tensions and culminating in ISIL extremist insurgency that seized a third of the country. ISIL has

afflicted the security of Iraq and the USA, Europe, and Africa. Besides, the USA's international standing concerning the principle of state sovereignty was further eroded, as well as the role of the UN as the arbiter of international disputes through the UNSC.

According to Crocker (2021), the Afghanistan operations by the USA from 2001 to 2021 did more damage to the USA's superpower standing and Afghanistan's stability, albeit the marginal successes in the GWOT endeavours. With over 20 years in the Afghanistan operational theatre, the often-ambiguous USA objectives of GWOT and post-conflict regime changes were inconclusive. Apparently, the poor alignment of ends, ways and means by USA military and foreign policy experts as part of the critical factor in the bungled exit from Afghanistan. The consequences of the USA's exit from Afghanistan are yet to manifest fully (Crocker, 2021). However, the takeover by the Taliban will likely roll the country back to the extremist enclave before the 2001 intervention. Currently, the country is reeling under economic instability that threatens to fragment the state. The case of a Taliban takeover is also a likely motivation for extremist organisations such as *Al Shabaab*, which would hope for the exit of intervention forces so that they occupy the vacuum left behind.

The various interventions in Somalia have had minimal impact on restoring peace and stability and reducing security threats to Kenya. The *Al Shabaab* menace will likely linger long since they are not involved in any post-AMISOM governance dispensation (African Union, 2022; Williams & Hashi, 2016). Historical territorial claims will also likely shape the post-AMISOM Kenya-Somalia relationship and the future security implications. The

study then briefly outlined some of Kenya's likely post-AMISOM national security concerns.

2.2.2.1 Territorial Claims

Neighbouring states have had conflicts over borders brought about by natural resources, community contiguity, and the desire to secede. In Eastern Europe, Russia is implicated in expansionist tendencies annexing parts of Georgia and Ukraine (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019). In Africa, Ethiopia and Eritrea were engaged in protracted conflicts leading to the secession by the latter, but border disputes persisted around the Tigray region. Along the Kenya-Ethiopia border, it has been established that; resource scarcity, vengeance (between *Merrile* and *Turkana* communities after raids), and stiff competition over land, pasture and water, among others, portend a spark for conflicts (Kimokoti, 2016: 214).

In East Africa, Uganda previously claimed Kenyan territory extending up to Naivasha. There is an unresolved dispute over *Migingio* Island in Lake Victoria and latent territorial disputes between Kenya and South Sudan over the Elemi triangle (Okumu, 2010; Ndirangu, 2020). Besides, with truism for Kenya and Somalia, Were (2013) submitted that transboundary conflicts in Eastern Africa partly manifest along land-based borders where competition over pasture and water has been experienced. However, maritime boundary disputes have also been manifest in requiring measures such as cross-border management teams, litigation through ICJ, *inter alia* (Were, 2013: 222-223).

Such conflicts tend to escalate against the backdrop of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Indeed, these disputes have historical antecedents, which find more credence in discovering exploitable natural resources, a sense of marginalisation by adjacent border communities, or mere expansionist desires by neighbouring states. Examining transboundary disputes affecting Kenya and Uganda in Lake Victoria, Mwinyi (2022) averred that such conflicts exist due to failure to manage resources of economic value in shared maritime zones. Similarly, the disputed could be located around transboundary natural resource management from a political and international relations perspective, suggesting policy guidelines for managing transboundary resources.

Somalia still harbours territorial ambitions, although not declared. It can be surmised from the decision by Somalia to lay claim to Kenya's Maritime territory by exploiting legal technicalities in the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS). As observed earlier, Somalia took Kenya to the ICJ to litigate the course of the maritime boundary between the two neighbours. As Elias (2021) notes, much of the estimated 100,000 Km² of the disputed Indian Ocean triangle is believed to be rich in natural resources containing significant deposits of oil and gas and rich fisheries.

Undertones of the *Shifita* legacy still ripple through the murky waters that have characterised the relationship between Kenya and Somalia. Some quarters in Somalia still view any dispute between Kenya and Somalia as nested in the 1960s and the subsequent 1990s, making Somalia weak and unable to stand for herself in the international arena. Elias (2021) has recorded the sentiments in her review of the outcome of the maritime

dispute between Kenya and Somalia. It was noted that Mogadishu contended that Nairobi has been taking advantage of the dysfunction in Somalia since the collapse of the state in 1991 to annex Somali waters (Elias, 2021). This indicates the rancour that Somalia still harbours against her neighbours over what she believes is exploitation due to her weaker position and denial of her claimed 'territory'.

The presence of natural resources, especially in ethnically contiguous border areas, tends to foment animosities and conflict over access and exploitation of those resources. Kimokoti and Were (2018) aver that natural resources are key drivers in a growing number of disputes, with potentially significant consequences for international, regional and national peace and security. With the justification of ethnic-area liberation spent, the next likely thrust of Somalia's claim of the NFD area may be the need to access and exploit resources. This study contends that it is a stable Somalia state that can engage its DIMEs to stake her claims, including militarily, which is already evident in the pre-ICJ judgement auction of oil blocks in the claimed maritime areas to foreign oil exploration companies. There are designated oil exploration blocks in the NFD areas (Mandera basin and Anza basin) whose potential is yet to be established (Cheruiyot, 2012). Post-AMISOM, the issue of the terrestrial and maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia will be outstanding and may affect the national security of the Republic of Kenya. Therefore, Kenya's governance and security experts must consider such issues.

2.2.2.2 Incursions, defections and terrorism

According to O'Brian, (2012), porous border areas have posed a myriad of security problems to states sharing the borders, more so where one state has cases of instability with rebels operating across borders. A concurring contention by Schneider (2012) claimed that in Sri Lanka, the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) established operating bases in neighbouring India and obtained support. In the DRC, FDLR rebels have been launching operations into Rwanda from Eastern DRC. The LRA had bases in South Sudan, North-Eastern DRC and Central African Republic (Okoth, 2018). These armed groups have destabilising effects on the countries of origin as well as host territories and the neighbouring areas.

Since the *Shifita* war, the Kenya-Somalia border has been characterised by incursions of armed groups and security forces from Somalia. According Okoth (2018), this has been made easy by the remoteness and porous nature of the common border. Therefore, it enables nefarious foreign elements such as *Al Shabaab* to infiltrate the expansive areas that separate security outposts. The ethnic contiguity also enables the effortless blending of foreign-armed groups with the local population, who may not feel compelled to report due to ethnic/clan loyalties or threats.

Border incursions for the perpetration of terrorism within Kenyan territory were compelling reasons for KDF crossing into Somalia in 2012 for Operation *Linda Nchi* (Protect Country) and remaining in AMISOM under the AU collective security approach. Opondo (2018: 379-381) partially chronicled *Al Shabaab* incursions and attacks in Kenya between October 2011 and the 2015 attack on Garissa University College. The trend of

attacks indicated an increased frequency of *Al Shabaab's* reach into the heart of Kenya and the use of local cells consisting of Kenyan youths (Opondo, 2018). Following Operation *Linda Nchi*, threats to Kenya's economic stability, national security, and territorial integrity were cited as the main justifications for pursuing *Al Shabaab* into Somalia (Barasa, 2018). These included abductions of tourists in the Lamu area and abductions of government officials in the North Eastern Area, among others. Whereas it could be argued that Kenya fell into *the Al Shabaab* trap of luring a response to justify more attacks, Kenya's government could not tolerate such acts, no matter the ruses.

During AMISOM operations, *Al Shabaab* continued infiltrating and perpetrating attacks inside Kenya. Were (2018) observed that several incidents of killing of teachers, quarry workers, and abductions of medical workers posted to the North Eastern Counties occurred, as well as the destruction of telecommunication masts. Besides *Al Shabaab* incursions, there have been incidents where the SNA has crossed into Kenya in the alleged pursuit of dissidents wanted by FGS. In 2020, Kenya accused Somalia of breaching her territorial integrity when a fight broke out in the border town of *Bula Hawo* in Mandera between SNA and JSF. The incident involved a dispute about Jubaland parliamentary processes, with Somalia making accusations of Kenya's interference (AFP, 2020). Such flagrant violations of Kenya's territorial integrity, even in the presence of AMISOM, indicate that Somalia has no qualms about threatening Kenya's National Security. The conflicts in an interstate interface tend to escalate when sovereignty and territorial integrity are at stake. In Post AMISOM period, ethnic, political as well as resource triggers may lead to similar violations.

Defections by elements of armed and security forces are issues of concern for Kenya's national security experts and agencies. William and Hashi (2016) observe that ironically, the militia groups hitherto trained to fight *Al Shabaab*, ended up defecting to *Al Shabaab*. The defectors go with their weapons and ammunition, which they sell to *Al Shabaab* or use in criminal activities such as highway robberies and banditry. Post-AMISOM defection by alienated Somali regional security forces is likely.

Dessu (2022) decried that as an AMISOM transition and exit strategy, the STP does not embrace the Somali regional security forces in the post-AMISOM dispensation. It reflects the persistent resistance of FGS towards the semi-autonomy ambitions of federal states such as Jubaland. The consequence include alienation and even fighting between SNA and regional forces, causing defections in neighbouring countries such as Kenya. Such movements are likely to be inimical to Kenya's National security and add strain on the already dicey diplomatic relations with Somalia.

2.2.2.3 Kenya-Somali Diplomatic relations

Diplomacy is one of the instruments of National Power, which is used, *inter alia*, to enhance national security. Okoth (2018: 461) observes that diplomacy has undergone a tremendous development from traditional practices to a more public outlook influenced by the ICT age. He concludes that since the world ceased to rely on war to settle disputes, the art of diplomacy forged a new world order that heavily hinges on people who can handle

difficult state-relational situations (Okoth, 2018: 482). Okoth's (2018) analysis provides insights into the challenges and opportunities of conducting diplomacy in the age of ICT. One discernible aspect of concern is the issue of national security. Whereas ICT has shifted diplomacy from the confines of boardrooms into the public domain, where vulnerability to hacking, interception and access to sensitive diplomatic cables are prevalent, there is the threat of straining diplomatic relations through lost trust.

The Kenya-Somalia diplomatic relations have been dicey, and the awkward diplomatic tiffs have been played out in the public domain. The strained relations between the two neighbours worsened when Somalia expelled Kenya's ambassador from Mogadishu and recalled its Ambassador from Nairobi (Ali & Muyonga, 2021; Demissie, 2021). Ali and Muyonga (2021) further observe that the underlying issues souring the relations include ownership of the oil, gas and tuna-rich maritime territory in the Indian Ocean. The ruling by the ICJ on the maritime case did no good in restoring good relations. Kenya rejected the ruling because it infringed on her territorial integrity, an issue that in future may justify actions under article 51 of the UN Charter.

Despite IGAD's effort to resolve the Kenya-Somalia diplomatic tensions, the issues remain outstanding (Demissie, 2021). However, Elias (2021) allays fears that the Kenya-Somalia Maritime dispute ICJ ruling will likely lead to military confrontations. It is a short-term prediction that may not hold in the long term. Somalia is engaging other countries to develop its defence capacity. Together with the stabilisation of FGS by AMISOM, Somalia

will eventually develop muscles to pursue her national interests aggressively outside the diplomatic remits.

2.2.2.4 Border Security Management

It has been observed that poor border management is a danger to international peace and security and can occasion disaster for local communities in border regions. Kenya and Somalia share what has been characterised as a long and porous border (Opon, 2015). It has posed challenges to Kenya's security agencies regarding border security management. The porous border has made it easy for adverse economic and security effects to spill into Kenya's NFD region and the hinterland.

Moreover, a study by Chumba (2016) on security-based diplomacy influencing transnational terrorism between Kenya and Somalia established that KDF intervention in Somalia has not effectively managed transboundary *Al Shabaab* terrorism. *Inter alia*, the study recommended a review of border surveillance systems, such as migration controls and the development of a state-centric counter-radicalisation framework (Chumba, 2016:761). However, the research did not adequately appreciate the non-existence of border security and control infrastructure along the Kenya-Somalia border. The reference to the 'fragility' of such a border control mechanism indicates weak existence. Due to the remoteness and insecure nature of the area, immigration and KRA officials are not stationed at the border centres but in major towns such as Wajir and Garissa, which are far from the border points. Besides, these border control points face acute understaffing and

corruption, among other operational challenges (Opon, 2015). Additionally, security deployments are sparse and do not adequately dominate the entire border stretch.

A study by Wasike (2016) analysed the application of Track Three diplomacy to the Kenya-Somalia situation. Observing that this type of diplomacy is often ignored and employed after the other tracks have failed, she recommended its adoption to address transboundary conflicts among border communities. According to Wasike (2016), Track Three diplomacy entails people-to-people diplomacy that individuals and private groups undertake to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile communities focused at the grassroots level. She identifies various aspects of Track Three diplomacy spanning community engagement, music and art, media, and discussion groups. Such efforts promote the participation of people directly affected by conflicts, thereby enhancing the acceptance of solutions to the conflict. Wasike (2016) did not examine the peculiarities of clannism attending conflicts among the Somalis. Such an appreciation is essential to analyse the applicability of Track Three diplomacy for lasting peace among the Somali community, where clannism trumps patriotism. As such, the nature of conflict along the Kenya-Somalia border calls for a change of tact to promote participation by the local community. Complexities of clannism require a solution that emanates from the community rather than imposed by experts and officials.

In addition to incursions by *Al Shabaab* and occasional SNA violations, the smuggling of contraband goods from Somalia has affected the Kenyan industry and businesses through unfair pricing competitions. Jubat (2019) and Bahadur (2022) observed that the contraband goods are smuggled through the border towns of *Liboi*, *Mandera*, *Elwak*, *Hulugho* and

Wajir. Their cheap pricing affects the legal goods that have to factor in taxation, profits and operations costs in their pricing. An AfriCOG report estimates that about 15,000 bags of sugar are worth more than KShs. 72 Million are smuggled daily through the porous border with Somalia, occasioning an estimated KShs. 5 million loss in tax revenue daily for Kenya (Jubat, 2019). Bahadur (2022) noted that sugar was the largest consignment of all the items smuggled across the Kenyan border. During the post-AMISOM period, there was optimism that the illegal trade would decline due to stable governance in Somalia and better border control. However, the culture of corruption facilitating contraband smuggling may not cease overnight, a factor that requires resolute action.

Another critical issue of border management concern within national security is population movement and refugees. The contiguity of communities along the border areas and porous borders blur nationalities' distinctions (Starr & Thomas, 2010). It enables refugee movement through porous areas with homogeneous ethnic habitation. Communities along the North Eastern Counties are predominantly of Somali ethnicity, with strong family and clan ties straddling the common border and even in the heartlands of the two countries. A border does not restrain movement to visit kindred across the border or grazing livestock (Sofield, 2006). The thin presence of security agencies and control points and the porosity of the border is exploited by nefarious elements that endanger the national security of Kenya.

The protracted conflicts in Somalia resulted in refugee influx into Kenya, primarily hosted in the Dadaab refugee complex comprising *Daghaley* and *Ifo* Camps (in *Lagdera*) and *Hagadera* (in *Fafi*), which host approximately 430,000 (UNHCR, 2020). Due to numerous

attacks in Kenya, believed to have been planned from within the refugee camp, the government of Kenya pushed for the permanent closure of the refugee camp, citing national security concerns. After previous proposals to close the camp, the Government of Kenya issued a fourteen-day ultimatum in March 2021 to close the Dadaab refugee camp (OCHA, 2021). It prompted the UNCHR to present a sustainable rights-based measures closure plan to the Government (UNHCR, 2021). As a result, the camp was scheduled to close in June 2022; a process yet to be finalised.

The issue of refugees' presence in a country poses many challenges to the security of the host country and community. Chumba (2016: 743) noted the dilemma between humanitarian concern for refugees and the realisation that refugees are a source of security tension between Kenya and Somalia. Moreover, Matanga and Muchilwa (2018: 415) submit that in the Kenyan scenario, refugees have posed a threat not only to conventional state security but also to human security, as evidenced by their undue pressure on depleting socioeconomic resources and amenities at the disposal of the state. Furthermore, while examining state conflicts and the refugee problems in Eastern Africa, Iteyo (2018: 399) concludes that while refugees have resulted from conflicts, they pose a humanitarian challenge and security concerns. This observation echoes findings by Mativo (2014), who established that, despite laws, refugee camps continue to grapple with insecurity. This security-centred observation has enabled the securitisation of the refugee problem and, thus, the need to repatriate.

Most areas in Somalia have been liberated, and a semblance of normalcy has returned and thereby could be considered for repatriation and resettlement of refugees from Somalia. For instance, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) argued that the preferable areas for Somali refugee resettlement of *Kismayu, Dhobley, and Hosingo*, among others, are due to the marked security improvements. The repatriation will ease the pressure on the Dadaab ecosystem and alleviate security concerns. Based on the lessons learnt from hosting Somali refugees in Kenya, prospects of hosting Somali refugees should remain a scenario of national security planning since the Post-AMISOM socio-political turn of events in Somalia is uncertain.

2.2.3 Kenya's National Security Responses to AMISOM Transition Implications

In postulating the concept of the Contact Dilemma, Ligawa, Odhiambo and Rahoy (2016: 5) submit that uncertainty and disorder on the battlefield contribute to the contact dilemma. It is true in any conflict or conflict transition situation. The fact is also well established in military doctrinal publications and is often referred to as the enduring characteristics of the battlefield. Therefore, planning, strategising and operations can only be possible against a backdrop of probabilities (Ligawa, 2018). This study sub-section examined Kenya's possible responses to national security implications emanating from AMISOM transitions. It was postulated in general national security responses and scenario-based national security responses.

2.2.3.1 General National Security Responses

Examining the concept of security as viewed by the realist philosophers, Matanga (2018: 28-29) notes that realists give security a statist approach equated to state security anchored

on military power and presence. It contrasts the idealist conception that views security as encompassing the efforts beyond the state to include individuals, international organisations and international law. Within the state's remit, national security is the ability of a government and its parliament to secure its citizens and territory. Whereas the realists place states and their interests as supreme in international relations, this should be tempered within the broad articulations of idealists regarding approaches to achieving the 'state-centric' national security objectives. It is to the realisation that the state operates within an international ecosystem within which it must exist and thrive (Matanga, 2018). Therefore, in the case of the AMISOM transition, Kenya can respond in a general or scenario-based way.

Some of the general ways that this study envisions Kenya can be adopted to address national security challenges emanating from AMISOM transition include, *inter alia*, shaping activities to influence AMISOM transition strategy with Kenya's security in perspective, policy reviews to empower NFD areas, reviewing of security deployments within the Multi-Agency Approach, and border management. In military parlance, shaping operations entails activities preceding the onset of decisive operations (Braun III & Allen, 2014). Shaping is meant to set necessary conditions on the battlefield to ensure victory while minimising the cost of operations.

Other major operational activities within the DSS (Decisive, Shaping and Sustenance) trilogy include decisive engagements, sustaining and stability operations, and support operations leading up to exit (Moore, 1999). Shaping is a multifaceted approach that

engages several lines of operations, such as political, economic, information, diplomatic, and military efforts. While IGAD, AU and UN shaped pre-AMISOM deployment through engagements, the concern for post-AMISOM transition is shaping activities that would guarantee the national security of TCCs and, more so, immediate neighbours such as Kenya. Within the collective PSO effort, Kenya has to retain its state-centric approach as the guarantor of the security of its citizens.

Despite the often-lukewarm relationship with FGS, Kenya has been a critical player in Somalia's peace and stabilisation process (Williams & Hashi, 2016). This is due to Kenya's concern for her peace and security through the stability of Somalia, in repudiation of a notion that Kenya would not want a stable Somalia. In doing this, Kenya needs to ensure that the conditions are set and re-calibrated for a post-AMISOM phase to anticipate and manage security concerns that could affect Kenya effectively. The involvement in the development of the STP and transition to AMISOM are some of the vital shaping opportunities for Kenya as a TCC. It should emphasise the integration of regional security forces in the STP CONOPs to avoid discontent and conflict flashpoint (Kamais, 2019). Furthermore, diplomatic relations have to be improved between Kenya and Somalia, on the one hand, and neighbouring countries. Resolving outstanding terrestrial and maritime border disputes must be resolved conclusively. *Inter alia*, a peaceful and stable buffer is a critical shaping effort in post-AMISOM Kenya's National Security.

Another critical aspect of post-AMISOM shaping for national security entails addressing the marginalisation of NFD regions. Nzau and Guyo (2018) observe that the NFD has faced

marginality since colonial times through the various Kenya Governments. This fomented resentment and feelings of exclusion, thus playing into the appeals to secede during the shifta war. The feeling of exclusion from socioeconomic and political issues can compel a group to seek recognition elsewhere. Besides, counterterrorism measures among the marginalised communities of North Eastern Kenya contribute to the perception of repression by the state security forces. The observation finds support in the submission of Hunnicutt and Broidy (2019), that nefarious terrorist and criminal entities such as *Al Shabaab* are adept at exploiting marginalisation grievances. Some marginalisation aspects of concern for NFD are; infrastructural and economic development, employment opportunities, ethnic profiling and insecurity, *inter alia*.

Furthermore, Chitembwe, Okoth and Matanga (2021) found that in Mombasa and Kwale Counties, poverty was the leading cause of radicalisation at 80%, while unemployment ranked second at 77%. It highlights the state of affairs that can be exploited by harmful elements that offer better alternatives. Moreover, studies have established that low levels of professionalism among the police service are displayed low levels of professionalism while dealing with radicalised youth, leading to forced disappearances, as reported by 97% of the respondents (Chitembwe, 2021: 276,334). Despite recommending a change of tact to less aggressive approaches, the study did not adequately explore alternative options. Although there are some efforts to resolve marginality in NFD and other areas, the pace is slow. With the KDF/ATMIS planned exit by 2024, more needs to be done to reduce feelings of marginalisation that *Al Shabaab* and other groups can exploit to threaten Kenya's National security post-AMISOM.

Deploying security agencies and mainstreaming the multi-agency approach to security operations are crucial to safeguarding Kenya's National security post-AMISOM. The large expanses of territory in Kenya's North Eastern counties stretch the ability of security forces to patrol every inch of the area and the length of the border effectively (Kibusia, 2020). Thus, having more military and security bases in the areas is critical to ensuring the overlap of patrolling zones and reducing infiltrations. Infused into the OAB to counter *the Al Shabaab* menace, MAA is an all-inclusive strategy that ensures relevant security and government agencies, the justice system, NGOs and humanitarian agencies, CSOs, as well as the community are engaged in the search for and maintenance of peace and security (Kibusia, 2020). Thus, security experts need to consider the need to strengthen and integrate MAA in containing security threats to Kenya.

Supporting the submission by Haider (2020), a study by Opon (2015) established an increase in terror attacks owing to the porosity of Kenyan borders. The Al Shabaab terrorist group mainly perpetrated these attacks. Furthermore, 12 out of 26 border control posts, immigration regional offices, and headquarters investigated showed that several factors militate against border control agencies' measures to curb cross-border terrorist incursions (Opon, 2015). These factors include staffing levels, serving under an unequal scheme of service and terms of employment, deployment of officials on personal integrity and competence, taking corruption, familiarity with anticorruption measures, constant surveillance, and sharing of intelligence and work environment affect the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies. However, the study by Opon (2015) did not accurately reveal

the location of the border control posts and that they are far from the border, thereby severely limiting their effectiveness.

More importantly, the aspects of border management have to be adequately planned and instituted to enable proper border control as part of post-AMISOM national security response and guarantees. Opon (2015) identified the need for a comprehensive border management and control system to secure the Kenya-Somalia border. Such border management should leverage, among other things: a 24 hrs operated surveillance systems, trenches, roads and border fence; functioning immigration offices at significant entry and exit points such as *Mandera, Elwak, Gherille, Liboi, Kolbio* and *Kiunga*; well-trained border management personnel. There are efforts by Kenya to install a border, although the pace is slow due to cost, sabotage, and the challenges of clan dynamics and border contiguity. Constructively engaging the border community and de-marginalisation efforts can help resolve border management issues (Mutisya, 2017; Chumba, 2016).

These scenarios can be viewed within a strategy continuum that entails: shaping the transition conditions in Somalia, including degrading *Al Shabaab*, creating a peaceful and stable buffer zone in the Jubaland region, diplomatic relations, multilateral cooperation, influence on STP for implementation by ATMIS; establishing proper and effective border management that leverages on surveillance technology while taking care of ethnic contiguity to retain public support; and addressing marginality and perceptions of exclusion is NFD, within the framework of Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM), to enhance public support. All these should be encapsulated within the MAA and multilateralism context for

lasting peace, stability and national security. The concept of MAA concerning the AMISOM PSO transition is illustrated in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1: Suggested General Kenya's National Security response model to AMISOM transition

Source: Researcher, 2022.

2.2.3.2 Scenario-Based National Security Responses

As earlier intimated, no plans and strategies in military operations, including PSOs, can happen in the backdrop of probabilities. It is due to uncertainties that underlie conflict situations. While examining the concept of security within the context of modern asymmetric threats such as those posed by *Al Shabaab*, Opondo (2018: 382) noted the need to adapt strategies of yesteryears to prevailing operational situations, which dictate what apply when and where. This idea conforms to contingency planning, which requires plans to have alternative plans in terms of sequels and branches to address the unforeseen and exploit fleeting opportunities. It is achievable if planners base their planning on possible

scenarios to inform the Courses of Action and war games to refine those plans. Taking a cue from Jonegård (2019), this study conceived three scenarios for the AMISOM transition situation that could affect Kenya's national security. The scenarios are presented in the context of likely mitigation for national security response by Kenya.

The first likely scenario is a failed AMISOM transition characterised by a collapse of FGS and SSF. It is not a far-fetched idea. PSOs have prior failures to stabilise Somalia, such as IGASOM and UNOSOMs. Furthermore, USA military adventures in Iraq and Afghanistan are instructive on failed attempts to stabilise a state's post-intervention (Sopko, 2021; Crocker, 2021). The challenges for AMISOM exit identified become ruinous, especially where proper FGS and SSF capacity has not been built, and the Somalia political tide causes a hasty AMISOM/ATMIS exit. The waning public support from countries contributing to AMISOM forces due to mounting costs and casualties force a political decision to exit. The funding partners such as the EU and the UN drastically reduce funding and logistical support or even stop altogether. It thus provides a worst-case scenario for planning and contingencies.

This worst-case scenario would require bolstering border security with primacy on military operations to thwart security threats. The increased deployment of security forces will be necessary along the entire stretch of the common border while reducing the gaps between FOBs. Border Patrol Units (BPU) and QRF will be essential for continuous presence along the border. Leveraging surveillance technology will be a critical integration in the border fence. The operations need to be conducted simultaneously with other agencies within

MAA concept. Supporting JSF is paramount for a continued buffer zone to minimise or thwart *Al Shabaab's* resurgence and incursions.

The second scenario entails fragile stability in Somalia with a weak FGS and SSF that can only manage limited areas and provide minimal services. This scenario offers a middle ground possibility and a transitory point stability of Somalia to a more stable state. The current state of AMISOM, as well as suggested exits, mirror the challenges highlighted. William and Hashi (2016) identify problems of AMISOM funding, weak FGS and SSF capacities, Clan dynamics, and fractured political systems. Ali and Muyonga (2021) note the maritime disputes affecting diplomatic relations. As in the first case, the capacity of FGS and SSF is not likely to have been developed adequately, and the internal political and clan dynamics will create a rift and instability.

Hersi (2015) aptly submitted the preceding; that there were failures in the existing Somali power sharing as a way to end political and socio-economical conflicts. Away from the 4.5 power-sharing model where major Somali clans dominate, Hersi (2015) recommended a power-sharing system that encourages a collaborative and sound relationship between elites that paves the way to political democracy that is just and upright in Somalia. Notwithstanding this, the AMISOM transition would be on schedule with minimal advisor staff and personnel left to continue mentoring FGS and SSF. Funding by international partners would be minimal and new sources would not be forthcoming due to global economic downturns occasioned by pandemics and conflicts such as the COVID-19

pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Outstanding diplomatic issues with Kenya will still be outstanding.

The response option for this scenario would reflect both the optimism and the need not to take chances. Thus, robust border security management, security forces deployment in NFD, addressing marginality in NFD, Jubaland buffer zone, MAA, and multilateral diplomatic efforts will still be required. Active engagement in nurturing and developing FGS and SSF capacity while adapting the democratic governance model to the Somali situation will be an essential activity by Kenya in a collective efforts framework. More importantly, the conclusive resolution of territorial disputes will be crucial for future relations as the Republic of Somalia stabilises.

The last scenario the study envisages, as AMISOM transitions and exits, is a stable Somalia with developed governance and security institutions ready to assume full state responsibilities. It is an ideal situation that all stakeholders in the Somalia stabilisation efforts are working towards and hope to achieve. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) and Williams and Hashi (2016) share the cautious sentiment that it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia before the country attains good capacities to assume governance and security responsibilities.

Besides, Ligawa, Okoth, and Matanga (2017) posited that there is a need for the realignment of AMISOM PSO activities to support the development of peace and stability in Somalia. Furthermore, AMISOM would not have a practical pathway out of Somalia

without a successful political process. This scenario hinges on the complete stabilisation of Somalia's governance and security, vanquishing or reformation of extremist groups such as *Al Shabaab* and their participation in a cordial political process of the country and a resolution of diplomatic hiccups with immediate neighbours.

A response to this situation would majorly entail the strengthening of diplomatic ties with Somalia, establishing joint border security management to include customs and immigration controls, border surveillance measures, cross-border collaborative security and developmental activities, including state-brokered cross-border livestock grazing agreements, among others (Wasike, 2016; Chumba, 2016). The de-marginalisation of NFD will further enhance the security of the area and Kenya. All this has to retain an MAA outlook with the governance and administrative agencies taking the lead.

A stable Somalia means a more legitimate engagement for trade, economic development, and security activities of mutual interest. However, with more stability, and external influence keen on exploiting natural resources, Somalia is likely to revive the 'Greater Somalia' dream and strongly claim the maritime portion awarded by ICJ. Therefore, Kenya ought to prepare for possible military confrontations on such a basis. Table 2.2 summarises the likely scenarios and national security responses by Kenya.

Table 2.2: Proposed Somalia stability scenarios and national security responses by Kenya

<p>Scenario 1: Collapsed FGS and SSF (Failed Somalia stabilisation)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A robust border security management, primacy on military operations to thwart security threats. • Enhanced security forces deployment in NFD along the entire stretch of the common border while reducing the gaps between FOBs. • Border Patrol Units (BPU) and QRF will be essential for continuous presence along the border. • Leveraging surveillance technology will be a critical integration in the border fence. • Multi-agency Approach/multilateral engagement CT in NFD and Lamu • Continued support to JSF and maintaining the Jubaland buffer zone. 	<p>Scenario 2: Fragile stability in Somalia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Robust border security management • Enhanced security forces deployment in NFD. • Addressing marginality in NFD • Maintain the Jubaland buffer zone. • Multi-agency Approach/multilateral engagement CT in NFD and Lamu • Nurturing and developing FGS and SSF capacity. • Conclusive resolution of any territorial disputes will be crucial for future relations as the Republic of Somalia stabilises.
<p>Scenario 2: Stable Somalia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening diplomatic ties with Somalia • Resolving outstanding diplomatic issues over territory • Establishing joint border security management to include customs and immigration controls, border surveillance measures, • Cross-border collective security and developmental activities, including state-brokered cross-border livestock grazing agreements. • The de-marginalisation of NFD will further enhance the security of the area and Kenya. • Multi-agency Approach/multilateral engagement CT in NFD and Lamu • Readiness to defend territorial integrity over possible claims by Somalia. 	

Source: Researcher, 2022.

The following section examines the third specific objective of the study on challenges and opportunities to Kenya's National security from the KENCON transition in AMISOM, with a quick view of AMISOM transitory challenges, in order to contextualise and telegraph the arguments to Kenya's National Security.

2.3 Opportunities and Challenges to Kenya's National Security from transition Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia

As in any undertaking, PSOs' conduct and transition are liable to challenges. de Coning (2019:300) notes that the PSO environment has undergone tremendous shift and transformation to extant and emerging challenges such as destabilizing effects of extremism and international organized crime, climate change, humanitarian emergencies, and internal stressors with PSO providers such as UN or AU among others. While this is inevitable, there are always positive aspects in the form of opportunities that can be seized to turn the tides for the good of national security.

In Afghanistan, Sopko (2021) posits that lack of understanding of the operational environment, lack of aligning means to ends, personnel problems, and funding, among others, beleaguered USA operations against Taliban and other extremist groups. The transition of military operations in Iraq portended unexploited opportunities for inclusive and acceptable governance. Structural challenges, such as Iraqi forces' loyalty, professionalism, and hatred of western influence, militated against a successful transition.

In Somalia, the structural and functional weaknesses in AMISOM hindering its operations and peacebuilding efforts are apparent challenges. Oluoch (2018:533-537) also identifies mostly operation-related challenges, such as the initial mandate of AMISOM in the unique operational context, financing, and cooperation by TCCs guided by respective national interests, among other challenges. All these are evidence that PSOs face a myriad of challenges. As much as the scholars and military experts identify the general challenges,

they are not analysed systematically, i.e. concerning the country, TCCs and PSO transitions. In this regard, the section will contextualise the challenges facing the AMISOM transition, the challenges of AMISOM transition to Kenya's National security, and the opportunities presented by the AMISOM transition.

2.3.1 Opportunities for Kenya's National Security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia

Blyth (2019) argues that even with the security challenges portended by PSO transition, some opportunities can be seized upon in a bid to divert the trajectory of events in a better direction. This view conforms to the submission by Jonegård, (2019) that the lead-up to the Afghanistan exit by the USA portended an opportunity for engaging the hitherto foes, the Taliban, in negotiations for a post-USA Operation environment and future governance of the Country. This approach provided a paradigm shift in transition planning with the possibility of negotiating with non-state actors to manage conflicts.

In Iraq, the USA employed classical attempts to democratize by propping various weak governments (Kanat, 2019). However, since this approach did not engage the local population, it became unpopular, and the government of Iraq collapsed immediately after the USA exit while ISIS/L took over. The NATO coalition failed to shape Iraq's future by instituting good governance. PSO transitions in Africa have had mixed results in terms of outcomes and opportunities. In Sierra Leone, success was registered through proper governance transition, DDR programmes and post-transition support. Similar opportunities were missed in other UN-led PSOs in Africa, such as *Darfur* and *Abiyei* (van-der Lijn, 2010).

In Somalia, the transition to ATMIS is one such opportunity that can be exploited to chart a better way for Somalia and her neighbours. Whereas the STP is hailed as an outstanding achievement in consolidating AMISOM gains and transitioning to FGS and SSF-led dispensation, the plan is not fool proof. One of the glaring issues is the status of regional security forces of the federal member states, which are not considered for inclusion in the SSF framework. Kamais (2019) argues that while military integration of armed groups is good for peace's sake, it usually fails to attain peace in the long term due to its rushed conceptualization and implementation, lack of sufficient resource support, lack of political will, stakes by the armed groups and external actor, among other reasons. Thus, the future of regional forces in Somalia needs a relook to avoid pitfalls.

Similarly, the involvement of TCCs in the development and implementation of STP should be seized to ensure national security interests are considered. The phases of the transition must be crafted in such a way as to ensure not only peace and stability in Somalia but the guarantee of peace and security for Kenya. Taking a cue from Nzau (2018) and Durch (2010), Kenya's national security experts should press for developing branches and sequels for the STP to address unforeseen situations and exploit opportunities.

An opportunity was presented to Kenya-Somalia relations concerning diplomacy, trade, and cooperation. Through shaping activities earlier noted, Kenya can influence diplomacy more so around territorial disputes such as the maritime border. A stable post-AMISOM Somalia presents opportunities for trade and investments in both countries. According to

Mwendwa (2021), Kenya lost an estimated KShs 20-30 million per day due to the existing *Miraa* (Khat) ban. Besides, the smuggling of sugar and other items occasions a loss of 5 million in tax revenue daily. Trade can be regularised depending on the measures taken, and amounts can be legally added to the exchequer.

Winning hearts and minds are not only confined to operations abroad. In a bid to get public support to secure Kenya's NFD post-AMISOM, WHAM is essential. The government should seize the opportunity to increase infrastructure and economic development to assuage perceptions of marginalisation (Mowat, 2015; Chumba, 2016). It enhances public support in securing Kenya from the implications of the AMISOM transition.

2.3.2 Transition Challenges of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya's National Security

The transition of PSOs portends challenges to immediate neighbouring states. It emanates from the stability conditions in the country of intervention post-PSO. The exit of the USA from Iraq created a security and governance vacuum that was exploited by ISIL (Kanat, 2019; Hamasaeed & Nada, 2020). It caused the reign of terror after the defeat of Al Qaeda. ISIL spread its tentacles into Syria, Libya, African Maghreb, and DRC. Affiliations of terror groups to ISIL, such as *Al Shabaab* and Boko Haram, increased the reach of ISIL. In Afghanistan, the exit of the USA in a huff led to the dramatic collapse of the government of Ashraf Ghani and the takeover by the Taliban, threatening the security of countries such as Pakistan.

These challenges of PSOs' exits to neighbouring countries apply to Kenya post-AMISOM. Whereas scholars have identified some challenges, they largely remain conjectural without statistical descriptors for policy decisions. As Otieno (2019) note, IGAD member states are cautious that hasty withdrawal from Somalia will repeat earlier experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The exit of AMISOM (KDF) from Somalia, coupled with the weaknesses of SSF and JSF, will likely give *Al Shabaab* more freedom to manoeuvre and strike into Kenyan territory. Even with the current force posture on both sides of the common border, *Al Shabaab* still manages to infiltrate and perpetrate attacks on crucial infrastructure and civilian populations in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu (Abdille, 2019; Otieno, 2019). The situation will likely escalate post-AMISOM as *Al Shabaab* seeks to score propaganda points by a possible claim of victory against KDF as they withdraw under the STP/ATMIS framework.

The border securitisation programme will likely face more sabotage activities due to the lack of KDF forces across Somalia (Bartlett, 2021). *Al Shabaab* will likely ratchet up vandalism on the border fence to keep the infiltration roots open. The border programme is a suitable propaganda selling point for *Al Shabaab*, who may claim that Kenya illegally annexes Somali territory. Similarly, in the scenario of stable FGS, the border fence issue is likely to brew territorial dispute, especially with the memory of the *Shifita* era and the maritime dispute.

To manage security in the NFD, the Kenyan government must ratchet up force numbers and adjust deployment to cover gaps exploited by *Al Shabaab* to perpetrate terrorism within Kenya. However, Haider (2020) and Demissie (2021) aver that such adjustment may lead

to discontent from locals misled to believe that the government is suspicious of them and treating them as a security threat. It is in the context of previous claims of discriminative profiling by security agencies. Conversely, the proximity of military forces along the common border with Somalia will likely attract FGS to claim aggressive intentions by KDF, especially given the outstanding Maritime dispute.

Regarding the smuggling of goods and SALW, a weak SSF and JSF increase the inflow of contraband items into Kenya. Notably, the lack of border control mechanisms, corruption, expansive territory and long-porous border make it easy for smuggling activities across the Kenya-Somalia border (Jubat, 2019; Chumba, 2016). Smuggling is likely to persist in the post-AMSIOM owing to the lack of proper border control mechanisms. The consequence will increase criminality due to SALW proliferation, loss of exercise duty for the government and unfair price competition for locally manufactured goods.

Regarding Somalia, scholars have noted that the transition of AMISOM has faced challenges likely to unravel a successful handover. However, most identified challenges remain conjectural without statistical backing for policy decisions. William and Hashi (2016) identified four broad challenges to AMISOM's exit from Somalia viz lack of political settlement, the threat of *Al Shabaab*, AMISOM internal problems, internal problems of SNA and poor perception of AMISOM by the locals. The political process in Somalia lacks a long-term strategic outlook; instead, it is focused on the political elites' short-term capture of state resources.

Besides, the clannism problem is pervasive, thus affecting political settlement in the country. It is stressed in the argument by Nzau (2018: 546) that the current Somalia conflict is rooted in a mismanaged post-colonial legacy that mostly polarised the country along clan-based lines for regime sustenance and survival, thus breeding political exclusion and concomitant grievances within the wider Somali society. Therefore, it affects the transition of KENCON from AMISOM and thereby posing potential national security challenges.

The asymmetric threats by *Al Shabaab* employing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), blending and operating within the population has posed a challenge to AMISOMs ability to pacify environs of liberated areas and also self-sustenance through logistics provision by UNSOS (Williams & Hashi, 2016). Though weakened, the *Al Shabaab* terror outfit still retains the advantage derived through its highly decentralized command structure that is instrumental in choosing when and where to attack targets of high symbolism through the employment of barbaric means and swarming tactics. Such was evident in attacks against AMISOM bases between 2015 and 2020 in areas of *Leego, Janale, El Adde, Halgan, Kolbiyow, Golweyn, Ceel Saliin, Quryoley, Asasey Hotel in Kismayo, US base in Baledogle* as well as Simba Camp in Manda (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 88-98). Such attacks point to the fact that even a weakened *Al Shabaab* is still a potent foe that threatens post-AMISOM Somalia as well as the security of Kenya.

Regarding AMISOMs internal problems, AMISOM suffers from a lack of critical operational enablers such as offensive air resources. However, this has since been remedied by including aircraft from KENCON in Contingent Owned Equipment (COE). William *et*

al. (2018) highlight the lack of unified command as a critical operational hindrance for AMISOM. The argument is about having the Force Commander (FC) drawn from the force with the most significant number of troops. However, this militates the geopolitical interest of having the FC rotational among the TCC on a biannual basis. Furthermore, UN missions such as UNMISS did not necessarily obtain FCs from TCCs with large contingents. Thus, the AMISOM Force Commander (FC) versus Unity of Command debate is more driven by regional hegemonic interest (Oluoch, 2018: 534); since implementation ensures that Uganda always produces the FC.

The capacity of SNA to assume security responsibilities post-AMISOM is in doubt, even as the STP rollout is underway. According to William *et al.* (2018: 70), AMISOM transition is heavily pivoted on SSF and some international partners picking up the security responsibilities from AMISOM. Ligawa (2018) noted this weakness when he submitted that the SNA could not contain and defeat *Al Shabaab*, and the terror group may resurge on AMISOM's exit. Clannism and political squabbles beleaguer the SSF and adversely affect the professionalism and dependability as guarantors of Somalia. The STP portrays this whereby the security forces of federal member states such as JSF or RKB are not considered within the CONOP due to political interests. The situation will likely flare up post-AMISOM, further denting SSF's capacity to secure Somalia.

Perceptions and support by the local population of the host country are essential in any PSO such as AMISOM. Such population support helps in what Ligawa, Okoth, and Matanga (2017: 5) refer to as 'cultural intelligence' that enables the collection of information about

Al Shabaab and the isolation of the terror group from the populace. However, William and Hashi (2016: 37) claim that the operations of AMISOM caused public support to wane. It was partly an exacerbating factor leading to swarming attacks on AMISOM bases between 2015 and 2020. However, the public support claims lack statistical backing and rely on unverifiable claims. For AMISOM transition under the STP framework, public support is critical. Madeira (2022) is optimistic that public support for AMISOM has improved, thus facilitating transition activities. These challenges require concerted efforts by all the stakeholders to resolve as the AMISOM transition continues.

2.3.3 Summary of Gaps in the Literature

From the literature reviewed, several gaps were identified. Except for some attempts by Jonegård (2019), there is no proposition of a coherent exit strategy provided by studies examining PSOs globally. It is well established as an unaddressed gap identified by Clark (2006) when he observed that military planners are urged to account for an exit strategy but are not guided on the exact framework.

Besides falling into a similar trap, studies on the Somalia conflict, PSOs do not adequately address the implications of such PSOs on neighbouring TCCs (Ligawa, 2018; Ligawa, Okoth, & Matanga, 2017; Williams & Hashi, 2016; Nzau, 2018). The studies have focused on the operational aspects and peacebuilding within Somalia, not post-PSO or beyond the borders. Nzau (2018) also examined buffering and zoning strategies for AMISOM. However, these in-theatre deployment options do not address transition aspects or implications to Kenya's national security.

The consequences of PSOs on immediate TCCs sharing borders with host nations are of concern, due to proximity, issues of neutrality and the credibility of regional approaches to conflict resolution are not adequately examined. Williams and Hashi (2016) attempted to broach scenarios for AMISOM exit but failed to give a proper strategy option for consideration. In addition, the scenarios so advanced are broad and not specific to Kenya as a concerned actor. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) offer exit 'pillars', but they do not advance any strategy options for transition or address possible implications to Kenya's national security.

Mutisya (2017) broached the subject of border securitisation in dealing with *the Al Shabaab* threat and its effects on border communities. However, her recommendation to downgrade the border wall to a border fence is an anti-climax. Her option is neither comprehensive nor well integrated to address national security challenges. It is also not sustainable due structural weaknesses of a border fence.

Williams & Hashi (2016) and Williams *et al.* (2018) highlighted AMISOM achievements and transition challenges. However, these were localized within Somalia and did not extend into TCCs that are immediate Somali neighbours, such as Kenya. The scholars only mentioned 'negative security effects' without being specific. The studies also do not identify opportunities from AMISOM operations and transition to TCCs such as Kenya. Finally, hardly any literature reviewed provides sufficient statistical analysis of AMISOM operations and transition implications, thus presenting them as opinions rather than researched findings.

2.4 Conceptual Framework

The study was grounded in the rational realism philosophy that requires a tempered pursuit of statist objectives within the multilateral international arena (Więclawski, 2020). The classical realist philosophy assumes that; a state is a principal actor in international relations, the state is a unitary actor, decision-makers are rational in their decisions to pursue national interests, and states exist in an anarchical international order (Antunes & Camisão, 2018). The study used Neo-functionalism, strategic and securitisation theories to underpin and contextualise the implications of AMISOM's transition to Kenya's national security. Table 2.3 summarises the theories, whose detailed analyses are provided after that. These theories delineate the investigative lens of assessing the critical variables of the study.

Table 2.3: Summary of theories

Theory	Proponent	Explanation	Weak point
Neo-functionalism theory	Haas (1958)	Describes and explains the process of regional integration with reference to how three causal factors	Assumes a degree of automaticity in integration

		interact: Growing economic interdependence between nations, Organizational capacity to resolve disputes and build international legal regimes, and Supranational market rules that replace national regulatory regimes.	processes and failing to account for increasing protectionism and limitations to integration.
Strategic theory	Schelling (1980)	All possibilities and forces should be considered against the adversary to optimize the outcomes.	Hinges on rationality and centrality of the political actors
Securitisation theory	Wæver (1995)	Political issues are framed as extreme security issues through a labelling process portraying them as dangerous, alarming, menacing, or threatening	It does not offer explanation for securitisation in a bilateral and multilateral context

Source: Researcher's summary compilation of postulations and analyses of the respective theories.

2.4.1 Neo-functionalism theory

Ernst Bernard Haas developed neo-functionalism in 1958, widely considered the foundational European integration theory. In the 1990s and 2000s, Wayne Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet modified and expanded on the hypothesis. As argued by Sandholtz and Alec Stone Sweet (1997), the theory sought to articulate the European integration process

and why countries agree to engage in supranational structures. According to Haas (1958; 1961), Neo-functionalism doctrine is predicated on four tenets. The first is the positive spillover effect, which is the idea that integrating states in one economic sector will create significant incentives for integration in other sectors to fully reap the benefits of integration in the one where it began. Second, higher transaction volume and intensity of negotiations coincide with growing regional integration. This leads to forming institutions that operate independently of "local" governments. Third, the mechanism of a change in domestic allegiances can be best understood by first recognising that a pluralistic society within the relevant nation-states is a crucial premise in neo-functionalist thought. According to Sandholtz and Stone Sweet (1999), Neofunctionalists argue that as the process of integration evolves, interest groups and associations will begin to shift their allegiances from national to supranational institutions. Fourth, additional regulatory complexity is needed, and other regional entities are often requested. According to Nicoli (2019), will attempt to create closer integration without compelling countries to progress too far or quickly. This causes integration to be shifted to higher-level decision-making processes.

Rosamond (2000) defines Neo-functionalism theory as an emphasis on the functions of social systems such as institutions, hierarchies, and norms. Neo-functionalism theory describes 'function' as the degree to which an action in particular promotes or interferes with the maintenance of a system (Rosamond, 2000). This structural perspective views society as a system in which constituent parts play a substantial part in making certain the total system operates efficiently within an array of norms and goals (Brown, 1965).

While Neo-functionalism theory addresses macro aspects of sociology within the framework of states (Nicoli, 2019), the study extended this paradigm to multilateral levels within regionalism, including the role of regional bodies such as the AU (AMISOM) and IGAD. To contextualise the implications of the AMISOM transition for Kenyan national security, the study identified society as the Republic of Kenya, the Federal Republic of Somalia, several AMISOM TCCs, and foreign organisations such as the AU, UN, and EU, among others. These nations and institutions operate within the framework of PSO, working to restore peace and stability in states that have an impact on the national security of neighbouring countries, such as Kenya.

Thus, Neo-functionalism theory was suited to this study because it offered a broad framework within which the problem was understood, in line with rational realist philosophy, which required consideration of the internal as well as external contexts within which a state exists and functions to appreciate their responses. Specifically, the second tenet of the theory advocates for organisational capacity to resolve disputes and construct international legal systems, which pertains to the role of the African Union (AMISOM) in resolving the Somalia conflict and facilitating a peaceful transition. However, Neo-functionalism has been critiqued for expecting a degree of automaticity in integration processes and failing to account for elevated protectionism and integration impediments erected by European member states at times. Though Neo-functionalism offers an authoritative logic of integration, Khara (2020) said that shortcomings of integration in other regions of the world, as well as stagnant European integration between the 1960s and 1970s, brought into doubt many of Neo-functionalism's assumptions. This critical view of

integration is based on the realist theory of international relations, with a primary focus on government interactions. Additionally, the theory fails to articulate how a state may detect, characterise, and respond to disruptions in society through disagreements in a multilateral setting through integration and a dependency on supranational institutions. The strategic theory remedied it.

2.4.2 Strategic theory

The strategic theory was propounded through the works of Schelling (1984; 1980), a classical strategic theorist. The theory posits that to optimize outcomes, all the possibilities and forces at play, including costs and risks, decisions and consequences, should be considered against those of adversaries or allies. It requires planners to adjust ends and ways to means in employing resources to attain national security objectives.

Scholars note that strategic theory studies correlations between ends, ways and means (Smith, 2008). It implies the use, threat of use, of armed forces as a conscious choice of political actors' intent on rationally pursuing their national security objectives. Yager (2006: 2) notes that strategic theory is anchored on seven key assumptions, viz: the importance of considering ends, ways and means; the centrality of the political actor as the unit of analysis; understanding the political actor's value system and preferences; the more comprehensive strategic environment will influence an actor's interest; the actor behaving rationally in pursuit of aims; the acceptance of clashing interests and the observance of moral neutrality.

The strategic theory is vital in comprehending the decision-making process concerning military power and its use in pursuing national security objectives. Thus, the theory was suitable for the study since it explained the need for careful planning that considers all possible permutations and combinations when pursuing national objectives in the context of multinational engagements and military operations. It entails careful planning through the continuum of conflicts, including transitions and terminations. The theory complimented the functionalist theory by emphasizing the need for detailed but rationalistic plans that aid a state in attaining its interests and objectives in multilateral and bilateral engagements. However, the theory mostly focuses on means, ways and ends, and does not explain how issues are framed as compelling to require a strategy. This gap was remedied by securitization theory.

2.4.3 Securitisation theory

The theory was postulated by Wæver (1995) and later developed by Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde (1998). It posits that political issues are framed as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently through a labelling process that portrays them as dangerous, menacing, threatening, or alarming. An authority does such framing as a securitising actor possessing the institutional power to advance the issues beyond politics.

Securitisation is set within the Copenhagen School of thought, which views security as an outcome of a social process or speech act instead of an objective condition. The Copenhagen School further posits that deciding on what issues are to be characterised as security threats is a rational process that is subjective mainly in orientation and changes

with the views of different individuals, groups or organizations (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998: 29-30). As Wæver (1995: 55) submits, nothing is a security issue by itself; instead, it becomes a security issue only if labelled. Consequently, the connotation of security in contemporary global politics is ultimately constructed through the speeches and representations made by relevant political actors; through the speech act, they are sold to their constituents for endorsement and acceptance of subsequent countermeasures by the state.

According to Eroukhmanoff (2021), securitisation is beset within five sectors *viz* economic, societal, military, political and environmental. For each, a definite threat is articulated as threatening a referent object. For instance, in the societal sector, the referent object is identity. The referent objects in the environmental sector are the ecosystem and endangered species, while the military sector retains the state as the referent object (Eroukhmanoff, 2021). The sectoring of threats means that existential threats are not objective but relate to each referent object's different characteristics. While some threats, such as suicide bombers, are a more significant source of anxiety for some people, they may not be accurate for others despite the globalist connotation of suicide bombing as a threat.

Securitization theory was apt for this study since the notion of national security as a matter of policy is not straightforward. Instead, such a policy is carefully designated by planners and decision-makers (Williams, 2003). The entry of Kenya into Somalia and subsequent re-hatting to AMISOM was justified as a security issue and accepted by Kenyan Citizens. Similarly, the transition of AMISOM portending national security challenges must be

securitised for proper strategies to mitigate adverse security effects. The theory provides clearly the political aspect of security issues unlike the strategic theory, which is keen on means and ends

2.5 Conceptual model

Figure 2.2 presents the conceptual model indicating the relationship between independent and dependent variables and the intervening variables' influence. The relationship is encapsulated within the context of rational realism philosophy providing the broader setting within which the variable influences can be understood. The Neo-functionalism and strategic theoretical paradigms further ground the understanding of the relationship. The independent variable for the study relate to the transition implications of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM to include the AMISOM transition strategies and effects on Kenya's national security from AMISOM transition.

The past relations between Kenya and Somalia as beset against the latter's expansionist ideology has continued to shape relations between the two states. The protracted conflicts in Somalia has made it difficult for a state-to-state resolution sticky national security issues between the neighbours. The Interventions by UN and IGAD through UNOSOM and IGASOM had failures that emanated from strategic weakness thereby exacerbating not only the stability of Somalia but security of Kenya and neighbouring states. The intervention of AMISOM and the attendant mandate influenced not only the stability of Somalia but also the security of Kenya. As in the UNOSOM and IGASOM, the way the

AMISOM and KENCON transition will be managed will impact national security either positively or negatively.

Beset on historical antecedents as well as recent diplomatic developments around the maritime sphere, KENCON transition and the ensuing stability state within Somalia could lead to effects such as violation of Kenya's territorial integrity, maritime disputes, economic sabotage as well as diplomatic spates. However, cooperation and positive relations are possibilities hinged on management of the transition. These affect the dependent variable *viz* Kenya's National Security as delineated in the statist sense by territorial integrity, Maritime security, national security responses and diplomacy.

The intervening variables were Kenya's national security responses, regional interests and influence. The interests of the host nation of Somalia, national interests of TCCs including Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Burundi, guide these. Such interests were manifest in the deployment posture of these TCCs within the Somalia. Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti deployed along the border proximal to the respective home countries while Uganda and Burundi were biased to strategic port cities of Mogadishu and Kismayu indicating their interest to the maritime transport corridor of the Indian Ocean as connected by the the respective airports in Mgadishu and Kismayu.

Regional and international interests are manifested by the involvement of TCCs, AU, UN and EU in the multilateral effort. These supra-national bodies exert significant resource and strategic influences that shape the direction of the PSO and its transition. These

interests coupled with national defence and security policies, foreign relations approaches, international obligations as well as opportunities and challenges have a bearing on the way the transition will affect Kenya's national security. Figure 2.2 illustrate the relationship of the variables within the context of rational realism, and guided by the functional and strategic paradigms:




Figure 2.2: Conceptual model showing the interaction of variables

Source: Researcher, 2022.

As depicted in Figure 2.2, the independent variables, the implications of the AMISOM transition, will influence the dependent variable, Kenya's National security. The conception of national security revolves around the traditional statist understanding of safety and freedom from danger, which should be securitised, bargained and strategised. The study's independent variable was the implications of KENCON transition and indicators related to territorial claim, diplomatic disagreement, incursions and defections, Al Shabaab terrorism, border security management, smuggling of contraband, resource conflict and refugee influx.

The dependent variable Kenya's national security. The independent variable affect dependent variable positively or negatively depending on how the transition would be managed and the Somalia stability scenarios in post-AMISOM. The indicators for the dependent variable included: Territorial integrity; maritime security; economic security; and, diplomacy. This relationship was moderated by the intervening variables *viz* the AMISOM transition, the extant and ensuing challenges to AMISOM, the opportunities arising from the AMISOM transition that can be exploited to redirect the course of the transition implications as well as national security apparatus response to mitigate on the challenges or exploit opportunities.

2.6 Chapter Summary

This chapter reviewed the literature to contextualise the implications of AMISOM's transition to Kenya's national security. The chapter was structured along with the specific objectives of the study. Past relations between Kenya and Somalia were revisited to contextualise the transition and implications to national security and previous attempted intervention efforts. The strategies used in those interventions were highlighted, and experts and scholars suggested transition strategies. AMISOM transition to ATMIS was briefly examined within the context of the STP. Possible responses and response scenarios by Kenya were also proffered. The challenges facing the AMISOM transition were highlighted, as well as those facing Kenya's national security due to the transition and opportunities present at the transition of AMISOM that can be seized to influence the course of the implications to national security.

The chapter then presented the conceptual framework discussing the three theories underpinning the study, i.e. Neo-functionalism theory, strategic theory and securitisation theory. The theories complement the multilateral approach to PSO within the contemporary realism philosophy providing a broad socio-geographical and political context within which the study was set.

The contemporary realism paradigm justified why the transition of AMISOM and the subsequent exit of KDF from Somalia should be viewed through a security lens while considering regional and international nuances; this aligning to the context of Neo-functionalism, strategy and securitization. This was construed as such because FGS and SSF were not adequately enabled to take over responsibilities in Somalia and thus created

security problems for Somalia and Kenya's national security. The strategic theory explained the need for Kenya to strategise on terms favourable to her national security in line with rational realist perspectives. In doing so, Kenya needs to employ strategic planning approaches to develop viable plans to safeguard National security as articulated in the strategic theory. Securitization theory expounded the process and need for the Kenyan state authorities to present and convince the populace that the transition is a strategic security issue thus requiring appropriate response.

The conceptual model presented the independent variables *viz* transition implications of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM to include nature of Somalia PSO transition strategies, effects on national security. The intervening variables were challenges and opportunities presenting to Kenya national security from AMISOM transition, Kenya's national security responses, regional interests and influence. The methodological issues surrounding the study formed the cynosures of the next Chapter.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter provided the operational framework for collecting, analysing and interpreting data. The study interrogated the implications of the AMISOM transition in the context of Kenya's National security. Therefore, the chapter describes the research methodology for the study, including research design, study area, target population, sampling techniques and instruments of data collection, validity and reliability, data collection methods and data analysis, ethical considerations observed in the study and chapter summary.

3.1 Research Design

The study used a descriptive survey design to investigate and contextualise the transition implications of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM in the perspective of Kenya's national security. Within a pragmatic research paradigmatic perspective, the study employed a mixed methods approach entailing both quantitative and qualitative methods (Creswell, 2009). Contextual interrogation of AMISOM National security implications was done to

highlight possible consequences to national security and provide options for developing practical solutions.

The mixed method approach was used to test the conceptual framework for the study entailing Neo-functionalism theory, strategic theory and securitisation. Scholars of peace and conflict management have previously employed these theories. For instance, Ligawa (2018) used strategic theory to study AMISOM's influence on peacebuilding in Somalia, in explaining the concept of strategic attack, while Mutisya (2017) used it to study the Kenya-Somalia border geopolitical conflicts. The strategic theory was also used to underscore the negotiation and planning aspects of the AMISOM transition to managing the implications on Kenya's national security.

A descriptive survey research design was used for the study since it accommodates qualitative and quantitative approaches suitable for the pragmatic paradigm. Besides, Okoth (2012) avers that humanities and social sciences subjects can be broad and complex; thus, using either qualitative or quantitative approaches alone would be inadequate in addressing these complexities. The design helped advance problem-oriented recommendations for the implications of the AMISOM transition on Kenya's National Security. Creswell (2009) also notes that combining qualitative and quantitative approaches within descriptive survey designs provides a broad understanding of the research problem. Kothari (2004) notes that descriptive survey design helps in addressing the *what, when, where, and how aspects of the research problem*. Therefore, descriptive

survey design helped gain a deeper insight into the problem, thus enabling the proposal of practical solutions.

3.2 Study Area

The study area was the North Eastern Counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and the North Coast of Lamu County. AMISOM areas of *Burahache* in Gedo , *Gherille* and *Dhobley* in Middle Jubaland, and *Kolbiyow* in Lower Jubaland also formed part of the study area. The study area was selected since it forms a contiguous border with Somali ethnic groups straddling the shared border. Furthermore, immediate security effects of the AMISOM transition are felt in the North Eastern Counties as emanating from the adjacent areas of Somalia comprising Jubaland. The study was done at the County Headquarters of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu. It was because the County headquarters hosted heads of administrative and security services, including headquarters of military bases, which could provide a comprehensive expert opinion on the national security implications of AMISOM transition to the NFD and Lamu areas. Besides, and to capture the transitory effects of


AMISOM from the immediate forces involved in the operations, the study examined the deployment areas in Jubaland, such as *Burahache*, *Gherille*, *Dhobley* and *Kolbiyow*. The study areas were as depicted in Figure 3.1.

Figure 3.3: Map of the study area showing North Eastern Counties (Mandera, Wajir, Garissa), Lamu County and Jubaland

Source: Mr. Japhet Ogenga, GIS expert at SDMHA MMUST, 2022

3.2.1 Mandera County

Mandera County is the northernmost County along the common border with Somalia. It borders Ethiopia to the North, Somalia to the East and Wajir County to the Southwest. The County lies between latitudes 2° 11` North, 4° 17` North, and longitudes 39° 47` East and



41° 4.8` East. It covers an area of 25,991.5 km². It measures about 25,991 km² and is

located at the end of North Eastern Kenya, bordering Somalia and Ethiopia. According to the 2019 census, the County has a population of 1,200,890.

Additionally, the County had an estimated population of 1,025,756 persons with 125,497 households and a density of 39 persons per Km² (KNBS, 2019). The main economic activity in the County is pastoralism, while others include cross-border trade with Ethiopia, artisanal mining, beekeeping and agriculture along the *Dawa* River (Mandera County Government, 2018). The ethnic composition is predominantly Somali, with the significant clan being *Garre*, *Degodia* and *Murule*, who have kinship across the border (Mandera County Government, 2018).

Security forces' outposts are found in Mandera with FOBs near Mandera town, *Omar Jillo*, *Damasa* and *Elwak*. Other areas of deployments include *Rhamu*, *Ashabito*, *Takaba*, and *Malka Mari*, among others. National police services are also deployed in towns and significant settlement areas. The County has experienced several attacks by *Al Shabaab* against passenger vehicles plying the Mandera-Elwak route, attacks on teachers, quarry workers and security outposts, and SNA incursions in the areas of *Bula Hawa* (AFP, 2020).

3.2.2 Wajir County

Wajir County is located in the North Eastern region of Kenya and covers an area of 56,685.9 Km² (Wajir County Government, 2018). It borders Somalia to the East, Ethiopia to the North, Mandera County to the Northeast, Isiolo County to the South West, Marsabit County to the West and Garissa County to the South. According to the 2019 census, the

County has a population of 1,200,890; the County had an estimated population of 781,263 persons (KNBS, 2019). Wajir County is also predominantly Somali in ethnicity. Three major Somali clans are the *Degodia*, *Ogaden* and *Ajuran*, who regularly feud over competition for political and economic resources and cultures (Rahoy, 2014; Hersi, 2015). As with other Somali inhabitants in the border counties, the Somali inhabitants of Wajir County have kinship across the border.

The County has security forces outposts with FOBs near Wajir town, *Konton*, *Gherille* (Kenya), *Diff* and *Dadajibulla*. Other security outpost deployments are in significant centres and settlements such as Wajir town, *Eldas*, *Tarbaj*, *Khotulo*, and *Habasweini*. The County has experienced several attacks by *Al Shabaab* against passenger vehicles plying the Elwak-Wajir route, attacks on teachers, entertainment joints, and quarry workers.

3.2.3 Garissa County

Garissa County is also located in the North Eastern region of Kenya. Somalia borders it to the East, Wajir County to the North, Tana River County to the Southwest and Lamu County to the South East. It covers an approximate area of 44 753 km² and, as of 2019, had a total population of 841 353 people (KNBS, 2019). The primary economic activities in Garissa County are pastoralism, trade and small-scale farming. Similarly, Garissa County is a predominantly Somali Ogaden sub-clan, the more prominent *Daarod* clan subset. In Garissa, the *Ogaden* has three major competing sub-clans, each with its sphere of influence *viz*; *Abudwaq* dominating Garissa township and Fafi, *Abdalla* having primacy in the southern part of the County while *Auliyahan* controls the areas around *Dadaab*, *Lagdeera*

and *Balambala* (Garissa County Government, 2018). Besides territorial tensions, these three groups compete intensely over the control of constituencies, political posts, and resource-related disputes with neighbouring counties of Tana River, Lamu, Isiolo, and Wajir (Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi, & Attree, 2016).

The County has security forces outposts with barracks at Modika area on the outskirts of Garissa town, a military camp next to Garissa town, and FOBs in *Liboi and Sarira* areas. Other security outpost deployments are in significant centres and settlements, such as Garissa town, *Liboi, Dadaab, Jara Jilla, and Bula Garissa*. The Dadaab refugee camp complex is in the County comprising of *Ifo, Daghaley and Hagadera* camps. The County has experienced several attacks by *Al Shabaab*. It is estimated that between 2017 and 2018 alone, at least 25 attacks targeting security officers, civilians and government officials were reported (Sahgal *et al.*, 2019). The most notable attack was the 2015 attack on the Garissa University College, where approximately 148 students, soldiers and police officers were killed and about 79 others injured (Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi, & Attree, 2016).

3.2.4 Lamu County

Lamu County is located at the northern-most point of the Kenyan Coastal stretch. It borders Tana River County in the Southwest, Garissa County to the North, the Republic of Somalia to the northeast and the Indian Ocean to the South. The County covers an area of approximately 6,273.1 km² with a total length of the coastline is 130 km, including 65 islands that form the Lamu Archipelago (Lamu County Government, 2018). The main economic activities include crop production, livestock production, fisheries, tourism, mining, and quarrying (Lamu County Government, 2018). The LAPSSET project

emanates from Lamu port, fuelling investment opportunities in the County. The County has a cosmopolitan inhabitation composed of indigenous communities made of Swahilis, Arabs (*Bajuni*), Koreni, Boni, Ormas, Kikuyu and migrant communities from the rest of the country (Lamu County Government, 2018). According to the 2019 census, Lamu County has a total population of 143,920 people (KNBS, 2019).

The County is host to the Manda Kenya Naval Base and several FOBs deployed within the expansive Boni forest, extending into Lower Juba in Somalia, in the context of the multiagency operation codenamed 'Operation Amani Boni' (OAB). The operation was launched in response to increased *Al Shabaab* attacks in *Mpeketoni*, *Mukunumbi*, *Witu*, *Pandanguo*, and *Baure*. The kidnapping of tourists and sabotage of economic activities occurred in Lamu, adding to the justification for the pursuit of *Al Shabaab* into Somalia in 2011 by KDF (Migue *et al.*, 2012). The infamous Mpeketoni attack occurred in June of 2014 and claimed over 50 lives of residents of Mpeketoni town (Anderson, 2014). These attacks reflect a common trend from Lamu County Northwards up to Mandera County. The Counties selected for the study are all at the border with Somalia and are directly affected by the security implications emanating from Somalia. The ethnic contiguity coupled with the long porous border also increases vulnerability. The County also lags in economic development except for the recent venture such as LAPSSET and other infrastructural developments, albeit slowly (Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi, & Attree, 2016; Anderson, 2014).

3.2.5 Jubaland Somalia

Jubaland, also known as *Azania*, is one of the six federal state of Somalia with an approximate total area of 110,293 km². The other five are *Puntland*, *Galmudug*, *Hirshabelle*, *Banadir* and *Southwest*. Puntland declared autonomy from Somalia in 1998 while Jubaland claims semi-autonomy (Mung'ala, 2013). Jubaland borders covering the entire length of the common border and has four main regions of Gedo in the north, middle juba and lower Jubba to the south (McCullough & Saed, 2017). Kismayo is the largest city, which also serves as the capital and seat of the government of Jubaland. Other major towns are *Bardhere*, *Dhobley*, *Afmadow*, *Bu'aale*, *Luuq*, *Garbahareey* and *Beled Haawo*. River Juba delimits the state Eastern border from Gedo into the Indian Ocean at Kismayo.

Jubaland has been critical in the fight against *Al Shabaab* during Operation Linda Nchi as it was the strategic objective for creation of buffer zone between the common border and River Jubba (Migue, *et al.*, 2012). Even after re-hatting to AMISOM, the KENCON has remained sectored within Jubaland. Critical operations to vanquish *Al Shabaab* and liberate territory has been conducted in Jubaland such Operation Sledge Hammer to liberate the port City of Kismayo on 28 September 2012 (Mwangi, Wanjiku, & Kimwele, 2019). Besides Operation Juba Valley Corridor involving KDF, ENDF and SNA was collaboratively conducted in 2015 to flush out *Al Shabaab* in part of Jubaland i.e. Gedo, as well as areas of *Bay* and *Bakool* (Kagwanja, *et al.*, 2020: 99). Jubaland thus remains critical to the national security of Kenya and the deployment of KDF in the area made it suitable as part of the study area.

3.3 Target Population

According to Creswell (2009), a population is the entire set of the relevant unit of analysis, or the data. Moreover, a population constitutes a large group of individuals, objects or items from which samples are drawn for measurement purposes (Creswell, 2009). The target population for the study was 3,340, comprising Military commanders, NPS officials, county commissioners and deputy county commissioners, KRA and immigration Officials deployed in the counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu County at the North Coast as well as Kenyan military personnel in Jubaland Somalia. Security sources indicated that there are approximately 2240 personnel deployed in the NEP region and 1060 in Jubaland (MoD, 2022).

Furthermore, according to the Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government (2022), there is one County Commissioner and one NPS County Commander in each of the study area counties, which formed part of the target population, as well as 4 KRA Officials and 5 Immigration Officials. Twenty Community elders represented the views of the civilian population. The Unit of analysis for the study was Kenyan Contingent and the unit of observation were KENCON and AMISOM PSO transition strategy. The two aspects of analysis were interdependent and affected Kenya’s national security. The distribution of the target population was as shown in Table 3.1.

Table 3.4: Target Population

CATEGORY	LOCATIONS					TOTAL
	MANDERA	WAJIR	GARISSA	LAMU	JUBALAN	
	A	R	A	U	D	

	SOMALIA					
Security Commanders	10	40	40	40	60	200
Security personnel	200	400	600	900	1000	3100
County Administrators	2	2	1	1	1	7
NPS Commanders	1	1	1	1	-	4
KRA Officials	1	1	1	1	-	4
Immigration Officials	1	1	1	1	1	5
Clan elders	4	4	5	3	4	20
Total						3340

Source: Researcher's compilation from MoD (2022) and Ministry of Interior (2022) databases.

3.4 Sample and Sampling procedures

According to Kothari (2004: 56), the sample size is the number of respondents selected to form the target population. The sample helps the researcher answer the critical questions for the research topic, thus gaining insights for analysis. In order to facilitate sampling, the study grouped the population into two categories from which respondents were drawn. The first category was Military personnel in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu and Jubaland Somalia cluster areas. The second category comprised key informants comprising County officials, NPS commanders, KRA Officials, Immigration Officials and Elders in the cluster areas of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu, cluster area.

The study employed a Cluster sampling technique for the first category, i.e. respondents, while purposive sampling was used for the second category, i.e. Key Informants.

Moreover, to obtain a sample size that satisfies a 95% confidence level, the study used Yamane's (1967) formula for categories one and three, respectively, as follows:

Where n = is the sample size

N = the target population

e = precision level (0.05)

The sample size for the first category was:

The 400 respondents were then proportionately distributed to the cluster areas. Simple Random sampling was used to obtain individual respondents to fill the sample size. The sample distribution was as indicated in Table 3.2:

Table 3.5: Distribution of respondents

Cluster	Area	Population	Proportion	Sample size
Mandera	Mandera	100	0.3	13
	Elwak	100	0.3	13
Wajir	Wajir	200	0.7	26

	Gherille	200	0.7	26
Garissa	Modika	300	0.1	39
	Liboi	300	0.1	39
Lamu	Manda	450	0.15	58
	Kiunga	450	0.15	58
Jubaland– Somalia (AMISOM)	Burahache	500	0.16	64
	Dhobley	250	0.8	32
	Kolbiyo	250	0.8	32
Total				400

Source: Compilation from MoD (2022) and Ministry of Interior (2022) databases.

The second category was for key informants and comprised County administrators, Military Commanders (senior Officers), NPS Commanders, KRA Officials, Immigration Officials and Elders in the cluster areas of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu and Jubaland Somalia cluster area. The key informants were purposively selected because they knew about national security matters and were involved in security operations and planning. According to Kothari (2004), 10% and 20% are sufficient for an in-depth study. This study selected 10% from the security commanders' sub-categories. The study also ensured that the significant clans are represented in the Elders' sub-category through consultation with research assistants knowledgeable on the clan dynamics in the study area.

The significant clan representation included *Garre*, *Degodia* and *Murule* in Mandera; *Degodia*, *Ogaden* and *Ajuraan* in Wajir; *Abdiwaq*, *Abdallah*, and *Aulyian* in Garissa; and *Swahili*, *Bajuni*, *Korani*, *Boni* and *Orma* in Lamu as well as *Marehan*, *Garre* and *Abdallah* clans in Jubaland Somalia. The community elders were critical for the study since they represented the community's views. According to Chonka and Healy (2021), community elders play a central role in the Somali community setup and are relied upon during times of

crisis. They mostly have the final say on political and socioeconomic matters in their communities. A total of 49 key informants were purposively selected, as shown in Table 3.3:

Table 3.6: Distribution of key informants

KI category	Area					Total
	Mandera	Wajir	Garissa	Lamu	Jubaland Somalia	
Security commanders	1	2	2	2	2	9
County Officials	2	2	1	1	1	7
NPS Officials	1	1	1	1	-	4
KRA Officials	1	1	1	1	-	4
Immigration	1	1	1	1	1	5
Elders	4	4	5	3	4	20
Total	10	11	12	14	2	49

Source: Researcher, 2022.

3.5 Unit of Analysis

The units of analysis for this study was the Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM, comprise of troops deployed in FOBs along the common border, Jubaland and Gedo areas of responsibility.

3.6 Data Collection Instruments

The researcher collected both primary and secondary data. The main instruments for data collection were questionnaires and interview schedules. Data triangulation was used to collect different but complementary data on the same question, thus obtaining enriched perspectives of the research problem.

3.6.1 Primary data

Primary data was collected by administering questionnaires and conducting interviews. Questionnaires were administered to the respondents in the identified areas comprising the first category of the sample comprising Military personnel in Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu and Jubaland (Burahache, Gherille and Dhobley, and Kolbiyow) cluster areas. The respondents provided information on the implications of AMISOM's transition to Kenya's national security. The respondents were primarily security professionals who were reasonably versed in security operations and the consequences of the AMISOM transition. The respondents were requested to complete the questionnaires and return them for analysis.

Interviews were conducted with the key informants. It enabled the researcher to collect expert and experienced information and gain in-depth insights into the national security implications of the AMISOM transition. The key informants were experts in the field of security planning, security operations as well as administration at various levels, that is to say, security, County and community levels. Interview schedules guided the conduct of the interviews.

3.6.1.1 Questionnaires

Questionnaires are a popular data collection method due to their relatively cheap cost, ease of construction and ease of distribution over a large geographical area (Kothari, 2004). The study area covered a significant geographical expanse comprising four border counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu, as well as the adjacent Jubaland region of Somalia.

Thus, questionnaires were suitable for reaching the military personnel across the study area. The use of questionnaires allowed more time for respondents to answer the questions. The study used semi-structured questionnaires entailing open-ended, close-ended and Likert scale-type questions administered to the respondents as per the sample distribution.

3.6.1.2 Interview Guides

The researcher used interview guides containing open-ended questions to conduct interviews for the 49 key informants as per the key informant distribution. The interview guides contained questions under thematic areas developed in line with the study's specific objectives. The unstructured nature of the interview sessions allowed the key informants to give in-depth information about the study. Besides, the researcher used probing questions to gain more clarity from the key informants.

3.6.2 Secondary data

Secondary data was gleaned from books, theses, and journals on security, PSOs, military operations, and planning. Publications by the National and County governments relating to development and security were reviewed, and relevant information was extracted. Communique by the AU, UNSC resolutions, and commentaries by AU and Somalia FGS officials also enriched the secondary data. Relevant library and Internet materials were consulted as part of the secondary data.

3.7 Reliability and Validity of Instruments

Reliability and validity tests were done to streamline the data collection instruments to ensure accurate and generalizable data for the study. It was done through peer reviews, test-retest and pilot study.

3.7.1 Reliability

Reliability refers to the consistency of the data collection tools to elicit similar responses over different times and with different groups. According to Mugenda (2008), reliability is the extent to which the research instrument gives consistent data after several trials. In order to ensure reliability, the study conducted a pilot study at *Minjila* in Tana River County. During the pilot study, a test-retest of the questionnaire was done using two pilot studies, each using 20 respondents. The responses were compared across the respondents and the different study times to compare the results.

Minjila in Tana River County was a suitable location for the pilot study since it is the immediate neighbour of Garissa and Lamu Counties, thus bearing similarities to the study area through a cosmopolitan inhabitation comprising the Somali and Ormas, as well as experience of *Al Shabaab* activities and Military deployment. The closeness to the study areas also predisposed the area to security effects from the AMISOM transition. Hertzog (2008) suggests that at least 10% of the respondents for the study is sufficient for a pilot study. Therefore, this study selected a sample of 40 respondents for the pilot study.

The data was used to perform reliability test using Cronbach Alpha for the Likert questions. According to George and Mallery (2003), Cronbach Alpha is used to measure the internal consistency of multiple Likert questions to determine their scale. Cronbach Alpha values were rated as follows: $\alpha \geq 0.9$ is excellent, $0.9 > \alpha \geq 0.8$ is good, $0.8 > \alpha \geq 0.7$ is well

acceptable, $0.7 > \alpha \geq 0.6$ is questionable, $0.6 > \alpha \geq 0.5$ is poor and $0.5 > \alpha$ is unacceptable (George & Mallery, 2003). This study sought variables that meet Cronbach Alpha values of 0.7 and above. The Cronbach Alpha for the pilot test were as follows;

3.7.1.1 Cronbach Alpha for nature of transition strategies affecting Kenya's national security

Cronbach Alpha for the nature of transition strategies was calculated, and the results were as depicted in Table 3.4:

Table 3.7: Cronbach Alpha for nature of transition strategies affecting Kenya's national security

Nature of transition Strategies	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Past relationship effect on diplomacy and security	.438	.447	.809
Kenya's pre-AMISOM strategies	.734	.707	.791
Pre-AMISOM intervention strategies	.772	.799	.816
AMISOM mandate achievement	.663	.735	.764
AMISOM transition strategy and preferred model	.689	.569	.879
Negotiation with <i>Al Shabaab</i>	.678	.636	.805
Maintenance of support to Jubaland	.651	.499	.921
Overall Cronbach Alpha (α)			.826

Source: Pilot data, 2022.

The reliability test for the research instrument on the nature of the transition strategies variable showed that the overall Cronbach Alpha was 0.826, indicating that the instrument was reliable for data collection. The variable with the highest Cronbach Alpha value was the maintenance of support to Jubaland buffer zone post-AMISOM with a value of 0.921,

followed by the existing AMISOM transition strategy and model with Cronbach Alpha of 0.879. The least Cronbach Alpha value was the achievement of the AMISOM mandate with a Cronbach of 0.764.

3.7.1.2 Cronbach Alpha for effects on Kenya's national security due to AMISOM transition

Cronbach Alpha for effects to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition was calculated, and the results were as depicted in Table 3.5;

Table 3.8: Cronbach Alpha for effects on Kenya's national security due to AMISOM transition

Effects on National security from AMISOM transition	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Territorial claims	.702	.643	.811
Armed incursion	.755	.737	.746
Defections	.794	.771	.729
<i>Al Shabaab</i> terrorism	.810	.838	.817
Diplomatic misunderstanding	.657	.481	.801
Contraband	.662	.604	.711
Resource conflicts	.678	.638	.704
Refugee influx	.833	.774	.703
Overall Cronbach Alpha (α)			.753

Source: Pilot data, 2022.

The reliability test for the research instrument on effects on national security variables showed that the overall Cronbach Alpha was 0.753, indicating that the instrument was reliable for data collection. The variable with the highest Cronbach Alpha value was *Al Shabaab* terrorism, with a value of 0.817, followed by territorial claims, with a Cronbach

Alpha of 0.879. The least Cronbach Alpha value refugee influx with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.703.

3.7.1.3 Cronbach Alpha for challenges and opportunities for Kenya's national security from AMISOM transition

Cronbach Alpha for challenges and opportunities to Kenya's national security from AMISOM transition was calculated, and the results were as depicted in Table 3.6 and Table 3.7, respectively.

Table 3.9: Cronbach Alpha for challenges to Kenya's national security from AMISOM transition

Challenges to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
<i>Al Shabaab</i> threat	.678	.649	.918
Funding and logistics	.685	.533	.817
Limited AMISOM enablers	.747	.694	.815
FGS and SSF capacity	.770	.712	.914
Transition timeline	.776	.697	.814
Regional forces	.558	.563	.823
Interests	.795	.729	.813
Overall Cronbach Alpha (α)			.845

Source: Pilot data, 2022.

The reliability test for the research instrument challenges to and from the AMISOM transition variable showed that the overall Cronbach Alpha was 0.845, indicating that the instrument was reliable for data collection. The variable with the highest Cronbach Alpha value was *the Al Shabaab* threat, with a value of 0.918, followed by FGS and SSF capacity,

with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.914. The least Cronbach Alpha value was on interests (regional and international), with a Cronbach of 0.813

Cronbach Alpha for challenges and opportunities for Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition was calculated, and the results were as depicted in Table 3.7.

Table 3.10: Cronbach Alpha for opportunities for Kenya's national security from AMISOM transition

Opportunities from AMISOM transition	Corrected Item-Total Correlation	Squared Multiple Correlation	Cronbach's Alpha if Item Deleted
Influence and shape STP	.654	.625	.854
Strengthen Jubaland buffer	.693	.630	.851
Enhance SSF reform and DDR	.692	.631	.852
Development of border counties	.646	.677	.854
Comprehensive border security management	.621	.644	.856
Overall Cronbach Alpha (α)			.853

Source: Field pilot data, 2022.

The reliability test for the research instrument for opportunities from the AMISOM transition variable showed that the overall Cronbach Alpha was 0.853, indicating that the instrument was reliable for data collection. The variable with the highest Cronbach Alpha value was comprehensive border security management, with a value of 0.856, followed by

influencing and shaping STP and the development of borders, each of which had a Cronbach Alpha of 0.854. The least Cronbach Alpha value was strengthening the Jubaland buffer zone with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.851.

3.7.2 Validity

Validity is related to the degree to which results obtained from data analysis represent the phenomena under study (Mugenda, 2008). The study considered face and content validity to ensure that the full range of issues under investigation are covered logically (Kumar, 2014). In order to enhance face validity, peer review was sought to ensure that the structure and content of the questions were sound. In addition, the pilot study conducted in *Minjila* in Tana River County assisted in improving the design aspects of the questionnaire. It further helped the researcher to determine if the different respondents derived similar meanings from the questions and thus reduced ambiguities. The status of regional forces was determined to be understood as forces from TCCs, and this was amended to the security forces of federal member states. Rearrangement of the questions was also done to enhance logical flow.

3.8 Data Collection Techniques and Procedures

The researcher collected qualitative and quantitative data by administering questionnaires and conducting interviews. Semi-structured questionnaires administered to respondents yielded quantitative and qualitative data, while interviews with key informants provided qualitative data.

3.8.1 Filling of Questionnaires

The researcher used self-administered questionnaires to collect responses to primary data from the selected respondents. Ten graduate research assistants were recruited, and trained by the researcher, to administer the questionnaires and collect them. The questionnaires were filled by respondents and returned for analysis. The researcher and the research assistants were available on the phone to provide clarification to the respondents as required. The questionnaire return rate is indicated in Table 3.8.

Table 3.8: Questionnaires return rate

	Frequency	Percentage
Returned Questionnaires	370	92.5%
Unreturned Questionnaires	30	7.5%
Total	400	100%

Source: Field data, 2022.

The returned questionnaires and unreturned questionnaires determined the response rate. Table 3.8 indicates that returned and completed questionnaires were 92.5%, a rate deemed high and adequate to represent the target population the researcher aimed to study effectively. According to Kumar (2014: 141), in social sciences, a response rate of 50% is adequate for producing accurate estimations when using questionnaires. Therefore, the

response rate for this research was significantly high; thus, the data could provide a reliable generalization to the study population.

The 7.5% unreturned questionnaire could have been due to the perception of the security sensitivity and expectations of inducement for responses, despite an explanation to the contrary in the consent form. The questionnaires used both close-ended and open-ended questions. The latter was used to probe further and obtain a detailed explanation for the responses provided for close-ended questions. The response to the close-ended questions was 100%, while some open-ended questions were partially filled or skipped, with response frequencies ranging between 236 and 338, which is over 50%, as Kumar (2014) recommended.

3.8.2 Interviews

This researcher used face-to-face interviews to collect qualitative data from Key Informants. Open-ended questions and interview guides were used for the interviews while probing questions were employed to gather more information and seek clarity. The researcher conducted 16 interview sessions in each study location (3 in Mandera, 3 in Wajir, 3 in Garissa, 3 in Lamu, 1 in Burahache, 1 in Gherille, 1 in Dhobley, and 1 in Kolbiyow). Interview sessions were recorded using voice recorders with the prior consent of the participants. After that, the recordings were transcribed, and relevant excerpts were analysed thematically to support and complement the quantitative findings. Moreover, notes were taken by the researcher and analysed thematically alongside the transcribed audio recordings. Interviews enabled the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of the

national security implications of the AMISOM transition through the expert perspectives of Key Informants.

3.9 Data Analysis and Presentation

Both quantitative and qualitative data were analysed to make the inference that can answer the research questions and address the research problem. Quantitative data was drawn from the questionnaires and analysed using SPSS version 26. It was then presented using percentages, charts, graphs and frequency distribution. Descriptive statistics were used, and results were presented as central tendencies, frequency counts and percentages.

Qualitative data from the interview of Key Informants were transcribed using notebooks and MS Word applications and analysed thematically using the excerpts method. The ideas and concepts gathered were organized into codes and categories. Various responses to a question were considered to identify common words or ideas and then associated with relevant themes. The study then used triangulation of data from different sources and methods to examine to corroborate consistency. The findings and themes were summarised and compared to establish differences or similarities with other related studies.

3.10 Limitations of the Study

According to Creswell (2009), limitations in research are the potential weaknesses or problems identified by the researcher that may hamper the conduct of the study. However, the research needs to mitigate the limitations to conduct the study. For this study, some respondents were unwilling to divulge information due to security considerations and fear of victimization. The problem was mitigated through assurance of confidentiality and non-

direct attribution of responses. The language barrier was encountered, especially when interviewing the community elders. It was mitigated by hiring ten research assistants who were autochtone and could translate the interviews into Somali for ease of understanding and response (2-research assistant in each County and in Jubaland due to clan dynamics). The security situation in much of the study area was precarious. Coupled with the expansiveness, traversing the study area was challenging due to security and means of transport. The researcher mitigated this by utilizing research assistants within the Counties who were security officers; or had clearance to access security and administration offices.

3.11 Ethical Considerations

Ethics in research pertains to the need to avoid or minimize harm to the respondents or participants (Kothari, 2004). Creswell (2009) notes that research studies pose ethical challenges that need to be addressed by the researcher. Besides, Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) advise that researchers must be guided by integrity to avoid harming research subjects. This study endeavoured to observe all the necessary ethical requirements. The study sought and secured authorization from the School of Graduate Studies of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. A research permit was obtained from the National Commission of Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI), and a clearance letter was obtained from the Somali Embassy for data collection in Jubaland. The researcher duly acknowledged all the literature consulted through proper attributions and citations.

All measures to protect the research participants were observed. The researcher sought prior informed consent from the participants by providing adequate information about the study. The participants were informed of the voluntary nature of their participation with no incentives to induce responses. The researcher maintained the anonymity of the respondents to ensure confidentiality. The information obtained from respondents was used only for the study and was stored and disposed of in a manner that did not prejudice their confidentiality or cause any harm.

3.12 Chapter Summary

This chapter presents the research methodology for the study. In terms of research design, the study used a descriptive survey design within a mixed methods approach using qualitative and quantitative methods. The study was conducted in the Counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu and the adjacent Jubaland regional state in Somalia. The target population were military personnel, county officials, NPS officials, KRA officials, Immigration Officials and elders in the North Eastern border Counties of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa and military personnel deployed in Lamu County. A pilot study was conducted to test and streamline the instruments in *Minjila* FOB of Tana River County. The pilot data was used to review the validity and reliability of instruments. The results of the pilot data are depicted in Tables 3.4, 3.5 and 3.6.

Primary data was collected using questionnaires and interviews and was analysed using SPSS for quantitative data and the thematic excerpt method for qualitative data. The data was presented using charts, graphs, frequency distribution and excerpts. All ethical

considerations were adhered to during the study. It leads to the presentation and discussion of the findings based on the three specific objectives of the study, beginning with the first specific objective on the nature of the African Union Mission in Somalia Transition Strategies affecting Kenya's National Security; the subject of the next Chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR

NATURE OF AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA TRANSITION STRATEGIES AFFECTING KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY

The chapter interrogates the nature of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) transition strategies affecting Kenya's national security. In this case, the connotation of 'nature' entail the form and content of AMISOM transition strategies. The basis for the

arguments in this chapter hinges on the fact that AMISOM operates as an entity of contingents and components; thus, any strategies are cascaded to all for implementation. The underpinning theories for the chapter are Neo-functionalism, strategic and securitisation theories. The chapter considers Kenya-Somalia relations and effects on diplomacy and security, Kenya's past strategies towards Somalia and its effect on National Security, Pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs in the recovery of Somalia's stability, the influence of plans and strategies on pre-AMISOM PSO outcomes, achievement of AMISOM mandate, and AMISOM exit strategy. Finally, a summary for the chapter was provided.

4.1 Kenya-Somalia Relations and Effect on Diplomacy and Security

States engage in the Montevideo convention's framework on states' rights and duties (Modasia, 2021). In this context, the realist perspective prevails, where state interests precede any considerations. These interests span socio-political and economic spectra, bearing on national survival. At the core is the consideration for national security that affects, and gets affected by, the socio-political and economic considerations, which Okoth (2018) advised should be handled diplomatically rather than violently.

In line with functionalist theory, societies function as the sum of their constituent elements for the good of all (Haas, 1958;1961). The geostrategic environment in which states exist and operate is critical (Modasia, 2021). As a neighbour, events in Somalia directly impact the socio-political and economic aspects of Kenya. Thus, Kenya has endeavoured to take a keen interest in the situation in Somalia, including interventions. As noted by a Key Informant:

The fact that Kenya and Somalia share a long and porous border places Kenya on the firing lines as insecurity and criminal activities spill over into Kenya across the border. The ethnic contiguity of the Somali community straddling the common border provides cover for malevolent elements. It dates back to the *shifita* period and became worse with the fall of the Somali government in the early 1990s and the subsequent turmoil that ensued to date. The relationship between Kenya and Somalia has hurt Kenya's security more so the expansionist tendencies of Somalia during the shift period. The failed state of Somalia and the persistent domination by militia has worsened the security situation, especially along the border areas (Interview with NPS Officer in Kotulo, Wajir County, on 20 November 2022).

The sentiments correspond to assertions by William and Hashi (2016) and Masese (2012) that the collapsed state of Somalia has been a breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalists who prefer approaching disputes through extremist stances and violent means. Ali and Muyonga (2021), Demise (2021), as well as Nzau and Guyo (2018), shared similar thoughts when observing that the relationship between Kenya and Somalia has been dicey and likely to affect the future security of the two states. A Key Informant aptly placed this notion into context as follows:

The strained aspects of the past and present relationship between the two countries (Kenya and Somalia) will affect them in the future. Somalia had expansionist tendencies during the Shifta era. Al Shabaab subscribes to ISIL's ideology of creating a caliphate in east and central Africa. The maritime dispute does not make it better to assuage Kenya's fears of Somalia's expansionism (Interview with a Military Commander in Bodhei, Lamu County, on 26 November 2022).

The quantitative findings further support the sentiments of the Key Informants. As depicted in Figure 4.1, 69.7% of the respondents acknowledged that the past relationship between Kenya and Somalia would affect the current diplomatic and security relations between the two states. Concerning future security and diplomatic relations between the two states,

78.9% of the respondents responded in the affirmative. It supports the findings by Chumba (2016), who established that the historical relations between Kenya and Somalia, and the prolonged collapse of the Somali state, significantly affect the security of the two states. The findings point to the relational significance between states; and how this determines the security status of each.

In the case of Somalia, the expansionist tendencies that continue to manifest across the terrestrial and maritime sphere indicate that the Country has not ceded her ambitions that defined post-colonial Somalia. It is an indicator of the state of affairs, which may manifest after the AMISOM dispensation, notwithstanding the state of stability in Somalia. The findings corroborate the assertions by Miyandzi (2012) and Warah (2014) that Somalia and its authorities have been suspicious of Kenya's involvement in the affairs of the Country. Furthermore, Ali and Muyonga (2021) noted that Somalia had viewed her immediate neighbours as taking advantage of her weak position to claim what she views as her rightful territory.




Figure 4.4: Effect of past Kenya-Somalia Relationship on current and future security and diplomatic relationship

Source: Field data, 2022.

In the contention of this study, the relational perspective is vital in the sense that PSO intervention strategies in Somalia ought to consider such aspects. It is more critical when immediate neighbours such as Kenya are involved (William & Nguyen, 2021). Such relational histories affect each actor's attitude towards intervention and transition strategies. As indicated in the aggregated respondents' explanations depicted in Figure 4.2, the rocky relationship has had a bearing on Kenya's security through the creation of hostile activities by the Somali government, a notion conveyed by 32.4% of the respondents. The maritime dispute also featured significantly in the explanations, with 27% of the respondents indicating that the maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia negatively affect the Security relations of the two states. Another 16.2% of the respondents feared that *Shifita-*

style insurgency operations might be sponsored in future in the NFD to destabilize Kenya and create anarchy in expansionistic pursuit. It likely covers the entire stretch of areas bordering Somalia from border Point 1 in *Mandera* to Border Point 29 in *Kiunga*, Lamu.




Figure 4.5 Aggregated explanations of the effect of past Kenya-Somalia Relationship on current and future Diplomatic and Security relations of the two states

Source: Field data, 2022.

The explanations depicted in Figure 4.2 indicate that unresolved adverse relationships between states may simmer and explode to life at a future time. Although the territorial ambitions of Somalia are said to have been resolved through the Arusha Agreement, its implementation was not adequately assessed due to the tumultuous experiences in Somalia's history that led to the collapse of the state (Nzau & Guyo, 2018; Masese, 2012).

The long period of instability did not provide an opportunity to assess the commitment of a recognized state representation (government) to the agreement. Previous agreements between Kenya and Somalia on the maritime sphere were negated, leading to a maritime dispute, a possibility that exists.

As inferred from the findings, the Arusha agreement may suffer a similar fate. The notion takes a cue from Mwasi's (2022) observation that peace agreements have been weak in ending conflicts, and most states relapse to fighting after ceasefire agreements. However, this analysis should be taken with a pinch of salt owing to two pertinent considerations that may shape state interests *viz* resources and community. For a pastoralist community such as Somalia, more grazing land for livestock may urge expansion into ethnic contiguous NFD counties. However, the decisions could be premised on mineral resources that could be present in NFD. It is a notion supported by the drivers of the riparian lands and maritime dispute, as Cheruiyot (2012) and Were (2013) noted. These drivers include minerals, gas, oil and fish, forming the cause of disagreement along disputed boundaries.

4.2 Kenya's past strategies towards Somalia's security situation and effect on national security

Kenya has been an active player in the continental and regional geopolitical landscape. In this endeavour, as submitted by Modasia (2021), Kenya has acted in the context of state-state engagement and as part of regional organizations such as AU, IGAD, EAC, and ICGLR. Therefore, the declared foreign affairs policy approach has been non-interference in the internal affairs of other sovereign states except in the context of Responsibility-to-Protect (R2P) within a bilateral or regional organization purview (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020).

Concerning the Somalia situation, various scholars such as Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), Ligawa (2018), Nzau (2018), and William and Hashi (2016), among others, have examined PSO interventions. Whilst the scholars examined the available intervention approaches, Williams *et al.* (2018) attempted to review the successes of PSO interventions in Somalia, more so AMISOM. The scholars concluded that although largely effective, AMISOM was yet to attain its objectives. As such, the study noted a gap in the assessment of Kenya's involvement in Somalia in the context of the effectiveness of past strategies to mitigate national security effects posed by the turmoil in Somalia. It is in cognizance of the fact that Kenya has previously countered *Shifita* incursions in NFD through Military and diplomatic approaches supported the stabilization efforts of Somalia and the formation of TFG, participated in AMISOM in the framework of APSA and facilitated the formation of FGS within the context of AU/AMISOM (de Coning, 2019; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). Where there is an after-action review of such engagements, they remain highly classified, thus denying scholars the benefit of assessing such effectiveness. However, there is a positive perception regarding Kenya's approaches to countering security implications pre-AMISOM. It was supported by the expression of one of the Key Informants:

Kenya's national security strategies have effectively ensured that security and normalcy are maintained in the NFD areas bordering Somalia. The KDF has played a significant role in using kinetic activities to thwart militia activities since the *Shifita* period up to the current Al Shabaab insurgency and engaging in CIMIC activities to pursue WHAM. We are glad that a multi-agency approach has been instituted as part of the strategies to deal with the security effects of Somalia's instability and to alleviate the socioeconomic hardships experienced in counties bordering Somalia. We hope the situation in Somalia stabilizes to enable the NFD to experience tranquillity and unleash the region's economic potential (Interview with County Administrator in *Diif*, Wajir County, on 04 December 2022).

The upbeat assessment of the Key informant corroborated the community perspective as presented by a community Elder, who affirmed that:

We [the community] have total faith in our government securing the region to ensure people continue their daily activities. The proximity to Somalia and the fact that Somalis are found on both sides enable infiltration of Al Shabaab, smuggling of contraband goods, the proliferation of arms and many other negative things. The border is open without controls except for a few security forces' camps far apart. Nevertheless, the government has been doing an excellent job of minimizing the security effects (Interview with a Community Elder from Garissa County, on 26 November 2022).

The view, as expressed by the Key Informants, indicates that the approaches used by Kenya to counter threats to national security emanating from Somalia have mainly been practical. The initial strategies heavily relied on militarized approaches to crush the *Shifita* uprising (1963-1967), with diplomatic efforts leading to the Arusha peace agreement (Nzau & Guyo, 2018). After that, Kenya played a crucial role in finding a solution to the Somalia crisis after the collapse of the Somalia state in 1991 (Ligwa, 2018; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). As Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) note, Kenya's strategic involvement in Somalia has been out of concern for the attainment of her security through the stability of Somalia. Despite the positive perspectives, there is an apparent lack of assessment of the effectiveness of Kenya's pre-AMISOM strategies. The quantitative findings presented in Figure 4.3 give indications on which to predicate such an assessment. The majority of respondents (63.6%) indicated that the pre-AMISOM Kenya national security strategy to address the security implications from Somalia was effective. Another 12.1% of the respondents indicated that the strategies were less effective, while 15.2% noted that they were ineffective. A paltry

6.1% of the respondents indicated that Kenya's pre-AMISOM national security strategies were highly effective. This is depicted in Figure 4.3.




Figure 4.6: Effectiveness of previous Kenya's national security strategies in dealing with Pre-AMISOM Security Implications

Source: Field Data, 2022.

The findings can be analysed in the context of the military diplomacy approach broached by Imbiakha (2021) when he posited that the aspects of porous borders, ethnic contiguity, and unstable neighbouring state(s) necessitate the employment of military diplomacy. Military diplomacy blends into a tenet of bargaining theory requiring an interest-based approach guided by underlying state interests rather than firm positions that cannot be abandoned without losing face (Hartzell, 2017). The military is one of the DIMES (Diplomacy, Information, Military and Economy) of national power. Military diplomacy

can take the form of coercion through hard power or persuasion through the employment of soft power (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). The aggressive nature of Somalia's expansionist ideology necessitated using hard military power through military campaigns (Land, Air and Sea) to thwart the attempts to annex Kenya's territory. The use of diplomacy was necessary to bring about a binding agreement to be observed by the belligerent parties despite the mutual suspicion that continues to characterize their relations (Nzau & Guyo, 2018: 576).

Kenya intensified military patrols in the border counties to ensure that security presence is a permanent feature, *albeit* in the expansive geographical area. Until 2011, Kenya had been operating within the strategic concept of defending its homeland territory rather than projecting forces inside the territory of Somalia (Migue *et al.*, 2012). The preference had been the use of diplomacy to resolve conflict and the military employed as measure-of-last-resort but defensively within the territory of Kenya. However, the menace of *Al Shabaab* prompted Kenya to adopt an offensive strategy; in pursuance of article 51 of the UN Charter (Migue *et al.*, 2012; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Barasa, 2018). Therefore, Kenya's border and territorial integrity were restored and maintained. The effectiveness or otherwise of Kenya's pre-AMISOM national security strategy approach toward Somalia can be understood in this context.

The respondents further explained their perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the pre-AMISOM Kenya national security strategy, and the same were aggregated in Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5. Respondents' aggregated frequency of explanations affirms that the strengths of pre-AMISOM Kenya's national security strategy lie in restoring the border and

territorial integrity (60%). Conversely, the significant weaknesses lay in lacking a comprehensive border security plan (24.1%), and *Al Shabaab* and other militia could still infiltrate Kenya's territory (11.6%).




Figure 4.7: Aggregated explanations of the strengths of pre-AMISOM Kenya national security strategy

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Figure 4.4 affirm the assertions by Migue *et al.* (2012) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that the KDF, as an instrument of national power, has been largely successful in performing its primary mandate as required by the constitution of Kenya *viz* defence of Kenya from external aggression to ensure territorial integrity. It is affirmed by the 60% of the respondents who believed that pre-AMISOM Kenya's national security strategy

ensured the restoration of the border and territorial integrity. A further 24.1% explained that the pre-AMISOM strategies aided in projecting Kenya's military strength. As a regional hegemon, this aspect is crucial in ensuring that the DIMEs of national power are visible and credible, thus deterring threats to national security. In this way, the brutal power of military diplomacy is projected to keep threats at bay (Imbiakha, 2021).

Conspicuously deficient in explaining the strengths is using a strategy of multidimensional approach to operations, as attested by 4.1% of the respondents. Corroboratively, the same is reflected by the explanations of weaknesses of the pre-AMISOM national security strategy as depicted in Figure 4.5, whereby lack of plans to develop NFD, lack of activities to win hearts and minds (WHAM) as well as little consideration for human security each scored 2.3% in terms of aggregated explanations. It corresponds with observations by Mutisya (2017) and Kibusia (2020) that there is a need to have a comprehensive multi-agency and multidimensional approach to securing Kenya's borders and territory.

Within the purview of multidimensionality of PSO operations, the Multi-Agency concept champions a synergistic approach, planning, implementation and review of government operations by incorporating all the relevant departments of the government, CSOs, NGOs, among others (Kibusia, 2020; Onditi, 2015). It is critical in terms of pooling material, financial and human resources to bear monumental tasks with national and international impact. Crucial in MAA is Civil Military Operations (CMO) activities that encompass CIMIC, QIP, and KLE, as well as community engagements that are critical in WHAM endeavours.

These aspects hitherto were lacking in pre-AMISOM PSO strategies. From the international perspective, Onditi (2015: 486-490) observed that CIMIC models within PSOs are overly militaristic and are exceedingly centralized, thereby inhibiting the effective participation of the civilian component. Such models are exclusionary and inimical to multidimensional intentions envisaged in PSO architecture, an aspect AMISOM ought to manage to enhance the success of the transition. A further explanation is provided in Figure 4.5:




Figure 4.8: Aggregated explanations of the weaknesses of pre-AMISOM Kenya national security strategy

Source: Field data, 2022.

Besides corroborating the aggregated respondents' explanations in Figure 4.4, a crucial finding of Figure 4.5 relates to the lack of comprehensive border security plans in pre-AMISOM national security strategies, as affirmed by 14% of the respondents. Key informants working with KRA and Immigration placed this in perspective when they noted that:

For a long time, the porous Kenya and Somalia border lacked proper border control infrastructure, such as border crossing points. These locations exist in areas such as Liboi, Gherille, Elwak, and Kiunga but do not have the requisite infrastructure for KRA and Immigration. The security of these areas has made it impossible to establish fully operational crossing points; thus, the staff of KRA and immigration have to operate in major urban areas where they have security. Unfortunately, these are far from the border, and people use informal routes to escape by passing through our offices. We lose much revenue on top of the many illegal elements that pose security threats to Kenya (Interview with KRA official in Garissa town, 20 November 2022).

The views of the key informant conform to findings by Opon (2015) that border control points between Kenya and Somalia suffer from acute operational challenges. These include staffing levels, serving under an unequal scheme of service and terms of employment, deployment of officials on personal integrity and competence, taking corruption, familiarity with anticorruption measures, constant surveillance and sharing of intelligence and work environment affect the effectiveness of counter-terrorism strategies.

A community Elder in *Elwak* also pointed to the fact that there are no control points and the border, and people cross at any point, avoiding established police checkpoints along the routes from the border. He observed:

The community here do not view any border as they have relatives on both ends and thus move freely. They do not cross at any particular point, especially for pastoralists on foot. Only big vehicles are forced to use routes that have police checkpoints. When people want to smuggle goods across the border, they use motorbikes or porters who can go through panya-routes [foot paths]. Even Al Shabaab use them to infiltrate across the border. The border posts have been destroyed since the community does not want the fence erected since it limits their movement to relatives across the border (Interview with a Community Elder in Elwak, on 15 December 2022).

The thoughts conveyed by the key informant point to the fact that the strategy to secure the Kenya-Somalia borders has been lacking even before the advent of AMISOM operations. It has earned the Kenya-Somalia border the characterization of being 'long and porous' (Okoth, 2018; Nzau, 2018; Mutisya, 2017; Opon, 2015). As averred by Jubat (2019), the lack of border control mechanisms, corruption, expansive territory and long-porous border makes it easy for smuggling activities across the Kenya-Somalia border.

4.3 Pre-AMISOM military intervention and recovery of Somalia's stability

Military interventions in the context of multilateral PSO are aimed at stabilizing the security and socio-political situation of the affected states. It was born from the need to ensure global peace and security as espoused in the UN Charter of 1948. In 2005, R2P was developed to implement lessons learnt from atrocities in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. Despite the noble intentions of PSO deployments, the results have been mixed. Scholars have noted that certain PSOs have failed in achieving the desired end state, for instance, in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Somalia, among others (Crocker, 2021; Gompert, Binnendijk & Lin, 2014). It has left more instabilities than the state of affairs in the pre-PSO period.

Some PSOs have been adjudged as being successful such as those conducted in Sierra Leone (Goldmann, 2014). Failure by PSOs to stabilize conflict situations has been attributed to a myriad of factors, such as what Ligawa (2018) cites as a lack of understanding of Cultural Intelligence. It infers the understanding of the Communities within which PSOs are conducted. Other scholars have attributed the failures to a lack of local mission support, an understanding of Somalia clan dynamics by peacekeepers, and

poor operation planning (Kareithi & Kariithi, 2008; Hersi, 2015; Ligawa, 2018). Furthermore, Salaün (2019) attributed such dismal PSO outcomes to a lack of clear transition plans and the fluid PSO environment. In the context of Somalia, Pre-AMISOM interventions could be assessed as having failed to owe to takeover by warlords and the eventual collapse of Somalia. This assertion was supported by sentiments by a Senior AMISOM commander when he observed that:

Since colonial times, Somalia was divided into spheres of influence between the Italians and the British. After independence, the Somalia clannist dynamics influenced the governance and social aspects of the Country, eventually leading to conflicts. The earlier military interventions by the UN and IGAD did not adequately understand the operating environment regarding clan dynamics and cultural and religious sensitivities. It largely contributed to the resentment of the local community, which turned against the peacekeepers to the advantage of warlords. In essence, the peace missions worsened the situation as witnessed by the protracted instability in the Country (Interview with a Senior ATMIS Commander in Dhobley, on 26 November 2022).

The assertion by the key informant affirms the argument by Ligawa (2018) that cultural intelligence is critical in stabilization and peacebuilding efforts; which UNOSOM, UNITAF and IGASOM did not factor. Besides, these earlier PSOs did not have comprehensive CONOPs to cater for post-PSO Somalia and the failure of peace agreements such as the Addis Ababa agreement of 1993 (Chonka & Healy, 2021; Oluoch, 2018). Moreover, Mwasi (2022) noted that peace agreements, such as the Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan(R-ARCSS), have failed to end conflicts since they did not adequately address the root causes. The findings in Figure 4.6 indicate that the pre-AMISOM PSO interventions are assessed as having failed to stabilize the state of Somalia. Most respondents (73%) affirmed that pre-AMISOM military

interventions and PSOs did help recover Somalia's stability. In comparison, 27% affirmed that pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs did not help recover Somalia's stability.

Scholars have attributed the failure of pre-AMISOM PSO and strategies interventions to various factors, *viz*; lack of understanding of the operating environment (cultural intelligence), lack of local support, poor planning and exit strategies, and lack of sufficient resources, among others (Chonka & Heally, 2021; Kareithi & Kariithi, 2008). Additionally, the findings lend to the argument by William and Hashi (2016) that the aftermath of interventions in Somalia has been a deterioration in the Country's stability and the rise of fundamentalist extremists such as *Al Shabaab* and ISIL. Similarly, a study by Mwasi (2022) established that the South Sudan peace agreements failed due to; a limited number of mechanisms to address impediments to the agreement, little agreement on the ownership of natural resources, inadequate modalities of navigating the interests of external actors, and poor handling of different political interests. However, despite the failures of pre-AMISOM PSOs, they helped set conditions and lessons upon which subsequent interventions were improved.




Figure 4.9: Whether pre-AMISOM Military interventions and PSOs were helpful in the stabilization of Somalia

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings further corroborate Chumba's (2018) submission that purely militaristic PSO approaches are ineffective in the face of changing nature of contemporary threats to peace. Earlier PSOs in Somalia attempted to synergize efforts between the military and humanitarian agencies. However, they did not sufficiently engage the community by

understanding clan and cultural dynamics within the Somali community. It failed in what Ligawa (2018) called 'cultural intelligence'. Without the critical support of the community, UNOSOM I and II, and UNITAF, eventually failed. IGASOM did not even deploy and had to change to AMISOM. To expound further on the issue, Figure 4.7 presents respondents' aggregated explanations on the issue of pre-AMISOM PSOs' usefulness regarding the stabilization of Somalia:




Figure 4.10: Aggregated respondents' explanations on the effectiveness of pre-AMISOM PSO in restoring the stability of Somalia

Source: Field data, 2022.

From the findings, the dominant opinion revolved around the fact that the guerrilla (asymmetric) tactics of the Somali militia defeated superior conventional armies (24.2%)

and the fact that stability was achieved by a minimal margin (24.2%). Notably, 9.1% of the respondents believed there was little attempt to build the capacity of SSF. In comparison, a paltry 3% assessed that the pre-AMISOM PSOs created an environment that enabled peace processes (future PSOs) to commence. Interestingly, the aggregated respondents' explanations converged around the notion that despite marginal successes, the pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs were largely unsuccessful in restoring Somalia's Stability.

According to Angell (2015), the failure of operational commanders to adapt their strategies to the unconventional nature of the Vietnam conflict contributed to the failure of USA military operations. The assertion supports the respondents' view in Figure 4.7 that guerrilla tactics employed by the insurgent groups in Somalia defeated conventional militaries. This notion was conveyed by 24.2% of the respondents. The changing nature of conflicts has moved away from the trenches and fixed battle formations that characterized warfare during the world wars. Weaker entities (mostly non-state) have sought ways to offset the tactical advantages by targeting weaknesses (gaps) of a superior conventional adversary while minimizing losses on their part. Often state militaries have been slow to adjust to the unorthodox strategies of insurgent and militia groups (Gompert, Binnendijk & Lin, 2014). It was true of the experiences of UNOSOM, UNITAF and later IGASOM forces. A Key Informant noted that;

Subsequent operations in Somalia by AMISOM had to learn from previous operations' shortcomings and adjust to the threat environment. Al Shabaab does not conform to the laws of armed conflict and employs asymmetric tactics to offset the AMISOM military advantage. In addition, the contingents must engage the

community, win their support and deny Al Shabaab the civilian terrain to hide and perpetrate atrocities. Compared to earlier operations, AMISOM has mainly been effective by learning from the failures of pre-AMISOM deployments (Interview with a Military Staff Officer in Dhobley, on 14 November 2022).

This view underscores the need to use failures in military operations as learning opportunities for subsequent deployments. Where repeat PSO deployments occur, such as in Somalia, comprehensive after-action reviews are crucial to the operational activities that should inform adjustments in ongoing and upcoming operations. It is in the form of lessons learnt that must be constantly updated since asymmetric threat environments are fluid. However, lessons learnt should not cause operational paralysis using the risk-averse approach (Patman, 2015). Ligawa (2018) advised that tactical dispositions of AMISOM troops are essential in ensuring success in peacebuilding. Tactical dispositions are critical adjustments in deployments to ensure maximum operational effectiveness and achievement, which to Ligawa (2018) is a strategic attack to achieve the end state. One Key informant observed that:

With the evolving nature of threats, continuous adjustments of plans are essential to ensure that we are better placed to address not only the enemy threats by the community needs that enables more significant support for AMISOM operations. We can achieve our mandate only through plan flexibility (Interview with ATMIS Operations Officer in Kolbiyow, 20 November 2022).

The notion by the key informant reflects the need for flexible plans that can adjust to the threat environment. This view supports the argument by Luft (2020), who posited that critical military strategic planning models require a comprehensive appreciation of all possibilities, including a possible forecast of outcomes to enable the development of branches and sequels. In essence, the notion advocates for flexibility in plans to address

what Oluoch (2018) viewed as the 'what next' and 'what ifs' of PSOs. Pre-AMISOM intervention strategies lacked flexibility in adjusting to the operational environment and planning for the post-exit situation. It left the post-intervention Somalia cascading through decades of instability as a failed state (William & Hashi, 2016; Masese, 2012).

Kagwanja *et al.* (2020:121) made a similar observation regarding Operation Iraqi Freedom between 2003 and 2011. They noted that Operation Iraqi freedom failed to factor post-Saddam stability, the existence of the state of Iraq, and regional as well as international implications. As aptly noted by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), failed PSO interventions not only negatively affect the security of the primary state but also have negative implications regionally and internationally. The affirmation that pre-AMISOM PSO interventions failed in containing the security instabilities in Somalia meant that the spillovers were felt in Kenya and the IGAD region.

4.4 Influence of plans and strategies on pre-AMISOM PSO outcomes

The strategic theory requires that a good plan be detailed enough to take care of all possibilities whilst remaining flexible enough to respond to the unforeseen (Shelling, 1984). Plans draw from strategies that should span the entire spectrum of the operation from the preliminaries, execution, termination and post-operation situation (Durch, 2010). Scholars have often advised that responsible PSOs should operate to stabilize a conflict zone and exit after setting favourable conditions for capable, legitimate and inclusive governance and security institutions (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; William & Hashi, 2016). It is upon a well-established security and governance platform that other state institutions can

be rebuilt for national stability. Security and governance create a conducive environment for other socioeconomic processes. It hinges on an adequately planned PSO whose strategies, branches and sequels the established conducive environment. One Key informant aptly summed as follows:

Often we are told that failing to plan is planning to fail. However, the lack of proper and comprehensive plans for military operations is as disastrous as not having a plan. Half-baked plans give false hope for operations only to realize that many gaps exist, often too late. Unfortunately, military failures occasion costs in terms of time and resources; and, most tragically, human lives and livelihoods. More is demanded of comprehensiveness in military plans and operations since success depends on how thorough planners can be to avert tragedy (Interview with a Military Officer in *Bojigaras*, on 10 November 2022).

While it is humanly impossible to achieve a perfect plan, the Key informant's observations call for thorough planning and strategising. The entire spectrum of operations must be adequately considered, no matter the level of operations or its attendant complexity. Poorly planned PSOs result in security, socio-political and economic turmoil that transcend the confines of the subject state (Dessu, 2022; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020).

Pre-AMISOM PSOs are noted to have failed due to poor considerations of the operating environment, population support, cultural intelligence and exit plan (Salaün, 2019; Ligawa, Okoth & Matanga, 2017; Kareithi & Kariithi, 2008). Military plans and strategies should be predicated on these primary planning considerations. At the crack of bullets, military operations tend to suffer what Ligawa (2018) calls the 'contact dilemma', characterized by hostility, uncertainty and disorder, violence and danger, and human stress. Essentially, the simple becomes difficult, and the difficult becomes seemingly impossible. The situation

gets disastrous when plans are poor. The hasty withdrawals of USA forces in Somalia and subsequent instabilities attest to this fact. The assertion was reflected in the sentiments of a

Key Informant who pointed out:

The initial interventions by the UN in Somalia under UNOSOM and UNITAF failed to consider Somalia's human terrain. The clan dynamics of Somalis are so entrenched and dictate even the most mundane of social affairs. Within the clans, some sub-clans equally antagonize other sub-clans within the same more prominent clan. Those inadvertently left outside automatically view engaging one clan or sub-clan with suspicion. It is a recipe for trouble for a foreign entity; the community can easily label that as a non-believer (kuffar) to rally opposition. Those UN missions' simplistic and rigidly structured approach underestimated the antagonism of ignoring such planning factors (Interview with a Senior Military Officer in Wajir, 02 December 2022).

The response by the respondents supported the argument that proper planning and having comprehensive strategies are critical in PSOs; and any military engagements in pursuit of national security. Besides, the sentiment conforms to Hersi's (2015) observation that clan dynamics are central to Somali reconciliation efforts and thus require proper understanding by conflict management actors. Indeed, the peculiar nature of Somali Clannism indicates a strong leaning towards clan loyalty over nationalism.

Depicted in Figure 4.8 are responses by the respondents on whether the pre-AMISOM plans and strategies were responsible for their outcomes viz success or failure. Most respondents (75.8%) indicated that pre-AMISOM plans and strategies were not responsible for successes, and 60.6% affirmed that the plans and strategies influenced pre-AMISOM failures. The findings point to deficiencies in the outcome of the pre-AMISOM PSOs the respondents used to infer the guiding plans and strategies, thus concluding that they were

also deficient. It is because the plans and strategies write-ups are classified and likely not accessible to the respondents. Notwithstanding this analysis, the findings point wherein the problem lay resulting in failed outcomes of pre-AMISOM PSOs viz as plans and strategies as depicted in figure 4.8.




Figure 4.11: Pre-AMISOM PSO outcomes influenced by plans and strategies

Source: Field data, 2022.

Nzau (2018) submitted that any typical military venture must have a clear objective based on a sound plan to attain the assigned mandate. Luft (2020) further averred that critical military strategic planning models require a comprehensive appreciation of all possibilities,

including a forecast of outcomes to enable the timely development of branches and sequels. Furthermore, Opondo (2018: 382) noted the need to adapt strategies of yesteryears to prevailing operational situations, thus underscoring the need for flexibility and adaptability of plans. The initial submissions by the scholars underscore the central argument of strategic theory for comprehensive planning and the need for adaptable plans that can ride the waves of a fluid asymmetric threat environment. As a Key Informant indicated:

Plans are guides and sensors for military operations. Therefore, they need to feel the threat environment and adjust to them to guide operations. Otherwise, operations will be executed blindly. Plans that lack this quality are even worse as they waste time and lead to otherwise avoidable pitfalls (Interview with ATMIS Staff Officer in Dhobley, on 15 November 2022).

The assessed failures of UNOSOM and UNITAF are attributed to poor planning. While the effect within Somalia was the collapse of the state, the security implications spread to the Horn of Africa and continue to shape the geopolitical and security landscape. Kareithi and Kariithi (2008) observed that Kenya's Northeastern parts continue to experience instabilities that, *inter alia*, are linked to the failed state of Somalia, ranging from attacks by militias, illegal trade, banditry, and refugee problems, among others. In light of the failed outcomes of pre-AMISOM stabilization efforts and their implications for Kenya's national security, a community elder opined that:

For a long time, the community has experienced insecurity and environmental hardships affecting human beings and livestock - problems coming from the other side of the border (Somalia). The area is also remote, most places do not get essential services such as security, and people have to arm themselves to protect themselves (Interview with a Community elder interviewed in Damasa, Mandera County, on 16 December 2022).

The Key informant's sentiment represents the broader problem facing the NFD, where the instability in Somalia coupled with harsh climatic conditions burden the inhabitants, thus reinforcing the notion of marginalisation. The indication that the community has to arm itself for its security portrays the resignation to fate due to long periods of persecution at the hands of militia from Somalia. The sentiment is also relevant to the assessment of pre-AMISOM PSO in that what the NFD communities are experiencing is essentially a ripple effect of bungled stabilization efforts in Somalia. Had the pre-AMISOM PSO been adequate to guarantee the stability of the state of Somalia, the situation of the people in Somalia and Kenya's NFD would have been different regarding security. The focus could be addressing economic development and the effects of climatic conditions, such as drought, rather than insecurity.

4.5 Advent of AMISOM, Actors and attainments of AMISOM Mandate

AMISOM is an AU-led PSO in Somalia that aimed to stabilize the Country after decades of instability. The PSO deployed in 2007 after the ignominious withdrawal of UNOSOM II in 1995. Initially authorized by the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) on 19 January 2007, AMISOM was also authorized by UN Security Council resolution 1744 on 20 February 2007 (Williams *et al.*, 2018). As identified by Williams *et al.*, (2018), the internal actors of AMISOM include the FGS, Federal Member States, SSF Somalia citizens. External actors of AMISOM include the TCCs (Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, and Rwanda); training, financial and logistics support (EU, EUTM, UK and UNSOS), the AU through PSC and the UN (Williams *et al.*, 2018:39).

Over the years, AMISOM's mandate strategies would evolve from protecting the Somali authorities and facilitating a political process to warfighting, counter-insurgency, and stabilization with state-building admixture. To execute its responsibilities, the AU and UN altered the character and nature of the mission to enable the attainment of the Mission tasks between 2007 and 2011 (Ligawa, 2018). From the confines of Mogadishu, the mission expanded to other regions when contingents from Kenya and Djibouti joined those from Uganda and Burundi.

AMISOM strategy employed throughout the PSO duration was encapsulated within its mandate. Deployed under the auspices of APSA, AMISOM's mandate was to degrade *Al Shabaab* and other militia and create conditions for the stability of Somalia (Williams *et al.*, 2018). Nzau (2018) and Oluoch (2018) observed that the threat environment in Somalia required that the AMISOM mandate be oriented towards peace enforcement since there was no peace agreement signed between belligerent parties and thus no peace to keep. Therefore, the AMISOM mandate took the peace enforcement trajectory (under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter) to create the necessary condition for restoring peace and stability. The AMISOM mandate hinged on degrading *Al Shabaab* through a mixture of approaches such as use of military forces as well as WHAM activities. This was the main effort of the strategy, and was meant to create conducive environment for the long-term stability and development of Somalia. A key informant's views encapsulated the holistic AMISOM strategy as follows:

The Somalia conflict has required a holistic approach in efforts to foster peacebuilding in Somalia. With the appreciation that sustainable peace will be

achieved in different fronts; civilian empowerment, institutional capacity growth and SSF capacity building, are critical in AMISOM strategy implementation. Besides the military kinetic operations against Al Shabaab's empowerment of the human terrain is key in fighting the Centre of Gravity of Al Shabaab insurgents. The same operational tempo is transferred to ATMIS as it takes over from AMISOM (interview with the Deputy Sector Commander, Sector 2 at *Dhobley*, on 28 December 2022).

The views of the key informant speaks to the broader approach to operations as espoused in MAA concept (Kibusia, 2021). Moreover, it resonates well with the submission by Onditi's (2015) argument that PSO structures should adapt to the realities of African conflicts, which require efforts beyond traditional military approaches. In addition, it gives credence to the argument by Ligawa 2018, that cultural intelligence alongside military approaches should be blended for optimal AMISOM peacebuilding outcomes. The sectoring strategy by AMISOM aligned to Nzau's (2018) analysis of contingent deployment to reflect the national interests by each TCC.

William and Nguyen (2018) observed that the AMISOM mandate had been extended severally by UN Security Council resolutions. Each mandate period lasts for six months. AMISOM eventually transitioned to ATMIS on 01 April 2022, effectively ending its mandate. An assessment of the achievements of the AMISOM mandate has been spasmodic at best, with various scholars providing varying assessments. Without statistical backing, William *et al.* (2018) claimed that AMISOM had made significant progress in pursuit of its strategic objectives, *viz* reducing the threat posed by *Al Shabaab* and other armed opposition groups, provision of security to enable Somalia's political processes and reconciliation and, handing over of security responsibilities to Somalia Security Forces. A Key informant shared a similar optimism, pointing out that:

AMISOM troops, especially the Kenyan contingent, have made a good account of themselves despite challenges. Strategic areas such as Kismayu, Afmadhow, Tabda, Hosingo, Gherille, Burahache and Beles Qoqaan have been liberated, thus denying Al Shabaab strategic deployment posts. The militants (Al Shabaab) have been degraded through a multipronged approach that has included hard military power and engaging the community in the context of WHAM using CIMIC. Governance has been restored in liberated areas through electoral and appointment processes done by and acceptable to the locals. Regular regional elections, as well as federal elections, have been conducted and secured by AMISOM forces. The progress has been commendable. However, the mentorship of the local security forces has been slow, and they are not yet up to the required standards to assume full security responsibilities. More must be done in this respect (Interview with ATMIS Military Commander in Kolbiyow, 30 November 2022).

The views of the Key informant resonate with Onditi's (2015) submission that adapting PSO structures to African conflict realities is crucial. Therefore, cordial relations between PSOs' military and civilian entities are essential, as envisaged in APSA. While AMISOM had set objectives, some of which would indicate the mandate's achievement, the success criteria were lacking in the strategies. It is impossible to attain 100% of set objectives, and thus, the need for success criteria that would set the extent to which each objective should be achieved to determine whether it is a success or failure (Yarger, 2006). To this end, achievement indicators that act as markers to determine progress and extent would be set. Similarly, a prioritization of the objectives based on weighted significance and a proportion of objectives to be achieved should be determined in the assessment matrix before the mandate achievement is determined. Success criterion is not an alien concept in military planning and should apply to PSO plans and strategies.

Supportive of the positive appraisal of the achievement of the AMISOM mandate, the findings presented in Figure 4.9 depict respondents' perception of the achievement of the

AMISOM mandate of degrading *Al Shabaab* and stabilizing Somalia. Most respondents (52%) affirmed that AMISOM had achieved its mandate, while 48% indicated that it had not. A split opinion on a question should attract a definitive opinion about success or failure. It indicates that while AMISOM has done well in attempts to stabilize Somalia, a significant portion of the population still feels that more has to be done. This onus has to fall on ATMIS as the shepherded transfer of responsibilities to FGS and SSF.




Figure 4.12: Achievement of AMISOM mandate

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings indicate an almost equal split in respondents' perceptions of the achievement of the AMISOM mandate. AMISOM has liberated large swathes of territory under *Al Shabaab's control*, including capturing the strategic port city of *Kismayu, Marka*, and control of Mogadishu (Ligawa, 2018: 281; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). Piracy along the Indian Ocean has been vanquished, thus saving Kenya's tourism sector and the economy. Other

critical areas liberated from *Al Shabaab* include the coastal towns of *Quday*, *Burgaabo*, and *Ras Kiamboni* (Williams *et al.*, 2018). These were the revenue bases for *Al Shabaab*, and their capture denied *Al Shabaab* finances to fund their activities. However, by the time of AMISOM's transition to ATMIS, critical areas such as *Jilib*, *Jamaame*, *Buale*, and *Sakoow*, among others, remain under *Al Shabaab's* control.

The aggregated explanations of the respondents regarding the achievement of the AMISOM mandate paint a better picture, as depicted in Figure 4.10. In support of the arguments by Williams *et al.* (2018) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), the respondents' explanations support the notion that the Kenya Contingent in AMISOM has liberated large areas from *Al Shabaab* thereby enabling the resumption of normal activities by the local population. It was conveyed by the sentiments of 42.4% of the respondents. Significantly, the sentiment of 18.2% of the respondents that *Al Shabaab* still operates in areas held by AMISOM forces is a cause for concern since the militants still influence the security landscape of liberated areas. The ability of the militants to strike devastating blows to AMISOM positions, such as in *Ceel Ade*, *Kolbiyow*, and *Ceel Baraaf*, among others, indicates that *Al Shabaab* still retains a significant level of operational capacity. It is an issue for consideration for AMISOM planners to decisively degrade the militants before exiting and handover to SSF. As Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) indicated, a transition pillar for AMISOM would hinge on a stable Somalia with a degraded *Al Shabaab*.




Figure 4.13: Aggregated explanations on achievement of AMISOM Mandate

Source: Field data, 2022.

The explanations in Figure 4.10 further highlight vital aspects critical to stabilizing the state of Somalia, viz, military efforts versus political processes. The findings indicate that the

mandate has primarily been successful as far as military efforts are concerned. It is explained by 42.4% of the respondents. Comparatively, 15.2% of the respondents believed that Somalia's government is still unstable. It indicates that the political process, a crucial element of the AMISOM mandate, has not been attained adequately.

Further exposition is provided by 6.1% of the respondents who explained that AMISOM has helped stabilize the FGS (government), 3% of the respondents who explained that *Al Shabaab* militants have reduced in number, and some joined the FGS. Similarly, 3% of the respondents explained that AMISOM provided a security-enabling environment for international humanitarian agencies to operate, more so outside Mogadishu. While the AMISOM military component was not to get involved in the politics of Somalia, they were charged with creating an enabling environment for establishing and conducting the political process to rebuild the FGS (Williams *et al.*, 2020). The fact that the findings indicate a lag in the political stabilization of Somalia is a validation of an observation by Ligawa, Okoth, and Matanga (2017) that there was a need for realignment of AMISOM PSO activities to support the development of peace and stability in Somalia.

Peace support operations such as AMISOM help a return to a pre-conflict state, enabling peacebuilding processes. Such is enabled by a clear and attainable mandate that has to be set and facilitated by the planners and sponsors. The strategic theory requires that plans and strategies informing mandates and operations thereof have to take into consideration the ends, means, the centrality of the political actors, political actors' value system and interests, and the influence of the broader strategic environment, among others (Yager,

2006:2). In so doing, the achievement of AMISOM mandate should be assessed within not only Somalia but also how it influences the immediate and broader environment. It aligns with the arguments of functionalist theory that a society is a sum of its constituent parts, and a disturbance (or instability) in one or more of the constituent parts affects the rest of the system functionally. It has to adjust or remedy the anomaly (Nicoli, 2019).

During the launch of Operation Sledge Hammer to capture the port city of Kismayu, KDF commanders intimated the preceding analysis. They securitised the issue by equating the *Al Shabaab* menace to a gigantic 'serpent' whose tail caused insecurity in Kenya while the head was inside Somalia. Therefore, it was operationally prudent to solve the problem at the source to reduce the consequences abroad. The findings in Figures 4.9 and 4.10 on the achievement of the AMISOM mandate are a testament that the 'head of the serpent' has essentially crashed. Thus, the disturbances to the entire socioeconomic and security system of HoA have been reduced. In essence, this study argues that the achievements of AMISOM should not be assessed only within Somalia but on how the achievement of the mandate affects the national security of Kenya and the wider HoA.

4.6 Achievement of AMISOM mandate strategic objectives

As depicted in Table 4.1, the respondents assessed each of the AMISOM mandate objectives to determine the extent to which each had been achieved in the context of the overall AMISOM mandate. It was in an attempt by the study to foster the idea of an assessment matrix with clear parameters to measure the achievement of each objective to determine the extent of the mandate.

Table 4.11: Cross-tabulation for Achievement of AMISOM objectives

AMISOM Mandate Objectives	Achievement rating (%)				Total (%)
	N=370				
	Great extent	Large Extent	Less extent	Not achieved	
Degrading <i>Al Shabaab</i>	15.2	51.5	24.2	9.1	100
Provision of support to FGS	27.3	57.6	9.1	6.1	100
Mentoring and Capacity building of SSF	6.1	33.3	54.5	6.1	100
Facilitation of Humanitarian assistance	6.1	54.5	36.4	3.0	100
Creation of conditions for long-term stability, reconstruction, and development of Somalia	3.0	30.3	39.4	27.3	100
CIMIC and Quick Impact projects	3.0	63.6	27.3	6.1	100

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Table 4.1 indicate the extent of achievement of the AMISOM objectives as rated by respondents. Regarding degrading *Al Shabaab*, most respondents (51.5%) rated that it had been achieved to a large extent, 15.2% rated that the objective had been achieved to a great extent, and 24.2% indicated that it had been achieved to a less extent. Providing support to FGS was rated to have been achieved to a large extent by 57.6% of the respondents, while 54.5% of the respondents rated that mentoring of SSF had been achieved to a lesser extent. Another 54.5% rated that AMISOM had facilitated

humanitarian assistance, 39.4% rated that conditions for stability and reconstruction of Somalia had been achieved to a less extent, and 63.6% rated that CIMIC had been conducted to a large extent.

Regarding the central objective of degrading *Al Shabaab* and creating a conducive and enabling environment for political processes, 51.5% of the respondents rated that *Al Shabaab* had been degraded to a large extent. Comparatively, the creation of conditions for long-term stability, reconstruction, and development of Somalia was rated to have been achieved to a less extent by 39.4% of the respondents. The findings are congruent with the data analysis in Figure 4.10 that military efforts have been significantly achieved, but the political processes still lag. Furthermore, another worrying aspect of AMISOM mandate achievement presented from the findings in Table 4.1 *viz* mentoring and capacity building of SSF, which the respondents (54.5%) rated as having been achieved to a less extent.

The two aspects are crucial for the stability of Somalia since they hinge on the security and governance of Somalia post-AMISOM. With the advent of ATMIS as part of the gradual handover of responsibilities to FGS and SSF, the objectives of security and governance ought to have been achieved to a greater extent. According to Kagwanja *et al.* (2020:122), the future of Somalia will not rest on militarism but on the civilian rule set in a law and order framework. While this observation is relevant in the context of destabilizing militarism and warlordism, concerning post-AMISOM Somalia, well-trained, disciplined, and professional security forces are essential for the stability of Somalia and the establishment of civilian governance. As aptly observed by William and Hashi (2016) that,

it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia without leaving behind capable, legitimate, and inclusive Somalia Security Forces. A Key Informant expressed concern for the professional state of SSF:

The security concern for most areas of Somalia, such as Jubaland, is the capacity of its security forces. The plans to train, equip and mentor them have not been effectively done; therefore, they (JSF) are not operationally capable. The regular soldiers have poor basic training, poor discipline, lack operational enablers, and not well remunerated. Clan loyalties affect the cohesiveness of the force as a fighting unit with defections back and forth between al-Shabaab and SSF. Patriotism is lacking, and a common sentiment amongst them is that they will abandon their posts immediately after the Kenyan contingent exits. It will surely give Al Shabaab an easy time taking over large swathes of liberated territory; thus, Somalia's security and governance will not be achieved. The new government and ATMIS need to reassess their approach to ensure that the security forces are brought up to the task to enable the socio-political and economic reconstruction of Somalia, or else the efforts by AMISOM will have gone to waste (Interview with ATMIS Military Commander in Gedo region on 27 November 2022).

The concerns of the Key Informant conform to reservations hitherto expressed by scholars on post-military interventions. Analysis of Military interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan supports the notion that a weak post-intervention security posture is inimical to the stability of a country. Kanat (2019) concluded that the exit of USA forces from Iraq created a security vacuum that led to protracted conflict between the Shia and Sunni Muslim sects leading to the collapse of the Country and takeover by ISIS/L. Afghanistan suffered the same fate after the Taliban swiftly took over the Country after, and even before, the USA forces had completed their exit. The common denominator in the two cases was the emphasis on military victory against the Republican Guard and Taliban while ignoring the rebuilding of the security apparatus of the states for post-conflict stability.

Plate 4.1: The researcher (standing at the podium) having a session with Kenyan troops in AMISOM in a FOB in Gedo Region



Source: Field Data 2022

The attainment of the AMISOM mandate is not exclusive to the post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia. A strategy continuum should inform PSOs in Somalia, such as AMISOM. The DSS trilogy espoused by Braun III and Allen (2014) entailing shaping, Decisive, Sustainment, and Stability should form a seamless continuum. Strategic phasing predicated on strategic theory assumptions should be organized so that the subsequent phases are conditioned on the success of the preceding phases. A success criteria matrix should be used to evaluate the achievements of objectives based on set parameters for each objective with due consideration of costs.

Beyond the governance and security-related objectives, AMISOM made significant achievements in supporting FGS, CIMIC, quick impact projects, and facilitating humanitarian assistance. It supports the assessment by Williams *et al.* (2018) that

AMISOM has made significant progress toward achieving most of its objectives. The aspects of CIMIC, quick impact projects (QIP), and facilitation of humanitarian assistance are efforts to alleviate the living conditions of the local population who had hitherto lived the hardships of a hostile climate, dysfunctional state, and brutal state oppression by *Al Shabaab*. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) highlighted the health, education, and economic projects conducted in the Kenyan Contingent areas of Dhobley, *Beles Qocaan*, and *Tabda*. The Dhobley female engagement teams (FET) implemented model agribusiness projects based on irrigation to teach the community about income-generation farming.

CIMIC and QIP are geared towards WHAM to gain the local population's support. WHAM enables a conducive environment for military operations by denying the *Al Shabaab* local support and thus isolating them for targeting. Onditi (2015) and Mowat (2015) opined that CIMIC and WHAM activities, especially in hardship and marginalised areas, help in assuaging the perceptions of marginalisation and thus restoring faith in state governance. While achieving these AMISOM objectives was critical, there ought to have been a balance between the core objectives (security and governance) and the facilitative objectives (CIMIC and QIP, facilitation of humanitarian assistance, and support to FGS). Whereas the facilitative objectives will enable AMISOM to have immediate wins, they are short time within the operation timeline. The security and governance objectives would transcend the PSO deployment, ensuring a stable Somalia post-AMISOM. In this way, the pitfalls of pre-AMISOM PSOs will be avoided alongside the negative security implications to Kenya.

4.7 Overall assessment of AMISOM PSO

Based on the extent of achievement of the mandate and the objectives, the overall assessment of AMISOM PSO was presented in Figure 4.11. Most respondents (52%) assessed that the AMISOM PSO was successful, while 27% gave it the overall failure assessment. About 21% of the respondents rated the overall assessment of the PSO as being successful.




Figure 4.14: Overall assessment of AMISOM PSO

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings presented in Figure 4.11 on the overall assessment of the AMISOM PSO correspond to the findings on achieving the AMISOM mandate, as presented in Figure 4.9. In both instances, 52% of the respondents answered in the affirmative. The findings further support the summation by William *et al.* (2018) that AMISOM has contributed

commendably to the stabilization of Somalia according to its mandate, which evolved from protecting the Somali authorities and facilitating political processes to warfighting and then counter-insurgency and stabilization mixed with state-building.

These favourable assessments notwithstanding, the data indicates a gap in achieving mandate objectives relating to security and governance. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) cautioned that the AMISOM transition should consider Somalia's post-AMISOM stability and regional peace and security. Blyth (2019) was succinct when he averred that for Somalia's stability and assumption of governance and security responsibilities, the exit of AMISOM contingents should factor more time allocation to phased handover, accelerated training of SSF, the building of institutions and further degradation of *Al Shabaab*. It is prudent that the security and governance mandate objectives are attained sufficiently to enable a stable post-AMISOM Somalia that will not be inimical to the security and stability of HoA, more so Kenya's national security.

The assessment by 27% and 21% of the respondents that AMISOM has been a failure and successful, respectively, is significant. The findings point towards deficiencies in setting suitable conditions for post-AMISOM Somalia's stability. Corroboration to this claim is found in Table 4.1, where a majority (39.4%) of the respondents rated that the conditions for long-term stability, reconstruction and development of Somalia had been achieved to a less extent. It supports Dessu's (2022) and Ligawa's (2018: 300) observation that there are still concerns about the state of FGS and SSF to assume governance and security functions credibly. Furthermore, Nzau (2018: 544) observed that the political wrangles and the Somali question (clannist political dynamics) had not been adequately resolved. Such

deficiencies cast a shadow of doubt on the stability of post-AMISOM Somalia and the security concerns of Kenya.

4.8 AMISOM transition and exit

AMISOM PSO took over responsibilities from IGASOM in April 2007 (Williams, 2012). Deployed under APSA, AMISOM had operated in Somalia for approximately fifteen years before transiting to ATMIS on 01 April 2022. As in any PSO and military operation, exit is an inevitable part of AMISOM's operational strategy. It is premised on the notion presented by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that AMISOM was not an occupation force. William and Nguyen (2018) observed that AMISOM had been mooting exit from Somalia since 2017, with various exit plans being broached for implementation. The standard in the plans was that the exit was conditioned on AMISOM, having created a stable environment in Somalia for the resumption of security and governance functions. However, the plans by AMISOM to exit Somalia were often delayed owing to non-attainment of desirable stability conditions for exit. A Key Informant concurred with this analysis, noting that;

Since Kenya crossed into Somalia in October 2011 and later re-hatted to AMISOM in August 2012, it has taken over ten years in the operation theatre. We have heard of plans to draw down and exit from Somalia since sometime in 2017, but there has not been any significant progress. Kenya Contingent forces exited from areas such as Busaar, Fafadun, Bardheere and Ceel Adde, but they only redeployed to other locations within Somalia proximal to the shared border. Al Shabaab immediately took control of the abandoned bases and areas (Interview with a Military Officer deployed in *Gherille*, on 15 November 2022).

The sentiment expressed by the Key Informant affirms the existence of plans for an exit from Somalia. However, the Key Informant notes that the effectiveness of the plans has been questionable since implementation led to the recapture of territory by *Al Shabaab*. In

rebuttal to the argument on the lack of an AMISOM exit strategy, William and Hashi (2016) pointed out that AMISOM PSO plans included an exit strategy. The scholars pointed out that during the incipient stages, AMISOM PSO was conceptualized into four phases viz, initial deployment, deployment expansion, consolidation and finally, redeployment. The redeployment phase entails exit, conditioned on setting conditions favourable for stability in Somalia. However, the phase took five years to materialize (2017-2022), begging the question of whether AMISOM was adequately prepared for exit and whether it was the right moment for AMISOM to transit to ATMIS and eventually exit.



Plate 4.2: The researcher (right with rifle) with a military commander of Gherille FOB after a KII session on 15 November 2022

Source: Field Data 2022

The findings and analysis of the study, as presented in Sections 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, indirectly attempted to answer the first concern by noting that, in contrast, the AMISOM mandate and attendant objectives were met mainly to warrant an assessment of mission success; crucial factors relating to security and governance still leave much to be desired. On the second question of whether it is the right time for AMISOM, including the Kenyan contingent, to exit Somalia, the finding in figure 4.12 presents the respondents' view on the issue. Most (70%) respondents indicated it was not the right time for AMISOM to exit Somalia. In comparison, 24% indicated it was the right time for AMISOM to exit Somalia. Only 6% of the respondents noted that it was not yet the right time for AMISOM to exit from Somalia but should do so soon.

The findings in Figure 4.12 present a paradox for AMISOM PSO. While it was noted to have been successful in mandate achievement (52% in Figures 4.9 and 4.11), the prevailing notion is that it is not the right time for the PSO to exit Somalia. It is ironic since an assessed success in mandate achievement should invite the triggering of subsequent phases to either exploit the successes or conclude the operations while offering support to the post-PSO dispensation. This paradox lends itself to the analysis that the critical security and governance AMISOM mandate objectives have not been sufficiently attained. The doubts expressed by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) and Ligawa (2018) on the capacity of FGS and SSF to assume security and governance functions persist. Therefore, the finding that it is not the right time to exit Somalia is apt, notwithstanding the assessed success in mandate achievement.




Figure 4.15: Whether it is the right time for AMISOM to transit and exit Somalia

Source: Field data, 2022.

This study agrees with the argument posed by scholars that, ultimately, the future of Somalia is the responsibility of its people and government, thus requiring that such responsibilities be handed over in a gradual and measured manner (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Williams & Hashi, 2016; Nzau, 2018). As in any PSO, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) reassured that AMISOM was not an occupation force in Somalia, refuting the propagandist line of argument hitherto employed by *Al Shabaab*. Whereas the AMISOM exit was delayed, the eventual exit plan did not consider the exit pitfalls of predecessor PSOs such as UNOSOM I and II, UNITAF and IGASOM.

The examples of protracted PSOs in Iraq and Afghanistan ended in exits that worsened the post-intervention state of affairs (Jackson & Amiri, 2021; Crocker, 2021; Kanat, 2019). Besides poor alignment of ends and means, operational fatigue and the urge to exit were prompted by the threat environment, protracted conflicts, resource burden, and waning support for the operations (Sopko, 2021). Furthermore, Jonegård (2019) observed that the agreement between the USA and the Taliban contributed to the reversal of gains in Afghanistan. Some of these factors could have informed the transition of AMISOM despite favourable conditions for Somalia's stability having not been established adequately. A Key Informant opined that:

Even if the Kenya Defence forces have been in Somalia for over ten years, their exit will make Kenya vulnerable. It is not the appropriate time for KDF to exit from Somalia. If they do, they must deploy within the immediate vicinity of the common border on the homeland side. As for the Somali, they will be back under the control of Al Shabaab the very minute we [KDF/AMISOM] exit. Their security forces will likely join Al Shabaab or flee into Kenya, especially those deployed close to our border areas. Somalia will likely experience what happened in Afghanistan when USA forces exited (Interview with a Military Commander in *El Wak*, on 15 December 2022).

Corroborative, another Key Informant similarly noted that:

What will happen when our troops exit if *Al Shabaab* can enter Kenya and attack people and security forces despite KDF being inside Somalia? The militants will establish bases inside Kenya. The expansive Boni forest is a good cover for them to avoid detection when moving to attack. Leaving Somalia will make the border areas even more vulnerable (Interview with a Community elder in Hulugho, Lamu County, 23 November 2022).

The sentiments conveyed by the Key Informants corroborated the responses provided by the respondents. In essence, they portray the fears that the exit of KDF from AMISOM will likely lead to a deteriorated security situation. Before the transition of AMISOM in April 2022, scholars had observed that while the FGS and SSF had been created through the efforts of AU and AMISOM, the institutions only had weak influence in Mogadishu. Williams *et al.* (2018) placed this assertion into perspective by noting that Somalia was mainly under the mercy of *Al Shabaab*, save for a few cantonments secured by AMISOM troops and SSF.

However, there were more gains by AMISOM during Operation Juba Valley Corridor involving KDF, ENDF and SNA. The operation was collaboratively conducted in 2015 to flush out *Al Shabaab* in part of Jubaland, i.e. *Gedo*, as well as areas of *Bay* and *Bakool* (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 99). Most of the gains by AMISOM were later reversed through draw-down [downsizing] and redeployments leading to *Al Shabaab* re-occupation of critical areas such as *El Ade*, *Busaar*, *Fafadun*, *Bardheere*, among others, thereby bringing the threat even closer to the shared border with Kenya. This trend creates the perception that the gains made by AMISOM, more so the Kenyan contingent would be reversed immediately upon exit since FGS and SSF cannot maintain the Country. Therefore, the finding that it was not the right moment for AMISOM to transition and exit finds grounds for justification.

The aggregated respondents' views depicted in Figure 4.13 further provides corroboration to the preceding finding and analysis. In elaborating their responses as to whether it was the

right time for AMISOM to transition and exit Somalia, a majority (48.4%) of the respondents held that it was not the right time since Somalia had not fully achieved stability and that skirmishes [with *Al Shabaab*] were still being experienced. Similarly, 27.3% of the respondents explained that, SSF was not ready enough to take over security responsibilities and that they could not fight *Al Shabaab*. More explanations aggregated around the fact that suitable conditions for long-term stability and development of Somalia had not been attained, as held by 6.2% of the respondents. These explanations tend to support concerns over the security and governance capacity of SSF/FGS, as expressed by Nzau (2018), Ligawa (2018) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020).

Those who concurred that it was the right time for AMISOM to transition held that; high cost and funding requirements for AMISOM coupled with high losses (9.2%), AMISOM has created conditions for stability of SSF/FGS(3%), AMISOM exit will enable Somalia to build a stable and working government (3%) and that AMISOM exit was long overdue (3%). To a marginal extent, the optimistic assessment by Williams *et al.* (2018) is echoed in the respondents' views that there has been significant attainment of AMISOM mandate objectives. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) held a similar assessment when they highlighted that large swathes of territory had been liberated from *Al Shabaab* and some economic activities restored through CIMIC. However, the achievements stated are not solid enough to allow for the immediate exit of AMISOM without reversion to instability. It is due to the persistent lack of capacity of SSF and FGS as guarantors of a conducive environment for stability and development.




Figure 4.16: Aggregated explanation on whether it is time for AMISOM to transition/exit

Source: Field Data, 2022.

The critical explanations in Figure 4.13, as held by most respondents, revolve around the capacity of SSF and FGS to assume security and governance of Somalia post-AMISOM PSO and create suitable conditions for Somalia's long-term stability and development. This study holds that the security and governance functions are core mandate aspects for AMISOM. They ought to form the bedrock upon which the future of Somalia's stability is predicated.

For a proper assessment of successful mandate achievements, more weightage ought to be given to the security and governance criteria. Only then can the fears expressed by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) and William and Hashi (2016) be allayed. The scholars cautioned that it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia before the Country attains good capacities to assume governance and security responsibilities. Furthermore, Ligawa, Okoth, and Matanga (2017) posited a need to realign AMISOM PSO activities to support the development of peace and stability in Somalia. Besides, Williams *et al.* (2018) point out that without a successful political process, AMISOM would not have a practical pathway out of Somalia. Therefore, transition and exit for AMISOM ought to have hinged, *inter alia*, on the complete stabilization of Somalia's governance and security and vanquishing or reformation of extremist groups such as *Al Shabaab*.

Whereas protracted engagements in PSOs are costly in terms of financial, human and other resources, once launched, the only way out is the mission strategy as espoused by Gilpin (1997). It requires that achieving an operation's mission form the basis for subsequent operational developments, including exits. Therefore, a determination for the appropriate time to transition or exit ought to be dictated by mission achievement. In this case, the mission of AMISOM is derived from its mandate, which consequently drives the strategy.

Hurried PSO exit endeavours urged by factors other than the mission will only work against the mandate and strategy. Interestingly, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) noted that IGAD member states are cautious that premature withdrawal from Somalia will repeat earlier experiences in countries like Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, Crisis Group (2022) is critical of the

hurried need for transition in Somalia that failed to appreciate the complexities of the Somali operating environment and geopolitical imperatives. The discussion around the right time for AMISOM transition and exit from Somalia leads to the interest in the existence and sufficiency of AMISOM transition and exit strategy, which forms the subject of the next section.

4.9 AMISOM transition and exit strategy

Military operations are guided by, and executed in line with, laid-out strategy. The strategy informs the mission, objectives and end states, forces to task, resource requirements, and roles of engagement, success criteria, and timelines from launch to termination of operations. The strategic theory requires that to optimize outcomes, all the possibilities and forces at play, including costs, risks, decisions and consequences, should be considered against those of the adversary (Schelling, 1984). Essentially, strategising is an endeavour to correlate ends and means (Smith, 2008). To enable such an endeavour, Military planning processes are customarily cyclical, beginning from; observation (identifying the threat/problem), orientation (Securitisation as well as mental and positional adjustments relative to the threat), the decision on the action to take after due consideration of planning factors, taking appropriate action to neutralize the threat; then the process begins all over again (Luft, 2020). The model is often called the OODA loop and considers the entire operational continuum from launch to exit.

Since PSOs are deployed for specific objectives, they cannot operate in theatre indefinitely. Therefore, an exit strategy is critical and essential to any PSO planning process. Gilpin

(1997) and Durch (2010) advocated for immediate military operation transition strategies to be built into the plans. However, scholars of military strategy have noted the ambiguities around the issue of the exit strategy for military operations, which eventually are left to the imagination, creativity, originality, and, indeed, initiative of individual planners augmented by case studies and experiences (William & Nguyen, 2018; Yager, 2006). Despite such planning ambiguities, Nzau (2018: 538) observed that there are no straightforward theoretical models for military PSO strategies, and thus they should be adapted to the prevailing situation. This notion infers the flexibility of plans that must be adaptable to the threat environment through sequels and branches.

Regarding AMISOM PSO, there have been arguments that there were no proper exit strategies for the PSO, which were initially envisaged to run for six months before transiting to an UN-led operation. However, the hurried need for transition failed to consider the complex nature of the Somali operating environment (William & Hashi, 2006). Subsequent mandate extensions did not explicitly refer to an exit strategy. However, they contained mandate objectives on creating suitable conditions for the stability and development of Somalia, from which the exit/transition of AMISOM could be inferred. It is a fact that remained vague, and the AMISOM PSO appeared to fall into the trap of protracted interventionism as was in Iraq and Afghanistan. A Key Informant observed that:

Before 2017, the AMISOM operation seemed to take forever, and most troops were not privy to any plans to conclude the operations. Even now, that AMISOM has ended and ATMIS is projected to end in 2024, we are likely to remain beyond 2024 despite the push to wind up AU operations in Somalia (Interview with a Military Officer in Ras Kiamboni, on 29 December 2022).

The Key Informant made two critical observations pertinent to understanding the nature of AMISOM transition and exit strategies. First is the vagueness of AMISOM exit strategies pre-2017, and the second is the fact that timelines for transition and exit are likely to remain unmet. As observed, primary AMISOM mandates, as issued and renewed via the various UNSCRs, were not explicit on specific timelines but tended to adopt a mission-oriented strategy (Gilpin, 1997), creating conditions suitable for the long-term stability and development of Somalia. Due to the heightened threat at that time, engaging in discussions and briefings of an exit would have been unnecessary, yet the said conditions were not yet in sight. Thus, the issue of the existence of a transition strategy, or lack thereof, remained vague.

This analysis is in line with the findings expressed by the responses presented in Figure 4.14, where a majority (54.6%) of the respondents indicated that AMISOM had a transition and exit strategy from the beginning, 33.2% indicated that AMISOM did not have a transition and exit strategy from the beginning while 12.2% were not sure. The notion that military operations would fail to consider an exit plan is improbable. The question should be around the adequacy of such transition and exit plans regarding their flexibility (William & Hashi, 2016) and the catering for contingencies (Nzau, 2018) through branches and sequels. Indeed the findings in Figure 4.14 affirmed the observation by William and Hashi (2016) that during the incipient stages, AMISOM has conceptualized four phases *viz* an initial deployment phase, an expansion of deployment phase, a consolidation phase and finally, a redeployment phase. It is likely that the issue of 'when rather than if' could have

informed the negative responses since the AMISOM mandate did not attach specific timelines to mandate objectives relating to transition and exit.




Figure 4.17: Presence of AMISOM exit strategy at the inception

Source: Field data, 2022.

Regarding the second issue arising from the sentiment of the key Informant on the transition timeline, scholars have observed that AMISOM exit has been mooted since 2017, with various plans put forward through the UNSCR and CONOPs for implementation (Williams & Nguyen, 2018). These plans were premised on the optimism that by 2020, SSF would have sufficient capacity to assume security responsibilities. Furthermore, the plans emphasized territorial recovery and consolidation of AMISOM and SNSF up to October 2018, then subsequently drew down and transferred security responsibilities to the SNSF

from October 2018 to December 2020 (African Union, 2016). Notable UNSCRs included UNSCR 2472(2019), where the drawdown of AMISOM forces was initiated (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020) and UNSCR 2614(2021), extending AMISOM stay as a transition plan was being discussed under STP to build consensus among key stakeholders (United Nations, 2021).

From the preceding, it is clear that from 2017 onwards, AMISOM started having clear timelines for projected transition and exit, *albeit* conditioned. The observation by the Key Informant on missing set transition timelines is thus explainable in the context of the various extensions. The complex Somali politics and clan dynamics mean that creating consensus around governance and security issues will be arduous. The issue of aligning ends and means to set suitable conditions for the exit, funding, capacity building, post-conflict peacebuilding, and reconstruction is not straightforward and is complicated by a multiplicity of actors and interests (Sopko, 2021; Ligawa, 2018; Clark, 2006).

Furthermore, Madeira (2022) attempts to explain that the transition could have been hampered by the failure to enhance the 'AMISOM Model' to suit a transition mission engaged in asymmetric warfighting, provision of the appropriate level of enablers and force multipliers, and force generation. Indeed, the explication by Madeira (2022) considers the need to adjust to an asymmetric threat environment (Angell, 2015) and have strong mission forces and Somali Security and Governance institutions. A Key informant explained that:

The question of AMISOM and the Kenyan Contingent exit from Somalia is not straightforward. There are many factors at play, mainly along the line of interests. There are internal interests around clannism, power struggles and the need for resource control. External interests entail issues around the business in contrabands,

arms proliferation, and access to resources in the Indian Ocean. The Somali forces are weak, and the governance structures are still fragile for them to assume responsibility for Somalia. On the other hand, there is an urge to have the Country return to normalcy after the protracted instability. We hope that this urge prevails for the sake of regional stability. Considering these factors, it is obvious why the set transition deadlines are not attained, necessitating extensions. Exiting Somalia may take a while (Interview with a planning Officer at Sector 2 headquarters, *Dhobley*, on 03 January 2022).

Despite the explanations provided by scholars and analysts as to the extensions to AMISOM PSO, the views by the Key Informant reinforce the prevailing perception that AMISOM transition and exit may not be concluded soon. Despite the AMISOM having changed into ATMIS according to UNSCR 2628(2022), the conditions within the theatre of operations remain significantly unchanged. In the transition to ATMIS, it is yet to be apparent if it will be effective or just a designation change as was with UNOSOM, UNITAF and IGASOM, which according to Nzau (2018), did little to address the Somali problem. To this end, it would be of interest to establish the form of exit strategy that the AMISOM PSO activities espoused based on the estimation of respondents. The respondents were asked to characterize the AMISOM PSO along the military operation transition/exit typology by Gilpin (1997) viz event-oriented strategy, mission-oriented strategy, time-oriented strategy or hybrid strategy. The findings were as depicted in Figure 4.15:




Figure 4.18: Transition Strategy adopted by the AMISOM PSO

Depicted in Figure 4.15, the 41% of the respondents viewed that AMISOM transition strategy could be characterised as mission oriented. Comparatively, 40% of the respondents thought that AMISOM has a time oriented transition strategy. On the other hand, 13% of the respondents felt that AMISOM transition strategy was event oriented and 6% viewed that AMISOM has a hybrid transition strategy. The characterization of the exit strategy by the majority 41% of the respondents affirms that assertion by Musoma (2021) that, AMISOM PSO ought to achieve its mission as outlined in the mandate before exiting Somalia. As propounded by Gilpin (1997), a mission-oriented exit strategy is pegged on the achievement of the mission irrespective of the length of time. In essence, the desired

endstate of the mission ought to be achieved before considerations to windup the PSO either at a go or in a graduated and phased manner.

In contrast, a time-oriented exit strategy focuses on operations within a specified timeline, irrespective of whether the mission is attained. This was the characterization of 40% of the respondents based on the six-month mandate extension interval. However, the mandate extension did not lead to termination of the mission at the lapse of assigned timelines. In fact, the extensions were conditioned on the establishment of suitable conditions for long-term stability and development of Somalia. Therefore, this would indicate a hybrid transition strategy that encapsulated both time and mission indicators for transition as characterized by 6% of the respondents. AMISOM PSO seems not to be event-orientated since deadly attacks such as in *El Adde*, *Kolbiyow*, *Janaale*, *Miido*, *Ceel Baraaf*, among others, did not prompt exit from Somalia. In contrast, UNSOM II PSO withdrew following the 'black hawk down incident and therefore it could be characterised as event oriented (Bass & Zimmerman, 2013; Patman, 2015). After characterising the AMISOM PSO transition strategy, an issue of interest would be the sufficiency of the AMISOM transition and exit strategy for the long-term stability of Somalia, a matter forming the focus of the following sub-section.

4.10 Consideration of the long-term stability of Somalia in the AMISOM transition strategy

Scholars have long argued that Military PSO transition and exit strategies should sufficiently consider the long-term stability of the post-PSO Country (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Williams *et al.*, 2018; Williams & Hashi, 2016). In essence, the PSO transition

strategy's nature and formulation should sufficiently factor in the key aim of ensuring a long-term post-PSO state. In the regional context, the post-intervention stability of the subject Country ensures that the security of the immediate neighbours is not adversely affected.

As guided in the functionalist theory, the society (in this case, HoA in the macro sense) is a sum of its constituent parts (states) performing interdependent functions and dysfunction in one or more of the constituent parts functionally affects the rest of the system. It has to be adjusted to remedy the anomie (Nicoli, 2019). Migue *et al.* (2012) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) alluded to the functionalist notion when they argued that Kenya had to intervene in Somalia over the concern for her security. Therefore, security and stability needed to be restored in Somalia to guarantee the security of Kenya.

The question that begs, therefore, is whether the PSO transition strategy was adequate for the desired long-term stability and development of concerned countries and their neighbours. The observations made, and conclusions arrived at, from the cases of interventions in Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan, DRC, and Sudan, among others, indicate that the military interventions and PSOs did not sufficiently cater for the post-intervention situation (Salaün, 2019; Croker, 2021; Felter & Renwick, 2021). Where the PSO outcome was assessed to have been successful, such as in UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, the exit plan sufficiently considered pertinent issues relating to the post-PSO state of the Country (Goldmann, 2005). It underscores the importance of having a proper exit strategy that accounts for post-exit stability, not only of the subject state but also of the neighbours and

the particular region. The adequacy of PSO transition and exit plans should be evaluated based on the degree to which they account for factors that would ensure long-term stability and development of the post-intervention period.

Concerning the AMISOM transition and exit plan, their adequacy is assessed in the findings depicted in Figure 4.16. A majority (70%) of the respondents held the view that AMISOM transition and exit plans were not sufficient for the long-term stability of Somalia, 15% indicated that AMISOM transition and exit plans were sufficient for the long-term stability of Somalia, while 15% were not sure.




Figure 4.19: Adequacy of AMISOM transition and exit strategy for the long-term stability of Somalia

Source: Field data, 2022.

The issues around the adequacy of AMISOM transition and exit plans call into question whether lessons were learnt from previous PSOs. Scholars have noted the critical failures

of pre-AMISOM PSOs. Williams *et al.* (2018) indicated that while UNOSOM I was meant to provide security and humanitarian agencies for relief aid distribution, it failed to contain the activities of saboteur warlords in Somalia and ended prematurely. UNITAF was to prepare for the return of peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding in Somalia. However, due to a lack of robust mandate, it failed to create sustainable peace despite creating an enabling environment for negotiating and signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in early 1993 (Mathews, 2004: 253; Oluoch, 2018; Jess, 2018: 142-143;). UNOSOM II had a similar mandate to UNOSOM I but ignominiously ended shortly after the infamous 'black hawk down' incident (Adam, 2004; Oluoch, 2018). It left local warlords and terrorists to riot in Somalia, thus threatening the Security of Kenya and HoA.

In 2005, IGASOM deployed in the context of the 'African Solutions to African problems' philosophy, but there were disagreements by TCCs over issues of Arms embargo between IGAD and AU on the one hand and UN on the other (OCHA, 2005; William & Nguyen, 2018; de Coning, 2019). These rafts of pre-AMISOM PSOs and their premature exits left Somalia at the mercy of warlordism that gradually morphed into Jihadism. After over fifteen years in Somalia, it is concerning that AMISOM PSO, though assessed to be successful, it is viewed to have not catered sufficiently for the long-term stability and development of Somalia in its transition and exit strategy. It is reflected in the view of a Key Informant, that:

When KDF [and AMISOM] exit Somalia, the Country will be back under the control of Al Shabaab. Another problem may arise on top of the Al Shabaab threat. Community defence militia known as *Maacawisely* are organizing to repel Al Shabaab in areas without AMISOM and Somali forces. These *Maacawisely* will

eventually engage in rivalry over control of territory and resources, thereby creating warlord-controlled areas. Since they are not regulated and do not operate under any rules, they will become a security threat in themselves or form alliances of convenience with other Maacawisley or even Al Shabaab. If not addressed, AMISOM operations and exit will not have helped. The threat to Kenya will continue, and the affected communities along the border will continue suffering (Interview with a Planning Officer at Sector 2 headquarter, *Dhobley*, 06 January 2022).

While novel and innovative in tackling the complex Somalia security situation, clan militia may precipitate warlordism after Al Shabaab is vanquished. There will likely be no well-coordinated measures to include a post-operation dispersal plan for the *Maacawisley*. The apprehension that AMISOM transition and exit will not necessarily leave a stable Somalia is sobering, especially for a protracted PSO in the Country for over fifteen years. Post-AMISOM stability factors majorly revolve around security and governance, a fact established by the findings of this study as having insufficiently been addressed. As Nzau (2018: 544-546) analysed, the Somali question must be adequately addressed to ensure it does not continue destabilizing. This aspect appears to be ignored in the conceptualization of 'the AMISOM Model' by Madeira (2022). The 'AMISOM model' to be adopted for transition emphasizes the need to suit operations to asymmetric warfighting, provision of operational enablers and force generation.

The overemphasizing of a militaristic approach, when the focus should be on gradual handover to SSF and FGS, indicates a deficiency in the AMISOM operational strategy and its transition and exit strategy. It is an inadvertent admission by planners that by the time of transition, the suitable conditions were not set and, therefore, the need to fast track through the robustness of military operations that may run the risk of overshadowing and even

precluding political processes. To examine further the sufficiency of the AMISOM transition strategy, the study sought to unpack some critical aspects of the transition. It is expounded in the following sub-section.

4.11 Factor-specific considerations in AMISOM transition and exit strategy

The need for detailed considerations in military planning is well propounded. Strategic theory guides that to optimize, all the possibilities, forces at play, including costs, risks and consequences, should be considered by planners to adjust ends to means in employing military resources to attain national objectives (Schelling, 1984; Smith, 2008). Furthermore, scholars and analysts have underscored the view that the AMISOM exit [and transition] strategy must be comprehensive, with clear timelines and considering a transition to Somali-led operations as well as the transition from military to police-led internal operations (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; William & Hashi, 2016).

Pursuant to this notion, the study sought to examine the sufficiency of consideration of critical factors pertinent to AMISOM transition and exit. The findings are presented in Table 4.2.

Table 4.12: Cross-tabulation of factors for AMISOM transition and exit strategy

Factor	Rating, N=370	Total
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	Sufficiently		Insufficiently		Not Considered		Freq	%age
	Freq	%age	Freq	%age	Freq	%age		
Stability of Somalia	101	27.3	224	60.6	45	12.1	370	100
Security of Kenya HoA	112	30.3	180	48.5	78	21.2	370	100
Phased and gradual handover to SSF	213	57.6	146	39.4	11	3.0	370	100
Sufficient handover timelines	157	42.4	157	42.4	56	15.2	370	100
DDR	90	24.2	168	45.5	112	30.3	370	100
Community engagement	123	33.3	191	51.5	56	15.2	370	100

Source: Field data, 2022.

Depicted in Table 4.2 are the respondents' perceptions on the sufficiency of AMISOM transition and exit strategy considering pertinent factors for the transition. These factors were drawn from suggestions by Williams and Hashi (2016) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), who proposed a detailed and well-thought-out exit plan for AMISOM. Additional factors were inferred from various UNSCR extending AMISOM mandate and a review of pre-AMISOM PSOs and other military interventions and PSOs. A majority (60.6%) of the respondents perceived that the AMISOM transition and exit strategy insufficiently factored in the stability of Somalia, while 27.3% indicated that the stability of Somalia was sufficiently factored. Regarding the security of Kenya and HoA, a majority (48.5%) of the

respondents believed it was insufficiently factored, while 30.3% responded that it was sufficiently factored.

Additionally, 57.6% of the respondents believed that the phased handover of security responsibilities to SSF was sufficiently factored in, while 39.4% considered it not sufficiently factored in. The three aspects *viz* stability of Somalia, security of Kenya and HoA, and handover of security responsibilities are pertinent to the security and governance mandate objectives of AMISOM. Therefore, they should have been well factored in the whole strategy continuum of AMISOM, including transition and exit. The indications in the findings that they were not sufficiently considered corroborate the findings presented in Figure 4.16 and, by extension, Figure 4.12, which, respectively, indicate that AMISOM exit and transition were not sufficient for the long-term stability of Somalia, neither was it the right time for AMISOM to exit Somalia.

The findings correspond to observations by scholars that PSOs and Military interventions inadequately focus on the long-term peace and stability of the countries of intervention. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 121) surmised that the invasion of Iraq did not factor in post-Saddam Iraq or regional and global implications of Iraq's destruction. Sopko (2021) and Crocker (2021) made similar observations on post-intervention situations in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively, that exit of intervention forces created a vacuum that ISIL and Taliban immediately filled. While the outcome analysis cannot definitively link the PSOs' aftermaths to a lack of aligning end and means through considerations of critical transition

and exit factors, it can be assumed that the security and governance factors were insufficiently considered rather than having lacked.

Furthermore, the findings in Table 4.2 indicate that 42.4% of the respondents viewed that AMISOM transition and exit sufficiently factored adequate timelines for the handover of security responsibilities to SSF. In comparison, another 42.4% indicated that it was insufficiently considered. Previous PSOs in Somalia were characterized to have had premature and hasty exits without significantly attaining their mandate objectives (William *et al.*, 2018; Oluoch, 2018; Nzau, 2018). Besides other shortcomings, AMISOM transition and exit plans that were mooted in 2017 were observed to tend towards the hurried exit without adequate allocation of time to build the capacity of FGS and SSF to take over security and governance responsibilities (Williams & Nguyen, 2018; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 122). It was supposed to be rectified in the STP and ATMIS CONOPs that marked the shift from AMISOM. As Madeira (2022) noted, the enhancement was in responding to asymmetric threat environment, provision of mission enablers and forces generation. The aspect of force generation relates to capacity building in terms of the professionalization of SSF through activities spanning recruitment, training, equipping, and regimentation.

Besides, the issue of sufficient timeline also relates to phased handover, an issue advocated for by scholars such as William and Hashi (2016) when they suggested a transition from AMISOM to Somali-led operations and then from Military-led to Police-led operations. Such a phased handover requires adequate time not only to build the capacity of SSF but also to mentor them until they fully understand their responsibilities. For instance, where

the situation allowed, the USA has often maintained a small number of key personnel, termed as 'advisors' in countries of intervention, ostensibly to monitor and assess the progress of responsibility assumed by the native security forces. In this respect, the transition and exit phase of AMISOM PSO ought to adopt a mix of mission-oriented and time-oriented exit strategies, as expounded by Gilpin (1997). A mission-oriented exit strategy is pegged on the achievement of the mission irrespective of the length of time. In contrast, a time-oriented exit strategy focuses on operations within a specified timeline, irrespective of whether the mission is attained. Since AMISOM PSO was not an occupation force and because protracted PSO is costly regarding resources, casualties, and public support, a hybrid of the two exit strategies would be desirable, conditioned on the attainment of milestones and markers.

DDR is a critical aspect of the in-PSO and post-PSO peacebuilding strategy in any PSO endeavour. In this respect, findings in Table 4.2 indicate that the majority (45.5%) of the respondents considered that DDR was insufficiently factored in AMISOM transition and exit strategy. In comparison, 24.2% of the respondents believed that DDR was insufficiently factored in the AMISOM transition and exit strategy. The significance of DDR is underscored in assessments of successful or failed PSOs in Africa. For instance, Goldmann (2005) surmised that in Sierra Leone, success was registered through proper governance transition, DDR programmes and post-transition support. Conversely, similar opportunities were missed in other UN-led PSOs in Africa, such as *Darfur* and *Abiyei* (van der Lijn, 2010). In Somalia, there were no apparent DDR aspects of pre-AMISOM PSOs, presumably owing to their short-lived nature.

Notwithstanding the findings in Table 4.2, DDR is well accounted for in UNSOS/AMISOM standing operating procedures (SOP) promulgated in March 2007. The context of the DDR is hinged on post-conflict Somalia, where there would be a ceasefire requiring the triggering of a ceasefire line of operations. According to the SOP, DDR entails a multidimensional and multilevel approach, including Liaison Officers from National Committee/Commission for DDR (NCDDR). At the same time, peacekeeping military and humanitarian agencies and NGOs play complementary roles. While noting that DDR enhances SNAs standing, Ligawa (2018) noted that it was minimally attained through AMISOM activities. It is the context that AMISOM operations in Somalia entailed majorly peace enforcement, while the SOP envisaged DDR in a peacekeeping context where voluntary disarmament is envisaged. This contradiction in effecting a post-conflict DDR process to a peace enforcement environment attracted the split assessment of DDR by the respondents. Thus, an adaptation of the AMISOM SOP relating to DDR should have been done to cater for the active combat phase of the PSO since DDR pervades the PSO continuum.

The human terrain is a critical factor in any military intervention and PSO. It is often characterized by population support for military operations. The population entails the native population within the PSO theatre, the population of the TCC, and the international population encompassing international organizations (Kibusia, 2020). In the context of this study, the local population in question were the native population of the PSO theatre viz the Somali communities along the shared border between Kenya and Somalia. The findings indicate that a majority (51.5%) of the respondents believed that community engagement

was insufficiently factored into AMISOM transition and exit strategy, while 33.3% noted that it was sufficiently factored. It corroborates the finding of the study by Chitembwe (2021: 198,334), indicating that 82% of respondents reported that the community was not engaged in counter-radicalisation efforts in Mombasa and Kwale Counties.

Moreover, Chumba (2016) recommended community-based approaches to managing transboundary terrorism between Kenya and Somalia. It echoes Track Three diplomacy approaches, advanced by Wasike (2016), and aimed at rebuilding fractured relations among ordinary citizens across various sectors. The community is a critical aspect of the success of AMISOM PSO. In Somalia, as in any African society, the community forms the *locus foci* of identity that drives the society's activities. They can be for or against an operation and harbour or disclose adversaries. As argued by Ligawa (2018), in Somalia, the community is a critical battleground that has to be engaged and won through CIMIC, QIP and Key Leader Engagements (KLE) in the context of WHAM.

Mowat (2015) observed that exclusion from socioeconomic and political issues could compel a group to seek recognition elsewhere. Such feelings could be remedied through WHAM activities to restore faith and support in authorities and security institutions. WHAM and community engagement fit into Ligawa, Okoth and Matanga's (2017) argument on the need to understand cultural intelligence to support peacebuilding activities in Somalia. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) highlighted the health, education and economic projects conducted in the Kenyan Contingent areas of Dhobley, *Beles Qocaa*n and *Tabda*. Whereas the Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM has endeavoured to engage communities within the

various cantonments, these activities are considered insufficient due to hardships the communities face due to, *inter alia*; environmental factors, the protracted collapse of the economy and subjugation by *Al Shabaab*.

Beyond the consideration of the Somali community, Clan dynamics are central to the Somali cultural heritage and form the basis of their social and political engagements (Ligawa, 2018; Nzau, 2018; Hersi, 2015). A Key Informant observed that:

In our efforts to engage the community, we carefully ensure representation of the area's clans and some sub-clans. No community support activity [CIMIC] can be planned without balancing the distribution to all the clans. It is a sensitive aspect that is not declared, but it is an entrenched cultural norm (Interview with a Military Commander in *Burahache*, on 18 November 2022).

The observation of the Key Informant resonates with Onditi's (2015) argument that PSO structures should adapt to the realities of African conflicts, which require efforts beyond traditional military approaches. AMISOM PSO straddles clan areas and engagement of one community is viewed suspiciously by the other and implicitly attracts enmity of the 'excluded' clan towards the PSO contingent. To illustrate, the Gedo region of Somalia is home to the *Marehan*, *Garre*, *Murulle*, and *Degodia* sub-clans of the *Darood* clan, who have traditional rivalries. They mostly live in *Bulas* (villages) separately from each other but within geographical proximity. To ensure that resentment is not stoked, and to maintain neutrality, a contingent deployed in such an area will have to ensure that any CIMIC activity in a *Marehan Bula* is simultaneously replicated in a *Garre Bula*. These are some of the intricacies that AMISOM PSO has to consider, more so in the context of transition and

exit for post-conflict peace and stability. As Ligawa (2018) noted, the Somali clan identity can be a stepping-stone to national reconciliation and peacebuilding.

In this respect, and to illustrate further the centrality of clannism, the clan of the particular Somali soldier dictates deployment. It is common for regional soldiers to refuse joint patrolling into areas of clans they do not belong. Thus, forces of one region rarely operate in other areas except those under federal deployment. Therefore, post-AMISOM management of these forces in the context of the Somali Transition plan is a subject of interest for the stability of Somalia. It forms the issue of discussion in the following subsection.

4.12 Inclusion of federal member states' forces in the Somalia Transition Plan

Somalia is a federal state comprising six semi-autonomous regions, each with its president, government and security forces (Mung'ala, 2013; McCullough & Saed, 2017). The regions are *Jubaland*, *Puntland*, *Galmudug*, *Hirshabelle*, *Banadir* and *Southwest*. The regional militia and security forces operate within the regional states delineated by clan boundaries that define their deployments. The command structures of these forces are loosely defined. Generally, they are controlled by a regional warlord appointed by the regional government or loyal to the regional government in the fight against *Al Shabaab*. In certain areas, federal government forces operate, such as *Gorgor* (trained by Turkey) and *Danaab* (trained by the USA).

Collaboration with federal and regional forces has been part of AMISOMs *modus operandi* to mentor them to take over security responsibilities. The local forces also understand the

terrestrial and cultural landscape and are valuable assets to AMISOM PSO. Observations by a Key Informant augmented this point of view and noted that:

AMISOM troops must work with the local forces since they understand the area well. We are also teaching them how to conduct operations effectively on their own. They assist in engaging the community; they know the language and cultural sensitivities our soldiers might not be aware of (Interview with a Military commander in *Kolbiyow* interviewed on 23 November 2022).

The Key Informant reiterates what is envisaged in the AMISOM mandate objectives viz mentoring of SSF as part of capacity building. Madeira (2022) noted that the AMSOM model should be able, *inter alia*, to emphasize force generation, especially towards the transition and exit timelines. This notion reinforces the observation by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that issues of force generation go beyond human resources provision, and emphasis should be placed on the troops' quality. It implies that they ought to be well trained, mentored and equipped to be effective. In this endeavour, Somalia's political and clan dynamics should be considered. The semi-autonomous regions are critical stakeholders in Somalia, and their security structures must be factored in within the federal security architecture. Attempts to sideline some security forces that have been part of the fight against *Al Shabaab* alongside AMISOM forces will backfire against the post-AMISOM stability of Somalia. A Key Informant cautioned that:

Mogadishu has sidelined Jubaland and its forces for a long. They have an issue with the Jubaland administration, so we are punished. Our forces and administration officials do not get any support from the federal government. We feel left out. Any attempts by Mogadishu to deploy federal forces here will be resisted until we are incorporated into the structures. After AMISOM, our forces will not work with Mogadishu if they do not recognize and treat us well (Interview with a Community elder in *Gherille*, on 20 November 2022).



Plate 4.3: The researcher conferring with a community Elder in Gherille on 20 November 2022 after a KII session

Source: Field data 2022.

The sentiments of the Key Informant convey the delicate balance that post-AMISOM has to consider. Unfortunately, by the transition of AMISOM to ATMIS, the definition of SSF in

the STP did not include regional forces such as JSF and RKB, among others. The STP only considers SNA, SNP and Prison Service within the understanding of SSF to the exclusion of regional forces (United Nations, 2021; African Union, 2022). This pitfall is urged by clannist and political segregation as noted by the key Informant's sentiments which conform with the observation by Ligawa, Odhiambo and Rahoy (2016) that 'clannism and political squabbles beleaguer the SSF and adversely affect the professionalism and dependability as 'guarantors of Somalia's security'. The respondents' responses to the question regarding the inclusion of forces of regional member states are depicted in Figure 4.17.




Figure 4.20: Inclusion of federal member states' forces in the Somalia Transition Plan

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Figure 4.17 place into perspective the issue of the inclusion of federal member states forces within the federal security structure as defined by the STP. The majority (73%) of the respondents held that Somalia's regional security forces should be

included in the federal security structure as defined by the STP. In comparison, 24% believed that the Somalia regional security forces should not be included in the SSF as conceptualized by the STP. The respondents' views reflect the need to consider the delicate politics of Somalia that are driven along regional and clannist delineations. Nzau (2018) aptly points out that the political wrangles and Somali question (Clannism) have not been addressed. The exclusion of regional forces under the STP will complicate Somalia's recovery and stability since the regional militia and forces will form centres of resistance to the federal state.

As noted before, the security forces of federal member states have been part of the operations against *Al Shabaab*. In Jubaland, the Kenyan Contingent works with JSF and RKB within the framework of collaboration with Somali forces. The exclusion of such forces from the STP presents a dilemma to AMISOM/ATMIS force; as to whom to mentor and hand over security responsibilities. As advised by William and Hashi (2016), Post-AMISOM Somalia should see a transition to Somali-led operations and then Police-led operations. In the conception of STP, SSF includes SNA, a collection of federal forces such as *Gogorgor and Danaab*, among others. For instance, the clannist and political tussle between the federal government and regional state may not be conducive to deploying SNA to Jubaland. This scenario leaves a lacuna in deploying and managing post-AMISOM Somalia's security. The respondents' explanations on the issue of the inclusion of Somalia regional forces into the Somalia federal security structure indicate its importance in post-AMISOM Somalia. The aggregated explanations are presented in Figure 4.18.




Figure 4.21: Aggregated explanations on inclusion of regional forces into Somalia Transition Plan

Source: Field Data, 2022.

As indicated in Figure 4.18, the majority (30.3%) of the respondents shared the explanation that the stability of SSF depends on proper mentorship and the participation of the security

forces of federal member states. Another 18.1% and 15.1%, respectively, held the supporting view that security forces of federal member states should be part of the STP to uphold the territorial integrity of the federal state and that security is a multi-sectoral endeavour that one player cannot achieve. The respondents support this study's argument that security forces of federal member states are essential stakeholders in post-AMISOM dispensation and peacebuilding. One of AMISOM's endeavours is to help develop the FGS, and federal member states' capacity for security, justice and local authority institutions (African Union, 2022). However, the definition of SSF in the STP contradicts this endeavour by excluding regional forces of the federal member states. As noted before, AMISOM transition and exit plans will be at crossroads as to whom they should mentor and hand over to if the regional forces are not envisaged in post-AMISOM STP.

The respondents' view that diversification of military skills is crucial in deterring security threats to Somalia, as indicated by 9.2% of the respondents, is essential in the broader context of functionalist theory. It is supported by 9.2% of the respondents that including federal member states' security forces will harmonize the joint stability of Somalia, and another 6.2% of the respondents indicated that regional security forces would help prevent spillover of insurgents (*Al Shabaab*) into neighbouring countries. As Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) rightly opined, any proposal for AMISOM's exit should consider Somalia's post-AMISOM stability and regional security. Therefore, the conception of STP should look beyond short-term Somalia internal political patronage and consider its long-term effects on the cohesion of the federal state and the stability of Kenya and HoA.

The role of security forces of federal member states in post-AMISOM dispensation bears directly on the national security of Kenya. Notably, the relationship between the FGS and Jubaland regional government has not been cordial. Mogadishu views the participation of Kenyan Contingent within Jubaland with suspicion, *albeit* the latter operating under AMISOM. As indicated by Warah (2016) and Ali and Muyonga (2021), FGS views Kenya's involvement in Jubaland as a ploy to foment the formation of an autonomous state uncontrolled from Mogadishu. However, this notion is contradicted by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), pointing out that Kenya's involvement in Somalia was purely over concerns for her peace and stability; thus, the need to collaborate with JSF and RKB. As such, a buffer was critical, defined by the Jubaland state stretching the entire length of the common border and extending up to River Juba to the east (Nzau, 2018; Migue *et al.*, 2012). Therefore, the respondents' (6.2%) view that regional forces will help prevent the spillover of insurgents lends to the significance of including JSF in SSF.

To highlight further the gravity of the need to include federal member states' forces in SSF, a Key Informant provided a worrying opinion, thus:

We have been part of the fight against Al Shabaab and have collaborated well with Kenyan troops in AMISOM. However, we do not get any support from the federal government, and the federal forces enjoy better terms of service than we do. If Kenya pulls out of Gedo, we will welcome you [KDF] on the other side of the border. They will then have to decide what to do with us. However, we will not remain here since we cannot hold ground and the federal government does not recognize us (Interview with a JSF commander in *Gedo* region interviewed on 19 November 2022).

The Key Informant's opinion presents a general representation of how regional forces feel; unsupported and segregated. Exclusion from STP was a deliberate effort and an indictment

of the AMISOM transition plan, more so for generation and DDR (Dessu, 2022). Somalia's Federal Member States forces are armed, and notions of defecting into Kenya are inimical to Kenya's security in that the buffer zone will have collapsed. Many armed and unpaid foreign soldiers will be roaming within NFD, compounding security and stability.

Maintaining communal harmony in Somalia is vital in post-AMISOM dispensation and Kenya's National Security. It was expressed by 9.2% of the respondents in their explanation that including regional forces in the SSF would help harmonize the joint stability of the Country, majorly defined along clans. This view lends credence to the observation by Ligawa (2018) that in the Somali community, the clan has been an integral part of their survival and existence since ancient times. Since even force generational deployment of security forces and militia is clan-based, exclusion from the federal structure further foments a sense of marginalisation that can increase fragmentation and conflicts, which will likely spill into Kenya (Chumba, 2016). Thus, it is prudent to consider harmonizing the integration of regional forces of federal member states into post-AMISOM security structures. Around the debate of excluding regional forces from SSF within the STP context arises concern for its effect on the AMISOM transition strategy, an issue of focus in the following subsection.

4.13 Possible ramifications of excluding federal member states' security forces in STP

Scholars of military strategy have submitted that AMISOM transition and exit should consider the ramifications to Kenya and the greater HoA (Smith, 2008; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 122). It is in cognizance of the functionalist setting of the HoA society where anomy

in one Country (segment of society) has functional repercussions for the rest of the systems (Rosamond, 2000). Being an immediate neighbour, occurrences in Somalia have direct consequences within the Country and the wider HoA, including Kenya. Ethnic homogeneity and contiguity between Somalia and the communities of NFD make it easy for the infiltration by militants, the proliferation of SALW, the smuggling of contraband goods, illegal immigration and refugee inflows.

While some consequences, such as refugee inflow, are often considered through the humanitarian lens, from a state security perspective, the ramifications are far-reaching. Matanga and Muchilwa (2018: 415) submitted that refugees have threatened not only conventional state security but also human security, as evidenced by their undue pressure on depleting socioeconomic resources and amenities at the disposal of the state. Similarly, Iteyo (2018: 399) and Mativo (2014) concluded that while refugees have resulted from conflicts, they pose a humanitarian challenge and security concerns. The border communities in remote and marginalised areas mostly feel the effects. A Key Informant observed that:

Despite the Somali community being on both sides of the border, the Kenyan Somalis have endured the effects of Somalia conflicts. The militia operates in Somali communities in Kenya, spreading insecurity, taking zakat [Islamic tax] and recruiting our young men to fight in Kenya and Somalia. The refugees also put a strain on our resources and are treated better. Clan clashes often occur due to the grazing of animals beyond clan boundaries, with armed Somalia herders crossing over and pushing away our herders. There are many hardships that our people have to endure. The border controls do not exist, and security posts are far in-between to patrol the expansive areas effectively (Interview with a Community elder in *Daddajabula*, on 21 November 2022).

The Key Informant's views provide a snapshot of what the border communities must endure due to instability in the NFD. With Kenya's intervention over concerns of her national security (Migue *et al.*, 2012), there was optimism that the issues plaguing NFD would be alleviated and the region would stabilize for socioeconomic development. A stable Somalia also offered a good prospect for trading between border communities without fear of insecurity.

The operations of AMISOM in Somalia over the years have improved the situation. However, management of the transition and exit presents a possibility of relapse. Pitfalls such as lack of proper DDR, consideration of security forces of federal member states as part of SSF as envisaged in the STP, and poor capacity building of security forces, among others, are causes for concern. The observations and suggestions by Ligawa (2018) on the need to consider cultural intelligence, clan dynamics, post-PSO Somalia, security and stability of HoA have not been adequately factored in the STP and ATMIS CONOPS. This apprehension conforms to respondents' views on the possible consequences of excluding regional forces from the AMISOM transition and exit strategy, as indicated in Figure 4.19.




Figure 4.22: Likely consequences of excluding regional security forces from AMISOM transition strategy

Source: Field data, 2022.

The majority (18.7%) of the respondents believed that excluding regional forces from SSF under the STP would allow the infiltration by *Al Shabaab* into neighbouring countries. It is a valid observation note that the ramification of the exclusion will be defections or conflict with SNA that will be deployed in those areas by the federal government. It will be an opportunity for *Al Shabaab* to exploit by recruiting the dejected regional forces or infiltration Kenya. Besides, the concept of a buffer zone, as advanced by Warah (2014), Nzau and Mwanzia (2018), Mogue *et al.* (2020), and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) will be defeated. Jubaland will provide an unsecured and unhindered transit area to *Al Shabaab* and other nefarious elements to gain access into NFD and deeper into Kenya.

Furthermore, the view that the exclusion of regional forces from SSF will lead to *Al Shabaab* infiltration is inimical to the proposed pillar for Somalia stabilization, as suggested by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 61-70). According to them, activities attending to the pillar include, *inter alia*, creating harmony between FGS and federal member states, including their security forces, thereby creating a safe Jubaland corridor free of *Al Shabaab*.

Similarly, as depicted in Figure 4.19, the initial analysis, on federal member states' forces, is supported by 16.8% of the respondents. They indicated that the exclusion of federal member states' forces from the AMISOM transition strategy would lead to a resurgence of *Al Shabaab* and 10.3% of the respondents who indicated that such an exclusion would lead to the recapture of liberated areas. The respondents' views present two notions. First, the capacity of regional forces is not up to par to take charge of security on their own. It is fear expressed by scholars such as Nzau (2018) and Dessu (2022) that the capacity of Somalia

forces is not yet convincing them to assume responsibilities. The same is supported in the views by 12.1% of the respondents that the exclusion will lead to poor capacity building of regional forces, ostensibly due to a lack of support from the federal government.

Secondly, the exclusion will not only lead to a collapse of the buffer zone but also open the route for attacks, sabotage and many other malevolent acts in Kenya. It is variously reflected in responses indicated in Figure 4.19, where they indicated that the exclusion would lead to, *inter alia*, a resurgence of piracy in the Indian Ocean (4.7%), a resurgence of kidnappings for ransom (5.6%), trafficking of SALW into Kenya (4.7%), and an influx of refugees (4.7%). These observations concur with Nzau and Mwanzia (2018: 357) and Masese's (2012) analysis that Somalia's instability became a regional security quagmire, giving rise to massive refugee flows into Kenya, the proliferation of SALW and infiltration of international terrorist organizations and maritime criminals.

Besides, Mativo (2014), Chumba (2016), Barasa (2018) and Iteyo (2018) shared the notion observed that refugees posed a dilemma between the humanitarian concern for refugees and the realization that those refugees are a source of insecurity. It is instructive to note that whereas Nzau and Mwanzia (2018) and Masese (2012) examined the consequences of the collapsed state of Somalia, management of PSO transitions can also be inimical regional security if not well managed. That is why Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) and William and Hashi (2016) stressed the need to properly consider post-AMISOM governance and security dispensation.

The suggested possible consequences of excluding regional security forces from the AMISOM transition strategy and STP supports the resounding concurrence by respondents (73%) in Figure 4.16 that security forces of federal member states should be included as part of SSF in the STP and ATMIS CONOPs. It is in realizing the critical role they will play in securing the federal state post-AMISOM and the need to understand and accommodate the clan dynamics in the STP in the context of cultural intelligence (Ligawa, 2018; Nzau, 2018). To this end, the STP and ATMIS CONOPs ought to mainstream force generation, deployments and redeployments of local forces as part of the transitory phases to conform to the advice by Madeira (2022) on the importance of force generation and capacity building in the new 'AMISOM model'. Having established the need to include regional security forces of federal member states and part of SSF as defined in the STP and ATMIS CONOPs, the focus now shifts to the transition model most suitable for AMISOM transition and exit in the broader sense. It is the cynosure of the following subsection.

4.14 Preferred AMISOM Transition and Exit model

For a good transition that considers Somalia's stability and regional security, the transition activities by AMISOM have to be consolidated by a proper transition model. As guided by strategic theory, all possibilities have to be considered when planning to optimize outcomes (Schelling, 1984; Smith, 2008). In the broader context, functionalist theory guides the broad considerations for strategy in the context of the wider society that is made up of individual parts affecting each other functionally within the system (Rosamond, 2000; Nicoli, 2019).

Scholars have suggested transition models that look beyond Somalia into broader regional stability. William and Hashi (2016: 35-39) suggested five options viz, muddling through, political settlement excluding Al-Shabaab, a political settlement including Al-Shabaab, AMISOM enabled, AMISOM reduced and Financial austerity. However, William and Hashi (2016) majorly based their transition options on challenges faced by AMISOM rather than a mixture of challenges, lessons learnt and achievement of mandate objectives. The challenges considered by the scholars in making the suggestions included a lack of operation enablers such as crucial equipment and command structures, the nuisance of *Al Shabaab* asymmetric operations, lack of proper capacity development of SNA and negative clan dynamic, waning support from local Somali population and Somali political wrangles.

Similarly, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 123-128) propounded six pillar vision for a post-AMISOM security order for Kenya. The relevant pillars in this analysis are the first two pillars. Firstly, *the* creation of conditions for AMISOM exit from Somalia through a review of operational activities by prioritizing handover areas to SSF and enabling SSF to lead operations progressively. The second pillar relevant to the analysis hinges on creating a stable, peaceful and prosperous Jubaland as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*. These two pillars focus on the PSO activities in Somalia and the role of Kenya in shaping the events to ensure her security. However, the scholars did not provide a suitable transition model for transition. This study sought to advance a model based on the suggestions of Jonegård (2019) and STP. It is presented as suggested transition models, viz, a transition from AMISOM to UN peacekeeping operations, withdrawal of AMISOM and handover to SSF,

and transition from AMISOM to AU-UN peacekeeping operations before handing over to SSF. The findings are presented in Figure 4.20.




Figure 4.23: Suitable strategy models for AMISOM transition and exit

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings depicted in Figure 4.20 indicate that a majority (57.6%) of the respondent suggested that a suitable transition model for AMISOM is to transit to a joint AU-UN mission before handover to SSF. Another 30.3% of the respondents recommended that AMISOM transit directly to an UN-led peacekeeping operation, while 12.2% preferred

AMISOM to withdraw and hand over to SSF. The respondents' preferences hinge on some critical considerations related to the AMISOM mandate objectives. Security, stability and governance of Somalia are some considerations related to the Security and Governance objectives of AMISOM. It plays into the concern by scholars on the stability of Somalia and the capacity of SSF to take over (William & Hashi, 2016; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Nzau, 2018; Dessu, 2022). The respondents' high preference for AU-UN hybrid transition model or the UN-led peacekeeping model is in cognizance that FGS and SSF are not ready to assume full responsibilities. It is further illustrated by the minority support for the direct handover to SSF, as indicated by 12.2% of the respondents.

The second factor informing the preference relates to resource support for post-AMISOM PSO. The EU, through the APF fund, thus far has mainly supported AU/AMISOM operations, while the UN, through UNSOS, has provided logistical support. One identified constraint facing AMISOM has been funding issues, and the AU has had to rely heavily on partner organizations (William & Hashi, 2016). A hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping model or a direct transition to the UN peacekeeping model will ensure more resources are pooled and availed, for accelerating peacebuilding functions, such as; capacity building of SSF, DDR, justice and governance institutions, and health, among others. With the EU's scaling down of funding and considering the capacity of SSF and FGS, a reliable source of support is essential to ensure that the security and governance weakness earlier identified in this study are adequately addressed.

The STP does not entail handover to the AU-UN hybrid or UN peacekeeping models. It considers a model where the AMISOM military, police and civilian components would be reconfigured to shepherd the transition to SSF by the end of 2024. The UN will provide logistical support through all STP phases (African Union, 2022). The STP model does not depart from the AMISOM model, where UNSOS will continue to provide logistical support to the PSO, *albeit* with the EU's reduced funding. As observed by Dessu (2022), this model indicates that the CONOPs do not depart significantly from its predecessor and may face similar political and funding challenges.

The question of a suitable transition strategy model for AMISOM is pertinent not only to the post-AMISOM stability of Somalia but also to the security of the HoA. As earlier indicated, the second transition pillar envisaged by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) hinges on creating a stable, peaceful and prosperous Jubaland as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*. With concerns over the capacity of FGS and SSF due to inadequate attainment of security and governance objectives of AMISOM, a transition model that will not be able to address the gaps brought forward will contribute to a definite failure. In this sense, resource support is critical to ensure that a post-AMISOM transition model accelerates the attainment of security and governance functions to remedy gaps left by AMISOM. Failure to adopt a hybrid model or transition to the UN before handover to SSF will reverse gains made on other AMISOM mandate objectives, destabilize Somalia through a resurgence of *Al Shabaab* and other armed groups, and remove Jubaland as a buffer zone for Kenya's national security. Therefore, a post-AMISOM transition will still need support, and thus a

hybrid model or transition to UN-led operations will be crucial. A Key Informant highlighted this as follows:

The AMISOM transition model [STP/ATMIS CONOPs] has not factored in all key stakeholders. Apart from excluding the JSF and RKB from SSF, the role of international partners such as the UN, EU, and IGAD has not been considered. It is a name change to ATMIS with the same stakeholders with a slight execution concept. The plan to hand over to SSF directly in three years [2024] will not be possible. If it happens, *Al Shabaab* will take over, and the gains over the years will go to waste (Interview with a Staff Officer at Dhobley, interviewed on 22 November 2022).

Besides repeating concerns over SSF/FGS capacity noted by Dessu (2022) and Nzau (2018), among others, the Key Informant's sentiments reflect the analysis by this study on the need for post-AMISOM model that will provide sufficient support to the acceleration of unrealized security and governance objectives. The objective of having a safe Jubaland corridor (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020) or buffer (Nzau, 2018; Migue *et al.*, 2012) will be reversed if a post-AMISOM transition model will not sufficiently support and guarantee the stability of Somalia.

The idea of 'stakeholders' in Somalia's peace processes brings into mind the question of the possible role that militants (*Al Shabaab*) may play. There have been instances when the terrorist party has been engaged to attain a possible compromise that can lead to a peace deal. In Afghanistan, the USA eventually negotiated with the Taliban anchored on the withdrawal of troops, guarantees that Afghanistan will not become a platform for terrorism, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire (Jonegård, 2019). In the context of AMISOM transition and exit strategy, this study sought to explore the exciting question that forms the subject of the next section.

4.15 Negotiation and inclusion of *Al Shabaab* in post-AMISOM governance of Somalia

In conflict management, compromise is a factor for consideration in engagements. Over time, the hardened positions of belligerent parties tend to soften, and perspectives change in the face of mounting losses, casualties, waning support, and competing priorities, among other factors. Despite the established practice, states can only engage states, opposed to non-state actors (Poynting & Whyte, 2012; Modasia, 2021). Asymmetric threat situations that become costly in the long term necessitate the engagement of non-state actors by states, *albeit* through backdoor channels (Jonegård, 2019).

Despite the declared policy by states that they do not negotiate with terrorists, scholars have analysed various instances where negotiations with terrorist organizations have been attempted to resolve conflict. Recently, the USA engaged the Taliban in Afghanistan to broker a post-intervention dispensation. The USA has earlier employed their classical regime-change approach of propping up puppet governments after toppling the established regime (Kanat, 2019). After a protracted engagement, mounting costs, dwindling public support, and political expediencies, the USA had to swallow the bitter pill and call the Taliban to the negotiating table. Jonegård (2019) points out that the aim of the negotiations revolved around the withdrawal of troops and guarantees that Afghanistan will not become a platform for terrorism, intra-Afghan dialogue, and a comprehensive ceasefire. All the exit models developed by Jonegård (2019: 3) revolved around the Taliban being part of the post-exit dispensation in Afghanistan. However, after USA's exit, the Taliban reneged on the deal and re-established a mildly moderate regime (Jackson & Amiri, 2021).

In the context of the Somalia conflict, the idea of negotiating with *Al Shabaab* has been fronted on several occasions. While proffering exit strategies from Somalia, William and Hashi (2016: 35-39) considered five options. *Inter alia*, two options revolved around political settlement with the engagement of *Al Shabaab* and political settlement without engaging *Al Shabaab*. However, in their final analysis, the scholars did not recommend a preferred option for adoption. Similarly, in their six-pillar vision, Kagwanja et al. (2020) did not entertain the idea of engaging *Al Shabaab* for political settlement except for their annihilation. However, the discussions on the concept of smart power through blending hard power and soft power can infer a possible consideration to engage *Al Shabaab* for political settlement if they become amenable. A Key informant captured the inevitability of such a consideration thus:

Al Shabaab is a hard nut to crack, and they will not be vanquished entirely by military might. They can only be reduced, but they will retain the ability to re-emerge. The issues of Somalia can only be sorted out when they come together, bury the clannist and extremist hatchets and decide to bring peace inclusively for the sake of Somalia. Otherwise, all the interventions will fail or make minimal effects here and there. (Interview with a County Administrator in *El Kaala* on 25 November 2022).

This opinion of the Key Informant aligns with the idea broached by William and Hashi (2016) of considering engaging *Al Shabaab* in the grand scheme of Somalia's conflict management. Crisis Group (2022), a reputable think tank on peace and conflict, has advocated a similar option, calling for consideration of political engagement with *Al Shabaab* in Somalia. The President of Somalia, Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, adopted a different stance from that of his predecessor on matters of *Al Shabaab* by pledging to beat back the Jihadists and then talk to them. As a consideration for the AMISOM exit strategy,

the study sought to obtain respondents' feedback on this issue, and the findings are depicted in Figure 4.21.




Figure 4.24: Negotiation and inclusion of Al Shabaab in post-AMISOM governance of Somalia

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Figure 4.21 indicate that a majority (63%) of the respondents did not concur with negotiating with *Al Shabaab* and their inclusion in post-AMISOM Somalia, while only 37% concurred. The findings contradict the proposals made by William and Hashi (2016) of having a political settlement including *Al Shabaab* as one of the options for post-AMISOM Somalia. It also goes contrary to the approach by the President of Somalia and

the suggestion by Crisis Group (2022) on the need to engage *Al Shabaab* for a political settlement to end the conflict.

Al Shabaab threat along religious extremism, and examples from Afghanistan, justifies the apprehension by the respondents on considerations of amenability to negotiations. Notably, the Taliban swooped through Afghanistan after reneging on the terms of the negotiation with allied forces. While considering engaging *Al Shabaab*, William and Hashi (2016) cautioned that the FGS would have to adopt conservative Islamic governance to appease *Al Shabaab*. However, spoilers allied to the fundamentalist ISIL would be less amenable to such an arrangement. Furthermore, *Al Shabaab* has not made such overtures for negotiation with FGS since they consider them as *Kaffirs* and illegitimate and the only way out is toppling FGS and establishing governance along fundamentalist interpretation of Sharia law. If such a negotiation occurs, it is likely to be a ruse by *Al Shabaab* to gain a foothold in government, eventually take over, and apply strict sharia law along extremist lines. It would be along with the motivation provided by the Taliban in Afghanistan (Jackson & Amiri, 2021).

To further place the issue into context, the respondents explained the preferred approach. The same was aggregated and presented in Figure 4.22. Generally, the explanations support the findings in Figure 4.21 and the analysis. A majority (17.1%) believed that *Al Shabaab* would likely renege on agreements if they were to engage in negotiations. In comparison, 14.3% of the respondents said convincing *Al Shabaab* to change their minds is impossible. Similarly, the notion that engaging *Al Shabaab* in negotiations will be a double-edged

sword and that FGS and SSF are not strong enough to contain *Al Shabaab* attracted a draw in responses, with 11.4% of the respondents each.

Moreover, respondents expressed apprehension that Somalia will turn into the new Afghanistan, as indicated by 8.6% of the respondents. The respondents' views indicate the uncertainties of engaging *Al Shabaab*, born out of the Afghanistan example (Jackson & Amiri, 2021), the extremist nature of the group and the weaknesses of FGS and SSF. All these will negatively affect Kenya's national security and HoA by reversing gains made by AMISOM over the years.




Figure 4.25: Aggregated explanations on negotiating with Al Shabaab

Source: Field data, 2022.

The supporting respondents' explanations revolved around the difficulty in defeating *Al Shabaab*, as indicated by the protracted nature of the conflict. It is a view held by 8.6% of the respondents; with a similar proportion (8.6%), supporting the argument by William and Hashi (2016), indicating that it is impossible to defeat *Al Shabaab* militarily. However, their extremist position can be moderated and accommodated. At the same time, the two perspectives held by respondents provide a glimpse into possibilities for consideration by AMISOM planners, including representatives from the Kenyan Contingent, which presents a dilemma of reconciling the strategy by AMISOM/ATMIS with that of the FGS authorities. Through the head of state, FGS envisions the military defeat of *Al Shabaab* before negotiations. On the other hand, the STP and CONOPs do not explicitly refer to engaging *Al Shabaab* in negotiation but infer through the mandate of 'support peace and reconciliation efforts of the FGS' (African Union, 2022: 3). Notwithstanding the inference, the mandate objectives only envision total defeat of *Al Shabaab* with no role on post-AMISOM dispensation.

Tinkering with engaging *Al Shabaab* for post-AMISOM Somalia presents uncertainties and a clash in transition and exit strategies. Therefore, it is inevitably prudent for the Kenyan contingent planners to eventually look inwards. This is due to the broader analysis of pre-AMISOM strategies, AMISOM PSO strategies and the various options and models for AMISOM transition strategies, all of which have been extensively interrogated in the preceding analysis of this chapter. As a stakeholder in AMISOM, the Kenyan contingent, as earlier clarified, conforms to strategies developed by AMISOM, which implicitly bear the input of the Kenyan contingent representatives. However, realist national security

considerations require consideration of state interests to take precedence. In that case, Kenya's objective of a buffer zone (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Migue *et al.*, 2012) post-AMISOM needs to be interrogated as part of the AMISOM transition and exit strategy for the Kenyan contingent. It forms the subject of the last section of this Chapter.

4.16 Support to Jubaland post-AMISOM for a buffer zone

The question of support to Jubaland can be analysed as a transition strategy for the Kenyan Contingent independent of the AMISOM CONOPs or within the AMISOM CONOPs context. Inevitably, Kenya would need to engage Jubaland as it forms a bridge between the common Kenya-Somalia Border and Somalia's hinterland where *Al Shabaab* strongholds are found.

Since Kenya entered into Somalia's conflict by engaging the KDF on 14 October 2011, scholars and pundits have speculated as to the aim of such involvement. Warah (2014:84) argued that Kenya went to Somalia to establish a buffer zone to secure the LAPSSET. Whereas the scholar could have alluded to the broader conception of establishing a security zone in Somalia for Kenya's economic security, this is a distraction from the immediate objective for KDF operations and subsequent re-hatting into AMISOM in 2012. The argument by Warah (2014:84) aimed to present Kenya's development project as a securitised issue owing to the events in neighbouring Somalia and the perennial security problems in Kenya's ASAL areas, including the NFD.

Migue *et al.* (2012) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) concur that Kenya went to Somalia over concern for Kenya's national security. It stemmed from the various incursions, attacks, kidnappings and economic sabotage activities that *Al Shabaab* conducted inside Kenya. Hitherto, Kenya supported Jubaland to re-establish security and governance through security training support, logistics, and limited military support to RKB and *Al Sunna wa Aljamaa* militia groups (Migue *et al.*, 2012). However, these efforts bore little fruit in pushing *Al Shabaab* away from areas closer to Kenya's terrestrial and maritime borders. After a spate of attacks and kidnappings of NGO doctors from *the Dadaab* refugee camp and French tourists in the Lamu area, the patience of the Kenyan Government had reached its limits; thereby, something had to be done, and KDF intervened.

Kenya continued to operate in Jubaland, stretching from the Gedo region down to Lower Juba and eastwards to the port city of Kismayu. The deployment was aligned with establishing a buffer zone from the common border eastwards up to river Juba, an area defining the Jubaland state of Somalia. It reflects the zoning and sectoring deployment strategy, as Nzau (2018:563) advanced, where TCCs deploy in defined sectors aligned with the strategic interests. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) and Williams *et al.* (2018) concur that AMISOM, and the Kenyan Contingent, have made significant achievements in liberating and pacifying large areas of Somalia, thus restoring some semblance of normalcy, *albeit* the presence of *Al Shabaab* activities. For the duration of Kenya's deployment in Jubaland, the activities of *Al Shabaab* in Kenya have been reduced except for the significant initial attacks in Westgate Mall in 2013, the Garissa University College attack in 2015, Dusit D2

attack in 2018 and sporadic attacks of quarry workers and passenger busses in Mandera and Wajir areas. A community elder expresses this as follows:

Compared to when the KDF had not crossed into Somalia, the community has experienced some ease and reduced the fear that Al Shabaab will attack or abduct the youth for forced recruitment. The collection of Zakat [Islamic tax] from the community has been reduced since there has been an increased presence of security officers on both sides of the border. We fear that if KDF gets out of Somalia, Al Shabaab will regain freedom of movement to conduct activities deep into Kenya (Interview with a Community elder in *Shimbir Fatuma*, Mandera County, on 30 November 2022).

The Key Informant paints an optimistic picture of the actual situation in the NFD communities. However, there are still sleeper cells and sympathizers within the community aiding surveillance and attacks against security forces, thus the need for continuous community engagement in WHAM. With the transition and exit of AMISOM, and the Kenyan Contingent, the presence of capable security forces will have been reduced, and the weak JSF/SSF will be in charge, thus presenting a gap for *Al Shabaab* to exploit and threaten Kenya's national security. Thus, the status of Kenya's involvement in Jubaland to maintain the buffer zone should be a matter of securitisation as part of the exit strategy considerations (Williams, 2003: 513). This aspect of securitisation is related to the military sector but might span socioeconomic and political sectors. As Eroukhmanoff (2021) avers, the sectoring of threats means that existential threats are not objective but relate to each referent object's different characteristics.

The previous analysis examined the suggestions and options presented by scholars and sentiments by a key informant on the issue of the Jubaland buffer zone. The scholars

examined the intended strategy for KDF involvement in Somalia and its continued operations in the Jubaland sector. However, the scholars did not adequately go further to examine the post-PSO support to Jubaland in continuance of the buffering strategy. This is evident in the outlined parameters attending to the second pillar of the six pillars vision by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 123) viz, the creation of a stable, peaceful and prosperous Jubaland as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*.

Despite being a transition vision, the scholars failed to examine the possibility of not fully achieving the 'safe corridor', thus warranting the need to continue support to Jubaland after exit. Bartlett (2021) aptly warned that border security would likely face more challenges in sabotage activities due to the lack of KDF forces across Somalia. Therefore, the study sought respondents' views on the question of maintaining support for Jubaland as part of the exit strategy by the Kenyan Contingent and the results are depicted in Figure 4.23.




Figure 4.26: Retention of Jubaland buffer zone after KDF exit

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings indicate that a majority (76%) of the respondents concurred that Kenya needs to support the Jubaland buffer zone after the KDF exists as part of a transition strategy to secure Kenya's border. Another 21% of the respondents had a contrary view and did not concur that Kenya should maintain support for Jubaland post-AMISOM. The findings highlight the importance of maintaining a buffer zone, as Warah (2014) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) suggested. A safe zone along the Kenyan border ensures that the activities of border communities are not disturbed, border security management programmes are established and maintained and above all, the development of NFD is affected.

Indeed, Chumba (2016) submitted that border management measures ought to ensure that all the resources available are employed to regulate the movement of people and goods across borders while curtailing transboundary terrorism and other criminal activities. Similarly, Rosenblum (2012) submitted that border security management should enhance the probability of apprehending terrorists at entry points, deterring smugglers and traffickers, and reducing crime within border communities. Not all these should hinder the border areas' quality of life and economic vitality (Opon, 2015). The majority concurrence by respondents further supports the observation by Bartlett (2021) on the need to ensure that Al Shabaab does not sabotage border security programmes due to the lack of KDF across the border.

Another analytical perspective cycles back to Somalia's security and governance aspects, specifically Jubaland. As noted in the findings of this chapter, AMISOM's achievements on the security and governance mandate are minimal. Strengthening this will require further

support beyond AMISOM/ATMIS through robust post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding. In the short and medium term, the concerns by scholars that SSF and FGS are not adequately enabled will persist with ramifications in Kenya and HoA (Williams *et al.*, 2018; Nzau, 2018; Musoma, 2021). Therefore, it is prudent that Kenya adopts an introspective approach besides the AMISOM transition and exit strategy to ensure that her security along the border counties is maintained post-AMISOM Somalia.

The dissenting view by respondents could be attributed to a myriad of factors. *Inter alia*, the protracted nature of the Somalia conflict along the clannist socio-political dynamics presents a sense of intractability. As Nzau (2018: 544-546) analysed, the Somali question is yet to be unravelled and adequately addressed. The various military interventions and PSOs attempted in Somalia have had no more than marginal successes that tended not to hold for long.

Furthermore, the strained diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia have continued to shape engagements between the two states, *albeit* covertly. Chumba (2016) established that the past Kenya-Somalia relations had had disastrous security effects on the two states. It goes back to the *Shifita* period through intervention in Jubaland and the Maritime border dispute (Ali & Muyonga, 2021; Elias, 2021). As observed by Miyandzi (2012), there have been suspicions between the two states. Ali and Muyonga (2021) locate this suspicion to the *Shifita* experiences occasioning FGS to view Kenya's involvement in Jubaland as a ploy to instigate the formation of an autonomous state uncontrolled from Mogadishu. The suspicion has played out mainly in how the FGS treats the Jubaland administration,

including interferences in electoral processes. The expulsion of diplomats marked escalations of the issue (Ali & Muyonga, 2021; Demissie, 2021). The strained relations continued to play out in economic aspects, which saw Somalia ban *Miraa*, thereby occasioning losses in billions of Kenya shillings (Mwendwa, 2021). Respondents' contrary view indicates that continued dabbling in Jubaland affairs in post-AMISOM will only attract loath and backlash from FGS.

To further place the issue in perspective, the study sought explanations from respondents on the need for Kenya to maintain support for Jubaland post-AMISOM. It is in the context of the continued buffer zone even after the transition and exit of the Kenyan contingent from Somalia. The aggregated respondents' views are presented in Figure 4.24.




Figure 4.27: Aggregated explanations on Kenya's maintenance of support to Jubaland post-AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

Most explanations affirmed support for Jubaland, with 24.4% of the respondents indicating that continued support for Jubaland post-AMISOM will allow Kenya to monitor *Al Shabaab* (and other armed militias) activities and the general security situation. Similarly, 15.4% of the respondents opined that continued support for Jubaland would limit infiltration by *Al Shabaab* across the border. In comparison, 12% indicated that it would assist in vetting refugees and creating a solid border. Other consenting views also revolved majorly around the theme of security *viz* for security cooperation (12%), to protect border integrity (9%), and to buffer *Al Shabaab* resurgence (3%).

The consenting explanations cluster around the theme of security of the border, NFD and the Country at large. It supports Migue *et al.* (2012) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that Kenya's involvement in Somalia was based on concern for her national security. Implicitly, the findings lend credence to the notion by Warah (2014) that Kenya's quest for a buffer zone in Somalia was meant to secure LAPSSET (economy). It is owing to the justification to intervene in Somalia after a spate of attacks that threatened the economic standing of Kenya, *inter alia* (Migue *et al.*, 2012). To broaden the analysis beyond the conventional state security (Nzau & Mwanzia, 2018: 353), the socioeconomic security imperatives of the NFD ought to be considered in deciding whether to maintain support for Jubaland as a buffer zone. Inevitably, the capacity of JSF and Jubaland administration to contain *Al Shabaab* in the post-AMISOM era is a factor in determining continued support for the Jubaland buffer zone.

The dissenting explanations by the respondents add a diplomatic aspect besides security considerations. It was indicated by 18.4% of the respondents who explained that Kenya should not continue support to Jubaland in the post-AMISOM era but instead focus on strengthening her borders. Diplomatically, 6% of the respondents believed that continued support of Jubaland in the post-AMISOM era would create conflict between Kenya and FGS. As earlier indicated, the Somalia conflict situation presents a summation that it is intractable owing to the toxic clan dynamics that affect the socio-political landscape (Nzau, 2018; Hersi, 2015). Protracted conflicts also tend to create operational fatigue among the citizenry of a TCC, thus eroding support (Waldron, 2017; Sopko, 2021; Crisis Group, 2022). Therefore, the preference for securing the Country shifts from interventionist to homeland defence.

Border securitisation measures by Kenya reflect this shift in approach. Mutisya (2017) recommended reviewing the border securitisation programme to a border fence and community engagement to manage border security. Addressing the socioeconomic challenges of NFD is also a priority for that not in favour of post-AMISOM Jubaland support. Such issues become central in strengthening the border (Nzau and Guyo (2018). Hunnicut and Broidy (2019) noted that terror outfits are adept at exploiting marginalised communities to gain support.

On post-AMISOM diplomatic relations, the involvement of Kenya with Jubaland will only affirm the suspicions of FGS (Miyandzi, 2019; Ali & Muyonga, 2021). It is the perspective held by 6% of the respondents. The views echo the study's findings in Figure 4.1, where

69.1% and 78.9% of the respondents submitted that past diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia would affect current and future security relations, respectively. Furthermore, the findings lend credence to assertions by William and Nguyen (2021) that intervention by immediate neighbours calls to question neutrality issues and shapes states' attitudes towards each other. Indeed, the findings support Chumba's (2016: 741-742) findings that the past relations between Kenya and Somalia, and the prolonged collapse of the Somali state, have had a disastrous impact on the security of the two states. Besides, Somalia is likely to assert sovereignty claim over her territory in the post-AMISOM era and demand non-interference in her internal affairs. Therefore, any post-AMISOM involvement in Jubaland by Kenya will not be viewed as an effort to guarantee Kenya's national security but rather as blatant interference in the internal affairs of Somalia.

4.17 Chapter Summary

The chapter interrogated the nature of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) transition strategies affecting Kenya's national security. The chapter considered Kenya-Somalia relation's effect on diplomacy and security, Kenya's past strategies towards Somalia and its effect on National Security, Pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs in the recovery of Somalia's stability, the influence of plans and strategies on pre-AMISOM PSO outcomes, achievement of AMISOM mandate, and AMISOM exit strategy. The underpinning theories for the chapter were functionalist and strategic theories.

The findings indicated that the pre-AMISOM Kenya-Somalia relations would significantly influence the two states' current and future security and diplomatic engagements. The

strategies for pre-AMISOM PSOs, such as UNOSOM and UNITAF, were influential in attaining their defined mandates in stabilizing Somalia, *albeit* with limitations. However, the strategies of the PSO were primarily responsible for their failures more than their success. Additionally, AMISOM has successfully achieved its mandate of stabilizing Somalia. However, security and governance mandate objectives were not sufficiently achieved, thus jeopardizing the assessment of AMISOM's success and post-AMISOM stability in Somalia. It was reflected in the finding that it was not the right time for AMISOM to exit Somalia.

Furthermore, the AMISOM transition strategy was insufficient for the long-term stability of Somalia as manifested in the omission of critically sensitive aspects of security forces of regional member states such as JSF in the post-AMISOM security structure of SSF. Including regional member states' forces in the STP and a structured DDR are essential for the stability of Somalia and for creating a buffer zone in Jubaland. Besides, the most preferred transition and exit model for AMISOM was a joint AU-UN mission before handing over responsibilities to SSF. That support negotiation with *Al Shabaab* is not a desirable strategy option. Finally, Kenya should support Jubaland post-AMISOM for a buffer zone and corridor free of *Al Shabaab* to reduce negative national security implications. After interrogating the nature of AMISOM PSO transition strategies, the next Chapter's subject is the effects of the AMISOM transition on Kenya's National Security.

CHAPTER FIVE

EFFECTS ON KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY FROM TRANSITION OF KENYAN CONTINGENT IN AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA

Having interrogated the nature of AMISOM transition strategies affecting Kenya's National security, this chapter examines the effects on Kenya's national security from the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM. In the context of Somalia's stability post-AMISOM, the transition of the Kenyan Contingent will have implications for Kenya's national security and the stability of HoA. The chapter's underpinning theoretical framework includes Neo-functionalism, strategic and securitisation theories. The chapter deliberates on; the possible resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in the post-AMISOM Era, the ability of SSF to assume security responsibilities, post-AMISOM stability states of Somalia, post-AMISOM, need for concern for post-AMISOM, affected Counties, the nature of effects of post-AMISOM effects on Kenya's national security, post-AMISOM effects on national security, the vulnerability of NFD counties to post-AMISOM effects to national security, and mitigation to NFD vulnerabilities. Finally, the chapter was summarised.

5.1 Resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in the post-AMISOM Era

Terrorist organizations have been known to re-emerge after a military intervention. USSR Military forays in Afghanistan occasioned their defeat at the hands of *the Mujahideen* militia despite the asymmetry in fighting power (Gompert, Binnendjik, & Lin, 2014). Additionally, Jackson and Amiri (2021) note that the outcome of USSR military operations in Afghanistan was an unstable country controlled by a fundamentalist Taliban regime friendly to the *Mujahideen*, who later morphed into Al Qaeda. It threatened regional

stability and global security, resulting in the 9/11 attacks in the USA and the 1998 bombing of USA embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, among others. GWOT emanated from the attempts by western powers to counter the destabilizing effects of Al Qaeda and Taliban, leading to allied interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. In the context of Afghanistan operations, the protracted PSO proved costly, and the USA and its allies had to exit in August 2021, leading to the resurgence of the Taliban, who took control of the Country (Crocker, 2021). The implications of the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan are yet to manifest fully, but it may threaten both national and global security. Besides, it inspires other Jihadist organizations they can lay low and resurge after the exit of intervening forces.

In Iraq, scholars have pointed to the fact that the intervention was focused on regime change with little regard for the post-Saddam stability of Iraq (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Kanat, 2019). Besides, the scholars argued that the USA did not correctly consider Iraq's destruction as well as regional and global implications. Hamasaeed and Nada (2020) were critical of the USA's meddling in the security and governance of Iraq after the fall of Saddam's regime. The scholars argued that such interferences left a political vacuum and scores of men with military training who had no alternative after Iraq's national army disbanded. The consequences were the onset of sectarian civil wars, political turmoil and widespread corruption that culminated in ISIL seizing half of the Country.

Somalia has experienced the metamorphosis of various militant groups punctuated by military interventions. Chonka and Healy (2021), Jess (2018) and Nzau (2018) shared the observation that since the onset of the Somalia conflict from 1988 through the 1990s, a mix

of opposition groups such as SSDF, SNM, USC, and SPM variously fought against the Junta led by Siaad Barre; with the Junta eventually toppled by USC led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed. Ensuing instability saw the ICU's emergence, which was toppled by ENDF in 2002 (Nzau, 2018). After that, several international and regional military interventions followed to stabilize and re-establish the collapsed state but failed.

The failures of the interventions led to a governance and security vacuum that the military wing of the ICU attempted to fill when itself rebranded into *Al Shabaab* (Nzau, 2018; William & Nguyen, 2018). The emergence of *Al Shabaab* and the failures of prior interventions necessitated the deployment of AU intervention forces (AMISOM) under the APSA in 2007, guided by the philosophy of African Solutions to African problems (AfSol) (Obi & Ukeje, 2018; Onditi, 2015). The context of revisiting these examples of interventions and outcomes is to lay the ground for the argument of this section on the possibility of the resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in Somalia. For Chapter Four, the glaring issue in pre-AMISOM, AMISOM PSOs and transition strategies related to weaknesses in the development of security and governance aspects of Somalia. With examples from Afghanistan and Iraq, *Al Shabaab* may bid their time then overrun the FGS once AMISOM is out.

In this context, the study sought respondents' views on the possibility of *Al Shabaab* resurging in the post-AMISOM Era, and the findings are presented in Figure 5.1. The majority (73%) of the respondents affirmed that *Al Shabaab* is likely to resurge after the exit of AMISOM. In comparison, 27% indicated that *Al Shabaab* would not resurge after

the exit of AMISOM. The findings support the analysis by NATO Strategic Direction South Hub(NSD-S HUB) that *Al Shabaab* is a resilient outfit with demonstrated ability to transform itself and its activities when necessary (NSD-S HUB, 2021). Furthermore, and in implicit support of this study’s findings, NSD-S HUB (2021: 18-22) observed that actions of AMISOM could have an impact on *Al Shabaab* capabilities and intentions, thus requiring constant and coherent monitoring of potential opportunities that could impede or pave the way for *Al Shabaab*’s expansion in the short and medium terms.




Figure 5.28: Resurgence of Al Shabaab post-AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

Despite the presence of AMISOM/ATMIS troops and SSF and the optimistic achievement assessments by Williams *et al.* (2018), *Al Shabaab* still has the potential to strike critical

areas in Somalia with devastating effects. It has been witnessed in attacks against hotels and security installations in Mogadishu and AMISOM cantonments outside Mogadishu. The *Al Shabaab* has also allied itself with ISIL for financial support that could revive a resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia. ISIL demonstrated the capacity to resurge in Iraq and Syria despite the onslaught of allied forces (Crisis Group, 2019).

Scholars and planners are cognizant of the possibility of a resurgence, as affirmed by the respondents. In the six-pillar exit from Somalia, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) envisioned that defeat of *Al Shabaab* would be crucial in stabilizing Somalia and averting negative security effects on Kenya and HoA. Besides, William and Hashi (2016) entertained that a political settlement can be attained, and *Al Shabaab* vanquished for post-AMISOM peacebuilding. A similar approach is reflected in the STP, which is to guide the transition and exit from Somalia. The first specified mandate for transition and exit is the degradation of *Al Shabaab* and other terrorist groups, a task to be achieved by conducting jointly planned and targeted operations with SSF (African Union, 2022). Similarly, a Military Commander deployed in *the Liboi* area observed that:

While there is the option of engaging *Al Shabaab* to form a joint administration, the group is amorphous and cannot be trusted. Hardliners within their ranks can decide to dissent and form opposition groups that can be even more powerful and devastating. The fact that the group is not responding to the implicit overtures by the FGS to negotiate indicates that they are intent on taking over the Country and ruling it using extremist laws. It is highly probable that once AMISOM is out of the way, Somalia will be at the mercy of the militants, and Kenya will be in the crosshairs (Interview with a Military Commander in Liboi area, Wajir County, on 09 December 2022).

The Key Informant makes a critical observation relevant to the analysis of possible resurgence by *Al Shabaab*. The apparent lack of interest by the group to engage in negotiations tells of their intentions. The group has occasionally indicated that it will not engage with *Kaffir* government. The proposal by William and Hashi (2016) and Crisis Group (2022) may not materialize as an option for post-AMISOM Somalia dispensation. As noted earlier, the Afghanistan example motivates *Al Shabaab* to wait to take over when the weak FGS and SSF are left behind. The respondent's explanation was sought to further elaborate on the possible resurgence of *Al Shabaab* post-AMISOM, and the findings are depicted in Figure 5.2.




Figure 5.29: Aggregated explanations on the post-AMSOM resurgence of Al Shabaab

Source: Field data, 2022.

The aggregated explanations by the respondents took a consequentialist perspective on the issue of the possible resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in post-AMISOM Somalia, with most of them inferring concurrence that *Al Shabaab* will likely resurge post-AMISOM. The majority (25.7%) of the respondents believed that the resurgence of *Al Shabaab* post-AMISOM would lead to increased attacks within Somalia and in Kenya's NFD. In

comparison, 16.2% of the respondents noted that in post-AMISOM Somalia, FGS and SSF would likely collapse in the face of a resurgence by *Al Shabaab*. As 13.7% of the respondents indicated, areas liberated by AMISOM will be recaptured by *Al Shabaab* post-AMISOM. As a result, the explanation by respondents alludes to the likely impact on Kenya. These include increased refugee inflow into Kenya (14.9% of the respondents), reduced tourism revenues due to the resurgence of piracy (13.3% of the respondents), radicalisation and recruitment by *Al Shabaab* in the NFD (2.9% of the respondents), and increased smuggling of contraband into Kenya (1.3% of the respondents).



Plate 5.4: The researcher standing next to a water drilling machine destroyed by Al Shabaab while it was drilling a borehole for the community in Kulbiyow

Source: Field data 2022

The respondents' pessimistic opinion conforms to scholars' caution that the only way to Somalia's stability is the decisive defeat of *Al Shabaab* (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Williams *et al.*, 2018). This calls for what Kanat (2019) called a 'victory strategy'. Besides, the security and governance aspects of AMISOM have not been adequately attained; thus, the respondents' pessimism reflects the concerns by scholars on the capacity of SSF to assume security responsibilities (Nzau, 2018; William & Hashi, 2016). The reversion of Somalia to *Al Shabaab* control will have far-reaching implications for Kenya and beyond, including what Okoth (2018) calls the Greater HoA.

Al Shabaab has allied with ISIS/L to push for the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic caliphate in the African Great Lakes spanning Kenya, Uganda, Eastern DRC, Tanzania and Cabo Delgado regions of Mozambique. Chitembwe (2021; 334) noted that besides religious motivations relating to skewed *Wahhabi* and *Salafi* teachings, other critical push factors for radicalisation include: poverty, historical injustices, perennial land issues, social-political factors, marginalisation, breakdown of families, lack of education, proximity to conflict zones, among others. The push factors provide a stream of recruits to terror organizations such as *Al Shabaab*, sustaining their human resource for terrorism. As a result, issues of terror attacks, radicalisation, refugees, and economic sabotage, among others, have been destabilizing factors in the HoA (Nzau & Mwanzia, 2018: 357; Matanga & Muchilwa, 2018: 415; Iteyo, 2018: 399). Most of these factors warranted intervention in Somalia to counteract the negative security implications (Migue *et al.*, 2012; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). In the event of a resurgence by *Al Shabaab* in post-AMISOM Somalia, the security of Kenya and HoA will continue to suffer.

Indicating that AMISOM is majorly keeping *Al Shabaab* at bay, 2.9% of the respondents noted that AMISOM exit affords *Al Shabaab* freedom of movement and action. However, some respondents were optimistic that *Al Shabaab* might not resurge in post-AMISOM Somalia, with 6.3% of the respondents having the conditional view that, if there is a strong SSF, *Al Shabaab* will be contained. Another 2.9% of the respondents noted that the local population have goodwill for peace and development and thus may not be pro-*Al Shabaab* post-AMISOM.

The findings align with Ligawa's (2018) submission, noting the importance of population support for the Somalia peace-building effort. Moreover, studies by Chumba (2016), Mutisya (2017) and Opon (2015) encouraged community participation in PSO endeavours. The conditional optimism of a strong SSF is, by implication, pessimistic in the face of a weak SSF and FGS at the time AMISOM has transited. The view aligns with the caution by William and Hashi (2016) that it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia without leaving behind a capable, legitimate and inclusive SSF. Similarly, all exit plans broached from the AMISOM transition have been conditioned on attaining requisite capacity by SSF and FGS before the complete handover of responsibilities.

The question of local population support for peace and stability is not a conclusion that could be arrived at with a significant degree of confidence. The Somali clan dynamics are fluid, and loyalties shift depending on who gives provisions or has the gun (Nzau, 2018). The achievements by AMISOM in the framework of WHAM require a long duration to entrench so that it does not appear as a short-term solution. Such support for peace and

development can evaporate when gun-toting *Al Shabaab* takes over. Corroboratively, such support is also conditioned on SSF and FGS's ability to secure, govern, and keep *Al Shabaab* at bay. It leads to whether SSFs can assume security responsibilities in post-AMISOM Somalia. It is the focus of the next section.

5.2 Somalia Security Forces' ability to assume security responsibilities

The ability of SSF to take over security responsibilities has been doubtful, as expressed by Williams *et al.* (2018) and Ligawa (2018). In order to establish this, the respondents were asked whether the SSF was ready to assume security responsibilities in post-AMISOM Somalia. The findings are depicted in Figure 5.3.




Figure 5.30: Somalia Security Forces' ability to assume security responsibilities post-AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

From figure 5.3, a majority (64%) of the respondents indicated that SSF was not ready to assume security responsibilities post-AMISOM. In comparison, 36% noted that SS F was ready to assume security responsibilities post-AMISOM. The findings confirm the doubts by Ligawa (2018), Nzau (2018) as well as William and Hashi (2016), who shared the view that SSF, and by extension FGS, does not have sufficient capacity to assume takeover in post-AMISOM Somalia. With the findings in Section 5.1 indicating a possible resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in post-AMISOM Somalia, the lack of capable security forces to contain them within Somalia implies that immediate neighbours such as Kenya would have to bear the brunt.

Scholars believe that the future of Somalia will not rest on militarism but on a civilian rule in a law and order framework (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Williams & Hashi, 2016). Similarly, the same scholars acknowledge that AMISOM PSO stabilization is a gradual process that requires careful planning, capacitation and implementation. Various analyses of the AMISOM transition have concluded with an observation of the deficiencies in security and governance elements, which are crucial in maintaining a conducive environment for peace-building and economic development. Nzau (2018), Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), as well as William and Hashi (2016), shared the concern about the capacity of SSF and FGS to assume security responsibilities in post-AMISOM Somalia. Implicitly, any reversal in the gains in Somalia since intervention will be inimical to Kenya's national security. The same fears were captured in the opinion of a Key Informant:

There is a general fear that when KDF exits Somalia, *Al Shabaab* will undoubtedly take over. The Somali soldiers are not well trained, equipped or motivated to take charge after the KDF exit. We experience infiltration and attacks from *Al Shabaab*, smuggling across the border, and clashes between herders crisscrossing the border, among other challenges. The environs of *Liboi*, *Gherille*, *Ceel Wak*, *Hulugho*, and *Ishakani*, provide the main access routes. The exit of KDF will likely lead to deterioration of the situation unless the home side of the border is adequately manned. The border is porous, and *Al Shabaab* has many places to access our soil, attack and escape (Interview with a County Administration Officer in *Liboi*, Wajir County, on 26 November 2022).

The opinion of the Key Informant points to a general lack of confidence that the situation will be better after the transition of the KDF from AMISOM. Various AMISOM mandates, and relevant reviews, have taken cognizance of this issue as reflected in the emphasis on capacity building for FGS, SSF and other critical organs for Somalia's governance (William & Hashi, 2016; Williams *et al.*, 2018). The STP takes cognizance of this issue and reemphasizes the need to have a capable SSF, FGS and other governance systems in full fledge before AMISOM can exit completely (African Union, 2022). However, the findings of this study in chapter four majorly indicated that the security and governance structures are not well capacitated and may not be able to assume responsibilities.

The follow-up question in this chapter sought to relate the issue of SSF capacity to the effects on Kenya's national security. While the SSF will provide the general context of this assessment, the JSF, in particular, will be the specific focus because they are responsible for Jubaland, which is the immediate area bordering the whole length of Kenyan territory to the East. The earlier findings and analysis in chapter four indicated that JSF and other security forces are not considered in the STP to be part of the SSF as envisioned in post-AMISOM Somalia. The findings further noted that omitting security forces from federal member

states, such as JSF in Jubaland, would be inimical to the cohesion and stability of Somalia and the security of Kenya and HoA. The militates against the second transition vision pillar by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that the security of Kenya hinges on a stable, peaceful and prosperous Jubaland as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*.

William and Hashi (2016) noted that it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia without leaving behind a capable, legitimate and inclusive Somalia Security Forces. Indeed, suppose AMISOM/ATMIS does not adequately address the security and governance issue of Somalia's recovery and stability. In that case, Kenya will have to continue contending with attacks by *Al Shabaab*, smuggling of contraband goods, Kidnappings, radicalisation and recruitment by militants, and refugee problems, among others. As rightly advised by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 122), AMISOM exit should consider the ramifications to neighbours' security.

As noted earlier, the issue of capacity building for SSF has been part of the aspirations of the various mandates and CONOPs for AMISOM. Similarly, there have been concerns on the same, as noted by William and Hashi (2016), Nzau (2018), and Dessu (2022), among others. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) have pointed out the significance of a capable SSF to the national security of Kenya, more so in Jubaland, which is under JSF. Furthermore, Madeira (2022), cognizant of the complex nature of Somalia's conflict environment, averred that issues of force generation go beyond human resources provision. It entails capacity building and professionalization of the force to assume security responsibilities, *albeit* adequately graduated. However, by AMISOM's transition to ATMIS on 1 April 2022, the

security and governance aspects upon which the security of Kenya NFD hinges had not been sufficiently addressed. It was emphatically confirmed in the findings and analysis in Chapter Four and further corroborated by the findings in Figure 5.3. Consequently, establishing the 'safe Jubaland corridor' as advanced by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) would be doubtful, leaving Kenya open to security repercussions of exit of AMISOM and KDF Contingent.

Besides, Figure 5.3 indicates that 36% of the respondents concurred that SSF was ready to assume security responsibilities in post-AMISOM Somalia. It partly supports the optimistic assessment by Williams *et al.* (2018) that AMISOM has made significant achievements in accomplishing its mandate. However, the assessment does not adequately account for the various extensions in the AMISOM mandate and transition timelines. The graduated handover of responsibilities to the SSF, as suggested by Williams *et al.* (2018) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), was conditioned on the capacity of the SSF. It has not been convincingly the case. Thus, AMISOM had to stay beyond the projected exit in 2018 (African Union, 2016). There has been training and equipment assistance by foreign partners such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, USA, and others in developing the capacity of 'Somalia elite forces' such as the *Danaab* and *Gorgor*.

It is important to note that these training and equipping assistance have been extended only to federal forces (SSF) and not to regional forces of federal member states, whom Mogadishu and the STP do not recognize, thus justifying the apprehension around the capacity of security forces. Even so, the elite forces do not adequately meet the threshold

for independent operations without significant support from AMISOM. Having examined the capacity of SSF to assume security responsibilities in Somalia and telegraphing how the same affect Kenya's national security, it is now imperative to expand the scope to the stability in the Country and how it influences Kenya. This leads to the point of analysis and discussion for the next section.

5.3 Somalia stability states impacting Kenya's national security post-AMISOM

Controversially, Warah's (2014) arguments indicated that Kenya and other interested actors would not wish for a stable Somalia due to the need to take advantage of her resource and dabble in illegal activities within her territory. However, the prolonged negative socioeconomic and security effects on Kenya do not support the view that Kenya does not wish well for a stable Somalia. Indeed Migue *et al.* (2012) pointed out that Kenya had to intervene in Somalia over concern for her (Kenya) security. Similarly, Oluoch (2018) and Opondo (2018: 379) shared the view that KDF had to cross into Somalia to pursue *Al Shabaab*, threatening Kenya's socioeconomic and security stability.

Beyond intervention, it is pertinent to assess how the state of Somalia's stability would affect Kenya's national security. Using the Failed/Fragile state index, Williams *et al.* (2018) compared how Somalia measured against Mali and DRC (known conflict zones) between 2006 and 2018. The index measures performance along twelve political, economic, military and social indicators of instability viz demographic pressures, refugees and displaced persons, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economy, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus,

factionalized elites, and external intervention. Higher scores indicate a greater level of state failure and fragility. The findings are depicted in Figure 5.4 as adopted from Williams *et al.* (2018: 49).




Figure 5.31: Failed/Fragile State Index, 2006-2018

Source: Adapted from Williams *et al.* (2018: 49).

In the findings, Williams *et al.* (2018) established that the index has consistently ranked Somalia as one of the world's most failed/fragile states. Since 2008, it has been either the worst or the second-worst performing Country in the world and has shown no improvement since AMISOM's deployment. Moreover, in 2022 the Fund for peace, a USA peace

research and education NGO, ranked Somalia second behind Yemen in the failed states index measured from 2006 to 2022, with a score of 110.5 (Fund for Peace, 2022: 52).

It is important to note that 2006 marks the rise and fall of the ICU and the assumption of a radical militant approach by its military wing of *Al Shabaab*, prompting intervention by AU. Besides, 2018 was the initial projected transition and exit of AMISOM from Somalia, which did not materialize. The inference that the study drew from this is that by the projected exit, Somalia's situation, as a failed state would not have improved despite AMISOM's efforts. The predicament loops back to the non-attainment of security and governance objectives of the AMISOM mandate as established in Chapter Four. As indicated by the ranking by Fund for Peace (2022), The same predicament existed by the time of the transition of AMISOM to ATMIS, with Somalia sliding in the fragile states index ranking by -0.4 in 2022 compared to 2021.

The consistent ranking of Somalia as a failed state has been a security nightmare for HoA and Kenya, in particular, who have had to contend with the attendant adverse security effects. It was aptly summed by Nzau and Mwanzia (2018: 357) that the civil war in Somalia since 1991 has been a regional security quagmire, giving rise to massive refugee flows into Kenya, the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and lately the infiltration of international terrorist organizations and maritime criminals.

While the assessments have been based on the pre-AMISOM and AMISOM PSO era, examining the same beyond AMISOM deployment is prudent to establish whether the same state of affairs will persist. In achieving this, the study postulated three states stability

and respondents' views were sought to determine if each would threaten Kenya's national security. The findings are depicted in Table 5.1.

Table 5.13: Cross-tabulation of post-AMISOM Somalia stability states and threat to Kenya's national security

Somalia Post-AMISOM Stability State	Threat to Kenya's national security (N=370)						Total	
	Threat		Not a threat		Not sure		Freq	%age
	Freq	%age	Freq	%age	Freq	%age		
Failed stabilization	280	75.7	67	18.1	23	6.2	370	100
Fragile stability	180	48.6	112	30.3	78	21.1	370	100
Stable Somalia	34	9.2	224	60.5	112	30.3	370	100

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Table 5.1 significantly point to the fact that a stable Somalia will not threaten Kenya's national security, and therefore it is a desirable stabilization outcome. The data indicates that 75.7% of the respondents believed that a failed stabilization of Somalia by AMISOM would threaten Kenya's national security, with 18.1% indicating that failed stabilization would not be a threat. Ligawa (2018) and Oluoch (2018) shared in the assessment that pre-AMISOM PSOs in Somalia failed, and thus the stability deteriorated, and the security of Kenya and HoA suffered. The failed PSOs in Somalia since the early 1990s illustrated the adverse effects on the region, as Nzau and Mwanzia (2018) indicated, thus becoming a security quagmire. Indeed, the continued and worsening security consequences to Kenya from failed Somalia stabilization prompted Kenya to invoke article 51 of the UN charter in pursuing *Al Shabaab* across the border. The same apprehension

holds for a failed stabilization of Somalia post-AMISOM exit and ought to inform planners and strategists for AMISOM transition and exit.

Furthermore, Table 5.1 indicate that a majority (48.6%) of the respondents considered that a fragile Somalia stable state would threaten Kenya's national security. In comparison, 30.3% considered a fragile Somalia stable state would not be a threat to Kenya's national security. A significant 21.1% of the respondents were uncertain and indicated whether it would threaten Kenya's national security. A fragile stabilization state of Somalia is a situation that will be on the precipice and may develop either way, viz towards stability or instability. Military intervention adventures in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya, among others, left them fragile after military intervention (Kanat, 2019; Hamasaeed & Nada, 2020; Sopko, 2021; Croker, 2021). The consequence has been a spiral of sectarian conflicts, warlordism, ISIL and Taliban takeover and adverse security effects on neighbouring states (Jackson & Amiri, 2021). AMISOM found itself in this quandary while attempting to exit with due consideration of the ramifications within Somalia and beyond, thus extensions in exit plans. As before, Kenya will withstand the worst of a fragile stability state in Somalia.

The best-case scenario would be a stable post-AMISOM Somalia. As indicated in Table 5.1, most respondents (60.5%) perceived that a stable post-AMISOM Somalia would not threaten Kenya's national security. Those who viewed that a stable Somalia would threaten Kenya had reduced to only 9.2% of the respondents. However, the respondents who were uncertain if a stable Somalia would threaten Kenya rose to 30.3%. Notwithstanding past relations between Kenya and Somalia and punctuation by Shifta campaigns, diplomatic

tiffs and, recently, the maritime border disputes, the findings point to a desire for a stable neighbour. Such outstanding diplomatic and territorial misunderstandings have to utilise dispute resolution mechanisms other than militancy (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; William & Hashi, 2016). The significant 30.3% of the respondents likely based their uncertainty on the complexity of Somalia clan-based politics and attendant volatility, the past uncordial relations around 'Greater Somalia' ideology and recently, the maritime dispute despite Kenya's effort to stabilize the Country.

A Political settlement and capacity of SSF are critical for the stability of Somalia and averting negative security consequences, thereby realizing the optimism of 60.5% of the respondents desiring a stable Somalia. In recognition of this, Ligawa, Okoth, and Matanga (2017) posited that there is a need for the realignment of AMISOM PSO activities to support the development of peace and stability in Somalia. Furthermore, Williams *et al.* (2018) pointed out that AMISOM would not have a practical pathway out of Somalia without a successful political process. The security of Kenya hinges on the complete stabilization of Somalia's governance and security vanquishing or reformation of extremist groups such as *Al Shabaab*. Think tank organizations such as Crisis Group (2022) and scholars such as William and Hashi (2016) entertained the idea that the participation of *Al Shabaab* in a cordial political process of the Country can provide a political settlement to the Somalia Conflict *impasse*. As strategic theory advises, all these are possibilities for consideration to attain optimum outcomes.

The study's findings on this issue repudiate Warah's (2014) claim that Kenya would not wish for a stable Somalia. Warah's assertion would have stemmed from unsubstantiated debates that profiteers of conflict would desire perpetual instability to proliferate and traffic SALW, exploit natural resources, and attract donor funding under the pretext of humanitarian assistance, among others. Issues of natural resources and preference for instability can be inferred from the maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia, with some Western powers pulling the strings behind the scenes having secured concessions for exploration and exploitation from Somalia (Elias, 2021). However, this is not the case with Kenya's interest in Somalia.

As noted by scholars, Kenya intervened in Somalia over concern for her socioeconomic and security interests and the need to create a buffer in Jubaland to cushion against such effects (Migue *et al.*, 2012; Nzau & Mwanzia, 2018; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). In line with interest-based bargaining (Hartzell, 2017) and within a multilateral AU/IGAD/HoA Neo-functional context (Nicoli, 2019), socioeconomic and security concerns have primarily informed Kenya's involvement in PSOs such as in Sudan, Somalia and recently in the DRC.

A Key Informant aptly captured this as follows:

A stable Somalia will mean a more secure Kenya. Somalis will focus on developing their Country rather than fighting and perpetrating attacks in Kenya. Border controls can be established, and cross-border activities regulated. However, there is anarchy, and we are adversely affected (Interview with NPS Commander in *Khorof Harar*, Wajir County, on 28 November 2022).

The Key Informant's view reflects that a stable Somalia is desirable and that state-to-state dealing will be possible where FGS has complete control of the entire territory of Somalia.

Deployed in the remote areas of the NFD, the key Informant had first-hand experience with the security effects and plight of residents of the region. The sentiment is also a further repudiation of Warah's (2014) claim that Kenya would not desire a stable Somalia. Implicitly, the key Informant supports the argument by, *inter alia*, Migue *et al.* (2012) and Nzau and Mwanzia (2018) that security concerns compelled Kenya to intervene in Somalia and later participate in the multilateral AMISOM PSO with the purview of APSA.

Having considered the situation in post-AMISOM Somalia that has consequences to Kenya's national security *viz* as a resurgence of *Al Shabaab*, the capacity of SSF to assume security responsibilities in post-AMISOM Somalia and the various envisioned stability states of Somalia, the next step is to examine whether Kenya should securitise the issue to inform responses when KDF contingent will exit Somalia. It is the deliberation of the next section.

5.4 Consideration of post-AMISOM implications to Kenya's national security

Neo-functionalism theory posits that society is more than the sum of its parts; instead, each aspect of it works for the stability of the whole (Haas, 1961). Khara (2020) further elucidates that a society is a sum of its constituent parts. A disturbance (or stability) in one or more constituent parts affects the rest of the system functionally. It has to adjust or remedy the anomie. While Neo-functionalism theory examines the macro aspects of sociology within a state, the study expanded this paradigm beyond the state confines to multilateral levels within regionalism. Indeed, this perspective conforms to contemporary realism philosophy, which advocates for a rational realist approach as opposed to the rigid

and parsimonious structural perspectives advanced by classical realists such as Morgenthau and Waltz (Wieclaski, 2020). Rational realists, therefore, ought to pursue state interests through broader openness to the domestic nuances of foreign policy making. Thus, with the AMISOM transition and attendant effects, Kenya has to act rationally and realistically to anticipate and respond to the consequences adequately.

The preceding argument seeks to firm up the basis for the subsequent analysis in this section, and recalls the guiding philosophy of this thesis. The issue of concern is how Kenya should consider and frame the implications arising from the transition of Kenya's contingent from AMISOM in a consequentialist manner. Securitisation of the issue provides a framework for analysis. Indeed, concern for the socioeconomic security of Kenya prompted active KDF intervention in Somalia (Migue *et al.*, 2012). The securitization paradigm require that political issues are framed as extreme security issues to be dealt with urgently through a labelling process that portrays them as dangerous or threatening and should be addressed immediately (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998). This ties in well with the Neo-functionalism perspective of anomie in a segment of society affecting the whole and has to be addressed by having the issues securitised for appropriate response.

In this respect, the study sought respondents' views on whether Kenya should be concerned about the consequences of KDF transiting from AMISOM. The findings were as depicted in Figure 5.5.




Figure 5.32: Kenya should be concerned about national security implications from transition Kenya Contingent in AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings indicate that 79% of the respondents affirmed that Kenya should be concerned with the security implication of the transition of the Kenyan Contingent from AMISOM. In comparison, 21% indicated that Kenya should not be concerned with the security implication of the transition of the Kenyan Contingent from AMISOM. The findings support Migue *et al.* (2012) and Oluoch (2018) that Kenya crossed into Somalia over concern for her socioeconomic security to arrest the situation away from home before it adversely bore on national security. The same state of affairs still holds since, according to Williams *et al.* (2018: 39), Somalia's situation, as a failed state has not improved even by

the projected transition timeline of 2018. The findings of this study in Chapter Four further indicated that the situation had not significantly improved since security and governance institutions had not been adequately capacitated. Therefore, owing to these findings and the historical relations between Kenya and Somalia, securitisation of the transition is paramount to inform appropriate responses.

Securitisation theory holds that nothing is a security issue by itself, but rather it only becomes such when it is labelled by a securitizing agent possessing social and institutional power (Wæver, 1995). Taking a cue from Eroukhmanoff (2021), the securitizing agent is the government of Kenya over the concern of the referent object *viz* the state of Kenya. The USA has used securitisation processes to justify actions in Iraq and Afghanistan in the context of GWOT and use labels such as 'axis of evil' (Crocker, 2021; Kanat, 2019). Engagements of the public and international organizations such AU and UN by Kenya after KDF's entry into Somalia occurred in the context of securitizing the issue under article 51 of the UN Charter to avert the notion of aggression. Similarly, with pointers towards insufficiently capable SSF and FGS post-AMISOM as established by findings in chapter four, transition and attendant consequences should be framed as security concerns to justify mitigation measures through bargaining and strategising as guided by strategic theory (Hartzell, 2017; Schelling, 1984).

In expanding on the issue further, explanations were sought from respondents on whether Kenya should be concerned about the consequences of KDF transiting from AMISOM. The

responses were aggregated around common themes, and the findings were as depicted in Figure 5.5.




Figure 5.33: Aggregated explanations on whether Kenya should be concerned about national security implications of transition exit of Kenya Contingent in AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

Most of the respondents' aggregated explanations, as depicted in Figure 5.6, indicate that Kenya should be concerned about the consequences of KDF transiting from AMISOM. A majority (27.4%) of the respondents believed that Kenya-Somalia border areas would experience the effects of the KDF transition. This is due to *Al Shabaab* exploiting the security vacuum to attack parts of Kenya, as 18.2% of the respondents indicated. Besides, 12.2% of the respondents indicated that there should be a concern about the effects of the Kenyan contingent's transition from AMISOM since this will negatively affect Kenya's economy. Concern for transition implications will enable Kenya to anticipate disputes such as the Maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia, as opined by 9.1% of the respondents and the development of border and internal security measures, as noted by 6.1% of the respondents. The influx of refugees in post-AMISOM Somalia should also concern Kenya, as indicated by 6.1% of the respondents.

The findings corroborate the consequentialist view on the resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in post-AMISOM Somalia, as established in Figure 5.2. Moreover, it supports the findings by Mativo (2014), Chumba (2016) and Barasa (2018) that refugees portended a dilemma between humanitarian and security considerations by the host state. The findings point to the harmful nature of the consequences of Kenya Contingent's transition from AMISOM, thus justifying the need to securitise the transition. According to Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), the AMISOM transition should consider the ramifications to Kenya and HoA and thus the need to hinge the transition on a stable and peaceful Jubaland corridor free of *Al Shabaab* [and other destabilizing agents]. This was aptly captured in the explanation by 12.2% of

respondents, as depicted in Figure 5.5. They noted that a successful transition would mean a peaceful Kenya.

Furthermore, a desirable state of affairs on transition would be a stable Somalia, as conveyed in this study's findings in Table 5.1. However, as has been variously established in this study's findings, the security and governance aspects in Somalia have not been sufficiently attained, and the concerns about SSF's capacity to assume security responsibilities persist. Therefore, the justification for crossing into Somalia, as advanced by Migue *et al.* (2012), continues to loom large in post-AMISOM Somalia; therefore, the need to frame the transition as a security issue for Kenya.

Respondents with contrary views on whether the transition should concern Kenya were a minority (21%). As depicted in Figure 5.6, these respondents majorly anchored their view on the confidence in Kenya's security alertness as indicated by 5.7% of the respondents as well as 3% of the respondents who noted that it should be a concern for Somalia. While this could be partly the case, the border areas with Somalia have been characterized as long and porous, and this lacks control against security effects from Somalia (Okoth, 2018; Nzau, 2018; Mutisya, 2017). The expansive nature of the area makes it difficult to effectively patrol every inch unless augmented by other security measures, negating the confidence in the security posture of 12.2% of the respondents.

The notion that the transition should be a concern for Somalia does not take cognizance of the macro 'spillover' perspective of Neo-functionalism theory, viz, what ails Somalia will

ail Kenya. It is the essence upon which the regionalism approach to AfSol concept has been advocated as underpinned in the R2P principle (Obi & Ukeje, 2018). The Westphalian notion of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states can fully suffice where Somalia is stable, and FGS is capable of accounting for affairs of the federal state, including insecurity projected onto neighbouring states. When such accountability is not possible such as in the case of Somalia, this dictate is subsumed in R2P. Thus, regional neighbours must be involved with a framework such as AMISOM, ATMIS and subsequent ones.

Furthermore, intervening regional members do so in a realist context to seek, advance and attain their national interest. In the case of Kenya, it is a socioeconomic and security interest (Migue *et al.*, 2012). Lensing the interests beyond AMISOM will indicate a prismatic scatter owing to the non-attainment of governance and security capacity to enable Somalia to take charge of her affairs. Thus to focus on the issues, Kenya has to be concerned and securitise the transition to develop appropriate mitigations to safeguard national security. Having established that Kenya ought to be concerned and securitise the consequences of the transition from AMISOM, consequences must be contextualised to a particular location(s) that bear the brunt. It is analysed in the next section.

5.5. Counties affected by security implications of AMISOM transition

The OODA-loop planning model, as an approach to strategy formulation, entails clearly defining the problem and placing it in the proper temporal and spatial context to inform the right decisions for action (Luft, 2020). After examining the need to securitise the transition and attendant implications (problem definition), this section will seek to locate the spatial,

and to some extent, the temporal, theatre in which it will play out. Kenya's national security being the dependent variable of the study, it is implicit that Kenya as a country provides the larger arena for the transition implications within the general context of HoA, EAC and even ICGLR. Specific areas of impact are the Counties bordering Somalia, hinterland areas, and along the Kenyan Coast.

Kenya's NFD areas have withstood the worst of instability in Somalia, besides environmental hardships and marginality that afflict ASAL areas. Nzau and Mwanzia (2018: 357) submitted that the civil war in Somalia since 1991 had become a regional security quagmire-giving rise to massive refugee inflows to Kenya, trafficking and proliferation of SALW as well as infiltration of international terrorists and maritime criminals. Before the civil war, the 'Greater Somalia' ideology perpetrated by Somalia using *Shifita* in NFD inflicted the areas through not only attacks by Somalia-sponsored *Shifita* but also repressive responses by the government of Kenya (Chonka & Healy, 2021). As noted by Nzau and Guyo (2018: 574-576), the *Shifita* irredentism was beset by a colonial legacy of segregationist policies that were exploited by Somalia to advance her expansionist ambitions, thus affecting present-day counties of Mandera, Wajir, and Isiolo, Garissa and Marsabit.

Since the rise of *Al Shabaab*, and their incursions into Kenya, the NFD counties have been a target or transit point for the militants to prosecute the heinous acts of terrorism. Abdille (2019) observed that *Al Shabaab* militants had perpetrated the killing of teachers and quarry workers, abduction of medical workers, and destruction of communication masts.

While the incidents have significantly reduced due to KDF operations in Somalia as part of AMISOM, occasional attacks continue to be reported owing to the ease of infiltration through the border and the socio-cultural homogeneity across the border that offers a contiguous zone for the militants to disguise themselves.

Given the Post-AMISOM transition that entails the exit of the Kenyan Contingent from Somalia, it is critical to assess whether the NFD faces the risks of transition implications and of what nature. Therefore, the study sought respondents' views on which counties face the effects of the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in Somalia. The findings depicted in Figure 5.7 indicated that the majority of the respondents agreed that the counties of Mandera (22.7%), Wajir (21.9%), Garissa (20.5%) and Lamu (22.7%) are the most affected by the security implications of the transition from Somalia.




Figure 5.34: Counties affected by the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

The responses trend indicates that Mandera and Lamu are at high risk, followed by Wajir and Garissa. It is supported by the numerous reported attacks on non-Somali teachers and quarry workers and the abduction of Cuban doctors in Mandera County (Abdille, 2019; AFP, 2020). Lamu has been an arena of *Al Shabaab* attacks since June 2014, when *Mpeketoni* was invaded by *Al Shabaab* militants (Anderson, 2014). Previously, kidnapping tourists in Kiwayu Island, located in Lamu County, added to the urgency for KDF to intervene in Somalia (Migue *et al.*, 2012). The expansive *Boni* forest covers *Al Shabaab*, allowing them freedom of movement to perpetrate attacks in areas such as *Mpeketoni*, *Mukunumbi*, *Witu*, *Pandanguo*, and *Baure*, compelling the launch of multiagency operations in the areas (Kibusia, 2020).

As with the rest of the NFD counties, Wajir has been a conduit for militants and contraband (Jubat, 2019; Bahadur, 2022). Bordering Mandera County and the hotspot *Gedo* region of Somalia, Wajir experiences infiltrations and IED attacks, kidnappings, *zakat* collection, and forced recruitment, among other pernicious activities by *Al Shabaab*. Garissa county has had incidents such as the attack on the Garissa university college in 2015 (Sahgal *et al.*, 2019; Opondo, 2018: 379-381; Wakube, Nyagah, Mwangi, & Attree, 2016). The Dadaab refugee complex is also domiciled in the County, hosting almost entirely Somali refugees occasioned by instabilities in Somalia (OCHA, 2021). It is congruent with Mativo's (2014) assertions that the Kakuma refugee camp continued to experience insecurity incidents perpetrated by or against refugees despite the presence of laws.

The preceding discussion on the effects experienced by the NFD counties traces back to the colonial legacy of segregation and marginalisation, from the *Shifita* and Somalia civil war to the period of *Al Shabaab* and AMISOM PSO. As analysed by Williams *et al.* (2018: 39) by the projected AMISOM in 2018, the situation in Somalia had not improved, and the Country was still categorised as a failed state. The findings of this study, while positive on the achievements of AMISOM, indicate that doubts about Somalia's security and governance capacity. The apprehension held by Williams and Hashi (2016), Nzau (2018) as well as Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), are yet to be dispelled. By the date of AMISOM transition, SSF/JSF was not ready to assume security responsibilities from AMISOM, thus jeopardizing the safe Jubaland corridor, as Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) desired upon which peace and stability of NFD hinged.

The finding presented in Figure 5.7 further affirms this: the AMISOM transition will have negative security implications on NFD owing to a lack of capacity on the part of FGS and SSF and the likelihood of *Al Shabaab* resurgence. This concern was captured in the sentiments of a Key Informant as follows:

Before the attack in *Mpeketoni*, the communities around here lived in harmony, the attack brought to the surface community tensions that had simmered over land issues. The attackers exploited this as cover for randomly attacking communities, including *Pandanguo*. The *Boni* forest is large and dense to allow the militants to hide. Operations by KDF have brought some calm, but still, people cannot go on with regular business without looking over their shoulders. You cannot tell when and where they will strike. This fear affects economic activities, and education services and health workers cannot access remote areas for fear of being killed or kidnapped. If KDF exits *Boni* and Somalia, the militants will have a field day (Interview with a Community elder in *Pandanguo*, Lamu County, on 29 November 2022).

The Community Elder's assessment presents a snapshot of the Community's afflictions due to *Al Shabaab* activities and the fears of KDF exit from *Boni* and Somalia. The thick *Boni* vegetation compounds the ungoverned nature of the border areas. It thus provides the *Al Shabaab* covered routes to sneak back and forth across the borders. Moreover, the large expanses of territory in Kenya's North Eastern counties stretch the ability of security forces to patrol every inch of the area and the length of the border effectively (Haider, 2020). Since AMISOM and KDF will not stay in Somalia indefinitely, eventually, a safe Jubaland buffer zone and robust homeland defence will have to be attained for national security (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020).

In order to expand on the spatial limits, the study sought to establish which other counties, other than in the NFD, would face the security implications of the transition from AMISOM. It was in cognizance of the fact that the consequences will not be localised only within the NFD but will have far-reaching effects on Kenya as a whole, HoA and even the ICGLR. The findings are presented in Figure 5.8.




Figure 5.35: Additional Counties affected by security implications of Kenyan contingent transition from AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

Besides the counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu, the findings in Figure 5.8 indicate that the majority (30%) of the respondents identified Mombasa County as being vulnerable to implications of the transition from AMISOM. It was followed by Nairobi County, with 29% of the respondents affirming it would be affected. Moreover, 24% and 17% of the respondents indicated that Kilifi County and Tana River County would be vulnerable to the transition implications. The findings are generally valid since these counties have previously experienced attacks and other activities by *Al Shabaab*.

Besides the Al Qaeda-linked 1998 bombings of the USA embassy, Nairobi witnessed two major *Al Shabaab*-linked attacks, viz Westgate Mall attack in 2013 and the Dusit D2 hotel attack in 2018. Being the capital city and the face of the Country, it is evident why Nairobi remains a high-profile target for *Al Shabaab* post-AMISOM. Similarly, Mombasa and Kilifi Counties have been radicalisation hotspots due to many factors. A study by Chitembwe (2021) established that poverty was the leading cause of radicalisation at 80%, while unemployment ranked second at 77% in Mombasa County. Furthermore, Speckhard and Shajkovci (2019) established that approximately 60% of youth between 14 and 30 years hailing from Mombasa and Kilifi had been recruited into Al-Shabaab, MRC and other extremist groups. Tana River County has remained relatively calm, punctuated by occasional communal conflicts over water and pasture. There have been a few attacks by *Al Shabaab* in areas of *Minjila*. However, proximity to Garissa and Lamu counties makes it a possible target.

The findings, and attendant discussion, point to the spread zone of the security effects of the AMISOM transition. It reflects that, as indicated by respondents in Figures 5.2 and 5.6, NFD will feel the immediate effects of the transition. After that, the spread will go hinterland and the coastal areas to critical and symbolic locations such as the capital city. It thus reinforces the argument of this study that the transition from AMISOM, and attendant implications, ought to be securitised, and located to likely target areas, for appropriate mitigation. This position supports the submission by Opondo (2018: 377) that national security is a concept that a government, along with its parliament, should protect the state and its citizens against all kinds of threats to the nation.

Furthermore, this aligns with the OODA loop planning conception (Luft, 2020), and the strategic theory dictates that all possibilities must be considered in military operations to attain optimum outcomes (Smith, 2008; Schelling, 1984). Therefore, the nature of the implications has to be established to prioritize mitigation measures. It is examined in the next section.

5.6 Manner of national security implications from AMISOM transition

Determining the manner of national security implications to Kenya is set within the context of the securitisation of the AMISOM transition to inform mitigation strategy. Identifying the various securitisation sectoring, Eroukhmanoff (2021) submitted that sectoring of threats implied that essential threats are not objective but relate to each referent object's different characteristics. In the Community of nations, this has to be done within the

context of Neo-functionalism (Haas, 1958) while advancing the rational interests of the state (Więclawski, 2020).

Scholars have variously assessed that instabilities in a state have adverse effects on their immediate neighbours. Crocker (2021) observed that the Afghanistan conflicts affected neighbouring states such as Pakistan through the infiltration of terrorism and the influx of refugees. Kanat (2019) and Hamasaeed and Nada (2020) averred that Iraqi instability affected areas beyond the Middle East through the takeover of ISIL, which sought to establish an Islamic caliphate extending into Syria. Nzau and Mwanzia (2018) submitted that the Somalia civil war had become a regional security quagmire. The instabilities in Somalia have been protracted and can be categorized as intractable owing to the complex clannist dynamics involved (Nzau, 2018). The entry of AMISOM and the lengthy military operations were envisaged to restore stability and allow FGS to take charge. While this has been achieved to a less extent, the effects will be felt in the post-AMISOM Era. The study sought to establish how the transition from AMISOM affects Kenya's national security, and the findings are as depicted in Figure 5.9




Figure 5.36: Nature of national security effects from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings depicted in Figure 5.9 indicate that the majority (48.6%) of the respondents believed that the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM would negatively affect Kenya's national security. In comparison, 21.1% of the respondents noted that the transition would positively affect national security. Some respondents (18.1%) were not sure of the nature of the effect, while 12.2% indicated that the transition would not affect national security either positively or negatively. The findings support the apprehension by William and Hashi (2016) and Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that a rushed transition from Somalia will be detrimental to regional security and stability. Indeed, Hardy (2004) cautioned that military operations have far-reaching implications depending on how they are planned, executed and managed.

The findings further corroborate the findings and analysis in Chapter Four that, while AMISOM has made some significant achievements in stabilizing Somalia, key mandate objectives of security and governance are not well attained. Besides, a resurgence of *Al Shabaab* post-AMISOM (Figure 5.1) gives substance to most respondents' view that the transition will negatively affect Kenya's national security. The consideration of the nature of the effects (positive or negative) aligns with Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) submission that the AMISOM transition ought to consider ramifications to neighbouring countries and the region. Besides, and as a subject of securitisation, determining the nature of the effects allows for the proper alignment of ends and means in attaining national security objectives regarding appropriate responses (Sopko, 2021; Smith, 2008). A Key Informant opined that:

We [the Community] have been affected by the Somalia instabilities and *Al Shabaab* activities. We are not seeing that the situation will improve after Kenya leaves [KDF exits]. It is better now since our soldiers are across and can contain most of the militants within Somalia. Nevertheless, we pray for things to improve (Interview with a Community Elder in *Damasa*, Mandera County, interviewed on 30 November 2022).

The Key Informant's thoughts further affirm that the transition ought to be managed well to avert negative implications. Whereas security officers are deployed to manage security situations in remote and frontier areas, the Community feels the impact. The homogeneous nature of the Somali Community forming a contiguous community zone straddling the border results in what Starr and Thomas (2010) characterized as the 'blurring of nationalities distinctions'. The communities crisscross the common borders to visit kindred, graze livestock, and conduct trade, thus forming a cover for infiltration of *Al Shabaab* and other elements with malevolent intentions.

On the other side, there is optimism that the transition from AMISOM will positively affect the national security of Kenya, as expressed by 21.1% of the respondents. This optimism can be interpreted in a myriad of ways. Notwithstanding the minority view that AMISOM to exit is overdue (Figure 4.12 and Figure 4.13), this optimism reflects 'operational fatigue' owing to the protracted nature of the deployment, loss of personnel and equipment, and mounting financial costs. Therefore, the view lends credence to the argument that there will be less to lose by exiting and defending the homeland. Analysts have held similar conclusions regarding the mounting costs of the Korean War, Iraq, and Afghanistan, which led to the loss of appetite for deployment (Haskew, 2022; Crocker, 2021; Hamasaeed & Nada, 2020; Kanat, 2019).

The other optimistic perspective is presented by Williams *et al.* (2018), who submitted that, AMISOM has significantly achieved its mandate, thus justifying transition and exit, with the benefit of engaging a supposed 'stable Somalia' on a state-to-state basis. Interestingly, the scholars contradict the same notion when they assessed that by the initial projected exit time of 2018, Somalia was still categorized as a failed state (William *et al.*, 2018:39; Fund for Peace, 2022:52). Similarly, this uncertainty could be used to explain the proportion of respondents (18.1%) that were unsure of how the transition will affect national security. The clan dynamics of Somalia present a complex socio-cultural and political puzzle that has proved tricky to sort out. It was the concern of Nzau (2018: 544-546), noting that the same has not been adequately resolved.

Similarly, Hersi (2015) posited that for sustainable peace, there is a need to promote genuine reconciliation among Somali clans and sub-clans to fix the damaged relationships. Concomitantly, the surprise move of Somalia to lodge a maritime dispute case with ICJ against Kenya (Elias, 2021; Ali & Muyonga, 2021), despite the latter's efforts for alternative dispute resolution avenues, indicates the unpredictability of the FGS, notwithstanding post-AMISOM stability situation.

After AMISOM transitioned to ATMIS in April 2022, and in preparation for projected exit by December 2024, the strategists and planners for national defence and security must consider the nature of the implications as presented in the findings of this study. The strategy guidance should consider all possibilities (Yager, 2006) and contingency planning to address the 'what ifs' and 'what next' (Nzau, 2018:549) underpins such considerations. Having established the insufficiency of security and governance aspects of SSF/FGS by the time of transition and the possibility of *Al Shabaab* resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia, the initial findings of this study laid the foundation of the analysis of this section. They focused the issue on the requisite seriousness.

In addition to the nature of the effects, and in a bid to unpack the issue further, the next section of the chapters looked at the possible national security effect, including; territorial claims, armed incursions, defections, terrorism, diplomatic tensions, smuggling of contraband, resource conflicts and refugee influx.

5.7 Identified National security effects from the transition of Kenya Contingent in AMISOM

PSO executions, transitions and exits have been noted to occasion consequences to the subject state of intervention and the intervening state(s). Heskew (2022) assessed that the US intervention in Korea led to massive casualties on belligerent parties and did not heal the tensions between the north and the south. Since there has not been any formal peace agreement between North Korea and South Korea, the two sides technically remain at war. Waldron (2017) submitted that the Vietnam War was not only the greatest struggle of the cold war but also one of the major defeats in the United States military history. Kanat (2019) and Hamasaheed and Nada (2020) share the assessment that USA intervention in Iraq destabilized the Country and the region.

For Kenya, the Somalia instabilities have had adverse effects ranging from ambitions of an expansionist regime through civil wars to *Al Shabaab* militancy and terrorism. It was aptly summed by Nzau and Mwanzia (2018) that the instabilities in Somalia are a regional security quagmire. Some are set on historical relational context (Nzau & Guyo, 2018; Chonka & Healy, 2021; Ali & Muyonga, 2021), while others relate to conflict outcomes and the PSO efforts and transitions (Jess, 2018; Oluoch, 2018; Williams, 2012). The experiences will likely linger beyond AMISOM, with threats posed by militants, proxies, or state agencies keen to reclaim what they believe should be theirs. It is indicated by the propensity for FGS, *albeit* frail, to lodge territorial dispute cases against neighbours attempting to stabilize the state. Some implications include; territorial claims, armed incursions, defections, terrorism, diplomatic tensions, smuggling of contraband goods, resource conflicts and refugee influx.

This study sought to elicit respondents' opinions on the likelihood of such implications materializing in post-AMISOM Somalia, and the findings are depicted in Table 5.2.

Table 5.14: Cross-tabulation of specific implications to Kenya's national security due to the transition and exit of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM

National security implications	Rating(%), N=370					Total
	Extremely Likely	Highly likely	Likely	Less likely	Not Likely	
Territorial claims	18.1	33.2	18.4	27.3	3.0	100
Armed incursions	42.4	27.0	6.2	15.1	9.2	100
JSF defections to Al Shabaab	30.3	18.1	12.2	18.1	21.4	100
<i>Al Shabaab</i> terrorism	60.3	9.2	13.0	14.9	2.7	100
Diplomatic tension	12.7	39.2	17.8	12.7	17.6	100
Smuggling of Contraband	57.6	8.9	24.3	6.2	3.0	100
Resource conflicts	18.1	27.3	9.2	30.3	15.1	100
Refugee influx	57.6	12.2	8.6	12.4	9.2	100

Source: Field data, 2022.

5.7.1 Territorial claims

The findings in Table 5.2 indicated that the majority (33.2%) of the respondents noted that territorial claims are highly likely in post-AMISOM Somalia and the transition of KDF. In comparison, 27.3% noted that it is less likely. The view by respondents on the territorial dispute is set on the history of Shifta and 'Greater Somalia' ideology, a situation that Nzau and Guyo (2018) submitted, which was fomented by the colonial legacy. Kenya is beset within a territorial dispute cycle with Somalia to the East claiming a portion of the Indian Ocean, South Sudan to the north laying claim on the *Ilemi* triangle (yet to be declared), and

Uganda to the East making claims on Islands of *Migingo* in Lake Victoria (Okumu, 2010; Ndirangu, 2020). While some claims are yet to be declared, the tensions persist, with colonial legacies around border demarcations contributing to the problem. A summary of some of the border conflicts between Kenya and her neighbours is depicted in Table 5.3.

Table 5.15: Border Disputes between Kenya and her immediate neighbours

States	Year	Description	Status
Kenya vs Ethiopia	1963	Dispute over <i>Gaduduma</i> wells	Unresolved
Kenya vs Somalia	1963-1981	Somalia laid claims on Kenya's NFD pushing for its secession to join Somalia under the 'Greater Somalia' ideology	Resolved in principle between the two states after the 1967 Arusha Agreement
Kenya vs South Sudan	1963 to date	Kenya asserts claims on a 1914 border demarcation by the British and later on the red line demarcated in 1938. Furthermore, <i>uti possidetis Juris</i> can be claimed under Art 4 (b) of the AU constitutive Charter. Kenya and South Sudan's claim over the Ilemi triangle is a potential conflict flashpoint.	Unresolved
Kenya vs Uganda	1976	Uganda under Idd Amin Dada claimed parts of western Kenya transferred by Britain from Uganda Protectorate in 1902 and 1926	Resolved diplomatically
Kenya vs Uganda	2008 to date	Conflict over <i>Migingo</i> Island in Lake Victoria	Ongoing
Kenya vs Somalia	2014 to date	Conflict over the Indian ocean Maritime border	ICJ delivered the ruling in October 2021

Source: Adapted from Ndirangu (2020: 71).

Source: Elias (2021: 14)

Figure 5.10 depicts the traditional maritime borders claimed by Kenya and Somalia. Kenya's claim has been based on the parallel of latitude, while Somalia sought to have the border delineated along the line of equidistance. The southern maritime border with Tanzania follows the line of equidistance, and the border runs due east. Elias (2021) notes that much of the estimated 100,000 Km² of the disputed Indian Ocean triangle is believed to be rich in natural resources containing significant deposits of oil and gas and rich fisheries. The exploitation of these resources remains a factor in the dispute. The contested ruling delivered by ICJ divided the disputed maritime area roughly in the middle, as illustrated in Figure 5.11.




Figure 5.38: The adjusted line, which represents the final border according to the ICJ ruling, roughly splits the disputed area into two

Source: Elias (2021: 21)

The second aspect of the analysis of territorial claims relates to terrestrial space that defines the NFD and casts to natural resources, which are known drivers for disputes with potentially significant consequences to international, regional and national peace and security (Kimokoti & Were, 2018). Despite signing the Arusha Agreement in 1967, spelling out the terms of hostilities cessation and official ceasefire, the *Shifita* conflict has continued to shape mutual suspicion between Kenya and Somalia (Nzau & Guyo, 2018: 576). Although the declared intention was to unite ethnic Somalis under Mogadishu, the need to access exploitable natural resources such as minerals was a factor. It can be inferred from the pre-ICJ judgement auctioning of oil blocks in the Indian Ocean as the case was still in court (Elias, 2021). Additionally, there are oil exploration blocks, in the Anza basin of the NFD, whose potential is yet to be established and may form the basis for future claims of the NFD (Cheruiyot, 2012).

The preceding lends credence to the majority finding (33.2%) who noted that territorial claims are likely. Conversely, a significant proportion of the respondents (27.3%) believed that territorial dispute is less likely to occur as a transition implication on Kenya's national security in post-AMISOM Somalia. It is majorly applicable to the territorial land claim, a position that finds backing the dictum of inviolability of existing borders under Article 4 (b) of the AU constitutive Act in conformity with the legal principle of *uti possidetis juris* (African Union, 2000). While the principle sought to eliminate border disputes post-colonially, the manner of border delineations that did not factor in historical claims and ethnic territories has been challenging. This has brought to question the fundamental

assumption on *uti possidetis juris*-inviolability of borders-territorial integrity, as demonstrated by the maritime case between Kenya and Somalia.

5.7.2 Armed incursions, defections and terrorism

Armed incursion is an identified transition implication to Kenya's national security post-AMISOM. On this, 42.4% of the respondents affirmed that it is an extremely high likelihood, 27% noted that it is highly likely, and 15.1% held that it is less likely. Border areas form contiguous zones characterized by socio-cultural and ethnic homogeneity that blur the distinction of nationality (Starr & Thomas, 2020). It is a factor attributed to colonial border demarcation, which did not consider these factors. Whereas such socio-cultural and ethnic contiguity can be harnessed to promote peace among border communities, they often lead to conflicts due to exploitation by state agencies in a proxy context or non-state elements acting independently. Scholars have assessed that neighbouring states have exploited ethnic contiguity along the borders for nefarious intentions, such as in Georgia, Ukraine and Eritrea (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019; Zondi & Réjouis, 2006).

The respondents' position supports the preceding analysis that Kenya-Somalia relations have been characterised by subversive activities in Kenya's territory. Without recounting the history of *Shifita* and the effects of instabilities in Somalia from the Civil war, there have been recent incidents of Somalia federal forces crossing into Kenyan border towns in areas of *Elwak* and *Bula Hawa*, causing tension and diplomatic tiff (AFP, 2020). As in the general anomie in border security, the remoteness and porous nature of the common border with Somalia make such incursions easy (Okoth, 2018). Without a professional military

and respect for international dictates on the territorial integrity of other states and the need for non-aggression, such will likely be a common occurrence in post-AMISOM transition and exit.

Al Shabaab has been operating into Kenya, mainly at will, due to the nature of the border, its remoteness, and its long stretch, making it difficult to be secured at every inch. Opondo (2018) noted that using local cells comprising Kenyan youth increases *Al Shabaab's* reach into the heart of Kenya. Due to *Al Shabaab* incursions, the threat posed to Kenya's economic stability and national security prompted KDF to pursue them across the border by invoking the right to self-defence provided in article 51 of the UN charter (Migue *et al.*, 2012; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). The apparent lack of SSF and FGS capacity and the fear of *Al Shabaab* resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia will only exacerbate the situation once KDF exits.

Defections by Somalia security forces, more so JSF, are also national security concerns for Kenya on the transition of the Kenyan Contingent. On this concern, 30.3% of the respondents affirmed an extremely high likelihood of defections by JSF after the transition of KDF from AMISOM. Comparatively, 21.4% indicated that defections are not likely to occur, and another 18.1% noted that it is less likely to occur. The findings are in tandem with observations by William and Hashi (2016) that numerous defections of militia (now regional member states' forces) had been trained to fight *Al Shabaab*. While the federal forces are considerably structured, regimented and disciplined, those for regional federal member states are less so. Defections back and forth between these forces and *Al Shabaab*

are common occurrences. The non-consideration of JSF and other forces of federal member states works to alienate them further in post-AMISOM Somalia (Dessu, 2022). Poor discipline and regimentation, lack of proper capacity, pressure from *Al Shabaab* resurgence, and alienation by the federal government, among others, are pushing factors for defections. It is worth noting that the defecting militia does so with their weaponry and poses the risk of heightening insecurity in the NFD through hijackings, robberies, the proliferation of SALW and banditry. *Al Shabaab* can use the same defectors to perpetrate mercenary activities inside Kenya.

Terrorist organizations have demonstrated resilience and capacity to resurge after military interventions to defeat them (Crocker, 2021; NSD-S HUB, 2021). Examples of ISIL resurgence in Iraq and Taliban takeover in Afghanistan inspire groups such as *Al Shabaab* (Kanat, 2019; Crocker, 2021; Crisis Group, 2022). In this respect, findings in table 5.2 indicated that 60.3% of the respondents affirmed that *Al Shabaab* terrorism in post-AMISOM Somalia was extremely likely, and 9.2% held that it was highly likely. In comparison, 13% noted that it was likely. Only 14.9% and 2.7% of the respondents perceived *Al Shabaab* terrorism as less likely and not likely, respectively. Abdille (2019) submitted that *Al Shabaab* had conducted several attacks targeting teachers, quarry workers, medical doctors, and telecommunication infrastructure in NFD areas. The findings of this study (section 5.1) indicate the high likelihood of *Al Shabaab* resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia. With a weak SSF/JSF and a Jubaland buffer zone not guaranteed, the respondents' concerns about *Al Shabaab* terrorism in post-AMISOM Somalia are validated.

5.7.3 Diplomatic misunderstanding

Diplomacy is a critical DIME component in, *inter alia*, enhancing national security. Okoth (2018: 482) surmised that since the world ceased to rely on war to settle disputes, the art of diplomacy provided a new world order that heavily hinges on people who can handle complex state-relational issues. Kenya-Somalia diplomatic relationship has been dicey over the years and has a rocky antecedent going back to the *Shifita* period. In this respect, a perception of the general post-ATMIS diplomatic relation between Kenya and Somalia is essential. Most respondents (39.2%) indicated a high likelihood of diplomatic misunderstanding between Kenya and post-AMISOM Somalia, 17.8% indicated a likelihood, and 12.7% perceived an extreme likelihood.

Respondents' trepidation about Kenya-Somalia diplomacy fits into the context of recent developments. Rocky diplomatic scenes were witnessed recently between Kenya and Somalia, mainly spurred by the maritime dispute and suspicions of Kenya's involvement in Jubaland, *albeit* under AMISOM (Ali & Muyonga, 2021; Demissie, 2021; Elias, 2021). The diplomatic spat resulted in recall of diplomats of the two countries for consultations, besides the suspension of miraa trade and flights between Nairobi and Mogadishu. A cautious assessment is that with appropriate capacity in the future, FGS will likely pursue her national interests aggressively. However, 17.6% of the respondents were optimistic that diplomatic misunderstandings would not be likely, while 12.7% noted that they would be less likely. Elias (2021) concludes that despite the outstanding diplomatic issues over the maritime dispute, tensions are not likely to lead to military confrontations, at least in the short term.

5.7.4 Effects on the Kenya Border security management project

The Kenya-Somalia border has been characterized as long and porous, enabling uncontrolled access into the territory of Kenya (Okoth, 2018; Mutisya, 2017). Starr and Thomas (2010) submitted that poor border management is dangerous to international peace and security, especially for communities along the borders. Among other things, porous borders make it easy for armed incursions, contraband smuggling, cross-border resource conflicts, and unchecked inflow of refugees and other migrants (Opon, 2015). Whereas most are existing problems, the likelihood of continuing post-AMISOM is evident. Thus, the study sought to determine the likelihood of contraband smuggling, cross-border resource conflicts, and unchecked inflow of refugees as consequences of the transition from AMISOM.

On contraband smuggling, a majority (57.6%) of the respondents affirmed that it was highly likely, 24.3% noted that it was likely, and 8.9% perceived it as highly likely. Smuggling contraband through Kenya- Somalia border is a threat to the economy as one of the critical components of national security. According to Jubat (2019), Kenya losses an estimated 5 million Kenya shillings per month in tax revenue due to the smuggling of contraband sugar from Somalia. Unfair pricing works against local products, besides posing health risk concerns due to a lack of quality assurance. Border towns such as *Liboi, Omar Jillow, Elwak, Gherille, Liboi, Diif, and Hulugho*, among others, provide routes for smugglers who can transport an estimated over 15,000 bags of sugar daily (Jubat, 2019). The post-AMISOM environment provides a weakening of controls and buffer from such

effects. Thus, the majority view respondents on the likelihood of smuggling in post-AMISOM Somalia, thereby threatening economic improvement and national security.

Additionally, a study by Bahadur (2022) has emphasized the preceding analysis regarding contraband. According to Bahadur (2022: 25), sugar constituted the most smuggled commodity passing through Somalia into destinations such as *Hargadera* in the Dadaab refugee complex. The proximity of the port of Kismayu to the Kenyan border and the absence of Kenyan customs points to levy import duty have made it more economical to import many basic staples and other goods through Kismayu and transport them overland into Kenya. Since most checkpoints are located away from AMISOM-controlled areas and are manned by *Al Shabaab*, the taxes levied by the militants provide funding for terror activities. In 2011, it was estimated that *Al Shabaab* generated between US\$400 000 and US\$800 000 annually by taxing sugar destined for Kenya (Bahadur, 2022: 28). Furthermore, Kenya's protectionist policies still play a role in augmenting al-Shabaab revenue. The high domestic sugar prices increase the preference for illicit sugar from Somalia, thereby increasing the overall volume of cross-border trade taxed by *Al Shabaab*. Ironically, it can be inferred that Kenya's protection of its domestic sugar industry works at cross-purposes to the Country's national security interests.

It is important to note that *Al Shabaab* has inserted itself into nearly every aspect of economic life in Somalia. Rather than taxing specific commodities, the group extracts a percentage of the value of the entire illicit cross-border trade between Somalia and Kenya. Therefore, efforts to disrupt their revenue streams must address this illicit trade. Bahadur

(2022) recommended that the Kenyan government consider sugar smuggling from Somalia a national security threat instead of treating it as mere criminality and a harmless economic crime.

Regarding resource conflicts, a majority (30.3%) of the respondents noted that it is less likely to occur because of the transition from AMISOM, whereas 27% of the respondents held that the likelihood was high, 18.1% viewed it as having an extreme likelihood of occurrence and 15.1% indicated that it would not be likely. In consonance with the findings, Kimokoti and Were (2018) posited that natural resources are key drivers in growing disputes, with potentially significant consequences for international, regional and national peace and security.

As border management and national security concerns for Kenya, border communities are pastoralist and nomadic and crisscross porous and uncontrolled ethnically contiguous border zones in search of water and pasture. Clashes occur where clan grazing areas are infringed, as reported between Orma and Somali Boni areas, or *Ogaden* and *Degodia* in Garissa and Wajir areas (Anderson, 2014; Wekube, Nyagah, Mwangi & Attree, 2016; Sahgal *et al.*, 2019). Furthermore, post-AMISOM, the presence of exploration blocks in NFD is likely to stoke conflicts in future (Cheruiyot, 2012). However, military confrontation is not an imminent threat to natural resources, as can be inferred from Elias's (2021) analysis of maritime border disputes.

Besides being a humanitarian concern, refugees have a bearing on the national security aspects of the host country. The findings in table 5.2 indicate that 57.6% of the respondents perceived an extreme likelihood of refugee influx into post-AMISOM Kenya, 12.2% perceived a high likelihood, and 12.4% perceived a lower likelihood. The findings correspond with OCHA's findings that due to protracted conflicts in Somalia, Kenya has been host to an increasing number of refugees (approximately half a million) from Somalia (OCHA, 2021). Scholars argued that refugees threaten both conventional state security and human security, as evidenced by their undue pressure in depleting socioeconomic resources and amenities of the host state (Matanga & Muchilwa, 2018: 415; Chumba, 2016; Mativo, 2014). Iteyo (2018:399) emphasized that while refugees have resulted from conflicts, they pose a humanitarian challenge and a security concern.

Securitisation of the refugee problem by the government of Kenya led to the decision to close the *Dadaab* refugee complex by June of 2022, although this is yet to materialize. Al Shabaab used refugee camps such as *Dadaab* to plan attacks and hide terrorists, and arsenals justified refugee repatriation (Savage, Khan, & Liht, 2014). A weak buffer zone in Jubaland, a resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in post-AMISOM Somalia, and the porosity of the border are not likely to encourage the repatriation of refugees, and the attendant security concerns will prevail. The following section analysed some general responses to the identified transition implications.

5.8 Responses to national security impact from the transition of Kenya contingent in AMISOM

The realist conception of security is statist in orientation and is anchored on military power and presence (Matanga, 2018). However, the contemporary view informing rational realism requires a broader openness to the framework of analysis (Wieclawski, 2020). Opondo (2018: 377) submitted that this responsibility belongs to the government and its parliament. As in any planning process, national security response planning can only happen in the backdrop of probabilities, as espoused by Ligawa (2018). These probabilities are best arrived at through assessment of the situation and reasonable anticipations of implications. It will enable the process of adjusting means to ends in employing national resources to achieve national security objectives (Smith, 2008; Yager, 2006).

After examining the transition implications of Kenya's contingent to Kenya's national security, the study sought to consider appropriate responses in the context of rational realism that expands understanding of national interest beyond statist and militarist considerations. The DSS trilogy approach as postulated by Moore (1999) and Braun III and Allen (2014) inspires it. The study postulated a model within MAA concept of security, as depicted in Figure 2.1, entailing shaping activities, decisive border security management measures and sustaining activities addressing NFD marginality to enhance public support. The findings depicted in Figure 5.12 present the respondents' views on the national security responses to transition implications from AMISOM.




Figure 5.39: General responses to national security implications from the transition of Kenya contingent in AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings depicted in Figure 5.12 indicate that most respondents agreed that the government should adopt and implement the national security responses to the implications of the transition from AMISOM. Expressly, 87.8% of the respondents affirmed that the government should shape and influence AMISOM transition activities. According to Braun III and Allen (2014), shaping activities is a multifaceted approach that engages several lines

of operation, such as political, economic, diplomatic, and military efforts. It lends credence to the ideation of strategic theory requiring considerations of all possibilities beyond military aspects in planning operations. Besides, the aspects of shaping understood by the DSS trilogy conform to the strategic theory tenet of interest-based bargaining (Hartzell, 2017).

The findings relating to shaping activities in the context of the AMISOM transition and Kenya's national security support the postulation by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020:122). The scholars averred that Kenya needs to ensure conditions are set and re-calibrated for a post-AMISOM phase to effectively anticipate and manage national security concerns. Indeed, as noted by William and Hashi (2016), Kenya has been a central player in peace and stabilization processes in Somalia. It has been exploited in the conception, implementation and adjustment of STP since Kenya has the benefit of holding strategic positions within AMISOM Force Headquarters. Key among the shaping endeavours ought to be a realization of the buffer zone as espoused by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020:132), as well as a reconsideration of the role of regional forces such as JSF in the federal security architecture of Somalia.

Additionally, the findings in Figure 5.12 indicate that 81.6% of the respondents affirmed the need for the economic development of NFD to reduce marginality and enhance public support. The findings concur with Nzau and Guyo's (2018) observation that NFD has faced marginality since colonial times, a situation perpetuated through various Kenyan regimes. Moreover, it supports Opon's (2015) submission that to address the underlying motivations

for terrorism; development is a vital counterterrorism measure while respecting human rights.

ASAL areas have long been characterised by expansive barren landscapes considered non-productive, thus shifting development attention from these areas and compounding hardships and perceptions of state neglect. Hunnicut and Broidy (2019) pointed out that terrorist and criminal entities are adept at exploiting marginalisation grievances. Similarly, Mowat (2015) noted that the feeling of exclusion from socioeconomic and political benefits could compel a group to seek recognition elsewhere. Besides other factors, the socioeconomic situation in NFD has been a significant push factor for locals to sympathize with *Al Shabaab* activities. Accelerated development of the region is essential to restore faith in the government.

Haider (2020) posited that the expansive nature of the NFD region stretched the capacity of security forces to cover every inch of ground and plug border porosity effectively. It thus requires redeployment and reconfiguration of security posture, as supported by 84.9% of the respondents. Besides, with the need to mainstream a collective approach to security through MAA (Kibusia, 2020), a similar proportion (84.9%) supported using a multiagency approach that considers efforts beyond 'boots on the ground'. It is a proposal supported by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 126) that strengthened and integrated MAA is critical in containing security threats to Kenya. Establishing more bases with overlapping areas of responsibility, relevant government departments and agencies, and engaging CSOs and other community organizations, NGOs, and humanitarian agencies are crucial in a coordinated MAA

framework with a command and coordination structure guided by SOPs and relevant guidelines.

Furthermore, 87.8% of the respondents supported the need to institute border control management measures as a response to the national security implications of the transition from AMISOM. The findings lend credence to the identification by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020:126) and Opon (2015: 222) of the need for a comprehensive border management control system for the Kenya-Somalia border, leveraging on, a 24-hour manned surveillance system, trenches, roads, border fence, immigration points and well-trained personnel. It is a hefty undertaking considering the length and remoteness of the border. Mutisya (2017) and Chumba (2016) averred that it is crucial to constructively engage border communities and de-marginalisation efforts to resolve border management issues. The efforts to erect a border fence have been met by sabotage activities by *Al Shabaab* and the Community, as evidenced by the destruction of poles and stalling of the project.

The response measures should be construed as overlapping and interdependent instead of sequential and discrete within the DSS and OODA Loop planning guidance (Braun III & Allen, 2014; Luft, 2020). The measures examined and analysed herein are not exhaustive and only serve as planning pointers for further assessment and planning consideration by national security agencies. The following section zeroed down on factors predisposing NFD counties to vulnerabilities arising from security implications of the transition from AMISOM.

5.9 Vulnerability factors predisposing Border Counties to security implications of AMISOM transition

Owing to the proximity to the border, ethnic contiguity, remoteness and porosity of the border, the immediate affected impact of transition from AMISOM is felt by the border counties stretching from Mandera to the north, through Wajir and Garissa, down to Lamu in the south. It is a fact supported by the effects on those counties arising from instabilities in Somalia before and during AMISOM deployment, including attacks, incursions, abductions, conflicts over water and pasture, and smuggling of contraband, among others (Abdille, 2019; AFP, 2020; Jubat, 2019; Sahgal *et al.*, 2019). A Key Informant observed:

The government, for many years, has forgotten our Community, and we feel that we do not belong to the Country [Kenya]. We do not have roads, and our health services are few and sparse, same for schools. We are also burdened by drought that kills our animals, leaving us with nothing. The benefits of devolution are only felt in significant settlements and towns such as *Mandera* and *Elwak*. The rest of the County does not see the impact. It leaves us with no option but to survive (Interview with a Community Elder in *Ashabito*, Mandera County, 02 December 2022).

The Key Informant's views indicate the Community's disillusionment due to marginalisation. The revelation by the key Informant supports Chumba (2016) finding that local Somali youth's general socioeconomic and political marginalisation, lack of inclusivity, and ethnic discrimination against Muslim communities fomented feelings of resentment. Such sentiments will likely push the Community to sympathize with Al Shabaab's activities. In security risk analysis, vulnerabilities compound the risks that a hazard will affect the target. In this case, the hazard emanates from Somalia's instability and precipitant AMISOM transition, while the target is Kenya's national security through the border counties. Predisposing factors besides proximity include marginalisation,

deployment of security, border porosity characterized by scarce border security management measures, and community profiling, among others. It formed a question of interest for the study. Respondent's perception of the same was sought to determine whether they predisposed the border counties to security implications from the AMISOM transition. The findings are depicted in Figure 5.13.




Figure 5.40: Vulnerability factors predisposing the Border Counties to security implications of AMISOM transition

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Figure 5.13 indicate a majority concurrence by the respondents on the identified predisposing factors, with 78.9% indicating that the underdevelopment of the NFD made it susceptible to effects from Somalia. It is either through despondency out of perceived neglect, helplessness due to the remoteness of the areas and scarcity of security reach or due to sympathy owing to ethnic-religious homogeneity and contiguity. In this case, marginality is of interest, resulting in underdevelopment in unproductive areas. Mowat (2015) argued that a feeling of exclusion from socioeconomic and political issues could compel a group to seek recognition elsewhere. Similarly, Hannicut and Broidy (2019) posited that terrorist and criminal entities are adept at exploiting marginalisation grievances. It is true of ASAL areas characterized by socioeconomic hardships due to environmental and policy reasons.

The preceding argument on NFD marginality is supported by the County development index developed by the Commission for Revenue Allocation (CRA) based on four indices: poverty, infrastructure, health and education. As indicated in table 5.4, CRA classified the counties of Mandera, Wajir and Garissa as most marginalised, while Lamu County was classified as moderately marginalised (CRA, 2018). Consolidated CDIs were used to rank counties based on their relative development. It was found that 20 counties were below the national average of 0.520, while 27 counties were above the national average. According to CRA, the Counties of Mandera, Wajir, and Garissa were among the counties below the national average with CDIs of 0.3107, 0.3334 and 0.4688, respectively. Lamu County performed slightly higher than the national average with a CDI of 0.564 (CRA, 2018: 23-24). In the counties across the parameters, Mandera scored 0.5430 on poverty, 0.2767 on

infrastructure, 0.3317 on health and 0.1910 on education. Wajir scored 0.6190 on poverty, 0.3693 on infrastructure, 0.2917 on health and 0.1760 on education. Garissa scored 0.7970 on poverty, 0.4717 on infrastructure, 0.4373 on health and 0.3100 on education. Lamu fared better with scores of 0.9370 on poverty, 0.4937 on infrastructure, 0.5710 on health and 0.4145 on education.

Table 5.16: County Classification based on CRA County Development Index

Most Marginalised (0.27- 0.518)		Moderately Marginalised (0.519-0.584)		Well off Above 0.6
Turkana	Migori	Isiolo	Nyandarua	Nakuru
Wajir	Bomet	Kajiado	Muranga	Kirinyaga
Mandera	Taita taveta	Kisumu	Embu	Kisii
Marsabit	Busia	Elgeyo marakwet	Kericho	Nyamira
Samburu	Kilifi	Machakos	Kakamega	Uasin gishu
West Pokot	Trans Nzoia	Makueni	Vihiga	Nyeri
Tana river	Tharaka Nithi	Nandi	Laikipia	Mombasa
Narok	Homa bay	Siaya	Lamu	Kiambu
Baringo	Garissa	Meru	Bungoma	Nairobi city
Kwale	Kitui			

Source: Adapted from CRA (2018: 24).

Comparatively, a recent Gross County Product (GCP) report by KNBS indicated that the bottom ten counties were majorly those from ASALS, with the main economic activity in these areas being animal production while critical activities such as growing crops, manufacturing, transportation and real estate were insignificant (KNBS, 2022). GCP is equivalent to County Domestic Product (CDP), whose estimates help to quantify the size of

the respective county economies. Between 2013 and 2019, ASAL counties, including NFD counties of Garissa, Wajir, Mandera and Lamu, ranked lower in GCP, as indicated in Figure 5.14. Despite the over ten years of devolution, it has seen a redistribution of resources to counties and equalization funds to hasten the growth of marginalised counties. ASAL areas lag in infrastructure, such as roads making transportation a nightmare and hindering commerce.




Figure 5.41: County Contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (percentage), (2013-2020)

Source: KNBS (2022:7).

Access to quality health and nutrition services, education, and water, among other essential and basic services, remains a luxury in many NFD and ASAL areas. The protracted lack of such services has created despondency and a perception that they are not considered part of the Country to receive essential and developmental services, a plight exploited by *Al Shabaab*.

Additionally, the economic marginality of NFD and attendant insecurity have led to the militarization of the area. However, the expansive nature of the territory stretches the capacity of the security forces to cover every point effectively (Haider, 2020). It is supported by findings in Figure 5.13 indicating that 84.9% of the respondents affirmed that scarce security deployment predisposed NFD to security implications from the AMISOM transition. Indeed, Opon (2015:11) observed that the presence of state security is marginal in most border areas, reflecting a general inability of the government to enforce order within these areas. The security outposts are interposed by significant distances, which form areas not dominated by security forces, which are used by *Al Shabaab*, smugglers, illegal immigrants and bandits to infiltrate. Redeployment of security posts and multiagency approaches could plug these gaps. Concomitantly, leveraging surveillance technology would be a force multiplier, as Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) advised.

Border porosity and remoteness further compound the security of border areas (Haider, 2020; Okoth, 2018; Mutisya, 2017; Opon, 2015). This assertion is supported by Figure 5.13, indicating that 87.8% of the respondents affirmed that porous borders predisposed NFD to the security implications of AMISOM transitions. It requires comprehensive and

appropriate measures to manage the porous borders. This assertion supports the recommendation by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that a comprehensive border management system is necessary for the Kenya-Somalia border. Furthermore, a resounding 90.8% of respondents identified that a lack of security management increased the vulnerability of NFD to the security implications of the transition from AMISOM.

The Kenya-Somalia border programme would help address the issue of border porosity. Alongside reviewed deployment, the measures suggested by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 126) would provide layered security. *Inter alia*, 24-hour surveillance technology, trench system, border road, border fence, immigration and customs points will augur well with strategically deployed security forces that can provide kinetic effects through rapid reaction and border patrolling. Mutisya (2017) advised that the Community's engagement in the entire architecture would provide cultural intelligence espoused by Ligawa (2018) to strengthen border security management.

In the context of WHAM and the need to exploit cultural intelligence, handling the Somali Community that predominates NFD ought to be reconsidered. It is in cognizance of the clan dynamics and other socio-cultural sensitivities. In this sense, the issue of security profiling as part of the bigger national security mitigation and management ought to be reassessed. As indicated in Figure 5.13, 67.3% of the respondents concurred that security profiling of NFD communities is a factor in predisposing them to the security implications of the transition from AMISOM. As averred by Starr and Thomas (2010), communal homogeneity along the borders blurs national identities.

Besides being used as cover by *Al Shabaab* and other criminal elements, profiling individuals posing security threats could be easily construed as community profiling, thus attracting backlash (Williams, 2015). Community engagement, economic empowerment to reduce marginality, streamlining citizen registration and identification, and instituting comprehensive border security management are some of the measures that need to be explored (Chumba, 2016; Opon, 2015). It reflects a recommendation by Kimokoti (2016: 224-225) for establishing control over porous borders through coordinated and integrated inter-ethnic fora, strengthening peacebuilding blocs, dealing with perpetrators of conflict, improving security personnel and strengthening capacity building. After examining the predisposing factors, the following section deliberates on the responses that could be instituted for NFD counties to mitigate the security vulnerabilities identified.

5.10 Measures to mitigate security effects of AMISOM transition in Border Counties

Scholars have identified the need to address marginality in the NFD to alleviate the socioeconomic hardships with systemic antecedents and climatic causes (Mowat, 2015; Mutisya, 2017). Particularly, meaningful engagement of the Community and addressing their plights will enable the implementation of border security management measures to enhance national security considerably (Mutisya, 2017). As done in the previous section, identifying predisposing factors entails problem definition in the OODA loop, securitisation and strategising. It guides the mitigation measures that can be tailored to the defined problems. The study sought respondents' views on whether identified response measures were suitable for addressing the vulnerability factors predisposing border

Counties to the security implications of the AMISOM transition. The findings were as depicted in Table 5.5.

Table 5.17: Cross-tabulation of measures to mitigate security implications from AMISOM transition in Border Counties

Mitigation measures	Rating, N=370				Total	
	Yes		No		Freq	%age
	Freq	%age	Freq	%age		
Economic development	336	90.8	34	9.2	370	100
Objective security profiling	280	75.7	90	24.3	370	100
Reviewed security deployments	314	84.9	56	15.1	370	100
Proper border security management	347	93.8	23	6.2	370	100
Multiagency Approach	325	87.8	45	12.2	370	100
Support Jubaland for a buffer zone	292	79.8	78	21.1	370	78.9

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Table 5.5 indicate a majority affirmation by the respondents that the identified measure responses would be suitable for implementation to mitigate the vulnerability of Border Counties to the adverse security implications due to the transition from AMISOM. The measures largely mirror those discussed in section 5.8, indicating a micro-level corroboration of the earlier findings. As indicated in table 5.5, 90.8% noted the need for economic development in the NFD as a mitigation measure. It is to alleviate the marginality of the region as variously established by scholars and government agencies

(Nzau & Guyo, 2018; Opon, 2015; Mowat, 2015; CRA, 2012). Hannicut and Broidy (2019) warned that terrorists are adept at exploiting feelings of marginality to nefarious ends.

Priority development areas include poverty alleviation measures, infrastructure, health and education. Chitembwe (2021) established that poverty was a key driver of radicalisation in the Counties of Mombasa and Kwale. The same can be generalised to NFD counties that face marginality. A review of the equalization fund and a credible monitoring and evaluation mechanism will ensure that the governance of marginalised counties does not divert the funds into recurrent county expenditures and corruption.

Furthermore, to assuage the perception of marginality, security profiling requires review to ensure that it is not construed as 'community targeting'. As a mitigation measure, 75.7% of the respondents affirmed that it would alleviate the vulnerability of NFD to the security implication of the AMISOM transition. Williams (2015) submitted that profiling individuals posing security threats could be easily construed as community profiling and thus attract backlash. It would be inimical to public support of security operations in the context of WHAM and cultural intelligence (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020; Ligawa, Okoth and Matanga, 2018). To avert this, agencies such as NCTC, NIS and NPS should engage the Community constructively by winning the trust of opinion shapers and elders. Streamlining citizen registration and identification processes is critical.

As earlier indicated, the expansive nature of NFD stretches the capacity of security agencies to dominate the areas effectively (Haider, 2020). The porosity of the border

further compounds the problem, thus requiring the rethinking of deployments to ensure overlapping zones for effective patrolling. It was supported by 84.9% of the respondents, as indicated in Table 5.5, who held that a review of security deployment is critical in securing the NFD and reducing vulnerability to security implications arising from the AMISOM transition. It must be done in an MAA context, as Kibusia (2020) propounded by engaging relevant government departments, agencies, NGOs, and CSOs. It is a notion supported by 87.8% of the respondents noting the need to implement MAA to ensure a holistic approach to mitigating the security implications to NFD arising from the AMISOM transition.

Blending these mitigation measures with comprehensive border security management is essential in providing adequate layered security. It was affirmed by 93.8% of the respondents, as indicated in Table 5.5. Similarly, it conforms to the argument by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020:126) and Opon (2015: 222) that there was a need for comprehensive border management control to secure the Kenya-Somalia border. Similarly, it supports the recommendation of a study by Kimokoti (2016) on the need to establish control over porous borders through coordinated and integrated inter-ethnic for strengthening peacebuilding blocs, dealing with perpetrators of conflict, improving security personnel and strengthening capacity building.

It is important to note that a study by Chumba (2016) established a prevailing perception among residents of North Eastern Kenya that Kenya's strategy of building a wall along parts of the border is a short-term strategy that cannot solve underlying problems of terrorism. Stretching the border management measures beyond the common border and the

question of a buffer zone in Jubaland remain indispensable for Kenya's national security. It was affirmed by 79.8% of the respondents as a measure to mitigate the vulnerability of NFD to security implications from the AMISOM transition. A buffer zone has been a pertinent objective for Kenya's operation in Somalia (Migue *et al.*, 2012). Moreover, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 123-128) observed that Kenya's security hinged on creating a stable, peaceful and prosperous Jubaland as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*. The same notion was upheld by 76% of the respondents in the findings depicted in Figure 4.22 on the need for Kenya to support the Jubaland buffer zone in post-AMISOM Somalia.

From the preceding findings, analysis and discussion, it is evident that mitigating national security implications due to the transition of the Kenyan Continent in AMISOM will require a comprehensive, multiagency and multifaceted approach that looks beyond the borders to factor in international nuances in domestic national security policy in line with rational realist philosophy (Wieclawski, 2020). Pertinent to this is the often ignored use of community engagement. It is in consideration of the advice by Mutisya (2017) and Chumba (2016) on border security management, as well as Ligawa (2018) on cultural intelligence and the central role of elders in the Somali Community. Furthermore, in community engagement, Wasike (2016) submitted that since it entails more involvement by different social segments, Track Three diplomacy encourages interaction and understanding between hostile communities or community groups, thereby enhancing ownership of the peace process and implementation. It forms the deliberation of the next section.

5.11 Community participation in mitigating national security implications of AMISOM transition

Community support is pertinent in any endeavour, including national security measures. The Community is affected by both security implications as well as the responses. Besides, the Community poses in-depth knowledge of their environment, culture and aspirations. It, therefore, requires considering what Ligawa (2018) conceived as cultural intelligence that exploits community socio-cultural and ecological knowledge and elicits solutions to promote community ownership. Mutisya (2017) advocated meaningful community engagement in Kenya's endeavour to develop the border security programme to enhance buy-in. It was further conveyed in the views of a Key Informant who underscored the importance of community engagement as follows:

Public administration intertwines with security, especially in North Eastern areas of the Country. The Community is an essential stakeholder in this effort, especially the elders, who have much say in guiding the Community and settling disputes. The administration has to interface with them to reach the grassroots and enhance understanding (Interview with a County Administrator in *Hulugho*, Garissa County, interviewed on 10 December 2022).

The Key Informant's observation corroborates those of a Key Informant in *Burahache*, whose views on the importance of community participation as captured in section 4.11, indicating that due to peculiarities of Somali Clan dynamics, no community support activities can be carried out without consultation. Additionally, the views of the Key Informant support recommendation of a study by Wasike (2016) that Track Three diplomacy is essential in addressing transboundary conflicts among adjacent border communities. As an ethnic contiguous zone, Somali clan dynamics traverse the borders and do not change due to nationality. In the context of mitigation measures in the NFD, community engagement by national security agencies formed a subject of interest. This

study sought the respondents' views to highlight its importance. The findings were as indicated in Figure 5.15.




Figure 5.42: Community participation in mitigating national security implications of AMISOM transition

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings indicate that the majority (76%) of the respondents highly recommended the participation of the Community in developing and implementing mitigation measures for security implications emanating from the transition from AMISOM. Another 18% of the respondents recommended community participation, while 6% did not. The findings corroborate the findings of this study in Chapter Four, Section 4.11, Table 4.2, indicating that 51.5% of the respondents noted that the Community had not been sufficiently considered in the STP. Furthermore, the findings support those by Chitembwe (2021) and

Chumba (2016), the border communities were not sufficiently engaged in managing transboundary terrorism between Kenya and Somalia.

Engaging the Somali Community in the NFD is mainly through interfacing with the security agencies and administration on one-side and community elders and communities on the other. It is in a symbiotic relationship in which marginality is alleviated, developmental empowerment implemented, and socio-cultural sensitivities observed and respected in return for support in the form of community buy-in and intelligence provision to security agencies.

The modelling of Community policing to fit the peculiarities of the NFD communities is essential, as well as the involvement of elders in security committees and cross-border security initiatives (Mambili, 2020; Otieno, 2019). Mainstreaming the Somalia *Xeer* justice system in settling disputes within the Somalia community in Kenya is likely to pay dividends in the context of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRM). A study by Wanyoike (2018) posited that despite the modernization of the justice system, traditional Somali justice-based conflict management still plays a significant role in peacebuilding in Garissa County, thereby the need for its integration with formal justice approaches. ADRM exploits cultural intelligence taking advantage of indigenous knowledge systems for peacebuilding.

5.12 Chapter Summary

The chapter examined the effects on Kenya's national security ensuing from the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM. Specifically, the chapter deliberated on: the possibility of *Al Shabaab* resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia, the ability of SSF to assume security responsibilities, post-AMISOM stability states of Somalia affecting Kenya's national security, Kenya's concern for post-AMISOM security implications, affected NFD counties and nature of the impact, the vulnerability of NFD counties on post-AMISOM effects to national security, and mitigation to NFD vulnerabilities. The underpinning theoretical framework for the chapter included functionalist theory, and strategic theory.

The significant findings in the chapter were that *Al Shabaab* would highly likely resurge on the exit of AMISOM and if the SSF's capacity is insufficient to contain *Al Shabaab*. It will likely lead to a fragile or failed stabilization in Somalia which will be inimical to Kenya's national security. Specifically, national security implications arising from the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM include a territorial claim, armed incursions, *Al Shabaab* terrorism, defections and desertion of armed SSF/JSF, diplomatic misunderstandings, and smuggling of contraband, resource-based conflicts and refugee influx. The maritime dispute will also significantly shape the security implications to post AMISOM Kenya.

Affected counties include Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Lamu, Mombasa, Kilifi and Nairobi. Specifically, the NFD counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and coastal county Lamu are predisposed by marginality, scarcity in security deployment, the porosity of the common

border and weak border security management measures, aspects that ought to be addressed in a multiagency framework in order to mitigate the vulnerability. Indeed, Opon (2015:11) observed that the presence of state security is marginal in most border areas, reflecting a general inability of the government to enforce order within these areas. Finally, community engagement is critical in enhancing community support and buy-in in the context of WHAM. In the macro analysis and the context of functionalist theory, the HoA community and the bilateral Kenya-Somalia context provide a setting for engagement to exploit the opportunities and address the challenges arising from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM. It informs the deliberations of Chapter Six.

CHAPTER SIX

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR KENYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY FROM TRANSITION OF KENYAN CONTINGENT IN AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SOMALIA

This chapter explores the challenges and opportunities presented to Kenya's National security by the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM. The chapter is framed around challenges to the AMISOM transition, effects of the challenges to AMISOM transition, challenges to Kenya's national security, mitigation of the challenges to Kenya's national security, and opportunities presented to Kenya's national security from the transition of Kenyan contingent in AMISOM. The guiding theories for this chapter are Neo-functionalism theory and strategic theory. Finally the chapter summary was done.

6.1 Opportunities for national security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM

Blyth (2019) submitted that despite the challenges posed by PSOs, opportunities could be seized to divert the trajectory of events for the better. The opportunities are identified and exploited in the context of PSOs with national security implications through strategy models such as OODA Loop (Luft, 2020), or DSS (Braun III & Allen, 2014). Engaging the DIMEs of national power enables the identification of opportunities in a bid to advance national security interests in a rational realist orientation. The guidance of bargaining strategies offer options in this respect through engaging in distributive, integrative, or interest-based bargaining to optimize the exploitation of the opportunities for national security interests (Hartzell, 2017).

Identifying and exploiting opportunities for enhancing national security assist in operationalizing national security models such as the DSS trilogy (Braun III & Allen, 2014) and the Multi-Agency Approach and Multilateral Approach models proposed in Figure 2.1. It guided the questions to respondents on the opportunities for national security arising from the transition of the Kenyan contingent from AMISOM. The findings are depicted in Table 6.1.

Table 6.18: Opportunities for national security presenting from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM

Opportunity for Kenya’s national security	Rating (N=370)				Total	
	Yes		No		Freq	%age
	Freq	%age	Freq	%age		
Influence Somalia Transition Plan (STP)	314	84.9	56	15.1	370	100
Strengthen Jubaland as a buffer zone	303	81.9	67	18.1	370	100
Enhance Somalia Security Sector Reforms and DDR	280	75.7	90	24.3	370	100
Improve development of border counties	292	78.9	78	21.1	370	100
Comprehensive border security management	325	87.8	45	12.2	370	100

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Table 6.1 indicate a majority concurrence by the respondents on the opportunities for national security presented by the AMISOM transition. It also supports the model's logic broached by the study in Table 2.1. Regarding shaping the transition and exit, 84.9% of the respondents perceived Kenya's STP influence as an opportunity for national security. The finding supports Braun III and Allen's (2014) argument that shaping

activities must be employed to set the right conditions to ensure operational success. Moore (1999) averred that shaping is a multifaceted approach involving several lines of operations, such as political, economic, diplomatic, and military efforts. The employment of DIMEs of power by Kenya fits in this conception.

The shaping AMISOM transition strategy provides an avenue to shape the outcomes. The transition strategy is outlined in the ATMIS CONOPs, which the STP essentially informs. The participation of Kenya in AMISOM as a TCC, at both AMISOM Force Headquarters and as Military Contingent, is a platform for influencing the direction of the TMIS CONOPs and STP to enhance national security. Potentially thorny issues threatening smooth transition and Kenya's national security, such as the status of security forces of federal member states, are issues of concern for FGS and Kenya (Dessu, 2022).

Kamais (2019) posited that military intervention strategies often fail due to rushed conceptualization and implementation, insufficient resource support, political will, and vested interests. Ligawa (2018) advanced a similar view when he noted that frequent changes in the AMISOM mandate were harmful to peacebuilding efforts in Somalia. Besides the status of security forces of federal member states, sufficient and realistic transition timelines and funding are a transition problem (Williams & Hashi, 2016; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). These glaring issues should be seized and influenced to alter the transition trajectory towards success for national security benefit.

Additionally, strengthening the Jubaland Buffer zone as a precursor to the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM is a critical shaping activity in a multifaceted context espoused by Moore (1999). This was affirmed by 81.9% of the respondents affirmed as an opportunity present for Kenya's national security. In the transition pillars propounded by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 123-128), the national security of Kenya hinges on a stable, peaceful and prosperous Jubaland as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*. It is in concurrence with the submission by Nzau and Mwanzia (2018:361) that KDF operations in Somalia were to support the TFG to contain *Al Shabaab*; with a strategic objective of creating a buffer zone in Jubaland. Whereas the buffer zone has been established, its characterization as a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab* remains uncertain due to weak SSF and the persistence of *Al Shabaab* threats into Kenya. As a learning point, GoK ought to institute measures to strengthen the buffer zone to ensure its longevity in post-AMISOM Somalia and meet the characterization by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020). The transition period projected to end in 2024 presents this opportunity.

In tandem, the enhancement of SSR and DDR in Somalia to address security, governance and stability aspects is an opportunity for Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition, as held by 75.7% of the respondents. The findings confirm the assessment by Goldmann (2005) that UN PSO in Sierra Leone was largely successful owing to comprehensive and inclusive SSR and DDR programmes. Ligawa (2018) also noted that a proper DDR would enhance the standing of SSF and, thus, its credibility. The crucial activities within the context of shaping are attainable through appreciation of Somalia clan dynamics attending critical structures such as SSF. Highly tinged with political rivalries,

clan dynamics are evident in the omission of federal member states in the STP and post-AMISOM SSF. Besides training, equipping and regimentation, SSR and DDR will be essential in unlocking the impasse around the status of security forces such as JSF and RKB, in which Kenya is interested.

Furthermore, and as a decisive phase in the model in Figure 2.1, the institution and implementation of a comprehensive border security management plan is a critical opportunity presenting to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition. This was affirmed by 87.8% of the respondents, as depicted in Table 6.1. The findings support propositions by scholars on the need for a comprehensive and inclusive border security infrastructure for Kenya's national security (Mustisya, 2017). Despite challenges to the border securitisation programme identified by Haider (2021), it remains an essential requirement for national security, and a mechanism ought to be sought to actualize and operationalize it. Border security management is a multifaceted undertaking that entails layered security (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020) and MAA and community participation (Kibusia, 2021; Mutisya, 2017). Deployment review in the NFD and Lamu remains a critical part of homeland defence as a post-AMISOM exit strategy for Kenya's national security alongside implementing the border security management programme.

To sustain the border security management programme and homeland defence in the post-AMISOM era, enhanced socioeconomic development of NFD and other marginalised areas is an opportunity for national security from the AMISOM transition. This view was supported by 78.9% of the respondents, as depicted in Table 6.1. The finding supports

Mowat's (2015) and Opon's (2015) suggestion that the GoK should seize opportunities to increase infrastructure and economic development of the NFD to appease perceptions of marginalisation. Moreover, the finding resonates with Opon's (2015) view that on border security, there is increased prioritization of policing efforts to deny territorial access by clandestine transnational actors or non-state actors in violation of state laws.

As hitherto identified in Figure 5.13, marginality, hence underdevelopment, of ASAL areas is a predisposing factor for amenability to sympathize with nefarious elements such as *Al Shabaab* to the detriment of national security. Coupled with the porosity of the border and the marginal presence of state security, infiltration of persons and groups with malign intentions is a challenge (Opon, 2015). In the context of WHAM and sustaining operations (as depicted in Figure 2.1), enhanced economic development of NFD, alongside other ASAL areas, is an opportunity for long-term stability and security of those regions and, by extension, national security. A Key Informant provided additional perspective on opportunities for national security:

When the KDF exits from Somalia, opportunities exist to revamp cross-border security initiatives through collaboration with security agencies, administration and communities. Peace meetings, conflict resolution fora, resource sharing meetings and pacts, and information sharing, among other essential security functions, have been ongoing, although in a limited way due to the security situation. We hope Somalia will be stable when KDF exits to facilitate both sides' more structured, legitimate and frequent engagements. Internally, the exit of KDF will provide more troops to deploy in North Eastern Counties to improve the security situation and enable people to engage in daily activities without fear (Interview with a County Administrator in *Elwak*, Mandera County, interviewed on 20 December 2022).

The views of the Key Informant add crucial aspects to the opportunities for national security from AMISOM transition *viz*, bilateral collaboration and community participation. A study by Chumba (2016) recommended strengthening intelligence sharing among Kenya's security agencies and between Kenya and Somalia to manage transboundary terrorism between the two states. In the event of a stable Somalia with functional security and governance structures, the cross-border peace initiatives in the context of Track Three diplomacy.

Track Three diplomacy entails the participation of grassroots actors (Kimokoti & Were, 2018: 425). Similarly, Wasike (2016) construed Track Three diplomacy as the people-to-people diplomacy undertaken by individuals and groups to encourage interaction and understanding between hostile communities focused at the grassroots level. The aim is to build or rebuild relations between or among communities fractured by conflict. It is implemented through peacebuilding initiatives such as *inter alia*, peace commissions, and community dialogue projects (Paffenholtz, 2003). In the context of Track Three diplomacy, Wanyoike (2018) noted that the community and the Somalia *Xeer* justice system would remain indispensable, especially for national security in post-AMISOM Somalia. The question of whether such opportunities are being exploited is examined in the next section.

6.2 Seizing the opportunities presented by AMISOM transition for Kenya's national security

Seizing fleeting opportunities is a truism of military strategy advocated by classical military strategists such as Sun Tzu, Carl Von Clausewitz, and Basil Liddell Hart, among others. Just as in the institution of mechanisms for mitigating challenges, exploiting


opportunities for national security arising from the AMISOM transition requires a proactive attitude of mind. The essence of strategic models such as OODA Loop (Luft, 2020) is identifying and staying ahead of the competition through early identification and exploitation of opportunities. In this endeavour, engaging the DIMEs of national power at a strategic level through the various lines of effort is crucial. The lines of effort, in a sense, entail the political line of effort, diplomatic lines of effort, military line of effort, economic line of effort, and intelligence line of effort, among others, within a bilateral and multilateral context.

The notion advanced herein augurs well with the guidance of strategic theory requiring a conscious employment of national resources by political actors to pursue rational national objectives for optimal outcomes (Yager, 2006). To do so requires a knack for recognizing the opportunities well in advance and aligning efforts to exploit them. In military parlance, it entails getting inside the opponent's OODA Loop and staying ahead. It informed this section's focus after identifying opportunities for national security in the previous section. The respondents' views regarding whether Kenya is exploiting the opportunities presented by the AMISOM transition for Kenya's national security are depicted in Figure 6.1.

Figure 6.43: Seizing of opportunities presented from AMISOM transition for Kenya's national security

Source: Field data, 2022.

As depicted in Figure 6.1, a majority (55%) of the respondents agreed that Kenya was taking advantage of the opportunities for national security presented by the AMISOM



transition. In comparison, 45% held a contrary view. The findings can be explained in the context of Kenya's participation in AMISOM and deployment of her troops in Jubaland, reflecting national interest. Submission by Nzau and Mwanzia (2018) indicated that Kenya's strategic intent was to create a buffer zone in Jubaland to keep *Al Shabaab* threat at bay. Recent redeployments in 2018 following the AMISOM drawdown indicated the strategic direction of KDF participation in AMISOM, with KENCON troops redeploying closer to the border. Furthermore, as a TCC and major regional partner, Kenya has used opportunities presented by IGAD and participation in AMISOM force headquarters to shape the trajectory of the AMISOM transition.

Despite diplomatic and political fallout between the two states on issues of Jubaland administration and maritime dispute (Demissie, 2021; Elias, 2021; Ali & Muyonga, 2021), diplomatic and political lines of efforts have continued to be exploited, as indicated by the resumption of diplomatic engagement, lifting of the ban on Kenya's *Miraa* export, and resumption of flights between Nairobi and Mogadishu. Mwendwa (2021) observed that Kenya was losing an estimated KShs 20-30 million per day due to the ban on *Miraa* export. Besides, Kenya has strongly argued for an amicable settlement of the maritime dispute instead of an adversarial court process that may injure long-term diplomatic relations. Such engagements open avenues for better diplomatic, political and economic engagements for national security.

Politically, Kenya has been instrumental in re-establishing governance structures in Somalia. Through the various periods in Somalia's conflicts, Kenya has been instrumental in searching for peace in Somalia by participating in and hosting peace meetings (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). For instance, the 2004 Nairobi peace conference led to the formation of TFG (Nzau, 2018). Besides, the formation of FGS in 2012 was through concerted efforts by Kenya and other IGAD and AU members (Ligawa, 2018).

Notwithstanding Kenya's various efforts to shape the transition for national security, 45% of the respondents held a contrary view. Their notion finds credence in the STP, capabilities of JSF, border security projects, the maritime dispute, and the marginality state of NFD. As established by the study, the capacity of SSF/JSF to assume security responsibilities remains weak at best. This is compounded by the exclusion of federal member states' forces

in the definition of SSF contained in STP. As a critical player in IGAD and AU, this indicates a failure by Kenya to shape this aspect of STP that effects the buffer zone and national security. Besides, capacity building in the form of SSR and DDR within the context of AMISOM ought to have been seized to shore up the capacity of SSF/JSF before the projected exit in December 2024.

The border security project was a crucial component as an opportunity to enhance national security. However, challenges to the project have seen slow progress, with stalling in significant portions (Bartlett, 2021). Chumba (2016) and Opon (2015) advocated for comprehensive border security measures leveraging o technology, deployments, layered defences, and border control points. The current implementation of the project does not reflect a layered infrastructure leveraging technology. Approaching the projected exit of 2024, it is doubtful that a practical border securitisation project will have been realized. Concomitantly, the development of NFD still lags, as evidenced in the data by 2021 GCP data despite the ten years of devolution and disbursement of equalization funds (KNBS, 2022). Continued perceptions of marginality remain inimical to local support to the government (Mowat, 2015), as well as its efforts to enhance national security.

Mutisya (2017) suggested a downgrade in the architectural design of the border wall to a border fence to lessen the impact on the contiguous Somali community. Commensurately, the construction of the border fence entailed a double fence with concrete posts, chain-link and concertina wire on top. While such a design can limit crossing, it does not present the security strength required for national security. The design does not offer significant

deterrence to national security threats. As per Kagwanja’s *et al.* (2020) and Opon’s (2015) prescription, the design should consider having a layered fence leveraging on technology and round-the-clock surveillance measure, anti-tunnelling measures, and intrusion detection. In order to analyse the issue further, respondents were asked to expound on their responses. The aggregated explanations are depicted in Figure 6.2.




Figure 6.44: Aggregated explanations on the exploitation of opportunities for national security presented from the AMISOM transition

Source: Field data, 2022.

The aggregated respondents' explanations indicate that the affirming responses clustered around Kenya's modernized and well-equipped security forces (22.6% of the respondents), Kenya as a key player in AMISOM force headquarters (17.8% of the respondents), presence of security FOBs along the border (15.6% of the respondents), MAA for security and development (12.7% of the respondents), and use of diplomacy for peace in Somalia (5.1% of the respondents). The findings align with the multifaceted approaches to security as espoused in the DSS trilogy (Braun III & Allen, 2014) and the employment of DIMEs of national power.

Besides, the exploitation of the opportunities is explained in the context of measures that recognize the international nuances in domestic security policies (Wieclawski, 2020). Emerging security approaches such as MAA provide a broader context for the exploitation of opportunities for national security beyond narrow militaristic approaches. While Track One and Track Two diplomacy are essential in the official sense, Track 3 diplomacy presents a valuable avenue for meaningful engagement of border communities for the success of border security programmes, as postulated by Wasike (2016) and Mutisya (2017). Engagement in AMISOM force headquarters, and other critical platforms such as IGAD, AU and UN, provides an opportunity for Kenya to shape the STP and CONOPs for optimum national security outcomes. Equipment, training and deployment of security forces with the right mix of capabilities enhance domination of the border augmented by the other layers of security proposed by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), *viz*; a 24 hrs manned

surveillance systems, trenches, roads and border fence; functioning immigration offices at significant entry and exit.

Respondents with contrary views base their explanations on the lack of border security management (15.9% of the respondents) and the weak Jubaland buffer zone and JSF (10.2% of the respondents). The slow progress in implementing the border security programme is at odds with the projected AMISOM exit by December 2024. Border porosity and lack of control points will stretch the capacity of forces deployed in the NFD region to dominate every inch of the border (Haider, 2020; Opon, 2015). Similarly, a weak buffer zone and JSF in the face of possible *Al Shabaab* resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia is a missed opportunity to create a safe corridor free of *Al Shabaab*, as advised by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020). *Inter alia*, these aspects, when not exploited, will threaten Kenya's national security. While identifying and exploiting the opportunities, the stakeholders ought to identify challenges that may be inimical for national security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM. It is the subject of the next section.

6.3 Challenges to AMISOM transition

In line with the problem definition in the OODA-Loop planning model (Luft, 2020) and the strategic theory guidance of considering all possibilities in operational planning (Yager, 2006), the identification and analysis of challenges to AMISOM transition are crucial to informing mitigation measures. In the context of Neo-functionalism, what ails Somalia, by implication, affects Kenya and what afflicts AMISOM similarly influences the Kenyan contingent since it is integral to the AMISOM multilateral PSO system. In any military

PSO undertaking, there are attendant challenges that can be factored in through planning while most of them develop and manifest during execution and, therefore, plans have to be flexible enough to address the unforeseen (de Coning, 2019; Schelling, 1984). As evidenced by several extensions to the AMISOM mandate since the initial projection of 2018, the time was not opportune since requisite conditions had not been set owing to challenges.

In contemplation of contextualising this notion to AMISOM, the chapter examined some possible challenges that afflicted AMISOM and hindered transition. The findings were as indicated in Figure 6.3.




Figure 6.45: Challenges to AMISOM transition

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Figure 6.3 indicate the respondents' majority concurrence that the identified challenges afflicted AMISOM transition. This supports the assertion by Oluoch (2018), Ligawa (2018) and William and Hashi (2016), who noted that AMISOM operations and planned exit face problems relating to structural and functional weaknesses, financing, cooperation by TCCs due to interests, political settlement by FGS, the threat from *Al Shabaab* among others. While these scholars had inferred the challenges, a statistical assessment was critical to determine the gravity of each challenge, an endeavour this chapter sought to undertake.

Concerning funding, 75.8% of the respondents agreed it was a challenge for the AMISOM transition. Sopko (2021) noted that the lack of sufficient funding beleaguered USA operations in the context of poor alignment of ends to means in Afghanistan. It compounded the operational capability of the USA as it battled to vanquish the Taliban, the latter waiting for operational fatigue to overwhelm the allied forces. The AU AMISOM PSO is dependent on partners for finances, especially the EU through the APF, and training assistance by the EU Training Mission (EUTM). Logistically, the UNSOS has been providing critical support through contracted agencies such as Agility Ltd for supplies of rations to AMISOM contingents. The various support partners are depicted in Figure 6.4.




Figure 6.46: AMISOM principle partners and support

Source: Williams *et al.* (2018: 39)

As indicated in Figure 6.4, the EU has mainly financed allowances of the troops deployed in AMISOM and provided technical maintenance support. The funds have been fluctuating over the years, with the EU indicating that the long-term financial support for the mission was not tenable. It informed the urgency to windup the PSO, and projections for the same have been mooted since 2018 (William & Hashi, 2016). Currently, the EU may not likely to extend financial support beyond 2024, when ATMIS is projected to exit Somalia and the UN or another partner must fund the subsequent models. Williams *et al.* (2018) and Ligawa (2018) noted that matters of AMISOM financing have consistently been controversial, with the AU searching unsuccessfully for new donors to make up shortfalls in the mission's funding. The most urgent shortfall is the allowances paid to AMISOM's uniformed personnel. Since the EU decision to cut its financial support for allowances by 20% from January 2016, AMISOM's contributing countries have received about \$800 per month for individuals in their troop and police contingents instead of the agreed \$1,028.42.

As a challenge, financial support does come with strings attached. Ironically, there is no identifiable financing capacity demonstrated by AU as the lead PSO agency. This weakness in funding its operations exposes AU to manipulation by external funders in pursuit of their interests that often conflict with the goals and models of Africa in the context of Afsol (Obi & Ukeje, 2018). Onditi (2015) aptly noted that, there is lack of a purely African-led PSO that does not depend on external support and is limited by hegemonic endeavours by bureaucrats within the AU. Furthermore, financial challenges hinder the attainment of

operational objectives due to disruptions in human resources levels and deployment capabilities. Williams *et al.* (2018) indicated that the EU's reduced funding forced a review of AMISOM military, police and civilian staff, which affected the attainment of critical AMISOM functions as they prepared to transition. Besides affecting AMISOM manning levels, funding issues hamper the capabilities of AMISOM to train and capacitate SSF as they prepare to take over security responsibilities in post-AMISOM Somalia.

The capacity of FGS and SSF to assume governance has been variously noted by scholars as weak, thereby presenting doubts (Dessu, 2022; William & Hashi, 2016). It was affirmed in the findings of this study in Chapter Four that. In contrast, AMISOM PSO can be generally assessed as successful, but the governance and security aspects of the AMISOM mandate have not been adequately attained. As a challenge to AMISOM transition, the findings in Figure 6.3 indicate that 81.8% of the respondents affirmed that weak FGS was a challenge to AMISOM transition. In contrast, a similar proportion of respondents (81.8%) noted that SSF capacity presented a challenge to the AMISOM transition. The findings corroborate similar findings in Chapters Four and Five of this study that governance (FGS) and Security (SSF) as a mandate objective have not been attained. Thus, AMISOM had not established suitable conditions for Somalia's long-term stability and development.

Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) posited that the future of Somalia would lie in a political settlement. William and Hashi (2016), when postulating political settlement with Al Shabaab and political settlement without Al Shabaab, entertained a similar notion. Williams *et al.* (2018: 31) also affirmed that *Al Shabaab* might not be defeated by military means alone. Crisis

Group (2022) also broached the idea of engaging *Al Shabaab* politically if tenable. It is to underscore the importance of security and governance in stabilizing Somalia. A political settlement would entail bargaining for the form of government, roles and responsibilities, and terms of engagement; in the context of distributive, integrative, or interest-based bargaining (Hartzell, 2017). Such is only possible when the legitimate state and security apparatuses are strong enough to present legitimacy and effectively assert their interests.

The aforementioned is compounded by the status of the security forces of federal member states in the security framework of the STP. In this respect, 90.9% of the respondents observed that the status of federal member states' forces was a challenge to the AMISOM transition. It corroborates the findings of this study in Chapter Four that the exclusion of regional forces in the STP and definition of SSF will be detrimental to the stability of Somalia and the national security of Kenya. Therefore, 73% of the respondents advocated for their inclusion in the SSF (Figure 4.16). It is in line with observations by Dessu (2022) that a structured DDR is required to integrate all security elements in Somalia for the sake of the stability of the federal state. The exclusion of federal member states' forces in the STP will hinder their training, regimentation, and resourcing to defend the respective federal member states from *Al Shabaab*. The collapse of regional forces will see SSF being overwhelmed, and the Jubaland buffer zone will be untenable, leading to threats to Kenya's national security.

The resurgence of terrorist and armed groups on the exit of PSO troops has occurred in Iraq and Afghanistan Taliban (Hamasaed & Nada, 2020; Crocker, 2021). According to NATO

Strategic Direction South Hub (NSD-S HUB), *Al Shabaab* is a resilient outfit with demonstrated ability to transform itself and its activities when necessary (NSD-S HUB, 2021). This argument is supported by 78.8% of the respondents, as depicted in Figure 6.3, who noted that *the Al Shabaab* threat posed a challenge to the AMISOM transition. The findings further buttressed findings in Chapter Five that *Al Shabaab* will resurge in post-AMISOM Somalia, a notion supported by 73% of the respondents (Figure 5.1). While it is assessed that AMISOM has significantly degraded *Al Shabaab*, the weaknesses in FGS and SSF and the example of Afghanistan provide an opportunity and motivation for *Al Shabaab* to re-emerge. Such will reverse the gains by AMISOM and throw Somalia's stabilization efforts into a tailspin.

Furthermore, the short transition periods projected for AMISOM's exit since 2017 presented a challenge to AMISOM's transition. Insufficient AMISOM mission enablers such as air assets, surveillance technology and counter-IED capacity add to the conundrum. Accordingly, the findings in Figure 6.3 indicate that 72.7% of the respondents affirmed that the short transition timelines were a challenge to AMISOM transition. Comparatively, 78.8% noted that the lack of AMISOM mission enablers presented a challenge to the AMISOM transition. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 119) cautioned against hurried transition and exit from Somalia without attaining critical milestones. Crisis Group (2022) noted that the hurried need for transition fails to appreciate the complexities of the Somali operating environment and geopolitical imperatives. Similarly, Williams *et al.* (2018: 78) noted that the lack of mission enablers confined AMISOM's supposed offensive posture to containing and disrupting *Al Shabaab* rather than striking the militants in depth and detail. As a

challenge, the two aspects tie back to funding challenges that militate against the capacity of AMISOM to conduct effective operations and ensure a capable and credible SSF for post-AMISOM stability.

Most respondents (81.8%) indicated that local support challenged the AMISOM transition. In WHAM and cultural intelligence (Ligawa, 2018; Kibusia, 2020), local support is indispensable for a successful PSO. However, studies have found fluctuations in support for AMISOM by the local Somali population. In corroboration of the findings in Figure 6.3, William *et al.* (2018:91) submitted that between 2009 and 2010, when many locals blamed AMISOM for indiscriminately harming civilians in Mogadishu, perceptions of the mission improved significantly from 2011 until about 2015, which later declined between 2016 and 2017. Besides, surveys conducted in mid-2016 indicated a significant overall decline in perceptions of security and AMISOM engaging in less constructive ways with the local population. Overall, support for AMISOM reduced by over half, from 64% to 28%, and nearly half of the Somali citizens polled (48%) wanted AMISOM to leave immediately (Williams, 2018).

Navigating the complexities of clannism in Somalia determines success or failure. Previous PSOs in Somalia failed to consider, *inter alia*, the clan dynamics of Somalia (Kareithi & Kariithi, 2008). While advising for cultural intelligence in peacebuilding efforts and resolving the clannism question of Somalia politics, scholars noted the same complexity (Ligawa, 2018; Nzau, 2018; Chumba, 2016). The complexities notwithstanding, AMISOM/ATMIS PSO need to find ways of winning and sustaining local support for

operations to alienate *Al Shabaab* and achieve the mandate for a stable Somalia. Protracted PSOs such as AMISOM have to be managed to avert apathy and resentment by the local population.

Additionally, regional and external interests portended a challenge to the AMISOM transition, as affirmed by 75.8% of the respondents, as depicted in Figure 6.3. Regarding support for PSO, regional cooperation is essential for AMISOM in the context of collective security, APSA, and Afsol in line with the postulations of functionalist theory. It promotes PSO legitimacy and credibility, as averred by Williams *et al.* (2018). However, interests in the context of realism inform strategising and bargaining that drive bilateral and multilateral actors in PSO. The deployments of TCCs roughly reflect the interest of each state around security and geopolitical pursuits (Nzau, 2018). The force deployment into zones has been, in part, informed by the strategic security interest of the TCC, with Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti taking up positions proximal to their shared border with Somalia (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 54-55).

The challenge arises in reconciling the TCC interests with the interests of Somalia. GWOT pursuits by the USA in Iraq did not consider Iraq's stability or the region's security. In Somalia, Kagwanja *et al.* (2020: 122) cautions against a similar pitfall for Somalia PSO, noting that AMISOM transition and exit should consider its ramification for the security of Somalia's neighbours. It requires balancing statist interests with those of Somalia to arrive at optimal stabilization outcomes that are not inimical to either of the actors.

External actors also portend a challenge to the transition as they advance their interests. Military and defence assistance by Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia may complement capacity building in security and governance. However, attachment to geopolitical and economic interests, such as access to Somalia's resources, risks derailing stabilization. The maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia is illustrative of this context. Certain international players allegedly pushed for the ICJ case against Kenya since they benefited from access to oil blocks and fishing in the disputed area (Elias, 2021). Such clandestine influence disregards the efforts of Kenya as a TCC in Somalia and the long-term relations between the two states.

The challenges identified and analysed heretofore could be telegraphed to affect Kenya's national security since they determine the aftermath of AMISOM regarding the security and stability of Somalia and its immediate neighbours. Therefore, the lingering question ensuing from the foregoing is, what is the degree of the effects of each identified challenge on AMISOM transition, and influence Kenya's national security? It is the subject of the following subsection.

6.3.1 Challenges of AMISOM transition and effect Kenya's national security

To evaluate the relative weight of each identified challenge on AMISOM transition, a perception of their effects was estimated, *albeit* nominally. Such an estimation would aid planners and strategists in determining which challenges ought to be resourced to alleviate their impact on neighbouring countries' transition and security. As averred by Smith (2008), strategising entails correlations of ends and means in employing resources to attain

national objectives. Ligawa, Odhiambo and Rahoy (2016) intimated that uncertainties characterize planning and entail probabilistic planning. Cognizant of finite resources and capacities at the disposal of PSOs, prioritization is essential, and this can be attained through estimation as to where efforts should be placed.

In this respect, the study sought respondents' perception of how each of the challenges to AMISOM transition will affect the PSO along the parameters of highly affect, affect, less effect and no effect. The findings are depicted in Table 6.2.

Table 6.19: Cross-tabulation of effects of identified challenges on AMISOM transition

Challenge	Degree of effect, N=370								Total	
	Highly Affect		Affect		Less effect		No Effect		Freq	%age
	Fre q	%age	Fre q	%age	Freq	%age	Freq	%age		
<i>Al Shabaab</i> threat	247	66.8	67	18.1	45	12.2	11	3.0	370	100
Funding	168	45.4	157	42.4	34	9.2	11	3.0	370	100
Lack of enablers	78	21.1	202	54.6	45	12.2	45	12.2	370	100
Weak FGS and SSF	224	60.5	90	24.3	23	6.2	33	8.9	370	100
Transition timeframe	123	33.2	146	39.5	90	24.3	11	3.0	370	100
Exclusion of regional forces	168	45.4	112	30.3	78	21.1	12	3.2	370	100
Local support	235	63.5	101	27.3	11	3.0	23	6.2	370	100
Interests	112	30.3	135	36.5	67	18.1	56	15.1	370	100

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Table 6.2 indicate a higher degree of concurrence by the respondents that the identified will highly affect or affect AMISOM transition. In order of preponderance, 66.8% of the respondents indicated that, as a challenge, *the Al Shabaab* threat would highly affect the AMISOM transition, followed by local population support (63.5% of the respondents), FGS and SSF capacity (60.5% of the respondents), funding (45.4% of the respondents), short transition timelines (33.2% of the respondents), external and regional interests (30.3%). Similarly, the respondents' respective majorities (54.6% and 39.5%) indicated that a lack of AMISOM enablers and short transition timelines would highly affect the transition.

The finding is a pointer to where planners ought to place more effort. It contradicts the assertions by William *et al.* (2018:13) that the significant challenges to AMISOM revolved around political settlement with *Al Shabaab* and resourcing of AMISOM. The findings show that *the Al Shabaab* threat and local population support rank high. In order to enable a smooth transition, the threat of *Al Shabaab* has to be degraded to a level that they cannot pose a threat to any future model of political settlement, *viz*, with *Al Shabaab* or without *Al Shabaab*. In doing this, exploiting cultural intelligence and resolving Somalia's clannist socio-political dynamics are essential (Ligawa, 2018; Nzau, 2018). It will create a conducive environment for Somalia's long-term stability and development as a mandated priority for AMISOM.

After degrading *Al Shabaab*, concomitantly with securing local population support, the issues around SSF and FGS capacity require a fast-track solution. All transition models

identified by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), William, and Hashi (2016), as well as the findings of this study (Chapter Four, Figure 4.19), end with the handover of responsibilities to SSF and FGS. It can only happen if the SSF and FGS can take charge of security and governance and contain threats to security within Somalia's borders. As William and Hashi (2016) advised, it would be irresponsible for AMISOM to exit Somalia without leaving behind capable, legitimate and inclusive Somalia Security Forces. It should consider the status and inclusion of security forces of the federal member state through a structured and inclusive DDR to promote cohesion, harmony, and the capacity for security and stability.

The preceding requires facilitation in terms of funding and provision of mission enablers. The AU's overreliance on partners such as the EU should be reviewed to develop funding models majorly resourced by the continent to enhance reliability and reduce external interests and influences. This would reduce pressure from outside for the mission to windup due to funding shortages, thus allowing sufficient time for the attainment of suitable conditions for long-term stability and development of Somalia and of Kenya and HoA. Williams *et al.* (2018) tied the hurried need to exit Somalia to financial resource challenges due to the reduction of funding by the EU and other partners. It led to the downsizing of forces and operations, reducing the momentum of AMISOM in achieving its mandate before exit. Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) observed that a hurried exit from Somalia would likely reverse gains and lead to a relapse of pre-AMISOM status, a scenario inimical to the national security of Kenya.

Regional and international interests have been evident in AMISOM PSO and relations with Kenya. It was indicated by 30.3% of the respondents who noted that it would highly affect the AMISOM transition. Besides the maritime dispute and diplomatic tiffs between Kenya and Somalia (Ali & Muyonga, 2021; Elias, 2021), Williams *et al.* (2018) pointed to operational challenges to AMISOM occasioned by issues around lack of unified command. The argument has been about having a Force Commander (FC) drawn from the TCC with a large contingent, Uganda. However, the geopolitical interests of TCCs require rotational FC on a biannual basis. Such controversies play into what Oluoch (2018:534) characterized as regional hegemonic interest since FC will always be drawn from Uganda. Comparatively, the UN FC model does not require the same to be drawn from the largest contributing TCC but instead based on competence and a designated FC rotation schedule. In the following subsection, the study sought to determine what the respondents considered the most significant challenge facing the AMISOM transition.

6.3.2 Significant challenge to AMISOM transition

In order to emphasize further the issue of challenges to AMISOM and the preponderance of effects on transition, the study sought respondents' views on what they considered the great challenge to AMISOM transition. This was framed as an open question to allow respondents to suggest challenges outside those identified. The findings are indicated in Table 6.3.

Table 6.20: Preponderance of challenges to AMISOM transition

Challenges	Frequencies	Percentages (N=314)
Threats of Al-Shabaab	67	21.3
Insufficient funding and Logistics	66	21.0
Poor Mentorship and capacity building of SSF	56	17.8
Short transition timeframe	46	14.6
Lack of local support	34	10.8
Somali clannist politics	34	10.8
Infrastructure development	11	3.5
Total	314	100

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings in Table 6.3 indicate the respondents' perception of the preponderance challenges to the AMISOM transition. *Al Shabaab* threat ranked highest, with 21.3% of the respondents affirming it is the greatest challenge to AMISOM. The finding can be interpreted in the context of *Al Shabaab*'s demonstrated ability to strike lethal blows to AMISOM bases in liberated areas such as *Leego, Janale, El Adde, Halgan, Kolbiyow, Golweyn, Ceel Saliin, Quryoley, Asasey Hotel in Kismayo*, US base in *Baledogle* (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020: 88-98). Similarly, it has been assessed that *Al Shabaab* portends the ability to resurge in post-AMISOM Somalia (NSD-S HUB. 2021). With the weaknesses around attaining the security and governance mandate objectives by AMISOM, *Al Shabaab* exploits the gaps by frustrating the stabilization efforts and reversing gains made by AMISOM.

Insufficient funding and logistics support was also identified by 21% of the respondents as a significant challenge to the AMISOM transition. It frustrated the efforts by AMISOM to degrade *Al Shabaab* and build capacity and mentor the SSF as a critical transition enabler, as indicated by 17.8% of the respondents. It supports the assessment by William *et al.* (2018) that AMISOM operations will be hampered significantly owing to the reduction of funding by the EU and thus derailing the attainment of the mandate. The apprehension by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), William and Hashi (2018) and Dessu (2022) on the capacity of SSF and FGS to assume responsibilities is, to a significant extent, tied to funding challenges besides lack of clear plans and the quagmire of Somalia clannist politics.

The preceding effects on the transition timeframe were indicated by 14.6% of the respondents as a challenge to the AMISOM transition. The finding supports the submission by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) that a hurried transition will not sufficiently address the security and stability of Somalia. Similarly, William and Hashi (2006) surmised that previous PSOs in Somalia hurriedly exited without factoring in the complex nature of Somalia's political and social dynamics. The hurried sense to exit Somalia in the face of dwindling financial and logistical support does not augur well with stabilization conditioned on sufficient attainment of mandate objectives. The optimistic assessment by Williams *et al.* (2018) regarding the attainment of the AMISOM mandate is repudiated by the findings of this study on the basis that critical security and governance objectives have not been sufficiently attained and, therefore, it was not the ripe moment for AMISOM to exit lest the gains be reversed.

The respondents identified support from the local population and Somalia's clan political dynamics (10.8% and 10.8%, respectively) as a challenge to the AMISOM transition. Scholars have observed that support for AMISOM operations by the local population has fluctuated, with a strong tendency towards less support (Williams *et al.*, 2018:91; Williams, 2018). Assessing local support for operations in Somalia is complex since clannism and convenience influence such assessment underscoring the significance of cultural intelligence espoused by Ligawa (2018). As previously indicated in the findings of Chapter Four, clan considerations influence AMISOM community support activities due to clan rivalry (Key informant interview on 18 November 2022, presented in Chapter Four, Section 4.11). Similarly, the locals will support PSO if it benefits them or when AMISOM has some significant control of the areas. Where this is not the case, and the locals perceive no benefit or are under the coercive control of *Al Shabaab*, the allegiance shifts and, thus, public support.

Finally, regarding post-conflict reconstruction, 3.5% of the respondents noted that infrastructural development would challenge Somalia's AMISOM transition and stability. The respondents' view supports the submission by Ligawa (2018:208) that the Somalia six-pillar strategy for stabilizing Somalia remains good on paper unless implemented. Among other things, the strategy envisaged an economic recovery pillar built around livelihoods and economic infrastructure. Furthermore, Ligawa (2018: 258) identified the significance of social infrastructure through Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) as essential in Somalia's peacebuilding efforts. However, infrastructural development in Somalia has been minimal, considering the damage done by protracted conflicts and instability. The state of roads,

even in major cities such as Mogadishu and Kismayu, is poor, save for good hotels and government buildings.

The feeling of exclusion, especially in areas far from major urban areas, is palpable, as pithily summed by a Key Informant as follows:

We do not know any government, whether in *Kismayu* or *Mogadishu*. They have not helped us with anything apart from collecting taxes from the community. We do not have roads, schools, health facilities, drugs, or watering points. AMISOM has not done well also. We just heard that they do projects in *Dhobley*. However, we have not had any of that here in *Burahache* or other areas such as *Gherille* (Interview with a Community elder in *Burahache*, 20 November 2022).

The summation by the Key Informant on the state of infrastructure and availability of social amenities not only paints the failures in post-conflict reconstruction but also ties the argument back to local support. It is a fact that Somalia's stabilization efforts and AMISOM mandate objectives are not discrete but overlap and thus require simultaneity of execution. AMISOM and FGS would not escape blame as guarantors of Somalia's stabilization. These hinge on neutralizing *the Al Shabaab* threat, sufficient funding and logistical support, realistic transition timelines with proper monitoring mechanisms, resolution of clannist dynamics and governance hitches, and capacity building of an all-inclusive SSF. The next section sought to project the challenges to the AMISOM transition in the context of Kenya's national security owing to the transition of the Kenyan contingent from AMISOM.



Plate 6.5: The researcher conferring with a community Elder in Burahache on 20 November 2022 after a KII session

Source: Field data, 2022.

6.4 Challenges to Kenya's national security from the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM

Scholars have posited that the transition of PSOs portends challenges to immediate neighbours owing to the stability states in the country of intervention. Kanat (2019) and Hamasaeed and Nada (2020) observed that the transition of USA-led allied forces from Iraq created a security and governance vacuum that ISIL exploited. Jackson and Amiri (2021) posited that the precipitous exit by the USA from Afghanistan resulted in the dramatic collapse of the administration of Ashraf Ghani and the takeover by the Taliban. The two scenarios of Iraq and Afghanistan led to more instability in the respective regions. They were globally characterised by the spread of ISIL and the threat to the security of immediate neighbours such as Syria and Pakistan.

In the context of Kenya and Somalia, it has been noted that IGAD member states are cautious of hurried exit by AMISOM, as it may precipitate instabilities such as that witnessed in Iraq and Afghanistan (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). Weakness in the capacity of FGS and SSF is a significant risk factor in the ability to contain the potential resurgence of *Al Shabaab* in post-AMISOM Somalia, more so in the border counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu, which continue to experience attacks despite the deployment of Kenyan contingent in Somalia (Abdille, 2019; Otieno, 2019). Moreover, *Al Shabaab* could use the transition to score propaganda points of 'defeating KDF' to overshadow the achievements of the latter. Presented in Figure 6.5 is the respondents' perception of challenges to Kenya's national security arising from the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM.




Figure 6.47: Challenges to Kenya's national security arising from the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

Figure 6.5 indicate a majority concurrence in Kenya's national security challenges from the AMISOM transition. These challenges are consequentialist in orientation, although most have been existing and are persistent through the instabilities in Somalia. In regards to the *Al Shabaab* resurgence, a majority (75.7%) of the respondents identified it as a challenge to Kenya's national security ensuing from the AMISOM transition. The findings support the observation by NSD-S HUB (2020) that, like other terrorist organizations, *Al Shabaab* poses resilience and the ability to resurface after the exit of AMISOM from Somalia. The examples from Iraq and Afghanistan also motivate *Al Shabaab*. With a weak FGS and SSF post-AMISOM, *Al Shabaab's* resurgence will threaten Kenya and beyond security.

Al Shabaab's resurgence connects with the spread of terror groups such as ISIL into the African enclave. It was affirmed by 72.7% of the respondents, as indicated in Figure 6.5.

Sections of *Al Shabaab* have pledged allegiance to ISIS/L and are working to establish an Islamic caliphate in the African peninsula (ISCAP). It includes the geographic areas defining Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Mozambique, and DRC, among others, compounding the effects of transboundary insurgency in the greater HoA, as Okoth (2018) observed. Operations of ISIS/L and affiliates close to Kenya will be a security challenge, especially in NFD areas.

Notably, 78.9% of the respondents identified the sabotage of border management infrastructure as a challenge to national security ensuing from the AMISOM transition. Border security management infrastructure is lacking at the shared border, thus characterizing it as porous. This finding supports the observation by Bartlett (2021) that the border securitisation programme will face challenges in terms of sabotage activities upon the exit of the KDF from Somalia. Moreover, it lends credence to the findings by Chumba (2016) that Kenya's strategy of building a wall along parts of the border is a short-term strategy that cannot solve the underlying problems of terrorism. Mutisya (2017) and Opon (2015) advocated for a comprehensive border security management infrastructure leveraging, *inter alia*, on technology and community engagement. The construction of a border wall at the shared border between Kenya and Somalia has not progressed as expected, and there are significant portions where the construction materials have been vandalised. The *Al Shabaab* and the community are implicated in the vandalism, and it will likely escalate in post-AMISOM Somalia, posing continuation in weak border controls.



Plate 6.6: Portion of Kenya-Somalia ongoing Border Security Fence Project

Source: Field data, 2022, (Taken around Border point 27 on 29 December, 2022)

Weak border control facilitates the smuggling of contrabands, SALW, illegal immigration, and uncontrolled movements across the border by pastoralists, occasioning conflicts (Opon, 2015). As a challenge to Kenya's national security, 78.9% of the respondents identified contraband smuggling. Illegal trade has characterized the NFD due to instabilities in Somalia and the lack of border controls. Jubat (2019) estimated that about 15,000 bags of sugar worth more than Seventy-two million Kenyan Shillings are smuggled daily through the porous border with Somalia, occasioning an estimated KShs. 5 million loss in tax revenue daily for Kenya. This impact negatively on economic security as a component of national security through unfair pricing competition, the collapse of local industries, poor quality controls, and loss of jobs, among others. Moreover, it validates the argument by Opon (2015: 5) that illegal transboundary activities provide funding for terrorism besides availing opportunities for security officials to engage in corruption, thereby aggravating National security risks.

In totality, the challenges bear negatively on the territorial integrity of Kenya. *Al Shabaab* threats and incursions, the spread of ISIL, weak borders and smuggling impinge on the sanctity of Kenya's territorial integrity and national security. Violation of territorial integrity was identified as a challenge to Kenya's national security by 81.9% of the respondents. Besides the identified challenges, the federal forces of Somalia have been implicated in an aggressive incursion into the *Bula Hawa* area of Mandera county in 2020 (AFP, 2020). The disrespect of international provisions relating to international borders by

SSF indicates their level of professionalism and aggression tendencies. It poses threats not only from *Al Shabaab* and other criminal entities but also from the SSF that may occasion diplomatic rows.

In order to expand the discourse on challenges to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition, the study sought additional challenges from the respondents. The findings were as depicted in Figure 6.6.




Figure 6.48: Additional challenges to Kenya's national security arising from the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM

Source: Field data, 2022.

The respondents pointed to four additional significant challenges to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition: Kidnappings, piracy along the Kenyan coast, economic sabotage and maritime dispute, all of which are consequentialist. As indicated in Figure 6.4, the majority (45%) of the respondents noted that piracy along the Kenyan coast would be a challenge, while 28% of the respondents revealed that economic sabotage would be a challenge, 18% indicated that kidnappings would be a challenge and 8% indicated that maritime border dispute would be a challenge.

The findings support Mutisya's (2017) and Opon's (2015) arguments that the border's porosity and scarcity in security deployment exacerbate insecurity in NFD. Moreover, the findings corroborate those depicted in Figure 6.3 in that weak FGS/SSF, poor border management, and the threat of *Al Shabaab* resurgence will be facilitative factors for the challenges identified in Figure 6.5. Piracy along the coast was effectively dealt with after Kenya entered Somalia and captured Kismayu (Migue *et al.*, 2012; Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). Post-AMISOM, weak SSF and *Al Shabaab* resurgence and recapture of liberated areas may result in the resumption of piracy at the coast of Kenya, especially in the areas of Lamu.

Kidnappings for ransom in the NFD and coastal areas and piracy will precipitate economic sabotage in Kenya, compounding the effects of other economically damaging activities such as smuggling contraband goods. Although ICJ delivered a ruling, the issue of maritime dispute technically remains outstanding since Kenya did not recognize ICJ's ruling (Elias, 2021). With a scenario of stability in post-AMISOM Somalia, the maritime

dispute will remain a cause of disagreement between Somalia and Kenya. The identified challenges are supported by views expressed by a Key Informant as follows:

Al Shabaab will increase their attacks, forced recruitment and kidnappings after KDF leaves Somalia. The effects of *Al Shabaab* are minimal due to our forces being in Somalia. However, they still get through and threaten the community (Interview with a Community elder in *Buji Garas*, Wajir County, on 15 December 2022).

The apprehension by the KI is speaks to the community fear borne of vulnerability due to isolated remoteness, sparse security deployment as well as poor accessibility.

Correspondingly, another Key Informant observed that:

The operations by KDF in *Boni* Forest have enabled the communities within to continue with daily activities, although there is still much fear. The expansive forest offers hiding places for the *Al Shabaab*, and they can strike at any time. The navy has done well in the ocean, and our fishermen are well protected. The community fears that when KDF leaves Somalia and *Boni* forest, *Al Shabaab* will take over the forest and ocean. We hope permanent bases will be established here to contain *Al Shabaab* and other security threats (Interview with a County Administrator in *Kiunga*, Lamu County, interviewed on 16 November 2022).

The opinions of the Key informants sum up the fears of the communities proximal to the border with Somalia. These communities are the ones who will face the immediate effects. This assertion finds support from observations by scholars that border communities characterized by socio-cultural homogeneity and marginality tend to suffer the negative security effects of porous borders (Gurganus & Rumer, 2019; Starr & Thomas, 2010; Zondi & Réjouis, 2006).

All the identified challenges will have national security implications. Therefore, mitigation measures are essential in the face of the challenges and taking a cue from responses to national security implications, which is the subject of the following subsection.

6.4.1 Mitigation measures for challenges to Kenya's national security from AMISOM transition

The concept of mitigation measures for challenges to Kenya's national security due to the AMISOM transition lends credence to securitisation and strategising within a functionalist context and guided by rational realism. At the state level, the function rests with the government and its parliament, as espoused by Opondo (2018:377). The government and its agencies have the latitude of means to engage at bilateral and multilateral levels to advance its interests. This latitude is structured along the concept of DIME as an instrument of national power.

Mitigating the challenges to national security requires a proactive approach by strategists and responsible government agencies. This is in the context of the OODA loop and flexibility in plans for engaging the DIMEs of national power (Luft, 2020; Nzau, 2018). In this perspective, the study sought respondents' views on what mitigation measures were required for the challenges to Kenya's national security arising from the transition of the Kenyan contingent from AMISOM. An open-ended question was posed, and the responses aggregated around common themes. The findings were as depicted in Figure 6.7.




Figure 6.49: Mitigation measures for challenges to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings depicted in Figure 6.7 corroborate the findings in Chapter Five on responses to national security implications depicted in table 5.5. Similarly, the mitigation suggestions by respondents mirror the scenario-based responses proposed by this study in Chapter Two, Table 2.2. However, the findings in Figure 6.7 infer some ranked preference in the mitigation measures, with the majority (32.5%) of the respondents indicating the need for solid border security management. This was followed by well-equipped border security

forces as proposed by 23.4% of the respondents, increased MAA as an approach to national security espoused by 11.8% of the respondents and the need for a strong buffer zone as opined by 6.5% of the respondents.

The findings support the propositions by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) on the need for proper border security management and a buffer zone in Jubaland free of *Al Shabaab* for the security and stability of Kenya. Moreover, Mutisya (2017) and Kibusia (2020) identified the need for well-structured and inclusive border security projects meaningfully engage the community in an MAA framework. It further supports the recommendation by Kimokoti (2016: 224-225) for the need to establish control over porous borders through coordinated and integrated inter-ethnic for, strengthening peacebuilding blocs, dealing with perpetrators of conflict, improving security personnel and strengthening capacity building.

Most of the responses were introspective with respondents indicating mitigation measures that should be implemented within Kenya. Besides the first four in terms of ranking, respondents suggested de-radicalisation of youths (7.7%) and objective anti-terror activities (7.7%), respectively. In comparison, 3.8% believed that the NFD's socioeconomic development would mitigate challenges to national security from the AMISOM transition. These propositions by respondents lend credence to the submission by Breidlid (2021), as well as Chitembwe (2021), on the need to recast the approach to counterterrorism and radicalisation from a theological perspective (Islam as a risk factor) to a multi-causal lens that allows objective mitigation approaches. Rink and Sharma (2018) observed de-radicalisation similarly after establishing that economic marginalisation

contributed 29% among the drivers of extremism in Kenya's Coast and North Eastern Regions. The findings further support the hypothesis of marginality predisposing NFD to effects of AMISOM transition and Somalia instability. Similarly, it was established in a study by Chumba (2016) that socioeconomic and political marginalisation of youth, lack of inclusivity and ethnic discrimination led to a perception of oppression by state agencies while executing counterterrorism in North Eastern Kenya.

Besides a buffer zone in Jubaland (as espoused by 6.5% of the respondents), outward-looking mitigation measures for challenges to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition entailed: the resettlement of refugees as suggested by 5.3% of the respondents and collaboration with FGS as put forward by 1.2% of the respondents. The Kenyan government securitised the issue of resettling refugees from Dadaab as harbourers for terrorists who threatened NFD and Kenya's hinterland, such as Nairobi. It is a notion supported by Matanga and Muchilwa (2018) and Mativo (2014) when they posited that in the case of Kenya, refugees had posed a threat not only to conventional state security but also to human security evidenced by undue pressure depleting socioeconomic resources and amenities. Furthermore, Iteyo (2018: 399) surmised that while refugees have resulted from conflicts in East Africa, they pose a humanitarian challenge and security concerns.

In consultation with UNHCR, the Kenyan government asserted the resettlement of refugees as a mitigation measure to national security challenges arising from AMISOM. After a 14 days ultimatum to close the Dadaab refugee camp complex in March 2021, a sustainable right-based plan was presented by UNHCR with projected closure by June 2022 (UNHCR,

2021; OCHA, 2021). Kagwanja *et al.* (2020) indicated that suitable Somalia refugee's resettlement areas would include *Kismayu*, *Dhobley* and *Hosingo* due to the marked improvement in security. *Inter alia*, the issue of refugee repatriation and resettlement requires collaboration with UNHCR, FGS and relevant stakeholders. Collaboration with FGS in a stable scenario will transcend issues of refugees and incorporate diplomacy, economy, and security in a bilateral context. Whether Kenya's government realizes the challenges and institution mechanisms remains uncertain. In the following subsection, the study sought to establish respondents' perceptions on whether the mechanisms are available for mitigation.

6.4.2 Existence of mechanisms to mitigate challenges to Kenya's national security from the AMISOM transition

As noted by scholars, strategy is the correlation between ends and means (Smith, 2008). In this sense, the national security objectives (ends) and the means (mitigation and responses) to achieve them have to be correlated by mechanisms in the form of structures and measure for the implementation of the means. While the problem of challenges and implications to national security ought to be defined and the mitigation measures determined through strategy and bargaining, mechanisms such as force deployments, intelligence gathering and sharing, border security management, WHAM in the form of de-marginalisation, collaborative diplomacy, anticipatory measures for border conflicts, among others, are essential for national security.

The existence of such mechanisms in the context of Kenya and Somalia has remained uncertain; and where they exist, they are anecdotal and feeble. Therefore, the study sought

respondents' perceptions of mechanisms for mitigating challenges to Kenya's national security due to the AMISOM transition. The findings depicted in Figure 6.8 indicate that 58% of the respondents affirmed the existence of such mechanisms, 39% indicated that such mechanisms do not exist, and 3% were unsure.




Figure 6.50: Existence of mechanisms to mitigate challenges to Kenya's national security

Source: Field data, 2022.

The findings support the assertion by Ligawa (2018) and Chumba (2016), who advocated the importance of instituting mechanisms for operational and logistics coordination, intelligence sharing, maintenance of institutional memory, monitoring and reporting, and funding, among others. While Ligawa's (2018) arguments were made in the context of peacebuilding in Somalia, they remain relevant for this study since they telegraph

AMISOM PSO national security implications and challenges from Somalia through the shared border into Kenya. Thus, such mechanisms within Kenya and in a bilateral and multilateral context remain critical for national security.

The affirmation by the majority of the respondents owes to the fact that there are security bases in the NFD and *Boni*, as well as the engagement of KDF in AMISOM since 2011. Besides, there are plans for border security infrastructure in the form of a border fence. However, these measures remain weak, as indicated by the infiltration of *Al Shabaab* into Kenya almost at will. The expansive NFD and *Boni* terrain makes it impossible for total domination (Haider, 2020). The same scenario ails AMISOM deployments and is aggravated by reduced forces and redeployments that result in abandoning liberated areas (Williams *et al.*, 2018).

The border securitisation programme also has technically stalled due to sabotage by *Al Shabaab* and the community (Bartlett, 2021). The lack of security along the border makes it impossible for the establishment and operation of border control measures such as customs and immigration. These can only be found in minimal versions deployed in secured significant towns such as *Garissa*, *Liboi*, *Kiunga*, *Gherille*, *Diif*, *Wajir*, *Elwak*, and *Mandera*. Most of these locations are up to 200 kilometres away from border points, thus making it easy for evasions. *Inter alia*, these observations support the hypothesis of feeble mechanisms for mitigating national security challenges and, therefore, the negation of such existence by 39% of the respondents.

In order to expand the discourse further, the respondents were asked to explain their responses regarding the presence of mechanisms to mitigate challenges to national security from the AMISOM transition. The findings are depicted in Figure 6.9:




Figure 6.51: Explanations of the existence of mechanisms to mitigate challenges to Kenya's national security

Source: Field data, 2022.

From Figure 6.9, those who affirmed the existence of such measures based their views on improved MAA as an approach to security (26.7% of the respondents), deployment of security forces along the border (20% of the respondents), improved capacity of Kenya security forces through modernization programme (5% of the respondents) and ATMIS

CONOPs (2.6% of the respondents). The affirming explanations align with Kibusia's (2020) submissions on the significance of MAA as an all-inclusive approach to national security, entailing the collaboration of government departments and agencies, CSOs, and NGOs, among others. Besides, the findings support Mutisya's (2017) proposal for a meaningful border security management programme that does not alienate the community or disrupt their socioeconomic and cultural activities. Partly, the explanations advanced by the respondents correspond to the need for layered security measures, as espoused by Kagwanja *et al.* (2020), entailing deployments, border fences, trenches and roads, and surveillance systems, among others. Besides, it reflects the recommendation by Kimokoti (2016: 224-225) for the need to establish control over porous borders through coordinated and integrated inter-ethnic fora, strengthening peacebuilding blocs, dealing with perpetrators of conflict, improving security personnel and strengthening capacity building.

The refuting respondents based their perspectives on the fact that: NFD remains underdeveloped (14.7% of the respondents), there are few measures for border security (12.6% of the respondents), and AMISOM PSO transition timelines have been short (10% of the respondents). As noted earlier, mechanisms for mitigating challenges and implications to national security along NFD and Lamu remain scanty. The deployments are far apart, and some are temporary, thus unable to cover the expansive areas. The border securitisation programme is technically stalled (Bartlett, 2021). The development of the NFD, as in most ASAL areas, still lags. It reinforces a sense of marginalisation and thus weakens faith in the government (Mowat, 2015; Chumba, 2016).

Furthermore, the marginality argument is supported by 7.4% of the respondents who noted that measures in the NFD focus much on militaristic approaches rather than adopting the broader concept of human security entailing economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (James, 2014). Most of these aspects contribute to marginality and have been observed that they are not catered for in ASAL areas (CRA, 2012).

As part of strategising and bargaining responses and mitigation for challenges to national security, having mechanisms and structures in place remains essential in actualizing the strategies. As indicated by the findings depicted in Figure 6.7 on mitigation measures and Figure 6.9 on the presence of mechanisms, the aspects are introspective, requiring the strengthening of homeland defences in the understanding that KDF must exit Somalia eventually (Kagwanja *et al.*, 2020). With the passage of time and marginal improvements in Somalia's stability conditions, homeland defence has become the best strategic option. MAA approach to security is thereby essential (Kibusia, 2021). Key agencies include the National Security Advisory Council (NSAC), the national assembly, relevant ministries, KDF, NPS, NCTC, NIS, KRA, immigration, relevant CSOs and NGOs. The role of County Governments has to be mainstreamed in the national security architecture and policy since they form critical but omitted stakeholders.

6.5 Chapter Summary

This chapter explored the challenges and opportunities presented to Kenya's National security by the transition of the Kenyan contingent in AMISOM. The chapter was framed

around challenges to the AMISOM transition, effects of the challenges to AMISOM transition, challenges to Kenya's national security, mitigation of the challenges to Kenya's national security, and opportunities presented to Kenya's national security from the transition of Kenyan contingent in AMISOM. The guiding theories for this chapter are Neo-functionalism and strategic theories.

The findings of the chapter indicate that the opportunities for national security presented by the AMISOM transition include influence and shaping of STP, strengthening of Jubaland buffer zone, enhancing Somalia SSR and DDR, improved socioeconomic development of border counties and comprehensive border security management measures. Most respondents affirmed that Kenya is exploiting opportunities for national security presented by KENCON's transition from AMISOM. It is through measures such as modernized and well-equipped security forces deployed along the border for homeland security, involvement in AMISOM force headquarters to shape transition, use of MAA for security and development, and employing diplomatic efforts. However, the study found that border security management measures were feeble, and SSF and Jubaland buffer zone were weak thereby posing a significant challenge to Kenya's national security.

The significant challenges that faced the AMISOM transition included funding, weak FGS and SSF, lack of inclusion of federal member states' security forces in the STP, the threat of *Al Shabaab* resurgence, short transition timelines, inadequate AMISOM mission enablers, diminished support of the local population for AMISOM and interests at regional and international levels. These highly affect the AMISOM transition, thus posing a threat to

Kenya's national security. Of all the challenges, the threat of *Al Shabaab* remains the major challenge to the AMISOM transition and Kenya's national security.

Besides, other critical challenges to Kenya's national security include *Al Shabaab*'s resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia, the spread of ISIS and other terror groups, sabotage of border security infrastructure, smuggling of contraband and violations of Kenya's territorial integrity. Additionally, piracy, economic sabotage, kidnapping and maritime disputes are challenges to Kenya's national security from the transition of Kenya's contingent in AMISOM. In mitigation, measures that ought to be instituted include solid border security management, deployment of capable and well-equipped security forces at the border areas, use of MAA, strong Jubaland buffer zone, and development of NFD, de-radicalisation of youth, refugee resettlement and collaboration with FGS. Most of these measures are present, but much needs to be done as the exit deadline approaches. Chapter Seven provides a summary of the findings, conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The chapter summarises critical findings, makes conclusions and proffers recommendations in line with the specific objectives in light of the study findings. In addition, an overall conclusion based on the general objective is provided. Finally, the chapter suggests areas for further research.

7.1 Summary of findings

The study had three specific objectives *viz*, assess the nature of African Union Mission in Somalia transition strategies affecting Kenya's National security, examine the effects on Kenya's National Security from the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia, and explore challenges and opportunities to Kenya's National Security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia.

Within the analysis and discussions of the findings of each specific objective, theoretical perspectives were applied and expounded since they shaped the understanding of the findings. The main theories underlying the analyses and discussions included functionalist and strategic theories. The guiding philosophy for the study was rational realism, as advanced by Wieclaski (2020), advocating for more comprehensive and rational consideration of international nuances in domestic policies as opposed to the rigid and parsimonious structural perspective held by classical realists such as Morgenthau (1948; 2006) and Waltz (1979). The synopsis of key findings of each specific objective is presented in the proceeding sub-sections.

7.1.1 Nature of African Union Mission in Somalia transition strategies affecting Kenya's National security

Considering the nature of the AMISOM PSOs transition strategy was crucial in understanding their impact on Kenya's national security. As postulated by Hardy (2004), Military operations, including PSOs, have implications depending on how they are managed. In order to interrogate effectively the nature of AMISOM transition strategies affecting Kenya's national security, a historical perspective was taken to trace the relational aspects and transition of pre-AMISOM PSOs and how they shaped security, stability and diplomatic relations between Kenya and Somalia.

The findings indicated that the pre-AMISOM Kenya-Somalia relations significantly influence the two states' current and future security and diplomatic engagements, as affirmed by 69.7% and 78.9% of respondents. The national security strategies adopted by Kenya pre-AMISOM were non-aggressive and relied majorly on homeland defence. They effectively countered pre-AMISOM security implications, which 64% of the respondents supported. Besides, pre-AMISOM PSOs in Somalia, such as the UNOSOMs and UNITAF, helped stabilize Somalia, *albeit* with limitations around their mandate, most of which were humanitarian, as was affirmed by 73% of the respondents. However, the strategies for those pre-AMISOM PSOs were primarily responsible for their failures more than their success, as held by 75.8% of the respondents. These findings support Ligawa's (2018: 302) finding that UNOSOM I and UNOSOM II failed to meet their objective of giving Somalia a stable government.

Additionally, the study found that AMISOM has successfully achieved its mandate of stabilizing Somalia, as 52% of the respondents noted. However, 54.5% of the respondents revealed that the security and governance mandate objectives were achieved to a less extent, thus jeopardizing the whole assessment of AMISOM success and post-AMISOM stability of Somalia, despite being in the country for over fifteen years since 2007. Furthermore, findings indicated that it was not the right time for AMISOM to exit Somalia, a view held by 70% of the respondents, majorly owing to the minimal capacity of SSF and FGS to assume responsibilities. Ligawa (2018: 302) submitted that security and stabilization plans should be given priority.

Moreover, while 54.6% of the respondents affirmed that AMISOM had a transition and exit strategy *ab initio*, the study found that the transition strategy was not sufficient for the long-term stability of Somalia, as opined by 70% of the respondents. It was manifested in the omission of critical aspects of security forces of federal member states such as JSF in the post-AMISOM security structure of SSF and poor capacity building of SSF. The inclusion of federal member states' forces in the STP and a structured DDR are essential for the stability of Somalia and for creating a buffer zone in Jubaland, as supported by 73% of the respondents. Ligawa (2018:300) noted that reintegration was yet to be applied, and FGS was yet to register militia such as RKB for absorption into the federal army. *Inter alia*, excluding federal member states' security forces will result in a weak buffer zone, a resurgence of *Al Shabaab* and threatening Kenya's national security. In addition, 41% characterised the AMISOM PSO transition strategy as being mission oriented and 40% viewed it as time-oriented.

Furthermore, the most preferred transition and exit model for AMISOM was the transition to a joint AU-UN mission before handing over responsibilities to SSF, as indicated by 57.6% of the respondents. This is in cognizance of the current state of mandate achievement, the capacity of SSF/FGS, the threat of Al Shabaab resurgence and the need for more capacity and resources to accelerate the stabilization effort. Negotiation with *Al Shabaab* is not a desirable strategy option for transition, as 63% of the respondents affirmed. The Afghanistan example provides a warning for this option. Finally, contrary to the recommendation by Ligawa (2018: 304) and Williams and Nguyen (2018) for non-involvement of immediate neighbours in Somalia, the study found that Kenya should maintain support to Jubaland post-AMISOM for a buffer zone and corridor free of *Al Shabaab* to reduce negative national security implications; a perspective supported by 76% of the respondents.

7.1.2 Effects on Kenya's National Security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia

Somalia's instability has negatively affected the security of Kenya, HoA and beyond. The attendant interventions and PSOs did not improve, and the country cascaded down the miasma of being a failed state with a continued impact on Kenya's national security. To examine the effects on Kenya's national security ensuing from the AMISOM transition, the second specific objective deliberated on *Al Shabaab* resurgence, SSF ability to assume security responsibilities, post-AMISOM stability states of Somalia, Kenya's concern for post-AMISOM security implications, affected border Counties, and mitigation to vulnerabilities that predispose border counties to security implications from the transition of KENCON from AMISOM.

The significant findings indicate that *Al Shabaab* was highly likely to resurge on the exit of AMISOM and that the SSF's capacity is insufficient to contain *Al Shabaab*, as revealed by 73% and 64% of the respondents, respectively. It would likely lead to a fragile or failed stabilization in Somalia, which would be inimical to Kenya's national security. Besides, the post-AMISOM stability state of Somalia will affect Kenya's national security. Notably, 75.7% and 48.6% of the respondents confirmed that Somalia's failed stabilization and fragile stability would threaten Kenya's national security, respectively. In repudiation of an argument by Warah (2014), 60.5% of the respondents indicated that a stable Somalia would not threaten Kenya's national security and, thus, a desirable transition outcome. Moreover, Kenya ought to be concerned about the effects of KENCON's transition from AMISOM, an idea that 79% of the respondents supported. The counties bound to be affected most are Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu since they are border counties as well as the porosity and inadequately secured border. Other counties include Tana River, Mombasa, Nairobi and Kilifi.

Generally, the implications of KENCON's transition from AMISOM will negatively affect Kenya's national security, as acknowledged by 48.6% of the respondents. Specifically, Kenya should be concerned about national security implications such as territorial claim (33.2% of the respondents), armed incursions (42.4 % of the respondents), *Al Shabaab* terrorism (60.3% % of the respondents), defections of armed SSF/JSF (30.3 % of the respondents), diplomatic misunderstandings(39.2% % of the respondents), smuggling of contraband (57.6% of the respondents), and refugee influx (57.6% % of the respondents).

The likelihood rating for the implications was between extremely likely and highly likely. Resource-based conflict as a national security implication was assessed to be less likely.

The border counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, and Lamu are vulnerable to the adverse security implications of the AMISOM transition. Predisposing factors include marginality (78.9% of the respondents), scarcity in security deployment (84.9% of the respondents), and the porosity of the common border (87.8% of the respondents), weak border security management measures (90.8% of the respondents) and subjective security profiling (69.7% of the respondents). To mitigate the implications, findings of the study indicate the need for shaping AMISOM transition strategy and STP (87.8% of the respondents), economic development of border counties (81.6% of the respondents), revamped security deployments (84.9% of the respondents), border security controls and management (87.8% of the respondents), and use of multiagency approach to security and development (84.9% of the respondents). Other measures include objective security profiling (75.7% of the respondents) and support of the Jubaland buffer zone (79.8%). Notably, 76% of the respondents highly recommended engagement of the community to enhance community support and buy-in in the context of WHAM and Track three diplomacy.

7.1.3 Opportunities and Challenges to Kenya's National Security from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia

Whereas the conduct and transition of PSOs are liable to challenges (de Coning, 2019), Blyth (2019) submitted that PSOs present opportunities that can be seized to divert the trajectory of events towards a better direction. In functionalist theory, the HoA community and the bilateral Kenya-Somalia context provide a setting for engagement to exploit the

opportunities and address the challenges arising from the transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM. It informed the analytical focus of the third specific objective: to explore challenges and opportunities to Kenya's national security from the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in Somalia. The analysis and discussion were framed around; challenges to AMISOM transition, effects of the challenges to AMISOM transition, challenges to Kenya's national security, mitigation of the challenges to Kenya's national security, opportunities presenting to Kenya national security from the transition of Kenyan contingent in AMISOM.

To begin with, the chapter examined the opportunities for national security from KENCON transition from AMISOM. The study found out that the opportunities for national security presented by the AMISOM transition include; influence and shaping of STP (84.9% of the respondents), strengthening of Jubaland buffer zone (81.9% of the respondents), Somalia SSR and DDR (75.7% of the respondents), improved socio-economic development of border counties (78.9% of the respondents) and comprehensive border security measures (87.8% of the respondents). Most respondents (55%) affirmed that Kenya is exploiting opportunities for national security presented by KENCON's transition from AMISOM. It is through measures such as modernized and well-equipped security forces deployed along the border, involvement in AMISOM force headquarters to shape transition, use of MAA for security and development, and employing diplomatic efforts. However, the study found that Kenya's border security management was feeble at best, and SSF and Jubaland buffer zone was weak.

Furthermore, the findings indicate that the significant challenges that faced the AMISOM transition included: funding (75.8% of the respondents), weak FGS and SSF (81.8% of the respondents), exclusion of federal member states' forces (90.8% of the respondents), *Al Shabaab* threat (78.8% of the respondents), short transition timelines (72.7% of the respondents), inadequate AMISOM mission enablers (78.8% of the respondents), diminished support of the local population for AMISOM (81.8% of the respondents) and interests at regional and international levels (75.8% of the respondents). These highly affected the AMISOM transition, thus posing a threat to Kenya's national security. Of all the challenges, the threat of *Al Shabaab* remains the major challenge to the AMISOM transition and Kenya's national security, as indicated by a majority (21.3%) of the respondents.

Besides, the study findings indicate that significant challenges to Kenya's national security include *Al Shabaab* resurgence in post-AMISOM Somalia (75.7% of the respondents), the spread of ISIS and other terror groups (72.7% of the respondents), sabotage of border security infrastructure (78.9% of the respondents), smuggling of contraband (78.9% of the respondents) and violations of Kenya's territorial integrity (81.9% of the respondents). Additionally, piracy, economic sabotage, kidnapping and maritime disputes constitute challenges to Kenya's national security from the transition of Kenya's contingent in AMISOM.

Mitigation for such challenges would entail solid border security management, deployment of capable and well-equipped security forces at the border areas, use of MAA, strong

Jubaland buffer zone, development of NFD, de-radicalisation of youth, refugee resettlement and collaboration with FGS. As noted by 58% of the respondents, most of these measures were present, although much needs to be done as the 2024 exit deadline approaches.

7.2 Conclusions

Regarding the first specific objective, the study concludes that AMISOM transition strategies have not adequately addressed the governance and security aspects of Somalia's stabilization, posing a threat to Kenya's national security. Whereas the overall AMISOM stabilization efforts can be adjudged as successful, the crucial mandate objective of creating suitable conditions for Somalia's long-term stability and development has not been adequately attained. The capacity of SSF and FGS remains weak and thus will be unable to credibly assume security and governance of the country in the post-AMISOM era. It poses a threat of failed stabilization and threatening to Kenya's National Security.

Moreover, the established buffer zone in Jubaland remains feeble and is likely to collapse on the exit of KENCON from Somalia. Jubaland security forces' capacity is not up to par with desired levels of professionalism, implying that they could not maintain the buffer zone. Besides, they are not considered in the STP as part of SSF, and this is a conflict flashpoint, in the post-AMISOM period, between the federal member states and the FGS. Kenya's post-AMISOM homeland defence strategy is not well instituted, as evidenced by weak border security management measures, porous borders and sparse deployment of security, and lagged socio-economic development of NFD, among others. In combination,

these factors leave the border counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu vulnerable to adverse security effects post-AMISOM.

Furthermore, as part of the transition strategy, the STP does not adequately factor in the cohesion of Somalia with due consideration of the clan dynamics, more so in the security architecture. The transition CONOPs risk failing due to such omissions besides short transition timelines, lack of monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to ensure the attainment of critical transition targets and lack of a coherent transition programme of action, among others. Eventually, the preferred model is a transition to AU-UN hybrid mission focusing on peacebuilding with the ability to muster sufficient resources. In sum, owing to the inadequacies, Somalia's PSO transition strategies (including AMISOM) have a significant negative correlation and influence on Kenya's national security.

Concerning the second specific, the study concluded that the transition of KDF from AMISOM would have negative security implications for Kenya's national security. These include, *inter alia*, territorial claim (both terrestrial and maritime), armed incursions by SSF, *Al Shabaab* terrorism, defections of armed SSF/JSF, diplomatic misunderstandings, especially around Jubaland geopolitics, smuggling of contraband threatening Kenya's economic security, refugee influx negating closure of *Dadaab* refugee camp complex over national security concerns, and resource conflicts among Somali pastoralist communities.

Additionally, vulnerability factors predisposing border counties to negative national security effects include marginality, scarcity in security deployment, the porosity of the

common border, weak border security management measures and subjective security profiling. Thus, there was a need for shaping AMISOM transition strategy and STP, economic development of border counties, review of security deployments, enhancing border security controls and management, use of multiagency approach to security and development, objective security profiling, support of Jubaland buffer zone and engagement of the community to enhance community participation. Thus, on this objective, the study surmises that the homeland defence measure is the best strategic option for Kenya's national security but must have been shaped before the AMISOM transition. Layered and well-integrated border security management will pay off national security dividends in the long term. Inferentially, the transition of KENCON from AMISOM will negatively impact Kenya's national security, mainly owing to the shaky establishment of conditions for Somalia's long-term stability and development.

Regarding the third specific objective, the study concludes that the transition of the Kenyan Contingent in Somalia poses national security implications for Kenya's national security. It is a build-up from challenges beleaguering AMISOM transition and jeopardizing stabilization outcomes. Generally, these challenges negatively affect Kenya's national security. *Inter alia*, they include insufficient funding for AMISOM PSO and transition, weak FGS and SSF even after years of AMISOM operations, exclusion of federal member states' forces, *Al Shabaab* threat, short transition timelines, and inadequate AMISOM mission enablers. While some mitigation measures have been instituted, they are weak at best.

Moreover, the study concludes that the resurgence of *Al Shabaab* and the spread of other terror groups, such as ISIS/L, are significant challenges to Kenya's national security post-AMISOM. Similarly, sabotage of border security infrastructure, smuggling of contraband and economic sabotage, violations of Kenya's territorial integrity, piracy, hijackings and kidnappings, and maritime disputes constitute challenges to Kenya's national security from the transition of Kenya contingent in AMISOM. The transition challenges, as identified, significantly and negatively influence Kenya's national security.

In terms of opportunities, the study concludes that the transition of Kenyan Contingent from AMISOM presents opportunities for exploitation to enhance Kenya's national security. Some of the opportunities for Kenya's national security include influence and shaping of STP, strengthening of Jubaland buffer zone, enhancing Somalia SSR and DDR, improved socio-economic development of border counties and comprehensive border security measures. Besides, the study concludes that the government of Kenya ought to exploit these opportunities in unilateral, bilateral and multilateral ways to advance national security interests. *Inter alia*, deployment of the right mix of forces, infrastructure and capabilities along the border in the context of MAA are crucial for exploiting the opportunities. It strengthens layers of border security infrastructure that is augmented by a strong Jubaland buffer zone that is stable, secure and free of *the Al Shabaab* threat. Increased opportunities for national security would have a significant favourable influence on Kenya's national security on condition that they are identified, seized upon and exploited.

7.3 Overall Conclusion

The study's general objective was to contextualise the transition implications of the Kenyan Contingent in the African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya's National Security. The study concludes that Kenyan Contingent's transition from AMISOM negatively affect Kenya's national security through territorial claims, Alshabaab incursions, refugee influx, kidnappings, piracy, and sabotage of border security infrastructure. Besides, the transition portends opportunities for exploitation to enhance Kenya's national security. In terms of the problem of the study, the identified issue was the lack of alignment of ends to the means. The study concludes that this is true for the AMISOM transition since the relevant strategies had deficiencies, more so in attaining governance and security mandate objectives. It affected the realization of a conducive environment for Somalia's long-term stability and development. As such, a successful AMISOM transition is questionable. Thus, the post-AMISOM stability of Somalia and Kenya's national security remains in limbo.

7.4 Recommendations

The recommendations presented herein are aligned with the specific objectives of the study. The study hopes the recommendations portend scholarly and national policy significance in informing necessary reviews of national security policies and strategies and bilateral and multilateral engagements to optimize national security outcomes.

Regarding the first specific objective, the study recommends that GoK engage AMISOM to review the transition strategy as reflected in the STP and ATMIS CONOPs to cater for the

security forces of federal member states such as JSF and RKB, among others. The SSF and FGS capacity must be developed sufficiently before the transition is finalized. Additionally, sufficient timelines be allocated for the transition shepherded by an effective monitoring and evaluation mechanism to ensure transition targets are attained and resources are utilized effectively. Cautiously, negotiation with *Al Shabaab* could be considered for post-AMISOM political dispensation in Somalia. However, this should be explored based on a strong FGS with sufficient capacity to control the process and outcome. Also recommended is a hybrid AU-UN Peacekeeping mission in post-AMISOM.

For the second specific objective, the study recommends that Kenya consider and securitise the effects of the AMISOM transition on national security. The platform afforded by Kenya's membership and participation in UN, AU, IGAD and AMISOM ought to be utilised to shape the transition and ensure a capable JSF and stable Jubaland. Besides, homeland defence measures should be instituted through solid border security management, deployment of security forces with the right mix of capabilities in the border counties, de-marginalisation measures for border counties, engaging Track 3 diplomacy for community participation, as well as cross-border collaboration. The border security programme should be actualised as a matter of national security. These measures should be implemented in the framework of multiagency approaches to security and development.

Lastly, concerning the third specific objective, the study recommends that Kenya consider the challenges posed by the AMISOM transition since they will inevitably present challenges to Kenya's national security. Specifically, a resurgence of *Al Shabaab* and the

spread of other terror groups, such as ISIS/L, are significant challenges to Kenya's national security post-AMISOM. Other challenges to national security include sabotage of border security infrastructure, smuggling of contraband and economic sabotage, violations of Kenya's territorial integrity, piracy, hijackings and kidnappings, and maritime disputes. Mitigation measures should be enhanced to include, but not limited to, shaping the STP, socio-economic development of border counties, review of security deployments, enhancing border security controls and management, objective security profiling, support of Jubaland buffer zone and engagement of the border communities. In doing so, considerations for possible Somalia post-AMISOM stability states should form a planning consideration.

Furthermore, Kenya's national security agencies should seize and exploit opportunities to enhance national security, as presented by the transition of KENCON from AMISOM. Shaping the STP, strengthening of Jubaland buffer zone, enhancing Somalia SSR and DDR, improving the socio-economic development of border counties, and comprehensive border security measures are some opportunities that the AMISOM transition presents for the enhancement of Kenya's national security. *Inter alia*, they should be exploited through security deployment review, border security infrastructure, employing MAA, and bilateral and multilateral engagements to settle outstanding issues such as territorial disputes (terrestrial and maritime), economic disputes and political misunderstandings.

7.5 Suggestions for further research

- i. Consistent with specific objective one, further research is suggested on the influence of Somalia clan dynamics on the Somalia transition plan and stability. The structuring of the STP reflects a tinge of clannism and political dynamics in the exclusion of security forces from federal member states in the federal security architecture. Furthermore, the deployment of Somalia security forces and militia considers clan boundaries. For a national army, where patriotism should transcend clan considerations, an investigation is necessary to determine how entrenched clannism affects such an architecture.

- ii. For specific objective two, research is required to establish the role of devolved units of border counties in peace and conflict management. In addition to typical socio-economic and political challenges, border counties are faced with effects from neighbouring counties in the form of spillovers of militia, bandits, resource conflicts, smuggling of contraband and SALW proliferation, and territorial disputes, among others. These effects are attended by ethnic homogeneity, marginality, border contiguity and remoteness. Being the first contact as government authority in these areas, the role of County Governments in peace and conflict management is critical yet remains vague. Further research in this area is crucial for defining and mainstreaming the roles of devolved units of border counties in peace and conflict management.

iii. Finally, in line with specific objective three, further research is suggested on the role of a multiagency approach in mitigating cross-border peace and security challenges. As a multilateral and multidimensional approach to addressing pertinent national security and development issues, MAA is a noble concept that brings various government, non-governmental and private capacities to bear on the particular problem. While the approach is taking hold, it must be interfaced with cross-border peace and security mechanisms since most issues requiring MAA attention are found along the national borders. Therefore, the attendant structures, SOPs and procedures for actualizing such an interface ought to be established, thus a need for research in this area.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: INTRODUCTION LETTER

Cosmas E. Kamais
P. O. BOX 254-80113
Mariakani, Kenya.

October 2022.

Respondent

RE: REQUEST FOR VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH

Dear Respondent,

I, the researcher, Mr. Cosmas Ekwom Kamais is a student at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology pursuing Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies. I'm interested in carrying out a study seeking to contextualise transition implications of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya's National Security. Your response will be of great value to the research findings.

I am contacting you to request for voluntary participation in my research. The questionnaire is estimated to take 15 minutes to complete. Any information you give will be treated with a lot of confidence.

Should you wish to get an electronic copy of the research findings, please indicate your email address in the space provided at the end of the questionnaire. If you have any questions please contact me on 0717 411 073 or email me at kamaiscosmas@yahoo.co.uk

Thank you very much for your attention, consideration as you sign your informed consent to participate in this research study.

Sincerely,

Kamais C. Ekwom.

PhD Candidate/Researcher

APPENDIX II: CONSENT FORM

PLEASE ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS TO THE BEST OF YOUR KNOWLEDGE:

- (I) Are you a fluent English speaker? YES NO
(II) Do you require interpreter assistance? YES NO

HAVE YOU:

(I) read the information contained in the introductory letter given to you explaining about the study? YES NO

(II) had any opportunity to ask questions and discuss the study with the researcher?

YES NO

(III) received satisfactory answers to all your questions? YES NO

(IV) have you spoken to the researcher concerning any of your fears concerning the study?
YES NO

DO YOU UNDERSTAND

That you are free to withdraw from the study and free to withdraw your data from any future analysis and/ or publication

- At any given time YES NO
- Without having to give any reason for withdrawing YES NO

I hereby fully and freely consent to participate in a study entitled; *Contextualising Implications of African Union Mission in Somalia Transition to Kenya's National Security.*

- I understand the nature and the purpose of these procedures involved communicated to me on a separate information sheet.
- I understand that a numerical code will replace my name so that my data can remain confidential
- I allow the researcher from Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology to record and process the data I provide during the course of this study unless I state otherwise. I understand this information will be used only for the purpose(s) set out in the information sheet, and my consent is conditioned upon the researcher complying with his duties and obligations.

Participant Signature: _____ Date: _____

APPENDIX III: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RESPONDENTS

Section A: Questions Addressing specific objective one (Nature of AMISOM Transition Strategies)

1. a. Does the past Kenya-Somalia relations affect diplomatic and security relations of the two states?

Current YES NO

Future YES NO

b. Kindly elaborate your answer _____

2. a. How effective were the previous Kenya's national security strategies in dealing with security implications of pre-AMISOM?

Highly effective

Effective

Less Effective

Not effective

Not sure

b. What were the strengths and weaknesses? _____

3. a. Were pre-AMISOM military interventions and PSOs helpful for Somalia's for recovery of Somalia's Stability? YES NO

b. Please elaborate _____

4. Were the plans and strategies of the pre-AMISOM PSOs responsible for their outcomes?

Successes: YES NO

Failures: YES NO

5. a. Do you think that AMISOM has been successful in achieve its mandate of degrading *Al Shabaab* and Stabilizing Somalia?

YES NO

b. Kindly explain your answer_____

6. To what extent do you think AMISOM has achieved the following objectives?

Objective	Extent of Achievement			
	Great Extent	Large Extent	Less Extent	Not achieved
Degrading <i>Al Shabaab</i>				
Provision of Support to FGS				
Mentoring and Capacity building of SSF				
Facilitation of Humanitarian Assistance				
Creation of conditions for long-term stability, reconstruction and development of Somalia				
CIMIC and Quick Impact Projects				

7. What is your overall assessment of AMISOM PSO in Somalia?

Success Failure Other (specify)_____

8. In your view, is it the right time for AMISOM to transit and exit Somalia?

YES NO Other (Specify)_____

Give reason_____

9. Did AMISOM have an exit strategy at inception/beginning?
 YES NO Not sure _____

10. Which of the following characterised AMISOM PSO transition strategy? (Tick one).

Mission-oriented

Time-oriented

Event-oriented

Hybrid

11. Do you consider the AMISOM transition and exit strategy sufficient for stability of Somalia?

YES NO Not sure _____

12. How sufficient does AMISOM, transition strategy consider the following?

Factor	Consideration		
	Sufficiently	Insufficiently	Not considered
Stability of Somalia			
Security of Kenya and Somali neighbours			
Phasing and gradual handover to SSF			
Sufficient timelines			
DDR			
Community engagement			

13. a. Should Somalia Transition Plan and AMISOM exit strategy consider inclusion of regional security forces as part of Somalia Security Forces?

YES NO Not sure _____

b. Kindly Explain _____

14. What are the likely consequences of excluding regional security forces in AMISIOM transition strategy?

- a. _____
- b. _____
- c. _____
- d. _____
- e. _____

15. What strategy model would be suitable for AMISOM transition and exit?

Transition to a UN Peacekeeping Operation

Withdraw and handover to Somalia Security Forces (SSF)

Transition to Joint AU/UN Mission before handover to SSF

16. Do you recommend negotiations with *Al Shabaab* and inclusion in AMISOM and post-AMISOM Somalia governance?

YES NO

Give reason _____

17. Should Kenya maintain support to Jubaland post-AMISOM to maintain a security buffer zone?

YES NO

Give reason _____

Section B: Questions addressing specific objective two (Effects on Kenya National Security arising from transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM)

1. Should Kenya be concerned about the security implications of AMISOM transition?

YES NO

Explain _____

2. Which are the most likely border Counties to be affected by AMISOM transition and exit?

Mandera: YES NO

Wajir: YES NO

Garissa: YES NO

Lamu: YES NO

Other (Specify) _____

3. How will AMISOM transition affect Kenya's National Security?

Positively

Negatively

Will not affect

Not sure

4. Do you consider the SSF ready to assume security responsibilities from AMISOM?

YES NO

5. In your view will *Al Shabaab* resurge after AMISOM transition and exit?

YES O

a. If yes, what are the likely effects?

b. If no, kindly give reasons.

6. What is the likelihood of the following national security implications to Kenya arising from AMISOM transition and exit?

Security implication	Likelihood				
	Extremely likely	Highly likely	Likely	Less likely	Not likely
Territorial claims					
Armed Groups incursion into Kenya					
Defections into Kenya by JSF					
<i>Al Shabaab</i> terrorism					
Diplomacy deterioration					
Smuggling of contraband					
Resource conflicts					
Refugees					

7. How do you consider the following post-AMISOM Somalia Stability states a threat to Kenya national security?

STABILITY STATE	THREAT SITUATION		
	Threat	Not a threat	Not sure
Failed stabilization			
Fragile stability			
Stable Somalia			

8. How do you consider Kenya-Somalia Maritime dispute affecting post-AMISOM relationship of the two countries?

Positively Negatively Not sure

9. Should Kenya respond in the following way to the national security implications of AMISOM transition?

Shaping activities to influence AMISOM transition strategy YES NO

Policy reviews to empower NFD areas: YES NO

Review of security deployments: YES NO

Border controls: YES NO

Use of Multi-Agency Approach: YES NO

10. Does the following predispose the Border Counties of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa and Lamu to security implications of AMISOM transition?

Underdevelopment: YES NO

Scarce security deployment: YES NO

Porous borders: YES NO

Lack border security management: YES NO

Subjective security profiling: YES NO

11. Should the Kenya consider the following for the border Counties to mitigate national security implications due to AMISOM transition?

- | | | |
|---|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Economic development | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Objective security profiling: | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Reviewed security deployments: | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Proper border security management: | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Multiagency approach to security and development: | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Support Jubaland for buffer zone: | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |

12. How do you recommend community involvement in measures to mitigate national security implications of AMISOM transition?

- | | |
|------------------|--------------------------|
| Highly recommend | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Recommend | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Not recommend | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Section C: Questions addressing specific objective three (Challenges and opportunities for Kenya’s national security arising from transition of Kenyan Contingent in AMISOM)

1. Do you consider the following as challenges facing AMISOM transition?

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Funding | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Weak federal government | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| SSF capacity | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| Status of regional security forces | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| <i>Al Shabaab</i> threat | YES <input type="checkbox"/> | NO <input type="checkbox"/> |
| | | <input type="checkbox"/> |

- Short transition timeframe YES NO
- AMISOM enablers (systems and Equipment) YES NO
- Local population support YES NO
- Regional and External interests: YES NO

2. How does the following challenges affect AMISOM transition?

CHALLENGE	LEVEL OF EFFECT ON AMISOM TRANSITION			
	Highly affects	Affects	Less effect	No effect
<i>Al Shabaab</i> threat				
Funding				
Limited AMISOM enablers				
Weakness in FGS and SSF				
Short transition timeline				
Exclusion of Regional forces				
Local support				

3. In your opinion, which is the biggest challenge to AMISOM transition?

4. Do you consider the following to be challenges posed to Kenya national security due to AMISOM transition?

- Al Shabaab* resurgence YES NO
- Spread of ISIS and other terror groups YES NO
- Sabotage of border security infrastructure YES NO
- Smuggling of contrabands YES NO
- Violations to Kenya's territorial integrity YES NO
- Any other(Specify) _____

5. How should Kenya mitigate on the national security challenges arising from AMISOM transition?

6. In your opinion are there mechanisms in place to address the challenges to national security arising from AMISOM transition?

YES NO

Please explain _____

7. Do you consider the following as opportunities presenting to Kenya for national security due to AMISOM transition?

Influence Somalia Transition Plan (STP) YES NO

Strengthen Jubaland as buffer zone: YES NO

Enhance Somalia Security Sector Reforms and DDR: YES NO

Improve Development of border counties: YES NO

Comprehensive border security management: YES NO

8. In your opinion, is Kenya seizing/taking advantage of the opportunities presenting from AMISOM transition to enhance national security?

YES NO

Explain _____

Thank you for your time and responses

APPENDIX IV: INTERVIEW GUIDES FOR COMMANDERS OF SECURITY FORCES

1. What is your opinion on the extent to which AMISOM has attained its mandate objectives?
2. Do you think it is the right time for AMISOM to transit and exit?
3. What is to your view on the capabilities of FGS and SSF to assume governance and security responsibilities post AMISOM
4.
 - a. Is the Somalia Transition Plan (STP) sufficient for smooth transition and exit of AMISOM/ATMIS?
 - b. Has STP factored lessons from previous PSO failures in Somalia?
 - c. Has the STP factored all necessary stakeholders for Post-AMISOM governance, security, development and peace?
5. What is your opinion on the participation of regional security forces such as Jubaland Security forces (JSF) the STP and Post-AMISOM Somalia Dispensations?
6. What is your opinion on considerations to negotiate with and include *Al Shabaab* in AMISOM transition and Post-AMISOM Somalia?
7.
 - a. Kindly outline some national security implications that arise from AMISOM transition.
 - b. Kindly outline some factors that predispose Kenya to the national security implications due of AMISOM transition.
 - c. What are the responses to possible responses to national security implications of AMISOM transition?
 - d. What is your opinion on the state of preparedness to respond to the national security implications of AMISOM transition?
8.
 - a. Which challenges to Kenya's national security arise from AMISOM transition?
 - b. What are the mitigation measures that can be instituted to address challenges to Kenya's national security arise from AMISOM transition?

Thank you for your time and participation

APPENDIX V: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COUNTY ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL POLICE SERVICE OFFICIALS

1. What is your assessment of the security challenges facing your county (Mandera/Wajir/Garissa/Lamu) due to proximity to Somalia Border?
2. What is the state of security in the county since KDF entered Somalia and joined AMISOM?
3.
 - a. What are some of the cross-border security initiatives you are engaged in?
 - b. What is your view on their influence of the cross-border security initiatives on security in the county?
4.
 - a. Kindly outline some national security implications that arise from AMISOM transition.
 - b. Kindly outline some factors that predispose Kenya to the national security implications due to AMISOM transition.
 - c. What are the responses to possible responses to national security implications of AMISOM transition?
 - d. What is your opinion on the state of preparedness to respond to the national security implications of AMISOM transition?
5.
 - a. Which challenges to Kenya's national security arise from AMISOM transition?
 - b. What are the mitigation measures that can be instituted to address challenges to Kenya's national security arise from AMISOM transition?

Thank you for your time and participation

APPENDIX VI: INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY ELDERS

1. What are some of the security issues faced by the community due AMISOM operations across in Somalia?
2. What is the state of community involvement in peace and security initiatives in the county?
3. In your view, elaborate on how the transition of AMISOM affect the community.
4. What are some of the issues that predispose the community to effects of security in the county due to AMISOM transition?
5. What are some of your recommendations to address security implications of AMISOM transition to the community?
6. What are some of the challenges hindering realization of security in the community in connection with AMISOM transition?
7. What are some of the opportunities presenting for security due to AMISOM transition?
8. How is the community prepared to seize these opportunities for improved security?

Thank you for your time and participation

APPENDIX VII: PROPOSAL APPROVAL BY DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES



MASINDE MULIRO UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MMUST)

Tel: 056-30870
Fax: 056-30153
E-mail: directordps@mmust.ac.ke
Website: www.mmust.ac.ke

P.O Box 190
Kakamega – 50100
Kenya

Directorate of Postgraduate Studies

Ref: MMU/COR: 509099

1st November 2022

Kamais Cosmas Ekwom
CPC/H/14-70020/2021
P.O. Box 190-50100
KAKAMEGA

Dear Mr. Ekwom,

RE: APPROVAL OF PROPOSAL

I am pleased to inform you that the Directorate of Postgraduate Studies has considered and approved your PhD proposal entitled: *“Contextualizing Transition Implications of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya’s National Security”* and appointed the following as supervisors:

1. Prof. Pontian Godfrey Okoth - SDMHA - MMUST
2. Dr. Sussy Namaecha Kimokoti - SDMHA - MMUST

You are required to submit through your supervisor(s) progress reports every three months to the Director of Postgraduate Studies. Such reports should be copied to the following: Chairman, School of Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance Graduate Studies Committee and Chairman, Department of Peace and Conflicts Studies. Kindly adhere to research ethics consideration in conducting research.

It is the policy and regulations of the University that you observe a deadline of two years from the date of registration to complete your PhD thesis. Do not hesitate to consult this office in case of any problem encountered in the course of your work.

We wish you the best in your research and hope the study will make original contribution to knowledge.

Yours sincerely,



Prof. Stephen O. Odebero, PhD, FIEEP
DIRECTOR, DIRECTORATE OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES


APPENDIX VIII: NACOSTI RESEARCH LICENSE


REPUBLIC OF KENYA


**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION**

Ref No: **893150** Date of Issue: **16/November/2022**

RESEARCH LICENSE




This is to Certify that Mr.. Cosmas Ekwom Kamais of Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology, has been licensed to conduct research as per the provision of the Science, Technology and Innovation Act, 2013 (Rev.2014) in Garissa, Lamu, Mandera, Wajir on the topic: Contextualizing Transition Implications of Kenya Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya's National Security for the period ending : 16/November/2023.

License No: **NACOSTI/P/22/22016**

893150
Applicant Identification Number


Director General
**NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR
SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY &
INNOVATION**

Verification QR Code



**NOTE: This is a computer generated License. To verify the authenticity of this document,
Scan the QR Code using QR scanner application.**

See overleaf for conditions

APPENDIX IX: MANDERA COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S LETTER

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT



MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Telegraphic Address: "County"
Email: ccmandera@hotmail.com
When replying please quote

The County Commissioner
P. O. Box 77 - 70300
MANDERA

Ref No: CC/MDR/RM.71/VOLII

28th November, 2022.

Deputy County Commissioners
MANDERA COUNTY


RE: RESEARCH AUTHORISATION

Reference is made to license no. **NCOSTI/P/22/22016** dated 16th November, 2022 from the Director General's Office, National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation and Masinde Muliro University approval of the proposal referenced MMU/COR.509099 on the above subject matter.

Major Cosmas Ekwom Kamais has been authorized to carry out research on "*Contextualizing Transition Implications of Kenyan Contingent in African Mission in Somali to Kenya's National Security*" within Mandera County.

Kindly be informed


ONESMUS KYATHA, MBS
COUNTY COMMISSIONER
MANDERA COUNTY



Cc:

The Director General/CEO
National Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation
NAIROBI

Director
Directorate of Graduate Studies
Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology
KAKAMEGA

APPENDIX X: WAJIR COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S LETTER

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT



MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Telegraphic Address: "County"
Email: cwajircounty@yahoo.com
When replying please quote

The County Commissioner
Wajir County
Private Bag
WAJIR

Ref No: F50/VOL.1/191

23rd November, 2022

Deputy County Commissioner
DIIF SUB-COUNTY

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

Reference is made to a research license from National Commission for Science, Technology & Innovation ref no. 893150 dated 16th November 2022 on the above subject matter.

Mr. Cosmas Ekwom Kamais, is hereby authorized to conduct research on: "Contextualizing Transition Implications of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya's National Security" for the period ending 16th November 2023.

This is therefore to request you to give him the necessary assistance to enable him conduct the research within your Sub-County.


J. G. Magangi
For: County Commissioner
WAJIR COUNTY



cc

Cosmas Ekwom Kamais

APPENDIX XI: GARISSA COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S LETTER



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION
STATE DEPARTMENT FOR INTERNAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Telegrams: "COUNTY" GARISSA.
Telephone: Garissa County
Email: ccgsacounty@gmail.com

THE COUNTY COMMISSIONER
GARISSA COUNTY
P.O BOX 1-70100
GARISSA

When replying please quote

REF. NO. CC/EDU/7/3/VOL.II/56

24th November, 2022

The Deputy County Commissioner
LIBOI SUB COUNTY

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION – COSMAS EKWOM KAMAIS-CPC/H/14-70020/2021 ID NO.24459714

This is to confirm that the above-named person, who is pursuing a PhD in peace and Conflict Studies at Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology has been authorized to carry out Research work in Liboi Sub-County, Garissa County on "**Contextualizing Transition Implications of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya's National Security**". The Research course will be done from 24th November 2022 to 24th November, 2023.

For any inquiries related to the study you can clarify with the researcher through **0717411073** or supervisors: **Prof Pontian Godfrey Okoth 0700025095** and **Dr. Sussy Namaemba Kimokoti 0723246206**.

Any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

Ensure compliance of all Ministry of Health Covid-19 protocols.

JOHN K. MARETE
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER
GARISSA COUNTY



APPENDIX XII: LAMU COUNTY COMMISSIONER'S LETTER



OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

MINISTRY OF INTERIOR AND NATIONAL ADMINISTRATION

Email: lamucounty12@yahoo.com
When replying please quote:

COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
LAMU COUNTY,
P.O. BOX 41 – 80500,
LAMU.

REF.NO: ADM.15/3 VOL.VI/12

Date: 18th November, 2022

Deputy County Commissioner,
LAMU EAST SUB-COUNTY.

RE: NOTIFICATION OF DATA COLLECTION FOR DOCTORAL THESIS

Attached herewith, please find a copy of a letter dated 16th November, 2022 from Cosmas Ekwom Kamais, CPC/H/14-70020/2021, PhD student from Masinde Muliro University on the above subject.

The purpose of this letter is to introduce to you the above named person, any assistance accorded to him will be highly appreciated.

Thank you.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'B. AKOLO'.

(B. AKOLO)
FOR: COUNTY COMMISSIONER,
LAMU COUNTY.

Copy to:-

County Police Commander,
LAMU COUNTY.

Cosmas Ekwom Kamais,
P.O. BOX 254-80113,
MARIAKANI.

APPENDIX XIII: SOMALIA EMBASSY CLEARANCE LETTER



Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia

Nairobi - Kenya


Re: ESR/2236/22

Nairobi 25th November 2022

RE: RESEARCH AUTHORIZATION

The Embassy of the Federal Republic of Somalia in the Republic of Kenya has the honour to inform your good office that it has no objection to Mr Cosmas Ekwom Kamais, CPC/H/14-70020/2021, a Student from Masinde Muliro University of Science & Technology (MMUST) pursuing a Doctor of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Studies to travel to Somalia's Jubaland state to carry out Field Research titled: "Contextualizing Transition Implications of Kenyan Contingent in African Union Mission in Somalia to Kenya's National Security".

Regards


Mr. Ali Mohamed Sheikh
Counsellor



Likoni Lane, Off Dennis Pritt Road, P.O. Box 623-00606 Sarit Centre, Nairobi, Kenya
Tel: +254 (0) 20 2736618, 2731816 . Fax: 254 (0) 20 2736619 . Email: admin@somaliembassy.co.ke